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The Southern Thailand Conflict and theMuslim WorldImtiyaz YusufPublished online: 18 Sep 2007.

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The Southern Thailand Conflict and the MuslimWorld1

IMTIYAZ YUSUF

Abstract

Several commentators and analysts have talked about the ongoing unrest in southern

Thailand from the perspective of the engagement of international terrorism, security

issues, center-periphery relations, organized crime and the drug industry; but none of

them has written about the role of religion and ethnicity in the crisis and its reception

in the Muslim world. This paper contends that the conflict in southern Thailand is

largely a local conflict rooted in clashes between two ethno-religiosities, those of

Thai Buddhists and Malay Muslims. In order to accomplish the above, the paper

begins with a discussion about the history of relations between Thailand and the

Muslim world including the historical religious interaction between Islam and

Buddhism and the state of relations betweenMuslims and Buddhists in contemporary

Thailand. The paper also discusses the state of the official diplomatic relations between

Thailand and the Muslim countries, and also the non-official community-based

relations between the Thai Muslims and the Muslim world and the educational

links between them. Furthermore, it also looks at the roles played by international

Muslim organizations, such as the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), in

relation to the southern Thai conflict. The final part of the paper discusses the

Muslim media reportage about the southern Thai conflict.

Introduction

The Muslim population, comprising of approximately 1.3 billion Muslims, is spread over

Asia, Africa, Europe and North America. Muslims live in various countries both as

majority and minority populations. The Muslims see themselves as an ummah—a world-

wide community bound by the fraternal spirit of ikhwah—brotherhood emerging from

common faith and practice of Islam as their religion.

The Muslim world is thus made of different races and ethnic groups speaking different

languages. The Muslim world can be divided into the following lingual-cultural zones—

Arabic, Persian, Turkish, Central Asia, Urdu, Sindhi, Punjabi, Bengali, Malay, Javanese,

Maghribi, West African, Swahili, including as well English and several European

languages such as Bosnian, French, Italian, Spanish, etc. In spite of this, the adherents

of Islam see themselves as a brotherhood with strong emotional attachment. The

Muslims see themselves as a composite unit united by faith.

Muslim-related international conflicts, such as those in Palestine, Kashmir, Chechnya

and southern Thailand, have drawn the attention of the worldwide Muslim community.

These are generally interpreted by the global Muslim community as instances of the

result of the religious victimization of Muslims, and are thus open to varied worldwide

Muslim interpretations, ranging from instances of the oppression of Muslims to exclusi-

vist subjugation of minority Muslim populations by non-Muslim states. The Muslim

world views these conflicts through the lenses of pan-Islamism, an ideology of worldwide

Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, Vol. 27, No. 2, August 2007

ISSN 1360-2004 print/ISSN 1469-9591 online/07/020319-21 # 2007 Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs

DOI: 10.1080/13602000701536232

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unity of Muslims proposed by Jamaluddin al-Afghani (1838–1897) during the colonia-

lized era of Muslim history.2 In addition to this, the southern Thai conflict is also viewed

from the perspective of pan-Malayness, referring to the regional ethnic fraternity of the

Malay race. Hence, the worldwide Muslim conflicts are viewed from the perspectives of

religion as well as racial identity.

The conflict in southern Thailand has been viewed from different angles by various

analysts. The majority of foreign security analysts have tried to discern the connections

between the conflict from the perspective of its alleged links with internationalist jihadist

movements such as al-Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI).3 While the majority of the

reports about the conflict in the Muslim world view the conflict as religious, one

between an oppressive Thai Buddhist state and its repressed Muslim minority, this

paper contends that the conflict in southern Thailand is largely a local conflict rooted

in a clash between two ethno-religiosities, those of Thai Buddhism and Malay Islam,

with the latter taking a Malay-Muslim nationalist and separatist stance. The southern

Thai episode demonstrates that ethno-religious identity is a large determining factor in

the forming, and shaping, of the consequences of the conflict. Yet, due to the Muslim

component, the Muslim world views the ongoing conflict as being purely religious.

The approach adopted by this paper is rooted in the field of religious studies with focus

on intra-religious relations within the Islamic and Muslim world contexts. It looks at how

the conflict in southern Thailand affects Thailand-Muslim world relations, in terms of

the history of relations between Islam and Buddhism as a religion, Thailand’s relations

with the larger Muslim world and Muslim countries in the neighborhood.

Hence, the first part of the paper discusses the history of relations between Thailand

and the Muslim world, including the historical religious interaction between Islam and

Buddhism. It then illustrates the unique ethno-religious dimension of Islam as practiced

in southern Thailand, followed by a survey of links between the Thai Muslims and the

larger Muslim world, especially in relations to Iran and Pakistan, the two states

founded on Islamic politico-religious ideology, and in relation to the two ASEAN

(Association of Southeast Asian Nations) Muslim neighbors of Malaysia and Indonesia,

with Malaysia being a neighbor which shares ethnic and religious relations with the

southern Thai population.4 Finally, after covering the roles played by the international

Muslim organizations, particularly the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), the

paper looks at the reportage about the southern Thai conflict in Muslim media. The

above-mentioned variety of perspectives and approaches about the status of Islam in

Thailand and the various international Muslim approaches toward the conflict show

that the conflict has drawn a concerned interest in the Muslim world at large.

An important point to consider before we proceed further is that the nature of conflict

in southern Thailand is an evolving one; it is shaped by the nature of local politics within

Thailand which is now entering into the post-Thaksin era. This recent development is

marked by change in the Thai state’s approach toward the resolution of the conflict.

The military authorities are more open to dialogue with the insurgents than was the

Thaksin government which was more open to the use of force. Such a stance has led

to an increase in the expected role of Malaysia in the negotiation process, some

aspects of which are discussed below.

Thailand–Muslim World Relations

Thailand has been successful in building dynamic and cooperative relations with several

Muslim countries in the region and also outside the region. Presently, 17 Muslim

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countries have established diplomatic relations with Thailand.5 Meanwhile, Thailand

has an observer status in the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) headquartered

in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia which has all 56 Muslim majority countries as its members.

Thailand also has extensive trade and commercial relations with several Middle

Eastern and Southeast Asian Muslim countries.

The nearly century-old ongoing conflict in southern Thailand has attracted the atten-

tion of the Muslim world in different ways, depending upon various factors such as the

ethno-religious similarity with neighbors such as Malaysia and Indonesia, and religious

similarity with the Muslim world in general. Thus, the Muslim world’s attention

toward the unrest in the South is also factored by the sentiments of pan-Malayness

and pan-Islamism. A glance at the media reports on the events in the South reflects

these two types of interests in the Muslim world.

At the religious and communal levels, Thai Muslims have established extensive

relations with Muslim countries in the areas of educational and socio-religious relations,

both at the public and private levels. Thousands of Thai Muslims have obtained their

religious and general education at educational institutions in the Muslim world; in

South Asia, Southeast Asia and the Middle East. Hence, there is a two-tiered relationship

between Thailand and the Muslim world: firstly, conducted at the official level and sec-

ondly, at the level of inter-Muslim community relations.

Buddhism and Islam

There is a long history of relations between Islam and Buddhism.6 Indeed, religious

encounter between Islam and Buddhism is as old as Islam itself.7 The first encounter

between Islam and ashab al-Bidada, or the Buddhist community, took place in the

middle of 7 A.D. in the regions of East Persia, Transoxiana, Afghanistan and Sindh.8

Historical evidences suggest that some early Muslims extended the Qur’anic category

of ahl al-Kitab (people of the book or revealed religion) to include the Hindus and the

Buddhists.9 The second encounter took place in Southeast Asia beginning around

12–13 A.D.

During the second century of Islam or the eighth century A.D., Central Asian Muslims

translated many Buddhist works into Arabic. We come across Arabic titles such as

Bilawar wa Budhasaf and Kitab al-Budd, as evidences of Muslims learning about

Buddhism.10

In spite of being aware of the idol-worship of the Buddha, Ibn al-Nadim (d. 995 A.D.),

the author of al-Firhist, comments that:

These people (Buddhists of Khurasan) are the most generous of all the inhabi-

tants of the earth and of all the religionists. This is because their prophet

Budhasaf (Bodhisattva) has taught them that the greatest sin, which should

never be thought of or committed is the utterance of “No”. Hence they act

upon this advice; they regard the uttering of “No” as an act of Satan. And it

is their very religion to banish Satan.11

There are evidences of Buddhist survivals in the succeeding Muslim era of this region

(Central Asia), such as the Barmak family of Buddhist monks who played a powerful

administrative role in the early Abbasid dynasty. The Abbasids ruled from Baghdad

during 750–1258 A.D., governing most of the Islamic world. The Barmakids controlled

the Buddhist monastery of Naw Bahar near Balkh in addition to other Iranian

monasteries.12

The Southern Thailand Conflict 321

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There was also the continuation of several Buddhist beliefs and practices among the

Muslims of Central Asia. For example, the Samanid dynasty, which ruled Persia

during the ninth and tenth centuries, invented and modelled the madrasah or Muslim

religious schools that were devoted to advanced studies in the Islamic religious sciences,

after the Buddhist schools in eastern Iran.13 Similar may have been the case with the

pondoks or pasenterens—the Muslim religious schools of Southeast Asia.

