the source of the encyclopÈdie article ‘loi naturelle (morale)’

THE SOURCE OF THE ENCYCLOPEDZE ARTICLE ‘LO1 NATURELLE (MORALE)’

The problem of the attribution of source and authorship to the very many unsigned articles in the Encyclope‘die is one which has been and continues to be of some interest to scholars.’ In what follows I hope to make a small contribution to the collective attempt to solve this general problem by conside- ring the more specific question of the source and authorship of just one of these unsigned articles, the article ‘Loi naturelle (morale)’.2

It used to be regarded as a safe assumption that, in the absence of any direct evidence to the contrary, all the unsigned articles in the Encyclope‘die may be considered to be original compositions of which Diderot is the a ~ t h o r . ~ On this basis the article ‘Loi naturelle (morale)’, simply because it is not signed, has been regarded in the past as an original Diderot composition. Thus, for example, the article is included by AssCzat and Tourneux in their edition of Diderot’s Euvres cornplPtes.‘

More recently, however, certain commentators, notably J . Proust and J . Lough, have questioned the usefulness of making this assumption. Proust in particular has argued that it is much safer to take the opposite view and operate on the basis of the assumption that no unsigned Encyclope‘die article has Diderot for its original author unless there is some direct evidence to suggest that the article in question is indeed a creative product of Diderot’s pen .5 Following this general methodological principle, although without dis- cussing the article specifically, Proust places the article ‘Loi naturelle (morale)’ in the category of those articles in the Encyclope‘die whose original authors remain anonymous.6

In this Proust is supported by Lough, who does discuss the article ‘Loi naturelle (morale)’ specifically, and who actually singles it out as being one of the unsigned Encyclopkdie articles regarding which he is definitely prepared to commit himself to the assertion that Diderot is not its original author. As Lough himself puts it: ‘we must begin by excluding a large number of those [articles] which are wrongly included in the Assezat-Tourneux edition [of Diderot’s works] . . . LO1 NATURELLE (MORALE): this cannot very well have been compiled by Jaucourt, as he was responsible for another article, NATURELLE, LOI; but it seems very dubious Diderot’.’

Lough does not express an opinion as to who the original author of the article ‘Loi naturelle (morale)’ might be. He is, however, convinced that the original author is not Diderot .

It would seem that, in the case of the article ‘Loi naturelle (morale)’, Proust’s general caution and Lough’s specific judgement regarding the question of original authorship are both fully justified. For there is evidence to suggest that this paticular article is in fact not an original Diderot composition. There is textual evidence which indicates that this article is, rather, copied in large part, and virtually word for word in some places, from Samuel Clarke’s A

40 Anthony Burns

Discourse Concerning the Being and Attributes of God,’ a French translation of which, by M. Ricotier, was first published in 1717 under the title De I’existence et des attributs de Dieu, des devoirs de la religion naturelle et de la ve‘ritk de la religion chrktienne .9

In short, there is textual evidence to support the view that the original author of the greater part of the article ‘Loi naturelle (morale)’ is not Diderot but Samuel Clarke, and that Clarke’s Discourse, in French translation, is the most important single source for the later Encyclope‘die article.

In order to demonstrate this I shall present the texts of the article ‘Loi naturelle (morale)’ and the Ricotier translation of Clarke’s Discourse in parallel columns. The resemblance between the wording and argumentation used by Clarke and the anonymous compiler of the Encyclope‘die article should become immediately obvious. Clarke

[. . .] la principale chose qui favorise, ce semble, I’opinion de ceux qui refusent de reconnoitre la distinction Cternelle & naturelle entre le bien & le ma1 moral, c’est d’un cBtC I’extrEme difficulte, que l’on rencontre quelquefois a marquer les bornes precises, qui separent la vertu & le vice: de I’autre la diversite d’opinions, qu’on trouve parmi les savans m&me, qui disputent entr’eux pour savoir si certaines choses sont justes, ou injustes sur tout en matiere de politique: & enfin les loix diametralement opposkes les unes aux autres, qu’on a faites sur toutes ces choses en divers sikcles & en divers pays.’” Mais, comme on voit dam la peinture, qu’en dttrempant ensemble doucement & par degrez deux couleurs opposees, il arrive que de ces deux couleurs extrgmes, il en resulte une couleur mitoyenne, & qu’elles se m&lent si bien ensemble, que I’ceil le plus fin & le plus penetrant ne l’est pas assez, pour pouvoir marquer exactement, ou l’une finit & ou l‘autre commence, quoique pourtant ces couleurs soyent aussi differentes l’une de l’autre, qu’il se puisse [. . .] ainsi, quoique dans de certains cas douteux & dClicats [. . .] il puisse se faire que les confins, ou se fait la separation de la vertu & du vice, de la justice & de l’injustice, soyent tres- difficiles a marquer precisement, de sorte

