April 2007

AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

THE SUCAV and BK-135:

TRANSFORMING THE DELIVERY OF CAS ORDNANCE

by

Musket

A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty

In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements

Advisor: Dr Michael P. May

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

April 2007

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Disclaimer

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not

reflect the official policy or position of the US government or the Department of Defense. In

accordance with Air Force Instruction 51-303, it is not copyrighted, but is the property of the

United States government.

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Abstract

In less than a decade, the Air Force has witnessed the profound impact of combat-proven

JDAMs (Joint Direct Attack Munitions), Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) firing

precision weapons, the development of the Predator’s successor, the truly offensive Reaper, and

the remarkable advent of the Small Diameter Bomb (SDB). With all these capabilities at its

disposal, the military is faced with the task of employing them in ways which maximize their

effectiveness. The primary intent of this paper is to offer two slightly different, but very realistic

options. The research examines trends in current operations which lay the foundation for systems

capable of thoroughly exploiting SDB benefits and significantly reducing the sensor-to-shooter

gap. Differing only in platform, two theoretical systems, the SUCAV (using MQ-9 Reapers) and

the BK-135 (using tankers), are described in terms of their components, connectivity and concept

of employment. Limitations and strengths are then addressed to show the systems can provide

persistent, responsive strike potential using existing technology but require the military to make

fundamental changes to paradigms surrounding air-delivered weapons.

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Contents

Disclaimer ........................................................................................................................................ i

Abstract ........................................................................................................................................... ii

List of Figures ................................................................................................................................ iv List of Tables ...................................................................................................................................v

Introduction......................................................................................................................................1

Current and Expected Employment .................................................................................................2

SUCAV / BK-135 Components.....................................................................................................16

SUCAV / BK-135 Concept............................................................................................................18

SUCAV / BK-135 Limitations.......................................................................................................22

SUCAV / BK-135 Strengths..........................................................................................................26

Conclusion .....................................................................................................................................29

Bibliography ..................................................................................................................................36

Appendix........................................................................................................................................39

Glossary .........................................................................................................................................47

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List of Figures

Figure 1. Small Diameter Bomb (GBU-39) in flight (top) and on the BRU-61/A (above) ........39 Figure 2. MQ-9 Reaper ..............................................................................................................39 Figure 3. Close Air Support Briefing Form (9-Line) ..................................................................40 Figure 4. The Actual DAGR / Proposed SUDAGR ...................................................................40 Figure 5. SUCAV and BK-135 Overall Concept ........................................................................41 Figure 6. Immediate CAS Request Process (Traditional) ...........................................................42 Figure 7. Immediate CAS Request Process (SUCAV/BK-135) .................................................42 Figure 8. Notional SUDAGR-SUCAV-SDB Linkage ................................................................43 Figure 9. Example of SUCAV/BK-135 Coordinate Validation..................................................43 Figure 10. SUCAV-Computed No-Strike and Danger Close Regions .........................................44 Figure 11. Notional SUCAV Coverage ........................................................................................45

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List of Tables Table 1. CENTCOM Airpower Summary, 15 February - 15 March 2007................................46

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Introduction

As the 20th century drew to a close, the JDAM (joint direct attack munition) made its

operational debut in Operation Allied Force.1 Oblivious to weather and autonomously guiding to

targets, these weapons forever changed the nature of air-delivered weapons. Just two years later,

the premier USAF tactical UAV (unmanned aerial vehicle), the MQ-1 Predator, flawlessly

launched and guided an AGM-114 Hellfire air-to-ground missile. A blatant success, the missile

“struck the tank-turret about 6 inches to the right of deadcenter.”2 Although it wasn’t a JDAM,

releasing a weapon from a UAV helped expand their application well beyond a reconnaissance

role. Realizing the implications of an armed UAV, the USAF began developing the Predator B,

or MQ-9 Reaper, and being built under the premise of delivering weapons, this UAV is expected

to employ JDAMs. However, through the tireless pursuit of better weapons, the military now has

the small diameter bomb (SDB) at its disposal. These munitions use the proven guidance of

JDAMs but have standoff ranges in excess of 40 miles.3

As the military faces a long, global war on terror, potential force reductions, and the

CSAF’s desire “to achieve...higher levels of access, agility and lethality,”4 there is no better time

to exploit the extraordinary capabilities of the SDB. Using them with a Reaper or other platform

which is then linked directly to soldiers is the best way to make it happen. Projected increases in

UAV inventories, their demonstrated offensive potential, and dominance in regions like Iraq

make two distinctions about UAVs - they are here to stay and can effectively employ weapons.

The persistent debate, however, is how to use UAVs and what they will bring to the fight.

The following pages suggest viable answers to those questions but require a fundamental

change in the concept of delivering ordnance to targets identified by any means in any location.

The military is facing increasing operations tempos, fewer and aging assets, growing demand for

ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) and the high probability of fighting irregular

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enemies in austere locations. At the same time, the armed forces are trapped in a manned-aircraft

paradigm where a sensor (man or machine) locates a target, the target is passed to a weapons

platform (often manned) and a weapon is finally employed. The reality, however, is the military

currently has UAVs capable of carrying weapons, multiple means of generating target location

and small, smart, accurate weapons with impressive stand-off capability.

This proposal will show how combining the capabilities of the SDB with a Reaper (or

KC-135) which are then linked to one of the best sensors available - the human sensor on the

ground - creates a system providing troops persistent, accurate, and rapid strike potential.

Although the systems will be discussed primarily in the context of close air support (CAS), the

employment need not, and should not be limited to CAS. To do so would restrict the technology

and result in a failure of application. Before describing the systems, an assessment of current

operations in terms of GPS weapons, UAV use and the realities of CAS reveals trends supporting

their arrival. Second, the overall concept, the components, and how they are connected will be

explained. Finally, foreseeable limitations and strengths of the systems will be addressed.

The limitations highlight the biggest hurdles are traditional command and control (C2),

current doctrine and misapplication of the system. Without significant changes in operating

paradigms by air and ground forces - namely more liberal C2 and CAS doctrine that approaches

UAVs as the offensive weapons they are - the system is destined to function less than optimally;

if at all. The strengths show how platforms armed with SDBs can transform CAS through

persistent ordnance and smaller sensor-to-shooter gaps while reducing human involvement.

Current and Expected Operations

A brief look at current and expected operations highlights several things setting the stage

for employing a UCAV (unmanned combat aerial vehicle) for CAS or AI.5 First, since its arrival

and use in Operations Allied Force, Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, the JDAM proves

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time and time again that GPS-guided munitions are past the novelty stage and now the premier

weapon of choice. Second, the unprecedented use of UAVs and the Predator’s Hellfire launch

laid the foundation for UCAVs and spiked interest in its descendant, the MQ-9 Reaper. Third,

delaying the use of UCAVs, GPS-guided weapons, or ideally the combination of both, has

caused CAS to become more cumbersome than it needs to be. To aid the discussion and frame

the context for current tactics, many of the following examples will draw from an excerpt of

airpower employed in the CENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR) from 15 February to 15

March 2007, which has been compiled in an Airpower Summary (Table 1). However, this data

only encapsulates use of air assets and air-delivered munitions; therefore the arena in which the

US military can expect to fight must also be addressed.

First, the Airpower Summary includes operations from both Iraq and Afghanistan and

reflects a very recent time slice of how the USAF is fulfilling AOR ordnance needs. Other than

CAS sorties, all numbers are occurrences of drops rather than number of bombs; the purpose is

to compare types of weapons used vice how many JDAMs or LGBs (laser guided bombs) were

used to hit a target. In other words, if two GBU-38s struck a target, it is only shown as one drop.

Also, the USAF has no control over the weapons the Royal Air Force (RAF) or US Navy employ

therefore, only USAF assets are reflected, and while the A-10 is such an asset, its drops were

omitted because it currently has no JDAM option.6

Second, the combat setting which will allow the proposed systems to operate is a critical

factor to their viability. Similar to what American forces have enjoyed for years, it requires a

permissive environment where air superiority and/or supremacy is, or quickly is attained. In

addition to being the dominant, unchallenged airpower of the globe, the US military can also

anticipate this permissiveness based on the expected threat. While today’s terrorists, insurgents,

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and extremists - even with sophisticated networks - pose an adaptive and lethal threat, they do

not operate air forces. This is not to say this is the only threat America should expect or train to

counter, but it is a valid assumption to say it is a long-term menace. The Air Force Chief of Staff,

General Moseley, put it in perspective saying, America “will be in a global war on terrorism for

[a] lifetime. This is a long war.”7 While air supremacy may not be guaranteed for a lifetime, the

military can expect it in most, if not all, situations when this is the engaged enemy.

GPS Weapons: Since the 1999 debut of the JDAM, it has been employed more than

15,000 times and is routinely used in fighting the global war on terror. The first operational use

occurred during Allied Force where more than 650 JDAMs were dropped from B-28 Sprits

during the conflict.9 In Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, ‘strategic’ B-1s and B-52s brought

hundreds of JDAMs overhead and destroyed targets as soon as coordinates were received. In

fact, over 5,800 JDAMs were dropped in the first six months of OEF, and B-1s alone employed

almost 3,900 (roughly 67%).10 Over 5500 JDAMs have already been employed in OIF, and have

achieved a two meter (or less) CEP11 - well below the expected distance.12 Less than a decade

old, these weapons have been so cost effective and successful both the USAF and Navy have

more than doubled original their orders to over 200,000 units.13 As long as GPS exists, or

something better arrives, there is no foreseeable end to the service life of JDAMs.

Aside from its performance, another key development - the conversion of the Mk-82, 500

lb bombs - has made the JDAM the practical and flexible weapon it is today. The GBU-38,

brought GPS accuracy with a smaller explosive power which is “especially important as forces

continue to target insurgents and their meeting places, normally in heavily populated residential

areas.”14 Since the USAF was primarily using the 2000 lb GBU-31, the JDAM was basically

becoming restricted by the combat environment.15 Soldiers caught in counter-insurgency fights

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often taking place in urban mazes must have a precise, effective weapon but at the same time

need manageable destruction. While the GBU-38 was a significant step, Boeing (who

manufactures JDAM kits) has since made the 250 lb SDB (Figure 1), and this weapon could

prove to be the urban weapon of choice.

While the JDAM has arguably been one of the greatest advancements in bomb guidance

ever witnessed, the ‘magic’ actually lies in harnessing the ubiquity of GPS. JDAMs are simply

dumb bombs with kits that receive GPS signals and pass the data to an inertial unit which then

moves a tail fin. With that in mind, the SDB is technically not a JDAM but uses the same

guidance and both belong to a group of weapons referred to as GPS/INS Aided Munitions or

GIAMs. In addition to the label, the SDB differs in several ways from its JDAM predecessors.

First, because the GBU-39 uses more GPS receiver channels than the GBU-31, 32 or 38,

it has an expected CEP of only 5-8 meters. Second, the attached expandable wing kit provides

standoff ranges from 4016 to 60 nautical miles17 depending on release parameters. Third, the

GBU-39 is a smaller weapon and the SDB system “employs a smart carriage capable of carrying

four 250-lb class guided air-to-surface munitions.”18 Because of this carriage unit and wing

system, the GBU-39 is not a kit which modifies existing bombs - it is a stand alone weapon.