Muslim religious scholar and historian, Abu Ja’far Muhammad ibn Jarir al-Tabari

(839–923 CE), who was born in Amul in Tabaristan, northern Persia, mentions that

Buddhist idols were brought from Kabul, Afghanistan to Baghdad in the ninth

century. It is also reported that Buddhist idols were sold in a Buddhist temple next to

the Makh mosque in the market of the city of Bukhara in present Uzbekistan.14

Classical Muslim scholar of comparative religion, al-Shahrastani (1086-1153 A.D.), in

his section on Ara0 al-hind (The Views of the Indians) of his magnum opus, Kitab al-Milal

wan-Nihal (Book of Religious and Philosophical Sects), pays high regard to Buddhism

and its richness in spirituality. This was done by identifying the Buddha with the

Qur’anic figure of al-Khidr, as a seeker of enlightenment.15

More recently, the late Prof. Muhammad Hamidullah observes that in line with the

Qur’anic view of prophethood, the Buddha can be regarded as one among the previous

prophets. According to Hamidullah, the symbolic mention of the fig tree in Chapter 95,

Verse 1 of the Qur’an alludes to the prophethood of the Buddha. He concludes that since

Buddha is said to have received Nirvana—Enlightenment under a wild fig tree—and as

that fig tree does not figure prominently in the life of any of the prophets mentioned in the

Qur’an, hence, the Qur’anic verse refers to Gautama Buddha.16

By the fig and the olive,

By Mount Sinai,

And by this land made safe;

Surely We created man of the best stature

Then We reduced him to the lowest of the low,

Save those who believe and do good works, and theirs is a reward unfailing.

So who henceforth will give the lie to thee about the judgment?

Is not Allah the most conclusive of all judges? (Qur’an 95 : 1–8)

And indeed, [O Muhammad], We have sent forth apostles before your time;

some of them We have mentioned to thee, and some of them We have not men-

tioned to thee. (Qur’an 40 : 78. See also Qur’an 4 : 164)

And never have We sent forth any apostle otherwise than [with a message] in

own people’s tongue . . . (Qur’an 14:4)

Hence, Islam’s position toward other religions is that of religious pluralism, recognising

the existence of different religions including Buddhism. The Qur’an states that:

To each among you have We prescribed a Law and an Open Way. If Allah had so

willed He would have made you a single people but (His plan is) to test you in

what He hath given you: so strive as in a race in all virtues. The goal of you all is

to God; it is He that will show you the truth of the matters in which ye dispute.

(Qur’an 5:48)

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Islam in the Land of Buddha

Islam, like all world religions, operates at global and local levels. The global identity of

Islam is constructed in the pan-Islamist terms of ummah or the worldwide Muslim com-

munity, while most of the local Muslim identities are construed in tribal ethnic and racial

terms as seen in Africa and the Middle East, Southeast Asia and South Asia.

Islam came to Thailand from different directions: the Malay-Indonesian archipelago,

Yemen (Hadhramawt), Persia, India, Burma, China and Cambodia. Just as other

Southeast Asian Muslim communities, the Thai Muslim community is made up of

two groups: the “native/local Muslims” and the “immigrant settler Muslims”. Hence,

there is ethnic, linguistic, cultural and political variety within the Thai Muslim

community.

The “immigrant Muslims” of Thailand belong to different sectarian and ethnic back-

grounds. For example, Persian Muslims belonging to the Shia sect served at the court of

the Ayudhaya Kingdom in different official capacities.17 The majority of Thai Muslims

belong to the Sunni sect; there is also the presence of a small Shia community belonging

to the Imami and Bohras/Mustali Ismailis sub-groups within the Shia sect.18 Overall, the

Thai Muslims make up the largest minority religious group in the country, constituting

“a national minority rather than as a border minority”.19

Islam in Thailand operates in three configurations defined by history and location:

1. Ethnicized Malay speaking Islam is practiced in the provinces of Pattani,

Yala and Narathiwat of the deep South. These southern Muslims make up

about 80% of the total Thai Muslim population today of about five to

seven million.

2. The integrated ethnically Malay but Thai speaking Islam which is practiced

in the provinces of Satun and in upper South such as Songkla, Nakorn Si

Thammarat, Phuket, Krabi, and Phangnga.

3. The multi-ethnic Thai speaking integrated Islam of the central Thai pro-

vinces of Bangkok and Ayudhaya and also of north and northeast Thailand.

This group comprises Muslims of Persian, Malay, Cham, Indonesian,

Indian, Bengali, Pathan and Chinese ethnic backgrounds.20 These

migrant Muslims from neighbouring and far countries came to settle in

Thailand for economic and political reasons. They fled religious persecution

at the hands of the communists in China and the nationalists in Burma.

There are also Thai converts to Islam either through marriage or religious

conversions.

The first type of Islam in Thailand has been largely historically resistant to integration

within the Thai polity, while the second and third types have been integrative.

The history of Islam in Thailand also has two distinct dates: first being the Islamization

of Patani around the 1520s and second, beginning with the arrival and the presence of

non-Malay Muslims such as the Persians, Chams, Indians and others, at the courts

and in the cities of the Ayudhaya and the Chakri dynasties since the 14th century.

Both of these were merged into one nation-state in 1939, when Siam became Thailand.

The general Thai Muslim attitude towards Buddhism is that of “live and let live”

drawn from the Qur’anic verse, “Unto you, your religion (moral law), and unto me

mine” (Qur’an 109:6). Educated Thai Muslims view Buddhism with its concept of

Dukkha—suffering and seeking of Nirvana (enlightenment)—as philosophical and offer-

ing a methodological approach to life. In their view the popular Thai religious beliefs in

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spirits and demons are strange and unwise. On the other hand, the educated Buddhists

view Buddhism as philosophical and scientifically superior to Islam. In their view Islam’s

belief in monotheism is philosophically inferior and unscientific.

At the popular level, Thai Muslims see Buddhism as a religion of kufr (disbelief in

God) and shirk (polytheism). They view Thai Buddhists as kafirs (unbelievers) and

infidels and mushrikeen (polytheists).21 These two concepts are scorned by the Qur’an

and opposed vehemently by Prophet Muhammad. As a result, they adopt and apply

a literal understanding of Qur’anic passages, which refer to the conflict

between Tauhid (monotheism) vis-a-vis kufr and shirk, in the Thai context,

without applying the tools of historical criticism. Hence, in charged political and

conflict situations, Thai Muslims view the Thai Buddhists as najis (unclean, immoral

and faithless) engaged in kufr and shirk, which are to be opposed by engaging in jihad

(war). Such a view lacks the knowledge of classical Muslim scholars about

Buddhism, and thus contributes to intensifying conflict and at the same time giving it

a religious color.

Ethno-Religious Islam in Southern Thailand

Analysing the ongoing events in southern Thailand from an ethno-religious dimension

emphasizes the need to understand how the Malay Muslims of southern Thailand

perceive their identity in ethnic and religious terms.

It is a matter of fact that the Malay Muslims place strong emphasis on the ethnic aspect

of their adherence to the religion of Islam. The Malay Muslims of the South give primacy

to their ethnic identity and view their life experience from within the context of the local

practice of Islam. Thus the mythic/narrative, experiential/emotional, ritual, ethical,

social, legal, material and political aspects of life are all interpreted and perceived

through the lens of ethnic identity. Here ethnicity and religion are intermixed resulting

in the formation of an ethnicized view of Islam.

In such a perspective, ethnicity is the defining characteristic of a group’s identity which

sets it apart from others in their own and others’ eyes. It serves as the foundation for the

interpretation of nationalist and religious aspirations of the group. Often religion can be

used for ulterior ethnic interests as a tool or veil. Thus the conflict in South Thailand has

an ethno-religious dimension, similar to the conflicts in Sudan, Sri Lanka, Tibet,

Kashmir, Rwanda, Nigeria, Lebanon, Bosnia and Northern Ireland.

The combination of ethnicity and religion often results in explosive conflicts in the

political arena to which solutions are not easy to be found.