Ency ctope‘die LO1 NATURELLE, (Morale) la loi naturelle est l’ordre eternel & immuable qui doit servir de regle a nos actions. Elle est fondee sur la difference essentielle qui se trouve entre le bien & le mal. Ce qui favorise l’opinion de ceux qui refusent de reconnoitre cette distinction, c’est d’un cBte la difficult6 que I’on rencontre quelquefois a marquer les bornes prtcises qui &parent la vertu & le vice: de l’autre, la diversite d’opinions qu’on trouve parmi les savans mCmes qui disputent entre eux pour savoir si certaines choses sont justes ou injustes, sur-tout en matiere de politique, & enfin les lois diametralement opposees les unes aux autres qu’on a faites sur toutes ces choses en divers siecles & en divers pays;

mais comme on voit dans la peinture, qu’en detrempant ensemble doucement & par degres deux couleurs opposees, il arrive que de ces deux couleurs extrkmes, il en rCsulte une couleur mitoyenne, & qu’elles se melent si bien ensemble, que l’ceil le plus fin ne l’est pas assez pour marquer exactement ou I’une finit & I’autre commence, quoique pourtant les couleurs soient aussi differentes l’une de l’autre qu’il se puisse: ainsi quoiqu’en certains cas douteux & delicats, il puisse se faire que les confins ou se fait la separation de la vertu & du vice, soient trb-difficiles a marquer precisement, de sorte que les hommes se sont trouvts partages 18-dessus, & que les lois des nations n’ont pas

The source of the Encyclope‘die article ‘Loi naturelle’ 41

que les hommes se sont trouves partagez la-dessus, & que les loix des nations n’ont pas ete par tout les m&mes; cela n’empC- che pourtant pas qu’il n’y ait reellement & essentiellement une tres-grande difference entre le juste & I’injuste [. . . I “ [. . .] la distinction eternelle du bien & du mal, la regle inviolable de la justice, se concilie sans peine l’approbation de tout homme, qui reflechit & qui raisonne. Car il n’y a point d’homme a qui il arrive de transgresser volontairement [. . .] cette regle dans des occasions importantes, qui ne sente qu’il agit contre ses propres principes & contre les lumieres de sa raison; & qui ne se fasse la-dessus des secrets reproches. Au contraire il n’y a point d’homme, qui, apres avoir agi conformement cette regle [. . .] ne se sache gre a lui-mCme & ne s’applaudisse d’avoir eu la force de resister a ces tentations, & de n’avoir fait que ce que sa conscience lui dicte &tre bon & juste. C’est ce que S . Paul a voulu dire dans ces paroles du Ch.11 de son Ep. aux Rorn.: Que les Gen- tils qui n’ont point de loi, font naturellernent les choses qui sont de la loi, & que n’ayant point de loi, ils sont loi a eux- rn&mes, qu’ils rnontrent l’ceuvre de la loi e‘crite en leurs ccpurs, leur conscience leur rendant te‘moignage, & leurs pense‘es entr’ elks s’accusant ou s’excusant.12

Je ne disconviens pas qu’il n’y ait des gens, qui, gitez par une mauvaise education, perdus de debauche, & accoutumez au vice par une longue habitude, ont furieu- sement deprave leurs principes naturels, & pris un tel ascendant sur leur raison, qu’ils lui imposent silence, pour n’kcouter que la voix de leur prejugez, de leurs passions & de leurs cupiditez. Ces gens plut6t que de se rendre & de passer con- damnation sur leur conduite, vous sou- tiendront impudemment qu’ils ne sau- roient voir cette distinction naturelle entre le bien & le mal, le juste & l’injuste, qu’on leur prCche tant [. . .] Mais ces gens-la, quelque affreuse que soit leur depravation, & quelque peine qu’ils se donnent pour cacher au reste des hommes les reproches qu’ils se font B eux-mCmes [ . . .] ne peuvent quelquefois s’empecher de laisser echapper leur secret, & de se dC-

ete par-tout les mCmes, cela n’empCche pas qu’il n’y ait reellement & essentiellement une tres grande difference entre le juste & l’injuste.

