Much effort is devoted by both NATO and the Warsaw Pactto attempt to develop plans that wiI1prove succes.wld in theevent of war in Europe. The Sow”et opera fi”onal maneuvergroup is seen as a concept for countering NATO defenseplans. In this article, one of the Western World’s leading ana-lysts of the Sow”et army examines the development of thisconcept, how it could be employed and its role in Sovietstrategy for the 1980s.

TheSoviet OperationalManeuver Group:

ANew Challenge

for NAT@C. N. Donnelly

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MILITARYREVIEW

F OR the past few years, it has beenevident that the Soviet armed forces

have entered a period of significantchange. Soviet writings and public rrtter-ances have referred to major develop-ments in Soviet strategy, and debates andexercise reports in the mditary press haveshown concern over the details and prob-lems of tactical change, Until recently,however, it has not been possible to saywith certa]nty what changes are occurringat tbe all-important operational level, It isby means of the operatron, defined as mih-tary action at front (army group) or armylevel, that the aims of.the strategy are tobe achieved.

Recent Soviet and Warsaw Pact analy-ses have now demonstrated the develop-ment of their new operational concepts,and It M one of these, the concept of theoperational maneuver group IO%IG ),which is the subject of this article, While,In principle, the OMG 1s completelyaccepted in its modern form by Soviet

‘?, operational planners, and It is clearly Inan advanced state of development, thedetails of’ the concept (which is “derivedfrom that of the World War 11 mobilegroup) are by no means fully resolved yet.There M still a good deal of room for per.fecting -and, therefore, changing—theconcept, and there is clearly doubt in someareas that the prmclples estabhshed canactually be Implemented.

To put this operational development in aloglcal and credible context, some strate-gic background and a r&um@ of the discus-sion of the concept as It has developed mthe Soviet press have been included in thisarticle. In this way, the concept of theOMG will be understood and its signifi-cance appreciated. For It is a concept of the

tiery greatest importance, designed specif-ically to defeat present NATO defensiveplans.

Soviet Strategy in the Event of War

Soviet military doctrine holds that, ifwar breaks out in Europe, it must be wonvery quickly by the Soviet Union Ifit is tobe won at all If the war drags on, there is ah]gh risk that it will develop into a cata-strophic strategic nuclear exchange and/or that the strains of war wIII destroy theSoviet bloc from the mslde.

Either way, the social system estah-Iished by the Communist Party willprobably perish, and the present leader-ship WIII be killed. No objective of policycould possibly be worth this price to theSoviet leadership. Therefore, ]f the Sovietleaders choose to start a war in Europe (orChina), they must be absolutely certain ofa very quick and complete victory. Alter-natively, ]f war IS forced upon them, thenthey will do their utmost to achieve such aqmck victory—this being the only way yetperce]ved by the So\riets to avoid disaster

If a war ]s to be won qu]ckly, some con-siderable degree of surprise M essentialThis is not to suggest that “a bolt from theblue” IS the most likely scenario for warbreaking out—such a suggestion appearsto be unreal ]st]c. There must be a reasonfor the war and probably a crvsrs to precipi-tate it. Even in the most adverse circum-stances, however, surprise is possible-forexample, the Middle East in October 1973,Czechoslovakia In 1968 and Poland in198 l—and it seems that the Soviets con-sider lt to be an &sentiaI p;erequislte for a

;,Reprm[ed from lnternat!onal Defense Rewew, Volume15,Number9,1982 Copyright.C1982 by Interawa S A, GenevaSwltrerland

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successful campaign. However, the sur-prise is equally unlikely to be complete,and some degree of NATO preparation anddeployment is to be expected.

The first task facing the Warsaw Pactwill be to mimm]ze the extent of NATOpreparations. In this writer’s opimon, thefirst two phases of war will, therefore, bethe phases preceding the outbreak of hos-tihties-the preparatory phase and thecrisis phase, In both phases, the Sowet aimis to employ all measures to exploitNATO’s weaknesses and reduce NATOcombat potent] al.

Preparatory Phase

In the preparatory phase—the phase Inwh]ch we are presently Ii\,ing—the effortsare mainly of a polmcal or economic na-ture. For example.

● The pursual of a“ foreign policydesigned to exacerbate rifts in the West-ern Alllance.

● Thesupport (welcome ornot)~iventopolit]cal and social movements whichundermine Western military s~rength ornational infrastructures such as the cam-palgns aga]nst the neutron bomb andcruise missdesor in support of unilateralnuclear disarmament, the antinuclearenergy lobby, and so on,

● Subversion, espionage &rd the mfll-tratmn of key trade unions.

● The application of polltical and eco-nomic pressure, designed to weaken theinfluence of economic groupings such asthe European Economic Community, aidengaging m fierce economic competition toweaken Western states.

Throughout this stage, the primary a]mwill betoweaken the Western capacity towage nuclear war either by preventingthe development or deployment of new

Soviet T72s on the move

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weapon systems or by sapping the pohticalwill, to use them. From the Soviet point ofview, it is most desirable that this stageshould not escalate to war but that Sovietinfluence and power should graduallygrow in Europe and US power declineuntil the states of Europe are effectively“Flnlandized” and the L’nited States MMo-lated.

In the Soviet deflnitlon, detente is areduction of international tens]on thatwould enable a gradual developmenttoward Sowet-style world communism tobe accomplished witbout triggering adisastrous war In the process. Thestronger the Soviet mlhtary might is inrelatlon to A’ATO’s, the less likelihoodthere is, the Soviets beheve, of war break-ing out. Detente, therefore, does notrequire a balance of forces but a signifi-cant and growvng imbalance ]n the Sowetfavor, which should not be prejudmed by .Western reaction and rearmament, Thedoctrinal developments wh]ch are the sub-,.

? ject of this article are, therefore, m no waycontradictory to the spmt of detente as theHlA5’SIClnSLII?U] lt.

Crisis Phase

The crisis phase IS only iikely to corn.mence if some aspect of So\~ie~POIICYfailsand It becomes apparent to the SovietUnion that a war M either inevitable or isthe only way by which the leadership canachieve a POIICYobjective that is abso-lutely vital to the country’s surv]val. .Moreimmediate steps must now be taken to cre-ate favorable politlcal and military cir-cumstances for a successful campaign. Theactual deployment and reinforcement ofNATO forces must be prevented or at leasthindered, and this is to be accompllsbed byall possible means—increased polltical

pr&sure of every type, active subversionand sabotage and a massive program ofdeception. Of particular Importance, atthis stage, Mthe neutralization of NATO’snuclear weapons.

