THE SO-CALLED ENVY OF THE GODS:REVISITING A DOGMA OF ANCIENT GREEK RELIGION

Lautaro Roig Lanzillotta

Difficulty in understanding the motivation behind the other’s behaviouris one of the most obvious sources of conflict in daily life, both in theprivate and public spheres. Of course there is the unavoidable fact thatthe other’s mind is generally opaque to our understanding and that thepositive or negative consequences of his or her conduct always reachus before any explanation may give us a hint as to the reasons behindit.Many a time, however, we actively contribute, giving our neighbour’s

attitude a positive or negative value independently of its actual motiva-tion or even before an explanation could be offered, and expressing inthis way our own hopes and fears. The character of our human relation-ships and their concomitant pleasure or displeasure is greatly dependenton our skills in understanding and assimilating themotivations that gov-ern our neighbour’s behaviour.Our knowledge of both the circumstancesand the actors involved is obviously essential for the accuracy of thisinterpretation.Given the difficulties involved in grasping the motivations of our con-

temporaries, it will not strike anyone as strange to find even more obsta-cles when attempting to give a satisfactory explanation of the drivingforces that govern the behaviour of humans and gods in the ancientworld. The effective chronological and cultural gap between the ancientworld and our own increase both the opaqueness referred to above andour interpretive difficulties, creating a fertile ground for subjectivism.One of the clearest examples of the hermeneutical difficulties and the

distortion that is likely to appearwhen analysing human and divinemoti-vation in Antiquity is the motif I have chosen to honour Jan Brem-mer on the occasion of his retirement, namely the so-called ‘envy ofthe gods’. From K. Lehrs,1 at the beginning of the nineteenth century,

1 K. Lehrs, “Vorstellung der Griechen vom Neid der Götter und die Überhebung”, inidem, Populäre Aufsätze aus dem Althertum (Leipzig: Teubner, ), –.

lautaro roig lanzillotta

to G.J.D. Aalders,2 in the last quarter of the twentieth, classicists almostunanimously accept and assess an understanding of divine stimulus intheir attitude toward mortals that, in my view, clearly introduces an ana-logical projection ofmodern conceptions ontoGreek gods. In spite of theserious problems that can be found in the analysis of the ‘envy of the gods’,modern scholars readily accept it without further proof as a likely expla-nation of divine behaviour toward humans. It is my contention that inGreek religion there is no such a thing as the ‘envy of the gods’ and thatwhen the Greeks use the term ���ν�ς they in fact simply refer to thedivine right to veto human happiness. As we will see below, even if theGreeks attempted to explain this divine opposition in a variety of ways,they never resorted to envy as the background explanation for divinedriving forces.Momentarily leaving aside the numerous problems that emerge from

the texts that supposedly support the traditional interpretation, let us firstsimply mention four basic irregularities which, at a general level, vitiatethe analysis of ancient religion in a way that a priori seems to invalidateits results.To begin with, scholars who discover the ‘envy of the gods’ in the

ancient texts tend to often deal with ancient religion as if it were amonolithic whole, that is, they tend to obviate both chronological andspatial differences in theGreek view of the gods.They seem to assume, forexample, that Homeric gods or the gods of fifth-century Athens behaveaccording to the same driving forces, or that gods of more dynamicsocieties such as Athens and those of more conservative regions such asBoeotia follow the same motivations in their relationship to mortals.Another important problem in these approaches is that they frequently

convey a rather static view of Greek gods and religion. In spite of thewarnings about the dangers of an overly static approach in modern stud-ies of Greek religion,3 scholars admitting the existence of the envy of thegods glaringly obviate the important evolution that Greek religion expe-rienced throughout its history.Thus, the ‘envy of the gods’ is said not onlyto appear both inHomer or Sophocles alike but also to do so in both peri-ods with exactly the same meaning, causes, contexts and implications.

2 G.J.D. Aalders, “De oud-Griekse voorstelling van de afgunst der godheid”, Med-edelingen der Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, Afdeling Letter-kunde (): –.

3 See J.N. Bremmer,Greek Religion (second edition; Oxford: Oxford University Press,), .

the so-called envy of the gods

Given these two previous methodological anomalies, no one will besurprised to see that inmost cases the analysis of the so-called ‘envy of thegods’ is based on an incomplete, if not totally absent, semantic analysisof the term or terms that allegedly refer to the notion, in particular theGreek root ���ν-, but also other verbs such as )γαμαι ‘admire’, ‘prevent’,or μεγα�ρω ‘prevent’, ‘hinder’.4Themere appearance of one of these termsin a ‘plausible’ context allows for an interpretation that classes them asinstances of the ‘envy of the gods’ even before terms and the context havebeen carefully analysed. Coupled with the lack of a serious analysis ofthe terms and their diachronic development throughout the history ofthe Greek language there is the indiscriminate use of the Greek terms���ν�ς or ���ν�ς �εν—note the Greek terms without any translationwhatsoever—to describe what the studies are trying to explain, in thisway already introducing into the argument the conclusion at which theanalysis wants to arrive.However, themost important of all these analytical problems certainly

concerns the neglect of a previous and consistent study of the character-istics, conditioning and contexts of envy in its human variety. It seemsobvious that if one expects to find envy among the gods, it must respondto an analogical projection onto the gods of feelings andmotivations thatpeople find in their environment and in their relationship with others indaily life. Given the specific characteristics of this emotion, the complexevaluative scheme it implies and the precise social factors it requires, itseems evident that it will not develop in the same manner or measurein all historical periods and contexts independently of their respectiveevaluative, conceptual and social settings.In an attempt to avoid all these shortcomings, the present study intends

to approach our subject matter by deconstructing, in the first place, thelocus communis of the envy of the gods in order to analyse, then, whatkind of phenomenon envy is, which Greek terms are used to define it,which social factors promote its appearance and which are likely to pre-vent it. In order to do so, this study is divided into three sections. The