Religion and ethnicity, as social and political concepts, have many similarities. While

ethnicity is not always congruent with a framework of belief, it is often associated with

nationalism, which does provide such a framework. This framework can include rules

and standards of behavior such as the requirement or at least the desirability of

forming or maintaining a state for one’s ethnic group. Even for ethnic groups which

do not express such nationalist sentiments, ethnicity is a basis for identity that can influ-

ence beliefs and behavior. Ethnicity, both in its nationalist and other manifestation, can

provide legitimacy for a wide variety of activities and policies and ethnic symbols can be

as potent a political and social mobilizing force as religious symbols.22

The above described phenomena of ethno-religiosity, which give primacy to ethnicity

in religion, are not exclusive to the Malays but a similar tendency is also found in the

other ethnic groups of Southeast Asia viz., the Thai, the Filipino and the Chinese

communities settled there.

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The Malay Muslims of southern Thailand view national integration as entailing their

own cultural disintegration, for Thai Buddhism and Malay Islam belong to two different

cosmological orientations.23 “They do not want to be integrated into the Thai state.

They do not want to lose their religious and cultural autonomy. If the Thai state is the

manifestation of the Buddhist cosmology, the Malay-Muslims do not want to be a part

of it”.24 The largely ethnic orientation of the two communities of the Thai Buddhists

and the Malay Muslims have been described as, “closed systems”.25

The Malay Muslims recoil from outsiders (even other Muslims) unless they are

members of the same ethnic group or speak the Melayu language. Simlarly, mere reli-

gious conversion to Islam is not enough. Rather one has to “masuk Melayu”—become

a Malay—to be accepted as a Muslim. This process is reinforced through loyalty to

the historical memory and the role played by the ‘ulama or tok gurus in asserting and

maintaining the ethno-religious identity of the Malay Muslim community.

The network of the ‘ulama and their role as custodians of religion and ethnicity makes

them important players in the conflict as custodians of the Malay culture and local Islam.

For example, there is the role of Haji Sulong, who in 1947 made seven demands to the

central government that included the demand for political freedom for the Malays, the

preservation of the Malay language and the religious demand for the recognition and

enforcement of Muslim personal law.26

Since the 1980s the Thai government has undertaken several efforts to accommodate

its Muslim population into the mainstream and has also succeeded in these efforts, as

seen by those who identify themselves as “Thai Muslims”. However, there are still sec-

tions who see themselves differently in ethno-religious terms.

The unassimilated, inspired by contemporary politicization of religion, engage in “poli-

ticization of ethnicity” or “ethno-religious nationalism”. They engage in what is referred to

as “regional or subnational reactions and resistances to what is seen as an over centralized

and hegemonic state. . .to achieve their own regional and local sociopolitical formations”.27

In their case, “Religion is not purely a matter of belief and worship; it also has social political

resonances and communitarian associations. Likewise, language is not merely a communi-

cative device but has implications for cultural identity and literary creation, educational

advantage, occupation, and historical legitimization of social precedence. Similarly, terri-

tory has multiple implications, which go beyond spatial location to include charged

claims about “homelands” and “sons [and daughters] of the soil”.28 A similar interpretation

about the southern Malay Islam was affirmed by a prominent southern Muslim scholar,

Dr. Ismae-Alee, Director, College of Islamic Studies, Prince of Songkla University, when

he recently remarked that ignorance about the Malay way of life and the role of religion

in it is the cause of conflict, and that the southern Muslims had different lifestyles and

beliefs from that of Muslims in other parts of the country as identity, nationalism and

history are rooted deeply in the psyche of southern Muslims.29

The recent events in southern Thailand show that intermixing of religion and ethnicity

has also resulted in destroying social relations between the Thai Muslims and Thai

Buddhists who have been living as neighbors for centuries; this is evident in the killings

of both Muslims and Buddhists including monks.30 The Muslim-Buddhist relations are

at their low now, with distrust and alienation on both sides.

Thailand and the Muslim World

Being a religious minority, Thai Muslims have always been concerned about maintaining

their religious identity within a largely Buddhist nation. The need for maintaining and

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reinforcing both ethnic and religious identity has been an important factor in deter-

mining the educational paths taken by Thai Muslims.

Southern Thai Muslims who are ethnically Malay have cross-border ethnic and

religious relations with the Muslims of Kelantan in Malaysia and also Indonesia. In

fact, Islam in southern Thailand shares strong intellectual and cultural roots and

relations with Islam in Kelantan from the past until today.31

Many young Thai Muslims travel to the neighboring Muslim countries of Malaysia,

Indonesia, Brunei and also India, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Iran, and

Egypt for seeking education to reinforce their religious and ethnic identities. Presently,

there are about 200 Thai Muslim students who are studying in Saudi Arabia and

about 2,000 in Egypt and 100 in Iran. Such educational sojourns contribute toward

the production of transborder and transnational versions of Islam with “cross-cutting

interpretations which produce and reproduce various understandings of this religion

across an equally diverse range of sociocultural contexts”.32

The educational sojourns by Thai Muslims in the countries mentioned above have

generated a variety of Islamic interpretations in Thailand, some of which emphasize on

an ethno-religious dimension of Islamic identity, others on being Malay with or without

stress on Islamic religious Puritanism, and still others on combining ethnic identity with

religious puritanism. The use of the term puritan here refers to the purist religious

tendencies acquired in Muslim majority countries. For example, Thais educated in

Egypt may stress on their ethnic Malay identity in nationalist terms without stressing on

the puritanical practice of Islam, while those educated in the Wahabbi theological semin-

aries/universities in Pakistan and the Middle East may stress on the puritanical practice of

Islam combined with Malay ethno-centrism of either integrative or un-integrative types.

Those educated in Iran, in contrast, will stress on the adoption of political theology that

stresses on the Shiite interpretation of Islamic history. Hence, educational links between

Thai Muslims and the Muslim world have important ramifications for the practice and

internal discourse within Thai Islam.

Travel to and education in Muslim countries may affect Thai Muslims’ perceptions

about their ethno-religious identity, reinforcing some salient ethnic and religious features

in the local context. Thus it is wrong to generally presume that acquiring education in

Muslim countries naturally leads to sympathies for the cause of insurgency. Many retur-

nee Thai students have engaged in promoting Islamic reform within the Thai Muslim

community along puritan and also sectarian lines. Yet, all such reformists are not

insurgents.

The foreign-educated Muslims have also played a significant role in the weaning of

local syncretic Islam to a more puritan form. Hence, the Salafi-Wahhabi Islamic

reformist movement amongst the Muslims of Thailand has succeeded in transforming

Thai Islam along puritan lines, resulting in the marginalization of the traditionalist

section within contemporary Thailand. Yet, Islam-related global events such as the

wars in Bosnia, Afghanistan, Palestine and Iraq do draw pan-Islamist sympathies from

amongst the local Thai Muslims.33

Foreign Muslim foundations also contribute to the building of mosques and pondoks/

madrasas (religious seminaries) in Thailand. For example, the Yala Islamic College has

beneficiaries in Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Kuwait, and the Saudi based International

Islamic Relief Organisation (IIRO) has been the biggest donor to Islamic social projects

in southern Thailand. Such support and acquiring education in the Muslim world has

brought much suspicion against the Thai Muslims which is much resented, for though

separatism in the South has a long history, there are no proofs that all the Thai

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Muslims educated in the Muslim world are involved in anti-state activities.34 What is

more, one cannot rule out nor yet measure the degree of local Muslim sympathy for

the insurgents. Thai Muslims educated from institutions in Saudi Arabia, Egypt,

Kuwait, Jordan, Sudan, Indonesia and Pakistan, who upon return become imams at

mosques and teachers at pondoks, are now suspected as supporters of radical separatism.

On the political front, the Salafi-Wahhabi religious trend within Thai Islam favors an

integrationist approach towards Thai polity in the spirit of “live and let live”, while

some inspired by Salafi-Jihadist radicalism opt for confrontation and opposition.

Pakistan

Diplomatic relations between Thailand and Pakistan were established on 1st of October

1951. This relationship was rooted in Thailand and Pakistan’s membership of the

Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO). Initially, the relations were based on

defense cooperation, and later on political relations started to develop, and among the

landmarks of this relationship is the 12 days visit by the Thai king and queen to Pakistan

in 1962. In addition, General Prem Tilsulanonda had visited Pakistan in 1983 and Gen.

Ziaul Haque visited Thailand in 1985. The Thai crown prince visited Pakistan in 1991

and 1998.35 The current state of relationship is that over the last four years, it has grown

substantially, not only politically, but also economically, and social interactions have also

increased.

In the wake of 9/11, Pakistan made a representation in the Thai parliament in October

2001 that set the ball rolling for the strengthening of relations between the two countries

and the first Thai parliamentary delegation visited Pakistan in January–February 2002.