Crisis management WIII be very impor-tant ]n achieving surprise Preparationsfor war are bound to give indications toNATO analysts, and so these indicationsmust be made ambiguous. For example,mobilization and reinforcement canbecome commonplace as repeated exer-cises (as happened prior to the 1973 Arab-Israel] War). Troop movements can beexplained as being necessary for internaleconomic reqsons (as was the case inPoland in 1981), Western countermobili-zatlon can be discouraged as “provocative”and rendered ludicrous in the eyes of theWestern publlc by sudden, If temporary,demobilization of Warsaw Pact forces.

In any event, ]t 1s clear to the Sovietsthat some considerable degree of surpriseISpossible. Since Soi,let doctrine rates sur-prise as absolutely essential, NATO wouldbe unwise to rely on war plans whichrequire long and easy preparation time.NATOS preparauon t]me for a war startedby tbe So\’Iet Union will, by detin]tlon, bevery limited. NATO’S defenses are, there-fore, unhkely (given present plans) to beeither heavdy fortified and dug In, eche.loned IZIdepth or possessed of a strongoperational reserve.

Open Hostilities

The third phase of the war WIII be openbosti llt ]es It M essential to Soviet successthat they br]ng the war to a rapid conclu-sion while tbe enemy IS still trying tomobillze. if INATO IS g]ven a long periodfor preparation and deployment, then theWestern forces will be so strong and well

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&ntrenched that a quick Soviet victory isunlikely, and, at best, the war is likely toend m a tactical nuclear stalemate. There-fore, a certain, even a high, degree of sur-prwe is essentiat to Soviet success.

Some NATO troops will undoubtedly,however, have time to deploy. In adversecircumstances, the Soviets recognize thatthey might underestimate the number ofNATO troops that have deployed. If thesetroops can contain the Soviet forces andprevent a breakthrough, then NATO com-manders may still be able to make effec.tlve use of their nuclear weapons Ifnuclear release is obta]ned in time. TheSoviets accept that an early and effectiveuse by NATO of tactical nuclear weaponswill certainly cause disastrous disruptionaf their offensive. This is of the utmostImportance when considering the remonsfor the current changes ]n Soviet opera-tional doctrine.

The Soviet General Staff was clearlyfaced with the need to develop a strategicand operational plan which would make Itvery difficult for NATO to implement itstact]cal nuclear opt]on and would accom.plish a rapid collapse of the NATO mili-tary and pohtlcal system. Th]s strategy

. Requires the achievement of surpriseand assumes a NATO defense caught, Insome measure, off balance.

e Will impose the maximum amount ofshock on the defender in the first hours ofwar

* Must paralyze the enemy’s commandand control systems and restrict hts abi Iltyto react.

s IS designed to achieve a rapid rate ofadvance on several important axes, deepmto the enemy territory, to shatter hisdefensive structure.

● Should reduce the risk posed byNATO tactical nuclear weapons. It wouldachieve this by destroying as many NATOnuclear weapons as possible during the

conventional phase: by adopting tacticswhich make it particularly difficult for thedefender to use his nuclear weapons effec-tively and, if NATO initiates the use oftactical nuclear weapona, by deatrwyingthe remainder of NATOs nuclear deliverysystems in a masaive “retaliatory” tacticalstrike.

Such a strategy offers, in Soviet eyes,th@ only real chance of victory should awar ]n Europe occur. The Soviet armedforces would have been guilty of a gravedereliction of duty had they not beenactively seeking ways to Implement such a .strategy to cope with the eventuahty ofwar.

Warsaw Pact Studies of NATO Plans

As a first step to implementing such astrategy, the Soviet General Staff has nat-urally spent a great deal of time studyingthe strategic, operational and tactical fea-tures of NATOS defenses. The WarsawPact spends just as much time studyingNATO as NATO does atudymg the War-saw Pact, Just as NATO mainly studiesthe Soviet army, sa the Warsaw Pactmainly studies the US Army and theBundeswehr. An excellent example ofsuch a study of NATOS operational plansappeared in the Polish Ground FW-ce~Reuzew, Number 12, 1981, written by a

retired Colonel Won truck].Tbe author of that article described the

US (and Bundeswehrl concept of activedefense as combining the characteristicsof positional and mobile defense. Itsessence, he sa]d, hes in a continuous, uni-form resistance, both actwe and passive,to the attacker which will maintain a con-stant and invariable ratio of troops in frontof the attacking forces of l-to-2 or 3.(instead of the l-to-6 to 9 which Warsaw

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Pact sources usually detlne.as necessaryfor rapid breakthrough).

Active defense Mintended to compel theattacker to make repeated and systematicattempts to break Into the defended line sothat the attacker should expend forces andtime without gaining momentum. Thedefender deploys strong covering forces toidentify breakthrough sectors and the axisof the main thrust. Once this axis Midenti-fied, subunits can be moved from passivesectors, from flanks and from positions indepth to aceomplisb a “counterconcentra-tion” where and when this 1s needed toblock the main thrust. Active defense,Wontrucki continued, does not surrenderthe mltlatlve as passive defense does, norR+It as risky as the “counterblow” tacticson which mobile defense depends,

Wontruckl went on to define advantagesand disadvantages of this form of defensein Warsaw Pact eyes. He defined theadvantages as follows:

. Active defense can achieve early‘? detection of the attacking forces, slow

down their approach and channel theminto killing zones

. “Even” deployment makes it possibleto conceal the main defensive positionsand rapidly achieve counterconcentra-tions once tbe main attacking thrust hasbeen identified.

. The attacker will be forced to engageconstantly m battle (includ]ng on foot) bythe creation ofa semicircular barrier witha high density of forces around h]s shockgroup.

. The attacker can be forced to commithis reserves very early on.

● . Active defense provides for a veryflexible employment of antitank reserves,especially the use of helicopters and mine-field.