4 Even though LSJ includes rather different meanings for these terms, the examplesadduced always concern Homeric passages which have been strongly interpreted. Asfar as the former is concerned, )γαμαι includes two definitions, in bonam and malampartem, of the same fundamental meaning ‘admire’, namely ‘wonder, admire’ and ‘envy,bear a grudge’ (Homer, Il. .). As for the second, μεγα�ρω is defined as ‘grudge onething as too great for him’ (Il. .). There is nothing in the texts, however, that allowsthis explanation of the divine opposition to human action which these verbs plainlyexpress. See n. and below.

lautaro roig lanzillotta

first provides an overview of themain interpretations of the phenomenonand argues that in interpreting the relationship betweenmen and gods inGreece scholars are in fact projecting a psychological model that is aliento Antiquity.The second section offers a conceptual, sociological, histor-ical and terminological analysis that may allow in the third section a cor-rect understanding of the texts that have traditionally been interpretedas a reflection of so-called divine envy.

The So-called ‘Envy of the Gods’:status quaestionis and Main Positions

Even if both manuals on Greek religion and history, and studies orcommentaries on specific authors systematically resort to the ‘envy of thegods’ to explain divine motivation, an analysis of the texts adduced todocument this or the explanation given to its appearance shows that byusing the same term scholars actually intend to explain rather differentthings. Previous studies have approached the issue from four differentperspectives, namely anthropomorphic, religious-moral, egalitarian andevil-eye points of view.5As far as the anthropomorphic interpretation is concerned, it ap-

proaches the ���ν�ς �εν from the perspective of the Greek anthro-pomorphic idea of the gods. Given that the Greeks attributed all kinds ofpassions to the gods, it is normal that they also attributed envy to them.From this perspective the ‘envy of the gods’ is a human analogical projec-tion onto the gods of feelings that are normal in human relationships.6However, the interpretation that has gained more adherents is cer-

tainly that which understands the ���ν�ς �εν in the light of religiousmorality. From this point of view, the envy of the gods is in fact not envy

5 All four approaches can also be found in T. Rakoczy, Böser Blick, Macht des Augesund Neid der Götter. Eine Untersuchung zur Kraft des Blickes in der griechischen Literatur(Tübingen: Narr, ), – (–), but he actually applies the fourth to thisissue.

6 See S. Hoekstra, “De wangunst der Goden op het geluk, ook der rechtvaardigen,naar het grieksche volksgeloof tot op het midden van de vijfde eeuw”,Mededeelingen derKoninklijke Nederlandsche Akademie vanWetenschappen, Afdeeling Letterkunde ():–; M.P. Nilsson, Geschichte der griechischen Religion, vol. (Munich: Beck, ),, and ; P. Walcot, Envy and the Greeks (Warminster: Aris & Phillips, ), ;M. Dickie, “Lo ���ν�ς degli dèi nella letteratura greca del quinto secolo”, Atene & Roma (): –.

the so-called envy of the gods

at all, but rather the punishment that gods inflict on those who tran-scend human measures, the barriers that separate immortals from mor-tals. Divine punishment (���ν�ς) therefore chastises human excesses,reintroducing the barriers and restoring divine authority.7The egalitarian explanation approaches the ���ν�ς �εν from the

perspective of the political and social developments that took place infifth-century Greece, or, more properly, in fifth-century Athens. Behindthe ���ν�ς �εν, scholars of this interpretive group argue, we find aconception of the gods that is governed by the egalitarian principles thatrule the political and social thinking of this historical period. Divine���ν�ς is simply the result of the gods’ supervision and intervention inorder that nothing will trespass the measures that regulate a harmoniousdistribution of good and bad luck.8Finally, we have the evil-eye model that resorts to anthropological

issues, such as the inveterate existence (and modern persistence) of thissuperstition in Mediterranean regions.9A quick look at the previous interpretive groups immediately reveals

that changing interpretations of the ���ν�ς �εν strikingly reflect dif-ferent stages in the development of Greek thought regarding the godsand their interaction with humans. The anthropomorphic model, forexample, is characteristic of the Homeric poems, while the more judicialexplanation of divine behaviour in the second group is standard fromSolon onwards. As far as the egalitarian model is concerned, it is mainlyvisible in the fifth century, while the fourth appears to give expression

7 Lehrs, “Vorstellung”; C.F. Nägelsbach, Nachhomerische Theologie (Nürnberg: Gei-ger, ); W. Hoffmann, “Aischylos und Herodot über den ���ν�ς der Gottheit”, Philo-logus (): –; F. Wehrli, Λ��ε �ι�σας. Studien zur ältesten Ethik bei denGriechen (Leipzig: Teubner, ); M. Pohlenz,Herodot. Der erste Geschichtsschreiber desAbendlandes (Leipzig: Teubner, ); E.R. Dodds,The Greeks and the Irrational (Berke-ley: University of California Press, ); E. Fränkel, Aeschylus, Agamemnon (Oxford:Clarendon, ); J. Kroymanns, “Götterneid undMenschenwahn”, Saeculum ():–; H. Lloyd-Jones, The Justice of Zeus (Berkeley: University of California Press,); P. Bulman, Phthonos in Pindar (Berkeley: University of California Press, ).