Nonetheless, the GBU-39 is a revolutionary development as it 1) provides four weapons in lieu

of one 1000 lb bomb 2) can reduce collateral damage to civilians, property, and infrastructure19

and 3) has finally broken the long-standing barrier of short standoff to deliver accurate

weapons.20 It is the SDB which will truly exploit GPS/GIAM capabilities and the transformation

comes down to size and range. The SDB can glide roughly 5 times further than any JDAM and

its size allows platforms to attack more targets with any given payload restriction.

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Providing more stand-off and less collateral damage than any of the JDAM models

makes the SDB/GBU-39 more and more enticing to commanders and has already been

successfully employed twice in 2007 to attrite enemy forces in Afghanistan.21 A short timeline

illustrates the intense desire to field the SDB and the fruition of using it in conflict. Initial

production started in April 2005, 16 months later the GBU-39 was delivered to warfighters,22 in

just 5 months the unit to first drop the weapon deployed to Afghanistan, and 13 days after their

arrival, an F-15E conducted the historic attack.23 The second drop is captured in the Airpower

Summary. Aside from using the weapon in combat, additional indication of USAF interest in the

SDB is Boeing’s plans to build 24,000 weapons and 2,000 carriages through 2014.24 Although

that number of SDBs matches the USAF’s projected inventory, the latest desire is delivery

through fiscal year 2020, which, depending on use, could very well increase final quantities.25

To recognize the full significance of JDAMs (or SDBs), it helps to approach it from an

operator’s point of view - beyond actual or projected inventories and employment statistics. In

the context of un-powered bombs the USAF has relied on TV or laser guidance since Vietnam26

and due to the cost and limited compatibility of TV-guided bombs27, LGBs became the primary

option. It was the JDAM that broke a 30-year span in which most operators were restricted to

LGBs or dumb bombs. Providing pilots an entirely new smart weapon alternative is as invaluable

to an aircraft’s lethality as aerial refueling is to its range. During Allied Force, poor weather

often limited or totally halted the use of LBGs, but the JDAM continued its assault and the

glaring reality was weather, one of aviation’s oldest nemeses, was removed from the equation28.

JDAMs are also impressively simple munitions which require no human input once released.

LGBs, on the other hand, guide to a laser spot which must be provided by an aircraft, UAV, or

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someone on the ground until impact. The most ‘difficult’ part of employing a JDAM is ensuring

coordinates are correctly typed before passing them to the weapon.

Finally, JDAMs/SDBs are more flexible than LGBs as attack parameters29 can be re-

programmed before release. Flexibility is also exuded in the SDB’s standoff. Simply because a

bomb can travel 40 miles does not imply it has to, or that a target at 4 miles can’t be attacked.

The ability to do both is the key. Simply put, JDAMs and SDBs have become and will remain

one of the easiest smart weapons to employ. GIAMs are a new paradigm in air delivered

ordnance and whether operators accept it or not, they have negated a historically critical attribute

of manned aircraft. Oblivious to weather and requiring no human input after release, these

weapons have essentially removed the requirement for a pilot to actually see the target.

UAV Inventories and Employment: After the Predator’s Hellfire launch, the USAF was

quick to recognize the offensive potential of UAVs and “in response to the [DoD] request for

GWOT initiatives,”30 began developing a larger version of the Predator. The MQ-9, or Reaper,

(Figure 2), operates at higher altitudes, carries over ten fold the ordnance, and cruises almost

three times as fast as the Predator.31 Built with the intention of carrying and delivering ordnance,

the Reaper is slated to employ Hellfires, GBU-12s, GBU-38s, and has the primary mission of an

unmanned hunter/killer.32 The USAF doesn’t actually call the Reaper a UCAV, but this paper

approaches it as one since it will be used in combat and is only a matter of semantics. General

Moseley expresses the evolution well, stating, “We’ve moved from using UAVs primarily in

[ISR] roles before Operation Iraqi Freedom, to a true hunter-killer role with the Reaper.”33

With the arrival of the Reaper, the military now has proven UAV technology combined

with tactical and operational offensive capability. However, the expected payload of GBU-38s

will limit standoff range which the proposed concepts try to exploit. Here, this paper makes the

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critical assumption that it will only be a matter of time before an SDB is successfully dropped

from an MQ-9. By adding this bomb to its arsenal, the Reaper UCAV will be able to reliably

bring accurate, smart weapons to bear while capitalizing on the standoff of the SDB.

The continued use of UAVs shows they have become much more than a secondary asset

to combat operations and as a result, requests are being made for larger inventories. Highlighting

their persistent employment, statistics from late 2005 showed Predators have been “logging

4,000 hours a month in support of the war on terrorism...and since the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist

attacks, they have flown more than 103,000 combat hours in global operations.”34 Although the

Reaper hasn’t made its full presence felt in an AOR, it will likely shoulder many of these combat

hours. The 2002 UAV Roadmap stated the Air Force originally planned for a total of nine

Reapers35 and had already acquired seven as of September 2006.36 However, as of January 2007,

the Air Force has increased those numbers with plans to acquire 50 to 70 Reapers by 2012. Once

Reapers demonstrate their capabilities, its manufacturer, General Atomics Aeronautical Systems,

forecasts request for 150 Reapers. “At present, USAF officials expect eventually to fit the Reaper

with the [SDB] giving it ability to hit [multiple] targets with precision on mission.”37

Two other critical decisions from Air Force leadership promote the use of the Reaper in

its present form. First, the USAF has dropped the plans to give the Reaper air refueling capability

which not only avoids increased expenditures and longer development; it takes advantage of the

Reaper in its current configuration. Second, and most important, is the recent decision regarding

the J-UCAS program. The Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems, was a joint program to develop

high-performance, unmanned air vehicles which would conduct missions such as electronic

attack and precision strike.38 However, the Air Force was ordered out of the J-UCAS program in

the 2006 QDR and has since told Boeing to “cease and desist”39 which is a major boost for the

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Reaper. The J-UCAS could have provided unmanned strike capability but with its termination

and no timeline for an anticipated, longer-range platform, there exists a void between unarmed

UAVs and conventional aircraft - a vacancy filled perfectly by the Reaper.

Further support for employing UCAVs comes from a candid assessment of how the

military is currently using its bomber and fighter airframes. A few salient points quickly stand

out from the Air Summary data; 100% of all the weapons dropped were smart weapons, over

80% of those were JDAMs, and 100% of all B-1 drops were JDAM. Also important to notice;

only 40% of all F-16 drops were JDAM, the average daily drop for bombers was one bomb per

day, and fighters (both types) dropped less than one bomb per day.

What’s key to recognize is as long as the capability exists, the military will use smart

weapons and given the choice, will employ some type of GIAM. Also, the frequency of JDAM

drops coupled with striking emerging targets (i.e., mortar positions vice buildings) shows the

generation of coordinates has become a far less complicated task. In the case of the bombers,

every weapon dropped was a JDAM which means no one in the aircraft had to see the target, and

without a targeting pod, they actually can’t see it. As it stands, bombers supporting CENTCOM

fly hundreds of miles to and from AORs, require air refueling, are restrained by crew rest limits

and accomplish all this simply to drop a JDAM on unseen coordinates. Bombers have a purpose

and this paper has no intent of negating their utility and unparalleled ability to provide mass, but

the manpower, basing requirements, maintenance, fuel, and risk required to drop an average of

one bomb a day creates a very complicated, expensive method of dropping bombs.

Simply because the JDAM gave an airframe new meaning and saved it from potential

retirement does not mean it’s the smartest or most efficient way to use it. The Air Force is

justified in its enthusiasm over JDAM benefits but seems to be missing the forest for the trees.

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The ability of the B-1 to deliver smart weapons in support of CAS is just one tree. The success,

the forest, is how a JDAM can transform any platform into an incredibly lethal system. Instead of

creating a more complicated, more expensive manned machine such as adding targeting pods

(TGP) to the B-140 (which is not required for GIAMs), the Air Force should focus efforts on

production of UAVs and expediting their compatibility with GIAMS, namely the SDB.

As mentioned, the F-16 dropped the lowest percentage of the Air Summary JDAMs -

dropping 4 of the 10 total bombs. The tendency is to assume there were more situations where an

LGB was the necessary weapon. Arguably, the simplicity of the JDAM has removed all but two

conditions requiring an LGB - when a target is moving or when coordinates can’t be generated.

These situations will be overcome when the SDB II41 arrives and the fidelity of TGP-generated

coordinates improve, but for now they add credence to the LGB. However, a closer look at the

Air Summary shows all F-16 LGBs struck stationary targets; four buildings (one was also hit

with a JDAM), a stopped vehicle, and a quarry. Likely, coordinates could have been attained for

all but the vehicle where an attack may have been unnecessarily delayed to get 3D location.

What aren’t seen in the Air Summary are tactics and aircraft limitations. Ironically, a

pilot often gets the TGP (to guide an LBG) to a target based on coordinates received from an

outside source such as a JTAC. In other words, the target location is already known - often with

the accuracy sufficient for a JDAM. Additionally, F-16s suffer from a somewhat crippling

configuration restriction. Jets have ‘hardpoints’ or stations on which weapons are carried and F-

16s typically have only two available for bombs. Most F-16s are limited to one JDAM per hard-

point, so to add firepower a normal combat load is one JDAM and two LGBs - SDBs could

increase the load to six or eight weapons.42 The point is, LGBs are often dropped more from

availability than need. If a UCAV with two SDB four-packs was supplying the ordnance, three

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F-16s are needed to match the number of weapons and since the USAF adheres (rightfully so) to

mutual support, the number would be four43. Four jets, four times the refuelings, and of course,

four lives is one way of conducing business, but to employ less than a bomb a day (per Air

Summary) it is a rather archaic method and one which can be done with a UCAV.

Realities of CAS:44

Doctrine states “CAS is air action...against hostile targets that are in

close proximity to friendly forces and which require detailed integration of each air mission with

the fire and movement of those forces.”45 CAS is normally apportioned based on a commander’s

“plan for CAS at key points throughout the depth of the battlefield.”46 While that may hold true

in a large land battle, the Air Summary and GWOT paint a much different picture. In the span of

the Summary, fighters and bombers flew over 2,500 missions and other than one specifically

labeled as a preplanned attack, all of them were considered CAS. The reality of urban warfare

with an irregular enemy is hostile targets are almost always in close proximity to ground troops.

In this environment with this type of threat, CAS has shifted from an apportioned mission to the

de facto use of airpower. Similarly, the arrival of GIAMs has had a profound impact on CAS;

most significantly, they have minimized the utility of certain procedures, reduced the need for

detailed integration, and transformed any GIAM-capable aircraft into a viable CAS platform.

THE 9-LINE: Many of today’s CAS procedures were created under the precept of using

what was available at the time; namely dumb bombs, LGBs or aircraft cannons. As a result, the

necessity of some practices, such as the 9-Line and talk-on, has reduced coincident with that of

dumb bombs. Without question, situations exist where they may be needed and the intent is not

to strike them from doctrine, but in the context of hitting targets with a GIAM, they become

more burdensome than useful and can significantly delay target destruction.

The 9-line (Figure 3) is the standard CAS briefing which helps aircrews determine if they

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have sufficient information to perform the mission.47 “In truth though, very few instances in

recent conflicts have seen the nine-line brief used in its entirety.”48 Mainly as a result of low-

threat environments, many 9-lines for LGBs/JDAMs begin by omitting the first three lines. Some

remaining lines are used, but only three - target elevation, target location, and friendly location -

are normally read back to the JTAC49 to confirm accuracy of the data. To the military’s credit

and an effort to simplify, more and more aircraft can now receive 9-lines digitally.