6 It creates favorable conditions forlaunching tactical counterattack so thatthe defender can seize the initiative.

These advantages hsted by Wontruckidemonstrate what a very effective form ofdefense the Warsaw Pact cons]ders activedefense to be. There is no doubt that East-ern bloc analysts considered it to be aneffective counter to their conventional tac-tics. This IS particularly true in that, byma]ntaininga stable battlefield, it made Itpossible for NATO to plan, with reason-able certainty, on being able to fall back onthe use of tactical nuclear weapons to haltthe advance.

Wontruckl’s study is reinforced by thework of no less a figure than Colonel Gen-eral Gr]nkevich, chief of the main staff ofthe ground forces In an article on the sig-mficance of the battle for Moscow in theSoutet Mtlztary Hlstorlcal Journal, De-cember 1981, he demonstrated just how it,.vas possible to conduct an effective strate-gic defense against a blitzkrieg by anattacker who Msuperior in numbers.

Wontrucki concluded by exploring theweaknesses of active defense with a viewto adopting tactics designed to exploitthem, He Identified the weaknesses ofNATO’s active defense as follows:

e It provides for only weak engineerpreparation of defensive positions, espe-cially by way of earthworks.

o It necessitates a decentral]zat}on offorces, making for a diffusion of effort withno clear defimtlon of the main defensiveeffort. The main defensive area onlydevelops during the battle

● Reserves are committed piecemeal bythe defender, giving no opportunity toeliminate a break-in to the defensive zone.

● “Activeness” is 1imited to maintain-ing a dense grouping in the tact]cal defen-sive zone, after which the defense becomespaaaive, at least until the senior com-mander orders a counterattack.

The lack of operational reserves, theneed to weaken one part of the line tostrengthen another and the reliance on

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early identification of the main thrust canbe exploited. When NATO reserves arecommitted, concludes Wontrueki, andcounterconcentration (NATO term coun-terpenetration) IS complete, then, if theNATO commanders not conductingcounterattack, the attacker can effectivelyexploit the lull in the operat}on, and, ]f hepossesses adequate reserves, he can effecta breakthrough.

From the foregoing, the value of possess-ing an extra, highly mobile, operationalforce that is uncommitted when thedefender has just comm]tted his ownreserves is obvious. That mobile formationcan be effectively committed to hit theNATO defense where it has just beenweakened by relocation to provide foreffective counterconcentration

To defeat NATO’s active defense, Won-trucki continues, it isessentlal to be surethat the defender m actually employingactive defense and to avoid being chan-neled, during the covering force battle,into hitting the main defenswe hne wherethe defender wants to be hit. It is alsoessential to conduct reconnaissance so asto know when the defender regroups hisreserves and to push on rapidly, avo]dstrongpoints and outposts and hit thema]n defensive l]ne quickly.

It isessential to prevent them-derlywithdrawal of the defender’s coveringforces and to disorgamze h]s defensive for-tdlcatlons. Au- and artillery support andtactical assaults behind the Iines shouldbe used to hinder the deployment ofreserves and ensure the suppression of thedefender’s artillery.

The defense should be breached on sev-eral axes and second echelone committedonly where the enemy hascomm]tted hisreserves. When second echelons are corn.mitted just before the defender commitshis reserves so as to achieve surprise andprevent effective Counterconcentration,

they should be committed on two separateaxes.

The features of active defense areemphasized by a further and most impor-tant consideration. During the 1970s,NATO adopted a strategy of forwarddefense m which, in a per]od of tension orcrisis, the bulk of NATO troops will takeup defensive positions in a 20 to 40-kdo-meter-wide belt relatively close to theinner German border (IGB). The troopswIII thus be able to meet the aggressor assoon as poss]ble and give up as 1Ittle terri-tory as possible.

This puts the main defensive positionsof NATO formations, in many instances, aIong way from the]r garrison areas andentails long deployment times Further-more, the covering force action, essentialto the identlficat]on of the mam thrusts, can-not take place in any depth, and the zigzag path of tbe ICZBbr]ngs that frontiervery close indeed to the front and flanks ofsome of NATO’s mam defensive areas.

Dffkrences within NATO have resultedIn the respective nat]onal formationsemploying different operational conceptsand may wel 1 result In varying states ofreadiness in the event of a crisis. More-over, we should remember that NATOleaders have staLed categorically that:

. In the event of a Sov]et attack, NATOWI1l initially tight a conventional battle.Flgwres of “five” or “a few” days are usu-ally quoted for this phase.

o NATO WIII eventually resort to tacti-cal nuclear weapons when conventionaldefensive measures fall

● Initial use of nuclear weapons will beon a Iimited, “demonstrational” scale.

A careful study of the enemy and the for-mulation of strategic, operational and tac-tical plans tailored to exploit h]s weak-nesses and neutralize his strengths is oneof the fundamental principles guiding tbedevelopment of the Sowet armed forces.

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It would be totally at var]ance with theirdoctrine and a breach of hlstorwal prece-dent If the Soviets were not ta have tal.enthe features of NATO’s defense Intoaccount and were not, therefore, amefid-lng them own strategic and operationalplans so as to be able to defeat this type ofdefense In the event of war.

The Perceived Need for Change inWarsaw Pact Operational Doctrine

By its very nature, Sov]et military dnc-tr]ne has developed gradually over theyears and has very strong roots m hmtory(To all intents and purposes, Li’arsaw, Pact

doctrine and Sov]et mlllrary doctrine are]denucal The Soviet Umon has Imposedthe framework of Its doctr]ne on all of thetVar~aw Pact countries, and the LVarsaw

Pact staff IS I]ttle more than an extensionof the Sowet General Staff, ) Even revolu-tionary changes, such as that brought

‘Y,about by the ]ntroductlon of nuclear weap-ons oato the battlefield, leave a ~reat dealunchanged, The doctrine Is, on the \vhole,ewlutionary and leans heav]ly on histori-cal operational analyem for the evaluationand re.evaluation ofprlnclples and opera-tional models. Sowet mllttary speclahstsrely heavily on such analys]s whFn at-tempting to develop and d]rect the evolu-tlon of mllltary doctrine down the mostappropriate paths.

To quote General 1. E. Krupchenko:Modern conditions haw Introduced rzeu,

factors znto the formula for ~ucccw [C,!th

complete meehanzmtzon, armar and neu

weapons, all troops haue becorrze mobileConsequently great posslbL[ttles huccemerged for deceloplng an operatton athzgh speed and engaging zn ~jtaneul,er u,lthtank and combzned arms armzes.