8 See R. Hirzel, Themis, Dike und Verwandtes (Leipzig: Teubner, ); F. Hell-mann, Herodots Kroisos-Logos (Berlin: Weidmann, ); S. Ranulf,The Jealousy of theGods and Criminal Law at Athens, vols. (Copenhagen: Levin & Munksgaard, –); K. Nawratil, “Θε��ν ταρα�δες”, PhilologischeWochenschrift (): –;W. Steinlein,Φ��ν�ς und verwandte Begriffe in der ältesten griechischen Literatur (Erlan-gen, ); H.W. Immerwahr, Form andThought in Herodotus (Cleveland: Press ofWest-ern Reserve University, ); Aalders, “Afgunst”; W. Nicolai, Versuch über HerodotsGeschichtsphilosophie (Heidelberg: Winter, ).

9 Rakoczy, Böser Blick.

lautaro roig lanzillotta

to the explosion of popular beliefs of later periods of Greek history. Itseems therefore obvious that when approaching the issue authors mainlydevelop their understanding on the basis of a given author or period,which they afterwards extrapolate to Greek thought as a whole.

Conceptual, Sociological, Historical, andTerminological Aspects of the Problem

In order to provide a satisfactory answer to the previous questions itseems necessary to clarifywhat lies behind the so-called ‘envy of the gods’.Conceptual Aspects. Common to the four previously mentioned ap-

proaches to the ���ν�ς �εν is that they all deal with human successor happiness as a rare event. Independently of the understanding of thegods’ attitude towards mortals that these approaches uphold, humanhappiness and wellbeing appear to be rare and/or difficult to maintain.In all four approaches, the gods are not only responsible for providinghappiness, but also for its perpetuation.As soon as mortals achieve what they were searching for, they become

obsessed with the idea of preserving it. In explaining the issue, modernauthors resort to a given human guilt complex or even to the concept ofsin,10 but it seems obvious that the consciousness of the fragility of humanwelfare assaults us before any search for a rational explanation can takeplace. Moreover, it is only when we achieve something that we can lose it.Here arises the fear that constitutes the background of the concept we aredealing with, be it the erratic will of the gods, ν�μεσις ‘retribution’, τ�σις,‘vengeance’ or the evil eye.Different ancient authors in different historicalperiods and diverse environments interpreted divine intervention inhuman affairs, namely their right to veto (���ν�ς) complete humanhappiness, in diverse ways, but they never resorted to ‘envy’ as a possiblemotivation. Doing that would have implied that they were placing thegods and human beings on the same existential level.Sociological Aspects: The Comparative Framework of Envy. The point

is that in order for envy to appear, a very specific evaluative context isrequired.The traditional definition of envy simply describes it as the ‘painfelt at the other’s good fortune’, but the passion involves something otherthan the pain of the envious. To begin with, there is a triangular relation-

10 For example, Dodds, Irrational, ; Kroymann, “Götterneid”, ; Rakoczy, BöserBlick, .

the so-called envy of the gods

ship including the envied good, its possessor and the envious individualwho desires to have it. More importantly, however, envy also requiresa typical axiological framework, namely a very specific evaluative con-text in which individuals, both envied and envious, compare themselveswith one another, and share the same existential level and the same inter-est in acquiring status tokens that may improve their relative positions.The envious person envies the one who possesses the disputed good,because its possession can be translated into a higher relative positionin the immediate social context within which both interact. It is not asmuch the object itself or the person who possesses it but the status theobject’s symbolic value irradiates.Thus envy is not just a matter of persons and objects, it also requires

a comparative context in which the ability of different individuals toacquire tokens might be compared at all. It goes without saying that noteveryone compares themselves with everyone else. A sort of existentialproximity is necessary. Hesiod had already described this in theWorksand Days (–): the ‘potter is angry with potter and craftsman withcraftsman and beggar is jealous of beggar’.This is whatmight be called theselective goal of envy. In spite of the traditional definition, not every for-tune arouses our envy, but only that of those with whom we share inter-ests, values and perspectives, in short, those who share our axiologicalcontext.11 The rich person and the beggar, however envious they mightbe, will not envy one another. They will rather envy the luck of anotherrich person or another beggar, respectively.12 Resorting to envy as anexplanation for divine opposition to human plans, therefore, might havebeen nonsensical. Not only because gods and humans are then placedon the same existential level, but also, and especially, because it seems toimply that gods desired and were attracted to the nothingness of humanhappiness.13As a matter of fact, the explanation given to divine intervention in

human affairs either to give or to abort human success and happinessgreatly varies throughout Greek history.

11 See Aristotle, Rh. b–.12 This is not to defend a purified vision of the gods. Greek gods could certainly envy

one another; what is not likely is that they would envy the ephemeral and minor glory ofmortals.