Regardless, sending a 9-line over voice or datalink ignores the point that it is simply not

needed for a GIAM. They need 3D coordinates, attack parameters, and release consent. Not only

is the extra information useless, the bombs are incapable of receiving it. This is precisely where

9-lines become a burden. The time from target identification to destruction (the sensor-to-shooter

gap) is often critical and fleeting. No matter how well a 9-line is executed, copied, and read back,

it unavoidably consumes time. Adding any communication problems, confusion, or incorrect

read backs to the equation consumes more of this precious time. These problems can be avoided

if the required data - even the release consent - is passed digitally and directly to a GIAM. The

rather unsettling truth is 9-lines are relayed to pilots merely because doctrine says to do it and the

data has to get passed (via the pilot) to the bomb.

Approaching the pilot as an extraneous information conduit will without doubt invigorate

the traditional argument that a pilot adds a critical layer of redundancy and can prevent situations

such as fratricide. Naturally, people can always stop certain chain of events, but the inverse -

more people can induce more error - also holds true. In situations not using a JDAM, such as an

LGB or strafing run, the adaptability of a pilot is one of their greatest attributes, but in terms of

GIAMs, there is a counter to argument. First, if a JTAC has identified a target within rules of

engagement and the ground commander is willing to accept responsibility for the bomb, it is a

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valid target which needs no further crosscheck. Second, doctrine clearly stipulates "friendly GPS

positions should not be passed over the radio."50 Third, fratricide involving a JDAM has yet to be

a bomb issue, but has instead resulted from mismanagement of coordinates. Finally, B-1s

dropped 29 JDAMs during the Air Summary with limited, if any, means of seeing the situation.

It is a matter of trust. The military entrusts soldiers and airmen to bring airpower to the fight and

the objective should be do provide it as accurately and rapidly as possible.

THE TALK-ON AND TYPE CONTROL: Two other CAS procedures which have lost

utility when using GIAMs are the talk-on and types of terminal control. The talk-on is one of the

oldest means of helping someone manually locate a target, and is used when other means of

marking the target are not available or practical. The concept is simple; someone who knows

where a target is talks someone else's eyes on the target using things such as geographic features

or notable man-made structures.51 Since GIAMs need no manual guidance to a target, it negates

the talk-on and any effort spent giving one wastes valuable time. Some will argue this, claiming

target coordinates can be compared to a talk-on to see if they coincide. This is true but doesn’t

justify the need of a pilot, and any JDAM released from a B-1 shows 1) additional checks are not

mandated or necessary and 2) the USAF is willing to (and does daily) accept 'blind' drops.

When controlling CAS, JTACs are expected to use one of three types (Type 1, 2 or 3)52

of terminal attack control, which is “the authority to control the maneuver of and grant weapons

release clearance to attacking aircraft.”53 As written, all types reference an 'aircraft' and are

differentiated by the JTAC's ability to see the target, the aircraft, both or neither. Also, the 2005

revision of CAS doctrine (four years after the MQ-1 Hellfire shot) still avoids the integration of

armed UAVs - showing the types of control are not as all-encompassing as once thought. The

biggest limitation is the assumption that ordnance requests will always be passed to someone else

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(pilot/UAV operator) before release. They do not readily incorporate or even apply to an

automated scenario where the request and consent could be passed simultaneously. Also, if

UAVs are forced under Type 1, 2 or 3 Control it gives credence to a UAV sensor operator who,

in the case of a GIAM, offers little or no value. This doesn't diminish the value of a sensor

operator; it is the simple fact that adding extra nodes in the sensor-to-shooter timeline delays the

delivery of a bomb needing no post-release input.54

DETAILED INTEGRATION: As mentioned, CAS is used when friendly troops are close

to enemy forces. Since this distance is situational, the need for 'detailed integration' is what

determines if the enemy is 'close'.55 A better, more flexible definition would replace "close

proximity to enemy forces"56 with "close proximity to target locations". For example, if a JTAC

controls a strike on an empty insurgent hideout it supports the war by removing a hideout, but

there are no enemy forces involved. Nonetheless, most would agree this is clearly a CAS sortie.

The reasons for 'detailed integration' are to better match airpower to a ground commander's

objectives and to minimize fratricide - regardless of enemy location. But that is not why it exists.

The need for integration exists because air-delivered ordnance is dropped by pilots. If a

JTAC could get a bomb on the insurgent hideout without talking to a pilot, the coordination stops

with forces in the area - the same troops who want the target destroyed. The accuracy and

performance of GPS munitions has increased willingness to use them which has made this

coordination even easier. For instance, "in Fallujah, ordnance was dropped as close as 100

meters from Marine Corps units [when] normally, heavy bombs [were] employed no closer than

1,000 meters from friendly positions."57 When a ground commander identifies a target, knows

where his forces are located, and is aware of the weapon's ramifications (collateral damage,

fragmentation, effects, etc), it is an affront to say further integration and/or deconfliction is

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required. If 3D coordinates are accurate and friendly troops are outside the risk-estimate distance

(small chance of incapacitation)58 of the weapon, GIAMs eliminate additional integration.

CAS PLATFORMS: In any future combat setting, and particularly permissive, low-threat

environments tied to ever increasing demands for lower collateral damage, almost every CAS

request will be fulfilled with smart weapons. The Air Summary shows this is already the case in

current CENTCOM operations where every bomb dropped for CAS was a smart bomb, and over

80% of those were JDAMs. Since more than 2500 CAS sorties are flown a month in this region,

any platform which can carry smart weapons is likely to be gainfully employed.

The MQ-1 and Hellfire have already demonstrated UAVs are a viable CAS platform, but

in terms of smart bombs, the most pronounced change has been the use of bombers for precision

CAS. When targets emerged in Afghanistan, special operations forces immediately passed the

locations to B-52s loitering overhead armed with smart weapons. During OIF, when a ground

source reported Hussein and his sons might be in a particular location, “it took less than twelve

minutes for an airborne B-1B bomber to strike the building with four GPS-guided munitions.”59

Although these are successes in their own right, they would not have happened without

the JDAM. Because of this, GPS munitions could theoretically transform any airborne platform -

a UAV, a cargo aircraft, or even a tanker - into a lethal CAS weapon. Also, the capability could

reach well beyond CAS to include battlefield interdiction and deep strike. For example, tankers

orbit the skies of Iraq every day and due to their speed and altitude, it's quite probable any tanker

could release an SDB to fulfill a CAS request without ever leaving its orbit.

It has yet to be demonstrated, but the SDB-UAV combination will happen and is likely to

reach fruition on the MQ-9 Reaper. Once again, a GPS munition will forever change what an

airframe brings to the fight, but the implications to CAS won't be fully realized unless the Reaper

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is actually used for CAS. If a B-1 was remotely flown and its JDAMs could receive coordinates

directly, it would essentially be a UCAV. It would be a massive, unwieldy one, but a UCAV all

the same. Smaller ones, such as the Reaper, could never match a B-1 in number of bombs, but in

the sustained fight, where less than two bombs are dropped per day, a UCAV could deliver

ordnance just as well as the B-1. Given the chance, SDBs on UCAVs (or other airframes) could

prove to be one of most effective CAS platforms used by the military.

SUCAV / BK-135 Components

Two systems will be proposed in this section and for simplicity will be labeled SUCAV

and BK-135. Both incorporate existing weapons and existing platforms with projected and/or

anticipated capabilities. They have the potential to capitalize on SDB capabilities and one of the

best sensors available - the solider on the ground. Simply put, the components are weapons,

platforms, equipment tying troops to the platforms and a common link used by all components.

Platforms: The primary difference between the systems is the platform. The SUCAV

(SDB-Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle) would use the MQ-9 Reaper while the BK-135

(Bomber KC-135) would employ tankers. Although the designation of BKC-135 implies using

the KC-135, it is for example only and could use any tanker such as the KC-10 or KC-X - the

expected KC-135 replacement. In fact, because survivability measures are a requirement of the

KC-X, it could prove a more flexible SDB platform.60 However, the reality is the KC-135 fleet

of 53061 is almost ten fold that of the KC-1062 and the KC-X is yet to be realized.

The proposed weapon for both systems will be Boeing’s SDB (GBU-39) in the four-

bomb carriage units (the BRU-61/A) already fielded and used by F-15Es. Fully loaded these

‘four-packs’ weigh 1460 lbs so two not only fit the Reaper’s 3,000 lb external payload, they

maximize the space by providing eight weapons.63 Although the Reaper is already expected to

carry the GBU-38, only six of these could fit the payload or four when considering the weight of

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suspension equipment; reducing potential targets to half that of an SDB load. While the BK-135

could theoretically carry many more than two BRU-61s, the notional system assumes two. Like

the Reaper, the BK-135 would carry its SDBs externally with the intent of minimizing aircraft

modifications and using two four-packs requires less space per wing. The point is the system, not

the number of bombs, and even eight SDBs is a significant force multiplier.

SUDAGR. The device linking the user to the platform will incorporate target generation,

video feed for situational awareness and request/consent capability. Since GPS is needed to get

coordinates, the device will build on a hand-held GPS unit. The Precision Lightweight GPS

Receiver (PLGR) has been the premier military GPS since 199464 but a long overdue

replacement, the Defense Advanced GPS Receiver, has since been fielded.65 SUDAGR (SUCAV

DAGR) will be the notional console to share target information between ground troops and the

SUCAV or BK-135. However, the SUDAGR assumes/requires capabilities which may not be in

the operational DAGR but are either readily available or already in use elsewhere. The

SUDAGR would be a stand-alone system expect for data from a laser range finder (LRF). In

conjunction with GPS, the LRF provides a means of generating 3D target location from a safer

distance and is normally external (but linked by cable) to GPS units. The SUDAGR and LRF

could quite possibly be combined as one unit, but the important assumption is the SUDAGR can

easily obtain the data. The DAGR/SUDAGR can be seen in Figure 4.

Additionally, the SUDAGR could incorporate the video capabilities used in the Remotely

Operated Video Enhanced Receiver (ROVER). The ROVER II modification was a change which

allowed UAVs to use the system and provides real-time, full-motion video which forces can use

“to rapidly identify targets, engage them, and view real-time battle damage assessment.”66 This

system has already been used with the Predator and other platforms, but the US military

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currently uses a laptop to receive the image. A smaller screen, such as the three-inch screen on

Israel's V-RAMBO (a wrist-size version of ROVER),67 would limit the physical growth of the

SUDAGR. Video is not required and its absence should not prevent using the SUCAV/BK-135,

but video capability can greatly enhance SA and exploit the existing sensors of the SUCAV.

Neither the video nor the SUDAGR are as critical as the final component - the common

link. Although the military continually enhances links for sharing information and the tactical

picture, no one system is compatible (or accessible) with all platforms or troops. While it would

be possible to adapt the line-of-sight and satellite links used by the Predator, the SUCAV/ BK-

135 system will use a theoretical communication net labeled LINK. Like the SUDAGR, the

LINK will have certain requirements which are assumed feasible.

LINK. The LINK must be able to pass 3D coordinates and attack parameters to the SDB,

and in theory this is the only information required to get bombs on target. The SUDAGR is what

passes this data and grants access to the LINK. Currently, GIAMs get data from the platform

carrying them and the Reaper or BK-135 could do the same. However, because of the need to

process SDB requests and transmit request status back to the SUDAGR, both platforms need

transmit and receive authority on the LINK. Control of the platforms could remain as is - ground

control stations for the SUCAV and pilots for the BK-135. Video feed could also remain as is but

ideally, it would use the LINK to prevent additional receive requirements on the SUDAGR.