In this connection there hare heea

chafiges in the type ofoperatton that can betamed out th rma,ghout the enemy defenses.Th~re are far greater apportunrties nowadays than 1,1the past, especially because ofthe greater ranges at u,hlch rockets, longra!ge artll[ery, aircraft anddesants[land-lng forces] can be used. Ellen so, examplesfrom the lobt uar hate ln no u,ay lost theu-iY[@L>anCe, III tkeory or 117practrcc. Rather,the~>encaara,qe lcieczsand suggest salutzonsto the modern prablern of hou, to get maJor/iwrm 1n the afftns[ 1e deq) tnto the opera.t[ona[ depths c)fthe defense, so as to ach levedctls{tc alms at h(.gh speed. ”

Krupchenku was dmcussmg the Worldt$’sw 11concept of the mobile group m oneof a series of articles on that concept,designed to examine and establish itsvalldlty on the modern battlefield. Morespeclflc reference to the concept was madeby hlajor !~ojclech itIichalak who wrote:

The mostcharm@rzstlc features of mod-em u arfa re are,

(a) ~anfllrr tuklng place over a widefront 0? on wl?cted a.ws,

Ib I Th<,h lg]l [c?,>!o} nzr)bdlty of fOrCeS,lc1 The al>udabt[lty Ofa COnStant Supp[y

()/”re[?lforcc,r71{,rits,.

(d] The orazlabtllt~ ofa large quanttty

uf rzaclrar llvqpons,

( t. I ThL, capaci t} to exert pressure on the

[chale depth of an ?nclny’s operational fOr-Inlltlon

Theretor+ the success of an offenstueopm’at!on wtll largely depend on deprzulngthe enemy 0[ the aboce-mentloned capabllz -tzes and, abme a[[, on the ellmznation ofn uc[mr m Isszles du rlag the con uentzonalpha.w oftke battle.

This .Ltuattaa makes [t necessary to seeknea, methods of emp[oylng forces so as tobreuk up tbe cokeszon of the completeenemy formutton ThLs might be accom -plwked, for example. by destroying objec -tt[,es or elements of the formations whichare sw.wntzal to the ulabtlityand combat fit-

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ness of the enemy forces. Based on the anal-ysls ofexpertence of the last war, theserequirements have led to the reappearanceon the modern battlefield of detachmentsengaged in raiding actwztles and also ofOperational Marching Groups [later des-ignated by the same author as OperationalManeuuer Groups]. The latter originatefrom the so-called hzgh-speed groupsformed from armored troops and widelyused by the Souiet Army durzng WorldWar 11.

The feature common totheoperatlonalactzuztzes of both marchzng groups andraiding detachments, he contznu~d, is thatthey are detached from their own mainforces to penetrate deep into the enemy rearto operate for a Itmltedperzod Conse -

quently they perform misszons at a consid-erable distance from the main forces,although zn close coordination with them,and always to their advantage. Thesetroops are intended mainly for destroyingnuclear missiles sites, command posts,electronic warfare equipment and antiair-craft defense weapons. They are also usfd,inter alia, to prevent the withdrawal ofenemy troops; to hinder the advance o~hisreserues from rear areas; to paralyze h~system of logistic~; and to capture and holdzmportan t areas and ob]ectwes untd the

approach of the main forces.zOn the same theme, Colonel Lachiewicz

and Colonel Rajmanski w~ote an article inwhich they said:

The aim of deploying an army’s Opera-

The filI-24 IS a highlymobileantitankweapon

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tzoncd Maneuver Group IS to switch thefocus of the fighting zn’to the rear of theenemy formatzon; to destroy importantobjectives whwh cannot be destroyed byother means; to achzeve chaos and dwor-ganlzatzon; and to limit the freedom ofmaneuver and the effectiveness of enemyactzon. .’

The Ioglc, therefore, M clear. In activedefense, NATO had found an effectiveanswer to Warsaw Pact operational strat-egy. Therefore, that operational strategyhas had to be changed. A new operationalstrategy has had to be dei,eloped whichwill ensure the rapid and total collapse ofNATO defenses and hence ensure therap]d conclusion of a war.

It is neither an easy nor a quick task,especially In peacet]me, to change theoperational concept of an entire army.Consequently, it ISobwous that we are notseeing a sudden or precipitous develop-”ment in Soviet doctrine, It would appearequally true, from a perusal of the WarsawPact milltary press, that, wh]le movestoward the umplementat]on al”a more flex-ible operational strategy were .lnltlatedpfobably as early as 1976, there was notthen, and still 1s not, any detailed blue-prlnt for th]s change. Resolution of thedetad and amendment of the very princi-ples themselves must be expected only asthe basic ideas are implemented, tactmsand operational maneuvers are tried outIn exercises and alternative mixes offorces and weapons systems are experi-mented with.

,Many of the changes and amendmentsof mmor principles have long been appar-ent in the Soviet army and have beentaken as evidence of major changes. It is

~ only as the new concept of operations hascome to maturity, and the weight of m]norchange has reached such large propor-tions, that it has been possible (certainlyfor this writer) to perceive the “opera-

tional plan as a whole’’—the form of therestructuring of Soviet operational strat-egy in Europe and the reasons for it.

Postwar Developmentsin Strategy and Operational Arl’

Two very significant developments inthe 1950s and 1960s dld much to alterSoviet operational thinking, These werethe deployment of battlefield nuclearweapons together with the “trip-wireresponse” strategy of .NATO and the massmechamzatlon of the So\,]et army. As aresult of the latter, combined arms forcesbecame capable of high speeds of ad-vance, maneuver and exploitation. Conse-quently, the designation of tank forma-tions as mobile groups came to be seen asrather anacbromstic.