13 Even if admitting the possibility of jealousy among the gods, G. Most, “EpinicianEnvies”, in Envy, Spite and Jealousy: the Rivalrous Emotions in Ancient Greece (eds.D. Konstan and N.K. Rutter; Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, ), –() seems to imply the same.

lautaro roig lanzillotta

Historical Aspects: Obstacles to Human Happiness in Historical Per-spective. Independently of the stage of Greek history, the Greek view ofthe gods always establishes a clear-cut difference between the divine andhuman spheres. Not only are gods and mortals ontologically and quali-tatively differentiated, but the latter also fully depend on the former fortheir wellbeing. It is the gods that determine human success or failureand this relationship of dependence is depicted plastically in theHomericepic by the gods’ right to veto human action.14 Conversely, every successis experienced as due to divine support. It is important to stress that atthis stage either veto or support may or may not be rationally explained.Sometimes it is just enough to name it, without attempting to clarify thedriving forces behind the divine attitude toward mortals; at other timestheremay appear to be an explanation, such as the fulfilment or neglect ofthe propitiatory rites owed to the gods or even erratic divine behaviour.15Together with the development of the Greek gods and their growing

involvement in justice incipient in Hesiod’s poems, a willing or reluctantattitude of the gods towards humans also began to acquire a new dimen-sion. To a certain extent, success or failure may still result from divineerratic behaviour, but from now on the individual’s good or bad luckcould also reveal their justice or injustice or even the righteousness ofthe enterprise the individual intended to engage in.16 Evidently the rela-tionship between the gods and humanity does not change; what changesare the driving forces that explain divine motivation. In such a juridicalcontext, in which the gods gradually become judges imparting justice, itmight be striking to find a reference to envy as a motivation for divineintervention, and as a matter of fact there is no such reference.The tendency sketched in the previous paragraph is evenmore promi-

nent in the period after Solon.His view of the gods as safeguards of justiceand equity is well known, and the development of a new concept of hybrisnow describes the attitude of those who intend to achieve happiness bymeans of injustice. The happiness that human beings accomplish withthe help of the gods is always stable and can be enjoyed in its entirety(Solon .– West, IE2). It is never suppressed, limited, or envied by

14 Homer, Il. .–, .–, ., .–, .– ()γαμαι); .;.– (μεγα�ρω). All these examples have been traditionally interpreted as ‘envy of thegods’, but an unbiased analysis can find in the passages nothing more than ‘opposition’ ofthe gods to human plans.

15 K. Latte, “Schuld und Sünde in der griechischen Religion”, in idem, Kleine Schriften(Munich: Beck, ), –.

16 Latte, “Schuld”, .

the so-called envy of the gods

the gods. When human happiness arises from injustice and deception,however, the punishing hand of the gods sooner or later intervenes tocorrect excesses and restore justice (.–West, IE2).That the goal ofthe gods is not happiness itself but the origin thereof can be clearly seen inthe Solonic conceptual chain �δικ�α-5λ0�ς-κ�ρ�ς-[0ρις-)τη that fromnow on describes the whole process from an original injustice to its finalpunishment, the intermediary stages offering the explanation for divineintervention (.– West, IE2). When its origin is injustice, happinessnecessarily leads to satiety, and satiety to insolence or [0ρις, as a result ofwhich )τη or ‘blindness’, as divine punishment, drives humans to theirruin (.– West, IE2). Once again, consequently, there is no trace ofenvy whatsoever in the corrective intervention of the gods, but simplythe restitution of justice.However, this begins to change in the post-Solonic ethics, with happi-

ness itself gradually coming to the fore. Perhaps due to a growing resent-ment arising from social and political instability, the late sixth centuryand the beginning of the fifth saw an important transformation of theSolonic view: injustice as the target of divine intervention faded and hap-piness now became the focal point. Both aristocratic discontent and pop-ular bias now began to focus on happiness as such: it is no longer theinjustice upon which 5λ0�ς could be based that justifies the godly cor-rective intervention in human affairs. Rather it is abiding success, gloryor welfare that provokes it, insofar as it now appears to necessarily stir aninclination to injustice and lack of measure in the individual.17The corpusTheognideum offers a good example of the point of view of

the impoverished aristocrat. The connection of wealth with injustice inhis poems becomes a necessary one. A first step in this direction alreadyappears in his equating wellbeing (5λ0�ς) with κ�ρ�ς or ‘repletion, sati-ety’ (Theognis – West, IE2). His view, however, is clearly formu-lated in his idea that wealth necessarily provokes madness (��ρ�σDνη)and that)τη or ‘blindness’ always intervenes to correct it in the end (– West, IE2). Without any rational explanation whatsoever as to whyor how this happens, 5λ0�ς or ‘happiness’ and injustice have been nowclosely associated.

17 The corpus Theognideum provides an excellent example of this view, since verses– West, IE2—with the substitution, in the first verse, of π�λ4ς 5λ0�ς with κακ\5λ0�ς and, in the second, of &σ�ις with κα� &τ\ω—already show that the Solonic causalchain has been changed.

lautaro roig lanzillotta

As far as the popular bias is concerned, this not only took the asso-ciation of happiness and injustice for granted, it also provided it withthe explanation, however subjective this may be, that was lacking inTheognis. Under the influence of the Delphic ‘golden mean’, theoreticallyadopted by the democratic thought of the period, the injustice committedby the happy one was interpreted quantitatively.Thismeans that the con-cept of hybris experienced a new turn, since it no longer arises from theinjustice through which happiness was achieved, or from a given inclina-tion to impiety in the happy individual, but rather from the quantity orduration of 5λ0�ς.It is only in such a context that the gods’ intervention could have

been interpreted as plain ‘envy’, since divine punishment seems now toattack the quantity or duration of happiness—but this interpretation isa naive fallacy. Divine intervention through )τη nevertheless always andexclusively strikes impiety or [0ρις, and the latter, however quantitativelyit might have been interpreted, is not happiness itself or its quantity orduration, but simply human insolence.The reactions by Pindar or Aeschylus against this view provide neg-

