the surplus ofthe athenian phoros - the unz review · putting athenian tribute revenue at 560t in...

The Surplus of the Athenian Phoros

Ron K. Unz

I N THEIR ATTEMPTS to understandthe tribute income of the FirstAthenian Empire, historianshave found that an unimpeachablecontemporary source is challengedby undeniable physical evi

dence:explicit statementsof Thucydidesare directly contradictedbythe epigraphical record of the quotaspaid to Athena on the tributecollected by Athens. This paper proposes a new theory aimed atresolvingthis long-standingdilemma.

I

Thucydides 1.96 statesthat when the Delian League was established in 478/7 the allies were assesseda total of 460 talents intribute; at 2.13 he reportsthat by the outbreakof the PeloponnesianWar 43 1/0 the tribute income hadreachedan averageof 600T. Yetaccording to the figures of the tribute quota lists, Athens’ revenuewas at most some 390T in 431/0 and probably between200i and250T when the Leaguewas founded.1 The discrepancy,over 200T ineachcase,is considerable.

How likely is it that Thucydidesknew the correct amount of theAthenian tribute?2 Such financial statistics were matters of publicrecord,with tribute quotasand assessmentssince 454/3 inscribedon

‘Surviving recordsof the aparchai paid to Athenaon the incoming phoros arewoefully incomplete.However, by combiningthe accountsof severalyears,we canobtain areasonablemaximumestimateof about 390T for the total tribute paid in 454/3 andthereafter.B. D. Meritt, H. T. Wade-Gery,andM. F. McGregor, The Athenian TributeLists Cambridge[Mass.]/Princeton1939-1953I 241, estimatethe increasein tributedue from new statesjoining the Leaguebetween478/7 and 454/3 at 122T or so cfn.19 infra; the increaseresulting from statesshifting from the ship-contributingcategory to the cash-contributingcategory e.g. Naxos and Thasos is subject to muchdoubt,but probablyrangedfrom 1ST to 65T, with the larger figure more likely. Basedon this reasoning,the total rise in monetarycontributionswould have been140-190Tbetween478/7 and454/3, yielding a cash total of some200-250rin 478/7. Cf A TLIII 239-43 andA. W. Gomme, A Historical Commentaryon ThucydidesI Oxford 1945273-80.

2 Cf S. K. Eddy, "460 Talents Once More," CP 63 1968 187f, for many of thefollowing arguments.

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LICENSED TO UNZ.ORGELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

22 THE SURPLUSOF THE ATHENIAN PHOROS

marblestelaesetup on the Acropolis.3 By 431 Thucydideshadbegunthe researchfor his history and was probably deeply involved inAthenian public life we know that he servedas strategos in 424. Itis implausible that a close observerwho went to such greatpains touncover all available information about the war from every source,and who recognizedthe greatsignificanceof Athens’ financial statusfor her military strengthcf 1.42, 1.84, 2.13, would makea patenterror in reporting publicly-posted tribute income. Thucydides verylikely had accessto the 478/7 total as well, stipulatedin the widelyfamous ‘Assessmentof Aristeides’, whose figures were sufficientlywell-known to be cited simply by name in diplomatic treaties;5 presumablya written copy was kept in the Athenian archives,as well asin the archivesof the other principal foundersof the Delian League.The possibility of textual corruptionin Thucydides-a highly unlikely‘double corruption’, involving both the 478/7 and 431/0 figures-canvirtually be ruled out: PlutarchArist. 24 quotesthe 460T and 600Ttotals asThucydidesgives them.

If Thucydides’ numbersare correct, then perhapsit is our understandingof them that is in error. Indeed, this has been the view of‘orthodox’ revisionism: it is arguedby the authorsof ATL andothersthat Thucydides’ figure of 460T includes both cash tribute incomeperhaps260T and the equivalentcashvalue of the shipssuppliedbythe remainingallies.6 But this interpretationviolates the direct wording of Thucydides 1.96, wherethe term phoros is used explicitly formonetarycontributions as distinguished from the ships, with thephoros in the first assessmentput at 460T:

iiapaXaf36vrs & o ‘Ath1vao6 riv ‘,yiwvLav i-otr i- Tpo1Ti.

KOVTØV T&V UqJLCvv 8L To Havoaviov croc, Taav c r&L ira pE&v i-cZiv ir6Xwv p’rLara irp6c TJV f3cpf3apovKaLiias .... Ka ‘EXXvoTadaL T3T ITpWTOV ‘A07p’aioLc KaTorq

?AfJxI, ot EbEOVTO T03/ c/X6p0V OVTO yap wvo1woth riv xrqiumw41op. v fi’ 6 lrp&roc 46poc raOic rerpakocna rcXaPTa KaL

7KOVT ...

Cf ATL III 12-16.Thuc. 4.104. He mentionsthat he was of an age to understandwhat washappening

throughoutthe yearsof war 5.26 andbegan writing his history at the very beginningof conflict 1.1.

