the soviet bor-4 spaceplanes and their legacy · the soviet bor-4 spaceplanes and their legacy ......

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13 The Soviet BOR-4 Spaceplanes and Their Legacy In the 1988 report the CIA believed Buran’s primary mis- sion would be space station support (logistics and assembly). Its lack of orbital manoeuvrability and the time required for pre-launch checkouts limited its usefulness for most potential intelligence and combat missions. The spaceplane, on the other hand, was expected to be able to change its orbital inclination by as much as 15° and change its orbital altitude by about 4,200 km, making it ideal for reconnaissance, inspection and combat missions. Its expected cross-range capability of up to 2,400 km would provide many additional opportunities each day to re- turn to selected military airfields. It was also expected to have limited space station support capability, being used for rapid return of high priority cargo or crew rescue missions. Still, the status of the spaceplane programme was said to be unclear and it was believed to have taken a backseat to Buran for several reasons: “A number of factors may have reduced the spaceplane’s priority, and the first full-scale prototype, assuming Moscow is still committed to the program- may not be launched until the early 1990s. Two of the primary missions that a spaceplane could perform – real-time reconnaissance of critical targets and post-strike reconnaissance – have now at least partially been fulfilled by the Soviet near-real-time imaging satellite. Moreover, we judge that resource constraints played a role in any recent Soviet decision not to complete the shuttle and spaceplane programs simultaneously. The shuttle and spaceplane would probably be developed by the same design bureau. The Soviets may have allocated available people initially to the shuttle in order to support near-term space station operations. Even if these trained personnel would be available, however, in light of current economic difficulties the Soviets may have chosen to complete the two costly programs sequentially rather than simultaneously. A Soviet decision to slow, or possibly even curtail, work on the spaceplane may also be related to Soviet efforts to delay US antisatellite programs and, more recently, the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). The negotiating record of the 1978-1979 US-USSR ASAT talks and subsequent Soviet arms control proposals indicate that Moscow is concerned about the potential of the US [Space Shuttle] to interfere with or destroy Soviet satellites and to deploy space-based weapons. The Soviets have sought to negotiate limits on military-related orbiter activities to ensure protection from near-term US capabilities. Full-scale testing of a Soviet spaceplane would undermine these efforts as well as their campaign against SDI” [24]. Outside the intelligence community the speculation about the spaceplane was only fuelled by several mysterious test flights flown by the Soviet Union in the late 1970s and mid 1980s. Firstly, in 1977-79 the Proton rocket flew three mis- sions in which it deployed two heavy objects that re-entered after a single orbit. Many observers linked these “Double Cosmos” missions to a spaceplane programme [25]. It wasn’t until the early 1990s that the Russians revealed that these had been test flights of the return capsules of the TKS spacecraft, which were transport ships for Chelomei’s Almaz military space station [26]. Secondly, in 1986-1987 there were four test flights of the Zenit rocket that deployed heavy, inert payloads into low Earth orbits (Kosmos-1767, 1820, 1871, 1873), interpreted by some outside the intelli- gence community as being mass models of the spaceplane [27]. Not until the turn of the century did the Russians reveal that the heavy Zenit payloads had been mass models of the Tselina-2 electronic intelligence satellite with an additional mock payload attached to see how the Zenit would perform when placing heavy payloads into orbit [28]. There are no indications that the Double Cosmos or Zenit flights were associated with the rumoured spaceplane by the US intelligence community. Actually, in a classified 1980 re- port the CIA had correctly identified the “Double Cosmos” missions as re-entry tests of the TKS return vehicles, although it wrongly interpreted the TKS vehicles as successors to the military Almaz space stations rather than transport vehicles serving those stations [29]. The Russians did little to discount the Western claims about the military spaceplane. Disclosing the true purpose of the BOR-4 missions would have forced them to publicly reveal the Buran programme, which officially remained a state secret until shortly before the maiden flight of the Energiya rocket in May 1987, when Moscow finally admitted the rocket would be used among other things to launch a reusable space shuttle. Soviet media finally released the first picture of the Energiya/ Buran stack on 29 September 1988, the very same day that Space Shuttle Discovery returned America to space more than 2.5 years after the Challenger disaster. On 24 November 1988, just over a week after the maiden mission of Buran, an article in the Pravda newspaper became the first to officially link the BOR-4 missions to Buran: “The final test [of the heatshield] were the launches of the manoeuvrable satellites Kosmos- 1374, 1445, 1517 and 1614. Those first Soviet aerospace ships made it possible to study the functioning of the tiles and the carbon material on the nose in conditions close to those expe- rienced by the heatshield of Buran” [30]. Nevertheless, Scientific American magazine published an article on the Soviet Union’s space programme in February 1989, which once again repeated speculation about the spaceplane [31]. The article was reprinted in the Russian ver- sion of the magazine in April 1989, accompanied by a picture of one of the BOR-4 recoveries [32]. With nothing to hide anymore, the Russians were quick to react. Soviet deputy De- fence Minister Vitaliy M. Shabanov called the story about the spaceplane a “canard”, not ruling out the possibility that it was Fig. 24 Illustration from Soviet Military Power 1985 showing the purported spaceplane attacking an enemy satellite. (source: US Department of Defence)