ative evidence for the developments that were taking place under theinfluence of the growing democratic winds, since they categorically dis-pute this interpretation of divine justice. Once the connection betweenwellbeing and injustice had beenmade and the insolence of the ]0ριστ/ςwas interpreted quantitatively, the concept of hybris was likely to lose itsethical character. The problem is that as soon as the quantity of 5λ0�ς orhappiness determined impiety, the individual could no longer be claimedto be responsible for a fault that he or she, sensu stricto, did not commit.18Consequently, both authors attempted to restore the Solonic character

to hybris. Pindar did so by altering the two key elements in the Solonicscheme. By making impiety ([0ρις) a precondition for satiety (κ�ρ�ς),he attempted to annul the equation happiness-satiety-impiety in orderto restore the original ethical character to the Solonic view. It is notthe quantity of happiness that produces satiety or repletion, but a giveninclination or previous state of insolence in the individual.19 Aeschylusdid the same in his Agamemnon, placing, in the Solonic way, insolence

18 The story of Amasis and Polycrates (Herodotus .–) clearly illustrates this newconcept of hybris, since it shows both its numeric interpretation (Amasis attempts motuproprio to restore the balance of his fortune) and the involuntary character of the impietyhe commits for the fact of being successful and happy (which he cannot avoid).

19 Pindar, O. ..

the so-called envy of the gods

before happiness. The chorus corrects the ‘old opinion’ that from ‘goodfortune will flourish unceasing misery’, defending the notion that therewhere justice reigns, good fortune only produces good offspring (–). It is not the quantity of happiness that angers the gods, but theinjustice upon which it may rely (–).Terminological Aspects. In order to properly understand how the

Greeks experienced the gods’ opposition to their will, one should takea look at the terminology used in this context. It is true that the termpar excellence to describe divine impediments to human will is ���ν�ς,a term which from the fifth century onwards mainly meant ‘envy’. As Ihave pointed out elsewhere, however, the root ���ν- originally providesthree different meanings:20

) deny, refuse to grant;) prevent, hinder;) envy.

Despite Liddell-Scott-Jones, who trace all three meanings back to ‘envy’,namely to a fundamentalmeaning ‘to refuse (to give) from feelings of envyor ill-will’, the texts show that this is not the case. At least six passagesin the Odyssey show that the verb ���ν�ω was originally equivalent toκωλDω and simply meant ‘hinder, prevent’.21 Also, even in Plato’s timethe fundamental meaning seems to be approximately the same, sinceit frequently appears in expressions that either wish to manifest willor request the disposition to speak openly:22 ‘please, do not refuse totell’.23This basic meaning of ���ν�ω, which expresses an unwilling disposi-

tion to do something, is especially frequent in the context of the gods. Aswe have already seen, originally the search for an explanation for divinebehaviour was not strictly necessary and, when it was, it was attributed

20 L. Roig Lanzillotta, La envidia de los dioses en el pensamiento griego (desde la épocaarcaica al helenismo) (diss. Universidad Complutense; Madrid, ), –; see alsoSteinlein,Φ��ν�ς, –.

21 Homer, Od. .– with scholion E; ., in opposition to κ�λ�μαι; .;.–; .–. The verb does not appear in the Iliad, in which μεγα�ρω and)γαμαι express the same meanings (e.g. Il. .–; .–). See n. above andn. below.

22 See Pohlenz, Herodot, (n. ); E. Milobenski, Der Neid in der griechischenPhilosophie (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, ), (n. ).

23 Plato, Prt. b–c;Men. d–; Grg. a; Smp. e–a.

lautaro roig lanzillotta

firstly to humanity’s neglect of its obligations to the gods, and, secondly,to the injustice of its enterprise. The ���ν�ς �εν as ‘divine opposition’or right to ‘veto’ human action was interpreted differently in differentperiods, but ‘envy’ was never adduced by Greek authors, as the followingtextual section will sufficiently show.24

The Texts

From the large bulk of texts that have been interpreted as instances ofthe ‘envy of the gods’ ever since the nineteenth century, there are onlya couple that are today still interpreted in that way. ‘Envy of the gods’was commonplace in the study of Greek religion and was even found inHomer. After the studies by Hoekstra and Steinlein, however, it becameobvious that the ‘envy of the gods’ was a construct alien to the Homericepic.25On the onehand, the root���ν- does not even appear in the oldestpoem and when it does appear in the Odyssey, it expresses somethingother than what would become its normal meaning in later periods (seeabove). On the other hand, as far as terms such as )γαμαι and μεγα�ρωare concerned, R.Hirzel andK. Latte showed that theHomeric use, aswasalso the case with [0ρις, )τη, ν�μεσις,26 did not yet have themoral chargethey only acquire in later periods.27 The verbs )γαμαι and μεγα�ρω infact simply express divine opposition to human plans and the divineintervention which hindered human action, without referring to a moralor psychological explanation for this.

24 For reasons of space, I shall restrict my analysis to the root ���ν- and derivatives,leaving other similar forms, such as μεγα�ρω and )γαμαι aside. The analysis of theseverbs gives exactly the same results, however. As far as the former is concerned, there isno doubt about its meaning as ‘refuse to give’, ‘prevent, hinder’, both in the Iliad (.–;.) and in the Odyssey (.–; .–). In relation to the second, in addition toits basic meaning to ‘be surprised’, ‘be amazed’ (Il. .; .; .), it also has anothermeaning which shares the semantic field of μεγα�ρω, namely ‘refuse to give’ (Il. .–; .–).