This was followed by exchange visits by foreign ministers and the then prime minister

Thaksin’s visit to Pakistan in July 2002. The Pakistani prime minister visited Thailand

in 2004, 2005 and 2006. Thailand invited Pakistan to be a founding member of the

Asia Cooperation Dialogue (ACD) at a ministerial level. This was in keeping with

Pakistan’s initiation of the “East Asian Vision Policy” which lays stress on building

economic relations with ASEAN. The trade volume between Thailand and

Pakistan now rates at over 500 million dollars with major Thai investment in the area

of infrastructure development in Pakistan.

A Pakistani diplomat in Bangkok reported that as a result of being a Muslim country,

Islam occupies an important place in Pakistan’s foreign policy with stress on bettering

relations with the Muslim world, but without discrimination toward non-Muslim

countries, and that Pakistan was formed on the basis of Islamic ideology but not

radicalism.36

The diplomat remarked that Pakistan is well known for its Islamic education offered

through madrasas (religious seminaries) and universities such as the International

Islamic University in Islamabad. The Thai students who go there for studies are screened

by the Thai authorities before being issued visas, and upon arrival in Pakistan, the Thai

students are registered with the Thai embassy. So far there is not a single case of violence

in which a Thai student studying in Pakistan was involved. Thus it is not proper to say

that these religious educational institutions are grounds for producing terrorists.37 Con-

cerning the southern Thai conflict, he replied that Pakistan views it as an internal Thai

problem and Pakistan was satisfied with the measures taken by the Thai government in

solving it. Pakistan welcomed Thailand’s invitation to the OIC Fact-finding Mission and

also the setting up of the National Reconciliation Commission as mechanisms toward

resolving the conflict in the South. Yet, there is a need to take measures for protecting

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the youth who are exploited to undertake subversive activities. This requires a well-

planned strategy to address a very old deep-rooted problem and needs time.38 Finally

he said that the international community should offer its services to the Thai government

in bridging gaps between the Center and Thai Muslims in the South. In this regard,

Pakistan has offered 50 scholarships for Thai Muslims students from the South to

acquire higher education in the area of non-religious education, i.e., sciences, social

sciences and professional education. It also offered 25 scholarships for Thai Muslim

teachers from the South to study in Pakistan for postgraduate studies in the fields of

education, languages and business administration.39

Iran

Diplomatic relations between Iran and Thailand were established on 25 November 1955

though an Iranian community had existed since the Ayudhaya period, which made

important cultural contributions to the development of Thai culture. Before the

Islamic revolution of Iran in 1975 relations were mostly restricted to trade and

commerce, and little else. Yet, the there were good relations between the royal families

of the two countries.40

Thailand was among the first countries to recognize the Islamic revolution of Iran in

1979 and relations started once again with the exchange of ambassadors in 1983. The

main aspect of this relationship revolves around energy. Thailand is in the process of

development and it needs oil and gas which it largely imports. The Thai petroleum

company PTT has invested in petrochemical projects in Iran and has also opened an

office in Tehran. Hence, Iran-Thai relations are on a good footing.

Concerning Thailand, Iran recognizes Thailand’s acceptance of the OIC Fact-finding

Mission. Iran and Thailand recognize the importance of recognition and non-violation of

human rights. Iran supports peaceful negotiations concerning southern Thailand and

does not support separatism. The southerners should negotiate and engage in dialogue

with the government and not resort to violent means, and the Thai government should

also respect Muslim religion and culture.

As regards education, there are currently about a hundred Thai students studying in

Iranian educational institutions, both in religious and general educational faculties.

They come from different parts of Thailand. Those studying in the religious institutions

study religious sciences such as Quranic studies, Hadith studies, Islamic philosophy and

mysticism. They are given the full freedom to increase their knowledge without any bias.

Thus, the overall state of relations between Iran and Thailand, both in the areas of

international and bilateral relations, is excellent.

Malaysia

The concept of ummah—worldwide Muslim community—is a significant point in

shaping the direction of Malaysian foreign policy with respect to both Muslim majority

and minority relations. Additionally, the pan-Malayan concept also plays an important

sentimental role in shaping Malaysian public opinion about the southern Thai conflict

and the involvement of their country in resolving the matter.

On the other hand, Thailand is always suspicious about Malaysian aid and support for

the southern Thai separatists. Thailand suspects that many rebels seek refugee status in

Malaysia to internationalize their case. Thus, while regional cooperation in the spirit of

ASEAN draws both these countries to a common platform, local issues make them

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sensitive to each others national security and ethno-religious concerns respectively. For

example, the former Mahathir administration was reluctant to allow any international

Islamic recognition of the matter due to his concern for the principal of “territorial

integrity”.41

Indeed, Malaysia has shown concern and aided Muslim minorities who have become

victims of conflict such as in Bosnia, Palestine and southern Thailand, citing humanitar-

ian considerations. However, Thai Muslims fleeing across the border into Malaysia have

always been a point of straining relations between both the countries as seen in 1981 and

also in 2005 when on both occasions Malaysia refused to repatriate the refugees. Malay

lobbyists in Malaysia have pressured their government to take a pro-Malay and pro-

Muslim stand toward the issue of refugees, as done earlier in the case of one hundred

thousand Kampuchean Muslim refugees in 1978 and those from southern Thailand.42

Malaysian politicians and political parties have been critical of Thailand’s handling of

the Takbai incident, calling it a massacre of the Muslims and blaming the then Prime

Minister Thaksin’s handling of the incident as pathetic.43 Comparing the southern

Thai conflict with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the former Prime Minister Mahathir

Mohammad called upon the Thai government to give autonomy to the South as a way

of resolving the southern conflict. Even though he also remarked that independence

was not possible, such statements from Malaysia irked the Thai government which did

not see such remarks in a positive light.44

The issue of how to treat people who flee across the Thai-Malay border into Malaysia

surfaced once again during the current conflict following the Tanyong Limoh incident,

when 131 Thai Muslims fled to the neighboring Malaysian state of Kelantan in

October 2005.

Mr. Nik Aziz Nik Mat, the Chief Minister of Kelantan, emphasized that cross-border

family ties encompassing race, language, and religion, exist between the people on both

sides.45 He also urged the Thai government to negotiate with the local Muslim popu-

lation instead of resorting to military force.46

In relation to the issue of the 131 Thai Muslims who had fled to Malaysia, the

Malaysian government took the stand not to return them unless they received assurance

from their government that their human rights will not be violated.47 The Malaysian

government also allowed the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to

interview the group. The stalemate over this matter led to a row between Malaysia

and Thailand and the matter remains unresolved.

In November 2005, the former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir visited Bangkok

and held private talks with Prime Minister Thaksin. It led to the end of the “megaphone

shouting match” between the two countries, and also to refraining from the use of the

word “autonomy” from the Malaysian side in reference to the South.48

The overthrow of the Thaksin government by the military led by General Sonthi

Boonyaratkalin may yet be a positive factor towards attending to the resolution of the

conflict. General Sonthi was the first to propose negotiating with the insurgents, even

during the period of the Thaksin regime, but he was sidelined. But after coming to

power General Sonthi and the interim Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont have

recognized the role of the former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir in contacting

the separatist leaders for peace talks with the Thai officials.49

The role of Malaysia in this process, both as an ASEAN and a Muslim neighbor

sharing ethnic relations with the Malay Muslims of the South, becomes both crucial

and complicated but an essential one. Malaysia does not want to get involved

uninvited.50 The Malaysian government, while encouraging peace talks between the

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Thai officials and the separatists, has declared that it will not interfere in the process.51

This could possibly be due to the ongoing political tension between the Malaysian

government and the former Prime Minister Mahathir, with the Malaysian government

wanting a clearly defined role for itself.

Indonesia

Indonesia is a country with largest Muslim population in the world. Its foreign policy is

based on the spirit of Indonesian nationalism. Islam has been a secondary factor in

Indonesia’s foreign policy. Yet, in light of various international Islam and Muslim

related events, the domestic Islamic groups and political parties have put pressure on

the government and its foreign policy to pay heed to worldwide Islamic/Muslim

considerations.

The regimes of Indonesian presidents Suharto, Habibie, Wahid, Megawati and Bambang

Yudhoyono have often had to accommodate Islamic concerns in dealing with the country’s

foreign affairs.52 Various Indonesian groups have protested against the Krue-Se and Takbai

incidences in Thailand, some referring to them as massacre of Muslims.