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Page 1: The Soviet BOR-4 Spaceplanes and Their Legacy · The Soviet BOR-4 Spaceplanes and Their Legacy ... Soviet media finally released the first picture of the ... tank and a spaceplane

13

The Soviet BOR-4 Spaceplanes and Their Legacy

In the 1988 report the CIA believed Buran’s primary mis-sion would be space station support (logistics and assembly).Its lack of orbital manoeuvrability and the time required forpre-launch checkouts limited its usefulness for most potentialintelligence and combat missions. The spaceplane, on the otherhand, was expected to be able to change its orbital inclinationby as much as 15° and change its orbital altitude by about 4,200km, making it ideal for reconnaissance, inspection and combatmissions. Its expected cross-range capability of up to 2,400 kmwould provide many additional opportunities each day to re-turn to selected military airfields. It was also expected to havelimited space station support capability, being used for rapidreturn of high priority cargo or crew rescue missions.

Still, the status of the spaceplane programme was said to beunclear and it was believed to have taken a backseat to Buranfor several reasons:

“A number of factors may have reduced the spaceplane’spriority, and the first full-scale prototype, assumingMoscow is still committed to the program- may not belaunched until the early 1990s. Two of the primarymissions that a spaceplane could perform – real-timereconnaissance of critical targets and post-strikereconnaissance – have now at least partially beenfulfilled by the Soviet near-real-time imaging satellite.Moreover, we judge that resource constraints played arole in any recent Soviet decision not to complete theshuttle and spaceplane programs simultaneously. Theshuttle and spaceplane would probably be developed bythe same design bureau. The Soviets may have allocatedavailable people initially to the shuttle in order to supportnear-term space station operations. Even if these trainedpersonnel would be available, however, in light of currenteconomic difficulties the Soviets may have chosen tocomplete the two costly programs sequentially ratherthan simultaneously.

A Soviet decision to slow, or possibly even curtail, workon the spaceplane may also be related to Soviet effortsto delay US antisatellite programs and, more recently,the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). The negotiatingrecord of the 1978-1979 US-USSR ASAT talks andsubsequent Soviet arms control proposals indicate thatMoscow is concerned about the potential of the US[Space Shuttle] to interfere with or destroy Soviet

satellites and to deploy space-based weapons. TheSoviets have sought to negotiate limits on military-relatedorbiter activities to ensure protection from near-termUS capabilities. Full-scale testing of a Soviet spaceplanewould undermine these efforts as well as their campaignagainst SDI” [24].

Outside the intelligence community the speculation aboutthe spaceplane was only fuelled by several mysterious testflights flown by the Soviet Union in the late 1970s and mid1980s. Firstly, in 1977-79 the Proton rocket flew three mis-sions in which it deployed two heavy objects that re-enteredafter a single orbit. Many observers linked these “DoubleCosmos” missions to a spaceplane programme [25]. It wasn’tuntil the early 1990s that the Russians revealed that thesehad been test flights of the return capsules of the TKSspacecraft, which were transport ships for Chelomei’s Almazmilitary space station [26]. Secondly, in 1986-1987 therewere four test flights of the Zenit rocket that deployedheavy, inert payloads into low Earth orbits (Kosmos-1767,1820, 1871, 1873), interpreted by some outside the intelli-gence community as being mass models of the spaceplane[27]. Not until the turn of the century did the Russians revealthat the heavy Zenit payloads had been mass models of theTselina-2 electronic intelligence satellite with an additionalmock payload attached to see how the Zenit would performwhen placing heavy payloads into orbit [28].

There are no indications that the Double Cosmos or Zenitflights were associated with the rumoured spaceplane by theUS intelligence community. Actually, in a classified 1980 re-port the CIA had correctly identified the “Double Cosmos”missions as re-entry tests of the TKS return vehicles, althoughit wrongly interpreted the TKS vehicles as successors to themilitary Almaz space stations rather than transport vehiclesserving those stations [29].