La distinction eternelle du bien & du mal, la regle inviolable de la justice se concilie sans peine I’approbation de tout homme qui reflechit & qui raisonne; car il n’y a point d’homme a qui il arrive de transgresser volontairement cette regle dans des occasions importantes, qui ne sente qu’il agit contre ses propres principes, & contre les lumieres de sa raison, & qui ne se fasse 18-dessus de secrets reproches. Au contraire, il n’y a point d’homme qui, apres avoir agi conformement a cette regle, ne se sache gre 2 hi-meme, & ne s’applaudisse d’avoir eu la force de resister a ces tentations, & de n’avoir fait que ce que sa conscience lui dicte Ctre bon & juste; c’est ce que saint Paul a voulu dire dans ces paroles du chap.ii de son Cpitre aux Romains: ‘que les Gentils qui n’ont point de loi, font naturellernent les choses qui sont de la loi d eux-rnthes, & que n’ayant point de loi, ils sont leur loi a eux- m h e s , qu’ils rnontrent l’cpuvre de la loi tcrite dans leurs ccpurs, leur conscience leur rendant tkrnoignage, & leurs pense‘es entr’elles s’accusant ou s’excusant.

Je ne disconviens pas qu’il n’y ait des gens qui, gites par une mauvaise kducation, perdus de dkbauche, & accoutumes au vice par une longue habitude, ont furieu- sement deprave leurs principes naturels, & pris un tel ascendant sur leur raison, qu’ils h i imposent silence pour n’ecouter que la voix de leurs prkjuges, de leurs passions & de leurs cupidites. Ces gens plQtBt que de se rendre & de passer con- damnation sur leur conduite, vous sou- tiendront impudemment, qu’ils ne sau- roient voir cette distinction naturelle entre le bien & le ma1 qu’on leur prCche tant; mais ces gens-la, quelque affreuse que soit leur depravation, quelque peine qu’ils se donnent pour cacher au reste des hommes les reproches qu’ils se font a eux-mCmes, ne peuvent quelquefois s’empCcher de laisser echapper leur secret, & de se d b couvrir dans de certains momens ou ils ne

42 Anthony Burns

couvrir dans de certains momens, ou ils ne sont pas assez en garde contr’eux- m ~ m e s . ’ ~

I1 n’y a point d’homme en effet si scelerat & si perdu, qui apres avoir commis un meurtre ou un vol hardiment & sans scrupule, n’aim9t mieux, si la chose Ctoit mise a son choix, avoir obtenu le bien, qu’il se proposoit, d’une autre maniere; & sans avoir etC oblige de commettre ces crimes, quand bien m&me il seroit siir de l’impunite. [. . .] il n’y point d’homme, imbu des principes de Hobbes, & place dans son etat de nature, qui, toutes choses &gales, n’aim9t beaucoup mieux pourvoir 2 sa propre conservation [. . .] sans &tre oblige d’6ter la vie a tous ses semblables, qu’en la leur 6ta11t.I~

C’est cette Loi de nature . . . (comme Ciceron le dit avec beaucoup de solidit6 & d’e1Cgance.) [. . .] que l’esprit humain n’a point invente‘e, dont aucun peuple n’est l’auteur, mais qui est kternelle, & a laquelle i’univers entier est soumis. I‘

De sorte que, suppose‘ qu’a Rome il n’y eirt point eu de loi e‘crite contre ceux qui violent les femmes, Tarquin n’auroit pas laisse‘ de pe‘cher contre cette loi kternelle iorsqu’il vioia ~ucrece .”

Cette loi [. . .] qui n’apas cornmence‘a ttre loi par la promulgation que les hommes en ont faite; mais 7:i est aussi ancienne que Dieu lui-m&me.

sont point en garde contre eux-m&mes.