25 Hoekstra, “Wangunst”, –; Hirzel,Themis; Steinlein, Φ��ν�ς, . For a studyof the issue with respect to the Homeric poems, see Roig Lanzillotta, Envidia, –.

26 See, in general Hirzel, Themis. For the case of [0ρις, see Latte, “Schuld”, –;Dodds, Irrational, –. For ν�μεσις, Irmscher, Götterzorn, ; for )τη, Latte, “Schuld”,–.

27 This interpretation can be found in Buttmann, Lexilogus, and Lehrs, “Vorstellung”,and is still present inAalders, “Afgunst”. For an extensive bibliography regarding the issue,see Roig Lanzillotta, Envidia, – (n. ).

the so-called envy of the gods

Given the complete absence of the motif in Homer and in the periodthat followed up to classical times, the existence of the ‘envy of the gods’has been recently more or less restricted to the fifth century and, morespecifically, to the following authors: Pindar, Aeschylus, Euripides andHerodotus.28When we come to Pindar things apparently become clearer, since the

motif of the���ν�ς �εν turns up for the first time in his poems. In rela-tion to the interpretation of what this expression actually means, how-ever, things are not that clear. Indeed one finds in Pindaric studies threeof the four approaches analysed above, namely hybris,29 the egalitarian30and the evil-eyemodels.31 Inmy view, however, none of these approachessatisfactorily explains the issue. In line with the previous analysis, it ismy contention that the ���ν�ς �εν in Pindar simply articulates thefear that divine opposition might interrupt human glory.32 The stum-bling block that gods may interpose between human desire and fulfil-ment, however, neither arises from the quantity of human glory, nor fromthe fact that it may threaten divine prerogatives.As to the former, the Pindaric gods never intervene to limit human

happiness.33 For Pindar, the difference between human and divine hap-piness is not a matter of quantity but quality. It is not its magnitude,

28 For example, Hoekstra, “Wangunst”, Steinlein, Φ��ν�ς, and, recently, Rakoczy,Böser Blick, –. See also F.G. Hermann, “Φ��ν�ς in the World of Plato’s Timaeus”,in Envy, Spite and Jealousy (above, n. ), –.

29 Hoekstra, “Wangunst”, –; Latte “Schuld”; O. Schröder, “Die Religion Pindars”,Neue Jahrbücher für Klassisches Altertum, Geschichte und neuere Literatur (): – (); Pohlenz, Herodot, ; Nilsson, Religion, ; J.C. Opstelten, Sophocles en hetGriekse perssimisme (Leiden: Sijthoff, ), ; Bulman, Phthonos, ; D.L. Cairns, “ThePolitics of Envy”, in Envy, Spite and Jealousy (above, n. ), –.

30 Lehrs, “Vorstellung”, ; Naegelsbach, Theologie, ; V.L. Schmidt, Die Ethik deralten Griechen (Berlin: Hertz, ); G. Strohm, Demos und Monarch (Stuttgart: Kohl-hammer, ), ; Wehrli, Λ!�ε, ; Ranulf, Jealousy, : H.V. Canter, “Ill Will of theGods in Greek and Latin Poetry”, Classical Philology (): – (); Dodds,Irrational, , nota ; E. Thummer, Pindar. Die Isthmischen Gedichte, vol. (Heidelberg:Winter, ), ; Walton, Envy, ; Lloyd-Jones, Zeus, ; Aalders, “Afgunst”, ;Walcot, Envy, ; G.M. Kirkwood, “Blame and Envy in Pindaric Epinicians”, in GreekPoetry and Philosophy: Studies in Honour of Leonard Woodbury (ed. D.E. Gerber: Chico,CA: Scholar’s Press, ), – ();M.Vallozza, ‘Ilmotivo della invidia in Pindaro’,Quaderni Urbinati di Cultura Classica (): – ().

31 See Rakoczy, Böser Blick, –.32 See Steinlein,Φ��ν�ς, –.33 See Pindar’s frequent prayers that the gods may grant a winner, a hero or himself

abiding and complete happiness, as much as mortals can enjoy:O. .–; I. .–; P..–.

lautaro roig lanzillotta

but its complete and abiding nature that marks off godly happiness.34Human happiness as such never arouses divine anger and ‘those whowalk the way of justice’35 may enjoy an enduring great happiness with-out fear. The punishment of Tantalus or Ixion clearly shows that it is nothappiness as such—which they abundantly received from the gods—butimpiety which is the goal of their corrective action. They were unable to‘digest’ a great glory, lost their human parameters and were consequentlydestroyed by the gods.36As far as the latter is concerned, Pindar never equates happiness with

insolence. As we have seen, it is not satiety (κ�ρ�ς) that provokes inso-lence ([0ρις), but the other way around. Without a previous inclinationto hybris, human happiness never stirs in the individual loss of measure.Happiness in the insolent, however, might produce the loss of parametersand lead such people to believe that there is no discrepancy between godsand mortals. This is the case of Bellerophon who attempted ‘to enter thedwellings of the sky and join Zeus’ company’.37 His punishment correctsthe fault of the ]0ριστ/ς and not the previous happiness that provokedit. In addition, it should be noted that in these cases it is not Pindaric���ν�ς �εν, but )τη that reaches the insolent.What about the evil-eye interpretation? After rejecting the egalitar-

ian and the hybris explanations, Rakoczy contends that when express-ing his concerns that the ���ν�ς �εν might alter human welfare Pin-dar actually fears becoming the target of the evil eye. Rakoczy’s analysisof the einschlägige Stellen, however, is not convincing. We can see this,for example, in his interpretation of the seventh Isthmian Ode.38 Pin-dar’s plea to enjoy an abiding happiness of human standards every singleday until the moment of his death, in spite of the expression J δ’ ��α-ν!των μU �ρασσ�τω ���ν�ς (), has nothing to do with the ‘envy ofthe gods’. However, there is also nothing that might allow us to makea connection with the evil eye. The poet’s request that the immortals’���ν�ς may not alter his wish gives expression, on the one hand, tohis conception of humanity as completely dependent on the gods’ Ein-