The Russians did little to discount the Western claims aboutthe military spaceplane. Disclosing the true purpose of theBOR-4 missions would have forced them to publicly reveal theBuran programme, which officially remained a state secretuntil shortly before the maiden flight of the Energiya rocket inMay 1987, when Moscow finally admitted the rocket would beused among other things to launch a reusable space shuttle.Soviet media finally released the first picture of the Energiya/Buran stack on 29 September 1988, the very same day thatSpace Shuttle Discovery returned America to space more than2.5 years after the Challenger disaster. On 24 November 1988,just over a week after the maiden mission of Buran, an article inthe Pravda newspaper became the first to officially link theBOR-4 missions to Buran: “The final test [of the heatshield]were the launches of the manoeuvrable satellites Kosmos-1374, 1445, 1517 and 1614. Those first Soviet aerospace shipsmade it possible to study the functioning of the tiles and thecarbon material on the nose in conditions close to those expe-rienced by the heatshield of Buran” [30].

Nevertheless, Scientific American magazine published anarticle on the Soviet Union’s space programme in February1989, which once again repeated speculation about thespaceplane [31]. The article was reprinted in the Russian ver-sion of the magazine in April 1989, accompanied by a pictureof one of the BOR-4 recoveries [32]. With nothing to hideanymore, the Russians were quick to react. Soviet deputy De-fence Minister Vitaliy M. Shabanov called the story about thespaceplane a “canard”, not ruling out the possibility that it was

Fig. 24 Illustration from Soviet Military Power 1985 showing thepurported spaceplane attacking an enemy satellite.

(source: US Department of Defence)

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just a ploy to obtain funding for a new Dyna Soar type pro-gramme. Asked what kind of vehicle was shown in the picture,Shabanov said: “Well, this is obvious. In order to test the Buranreusable spacecraft four scale models were launched. Theywere placed into orbit with the designations Kosmos-1374,1445, 1517 and 1614. The models were used to test elements ofthe heatshield, control systems and so on. One of them wasphotographed by the Australians” [33]. What Shabanov failedto mention, however, was that the vehicles had not been scalemodels of Buran, but of a spaceplane cancelled back in the1970s.

With hindsight, the Soviet military spaceplane of the 1980s,rumoured by some to be called Uragan (“Hurricane”), onlyexisted in the imagination of Western analysts. The US intelli-gence community may at least partly have been led to believethat such a programme existed because of the Air Force’s owncontinuing ambitions to develop a military spaceplane. Al-though BOR-4 did have its roots in a military spaceplaneprogramme (Spiral), that programme no longer existed whenthe missions were flown. The spaceplane myth nicely illustratesthat photographic reconnaissance, however detailed it may be,remains hard to interpret if not backed up by human intelli-gence [34].

7. SPACEPLANES UNRELATED TO BOR-4

While it is now clear that BOR-4 was not a precursor to a Zenit-launched spaceplane, the Soviet Union did work on severalspaceplane concepts in the 1970s to 1990s, although none ofthose bore any direct relationship to Spiral or BOR-4. In thesecond half of the 1970s the design bureau of Vladimir Chelomeicontinued work on a 20-ton Light Space Plane (LKS) to belaunched by the Proton rocket and intended primarily for mili-tary missions (Fig. 25). However, lack of government support,especially from Defence Minister Dmitriy Ustinov, a lifelongenemy of Chelomei, grounded the project in the early 1980s.

There was also continued interest in air-launched spaceplanes.Even as the newly created NPO Molniya got down to Burandevelopment in 1976, the Mikoyan bureau contingent in theorganization seemingly had a hard time parting with the air-launched Spiral concept. Realizing that one of the major draw-backs of Spiral had been the need to develop a futuristichypersonic carrier aircraft, the Mikoyan designers began work-ing out plans for spaceplanes launched from existing subsonictransport planes. The aim was to expand their missions beyondmilitary reconnaissance and offensive operations to satellitedeployment/retrieval and space station support.

In the late 1970s/early 1980s NPO Molniya looked at twoair-launched spaceplanes relying on the An-125 Ruslan as thelaunch platform (System 49 and Bizan). By the mid-1980sthese studies evolved into a new concept called the Multipur-pose Reusable Aerospace System (MAKS). This consisted ofthe Antonov-225 Mriya carrier aircraft (intended primarily totransport Buran and elements of the Energiya rocket from themanufacturers to the Baikonur cosmodrome), an external fueltank and a spaceplane with a tripropellant RD-701 engine (Fig.26). Although the MAKS spaceplane was not at all an aerody-namic copy of Spiral/BOR, it was also a lifting body withfoldable wings and was supposed to use thermal protectionmaterials similar to those flown on Buran. Therefore, althoughthe BOR-4 missions were geared primarily to Buran, the dataobtained during the flights were indirectly applicable to MAKSas well [35].