In a tactical nuclear war, the defensewould be shattered by a nuclear strike,and the breakthrough and exploitationwould mainly become a problem oftrafflccontrol. Moreover, Important targetscould be neutralized or destroyed by tactl~cal nuclear strikes, thereby freeing troopsfor other tasks Invulnerabdity to tacticalnuclear strikes can only be obta]ned ]ftheSoviet forces can maintain a high rate of

advance and can prevent the establish-

ment of clear lines dlvldlng the two sidesby an early stage in the war,

The 1970s, therefore, saw a return h thestudy of conventional tactics, operationalart and strategy, with the added impetusof finding some way to neutralize NATO’snuclear trump card. It is not surprisingthat Sowet analysts turned to the experi-ences of World War If for an answer, and itwas the experience of tank formationswhich was seen by the Soviets as mostrelevant to modern conditions. This isbecause the development of mechanlza-

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tion has succeeded In raising the level of’mobility and protection of all arms to thatenjoyed only by the tank troops in WorldWar II. Tank formations were, therefore,

$

most caref lystudled. This trend was nodoubt enco aged bythelarge number offormer commanders of tank formationsoccupying senior posltlons w]th]n theSoviet ground forces—a factor that M notto be underestimated,

As tank formations were the must com-mon subject of study and the most com-mon component of World War 11 mobilegroups, it is hardly surprising that aware-ness of the concept of the mobde group as avaluable means of raising the tempo of theadvance and exploltmg success into theenemy rear areas should grow throughoutthe last decade. The similarities betweenNATO’s intended form of defense and thestyle of defense adopted by the Germans laboth the In]t]al and the later stases of thewar serve to make the study of the mobilegroup even more appropriate

Many contemporary Soviet strategwtsare at pains to point out that, howevermuch the mob]l]ty and protection of allarms formations is ra}sed, there can be nodoubt that tank formations still remammore maneuverable. Tactical cons] der-atlons, especially the widespread deploy-ment of Ilghtwe]ght antitank weapons,have necessitated the mcluslon of someinfantry ]n tank formations. Th]s has onlyaffected the Issue to a sl]ght degree, ho\v-ever, and does not alter the basic pnncl -pies.

The attention given to the role, composl- .tion and utdlty of the mobile group hasbeen reflected ]n the Soviet mditary press,particularly since 1974. Interest has beensteady and at a hgh level, with excep-tional bursts of attention in 1976 and1979. On the one hand, It can certainly besaid that the activities of the wart]memobile groups are providing examples for

operational analysis which are applicableto all modern mechanized formations.

On the other hand, what all contributorsto discussions in the Soviet military pressstress nowadays, when referring to theconcept of the mublle group, is that a for-mation vnth a relatively h]gher speed andgreater inherent flex] b]llty than otherformatlans presents the best means ofachlevmg a rapid penetration mto the rearareas of a modern defense based on theIInes of that proposed by NATO. \Vhenthat defense, if hastll~ estabhshed, POS-ses~es llttle in the ~vay of operationalreserves and bas no strong, second opera-tional )Ine of defenses. the premium on arapid breach and rapid ddvance Into the -defender’s rear area becomes Immediatelyabi Jous,

World War II Lessons Applied Today

To summarize the lessons now drawnfrom the historical development of the con-cept of the \i’orld \t’ar 11mobile group, fol-Iovmg are the mobile group characteris-tics considered most frequently bj Sowetauthors as be]ng dppllcable to the modernOMG.

e The mobile.group ~vas not so much anorganization as a concept. It was a way ofemploylng an existing force to berterexplo}t both the culnerabilltles of theenemy and the capab]lltles of the friendlyformat Ian. hloblle groups conferred genu-]ne flexlbll]ty on the operational com-manders and were employed for a widevariety oft asks.

e Mob] le groups \vere the most success-ful means ofexploltation that the Sovietsfound to turn tact]cal success into opera-tional success and achieve a high rate ofadvance to great depth. It 1s for this rea-son, above all else, that the concept has

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now been revived m the OMG.● Mobile groups were most important

m“achieving tbe continuity of the offensiveand avoiding disastrous pauses or lulls inthe operation which would give the enemytime to recover (or, in modern terms, touse his nuclear weapons effectively).

● Mobile groups were rarely used singlyIn an operation. Usually, several were em-ployed on different axes.

● There was always a great degree offlexibility in reorganization, echeloningand grouping of forces involved m mobilegroups, and army commanders hatia lot offreedom to exercise their choice of options.In modern terms, this freedom of choiceand greater degree of flexlbd]ty may wellbe found at a lower level,

* Formations and units comprisingmobile groups were often reinforced ortailored to enable them to meet specificrequirements For example, considerableengineer assets were added when obstacle

,. crossing was Important. The ideal basis for‘s a mobde group was a tank or a mechanized

(all arms) corps. In modern termF, thiswould equate to a tank or motor rifle divi-sion.

e AS World War H progressed, the pro-liferation of antitank weapons made itessential to-make tank formations operat-]ng as, or in, mobile groups more self-con-tained. Integral infantry, artillery andlogist]c elements became the norm. This Mreflected in the current reorganizationand re-equipment of the Group nf SovietForces in Germany (GSFG )

o Technical support to mobile groupswas essential to their viability. As a rule,the capacity to repair armored fightingvehicles (AFVS) fell offrap]dly as the oper-ation progressed until finally the corpssometimes lost virtually all of its repairassets and ground to a halt. This wasone of the major causes of the Vzstula -(lboperation finally running out of steam.

The lessons drawn out for the modernSoviet army stress

—The importance of repairing damagedAFVS in mobile groups (OMGS) in thefield.

—The importance ofcommencing opera-tions with reliable AFVS powered by newor low-mileage engines.

—The need for corps-sized mobilegroups (equivalent to a modern division)to be self-contained and well-equipped interms of repair assets.

e Strong forward detachments—usu-ally from the first echelon of the forcesin the mobile group—were always de-ployed and were most important for assur-ing the speed of advance. Their primaryfunction was to reconnoiter enemy posi-tions and to pre-empt hie deployment intoprepared positions or into towns and vil-lages. The importance of this is even moreheavily emphasized today.

. The committal of mobile groups wasthe most crucial moment of the battle andwas itself crucial to the success of themobile groups:

—Committal was ]nvariably on two axes.—It was essential that there was little

oPPOsltlOn on committal, either from re.malnlng enemy defenses or from coun-terattack by land or an-,

.—Surprise was crucial and deceptionalways practiced. For example, the mainweight of supporting am strikes was put innormally about two to three hours afterthe start of committal so as not to betraythe stratagem.

—Massive air and artillery support wasalways prov]ded—that is, 50 to 70 percentof the front’s aviation and 18 to 20 guns foreach tank or infantry battalion in themobile group.