Diplomatic relations between Thailand and Indonesia were first established in 1950

and now have 55 years of history. The main features of these relations cover an increasing

number of areas including politics, security, social, cultural and economic ties, and they

are of a comprehensive nature as required by the stature of two close neighboring

countries. These relations also focus on regional security under ASEAN. Indonesian

foreign policy is directed by nationalism and anti-colonialism and not religious

motives. The Indonesian ambassador reiterated that Indonesia is a member of the

OIC and has good relations with the Muslim world. But it pays more attention to

ASEAN regional interests rather than to religion or ethnicity. At the same time, internally

within Indonesia, the government wants to empower Muslim moderates to fight against

terrorism and encourage interreligious dialogue.53

The ambassador also remarked that Indonesia does not have special relations with the

Muslims of southern Thailand and officially Indonesia considers southern Thailand as

an integral part of Thailand. Presently, there are about 120 Thai Buddhist and

Muslim students studying in Indonesian religious institutions, the madrasah, and at

secular universities, some of whom have been awarded government scholarships.

However, the Thai Muslim students studying in the religious madrasah are self financed.

Some of them attend religious schools managed by the largest Indonesian Muslim

religious organization known as Nahdatul Ulama or NU while others attend educational

institutions managed by religious organizations such as the Muhammadiyah. There are

also Thai Muslim students studying at the religious studies universities such as

Univesitas Islam Negeri Syarif Hidyatullah in Jakarta or various State Institutes of

Islamic Studies known as Institute Agama Islam Negri (IAIN) in different parts of the

country.

Concerning southern Thailand, the ambassador said that Indonesia sticks to the

ASEAN principle of non-interference into Thailand’s domestic affairs unless invited

by Thai authorities. The Thai government invited an Indonesian Muslim delegation

led by Mr. Hasyim Muzadi, the leader of the Nahdatul Ulama, which also comprised

of members from the Muhammadiyah to visit the South and mediate between the

government and the insurgents, and also to remove misperceptions about Thailand’s

treatment of its Muslim religious minority.54 After the visit to the South the Indonesian

delegation advised the Thai government to deal with the conflict situation in a civil way

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using the means of law similar to the way Indonesia dealt with its Bali bombers. This is

because resorting to military means and use of excessive force will further escalate the

situation, and will draw condemnations from the Muslim world and also international

human rights groups. The Indonesian delegation also offered undertaking an exchange

of ulamas or Muslim religious scholars between the two countries, as well as opportu-

nities for Thai Muslim scholars to study in Indonesia.

Overall the Indonesian Muslim public has expressed concern about the southern Thai

conflict within the spirit of Islamic religious fraternity while the Indonesian government

has offered its help to Thailand in dealing with its restive South in the spirit of neighborly

relations.

Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) and the Southern Conflict

The ethno-religious dimension of the conflict in southern Thailand has also become a

matter of foreign policy, effecting relations between the Muslim world and Thailand.

Though the foreign policy of most of the Muslim countries is based on their national

interests, all of them also give a reference to Islam due to the convergence of international

and domestic Muslim concerns.

The Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) and the neighboring Muslim countries

of Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei and the Muslim world in general have expressed concerns

at the plight of southern Thai Muslims. Largely viewing it as a non-religious and

domestic political issue, Muslim countries and the OIC expect that Thailand will be

able to restore peace in the South with respect for the ethnic and cultural identity of

the Thai Muslim minority. However, the general foreign Muslim opinion about the

conflict is that it is a conflict of religious dimension. Hence, there are two readings of

the conflict in the Muslim opinion.

The Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) is an inter-governmental organization

grouping fifty-seven Muslim countries. It was established in 1969 through the efforts of

King Faisal of Saudi Arabia. The goals of the OIC are to work for solidarity and build

cooperation among the Muslim member states. It is also committed to stand up for

the national rights, dignity and independence of all Muslim peoples in different countries

of the world including the non-Muslim states. Thailand joined the OIC in 1998 in the

capacity of an observer.

Since the aggravation of the conflict in 2004 and following the Krue-Se and Takbai

incidents in Pattani, the OIC issued several press releases in regard to southern Thailand,

which condemned the continuation of violence and the loss of lives and called for peace-

ful dialogue to resolve the problems faced by the Muslims in Thailand. They also called

for the safeguarding of their rights and to ensure that they are treated on equal footing

with other citizens and assisted to achieve a higher economic and social standard of

living.55

The OIC sent a high-level delegation to Thailand on official invitation from the Thai

government. The objective of the delegation was to observe and evaluate the conditions

of Muslims in southern Thailand, and to report its finding to the Islamic Conference of

Foreign Ministers (ICFM) that was scheduled to be held in San‘aa, Yemen at the end of

June 2005.

The delegation aimed to use their “good offices with the Thai government to ease the

obstacles facing negotiations on allowing Thai Muslims to enjoy their acquired rights as

citizens. It would also aim at halting security authorities’ acts of violence and oppression

against them, so as to support the efforts to enthrone peace and stability in

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Thailand, within the framework of respect for the country’s sovereignty and territorial

integrity”.56

During their visit, Ambassador Syed Qasim al-Masri remarked that the mere transfer

of military personnel to inactive posts following the Krue-Se and Takbai incidents was

not enough and called for the payment of adequate compensation to the victims and

their families.57 The delegation concluded that the unrest in the South was not the

result of religious discrimination against the Muslims nor was it rooted in religion but

could be rooted in culture and the historic neglect of the South.58 Also Thailand was suc-

cessful in convincing Malaysia about the same and succeeded in keeping off from discus-

sion the issue of the South at the OIC ministers meeting in San‘aa on 30 June 2005.59

Yet, Ambassador al-Masri in his report to the San‘aa meeting of the OIC remarked

that though religion was not a factor in the conflict, this did not mean that there was

no problem in the South. He remarked that Thailand should allow the southern local

Muslims to have a greater say in managing their affairs and also to be allowed to practice

their culture and language.60

In October 2005, the OIC issued another press release that called for addressing the

roots of the problem and settling the issues through dialogue and recognition of the

legitimate aspirations of the population of the South. The Secretary General, Professor

Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, expressed regret over the casualties among innocent civilians and

reiterated his strong condemnation of actions that harmed the civilians.61 This statement

irked Prime Minister Thaksin, who remarked that Islam requires all Muslims to respect

the law of the countries in which they reside and live peacefully with others, and that the

OIC should also express regret for the killings of both the Buddhist monks and the

Muslims. However, political observers are of the opinion that the OIC is listening to

both the Thai government and the separatist groups outside Thailand and wants to

see more being done to resolve the conflict.62

The next OIC reference to the southern Thai conflict was made at the opening of the

33rd Session of the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers in Baku, Azerbaijan on 19–

22 June 2006 when the Secretary General urged Thailand to respect cultural differences

in order to resolve the conflict, and on this occasion the OIC also released a five-page

report on the Thai situation.

In the aftermath of the overthrow of the Thaksin regime and the interim Prime

Minister Sarayud Chulanont’s apology to the southern Muslims, the OIC issued a state-

ment welcoming this positive change on the part of the government and also offered its

services in finding “ways to establish security and stability within the framework of peace

negotiations between the government and the representatives of Muslims in southern

Thailand”.63

The latest OIC participation occurred when Mr. Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, Secretary-

General of the OIC visited Bangkok between 30 April and 2 May 2007, to discuss the

southern Thai crisis, but he did not visit the South. He expressed appreciation of the

change of approach adopted by the new military-backed government and offered

cooperation in resolving the crisis through welfare, economic, social and educational

initiatives.64 Furthermore, he asked the Thai Muslims to respect the law and the

Thai government to equip them with equal rights.65 Most recently, the communique

on Thailand issued at the end of the 34th Session of the Islamic Conference of

Foreign Ministers in Islamabad, Pakistan, 15–17 May 2007, called for accelerating

the process of accountability for building confidence among the local southern Thai

Muslim population and granting them the responsibility to manage their own affairs

within the sphere of the Thai constitution.66

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Reportage about Southern Thailand in the Muslim Media

Today, news travels in a flash and the news about the events in southern Thailand is being

reported in nearly all Muslim media. The Thai press has been very emphatic about

reporting the events in southern Thailand as largely an internal matter. Since the area

of conflict involves a region with the largest Muslim population, the international

Muslim media has largely reported on the southern Thai conflict as being a religious

conflict between a Buddhist state and the local Muslims. A general survey of the print,

radio, television and online media reports in the Muslim world about events in southern

Thailand confirms this trend.