I1 n’y a point d’homme en effet si scClerat & si perdu, qui, apres avoir commis un meurtre hardiment & sans scrupule, n’ai- mi t mieux, si la chose Ctoit mise a son choix, n’avoir obtenu le bien par d’autres voies que par des crimes, fiit-il siir de l’impunite. I1 n’y a point d’homme imbu des principes d’Hobbes, & place dans son etat de nature, qui, toutes choses Cgales, n’aimat beaucoup mieux pourvoir 5 sa propre conservation, sans &tre oblige d’6- ter la vie a tous ses semblables, qu’en la leur Btant.

On n’est mechant, s’il est permis de parler ainsi, qu’a son corps defendant, c’est-a- dire, parce qu’on ne sauroit autrement satisfaire ses desirs & contenter ses passions. I1 faut &tre bien aveugle pour confondre les forfaits & les horreurs avec cette vertu qui, si elle Ctoit soigneusement cultivee, feroit voir au monde la realite des traits ingenieux dont les anciens poe- tes se sont servis pour peindre 1’Lge d’or.15 La loi naturelle est fondee, comme nous I’avons dit, sur la distinction essentielle qui se trouve entre le bien et le ma1 moral, il s’en suit que cette loi n’est point arbitraire.

‘La loi naturelle’, dit Ciceron, liv.II, des lois, ‘n’est point une invention de l’esprit humain, ni un etablissement arbitraire que les peuples aient fait, mais l’impres- sion de la raison eternelle qui gouverne l’univers.

L’outrage que Tarquin fit a Lucrece, n’en Ctoit pas moins un crime, parce qu’il n’y avoit point encore B Rome de loi Ccrite contre ces sortes de violences. Tarquin pecha contre la loi naturelle qui Ctoit loi dans tous les terns, & non pas seulement depuis I’instant qu’elle a Cte Ccrite.

Son origine est aussi ancienne que I’esprit divin: car la veritable, la primitive, & la principale loi, n’est autre que la souve- raine raison du grand Jupiter’. Que ce soit donc une maxime pour nous

The source of the Encyclopkdie article ‘Loi naturelle’ 43

incontestable, que les caracteres de la vertu sont Ccrits au fond de nos ames: de fortes passions nous les cachent 21 la veritC quelques instans; mais elles ne les effacent jamais, parce qu’ils sont ineffaGables. Pour les comprendre, il n’est pas besoin de s’Clever jusqu’aux cieux, ni de percer dans les abymes; ils sont aussi faciles a saisir que les principes des arts les plus communs: il en sort de toutes parts des demonstrations, soit qu’on rCflCchisse sur soi-m&me, ou qu’on ouvre les yeux sur ce qui s’offre B nous tous les jours. En un mot, la loi naturelle est Ccrite dans nos coeurs en caracteres si beaux, avec des expressions si fortes & des traits si lumi- neux, qu’il n’est pas possible de la meconnoitre.

Given the results of this textual comparison it seems reasonable to conclude, in the absence of any opposing evidence, that Clarke is indeed the original author of the greater part of the article ‘Loi naturelle (morale)’ and that it was his work, probably in French translation, which was the most important single source used by the anonymous compiler of the unsigned Encyclope‘die article.

It is advisable, however, to add a word of caution at this point. This conclusion can and indeed must only be regarded as provisional. It is quite possible that there is yet a third text, resembling closely both Clarke’s Dis- course and the article in the Encyclope‘die, which might have served as an intermediary between Clarke and the compiler of the article ‘Loi naturelle (morale)’. It is possible that the compiler of the Encyclope‘die article was not familiar with Clarke’s work directly. This problem of the existence of such a third text occurs in the case of another of the unsigned articles on politics in the Encyclope‘die, the article ‘Juste’, and there is no reason to suppose that it could not also occur in the case of the article ‘Loi naturelle (morale)’.19 Prudence demands, therefore, that this conclusion should only be regarded as provisional in nature.

It would seem then that we are now in a better position to resolve the problem of the identity of the original author of most of the article ‘Loi naturelle (morale)’. Unfortunately this is not the case with the not so important problem of the identity of the unknown compiler of the Encyclope‘die article.