● Mobile groups often operated in con-junction with air assault forces and parti-sans.

. Mobile groups often detached units to

54 March

MANEUVERGROUP

I

r-aid, and somet]mes the whole mobilegroup had a raiding function. In the mod-ern concept of the OMG, the raiding func-tion has become more important due to theIncreased value of certain targets such asnuclear weapons or headquarters.

e ,Moblle groups uery frequently en-gaged In encounter battles e]ther withwithdrawing forces or with advancingenemy reserves wh]ch they attracted byvirtue of the threat they posed to the stia-bllity of the defense. These encounter bat-tles varied In scale from those of themobile group’s forward detachment (rapidbattalion or brigade actions) to encounterbattles up to three days long involv]ng anentire army, with 500 tanks and 1,500guns plus aircraft engaged on each side.Encounter battles were fought both by dayand by night, oftena Iong way forward ofthe advancing combmed arms formation,and at up to350 kilometers beyond the ln]-tial forward edge of the battle area. Theywere very demandmg of commanders’skills, but them successful outcome oftenhad a great bearing on the overall successof the operation.

It must always be borne in mind that, asthe OMG isa concept, or a new way ofusing existing formations, it does not

The MiG23 Flogger

necessarily requ]re thecreation ofnewfor- -mations. At the most, ]t will require minortailoring and reshuffling. IfOMGs are spe-cially formed, they are likely to bedeployed by many of the armies in theoffensive and even by the fronts.

As a concept, the OMG M only a part ofan overall strateg]c operation to defeat theWestern Alliance. It is not an end in Itselfbut Ma tool to assist the rapid, widespreadadvance of the Warsaw Pact’main forcesand hence ach]eve a more rapid end to thewar. As a concept, it appears to be wellfounded ]n v]ew of both NATOs presentdefensive posture and the numerous his-torical examples of a defensive conceptbeing defeated because of the psychologi-cal Inability of the defenders to accept theneed to yield ground, particularly homeground.

The relevence of these recent Sovietstudies of wartime operations, plus theapphcabihty of the prewously mentionedprinciples governing the deployment ofmob]le groups to the modern OMGS, iswell-supported in the East European mili-tarYPress, Theemphasls onthe fact that .

“committal of this group was the mostImportant and tense moment of the battle”emphasizes what an Important role this

1983 55

MILITARYREVIEW

new concept plays m the revised Sovietstrategy for the 1980s. ‘

lt IS belleved that there WII1 be onemajor point of difference between theOMG and the World War 11mobile group.This IS that, as the 1980s progress, theONIG WI1l come to play a role relativelymuch more Important In the o~,erall opera-tional plan of the Warsaw Pact than themob]le ~roup played In the operations ofthe Red army in tt’orld War 11. Thm ISdue to the decreased scale of modernoperations m terms of overall numbers ofmen, the Increased Importance of speedand a h~gh rate of ad~,ance, the certainty ofstrategic disaster In the event of opera-tional fadure and the particular nature of,NATO defense>

We have to remember that this conceptprovides the all-lrnportant Ilnk betweenstrategv and tactich lt is a means to anend—the end helng the rapid cullapse ofNATO and the l]mltlng of the war ta thebattlefield and the means be]ng by sur.

,. prise attack, on a broad front, along sev.Teral axes, The concept of the operation WIIIbe to Insert on each axis, as an OMG, astrong dlvlslon b[,hlnd the main NATOdefense belt WLth( fir>t orswondcla} oftlw

offensIre It may even prove feas]ble todeploy fnr this task the best part of a tankarmy, operating as a fro)tt.level O.MG

The control of these ()\lGs WI1l at alltimes be subject to a centralized overallplan, They WIII not be operating indepen-dently but on tasks set by the commanderm chl~f They WI]], however, have consld-erahle Iat]tude as to howto ]mplement theplans they are given, and they will not beconstrained by mct]cal boundaries. Theonly limlt to them action WVIIbe opera-~lonal boundanes

Once they have achieved penetration,the OLIGS WIII act as a consolidated forceto assault or seize major targets or objec-tives, or they may break up as tactical

raiding units to hit such small but opera.tlonally Important targets as headquar-ters or nuclear weapons sites, The OM.Gmay operate alone or m concert with otherOMGS. By definition, the OMG (and itsconstituent raldlng groups and forwarddetachments) will be three-dimensional.That m, an air element wIII be an essen-tial part of the organization.

The Effect of the OMG on theTactical Nuclear Battle

AS long as NATO retains normal (notenhanced radiation or neutron) tactlca]

weapons, w]th their high collateral dam-age, tbe]r long dwell time and with thepolmcal Inhlbitlons about their use, theWestern Alliance WIII only be able to usethem effectively If the attacking forces canbe slowed down and ]f friendly andenemy troops can be kept apart. It will beextremely difficult for NATO to considerthe use of normal battlefield nuclearweaponson the first orsecondday of theattack, well ]nslde\Vest Germany, against .Soviet forces in close contact with NATOtroops.

Furthermore, ]fthe offensive w, in oneoperational echelon, NATO’s plans forInterdiction (with nuclear and conven.tional forces) against a second operationalechelon WIII be In va]n. There may well beno such second echelon within East Ger-many for several days.

If, asseemst]kely, ]tdoestake NATOseveral days to obtain nuclear release, bythat time spec]al purpose forces, airstr]kes, OhlGs, raids, sabotage, and thelike WIII undoubtedly have eroded consid-erably the nuclear stocks and weaponaavailable. They may also have ser]ouslydamaged the command and control systemessential to their effect]ve use.

56 March

MANEUVERGROUP

A great deal of effort has gone into mak-ing the Soviet forces well able to survivetactically on a nuclear battlefield. Thisapplies as much to Iogistlc elementi as toteeth arms. If NATO, on tbe other hand,puts most of its nuclear, biological andchemical effort Into fighting a chemicalrather than a nuclear war, NTATO maywell be at a serious disadvantage.