The conflict in southern Thailand is largely viewed in the Muslim media in pan-

Islamist terms. The worldwide Muslim community views the conflict as being

the persecution of Muslims in a Buddhist majority country, while at the regional level,

the Malay press tends to view the conflict in terms of pan-Malayness in reference

to the ethnic unity of the Malay people. This is evident from the street protests against

the Thai embassy and raging parliamentary debate in Malaysia following the Kru-Se

and Takbai incidents. A Malaysian commentator Farish Noor has written media articles

entitled, “Southern Thailand: A Bloody Mess About to Get Bloodier” and “The Killings

in Southern Thailand: A Long History of Persecution Unrecorded”, both written in

pan-Malayan spirit.67 Similar sentiment prevails in the Malay press reporting on the

southern Thai unrest.

Similar pan-Malay and pan-Islamic sentiments were expressed by the Malaysian

Foreign Minister Mr. Hamid Albar who as reported in the Pakistani daily Dawn

remarked that as Thailand is close to Malaysia, what happens to Muslims in Thailand

has an impact on Malaysia. The Chief Minister of Kelantan and leader of the PAS

(Parti Islam Malaysia) party, Mr. Nik Aziz Nik Mat, even stated that the Bangkok

government was insensitive and dictatorial in its policy towards the South, while other

PAS leaders mentioned that the southern Thai provinces belong to Muslim Malaysia

and not Buddhist Thailand.68

The Jakarta Post of Indonesia urged Prime Minister Thaksin to learn from Indonesia’s

experience in dealing with the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) and called for holding talks

with separatists in the South and to come up with a peace agreement. The report also

informed its readers that “the discontent among Muslim Thais in the south has been

fed by the poor economic opportunities in the region; their distinct culture, history,

language and religion from the Buddhist Thai majority; and the human rights violations

they have been subject to by Thai troops and police”.69

There have been many reports about South Thailand in the Muslim media outside the

ASEAN region. The Canadian-based “muslimedia international”, which is the online

edition of the pro-Iranian print magazine Crescent International and calls itself the news-

magazine of the Islamic movement, reported on the southern Thai conflict in pan-

Islamist terms. It asserted that cultural imperialism is being imposed on the southern

Muslims by the regime in Bangkok through the suppression of the local Malay identity

and language. It also mentioned that the Muslims of southern Thailand, like those in

Mindanao, have sought moral and material support from the Arab regimes but to no

avail. It is also hoped that the Thai government does not end up like those of Indonesia

and the Philippines, which have gotten entangled in an unending protracted war which

they cannot afford nor can win.70

Another report in the same magazine after the Takbai incident referred to Thaksin as

the “Butcher of Bangkok” who avoided use of democratic means to resolve the conflict.

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It remarked that the Thaksin government was more interested in showing the Bush

administration that it was an ally in the latter’s global “War against Terror”.71 The repor-

tage in the Crescent views the southern conflict as a highhanded war against defenseless

Muslims.

A popular Muslim website by the name of “islamonline.net” has also been

reporting the southern conflict regularly. In its news reportage it has used headlines

such as “Thailand Buys US Arms for War in Muslim South”72 and “Thai Muslim

Massacred. . .What Lies Beneath” and has talked about the historical past of the

Patani sultanate, and the movement for separatism sparked by discrimination in jobs,

education and economic neglect of the South.73

A report entitled, “Thailand Perpetuating the Taming of Islam in Patani” talks about

the long war perpetuated by Siam against Islam and Muslims in Pattani, where the

freedom fighters are fighting for the birthrights of Muslims in their own motherland.74

Commenting on the Krue-Se incident, a report on the same website calls upon

Muslims to familiarize themselves “with the struggle of our brothers in Pattani”,

which is currently occupied by outsiders.75 It also calls upon worldwide Muslims to fam-

iliarize themselves with the case of Pattani for this case is similar to those in Chechnya,

Kashmir, Aceh and Uzbekistan.

Another article talks of the history of Siamese rule over the Muslim South and its

insensitivity to local culture and religion combined with economic neglect and

imposition of Thai language and Buddhist culture. It remarks that the repression of

the “Pattanese” people “is part and parcel of a global campaign aimed at suppressing

Muslims worldwide”.76 It further remarks that, “crackdown on Pattanese Muslims

may also have an impact throughout Southeast Asia due to multiple ideological and logis-

tical linkages between Muslim separatists operating in the region”.77

On 1 July 2004, islamonline.net conducted a live dialogue about “Struggle in Pattani”

which illustrated how the conflict is understood by Muslims internationally. An anon-

ymous respondent to various questions asked from around the world called for a

united Muslim stand against attempts by the Thai state to eradicate the “Muslims’ cul-

tural identity”, and also welcomed the change in the stance of the Malaysian government

under Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi who has taken a “pro-Muslim approach”,

marking a difference from that of former Prime Minister Mahathir.

The respondent emphasized the common history between Malaysia and Pattani and the

close ethnic relations between the people in the two locations and that the conflict is now

moving towards a state of conflict between Thailand and Malaysia. Calling the unrest as a

Muslim-Buddhist conflict, the respondent also said that the conflict in Pattani is in line

with Muslim conflicts in Palestine, Chechnya, Aceh and Mindanao, and the conflict is

to be interpreted as a jihad situation as indicated in the text of Berjihad di Patani.

Conclusion

The Islamic religious concepts of ikhwah (Muslim religious fraternity) and ummah

(Muslims constituting a world community) have played an important role in drawing

the Muslim world’s attention toward the southern Thai conflict at various levels in

spite of the fact that it is largely a local domestic conflict.

The problems in southern Thailand are the result of decades of economic neglect, lack

of employment opportunities for the local Muslims in both public and private sectors,

cultural insensitivity of the bureaucracy and the non-recognition of the religious, linguis-

tic and cultural diversity within Thai polity. A resolution to these problems requires

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greater efforts by the Thai government to respond to the demands of the local Muslim

population, which would contribute to building peace and stability within Thailand.

Otherwise, the Muslim world, both in the neighborhood and further away, will be

misinformed and continue to perceive the problems in the South as being directed

against a part of the Muslim ummah in Thailand, similar to the experience of those in

Palestine, Kashmir, Chechnya, Iraq, Afghanistan and the Philippines, etc.

The southern Thai conflict has drawn the attention of the worldwide Muslim community

and also international and regional jihadists i.e., ideological militant Islamic groups engaged

in armed struggle against Muslim and non-Muslim nation states. Lacking information, they

view the southern Thai conflict in religious terms as being directed against Thai Muslims.

However, as per the International Crisis Group report on southern Thailand, the conflict

still remains local and has not involved the global or regional jihadists.78

The southern Thai conflict, being an ethno-religious conflict between the two exclu-

sive ethno-religious worldviews of Thai sasana (religion) and Malay agama (religion)

has to be understood in a cosmological and ethno-cultural context, needing more than

a mere political and security response to solve it. It requires the mutual recognition of

the Thai and Malay identities within Thai space. In other words, it also requires a

degree of social engineering through reviving the previous more efficient administrative

body. One such effort is the post-Thaksin government’s proposal to revive the Southern

Border Provinces Administrative Center (SBPAC)—a civilian-military-police task force

which played a crucial role in offering a forum for dialogue between the locals and the

authorities but was dissolved by Thaksin.79 The revived SBPAC, under its new name

of Southern Border Provinces Development Center (SBPDC), will, in the aftermath

of two years of violence, play a crucial and a newly designed role towards resolving the

southern conflict. It should work towards changing the prevalent hostile attitudes

between the Thai Buddhists and Malay Muslims of the South to ones of mutual accep-

tance and trust and towards the building of cooperation in managing their political and

social affairs together.

From the perspective of the Muslim world which is observing the southern Thai

conflict, the resolution of the conflict requires not only the effort and recommendations

for reconciliation, but the deliverance of justice both as a symbolic offering and reality, for

it is confession, atonement and forgiveness that seal reconciliation both psychologically

and politically.

Furthermore, though Thailand prefers to handle the conflict on its own without

outside assistance, the ground reality shows this is not possible strategically. Involving

Muslim neighboring countries and international Muslim organizations such as the

OIC cannot be ruled out, for their involvement can go a long way in helping to resolve

the conflict. Thus Thailand should do more than just concentrate its efforts internally

and focus on the types of resolutions and press releases issued by the OIC that will

contribute towards improving relations between Thailand and the Muslim world, to

the mutual benefit of all parties concerned. The recent Thai invitations to the OIC

and to Indonesia to send fact finding missions, and the former Malaysian Prime Minister

Mahathir Muhammad to intervene, demonstrate that international diplomacy and

cooperation cannot be ignored or disregarded. General Sonthi attended the Hajj pilgrim-

age of 2006 with the intention of explaining the Thai government’s efforts in resolving

the southern conflict in a peaceful manner, but had to cut short his visit due to the

New Year eve bombings in Bangkok.80

Finally, on the internal front, the resolution of the conflict requires the Malay

Muslims of Thailand to sift between their ethnically defined perspective of Islam,

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which is exclusivist in orientation and the universal percepts of Islamic religion, to recog-

nize that Islam as a world religion promotes and encourages co-existence, dialogue and

cooperation with other religions, cultures, ethnic communities and nations, as evident

from the following verse of the Qur’an:

O mankind! We created you out of a male and a female and have made you into

nations and tribes, so that you might come to know one another (not that you

may despise each other). Verily, the noblest of you in the sight of God is the one

who is most deeply conscious of Him. Behold, God is all-knowing, all-aware.