Most of the articles on law and politics in the Encycloptdie were contributed by the Chevalier de Jaucourt and Boucher d’Argis. At first sight, therefore, there would appear to be three plausible candidates for the title of compiler of the article ‘Loi naturelle (morale)’, Jaucourt, d’Argis and, of course, Diderot himself.20

As Lough points out,” the compiler of the article is not likely to be Jaucourt, as he was responsible for another article on natural law in the Encyclope‘die, the article ‘Naturelle, Loi’, which is signed with his name. Lough also argues that the article ‘Loi naturelle (morale)’ should not be attributed to Diderot.

44 Anthony Burns

It is evident, however, that Lough means by this that Diderot should not be considered as the original author of the article. As to whether Diderot might plausibly be considered as the possible compiler of the article, Lough does not express an opinion. It should be noted, though, that the article is not prefixed by an asterisk, Diderot’s editorial symbol. And on the whole the conclusion that Diderot was in any way responsible for it also seems unlikely.

There remains to be considered the possibility that Boucher d’ Argis might be the compiler of the article ‘Loi naturelle (morale)’.

In this connection it is worth making an observation about the context in which the article is placed in the Encyclope‘die. The article is sandwiched in between a number of articles on various types of law, all of which would appear to have been written by Boucher d’Argis. These articles are either signed individually by him or appear as elements in a sequence the last article of which carries his signature, which is an indication that he might be responsible for them. The evidence for this is provided by the following passage from the Discourspre‘firninaire in the first volume of the Encyclope‘die: ‘Lorsque plusieurs articles appartenant a la mCme matih-e, et par condquent faits ou revus par la m&me personne, sont immediatement consecutifs, on s’est content6 quelquefois de mettre la lettre distinctive a la fin du dernier de ces articles’.2z

The available evidence suggests, therefore, that the anonymous compiler of the article ‘Loi naturelle (morale)’ might well be Boucher d’Argis.

If this were indeed the case, then the fact that the article is a part of a collection of articles on law, many of which are in sequence and all of which were contributed to the Encyclope‘die by Boucher d’Argis, might possibly provide the solution to two outstanding puzzles. In the first place, it could, for the reasons mentioned, explain why it is that the article is not signed. In the second place, it could perhaps explain why it is that Jaucourt’s article ‘Naturelle, Loi’ has a duplicate in the article ‘Loi naturelle (morale)’. If d’Argis were given the task of contributing a large number of articles on law to the Encyclope‘die, it would not be so surprising if he too should include amongst his general contribution an article on a subject which was so close to the hearts of most students of politics and jurisprudence in the eighteenth century, namely natural law.

Of the three candidates that initially suggest themselves, then, I would tentatively like to propose that Boucher d’Argis, and not Diderot or the Chevalier de Jaucourt, is the most plausible as a possible compiler of the article ‘Loi naturelle (morale)’. Again, however, this conclusion must be treated with the utmost caution. And in the absence of any definite supporting evidence in favour of any particular candidate this is probably a question regarding which we would be well advised to reserve judgement.

There remains the question of why the anonymous compiler of the article ‘Loi naturelle (morale)’, whoever he was, should have chosen Clarke’s Dis- course rather than, for example. the presumably more popular and better known works of Grotius, Pufendorf, or Burlamaqui, as his source for an article on natural law in the Encyclope‘die.

One reason for this could be that the writings of these natural law theorists

The source of the Encyclope‘die article ‘Loi naturelle’ 45

were used extensively as sources for several of the other articles on politics in the En~yclope‘d ie .~~ Jaucourt, for example, draws heavily on them in his article ‘Naturelle, Loi’. Boucher d’ Argis also utilizes these works, particularly Burlamaqui’s Principes du droit naturel, as sources for his own article ‘Droit de la nature’.24 It seems reasonable to suppose, therefore, that the compiler of the article ‘Loi naturelle (morale)’ might have wished to use an alternative source in order to avoid any duplication of ideas already expressed elsewhere in the Encyclope‘die.

In addition to this there is the fact that Clarke’s Discourse was actually quite well known in eighteenth-century France.25 After the first edition of 1717 a second, revised edition was published in 1728 and there were reprints of this second edition in 1744,1756 and 1825. The edition of 1717 was reviewed in several contemporary journals, including the Bibliotheque ancienne et moderne, the Bibliothkque franCaise, the Journal des savants and the Jesuit Journal de Tre‘voux, and this must have done much to stimulate a general interest in it.26

Evidence of this general interest is provided by the extent to which all four of the major eighteenth-century French thinkers, Montesquieu, Voltaire, Rousseau and Diderot were familiar with Clarke’s ideas.