This is not to mln]mize the need forINATO to be equipped and trained to fightin a chemical environment, nor to denythat NATO’s possession of chemical weap-ons would be the greatest deterrent to aSoviet useoftbem. Rather, ]t is to pointout that chemical weapons are very muchsecondary In Importance, m Soviet eyes, tonuclear weapons Addiuonally, It is theability to surwve on a nuclear battlefieldwhich the Soviets deem more ImportantYet most NATO forces do far more tra]n-ing for chemical warfare than for nuclearwarfare,

If the war develops Into a nuclear-war,the OMC, WIII put the Sowets in a goodposition to explolt their own use of tact]calnuclear weapons. At tbe same time, theywill mmimize their own vulnerability tothem. The OMG IS a h]gh-speed stratagemwh]ch ]sequally >,alid for both the nuclearand the conventions 1battlefield.

Comparisons Between Mobile Groupsand OMGS

Composition. In the past, only tankformations were capable of filling the roleof mobile groups. .Now, all-arms forma-tions are also capable and may well be

appOlnted tO act as OMGS. On balance,however, tank formations are stall seen asbetter in most circumstances althoughthey require integral infantry and moreartillery than they previously held to

make for abetter balanced force. Ideally,any well-equipped format]on should becapable ofoperating as an OMG, and thewidespread reliance on battle drills evenatdlvlslonal level will facilitate thelrrtro-duct ion of this Idea.

Targets The importance of destroyingnuclear weapons (even in tbe conventionalphase], electronic equipment and com-mand and control elements constitutes thebiggest difference here Otherwise, theprinciples of engaging targets rema]n vir-tually unchanged What modern equip-ment confers, ofcour~e, ISa greater~’billtyto carry out these prlnc]ples. Tb]s is per-haps no~vhere more marked than ]n thefield ot’electronic \varfare. The advantages -of having a strong force deep In the ene-my’s defens}ve zone are immediately obvi-ous In terms of radio and radar location oftargets, jamm]ng of radio relay communi-cations and the implernentat}on ofdecep-tlOn measures

Tactics. The Increased emphas]s onraldlng actlvltles and for~vard detach-ments WI1l he very demanding Indeed ofInlt]atlve and competence on the part ofyoung officers Although a great deal ofprogress bas been made In Improving themental flex]blllty of thejunlor commanderand mcreaslng hls overall competence andunderstanding of the battlefield, there Mstill a long wayto go Initiative isa verydifficult concept for the Soviet militarysystem to come to terms with. As a partialremedy, a lot of effort has recently beenput into automatmg command and controlprocedures by the use of algorithms anddrills and by the Introduction of com-puters. A great deal of effort has also goneInto improvurg command and controi sys-tems, especial Iy communications

Two changes of tactical empbas]s due tothe nature of NATO defenses are alsonotable Lachlewlcz and RaJmanskl notethat:

1983 57

MILITARYREVIEW

flghtzng on the approaches to a waterobstacle, and 1ts impact on the successof the forced crossing has recently becomeespemally important, because the enemyhas come to rely on exploltzng water obstacles as a means of establmhlng a perma-nent defense,’

A water-crossing capabihty has, as aconsequence, become even more impor-tant for the OMG than It was for tbemobile group.

Second, the defense of minor bulltupareas—villages, small towns and stripdevelopment—bas become an importantfeature of NATO defenses, This baslead to a reassessment of tactics for fight-ing In btultup areas, wltb a blg swingaway from the city siege tactics of 10years ago to a basic drill of Iightnlngattacks on wllages.

N]gbt. Special attention Mbeing pa}d tooperations at mght as a means of reducingthe advantages of modern weapons in thedefense. Over the last year, this, too, has

‘T been a topic of particular interest ]n tbeSoviet army. Lacbiewicz and Rajmansklnote:

At ntght lt 1s mow dlfficuIt to zdentz~yu,here the OMG w, and what Its directionof march 1s, and It w not easy to argan[zecounter-measures to destroy zt. Therefore ttm cons~dered that nlghtpro~zdes fauorab[econdrtlons for the pcnetratton of theArmy’s OMG in the depth of the enemygrOuplng.”

Artillery support This was always ofcrucial Importance to the successful com-mittal of a mobile group and bas notchanged with the OMG. However, mob]learmored arti Hery on tbe enemy side andmodern location techniques have made itnecessary to move away from lengthy roll-ing barrages to short [four to five mmute),heavy, successive fire strikes as a means ofneutralizing the enemy. In Soviet eyes,remote mining (especially by multiple-

rocket launcher) Roses one of the greatestthreats to the successful commi~tal andoperation of the OMG. Any means ofremotely delivering mines wi 11be a partic-ular target for Soviet artillery and air-craft.

The style and volume of new gunnerypractices have necessitated changes in thecommand and control of artillery and Inthe ammumtion Iogmtlcal supply system.New Soviet art]llery weapons, such as theBM27 multiple-rocket launcher, havemade it poss]ble to provide artdlery sup.port at far greater ranges than in the past.The mechanization and armoring of artil-lery are clearly of great importance for theviabll]ty of artillery accompanying theOMG

Tbe role of air power. This is of muchgreater Importance nowadays, particu-larly in view of the fact that 50 percent ofNATO’s firepower (Including, of course,nuclear firepower) IS vested in the airforces. Consequently, an an- operation hasbecome an Integral part ofa strategic oper-ation, and the air element is tbe thirddimension of tbe ground battle. I{elicop-ters, particularly those Integral to cover “formations, are best considered as flyingartl 1lery—the Ml -8 providing heavy fire-power support and the Lfl -24 providingspeclahzed antitank capabi Iity.

This requires alr support to be muchmore closely Integrated with Soviet lowerformations than it was previously, Itdemands much closer support, greaterversatility and, consequently, a ddTerentsystem of coordination and control.

The greater importance of air support,the Sowets stress, bas made theweather a more Important considerationthan ever before when planning OMGoperations. Thm is not to say that OMGScannot be committed in bad weather, How-ever, their use WIII certainly be risk]erunder such conditions if the defender pos-

’58

sesses aircraft that are better equipped tofly in poor visibility, and/or if thedefender’s meteorological service is morereliable at predicting changes in theweather.

Combat support—by air, by way ofreconnaissance, fire support, minelaying,smoke-screen laying, desants, Ioglstlc sup.ply, and so on—has been revolutionized bythe hehcopter, and air defense has beenrevolutionized by the tactical surface-to-air missile. This has necessitated a com-plete reorganization of the Soviet am forceand air defense and requires managementof airspace on a more rational basis. Armyaviation has returned as the formationcommander’s integral air arm, and th]s,mainly rotary-wing support, has come tobe of positively crucial importance in theconcept of the OMG—to such an extentthat there are numerous articles dealingsolely with thm aspect of the operationalstrategy.