(Qur’an 49 : 13)

Geography and history have tied the destinies of Thai Islam and Thai Buddhism to exist

together, thus it bears on both of them to live in the spirit of cooperation. It is time that

both these communities became religious pluralist.

NOTES

1. This research is part of “Violence and non-Violence in Thai Society” project under senior research

scholar Assoc. Prof. Dr. Chaiwat Satha-Anand funded by Thailand Research Fund.

2. Jacob L. Landau, The Politics of Pan-Islam, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994, pp. 13–21.

3. Joseph Chinyong Liow, “The Security Situation in Southern Thailand: Toward an Understanding of

Domestic and International Dimensions”, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 27, 2004,

pp. 531–48; Peter Chalk, “Separatism and Southeast Asia: The Islamic Factor in Southern Thailand,

Mindanao, and Aceh”, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 24, 2001, pp. 241–69; Rohan Gunar-

tana, Arabinda Acharya and Sabrina Chua, Conflict and Terrorism in Southern Thailand, Singapore:

Marshall Cavendish, 2005.

4. The author of this paper had requested interviews with various Muslim embassies in Thailand

concerning the topic of this paper. Only the embassies of Pakistan, Iran and Indonesia responded to

the request. The embassy of Saudi Arabia declined the request while that of Egypt did not respond

at all.

5. These are: Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalaam, Egypt, Qatar, Indonesia, Iraq, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait,

Malaysia, Morocco, Oman, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, UAE and Uzbekistan.

6. Imtiyaz Yusuf, “Religious Diversity in a Buddhist Majority Country: The Case of Islam in Thailand”,

International Journal of Buddhist Thought and Culture, Vol. 3, September 2003, pp. 131–43.

7. Islam was founded in 611 A.D. when Prophet Muhammad received the first revelation of the Qur’an

in Mecca.

8. Encyclopedia of Islam, s.v. “Balkh”; Encyclopaedia Iranica, s.v. “Buddhism”.

9. The term Ahl al-Kitab, or “the People of the Book”, is a Qur’anic term and Prophet Muhammad’s

reference to the followers of Christianity and Judaism as religions that possess divine books of

revelation (Torah, Psalter, Gospel) which gives them a privileged position above followers of other

religions. See Encyclopedia of Islam, s.v. “Ahl al-Kitab”.

10. Ignaz Goldziher, Introduction to Islamic Theology and Law, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,

1981, p. 141.

11. Quoted in S.M. Yusuf, “The Early Contacts Between Islam and Buddhism”, University of Ceylon

Review, Vol. 13, 1955, p. 28.

12. Richard C. Foltz, Religions of the Silk Road, New York: St Martin’s Griffin, 1999, p. 100. Also Richard

Bulliet, “Naw Bahar and the Survival of Iranian Buddhism”, Iran, Vol. 14, 1976, pp. 140–5.

13. Richard C. Foltz, Religions of the Silk Road, op. cit., pp. 100–1. See also Encyclopedia of Religon (Mircea

Eliade, General Editor), s.v. “Madrasah”.

14. Richard C. Foltz, Religions of the Silk Road, op. cit., p. 100.

15. Qur’an 18 : 64. See also Bruce B. Lawrence, Shahrastani on the Indian Religions, The Hague: Mouton,

1976, pp. 113–14.

16. Muhammad Hamidullah, Muhammad Rasullah, Hyderabad: Habib & Co, 1974, pp. 27, 107. See also

David Scott, “Buddhism and Islam: Past to Present Encounters and Interfaith Lessons”, NUMEN,

Vol. 42, 1995, pp. 141–55.

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17. Raymond Scupin, “Islam in Thailand before the Bangkok Period”, Journal of Siam Society, Vol. 68,

1980, pp. 55–71.

18. See Shorter Encyclopedia of Islam, s.v. “Ismailiya” and “Shi’a”. See also Moojan Momen, An Introduc-

tion to Shi’i Islam, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1987.

19. Omar Farouk, “The Muslims of Thailand”, in ISLAMIKA, ed. Lutfi Ibrahim, Kuala Lampur:

Sarjana Enterprise, 1981, pp. 97–121.

20. Raymond Scupin, “Cham Muslims of Thailand: A Haven of Security in Southeast Asia”, Journal

Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 2, 1989, pp. 486–91. Also Seddik Taouti, “The

Forgotten Muslims of Kampuchea and Vietnam”, Journal Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs,

Vol. 4, Nos. 1 & 2, 1982, pp. 3–13. See also Suthep Soonthornpasuch, “Islamic Identity in

Chiengmai City: A Historical and Structural Comparison of Two Communities”, unpublished

PhD dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1977. Also David Wilson and David Henley,

“Northern Comfort: The Contented Muslims of Chiang Mai”, Bangkok Post Outlook Section, 4

January 1995, pp. 33, 40.

21. This is different from a learned Muslim view about kufr and mushrik. Muhammad Asad, a translator

and an exegete of the Qur’an, comments that the meaning of the terms kufr and kafir in the Qur’an are

determined by the meanings these terms had in the Arabic language during pre-Islamic times, and

their meanings cannot be equated to “unbeliever” or “infidel” in the restricted sense as referring

to one who rejects the doctrine of the Qur’an and the teachings of Muhammad, as is being done

by Muslim theologians of the post-classical times and also Western translators of the Qur’an.

Rather, “a kafir is ‘one who denies [or “refuses to acknowledge”] the truth’ in the widest, spiritual

sense . . . irrespective of whether it relates to a cognition of the supreme truth—namely, the existence

of God—or to a doctrine or ordinance enunciated in the divine writ, or to a self-evident moral prop-

osition, or to an acknowledgement of, and therefore gratitude for, favours received”. Muhammad

Asad, The Message of the Qur’an, Gibraltar: Dar al-Andalus, 1980, p. 907. The term shirk means

the ascribing of divinity to anything besides God and “is not confined to a worship of other

“deities”, but implies also the attribution of divine or quasi-divine powers to persons or objects not

regarded as deities: in other words, it embraces also saint-worship, etc.”. Or through “overstepping

the bounds of truth”. Ibid., pp. 110, 160. In the case of Buddhism, it would imply overstepping

the Dhamma—the teachings of the Buddha.

22. Jonathan Fox, Ethnoreligious Conflict in Late Twentieth Century: AGeneral Theory, Lanham: Lexington

Books, 2002, p. 26.

23. Surin Pitsuwan, Islam and Malay Nationalism: A Case Study of Malay-Muslims of Southern Thailand,

Bangkok: Thai Khadi Research Institute Thammasat University, 1985, pp. 8, 12.

24. Ibid., p. 13.

25. Donald Tugby and Elise Tugby, “Malay-Muslim and Thai-Buddhist Relations in the Pattani Region:

An Interpretation”, in TheMuslims of Thailand, Vol. 2, eds, Andrew D. W. Forbes (general editor) and

Sachchidanand Sahai, Gaya, India: Center for South East Asian Studies, 1989, p. 73.

26. M. Ladd Thomas, “Thai Muslim Separatism in South Thailand”, in The Muslims of Thailand, Vol. 2,

eds, Andrew D. W. Forbes (general editor) and Sachchidanand Sahai, Gaya, India: Center for South

East Asian Studies, 1989, p. 21.

27. Stanley J. Tambiah, Leveling Crowds: Ethnonationalist Conflicts and Collective Violence in South Asia,

Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996, p. 16.

28. Ibid., p. 22.

29. “Ignorance ‘Cause of Unrest’”, Bangkok Post, 12 May 2006, p. 2.

30. “Buddhists, Muslims on Path to Mistrust and Fear”, The Nation, 13 March 2004, p. 6A; Sanitsuda

Ekachai, “What Can the Generals Have Been Thinking”, Bangkok Post, 5 August 2004, p. 11;

“Buddhists Tell PM They Live in Fear”, Bangkok Post, 8 November 2004, p. 1; “Violence Doesn’t

Spare Even Peace-loving Buddhist Monks”, Bangkok Post, 4 January 2005, p. 4.