It has been suggested that the definition of the term ‘loi’ offered by Montesquieu in Lettre XXXIII of the Lettres persanes and in the opening chapter of De 1’Esprit des Zois was derived from his reading of Clarke,27 and Montesquieu is known to have had a copy of Clarke’s Discourse (in the original English) in his library.2K

It has also been claimed that Voltaire was greatly stimulated, sometimes negatively, at other times positively, by his reading of Clarke’s work. Clarke’s ambivalent influence on Voltaire seems to have stretched throughout most of the later part of Voltaire’s life, being evident in the Lettres philosophiques of 1734 as well as in the later Dictionnaire philosophique of 1764. Voltaire also is known to have possessed and heavily annotated a copy of Clarke’s

As for Rousseau, the influence of Clarke seems greatest in the Profession de f o i du Vicaire savoyard. It is there that one can read remarks such as: ‘Le seul sisteme de Clarke Ccrase tous les autres, il doit donc Ctre prCfCrC par la ra i~on’ .~’ Rousseau had a high opinion of Clarke’s work. He was familiar with it and praises it on more than one occasion.

Finally, Diderot, in his Plan d’une Universite‘ pour le gouvernernent de Russie, recommends Clarke’s work as a classic of metaphysics: ‘I1 y a l’ouvrage de Clarke. Son Traite‘ de l‘existence de Dieu passe pour le m e i l l e ~ r ’ . ~ ~ Clarke’s reputation, if not the work itself, was familiar to Diderot.

This general interest in Clarke’s work falls into two broad subject areas, metaphysics and politics. It is probably true to say that Clarke’s influence on metaphysical thought was greater than his influence on political thought. His influence on the political thought of eighteenth-century France, largely as a commentator on and refuter of the political thought of Hobbes, and as an expositor of the doctrine of natural law, should not, however, be ignored. Although modest, it was nevertheless of some ~ignif icance.~~ In my view, therefore, W. H. Barber is not accurate when, in his article ‘Voltaire and

46 Anthony Burns

Samuel Clarke’, he says that from the point of view of the intellectual history of the eighteenth century Clarke is only of interest because of his correspondence with Leibniz and because of his influence on V ~ l t a i r e . ~ ~ This is not accurate simply because, by way of omission, it fails to do justice to Clarke’s influence on the political thought of eighteenth-century France.

It appears to be the case that a knowledge of Clarke’s thought, and particularly his political thought, was much more widespread in eighteenth- century France than one might at first expect. It is not too surprising, therefore, that it should have been Clarke’s Discourse that was chosen, as an alternative to the works of the natural law theorists, as the major source for the Encyclopk- die article ‘Loi naturelle (morale)’.

Anthony Burns University of Sheffield

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7. 8.