The frontal and theater aviation willprovide resources for the air operation—for example, the air element of the strate-g]c operation, Resource limitations maywell dictate that the corridor of air super-iority, established for the conduct of airoperations, must be coordinated with theair-cover corridors created to protect theOMGS.

Of tactical Interest is the great impor-tance allotted to combating NATO’s com-bat helicopters. After nuclear weapons,and together with remotely deliveredmines and the multiple. rocket launcher,helicopters are said to present the greatestthreat to the OMG. For this reason, theSoviets are expected shortly to deploy anew helicopter, the Mi-29, which has beendesigned to combat the helicopter threat.

Link with special purp~se forces. Theincreased need for a rapid collapse of theenemy, plus the easily defined nature ofcrucial targets, the destruction of which

MANEUVERGROUP.

will put the whole of NATOS defensiveframework at risk, has increased the valueof clandestine behind-the-lines opera-tions. This, coupled with irhproved meansof inserting special forces-by air, helicop-ter, in disgmse, and so forth—has led to asignificant increase m the role played byspecial purpose forces. This is especially sofor the reconnaissance and verification oftargets to be engaged by air or long-rangeartillery.

It is probably no exaggeration to saythat the recent development of Soviet,operational doctrine is the most signifi-cant to occur since the changes wrought bythe advent of nuclear weapons. It is noth-ing less than a complete operational.shakeup designed to produce an effectivemethod of winning a war quickly and, ifnecessary, byconventlonal means. At thesame time, its applicability to the nuclearbattlefield 1s evident and impressive.However, It has, as might be expected,necessitated a serious rethink by the Sovi-etsonhow torun their formations. This]sespecially true m terms of them philoso-phies on command and control and on all-arms cooperation and coordination.

At the tactical level, it is forcing a reor-gamzation of logistics, air defense tactics,artillery practices, and repair and maint-enance methods, to name but a few areas ofinterest. It isclear from thediscussloninthe specialized Soviet mdmary press thatsolutions to the problems generated by thechange in operational strategy are onlyjust being attempted. It will be a long timebefore the Soviet army can even identifyall the associated problems, let aloneanswer them.

There can be no doubt, however, that theSoviets are now irrevocably committed toa significant amendment to their opera-tional strategy. Developing the potentialcapability to deploy OMGS will be evi-dence of the acquisition ofa very great

1983 59

MILITARYREVIEW

degree of operational flexi~lllty. It WII1give the Warsaw Pact an alternative

means, and it 1sclearly an attractive alter- “native.

Let us not forget that it envisages largeSo\let formations operat]ng behindNATO’s main defens]ve belt by the end ofthe first dayofthe malnbattle. ThTswlll, ifIt M accomplished, present NATO w]th aproblem at precisely that lcwel at ~hlch ItIs, currently, least well organized tocope—the operational level. If .NATO Mtomeet this challenge, It ~v)ll require aneffort at the corresponding scale because,as the Soviets point out, no matter howgood the tactics are. ]f the operationalplans are no good. you lose The alm ofdeployln~ OMGS WII1 be to try to makeNATO lose very quickly.

NOTES

, s,, P w v W, T.. SO,<., Mew of w., Pea,. 8“0 Ne.!raw

Roulledw & Keg,. 80ss.” M,,, 1975 vf90r s the W,S[S Ioremos!au,h.r t, 0“ SOW,! M law Iheo+ a,, readers are re+erred t. .S I..h

commg.oo. BiMzkr,. gsJ,tef swe 10 mwN,51md by Macro Ila” Co The,, ,,! of ,,!5 ..,.1, “a, r, e, hew “ m “go, s .,0,”,s, m m, IIeld 01

I@% 9 Len!n,sf m,l,taq Iheov

2 Gene,. E Kr.whenw I. m an c,e - I.. So.ret M,r,kw H!s!orr.d

.ow.ef . . Y 1q8, cm +3(1

3 Ma 0, Wio,’,eC. Ml.hala” Av,al,n. m Ra,6a.d Wi”euverODeratm”$,, ,.e C,ou.d ,.,,,. A,, ,,,r. e.nd A,, D,,..s, He.,e,v Few.ary ,982

4 Coon.1 Lxt e.,cz a.o Colone’ Rwnansk, .el,c.mter Recon.a$s-

,..>., ,“, F,,. M,,, 0“, m S.tmo.d L.., OPeW,$O.$at N q“, Jr Force..0 Ar Defense 8,,!,. June .981

5 1. ,escr b .g 1h,5 I mu,t ac, ”CWleUge the Weal hen occ.soned byV.)., Jot!. H>ne$ .5 Army t. .Wm I em ,naemed 4.. 6,aW,”g 1. my

are ,!,0. man, d [he mc,e r,.,., references, $heown me,, wtuch mo“Ham COwre!e CL,”! !Tm,, o. of ,,. Lieve!omlents under , SCuss!o”

6 .ect ..,,, ,“0 % rra%k, o“ tat7 ,m,d

,— - —- — )

No Exceptions to USAR Education Requirements. Ofhclals at theUS Army Reserve Components Personnel and Admincstrat{on Center(RCPAC) warn that US Army Reserve (USAR) officers approachingmandatory promotion consideration must meet certain mandatoryeducation requirements These standards must be achieved beforepromot!on, and there are no exceptions.

In the past few years, thousands of USAR officers have not beenselected for promotion solely because they d!d not meet the educationrequtremenfs In 1981 alone, 46 percent of the captains who hadreached therr eliglbhty dates were not recommended for promotion tomajor because they d]d not meet mm!mum education standards. As ofAugust 1982, boards have turned down more than 1,000 captains forpromotion to major because they had not completed an officeradvanced course

RCPAC off[c!als recommend that mditary educat!on be planned farenough m advan~e to al~ow completion before promotton board con-s[deratlon Selection boards consider USAR officers for promotionduring the calendar year preceding that m which the required amountof service is completed. Education requirements must be completedno later than the date the board convenes.

For more information, contact your nearest USAR school or yourpersonnel management ofhcer at the RCPAC

60 March