31. William Roff, Kelantan, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1974; Mohd. Taib Osman, Islamic

Civilization in theMalayWorld, Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka and The Research Centre

for Islamic History, Art and Culture, 1997; Azyumardi Azra, The Origins of Islamic Reformism in

Southeast Asia, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2004; A.B.Shamsul, “Islam Embedded:

Religion and Plurality in Southeast Asia as a Mirror for Europe”, in Asia Europe Journal, Vol. 3,

2005, pp. 159–78.

32. Peter Mandaville, Transnational Muslim Politics, London: Routledge, 2004, p. 55.

33. Chaiwat Satha-Anand, “Praying in the Rain: The Politics of Engaged Muslims in Anti-War Protest in

Thai Society”, Global Change, Peace and Security, Vol. 16, No. 2, 2004, pp. 151–67.

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34. Alisa Tang, “Arab education of Thai Muslims under fire”, 14 April 2004, available online at:

,http://www.boston.com. (accessed 25 October 2005).

35. Interview with Mr. Mohammed Nafis Zakariyya, Deputy Head of Mission, Embassy of Pakistan,

Bangkok, 25 October 2005.

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid.

39. Ibid.

40. Interview with Mr. Mohsen Pakain, Iranian Ambassdor to Thailand, 15 September 2005.

41. Shanti Nair, Islam in Malaysian Foreign Policy, London: Routledge, 1997, p. 182.

42. Ibid., p. 176.

43. “Thailand faces Malay Criticism”, 10 November 2004, available online at: ,http://english.aljazeera.net. (accessed 10 November 2004).

44. “Mahathir Urges Autonomy for South Thailand”, 29 October 2004, available online at: ,http://

islamonline.net. (accessed 29 October 2004).

45. Vaudine England, “Malays Reject Accusations They Aid Thai Separatists”, 6 May 2005, available

online at: ,http://www.iht.com. (accessed 6 May 2005).

46. “Malaysian Party Urges Thai-south Talks”, 3 September 2005, available online at: ,http://

english.aljazeera.net. (accessed 3 September 2005).

47. “Diplomatic Stalemate: KL Says it Won’t Release ‘Refugees’”, 29 September 2005, available online

at: ,http://www.nationmultimedia.com. (accessed 29 September 2005); “KL’s Envoy Summoned

for Protest”, Bangkok Post, 8 October 2005, p. 1; “Thaksin Sees No Need for Talks with KL”,

Bangkok Post, 10 October 2005, p. 1; “Thai-M’sian War of Words Heats Up”, Bangkok Post, 19

October 2005, p. 2; “M’sia, Thailand Still at Odds”, Bangkok Post, 28 October 2005, p. 3.

48. “‘Autonomy’ Not a Good Word Both Sides Agree”, The Nation, 23 November 2005, p. 1.

49. “Rebels Signal They May Talk to End Unrest”, Bangkok Post, 5 October 2006, p. 1; “KL Promises

Not to Interfere in South”, Bangkok Post, 8 October 2006, p. 3; “Authorities Seek Two Key Rebel

Leaders”, Bangkok Post, 12 October 2006, p. 2; “KL May Host Negotiations with Militants”,

Bangkok Post, 14 October 2006, p. 4.

50. Omar Farouk Bajunid, “The Malaysian Factor in the Prospects for Peace in Southern Thailand”, in

Understanding Conflict and Approaching Peace in Southern Thailand, eds. Imtiyaz Yusuf and Lars Peter

Schmidt, Bangkok: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V., 2006, p. 235.

51. “KL Backs ‘Peace’ For Far South”, Bangkok Post, 19 October 2006, p. 1.

52. Michael Leifer, “The Islamic Factor in Indonesia’s Foreign Policy: A Case of Functional Ambiguity”,

in Islam in Foreign Policy, ed. Adeed Dawisha, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983, p. 144;

Rizal Sukma, Islam in Indonesian Foreign Policy, London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003; Azyumardi Azra,

Indonesia, Islam and Democracy, Jakarta: Solstice Publishing, 2006, pp. 89–111.

53. Interview with Mr. Ibrahim Yusuf, Indonesian Ambassador to Thailand, 20 October 2005.

54. “World’s Largest Islamic Group Ends Peace Mission to Thailand”, The Nation, 1 April 2005.

55. “The OIC Condemns the Aggressions against Civilians and Foreign Tourists in Southern Thailand”,

press release, 10 April 2005, available online at: ,http://www.oic-oci.org/press/english/2005-

activity.htm. (accessed 10 April 2005).

56. “OIC Secretary General Dispatches a Good-offices Mission to Assess Conditions of Muslims in

Southern Thailand”, press release, 1 June 2005, available online at: ,http://www.oic-oci.org/

press/english/2005-activity.htm. (accessed 1 June 2005).

57. “OIC Doubts Transfers were Enough”, Bangkok Post, 4 June 2005, p. 2; Anuraj Manibandhu, “OIC

Team Here to Ferret Out the Truth”, Bangkok Post, 7 June 2005, p. 11.

58. “Bid to Keep South Off the OIC Agenda”, Bangkok Post, 9 June 2005, p. 4.

59. Achara Ashayagachat, “OIC Panel Says Unrest Local Issue—Surakiart”, Bangkok Post, 10 June 2005,

p. 3; Kantathi Suphamongkhon, “Govt Keen to Promote Muslim Community”, Bangkok Post, 2 July

2005, p. 8.

60. Achara Ashayagachat, “An Internal Issue of Keen Interest to Outsiders”, Bangkok Post, 5 July 2005,

p. 11.

61. “Press Release on Recurrent Waves of Violence in Southern Thailand”, press release, 18 October

2005, available online at: ,http://www.oic-oci.org/press/english/2005-activity.htm. (accessed

18 October 2005).

62. “Thaksin Tells OIC Sec-gen to Read Koran”, The Nation, 20 October 2005; “OIC Slight: Loaded

Remarks Strain Relations”, The Nation, 21 October 2005.

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63. “OIC Lauds Sarayud’s Measures to End Unrest”, Bangkok Post, 8 November 2006, p. 2.

64. “Official Here with Suggestions on How to Ease Violence in Region”, The Nation, 1 May 2007, avail-

able online at: ,http://www.nationmultimedia.com. (accessed 1 May 2007).

65. “Muslims Should Behave and Have Equal Rights, Says OIC”, The Nation, 2 May 2007, available

online at: ,http://www.nationmultimedia.com. (accessed 2 May 2007).

66. “More Can be Done in South” Bangkok Post, May 3, 2007, p. 4; “Communique Amended After Thai

Lobbying” Bangkok Post, May 18, 2007, p. 2.

67. Farish Noor, “Southern Thailand: A Bloody Mess About to Get Bloodier”, and “The Killings in

Southern Thailand: A Long History of Persecution Unrecorded”, available online at:

,www.muslimwakeup.com. (accessed 30 April 2004).

68. Baradan Kuppusamy, “Thai Unrest a Serious Problem for Malaysia”, DAWN, 7 September 2005,

available online at: ,www.dawn.com. (accessed 7 September 2005).

69. Thang D. Nguyen, “Thaksin can Learn From Indonesia”, The Jakarta Post, 26 September 2005 avail-

able online at: ,www.thejakartapost.com. (accessed 26 September 2005).

70. “Plight of Pattani Muslims Highlighted by Violence in Southern Thailand”, February 2004, available

online at: ,www.muslimedia.com. (accessed February 2004).

71. “Thailand’s Thaksin Unfazed by Condemnations after Latest Massacre of Muslims”, December

2004, available online at: ,www.muslimedia.com. (accessed December 2004).

72. “Thailand Buys US Arms for War in Muslim South”, available online at: ,http://islamonline.net/English/News/2005-07/14/article03.shtml. (accessed 14 July 2005).

73. Mohamed Gamal Arafa, “Thai Muslim Massacred. . .What Lies Beneath”, available online at:

,http://islamonline.net. (accessed 28 October 2004).

74. Kazi Mahmood, “Thailand Perpetuating the Taming of Islam in Patani”, 13 March 2002, available

online at: ,http://islamonline.net. (accessed 13 March 2002).

75. “Pattani Erupts”, 28 April 2004, available online at: ,http://islamonline.net. (accessed 28 April

2004).

76. Kareem Kamel, “Shock and Awe in Pattani Muslims Under Attack in Thailand”, 12 May 2004,

available online at: ,http://islamonline.net. (accessed 10 May 2005).

77. Ibid.

78. International Crisis Group, “Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad”, Asia Report No. 98, 18

May 2005, pp. 37–8.

79. “SBPAC Successor Name Agreed”, Bangkok Post, 17 October 2006, p. 3.

80. “Sonthi Plans to Visit Muslim Countries”, Bangkok Post, 18 October 2006, p. 2.

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