Ironically, MAKS was intended to carry out many of themissions that the US intelligence community believed wereintended for the purported Zenit-launched spaceplane. Asidefrom space station support and satellite deployment missions,MAKS was also considered for reconnaissance, inspection andattack missions [36]. One may even wonder if MAKS wasn’t atleast partially inspired by the US Air Force’s Space Sortiesystem, a quick-response military spaceplane studied in theearly 1980s that would be launched with an external fuel tankfrom the back of a modified Boeing 747.

However, it would be wrong to conclude that the US intelli-gence community had been correct in its assessments after alland had only got the launch vehicle wrong. For most of the1980s it had believed that Buran and the spaceplane were twoprojects given equal priority and that BOR-4 had been a subscalemodel of such a spaceplane. In actual fact, BOR-4 was notdirectly related to MAKS and there are no indications to sug-gest that during the 1980s MAKS was anything more than arelatively low-priority paper study carried out in the shadow ofthe Buran programme. MAKS was first publicly disclosed inlate 1989 and despite being in prominence at several interna-tional aerospace shows struggled for government fundingthroughout the 1990s. It was considered a possible successor toSoyuz along with RKK Energiya’s Kliper and a vehicle pro-posed by the Khrunichev Centre in a government tender held in2005/2006, but the tender was discontinued in the summer of2006 without a winner being announced.

It should also be pointed out that beginning in 1984 NPOEnergiya did study a 15-ton Zenit-launched spaceplane calledOK-M, primarily intended to replace Soyuz and Progress forspace station support (Fig. 27). However, just like MAKS, this

Fig. 25 Chelomei’s Proton-launched LKS spaceplane.(source: T. Varfolomeyev)

Fig. 26 Scale model of the air-launched MAKS spaceplane.(source: T. Varfolomeyev)

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The Soviet BOR-4 Spaceplanes and Their Legacy

spacecraft for other missions. One vehicle, possibly the onethat had originally been supposed to fly the fifth BOR-4 orbitalflight, was modified for an experiment to evaluate radio trans-mission during atmospheric re-entry. Dubbed BOR-6, it wasequipped with two large antennas extending out and downwardfrom the nose (Fig. 28). Using a special cooling system, theseantennas were designed to see if radio signals could penetratethe plasma sheath that envelops spacecraft during re-entry andcauses radio black-outs. Construction of the spacecraft wasfinished by 1990, but it was never launched due to the collapseof the Soviet Union and the ensuing shutdown of the Buranprogramme [38].

Another application of BOR-4 technology was studied inthe framework of a Soviet “Star Wars” programme activelypursued by NPO Energiya in the 1970s and 1980s. This wouldhave seen the use of space-based assets to destroy enemysatellites, ballistic missiles and ground-based targets. Makingmaximum use of existing technology, NPO Energiya tabledproposals for “battle stations” that would be based on Salyut/Mir technology.

For the destruction of ground-based targets the NPO Energiyaplanners came up with a Mir-type core module that served asthe berthing place for so-called “combat modules” resemblingBuran orbiters without wings or other aerodynamic surfaces(Fig. 29). After undocking from the station, the unmannedcombat modules would manoeuvre to the proper location andthen deploy small vehicles tipped with (unspecified) weaponsthat could re-enter the atmosphere. These could be either bal-listic-type vehicles or lifting bodies. One design studied forthese re-entry vehicles was based on the BOR-4 lifting bodies[39]. Presumably, the idea was that after deploying the weap-ons the Buran-based combat modules would return to base tobe reloaded with new ones. Work on the Star Wars effort wasdiscontinued in the early 1990s following the end of the ColdWar.

With the political climate changing and the Russians scram-bling to find new customers for their space technology, BOR-4was offered on a commercial basis to the international commu-nity in the early 1990s. A brochure issued by the AviaexportForeign Trade Association in 1990 suggested potential mis-sions for the spaceplane:

• to perform measurements on test routes from 2,000 to6,000 km in length and under plasma conditions

• to determine aerodynamic characteristics with the useof large-scale flying prototypes within the entire rangeof speeds and altitudes of the air-space plane

• to perform tests of large-scale fragments of thermalinsulation under real-flight combinations of the flowconditions, heating level and flight duration

• to perform functional tests of elements of air-space planecrew emergency rescue systems at hypersonic flightspeeds [40]

In the early 1990s the European Space Agency weighed thepossibility of using BOR-4 vehicles to test the heatshield ofEurope’s Hermes spaceplane, but these plans never material-ized [41].