34 Pindar, P. .–.35 Pindar, O. .–.36 See Pindar,O. .–, for the case of Tantalus and P. .–, for Ixion.The latter’s

attempt to sleep with Zeus’ wife, Hera, depicts this loss of human parameters that leadhuman beings to equate themselves qualitatively with the gods in a lively way.

37 Pindar, I. .–.38 Rakoczy, Böser Bilck, –.

the so-called envy of the gods

spruchrecht, as Steinlein calls it,39 to either help or to hinder human will.On the other hand, it also expresses his view of the mixed character ofthe human condition, which is equally open to both fortune and misfor-tune.This is precisely the intrinsic discrepancy between gods andmen: only

gods possess abiding and inalterable happiness. Alternatively, humanhappiness is always subject to alteration andmay at any point change intodisgrace, and this not the result of punishment or due to themagnitude orduration of happiness, but simply due to its inherentlymixed character. Itis the very nature of the human condition that threatens themaintenanceof welfare.40Something similar happens in the tenth Pythian Ode. Even though

only a god knows complete happiness and is alien to suffering (–),reaching all the goods available to mortals may allow Hippokleas andhis father to achieve complete happiness within human parameters (–). In this context, Pindar’s prayer that the ���ν�ς �ενmay not alterthis wellbeing (μU ���νερα�ς (κ �εν μετατρ�π�αις (πικDρσαιεν, –) once again appeals to divine Einspruchrecht—to the gods’ right toveto human action and not to the evil-eye.41 This is due to the fact thathumanity is open to luck or adversity, since according to an old dictum(.–), the gods ‘for every one good thing bestow on men two evils’.As F. Schwenn has pointed out, therefore, the ���νερα� μετατρ�π�αιshould rather be connected with the Ν�μεσις ]π�ρδικ�ς who, somelines below (.–), determines this mixed nature of the humancondition.42With regard to Aeschylus, I have already pointed out above that the

egalitarian explanation is disproved by the tragedian. It is not the quantityof 5λ0�ς but injustice that is the target of divine punishment. For Aeschy-lus, human happiness is never disturbing for the gods, and those whorespect justice always remain happy (Agamemnon –). However,what about the hybris model, does he consider that enduring happinessmight inducemortals to become insolent towards the gods, trespassing inthis way human barriers? What about the evil-eye model? Agamemnonitself shows that either or both possibilities explain the ���ν�ς �εν,

39 Steinlein,Φ��ν�ς, .40 Pindar, P. .–.41 Cf. Rakoczy, Böser Blick, .42 F. Schwenn, Der junge Pindar (Berlin: Nicolai, ), . See also Pindar, O. .–

, ν�μεσις δι��0�υλ�ς having an equivalent function.

lautaro roig lanzillotta

which is conceived as the destruction that reaches those who obviatedivine prerogatives and deliberately offend the gods (–).43This is the case, for example, in Persae, where the messenger an-

nounces Xerxes’ ruin to be due to the ‘cleverness of the Greek and the���ν�ς of the gods’ (–). The ���ν�ς �εν is not a reactionagainst his excessive glory, since Darius had never provoked the ruin ofhis army, even though he was the luckiest of men (, , ) and waseven deemed ‘similar to a god’ (). Divine ‘opposition’ (���ν�ς) andanger against Xerxes originate in a combination of old faults and his ownrecklessness (–).That the root ���ν- in Aeschylus still preserves the old Homeric

meaning seems to be supported by two other passages from Prometheus.In the first, the verb expresses the gods ‘refusal to grant’ something(–); in the second, the substantive ���ν�ς describes the godlyimpediments to human action (–).In Euripides one finds four relevant passages including a reference to

the ���ν�ς �εν. In none of these, however, is it possible to find any-thing like the ‘envy of the gods’.44 The ���ν�ς is not directed against thequantity of human 5λ0�ς or the lack ofmeasure due to κ�ρ�ς, but againsthuman injustice and impiety. This is the case in Orestes, where the �ε�-�εν ���ν�ς () punishes old family faults, as W. Nestle has alreadynoted.45 The same is true in Iphigenia in Aulis, where the ���ν�ς �εν(–) is once again attracted by human impiety (, τ- )σε-πτ�ν). The final two examples, in Alcestis and Supplices, present exactlythe same background. In both of these Heracles and Theseus, respec-tively, manifest the resolution to accomplish their enterprise even againstthe will of the gods. Due to their impiety, they both (Heracles in Alcestis; Theseus in Supplices –) express their fear that the ���ν�ς�εν, namely the ‘anger and punishment of the gods’ may strike them.In all four cases, consequently, it simply describes the gods’ anger andsubsequent punishment when mortals offend their divine prerogatives.The Histories of Herodotus deserve special attention. In my view,

the interpretation of the Herodotean (..) τ- �ε��ν πFν ���νερ-ν

43 The (π����ν�ν π�ρ�ν (–) or ‘way of destruction’ Agamemnon fears to treadand his apprehension regarding the �εν πρ�σω�εν 5μματ�ς ���ν�ς (–) isstrictly related to impiety.