SUCAV / BK-135 Concept

The idea of delivering weapons from an unmanned platform is far from new and in terms

of smart weapons, the ALCM and TLAM have given the military this capability for years. In the

realm of reusable UAVs, the Predator and Hellfire has made a lethal pair for over five years.

However, what has changed is the arrival of the SDB. Although the JDAM had already removed

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the requirement for man-operated terminal guidance, the SDB surpassed the JDAM (and LBGs)

by extending the standoff range historically associated with smart munitions.68

The SUCAV/BK-135 concept (Figure 5) uses the SUDAGR and SDB to provide CAS

and responsive ordnance to troops in a variety of AORs - and the weapons can be available as

soon or even before the troops arrive. By linking the JTAC to either platform, the system reduces

coordination time, provides weapons to numerous forces miles apart and can do it for hours at a

time. The BK-135 exploits existing tanker orbits, the SUCAV exploits the persistence and low

risk of UAVs, and both can deliver ordnance to a large area because of the SDB glide distance.

The most appealing aspect of this proposal is nothing requires fundamental change.

Airmen and soldiers will continue locating, fighting, and targeting enemies with the precision

required to support JDAMs; tankers will continue flying thousands of sorties a year;69 and UAVs

will continue logging countless mundane, yet critical hours to provide unparalleled persistence

and offensive capability. They will all continue doing what they do well and the SUCAV and/or

BK-135 combines them into an unmatched means of delivering weapons. As quickly as a troop

can identify, generate coordinates, and get approval for a target, he can request ordnance using

the SUDAGR. Any SUCAV or BK-135 within range acknowledges the request, checks the

coordinates against certain criteria, and if valid, delivers an SDB.

Process: The sequence of events is purposely streamlined with the goal of a much

smaller sensor-to-shooter gap. Since one benefit of the SUCAV/BK-135 is rapid response, the

sequence will be compared to the doctrinal sequence for immediate CAS requests. The two

processes, labeled Traditional and SUCAV/BK-135, are shown in Figures 6 and 7 respectively.

The cycle for both begins when a unit identifies a target and determines they want CAS. If

available, a TACP (or JTAC) makes the request which is approved or denied. If approved, air

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assets which are already airborne (or by scrambling), transit to the target area, contact the JTAC

or FAC(A), and after coordination (such as the 9-line), deliver weapons on the target.

The SUCAV/BK-135 concept differs greatly after the JTAC requests the CAS - when the

response time (and weapons) now relies on the availability of air assets. This concept doesn’t

simply remove steps from the Traditional process; it removes the steps which often consume the

most time. Best case, aircraft are already airborne, unengaged, and in close proximity to the

target area. Worst case, a scramble and extended transit are necessary to arrive at the target.

Airborne or not, both will encounter the often lengthy coordination when contacting the JTAC.

To help avoid this delay and supply weapons to more JTACs, multiple SUCAVs could be

flying pre-programmed tracks and/or routes scattered across the AOR. If any conventional jets

are airborne it is likely tankers would be too, thus adding to the total area covered by SDBs. If

this is the case, it's probable a JTAC request could be met by multiple SDBs. To avoid more

bombs than requested and minimize response time, the platform which processes requests is

determined by proximity and available ordnance. When the TACP/JTAC first initializes the

SUDAGR it transmits on the LINK and locates the nearest SUCAV or BK-135. These platforms

respond to the SUDAGR with status (range and number of SDBs). The closest platform with

SDBs will become the ‘primary platform’ and processes all subsequent requests. The next closest

platform (with SDBs) becomes the ‘secondary platform’ and immediately assumes requests if

priority platform expends all SDBs and/or has SDB malfunctions.

SUDAGR: Before it can transmit a request for ordnance, the SUDAGR requires certain

data which is obtained through the JTAC and automatically (Figure 8). Automatically, it receives

its location from GPS, the status of SDB platforms, and any supporting SUCAV video. The

JTAC inputs target coordinates and attack parameters which will be driven by desired effects.

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Like JDAMs, these parameters can be set to defaults which would save time and minimize error.

After receiving request and prior to release, the primary platform automatically positions itself to

provide sufficient potential energy to the SDB while crosschecking target location. The location

is compared to TACP/JTAC location (known via the SUDAGR), political boarders and no-

strike/restricted target coordinates to prevent fratricide and undesired effects (Figures 9 and 10).

Borders and off-limit targets can be preprogrammed into the SUCAV and updated (by the LINK)

anytime to match the situation in an AOR. The JTAC location, however, can rapidly change but

the SUCAV always knows the origin of the request and adds it to the no-strike list. In either case,

if the target location matches (or within certain distance of) any of the restricted data the SUCAV

will deny the request. Also, the minimum distance between the SDB and SUDAGR can adjust

automatically based on requested attack parameters. Assuming these criteria are met, the primary

platform queries the TACP/JTAC to confirm consent, and once received, releases the SDB.

Command and Control (C2): C2 is always a sensitive topic within the military and when

weapons are involved it unarguably becomes critical. Since the USAF already organizes, trains,

and equips their branch to operate tankers, UAVs, SDBs, and JTACs, all assets could be

controlled as they are now. Basically, it becomes an issue of simply putting the assets together

which has already been demonstrated with an F-15E in lieu of the UAV.70 Needing only target

and attack data (of which the later can be default values), the SDB doesn’t require a national

asset with two pilots (or four in a B-1) to drop it. If the F-15E was replaced by a SUCAV or BK-

135 which the JTAC can communicate with using the SUDAGR, the concept is already a reality.

Similar to the C2 of assets, control of delivering weapons can remain the same by

continuing to use the JTAC. As an established and excepted part of the joint team, a JTAC “is a

qualified (certified) service member who, from a forward position, directs the action of combat

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aircraft engaged in CAS and other air operations.”71 Using JTACs as the terminal control

authority eases the integration of the SUCAV by drawing on existing doctrine, operational

experience, fielded equipment and common terminology. However, just like a USAF fighter,

neither the JTAC nor the Army 'owns' a SUCAV - they simply can request/use its ordnance.72

SUCAV / BK-135 Limitations

Like any weapon in the military’s inventory, this concept has limitations, but

interestingly, the most significant have nothing to do with the JTAC, bomb or platform. Rather

they reside in doctrine, C2 and the tendency to misapply the concept. The joint doctrine for CAS,

mentions ‘UAV(s)’ twelve times.73 Most common is describing them as a means for passing

targeting data and an aircraft that needs to be deconflicted with other assets. They are never

mentioned as an offensive capability which can actually deliver munitions. This not only slows

their use as a weapon, it continues to enforce the ISR paradigm.

Less than a year old, the Multi-Service TTP for the Tactical Employment of Unmanned

Aircraft Systems, attempts to break this paradigm by reminding readers “there has been a

dramatic increase in the use of [UAVs] in the tactical.”74 Also, UAVs are portrayed in some

attack diagrams as a means of designating targets for other aircraft. Valiant as these efforts are,

they are somewhat defeated in the prescribed C2 architectures for air interdiction and CAS. In all

cases, the diagrams clearly separate ‘UA’ (unmanned aircraft) and ‘Wpns Platform(s)’. Further,

the supporting verbiage implies or specifies the Wpns Platform(s) is a manned aircraft with

direction such as “...talk a strike aircraft onto the target.”75 While more receptive to UCAVs, this

document, albeit unintentionally, still reinforces the separation of weapons and UAVs.

Two other aspects of the Joint Pub slow the acceptance of the SUCAV - the types of

terminal control and the absence of GBU-39s. As mentioned, types of control are somewhat

limited since they all address attacking aircraft. Granted, the doctrine doesn’t specify ‘manned

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aircraft’ but the presence of dialogue makes the intent clear. UAVs already deliver weapons but

to this point they have all been laser-guided. It would be wise for JP3-09.3 to assume UAV drops

will increase and GIAMs (particularly the GBU-38/-39) will be involved. The Joint Pub can

preempt this with a new standard - Type 4. If the UAV has an operator and/or is in a situation

where the operator is required, Type 1-3 can be used as appropriate. However, if only dropping

GIAMs and/or the UAV has no sensor operator, Type 4 could be used. Obviously, the UAV

wouldn’t be ‘told’ it’s a Type 4 control, but JP3-09.3 can use Type 4 to describe the procedure

and it would provide SA to other operators (including pilots). Similar to the ISR paradigm,

forcing UAVs into Type 1, 2 or 3, makes the assumption they will always have an operator.

Along the same lines, the GBU-39 is not in the Risk-Estimate Distances76 but has already

been used in combat. Risk-Estimates help JTACs determine when a bomb is dangerously close

so it is imperative to include the SDB not only for better understanding but for safety. If a

platform is providing CAS with SDBs, but the JTAC has no reference, he may be hesitant to use

the SDB or underestimate its smaller collateral damage. To be most effective and maximize their

assets, service members controlling CAS or AI must be made aware of all UAV capabilities and

how to successfully control their weapons. As Joint doctrine and related TTPs are the preferred

method, they need to embrace these capabilities and incorporate them as quickly as possible.

Command and control will be another limitation to the SUCAV - and more so for the

BK-135 - but it is not an insurmountable issue. If the systems are to be directly linked to the

JTAC, the military will have to accept giving the JTAC consent authority77 through the

SUDAGR. The Air Force has allowed remote consent and proven it is both functional and

reliable every time a Predator fires a Hellfire. But the Predator doesn't fire the missile, a UAV

operator does, and a JTAC could do the same. They already have authority to request and control

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weapons, and in many situations (namely JDAM employment) they could easily own consent.78

This is the junction where the two platforms significantly vary. The BK-135 will not

happen without JTAC-to-SDB consent, but the SUCAV could survive; reduced to a larger

Predator, but survive nonetheless. The BK-135 is essentially a B-1 with fewer bombs and the

ability to refuel jets, but the intent is to remove the crew from the loop. If consent is not passed

with the SUDAGR and the crew remains involved, the tumult in the tanker community would be

overwhelming and the concept lost. On the other hand, the SUCAV uses the Reaper and since it's

likely to drop SDBs, the concept will almost be complete. When this happens, the biggest

difference between a Reaper and SUCAV becomes direct consent and the concept of operations.

How the SUCAV or BK-135 are employed leads to what may prove the biggest

limitation - the misapplication of the concept. The objective of these platforms is to bring

ordnance into an AOR, fly orbits (or routes), wait for requests, and fulfill requests in as many

locations as possible. This is achieved mainly through the standoff of the SDB and the standoff is

maximized by the platform's orbit. The misapplication of the BK-135 and SUCAV will be a

result of incorrect assumptions and the ISR paradigm respectively.