Interestingly enough, as early as 1983 the BOR-4 recoveryimages inspired engineers at NASA’s Langley Research Centreto clandestinely build small models of the subscale spacecraft

Fig. 27 Zenit-launched OK-M spaceplanestudied by NPO Energiya.

(source: RKK Energiya)

was not the rumoured military spaceplane of the 1980s andthere was no direct link with the BOR-4 missions. Firstly,OK-M was not a lifting body but a mini-version of Buran,having fixed delta wings with elevons and a vertical stabilizerwith a rudder/speed brake. Also, all indications are that OK-Mwas given even lower priority than MAKS within NPO Molniya.Its existence was not revealed until the publication of an RKKEnergiya history in 1996 [37].

8. BOR-4 SPIN-OFF PROJECTS

Even as BOR-4 led a life of its own in the imagination ofWestern analysts, the Russians were considering to use the

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for wind tunnel tests (Fig. 30). Several years later these studiesserved as the basis for designing Langley’s 10-ton HL-20spaceplane, a lifting body closely resembling BOR-4 and con-sidered in the early 1990s as a crew transportation system andcrew rescue vehicle for the Freedom space station. Also knownas the Personnel Launch System (PLS), it would be launchedby an expendable rocket such as the Titan-4 and be capable ofcarrying a crew of 10.

Both Rockwell International Space Systems Division andLockheed Advanced Development Company conducted PLSfeasibility studies in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Although afull-scale mock-up of the HL-20 was built, the design was notselected for further development as the Russian Soyuz space-craft was picked as the lifeboat for Freedom and eventually theInternational Space Station (Fig. 31). NASA has always beenquick to point out that the HL-20 relied on extensive US liftingbody research carried out in the sixties and seventies both withsuborbital scale models and full-scale atmospheric models, butthe BOR-4 heritage is undeniable [42]. As US space analystJames Oberg once put it, “the HL-20 out-Burans the Buranwhen it comes to one side copying the other” [43]. Later in the1990s Langley proposed a 42 percent dimensional scale-up of

Fig. 28 The BOR-6 vehicle on display outside the CentralAerohydrodynamics Institute (TsAGI). (source: Aviadata)

Fig. 29 Soviet “battle station” with Buran-based combat modules.(source: RKK Energiya)

Fig. 30 BOR-4 wind tunnel model used by NASA to study itsconfiguration and refine it for use in the HL-20. (source: NASA)

the HL-20 called the HL-42, but this seems to have been ashort-lived effort [44] (Fig. 32).

In 1999 Orbital Sciences Corporation presented a new“Space Taxi” derived from HL-20/BOR-4 at the Interna-tional Astronautical Federation congress in Amsterdam. Thevehicle was first proposed jointly with Northrop Grummanunder the Space Launch Initiative, initiated by NASA in2000 to develop new space launch technologies after the X-33/VentureStar debacle. The idea at that time was to launchthe vehicle on a reusable flyback booster (Fig. 33). In 2002,with the Space Launch Initiative having failed to find tech-nologies that could revolutionize space launch, NASA shiftedits focus to the Orbital Space Plane (OSP) that would com-plement the Shuttle by carrying crews (not cargo) to andfrom orbit. Under the new programme Orbital Sciences andNorthrup Grumman modified their plans to launch the spacetaxi on an expendable Delta-4 Heavy launch vehicle (Fig.34). However, the OSP programme was discontinued as wellafter the February 2003 Columbia accident and NASA’ssubsequent reorientation to a capsule type vehicle under theConstellation programme.

In January 2006 NASA announced a programme calledCommercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) in whichtwo industry partners would receive a combined total of ap-proximately $500 million to help fund the development of a

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The Soviet BOR-4 Spaceplanes and Their Legacy

Fig. 31 Full-scale model of the HL-20. (source: NASA)

Fig. 32 HL-20 and HL-42 compared. (source: NASA)

Fig. 33 Orbital Sciences “Space Taxi” with flyback boosterproposed under the Space Launch Initiative.