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See J . Lough, ‘The Problem of the Unsigned Articles’, in J . Lough, The Encyclopkdie in Eighteenth-Century England: And Other Studies (Newcastle-upon-Tyne, 1970), pp. 159-232; J. Proust, Diderot et I’Encyclopedie (Paris, 1967). Ch. IV, pp.117-62; R. N. Schwab, ‘The Diderot Problem: The Starred Articles and the Question of Attribution in the Encyclopkdie’, Parts I and 11, Eighteenth-Century Studies, 2, no.3 (Spring 1969), 240-85 and 2, no.4 (Summer 1969), 370-438; G . A. Perla, ‘The Authorship of the Unsigned Articles in the EncyclopCdie’, Eighteenth-Century Studies, 4, no.4 (Summer 1971), 447-54. The edition of the Encyclopkdie which I have used is the 1966 reprint of the first edition: Encyclopkdie ou dictionnaire raisonnk des sciences, des arts, et des mttiers: nouvelle impres- sion en facsimilk de la premiere edition de 1751-1 780 17 vols (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, 1966). The article ‘Loi naturelle (morale)’ is at pp.665-66 of the ninth volume, dated 1765. As I give the entire article in the main body of the text, I shall give no further detailed references to it. See Proust, Diderot et I’EncyclopCdie, pp.131-49. The main support for this assumption is a statement contained in the Discours prilirninaire to the first volume of the Encyclopedie: ‘Les articles qui n’ont point de lettres a la fin, ou qui ont une ttoile au commencement sont de M. Diderot: les premiers sont ceux qui lui appartiennent comme Ctant un des auteurs de I’Encycloptdie; les seconds sont ceux qu’il a supplCCs comme kditeur’, Encyclopkdie, I , xlvi; cited by Proust, Diderot et I’Encycloptdie, p. 131, and Lough ‘Unsigned Articles’, p.163; emphasis in original. Diderot, D., 6uvres compl2tes, edited by J. AssCzat & M. Tourneux, 20 vols (Paris 1875- 77). The article ‘Loi naturelle (morale)’ is at vo1.16, pp.1-3. Proust, Diderot et I’Encyclopedie, p. 148: ‘Aucun article anonyme de I’Encyclopkdie ne doit &re attribuC a Diderot si la preuve n’est pas faite qu’il est bien de hi’. Lough finds this view too restrictive. See ‘Unsigned Articles’, pp.162 and 232. See Proust, Diderot et I’Encycloptdie, p.532, where Proust states that in a list of Encyclopkdie articles to follow ‘Les articles imprimCs en caractkres ordinaires sont anonymes’; and, further, p.538, where the title of the article ‘Loi naturelle (morale)’ is printed in such ‘caracttres ordinaires’. Lough, ‘Unsigned Articles’, p. 181. S . Clarke, A Discourse Concerning the Being and Attributes of God, the Obligations of Natural Religion and the Truth and Certainty of the Christian Revelation, In Answer to Mr. Hobbes, Spinoza, the Author of the Oracles of Reason, and Other Deniers of Natural and Revealed Religion, Being Sixteen Sermons Preach’d in the Years I704 and 1705, first edition (London, 1706). S . Clarke, De (‘Existence et des attributs de Dieu, des devoirs de la religion naturelle et de la

The source of the Encyclopkdie article ‘Loi naturelle’ 47

vtritk de la religion chrktienne, precis de XVI sermons prononcks a Londres par M . Clarke, traduits de I’Anglois par M. Ricotier. en deux tomes, J. F. Bernard (Amsterdam, 1717). There was a second edition of this work published in 1728. All references in the text are to the 1744 reprint of that second edition which is held in the Bibliothtque nationale. Clarke, De I‘Exisfence, 11, 79-80 Clarke, De /’Existence, 11, 80-81 Clarke, De I’Existence, 11, 98-100. Clarke, De I‘Existence, 11, 102-104. Clarke, De [’Existence, 11,104-105. I can find no equivalents in Clarke for this passage, the one immediately following, and the opening and closing passages of the article. Clarke, De I‘Exisience, 11, 149-50. Clarke, De I‘Existence, 11, 150. Clarke, De I’Exisience, 11, 150. For an appreciation of the difficulties created by the existence of such third texts see Leland Thielemann, ‘Diderot’s Encyclopedic Article on Justice: its Sources and Significance’, Diderot Studies, 4 (1963), 261-83, together with my own reply, ‘The Sources of the Encyclopedia Article on Justice: A Reply to Professor Thielemann’, Diderof Studies, 22, forthcoming. ‘Not all the political articles in the Encycloptdie are signed. Jaucourt supplied a large number which bear his signature though they are merely compiled from a variety of sources’, J. Lough, The Encycloptdie (London, 1971). pp.273-74. ‘[. . .] Boucher d’Argis, chargt de confectionner les articles de ‘jurisprudence’ de I’Encyclopkdie, a partir du troisikme volume’, Proust, Diderot et "Encyclopedic, p.346. Lough. ‘Unsigned Articles’, p.181. EncyclopCdie, I, xlvi; cited by Proust, Diderot et I’Encyclopkdie, p.135; Lough ‘Unsigned Articles’, p.179, fn.47. But as a corrective see also Schwab, ‘The Diderot Problem’, Part I, p.248: ‘Sometimes related entries by the same author are nevertheless each marked with the sign of that author. This is often the case in the articles by the Chevalier de Jaucourt and Boucher d’Argis [. . .] In other instances related unsigned articles in a sequence are not all by the author whose sign of attribution appears at the end, but rather by another author, in some cases Diderot’. ‘A good many of the political ideas to be found in the Encyclopkdie are decidedly second hand. The Esprit des lois was chopped up into appropriate articles [. . .] Another favourite source. particularly with Jaucourt, was the works of the Natural Law writers, Grotius and Pufendorf [. . .] The more recent writings of [. . .] Burlamaqui [. . .] were also brought under contribution’. Lough, The Encyclopkdie, p.274. Cf. EncyclopCdie, V (1755), 131-34. For Clarke’s general influence see C. DCdtyan, Voltaire et la pemke anglaise (Pans, 1956), pp.150-53; also P. M. Masson, La Profession de foi du Vicaire savoyard de Jean-Jacques Rousseau, edition critique, d’aprbs les manuscrits de Gentve, Neuchltel et Pans (Paris- Fribourg, 1914), p.67, fn.1. For details of these reviews see DCdCyan, Voltaire et la penske anglaise, pp.150-51; also L. Thielemann, The Tradition of Hobbes in Eighteenth-Century France, unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Columbia University, New York (Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1950), p.78; and I . M. Wilson, The Influence of Hobbes and Lacke in the Shaping of the Concept of Sovereignty in Eighteenih-Century France, Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century, 101 (1973), 54 and 154-56. ‘A possible source of Montesquieu‘s conception of law is, as many scholars have noted, Samuel Clarke’s Discourse of 1704 [. . .]’ M. H . Waddicor, Monfesquieu and the Philosophy of Natural Law (The Hague, 1970), p.188. See also R. Shackleton, Montesquieu:A Critical Biography (Oxford, 1961), pp.245-46. ‘[Montesquieu] [. . .] ait probablement connu et estimC la pen& de Clarke, dont ilposskdait le Discourse concerning the being and atiributes of God dans I’tdition anglaise de 1728’. C.