44 On the exiguous role of envy in Greek tragedy, see S. Goldhill, “Tragic Emotions”,in Envy, Spite and Jealousy (see above, n. ), –.

45 W.Nestle,Euripides, derDichter der griechischen Erklärung (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer,), ; See: Euripides, Or. –, –.

the so-called envy of the gods

κα� ταρα�δες as ‘divine envy’ has been determinant in shaping theconstruct we are dealingwith, whichwas later extrapolated to every otherpassage that included a reference to the���ν�ς �εν. As amatter of fact,however, there is nothing inHerodotus that might be interpreted as ‘envyof the gods’, be it from an egalitarian or religious moral perspective, oran expression of the evil eye. In fact, the ���ν�ς �εν in Themistocles’explanation of the victory over the Persians (..) still preserves theold Homeric meaning ‘refusal, opposition’. The gods and the heroes didnot agree that one single person might rule both Europe and Asia. Thisopposition is not due to the threat of his excessive power, but simply toXerxes’ �τασ�αλ�α or ‘recklessness’.There are two other passages that express Herodotus’ famous idea of

the �ε��ν ���νερ�ν in similar terms. The first is Solon’s conversationwith Croesus. According to Solon, a man should never be called ‘happy’before the moment of his death, since in human life all is fortuitous.Given that at any point fortune may turn into misfortune, the best char-acterization that fits man is ε"τυ�/ς ‘fortunate’ and not 5λ0ι�ς ‘happy’(..–). The second passage is the story of Polycrates’ ring (.).Even if the same background applies to the story, here it is not ‘chance’(συμ��ρ/) that prevents mortals from enjoying complete happiness, buta certain determinism (due to J κDκλ�ς τν �ν�ρωπη�ων πρηγμ!των[..]?) that a priori balances human life with an equal share of for-tune and misfortune. In contrast to the gods, who possess complete hap-piness, the human condition partakes in both happiness andmisery alike.In explaining this peculiarity of the human condition both Solon

and Amasis resort to divine ���νερ�α, a term that should be translatedrather as ‘avarice’ than ‘envy’. There is nothing that gods might envy inhuman ephemeral happiness. They simply keep for themselves, as divineprivilege, the right to enjoy happiness without counterpoint. Artabanus’words in the seventh book seem to confirm this interpretation. In hisview, no mortal may be called ‘truly happy’ (ε"δα�μων), since humanhappiness is always mixed with a portion of misfortune (..). Onlythe gods enjoy complete happiness and the sweetness of their existencemarks out the misery of human life. Divine ‘avarice’ and not ‘envy’explains the fact that while possessing complete bliss themselves, godsallot mortals a mixed condition (..).46

46 Divine ‘avarice’ and the ‘mixed’ character of the human condition are also behindHerodotus . ε, the passage that has been interpreted as expressing envy of the gods.

lautaro roig lanzillotta

Conclusions

The above analysis has shown that the ‘envy of the gods’ is a constructalien to Greek culture and that the varying explanations given by schol-ars are symptomatic of its artificial character. Given the Greek concep-tion of the gods as higher beings that determined human happiness ordisgrace, the ���ν�ς �εν appears in this context as a ‘divine refusal’ togrant human aspirations. Originally, there was no search for a rationalexplanation and divine opposition was simply attributed to the erraticbehaviour of the gods or to humanity’s neglect of its obligations to thegods. As soon as a divine attitude of reluctance towards mortals requireda satisfactory explanation this opposition was interpreted differently atdifferent stages of Greek thought; however, ‘envy’ never played a role inthis rationalization. The first explanation of divine opposition was thatwhen human success or happiness had been achieved by means of injus-tice it necessarily produced satiety and madness, which was indefectiblypunished by the gods.The gradual development of the idea, however, seems to have allowed

room for an explanation that focused on happiness as such. Happinessthen, seemed dangerously to provoke madness and this necessary rela-tionship received proper rationalization when, under the influence ofthe idea of the ‘golden mean’, the quantity or duration of happiness washeld responsible for this connection. Yet even when strongly interpretedthroughout Greek history, divine motivation never appears to have beenrelated to the so-called ‘envy of the gods’. In this context, the root ���ν-and other verbs such as )γαμαι and μεγα�ρω in the Homeric poemssimply refer to the divine right to veto human action. This fundamen-tal meaning appears to remain unchanged in later periods, as the testi-monies of Plato, Aeschylus, Pindar and Euripides sufficiently show.This appears to be the common background to all the occurrences of

the ���ν�ς �εν, since the view of the gods as the origin of humanfortune was never challenged in ancient Greece. Given that divine willdetermined either success or failure, when their wishes were frustratedhumanity looked to its own behaviour and not to the gods in the searchfor an answer. There is, consequently, no attempt to resort to the morecomplex psychological background of envy that, moreover, implies aspecific evaluative framework in which envied and envious individuals

See, for example, T. Harrison, “The Cause of Things”, in Envy, Spite and Jealousy (seeabove, n. ), – (–).

the so-called envy of the gods

might compare their circumstances with one another. In the case of thegods, this might have been nonsensical since it meant both that mortalsand immortals were placed on the same existential level and that theyenvied the nothingness of ephemeral human glory.