(source: Orbital Sciences)

Fig. 34 Orbital Sciences’ proposed Orbital Space Plane for launchby a Delta-4 Heavy rocket. (source: Orbital Sciences)

reliable, cost-effective commercial transportation system tosupport the International Space Station after the Shuttle era. InMay 2006 NASA selected five out of more than twenty propos-als for further study. One of these was SpaceDev’s DreamChaser™, first revealed in November 2005 as a suborbitalvehicle for tourist missions. Having the same size and outermold line as the HL-20, it would fly six rather than ten passen-gers in order to save weight. The ship would come in a subor-bital tourist version and an orbital version. The suborbitalversion was envisioned to use internal hybrid rocket motorsburning a combination of solid fuel and liquid oxidizer, whilethe orbital version was proposed to be launched on the side ofthree large hybrid boosters (Figs. 35 & 36). The engines areimproved, higher-performance version of the hybrid enginesthat SpaceDev developed for SpaceShipOne, the experimental

suborbital vehicle that won the $10 million Ansari X-Prize in2004. However, SpaceDev found itself sidelined when NASAawarded the COTS contract to two competing companies(SpaceX and Rocketplane-Kistler) in August 2006. Interest-ingly, SpaceDev’s website says that “a predecessor to theNASA HL-20 design reached orbit and re-entered safely”,without specifically mentioning BOR-4 [45].

In September 2006 SpaceDev founder Jim Benson steppeddown as chairman and chief technology officer of the companyto launch the Benson Space Company, an ambitious new ven-ture focused on commercial space tourism. Benson plans topurchase multiple Dream Chaser™ vehicles from SpaceDevand be first-to-market with a spaceship designed for both sub-orbital and eventually orbital flights. Benson hopes it will alsobe used to transport people and cargo to the International SpaceStation and to a variety of emerging private sector orbitaldestinations. The Benson Space Company’s website is not sotight-lipped about DreamChaser’s roots:

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“The Dream Chaser™ spaceship has a long andsuccessful history. The vehicle is based on the NASALangley Research Center’s ten passenger orbital HL-20, also known as the Personnel Launch System and theSpace Taxi. The HL-20, in turn, was based on the SovietBOR-4, and thus has significant orbital heritage.

The Soviet BOR-4 was a successful, orbital, autonomousre-entry vehicle, intended to be the basis of their humanaccess to space. As the U.S. Shuttle was developed, theSoviet Union progressed to the BOR-5, and then theBuran, a copy of the U.S. Shuttle, leaving the safe andaffordable BOR-4 behind.

Similarly, after receiving intelligence agency photos of

Fig. 35 SpaceDev’s DreamChaser launched by a rocket withhybrid rocket engines. (source: SpaceDev)

Fig. 36 DreamChaser. (source: SpaceDev)

1. Y. Kazarov, “The child mortality of Buran” (in Russian), Nezavisimayagazeta/ Nauka, 13 November 2003. On-line at http://www.ng.ru/science/2003-11-12/13_buran.html. The missiles were reportedly to be shotdown by air-to-space missiles launched from the belly of a MiG-25. Theidea of launching objects into space from aircraft was subsequentlyoutlined in a patent on 17 July 1962, one of the authors of which was Y.Kazarov (the author of the quoted article).

2. N. Kamanin, Skrytyy kosmos (kniga 4), Novosti kosmonavtiki, Moscow,2001, pp.222-223, 240.

3. A detailed history of the Spiral programme can be found in the followingseries of articles: V. Lukashevich, V. Trufakin, S. Mikoyan, “Theaerospace system Spiral” (in Russian), Aerokosmicheskoye obozreniye,3/2005, pp.192-197, 4/2005, pp.334-339; V. Lukashevich, V. Trufakin,S. Mikoyan, “The orbital planes of the Spiral system” (in Russian),Aerokosmicheskoye obozreniye, 5/2005, pp.174-177, 6/2005, pp.132-137, 1/2006, pp.158-163; V. Lukashevich, V. Trufakin, S. Mikoyan,“Spiral in national cosmonautics”, (in Russian), Aerokosmicheskoyeobozreniye, 2/2006, pp.192-195. An English summary can be found in:V. Lukashevich, “Predecessor of Shuttle and Buran: Spiral OrbitalAircraft Programme, Air Fleet, 4/2004. All these articles are on-line atVadim Lukashevich’s Buran website at http://www.buran.ru/htm/spiral.htm, added April 2006.

4. Y. Semyonov (ed.), Mnogorazovyy orbitalnyy korabl Buran,Mashinostroeniye, Moscow, 1995, pp.124-130; M. Gofin, “Heatshielddesign of the reusable orbiter” (in Russian). In G. Lozino-Lozinskiy, A.Bratukhin (eds.), Aviatsionno-kosmicheskiye sistemy, Izdatelstvo MAI,Moscow, 1997, pp.136-144.