The idea of the BK-135 is almost immediately countered with the notion that the KC-135

would require additional modifications for survivability such as radar warning receivers79, chaff

and flares, and electronic countermeasures. However, this assumes the BK-135 will be tasked to

conduct strikes in areas with airborne or ground-based threats - which was never proposed and is

far from the intent. Taking advantage of the automatic guidance and range of the SDB, the BK-

135 simply brings ordnance anywhere it's tanking. If the military allows a KC-135 to refuel in

Area X, then the environment in Area X is obviously permissible for tankers. The mere presence

of the BK-135 supplements any assets they’re tanking and can prove a significant force

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multiplier in the face of aging fleets and smaller forces. Equally important is the BK-135 is a

tanker which can drop SDBs - not a bomber that refuels. Assuming this jet was actually

employed, its effectiveness might spur the temptation to use it in situations normally avoided by

tankers. If that happened, the argument for self-defense measures becomes valid and the aircraft

is now a bomber that refuels. The bottom line is the BK-135 can supply ordnance to an AOR

without changing a tanker's mission, adding extra crew duties, or how it conducts refueling, but

until this is accepted, it will never materialize.80

The SUCAV platform, the Reaper, is being built as a "Hunter-Killer"81 which means it

will have a full suite of sensors. These sensors bring inherent capabilities to the SUCAV but at

the same time could drastically lessen the number of JTACs supported; i.e., if SUCAVs are

flown at lower altitudes, their umbrella of coverage shrinks.82 The same can happen if the ISR is

dedicated to a very small area thereby reducing the size of the orbit. This makes the case for a

SUCAV which has no sensors and replaces the weight with LINK equipment and/or more SDBs.

However, it's unlikely UAVs will be produced without sensors so trade-offs are inevitable. The

MQ-9 ceiling of 50,00083 feet doubles that of the MQ-1 and would establish considerable

coverage, but the fidelity of sensors decreases with altitude/range. Potential options include 1)

accepting the fidelity from higher altitudes 2) increasing sensor capability to adapt to higher

altitudes (this is already happening) and/or 3) shifting the objective of SUCAV sensors to larger

picture/area ISR while MQ-1s continue the smaller-picture, higher-fidelity ISR they currently

provide. In any case, SUCAV sensors would automatically slave to the requested target and, for

SA, transmit video back to the SUDAGR, AOC, UAV GCS, ASOC or anyone LINK capable.

Users must be aware that any restrictions to the orbit/altitude of the SUCAV for ISR (or other)

reasons equates to offensive limitations; even to the point of removing a JTACs coverage.84

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SUCAV / BK-135 Strengths

Since it's likely the USAF will soon drop SDBs from a Reaper and has proven successes

with UAVs, there is little value in addressing many of the SUCAV/BK-135 strengths. Therefore,

this discussion will remain in the context of the original concept; where the platforms fly orbits

and altitudes which maximize the range and coverage of the SDB. Some of the platform-specific

traits will be addressed but the focus is what both systems offer; persistent ordnance and smaller

sensor-to-shooter gaps with reduced layers of human involvement.

Understandably, it can be difficult to accept the BK-135 when other jets such as the B-1

and B-52 with crews, larger payloads, and heavier bombs are already flying. However this stems

from assuming BK-135s are bomber replacements and the difficulty subsides when focusing on

what they bring to the warfighter both conceptually and tangibly. First, the idea isn’t restricted to

the 135. It serves as an example only, and the benefits could be applied to almost any airframe.

Second, it hinges on the reality that manned fighters will be around for an undetermined amount

of time. As capable as USAF fighters are, they all burn fuel and until that requirement is

removed, tankers will be in the air. Also, faced with losing up to five legacy85 fighters for every

one F-22 or F-35,86 the BK-135 can enhance fire power any time it provides these fighters fuel.

Tangibly, the BK-135 does have capabilities not yet (and likely never) realized by the

Reaper. Faster than the MQ-1, the Reaper is still limited to just over 200 knots87 but the KC-135

files well over 400 knots at only 30,000 feet and refuels most fighters around 300 knots.88 This

inherently gives greater energy and standoff to the SDB. Additionally, the 'combat' radius89 of a

KC-135 is slated as 1,500 nm90 which is less than the Reaper's of over 1,600 nm91 but that

assumes passing 150,000 lbs of fuel.92 Theoretically, if fewer fighters are needed because the

BK-135 is also supplying weapons, its range and endurance is extended by passing less fuel.

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The SUCAV provides two intrinsic advantages of UAVs - "a level of persistence that far

exceeds the human capacity to endure [and]...options for risk taking and risk avoidance not

previously available.”93 Also, the basing and support required for UAVs - such as needing only

5,000 feet of runway94 - is much less than a tanker, bomber, or fighter requires. Further, using

existing communication networks "has resulted in...[deploying] only the air vehicles and the

launch and recovery station, which has greatly reduced the amount of... infrastructure...required

at the forward operating location.”95 Fewer requirements provide many more options for getting

a SUCAV closer to the fight which in turn increases its endurance per flight.

Persistence. While both platforms bring unique strengths, it is what they share that makes

them most valuable; first of which is persistence. Since both platforms provide relatively long

sortie duration the discussion will focus on persistence in terms of coverage resulting from the

SDB. Using the notional orbit96 in Figure 11, the area covered is roughly 11,000 sq miles. If a

fighter is given a 30x30 or 60x60 mile grid (or ‘kill container’) its coverage is only 900 or 3600

sq miles respectively. Also, this coverage is not instant (like the SUCAV)97 as it often requires

getting within bomb range of a target. Because they glide, SDBs can expand the coverage of any

platform regardless of orbit. Tying this to the reality that fighters often provide over watch and/or

NTISR for a much smaller area (usually a city) it becomes clear how the restricted range of

JDAMs (not SDBs) and routine missions are limiting the ability to maximize potential coverage.

The stark contrast is shown with the red circle in the top orbit of Figure 11; depicting the

area a fighter could strike with a JDAM.98 At the same time, the depicted location of orbits

dramatically shows how only four SUCAVs can provide weapons to several cities - most of

which are traditional 'hot spots'. If these were supplemented by tankers refueling in tracks

purposely located to fill SUCAV gaps, the coverage would be immense. Also, because the SDB

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can glide almost anywhere in the coverage, the orbits provide instant ordnance where the only

delay between a request and impact is the bomb's time of flight. 99

Sensor-to-shooter Gap. The Air Force’s 2004 Transformational Flight Plan highlights

how “commanders rely increasingly on surveillance to gather information on targets...and then

get the information to the shooter fast enough for that asset to act.”100 While reliance on ISR is a

fact, this assumes the ISR platform detects targets first. In the instances where the 'shooter'

detects the target first, the SUCAV/BK-135 allows the shooter to act immediately and takes

advantage of one the best sources of intelligence available - the solider on the ground.

Passing coordinates through a pilot or UAV sensor operator admittedly offers layers of

redundancy, but even if done correctly, still adds delays to the kill chain. Also, if the argument is

another person can catch a mistake, it is just as logical to admit another person can induce error.

Linking the JTAC to the SDB with the SUDAGR not only reduces the timeline by eliminating

check-ins, talk-ons, and/or confusion, it also adds redundancy. The SDB platform knows the

requested target and where the request originates;101 if they match (or fall within a certain range)

SDBs won't be released. In the case where the JTAC has incorrect coordinates, a manned aircraft

may be just as likely to release as a SUCAV because the initial assumption of an aircrew is the

target coordinates are correct. Without a means of comparing the actual location to the intended

location (visually or digitally), the crew has no reason to assume there is a mistake.

Another factor in the sensor-to-shooter gap is availability of assets, and this is exactly

where the SUCAV/BK-135 can have tremendous impact. As mentioned, the concept isn’t meant

to replace fighters but augment them. Persistent coverage and 'instant ordnance' allow these

platforms to support areas not covered by fighters. For example, assume fighters are providing

CAS for City A and a target arises in City B, 40 miles to the west. If these fighters have LBGs or

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JDAMs the only option is to fly to City B, establish contact with the JTAC, get a 9-line and, if

necessary, employ weapons. All in all, that appears to be a reasonable option and, because of

assets, usually is. However, two critical things can happen while the jets move to City B. First,

the target can evaporate due to time or jet noise102, and second, City A is now without on-call

ordnance. A single SUCAV could provide ordnance to City A and B at any time in its orbit.

Conclusion

In November of 2006, US troops were taking fire from snipers in a nearby building. After

an Abrams fired into the building with little effect, an M31 GMLRS tore through the building

and eliminated the threat. This weapon, the Army’s Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System uses

GPS guidance and has a range of over 40 miles. Army Lt Col Mark Pincoski highlights a key

result of this and other GPS weapons, stating “soldiers in the field are so confident in [the]

accuracy that they’re willing to call in strikes...very close [to their position].”103 This vignette

highlights three important things; 1) generating coordinates was well within the troops' abilities

2) soldiers are convinced GPS weapons work as expected and 3) if the Army needs support, they

do not want to wait (or have the luxury of waiting) for air power.

The SUCAV and BK-135 are two concepts which can not only hit targets like this, they

can reduce the wait. The focus of this paper was not to suggest dropping SDBs from a UAV (or

even a tanker) is a new idea. Rather, it offered one approach of linking these assets which, if

accepted, could significantly impact the future employment of GPS-aided munitions. However,

the SUCAV and BK-135 are not silver bullets, do not fit every situation, and are not suggested as

a direct replacement for manned aircraft. They simply offer a means of augmenting the manned

fleet by bringing small diameter bombs to the battlefield, supporting several locations at any one

time, and delivering ordnance as quickly as possible.

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The Air Force has quickly recognized the impressive capabilities of both the Reaper and

SDB, and it will be only a matter of time before a Reaper successfully drops one. When this

happens, that SDB release will be initiated from a signal most likely sent from a UAV control

station. Here, the USAF has the opportunity to make major paradigm shift. Will that signal

remain only with UAV operators or will others be allowed to send it? If given the ability, a

JTAC could initiate that release as soon as a ground commander wants a target struck. To argue

that it must remain as is - in the current paradigm - avoids the fact that passing coordinates

through a UAV operator adds no value and if anything, can induce error.

Removing this layer of human involvement will be challenging for the USAF and equally

challenging will be the ever-present demand for ISR. The SUCAV concept doesn't preclude ISR,

but the tendency to use them primarily as ISR assets should be avoided unless conducted at

altitudes maximizing the SDB. If they are employed lower for the sake of ISR, the quality which

sets SDBs apart from JDAMs is negated. The BK-135, however, gives the military the same

benefits as the SUCAV and ISR will never hinder its persistent coverage.

The USAF is constantly pursuing ways of improving the “kill chain timeline by linking

the sensor to shooter and linking the shooter into a network of information.”104 The SUCAV/BK-

135 would not only meet this objective, it would reduce the chain to one link; the ‘solider sensor’

direct to the SDBs. With the task of bringing fire power to the fight, the SUCAV can provide

ground troops rapid access to ordnance for pre-planned and immediate CAS. Furthermore,

waiting only for target coordinates and release consent, SUCAVs and BK-135s can minimize

human error and not only shrink the sensor-to-shooter gap, they could potentially close it.