10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15.

16. 17. 18. 19.

20.

21. 22.

23.

24. 25.

26.

27.

28.

48 Anthony Burns

J. Beyer, ‘Montesquieu et la philosophie de I’ordre’, Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century, 87 (1972), 145-66 (cited on p.147). For Voltaire and Clarke see W. H. Barber ‘Voltaire and Samuel Clarke’, Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century, 179, (1979), 47-61; G . Gargett Voltaire and Protestantism, Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century, 188 (1980), 427-34; and finally N. L. Torrey, Voltaire and the English Deists (New Haven, Connecticut, 1930). Torrey informs us: ‘Whether from the English, or from the French translation in 1727, the influence of Clarke’s Traitis de I‘Existence de Dieu et de ses attributs, etc., is apparent in Voltaire’s Lettres philosophiques, Poeme sur le disasire de Lisbonne, and Candide. Voltaire’s copy at Leningrad is amply annotated [. . .]’. The best discussion of Voltaire’s ambivalent attitude towards Clarke is in Gargett. See Masson, Profession de fo i , pp.2, 62, and 63-67. See also P. M. Masson, La Religion de 1. J. Rousseau (Paris, 1916), 3 vols. Masson informs us:‘Clarke sera le mktaphysicien de Rousseau. 11 lui fournira des dkmonstrations pour quelques thkses, d’une mktaphysique klkmentaire [. . .] qu’il opposera inlassablement a la philosophie encyclopkdiste’, I, 109. Finally, see R. Grimsley, Rousseau and the Religious Quest (Oxford, 1968). According to Grimsley, ‘Rousseau appears to have been particularly impressed by the English deist Samuel Clarke [. . .]’, pp.10-11. And on pp.45-46: ‘It is significant that in the letter to Franquikres he [Rousseau] does not hesitate to couple Clarke’s name with Plato’s!’

31. Diderot, Euvres complc?tes, 111, 491. 32. For Clarke’s influence on French political thought see Thielemann, The Tradition of Hobbes,

pp.25-27, and Wilson, The Influence of Hobbes and Locke, pp.54, 90 and 154-56. 33. W. H. Barber, ‘Voltaire and Samuel Clarke’, p.47.

29.

30.

the source of the encyclopÈdie article ‘loi naturelle (morale)’

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