5. A. Voinov, “We all need this” (in Russian) (Gherman Titov interview),Aviatsiya i kosmonavtika, 4/1993, pp.2-3; V. Lebedev, “History of thenational Unmanned Orbital Rocket Planes” (in Russian), paper presentedat the Utkin readings in St. Petersburg, 14-15 April 2005, on-line athttp://www.buran.ru/htm/str143.htm.

the BOR-4, NASA spent ten years, from the mid 1980sthrough the early 1990s, analyzing and improving thedesign, with over 1,200 wind tunnel and computer tests,to refine and perfect the shape of the outer mold line(OML). The end result was the HL-20 lifting body vehicle.

Since then, SpaceDev, a successful and rapidly growingpublic space technology developer, has taken thosedesigns and refined them further…. SpaceDev selectedthe NASA HL-20 Space Taxi design because of its space-based heritage, derived from successful Soviet orbitalmissions, and the refinements added by NASA” [46].

Strangely, if Dream Chaser™ ever flies, a Sovietspaceplane design once intended to spy on Western territoryand knock out American satellites will be carrying touristsinto orbit.

REFERENCES

6. Y. Semyonov, op. cit., pp.108-109.7. V. Timoshenko, “Design and testing of Buran’s thermal protection

system” (in Russian). In G. Lozino-Lozinskiy, A. Bratukhin, op. cit.,p.133; S. Mikoyan, “The Spiral spaceplane and the BOR-4 and BOR-5flying models” (in Russian), In G. Lozino-Lozinskiy, A. Bratukhin, op.cit., pp.296-302; BOR page on Vadim Lukashevich’s Buran website athttp://www.buran.ru/htm/bors.htm.

8. O. Urusov, “Tracking station in the sky” (in Russian), Novostikosmonavtiki, 9/2003, p.64-67.

9. MAKS-2005 photo gallery on the Novosti kosmonavtiki website athttp://www.novosti-kosmonavtiki.ru/content/photogallery/gallery_042/index.shtml (August 2005).

10. BOR page on Vadim Lukashevich’s website; V. Dmitriyev, “SpaceLaunch” (in Russian), Morskoi sbornik, November 2004. On-line athttp://www.buran.ru/htm/str135-1.htm.

11. “Soviets Test Sub-Scale Shuttle”, Aviation Week and Space Technology,21 June 1982, p.8. One Russian eyewitness claims that US Air ForceOrion aircraft deployed from Diego Garcia were also involved in theoperation, but this is not confirmed by other sources. See: V. Dmitriyev,op. cit.

12. A. Voinov, op. cit.13. O. Urusov, “Tracking station in the sky”, op. cit.14. V. Gavrilov, “Taking off like a spiral” (in Russian), Caravan

International, 26 April 2002, on-line at http://www.buran.ru/htm/str70.htm.

15. A. Voinov, op. cit.; A. Zhbanov, “Fleet and space: experience comes inhandy ” (in Russian), Flag rodiny, 9 June 2006, on-line at http://www.buran.ru/htm/str165.htm.

16. S. Mikoyan, op. cit., p.299.17. Y. Larionov, “BORs above the planet” (in Russian), Novosti

kosmonavtiki, 7/2000, pp.71-73.18. Section on Buran’s thermal protection system on www.buran.ru website.

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The Soviet BOR-4 Spaceplanes and Their Legacy

19. “Soviet Military Capabilities and Intentions in Space”, NationalIntelligence Estimate, 6 August 1980, pp.32-33. On-line at the“Electronic Reading Room” of the CIA website at http://www.foia.cia.gov/search_options.asp.

20. “Soviet Capabilities and Intentions for Permanently Manned SpaceStations: An Intelligence Assessment”, 1 November 1982, p.8. On-lineat the “Electronic Reading Room” of the CIA website.

21. “The Soviet Space Program: National Intelligence Estimate. Volume I:Key Judgments and Summary”, 19 July 1983, p.11, 14. On-line at the“Electronic Reading Room” of the CIA website.

22. “Soviet Military Power 1987”, United States Department of Defense,p.54.

23. “Soviet Reusable Space Systems Program: Implications for SpaceOperations in the 1990s (An Intelligence Assessment)”, 1 September1988, p.2. On-line at the “Electronic Reading Room” of the CIAwebsite at http://www.foia.cia.gov/search_options.asp.