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NOTES

1 ACC, "Joint Direct Attack Munitions GBU 31/32/38," Air Force Link, http://www.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=108. 2 Sue Baker, "Predator Missile Launch Test Totally Successful," Program Manager 30, no. 2. 3 ACC, "GBU-39b, Small Diameter Bomb Weapon System," Air Force Link, http://www.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=4500. 4 Michael J. Moseley, "CSAF's Vector: Shaping and Transforming the Force," AF Link, http://www.af.mil/library/viewpoints/csaf.asp?id=262. 5 Three of the 17 critical operational functions of air and space power listed in AF Basic Doctrine include counterland, intelligence and surveillance and reconnaissance (the last two are paired as one function). [AFDD-1, "Air Force Basic Doctrine," ed. Air Force, Air Force Doctrine Document (2003), 39.] ISR is already being conducted by UAVs with no foreseeable decrease in the future, but with UCAVs, the Air Force now has additional assets to conduct counterland operations. Counterland is further broken down into two types of operations which support land maneuver - air interdiction (AI) and close air support (CAS) - and are differentiated by the type of support provided. AI support is deemed indirect while CAS provides direct support [AFDD-1, "Air Force Basic Doctrine," 44.]. The proposed systems will focus on CAS for one significant reason; CAS tends to involve higher levels of coordination and closer proximity to friendly troops. Therefore, since AI requires less coordination, any capabilities afforded in CAS should be easily transferred to most, if not all AI situations. 6 Until the A-10C with its ‘Precision Engagement’ upgrade - which allows it to drop GPS-aided weapons - is fielded (Chris McGee, "A-10 Upgrade Effort Transforms Warthog Capabilities " Air Force News, http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123029281.), an A-10 pilot doesn’t prefer an LBG over a JDAM, it’s the only choice. 7 CSAF, "The Adaptive and Flexible Air Force for the Future," USAF Public Affairs, http://www.af.mil/library/airforcepolicy2/2005/november.asp. 8 Since the JDAM was in its infancy, the weapons dropped by the B-2 were the 2000lb GBU-31. The Air Force tends to favor the 2000lb or 500lb variant of munitions while the Navy is the dominate user of the 1000lb GBU-32. 9 Ryan Hansen, "JDAM Continues to Be Warfighter's Weapon of Choice," Air Force Link, http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?storyID=123017613. 10 ACC, "B-1B Lancer," Air Force Link, http://www.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=81. 11 Circle Error Probability “defines the radius of a circle inside which there is a 50% probability of the position being located” (Chris Rizos, "Principles and Practice of GPS Surveying," The University of New South Wales, http://www.gmat.unsw.edu.au/snap/gps/gps_survey/chap2/243.htm.Rizos, Chris. “Principles and Practice of GPS Surveying.” The University of New South Wales. Sydney, Australia, http://www.gmat.unsw.edu.au/snap/gps/gps_survey/Rizos, "Principles and Practice of GPS Surveying.") and can indicate a weapon's delivery accuracy. In other words if a GBU-45 (for example only) has a CEP of 10 meters, at least half of any GBU-45s dropped will impact within a 10 meter radius circle. The lower the number, the more accurate the weapon. 12 Brig Gen Larry Jones, Briefing. Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, AL, 5 March 2007. 13 Hansen, "JDAM Continues to Be Warfighter's Weapon of Choice." 14 Mae-Li Allison, "Airmen Use GBU-38 in Combat," Air Force Link, http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?storyID=123008840. 15 It is extremely difficult to avoid collateral damage with the explosive power of a GBU-31unless the target is in an isolated location. In measuring explosive power, JP 3-09.3, uses Risk-Estimate Distances which are shown in Figure D-1 of that document. For any given weapon, the larger numbers are normally used to determine the minimum distance where a troop can be reasonably safe. The worst case for a GBU-31 is 340m and only 300m for a GBU-38. That number is from bomb impact so the fragmentary pattern of a GBU-31 extends 80m further than the -38 which, for perspective, is almost a football field. (CJCS, "Joint Publication (JP) 3-09.3 Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air Support (CAS)," (Department of Defense, 2003), D-2.) 16 ACC, "GBU-39b, Small Diameter Bomb Weapon System." 17 Boeing, "Small Diameter Bomb Increment I Backgrounder," in Precision Engagement & Mobility Systems Global

Strike Systems, ed. Boeing (IDS Business Support, 2007). 18 ACC, "GBU-39b, Small Diameter Bomb Weapon System." 19 Michael Puttre, "You Can't Be Too Thin," Journal of Electronic Defense 29, no. 1.

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20 While the AGM-130 also did this, the SDB does not rely on powered flight, has no datalink requirements, and needs no pilot control post release. 21 AFNEWS, "Feb. 22 Airpower: F-15s Stop Sniper Fire," Air Force News, http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?storyID=123041967. 22 ACC, "GBU-39b, Small Diameter Bomb Weapon System." 23 Travis Tougaw, "Small Diameter Bomb Debuts in Afghanistan," Air Force News, http://www.bagram.afnews.af.mil/news/story_print.asp?storyID=123039232. 24 Bill Barksdale, "Boeing Small Diameter Bomb Aces Test Mission," The Boeing Company, http://www.boeing.com/news/releases/2004/q3/nr_040816m.html. 25 CSAF, "Air Force Handbook - 109th Congress," ed. USAF (USAF, 2007), 132. 26 Little progress took place in weapons guidance after WWII and through the Korean War, but US involvement in Southeast Asia saw the reemergence of EO-guidance and the advent of the laser-guided bomb. Texas Instrument's 750lb BOLT-117 is hailed as the world's first laser-guided bomb and was combat evaluated in 1968. Further tests were conducted on 2000 lb bomb bodies and these versions, later called the GBU-10, were not only twice as accurate, they carried far more explosive power ["Texas Instruments Bolt-117 Laser Guided Bomb," National Museum of the USAF, http://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=1014.]. Additionally, a lighter bomb was developed to provide greater maneuverability and suitability to smaller targets. This 500lb bomb (the GBU-12) phased out the 750-lb variant and is still in use today along with the GBU-10. These laser-guided munitions revolutionized delivery of conventional ordnance and made marked increases in accuracy. For example, the 10,651 LGBs (laser guided bombs) dropped in a 13-month period starting in Feb 1972 generated a CEP of about 7 meters while the best non-guided CEP achieved was only 111 meters [Donald I. Blackwelder, "The Long Road to Desert Storm and Beyond: The Development of Precision Guided Bombs" (Air University, 1992), 27.]. However, because of their physical characteristics, these LGBs were and remain limited to about an 8 nm standoff. 27 After Vietnam, EO (electro-optical) capabilities continued to develop and culminated in the GBU-15. Using better fin designs and seeker heads, this weapon provided excellent accuracy with a stand-off range of roughly 15 nautical miles. The GBU-15 is only used by the F-15E [ACC, "GBU-15," Air Force Link, http://www.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?fsID=105.]. Similar attempts were made to extend the range of LGBs, and the GBU-24 - using different flight characteristics - could be released beyond 10 nm. Despite these attempts, America’s aircraft spent over two decades employing and training with these same capabilities - basically limited to a 15 nm standoff to obtain smart weapon delivery. During this time however, one weapon was made which significant increased standoff and was nothing more than the pairing of readily accessible capabilities. Similar to combining a two existing concepts such as a bomb with wings to create a glide bomb, rockets were attached to the GBU-15 to create the AGM-130. Since the range of the GBU-15 was essentially limiting the data link, the rocket increased the range to an unclassified distance of over 40 miles. This was a significant improvement to standoff precision but not without compromise. The weapon was limited to aircraft with the data link support (currently only one in the USAF) and cost approximately $450,000 per weapon - over 17 times more expensive than GBU-12 or -10 nose and tail kits. Also, the AGM-130 is designed for use only on the F-15E Strike Eagle. [ACC, "AGM-130 Missile " Air Force Link, http://www.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?fsID=76.]. 28 Interestingly, because airplanes still require certain weather to takeoff and land, they can actually be the sole limiting factor in bringing ordnance to the fight; no longer can some or all blame be placed on ordnance. 29 Attack parameters. These determine how a bomb impacts the target and the resulting effects. For a JDAM, this typically includes the speed of impact, fuze settings, angle of impact and azimuth. Speed is usually maximized and is in feet per second (FPS). An angle of 90 degrees tends to minimize collateral damage since the bomb enters from above as perpendicular to the target as possible. The “electronic safe/arm fuze (ESAF) cockpit selectable functions, including air burst and delayed burst options” [Boeing, "Small Diameter Bomb Increment I Backgrounder."] which gives another capability the older JDAMs do not have. 30 ACC, "MQ-9 Reaper Unmanned Aerial Vehicle," Air Force Link, http://www.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=6405. 31 AFNEWS, "Reaper Moniker Given to MQ-9 Unmanned Aerial Vehicle," Air Force News, http://www.af.mil/news/story_print.asp?storyID=123027012. 32 ACC, "MQ-9 Reaper Unmanned Aerial Vehicle." 33 AFNEWS, "Reaper Moniker Given to MQ-9 Unmanned Aerial Vehicle." 34 Chris McGee, "Predator’s Success Ups Procurement and Development," Air Force News, http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123012578.

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35 United States. Dept. of Defense. Office of the Secretary of Defense., Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Roadmap, 2002-

2027 (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2002). 36 AFNEWS, "Reaper Moniker Given to MQ-9 Unmanned Aerial Vehicle." 37 John A. Tirpak, "UAVs with Bite," Air Force Magazine, January 2007, 46-47. 38 DARPA, "Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems," http://www.darpa.mil/j-ucas/index.htm. 39 Tirpak, "UAVs with Bite," 48. 40 UPI, "USAF Tests Sniper Target Pod on B-1 Bomber," Office of The Secretary of the Air Force, Public Affairs Office, Media Operations Division, http://aimpoints.hq.af.mil/display.cfm?id=17001. 41 “The second SDB weapon (SDB Increment II) that will join the SDB family will provide a robust capability

against moving targets in all weather from stand-off. The Air Force is competing the SDB II weapon. In April 2006, the Air Force selected Boeing and Raytheon to compete in a 42-month Risk Reduction program. The winner will be sole source producer of the SDB II weapon.” Boeing, "Small Diameter Bomb Increment II Backgrounder," in Precision Engagement & Mobility Systems Global Strike Systems, ed. Boeing (IDS Business Support, 2007). 42 The F-16 has nine hardpoints but four carry air-to-air ordnance only. Of the remaining five, two are used for external fuel to extend endurance, range, loiter times and reduce air-to-air refueling requirements. Weapons don’t attach directly to jets - there is some type of suspension equipment connecting the two. Many F-16s don’t have the suspension equipment which holds multiple JDAMs, but F-16s can ‘slant mount’ (similar to one side of an equilateral triangle) two 500-lb LGBs. This technique has proven a very effective way to increase precision payload. The assumption of six or eight weapons is that the four-pack is in lieu of the single JDAM or the JDAM and LBGs respectively. The load is six if the LGBs capability wants to be retained. The four-pack which holds the SDB is a single attachment and is essentially the same as attaching a single bomb. F-16s regularly employ the same principle when a multiple ejector racks are used to carry six practice bombs on one hardpoint. 43 The comparison of weapons is strictly in number and not explosive power. This paper acknowledges the SDB is limited in a by-weight measurement, but at the same time, multiple SDBs can strike the same target and SDBs help manage collateral control. In slower, long-term conflicts, days may pass between weapon drops, and every drop is highly scrutinized - made worse by the presence of Predators and live video feed. Therefore, collateral damage isn’t a concern only riding the thoughts of commanders; it tends to seep into the minds of the tacticians. SDBs do not remove collateral damage from the equation, but certainly help control and manage it. 44 Controlling CAS is somewhat of an enigma as it has evolved to incorporate changing technology but at the same time remains unchanged. It’s unchanged in situations where the controller wants or needs a pilot to see a target. To accomplish this, the controller will often mark the target (through means such as smoke or a laser pointer) or, if unable to mark, provide a target ‘talk-on’ which is simply a narrative description of the target. However, as weapons have changed (primarily the arrival of the JDAM) so has the need for a pilot to see targets. 45 CJCS, "Joint Publication (JP) 3-09.3 Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air Support (CAS)," I-1. 46 Ibid., I-4. 47 Ibid., V-22. 48 Jay Stout, "CAS Using Armed UAVs?," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 131, no. 7. 49 According to page Gl-12 of Joint Publication (JP) 3-09.3, the JTAC is “a qualified Service member who, from a forward position, directs the action of combat aircraft engaged in CAS and other offensive air operations.” 50 CJCS, "Joint Publication (JP) 3-09.3 Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air Support (CAS)," V-48. If a JTAC doesn’t pass coordinates of friendly locations, he has essentially reduced/removed the potential for fratricide. A GPS weapon can’t go to coordinates it doesn’t have and a pilot can’t send a bomb to coordinates he/she doesn’t have. Theoretically, a pilot - just like a JTAC - could make a mistake which actually brings a bomb closer to friendly locations. 51 The difficulty of a talk-on depends on the environment and can be as easy as finding a shopping mall to as challenging as finding a specific car in the mall's lot. 52 In an attempt to be more flexible, CAS control has now been categorized into three types (Type 1-3). The biggest delineation is what the JTAC does or does not see. None of these indicate or relate to specific levels of risk or ordnance - rather both are determined by the situation. Paraphrased from JP 3-09.3 (page xiv), Type 1 is used when JTAC must see the attacking aircraft and target for each attack. Type 2 is when JTAC assumes he won’t see either the attacking aircraft or target at weapons release, or the attacking aircraft won’t see the target prior to release. Type 3 is when a JTAC needs to provide clearance for multiple attacks within a single engagement and does not expect to visually acquire the aircraft or the target. In all cases, the JTAC is expected to pass a 9-line briefing to rapidly pass

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information. These briefs are the standard for any aircraft, can be used in any environment, and do not dictate tactics. 53 CJCS, "Joint Publication (JP) 3-09.3 Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air Support (CAS)," GL-15. 54 There is value in Type 1-3 Control when a manned aircraft is working with a JTAC as it quickly informs all players of the situation, expectations, responsibilities and communication in any subsequent attacks. This utility is transferable when using a UAV which requires an operator to release any weapons. However, if this additional node is removed, the applicability of the control types becomes obvious. A UAV/UCAV dropping a JDAM or SDB does not need to know what the situation is or what type of control to expect, and without having to transmit it, the JTAC saves time. While this may seem negligible, it can become significant when dealing with secure radios (often more unintelligible when secure), enemy-generated noise jamming, bad frequencies or just clear but broken communications. 55 CJCS, "Joint Publication (JP) 3-09.3 Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air Support (CAS)," I-2. 56 Ibid., I-1. 57 Stout, "CAS Using Armed UAVs?." 58 Risk-estimate distances allow commanders to estimate the risk in terms of percent of friendly casualties that may result from an air strike against the enemy. Risk-estimate distances are based on fragmentation patterns. The casualty criterion is the 5-minute assault criterion for a prone soldier in winter clothing and helmet. The physical incapacitation means a soldier is physically unable to function in an assault within a 5-minute period after an attack. A PI value of less than 0.1 percent PI can be interpreted as being less than or equal to one chance in one thousand. CJCS, "Joint Publication (JP) 3-09.3 Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air Support (CAS)," D-1, D-3. 59 United States. Dept. of the Air Force and Plans and United States. Air Force. Deputy Chief of Staff for, Programs, The U.S. Air Force Transformation Flight Plan 2003 / Produced by HQ USAF/XPXC (Washington, D.C.: Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Programs, U.S. Air Force, 2003), 52. 60 AFNEWS, "Air Force Posts KC-X Request for Proposals," Air Force News, http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?storyID=123039273. 61 AMC, "KC-135 Stratotanker " Air Force Link, http://www.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=110. 62 ———, "KC-10 Extender," Air Force Link, http://www.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?fsID=109. 63 Tirpak, "UAVs with Bite," 47. 64 PMGPS, "AN/PSN-11 and AN/PSN-11(V)1, Precision Lightweight GPS Receiver (PLGR)," US Army, https://gps.army.mil/gps/menu.cfm. 65 ———, "AN/PSN-13, Defense Advanced Global Positioning System (GPS) Receiver (DAGR)," US Army, https://gps.army.mil/gps/menu.cfm. 66 United States. Dept. of the Air Force and United States. Air Force. Deputy Chief of Staff for, The U.S. Air Force

Transformation Flight Plan 2003 / Produced by HQ USAF/XPXC, B-5, 6. 67 TADSPEC, "V-RAMBO (Video Receiver and Monitor for Battlefield Operations)," Tadiran Spectralink, http://www.tadspec.com/includes/download.php?file_loc=912. 68 Among current weapons, ranges are rather limited and the maximum tends to be around 15 nm. The GBU-15 is 5-15 nm [ACC, "GBU-15."]. The AGM-130 (a GBU-15 with a rocket) breaks the standard limitation but it is not a true glide bomb as it has propulsion. GBU-31/32/38s are slated as “up to 15 miles” [ACC, "Joint Direct Attack Munitions GBU 31/32/38."] and the GBU-10/12 or 2000/500 lb laser guided bombs are even less because of guidance mechanics - usually 8-10 nm (favoring 8). Interestingly, the Air Force has removed references to LGBs in their online references and the only bombs remaining are JDAMs, the SDB, AGM-130 and GBU-15. [USAF, "Air Force Link," Air Force, http://www.af.mil/factsheets/index.asp.] Intentionally or not, even the Air Force Link makes a statement about the diminishing necessity of LGBs. 69 Northrop Grumman, "Modernizing the Aerial Refueling Fleet," ed. Lexinton Institute (Arlington: Lexington), 4. 70 AFNEWS, "Feb. 22 Airpower: F-15s Stop Sniper Fire." 71 CJCS, "Joint Publication (JP) 3-09.3 Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air Support (CAS)," ix. 72 The discussion of JTACs inevitably raises the questions of whether or not they need to be of Air Force lineage and if they are even required when using GIAMs. It is true SDBs are indifferent to the attack data origin - be it USAF, Army, man or machine - but that does not negate JTAC utility. First and foremost, until the military is completely automated, someone has to get the attack data to the SDB. Second, there will be situations when the SDB isn’t the best option or it’s not possible (or practical) to get coordinates. Third, knowledge of airborne assets, weapon effects/capabilities, procedures, etc. is imperative. None of these reasons, however, mandate a service branch and the

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military should leave the argument behind, focusing instead on doctrine. The important thing is the qualification of a JTAC, not his uniform. Therefore, if the Army wants/needs more JTACs to fill lower echelons, then the Army can certify more JTACs. Until they do, they will continue to rely on USAF JTACs and continue to have a shortage. 73 CJCS, "Joint Publication (JP) 3-09.3 Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air Support (CAS)." 74 AFTTP(I)_3-2.64, "Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Tactical Employment of Unmanned Aircraft Systems," Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (ALSA, 2006), vi. 75 Ibid., IV-9. 76 CJCS, "Joint Publication (JP) 3-09.3 Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air Support (CAS)." 77 Consent is in terms of giving consent to the weapon - initiating the sequence of events to release a bomb from its platform. This is, and has been nothing more than a series of electrical signals initiating certain events. In a fighter, consent is through the 'pickle' (Weapons Release) button which sends the signal to the jet's computer which further passes signals to the bomb, its suspension equipment, or both. In the case of a JDAM, 'pickling' not only releases the weapon, but passes certain data the JDAM needs to initiate and terminate its attack. 78 If a JDAM is dropped - even if it's a dynamic situation - someone generated coordinates. That someone is a JTAC, Predator, someone pulling coordinates from satellite imagery, or even a jet using a targeting pod. However, that is after a target has been identified. During day-to-day operations, troops on the ground are likely to be the first to identify emerging targets, and assuming a JTAC is with them, he is the first link to airpower. If a JTAC's target was eventually hit by a JDAM, the coordinates had to be passed, receive, repeated, the aircraft had to be within range (or get there), the Type of Terminal Control had to be established and a pilot had to give consent to the weapon. If the airplane didn't have a targeting pod, all this took place so a pilot could give consent to a weapon hitting a target which he had no way of examining. 79 Radar warning receivers (RWR) alert aircraft crew members of potentially dangerous radar emissions such as the missile guidance of a surface to air missile (SAM). For example, if an SA-6 SAM was tracking an RWR-equipped aircraft, the crew would know they're being tracked, the relative bearing of the SA-6, and depending on the capabilities of the RWR, the distance of the SA-6. With this information the crew would be able to assess if the SA-6 is within a dangerous range and react accordingly. 80 It is difficult to summarize the reluctance to the BK-135 in a few short paragraphs, but most of it stems from faulty assumptions. Common is to forget the SUDAGR-SDB connection and assume the tanker crew has to conduct additional training and in-flight tasks. Any SDB on a BK-135 gets positional data from the jet (automatically) requests from SUDAGRs over the LINK. The ability of an SDB to fulfill a request or if the BK-135 is the Priority Platform is displayed on the SUDAGR and is based on the tanker's location. It has nothing to with relocating the tanker. These processes require no action on part of the crew. The extent of involvement could be limited to knowing their aircraft has SDBs and being informed of SDB malfunctions (which would be passed to maintenance). 81 ACC, "MQ-9 Reaper Unmanned Aerial Vehicle." 82 SDBs are glide bombs and can't climb to an altitude required to strike a target at Distance X. These bombs depart with the energy (through speed and altitude) they get from the carrying platform. Since platforms are limited to a maximum speed, additional energy can only be achieved with altitude. At a specific airspeed, a certain amount of altitude is required to travel to Distance X. If the altitude is restricted because of ISR requests, Distance X may now be out of range. The only way to get back in range is to travel closer to the target or climb, and both can be rather time consuming with a Reaper. 83 ACC, "MQ-9 Reaper Unmanned Aerial Vehicle." 84 Transmitting video to all LINK players, in particular the AOC (JAOC or CAOC), accepts the reality that these centers have grown to assume UAV video feed is provided. Also, as long as the SUCAV is manned, the UAV GCS (ground control station) would receive the video as they control the platform. Additionally, there are higher echelons which now demand UAV video and the SUCAV would be no different. The relay of this data would use the same methods and architecture already in place. 85 In the USAF inventory, legacy fighters would include A-10, F-15 and F-16 - and possibly the F-15E although that airframe tends to be left out of the equation. Regardless, it is basically any fighter which isn’t an F-22 or F-35 as they are the latest generation aircraft; sometimes referred to as 5th generation fighters. 86 John A. Tirpak, "Making the Best of the Fighter Force," Air Force Magazine, March 2007, 42. 87 AFNEWS, "Reaper Moniker Given to MQ-9 Unmanned Aerial Vehicle." 88 AMC, "KC-135 Stratotanker ". The USAF slates the 30,000 foot speed 530 mph which is about 460 knots. The 300 knot reference comes from experience flying F-16s.Airframes normally attain higher airspeeds at higher altitudes even if there is no change to the speed indicated in the cockpit. In other words, jets tanking at 310 knots at 33,000 feet are moving through the air faster than tanking at 310 knots at 25,000 feet. The point is, even while