24. ibid, pp.14-15.25. See for instance: T. Williams, “Soviet Re-entry Tests: A Winged Vehicle?”,

Spaceflight, pp.213-214, 1980; N. Macknight, C. Vick, A. Bozlee,“Soviet Mini-Shuttles”, Spaceflight News, pp.24-28, January 1989; N.Macknight, C. Vick, A. Bozlee, “Double Cosmos”, Spaceflight News,pp.46-47, February 1989; H. Matthews, The Secret Story of the SovietSpace Shuttle, Beirut, 1994, pp.32-33.

26. The true nature of these flights was first revealed in I. Afanasyev,“Unknown ships” (in Russian), Astronomiya, kosmonavtika (Znaniye),12/1991, p.54.

27. See for instance H. Matthews, op. cit., p.36.28. S.N. Konyukhov (ed.), Rakety i kosmicheskiye apparaty

konstruktorskogo byuro Yuzhnoye, GKB Yuzhnoye, Dnepropetrovsk,2000, p.212.

29. “Soviet Military Capabilities and Intentions in Space”, NationalIntelligence Estimate, 6 August 1980, op. cit., pp.32-33.

30. K. Vasilchenko, G. Lozino-Lozinskiy, G. Svishchev, “The Road to Buran”(in Russian), Pravda, 24 November 1988.

31. S. Ride, P. Banks, “Soviets in Space”, Scientific American, February1989, p.18.

32. “About the Soviet Space Programme”, V mire nauki, April 1989.33. N. Dombrovskiy, “Space orbits of a canard” (in Russian), Sovetskaya

Rossiya, 17 May 1989.34. The Uragan myth is debunked in V. Lukashevich, A. Borisov, “The two-

faced Janus ‘Bor-Uragan’” (in Russian), Novosti kosmonavtiki, 6/2006,

p.69.35. S. Mikoyan, op. cit., p.302.36. The military applications of MAKS are mentioned in “Space designers

interviewed on new shuttle”, interview with G. Lozino-Lozinskiy andA. Bashilov about MAKS on Ekho Moskvy radio, 22 January 1999,translated by BBC Monitoring Service SU/3441 H/1; V. Kucherenko,L. Batalov, “No RAKS without MAKS” (in Russian), Rossiyskayagazeta, 11 March 1999. At least part of the MAKS research in the1990s was sponsored by the Ministry of Defence. See E. Devyatyarov,“We are burning with desire to build MAKS” (in Russian) (interviewwith NPO Molniya general director A. Bashilov), Novosti kosmonavtiki,4/1999, pp.47-49.

37. Y. Semyonov (ed.), Raketno-kosmicheskaya korporatsiya Energiya imeniS.P. Korolyova 1946-1996, RKK Energiya, Moscow, 1996, pp.404-407.

38. J. Lenorovitz, “New Hotol Version Emerges Following British/SovietStudy”, Aviation Week and Space Technology, 9 September 1991,pp.68-69.

39. Y. Semyonov, Raketno-kosmicheskaya korporatsiya…, op. cit., p.420 ;e-mail correspondence with Vadim Lukashevich, 19 September 2006.

40. “BOR complex”, brochure issued by Aviaexport USSR, 1990; N.Johnson, The Soviet Year in Space 1990, Teledyne Brown Engineering,Colorado Springs, 1991, pp.17-18.

41. P. Langereux , “Le BOR soviétique pourrait aider HERMES”, Air &Cosmos, n°1314, 1991.

42. J. Asker, “NASA Design for Manned Spacecraft Draws on SovietSubscale Spaceplane”, Aviation Week and Space Technology, 24September 1990, p.28; E. Phillips, “Langley Refines Design, BeginsHuman Factors Tests of Personnel Launch System”, Aviation Week andSpace Technology, 15 July 1991, pp. 52-53; “HL-20 Model for PersonnelLaunch System Research”, NASA Fact Sheet, April 1992, on-line athttp://www.nasa.gov/centers/langley/news/factsheets/HL-20.html

43. J. Oberg, “Spacecraft design histories”, Spaceflight, p.67, 1992.44. HL-42 page at Mark Wade’s Encyclopedia Astronautica, http://

www.astronautix.com/craft/hl42.htm45. “SpaceDev’s DreamChaser”, on-line at http://www.spacedev.com/

newsite/templates/subpage2_article.php?pid=54246. “DreamChaser Spaceship”, on-line at http://www.bensonspace.com/

index.html. The website wrongly creates the impression that BOR-4was a design cancelled in favour of BOR-5 and Buran.

(Received 3 January 2007)

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