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refueling, the energy a BK-135 could provide to an SDB is more than a SUCAV could provide at the same altitude. Also, since tankers often have gaps in planned refueling and/or are on standby, they can easily climb while waiting which provides even greater SDB standoff. Even during these lulls, KC-135s usually only slow to about 275 knots for fuel conservation - still outpacing the Reaper. 89 ‘Combat’ radius was used as a way to differentiate between missions when the tanker is giving fighters fuel and those where the tanker is simply flying point-to-point. 90 AMC, "KC-135 Stratotanker ". 91 ACC, "MQ-9 Reaper Unmanned Aerial Vehicle." 92 AMC, "KC-135 Stratotanker ".The range of a KC-135 on a ferry mission (point to point) is as much as 11,000 miles. Since most tankers are closer the AOR in regions like Iraq, they could conduct the same missions as a B-1 or B-52 without the requirement to refuel. Although it is a manageable risk, aerial refueling increases risk simply by nature of two jets being in contact. Also, aerial refueling can take place en route, but aircraft often reduce speed during the process. Traditionally, the military avoids risk and/or delays whenever possible. 93 "Tactical UAVs: Defining the Missions (Cover Story)," Military Technology 30, no. 7: 91. 94 ACC, "Air Combat Command Concept of Operations for Endurance Unmanned Aerial Vehicles," ed. Col Harold H. Barton (ACC, 1996). 95 United States. Dept. of the Air Force and United States. Air Force. Deputy Chief of Staff for, The U.S. Air Force

Transformation Flight Plan 2003 / Produced by HQ USAF/XPXC, b-19. 96 The notional orbit uses 50 miles as the SDB range which is between the 40 or 60 claimed by different sources. While 40 would be most conservative, 50 is a trade off between minimizing the SDB and assuming the maximum range would always be achieved. 30 miles was used as a notional orbit distance to preclude excessive turns by either platform and more realistically incorporates tracks flow by tankers. 97 The word ‘instant’ is used here meaning instantly able to drop the weapon; i.e., being within range at the same time of request. It’s understood no weapon is instant for all are bound by the time-of-flight (or travel) reality. Even JDAMs on a fighter could be instantly within range - it all depends on relative location when the request for ordnance is made. The SUCAV/BK-135 as described are instantly covering more area at any one time which is nothing more than a result of the SDBs standoff. 98 The circle shown has a 25 mile diameter which assumes a liberal 12.5 mile standoff for the JDAM. 99 Silence is another, less obvious benefit of significant standoff but is difficult to label as 'persistence'. Many situations in the Air Summary involved aircraft being called to suppress hostile fire only to have the fire fight stop when arriving overhead. This is likely a result of the enemy hearing the jets, and although it can be affective in the near term - stopping the fires - it doesn't address the longer term goal of enemy attrition. 100 United States. Dept. of the Air Force and Plans and United States. Air Force. Deputy Chief of Staff for, Programs, The U.S. Air Force Transformation Flight Plan 2004 / Produced by HQ USAF/XPXC, 3rd ed. ed. (Washington, D.C.: Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Programs, U.S. Air Force, 2004), B-10. 101 This is traditionally a point of contention. As mentioned, doctrine says friendly location/coordinates will not be passed over the radio, and this is sound policy as that has led to fratricide. The concept that the SUCAV/BK-135 would know the location of the requestor is reason alone for many to dismiss the idea altogether. However, the JTAC doesn’t actually enter (type) or pass his location. Instead, the SUDAGR sends it with the target information - completely transparent to the user. The benefits well outweigh the option of not sending the friendly location. First, the SDBs will not strike the friendly location. Second, the friendly location is how the airborne SDBs know which can fill the request quickest. Third, friendly location could be shared with other assets using systems such as Link16 or Blue Force Tracker to supplement their SA and increase the fidelity of the common operational picture. The irony is there seems to be complete trust across warfighters that GPS weapons will go where they’re told, but at the same time far less confidence in automating other procedures. More so, the confidence in JDAMs seems to completely disregard the reality that a JDAM can still suffer from a physical malfunction. In other words, if the GPS and INU are working perfectly, something can still fail in the linkage from the ‘brain’ to the fin. Or, the INU could work perfectly and then stop working shortly after release. The intention isn’t to say there should be a lower confidence in JDAMs, it is just to highlight the possibility exists. Readers should pause and ask what ramifications will result if a JDAM suffers such a plight and fratricide occurs with correct coordinates. Will the military react in ways which essentially and incorrectly limit JDAMs and SDBs? One scenario might be a requirement to get ‘eyes on’ for any JDAM drop. That reaction, for example, would remove B-1s from the JDAM-dropping inventory and not actually address the issue which initiated the change. Those who request weapons and those who drop them already accept the potential of undesired results and - if the above scenario unfolds - be prepared to honor all the successful GIAM

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drops before agreeing to undue limitations. Ideally, the scenario will never take place and GPS munitions will continue striking exactly where they’re sent all the while becoming more and more reliable. 102 There was an interesting trend among several of the Air Summary transcripts. Friendly troops often called CAS as a result of being engaged in fire fights. Sometimes, CAS was responsive enough to attack the enemy but many times the CAS wasn’t immediately available and fire fights would cease before or shortly after aircraft arrived. The termination of enemy fire was never directly attributed to aircraft noise, but even insurgents recognize what the noise can bring. Assuming a fire fight stopped based on noise, the airpower could be deemed effective, and in terms of protecting US servicemen was - but those are limited effects. Ideally, the enemy could be stuck without hearing the weapons platform. Other than the long-term effect of removing vice slowing the enemy, this would seem much more coercive as the enemy has no means of determining when and where targets can be hit. 103 Bob Cox, "Hitting the Target in Iraq," Star-Telegram, http://www.dfw.com/mld/dfw/15936155.htm. 104 United States. Dept. of the Air Force and United States. Air Force. Deputy Chief of Staff for, The U.S. Air Force

Transformation Flight Plan 2004 / Produced by HQ USAF/XPXC, B-18.

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AFNEWS. "Air Force Posts KC-X Request for Proposals." Air Force News, http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?storyID=123039273.

———. "Feb. 22 Airpower: F-15s Stop Sniper Fire." Air Force News, http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?storyID=123041967.

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AFTTP(I)_3-2.64. "Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Tactical Employment of Unmanned Aircraft Systems." 100: ALSA, 2006.

Allison, Mae-Li. "Airmen Use GBU-38 in Combat." Air Force Link, http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?storyID=123008840.

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———. "KC-135 Stratotanker " Air Force Link, http://www.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=110.

Baker, Sue. "Predator Missile Launch Test Totally Successful." Program Manager 30, no. 2: 81.

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Blackwelder, Donald I. "The Long Road to Desert Storm and Beyond: The Development of Precision Guided Bombs." Air University, 1992.

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Boeing. "Small Diameter Bomb Increment I Backgrounder." In Precision Engagement &

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"Tactical UAVs: Defining the Missions (Cover Story)." Military Technology 30, no. 7: 91-99.

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Tirpak, John A. "Making the Best of the Fighter Force." Air Force Magazine, March 2007, 40-45.

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APPENDIX A FIGURES

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to:

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eing

Figure 1. Small Diameter Bomb (GBU-39) in flight (top) and on the BRU-61/A (above)

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Figure 2. MQ-9 Reaper

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JP

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Figure 3. Close Air Support Briefing Form (9-Line)

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Figure 4. Actual DAGR / Proposed SUDAGR

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Figure 5. SUCAV and BK-135 Overall Concept

Not To Scale

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JP3-09.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air Support (CAS), 2005, iii-29

NOTES

AFAOC: Air Force Air and Space Operations Center ASOC: Air Support Operations Center AWACS: Airborne Warning and Control System CRC: Control and Reporting Center CRE: Control Reporting Element DASC: Direct Air Support Center FAC(A): Forward Air Controller (Airborne) HQ: Headquarters JTAC: Joint Terminal Attack Controller ROE*: Rules of Engagement SA*: Situational Awareness TACC: Tactical Air Command Center TACP: Tactical Air Control Party TOT*: Time on Target WOC: Wing Operations Center * These were added and are not in the Joint Publication diagram.

Figure 6. Immediate CAS Request Process (Traditional)

NOTES

• All acronyms are the same as in the Joint Pub Immediate CAS Request Process.

• STEP 4. If certain ROE are meet such as in self-defense, this step may be eliminated, but that would also be true for the Traditional process.

• TACP/JTAC is often the same person and/or collocated.

• To avoid idle sensors (SUCAV), they would automatically focus on requested coordinates and pass the image for SA.

* The platform which processes requests is determined by proximity and available ordnance. When the TACP/JTAC initializes the SUDAGR it transmits on the LINK and locates the nearest SUCAV or BK-135. These platforms respond to the SUDAGR with status (range and number of SDBs). The closest platform with SDBs will become the ‘primary platform’ and processes all requests. The next closest platform with SDBs becomes the ‘secondary platform’ and immediately assumes requests if priority platform expends all SDBs and/or has SDB malfunctions.

** After receiving request and prior to release, the primary platform automatically positions itself to provide sufficient energy to the SDB while crosschecking target location. The coordinates are compared to TACP/JTAC location (known via the SUDAGR), political boarders and restricted targets to prevent fratricide and undesired effects. Assuming these criteria are met, platform queries TACP/JTAC to confirm consent. If no TOT was specified, time of flight will be sent to SUDADR.

Figure 7. Immediate CAS Request Process (SUCAV/BK-135)

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Figure 8. Notional SUDAGR-SUCAV-SDB Linkage

Figure 9. Example of SUCAV/BK-135 Coordinate Validation

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Figure 10. SUCAV-Computed No-Strike and Danger Close Regions

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Map: University of Texas at Austin

Figure 11. Notional SUCAV Coverage

Also see Figure 9, SUCAV/ BK-135 Coordinate Validation

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APPENDIX B TABLES

Table 1. CENTCOM Airpower Summary, 15 February - 15 March 2007

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GLOSSARY / DEFINITIONS

AAA Anti-Aircraft Artillery AGM Air Guided Missile AGM-114 Named the Hellfire, a guided missile, usually relying on laser designation/guidance AI Air Interdiction AOC Air Operations Center ASOC Air Support Operations Center BDA Battle Damage Assessment CAS Close Air Support CCD Charge-Coupled Device (produces a TV quality image) CEP Circle Error Probability “defines the radius of a circle inside which there is a 50%

probability of the position being located” (Rizos, Chris. “Principles and Practice of GPS Surveying.” The University of New South Wales. Sydney, Australia, http://www.gmat.unsw.edu.au/snap/gps/gps_survey/) and can indicate a weapon's delivery accuracy. In other words if a GBU-45 (for example only) has a CEP of 10 meters, at least half of any GBU-45s dropped will impact within a 10 meter radius circle. The lower the number, the more accurate the weapon.

COMINT Communications Intelligence CPU Central Processing Unit ECM Electronic Counter Measures ELINT Electronic Intelligence FAC(A) Forward Air Controller (Airborne) FEBA Forward Edge of Battle Area FLOT Forward Line of Own Troops FSCL Fire Support Coordination Line GBU Guided Bomb Unit GBU-12 A 500lb bomb using laser guidance GBU-38 A 500lb bomb using GPS/INS guidance GBU-39 A 250lb bomb using GPS/INS guidance GCS Ground Control Station GPS Global Positioning System GWOT Global War on Terrorism IR/IIR Infrared / Imaging Infrared ISR Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance JDAM Joint Direct Attack Munition which uses GPS/INS guidance (such as the GBU-38) JSTARS Joint Surveillance Attack Radar System JTAC Joint Terminal Attack Controller LGB Laser Guided Bombs NM Nautical Mile NTISR Non-Traditional Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance QDR Quadrennial Defense Review RAF Royal Air Force SAC Strategic Air Command SAM Surface-to-Air Missile SDB Small Diameter Bomb (see also GBU-39)

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SUCAV SDB-Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle TAC Tactical Air Command TACC Tactical Air Command Center TACP Tactical Air Control Party TTP Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures UCAV Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle Wpns Weapons (also WPN or WPNS)