6 For example,in the treatyof Nicias Thuc. 5.18.6 Cf ATL III 236-43;Gommesuprani 284-86;Eddy supra n.2 184-95.The distinctionmadehereappearselsewhere:at 7.57.4Thucydidesdescribescertain

Athenian allies as being "subject to phoros," but says of the Chians that they were"not subjectto phoros, but brought ships in as independentallies." For a thoroughdiscussionof the linguistic problems at issue, cf M. H. Chambers,"Four HundredSixty Talents," CP 53 1958 26-32, esp. 27f.


RON K. UNZ 23

If we attempt to salvageThucydides’ accuracy by ‘reinterpreting’ hisstatementto meanthat the 460T in phoros included both cash andships,we are in effect emendingthe text-anapproachthat shouldbetakenonly as a last resort.

Again, Thucydidesreportsa tribute figure of 600T for 431/0:

Oapo-etv TE KEXEVE 1TpOowPTwv 15EV aKocruuv raXavrwii thc iri

TO iroXi, 4pov scar’ IILaVTOII 1r Tp e/.uav rj TOXEL avvT’qS aXX1cirpoo6bov, i’irapxóvrow be ES’ T aKpO1TOXEl ETL TOTE

yvpLoV ITWThUOV aKUTXL1wP TaXaj’TWP rc yp irXeora rpux

KOOtWPalTobEovra 151 U2 E7EPETO, a4.’ J1R E TE ra rrponXau.s r’ç

ipoir6Xeoc KaL r&XXa oico8ornLara KaL ç Horetbauzv ravrXo 2.13.3.8

Since the quotalist allows a tribute total of no more than 390T for thisperiod,it is arguedby A TL, Gomme,Eddy,andothersthat the figureof 600T comprisesthe cash tribute, the value of the ships of Chiosand Lesbos, the Samian indemnity strictly speaking,not tribute atall, the port revenueof Amphipolis, and the foreign income of theGoddessAthena-inotherwords, all Athens’ overseasrevenue.9Related attemptsto assignspecific amountsfor thesesourcesare purelyconjecturalandmust, onceagain, do violenceto the words of Thucydides describingthe 600T as 46poc?E1r Tow v xcoi’ Tfl iT6ltt.

Such freedomdoes not, in the main, characterizeancientauthorities. Plutarch, as we have pointed out, uses Thucydides’ figureswithout comment, which suggeststhat they were in agreementwiththe numbersfrom his other sources.1°According to Xenophon, total

8 Tr. Crawley: "Here [the Atheniansihad no reasonto despond.Apart from othersourcesof income,an averagerevenueof six hundredtalentsof silver was drawn fromthe tribute of the allies; andtherewere still six thousandtalentsof coined silver in theAcropolis, out of nine thousandsevenhundredthat hadonce beenthere, from whichthe moneyhadbeentaken for the porch of the Acropolis, the other public buildings,andfor Potidaea."

ATL III 334-41 contains the following estimates: 3881 in tribute; SOT from theSamian indemnity; 25-30T in other sacredrevenuesof the gods;70-75T from the portrevenue of Amphipolis; and the remaining60T or so from unknown other imperialrevenuesourcesand the 10% tax. Aside from the 388T in tribute the maximumpossiblefigure suggestedby the quotalists, all theseamountsareessentiallysimpleguesseschosento fit the 6001 total. Eddy supra n.2 195 borrows thesefigures for thetribute, the Samian indemnity, the sacredrevenue,andthe port revenueof Amphipolis, for a total of 533-543T. To this he addsthe capital value of the shipscontributedby Chios andLesbos,which he estimatesto have been65T, yielding a combinedtotalof 598-608T. He remarksthat the close correspondenceof this figure to the desired6001 total given by Thucydidesmay seem "rather too neat"-an understatement,sincethe calculation is basedmostly upon pureguesswork.

10 Plutarchgenerallymentionsany disagreementsamonghis sources:Ages. 32; Alex.15, 18, 27, 31, 38, 46; Them. 32; Per. 9, 10, 24; Arist. 1.



Athenian income was 1 ,000T at the beginning of the PeloponnesianWar, a figure consistentwith Thucydides’ 600T in tribute alone.’1Nepos Ansi. 3.1 repeatsthe figure of 460T for Athens’ first tributecollection. Only Diodorus dissentsfrom this harmony of sources,putting Athenian tribute revenueat 560T in 478/7 and 460T in 431/0Diod. 11.47.1, 12.40.2; but thesefigures contradictsimple logic andevidencethat tribute actually increasedduring this period.

In weighing the plausibility of the figures from literary evidenceagainst thosefrom the quota lists, it is helpful to consider the external evidencefor the size of accumulatedtribute surplus.In 450/49,after the Peace of Callias, the accumulatedtribute reserve, thenapparently5,000T, was liquidated by Pericles in order to pay for theconstruction of the Parthenonand other public works.’2 It is likelythat sailors’ pay was 3 obols per day in this period; if we use thestandardfigure of 200 men per trireme, we find that naval expensesfor a ship cameto roughly 100 drachmasper day, or half a talentpermonth.’3 Betweenthe foundationof the Delian Leagueandthe Peaceof Callias, League fleets were involved in a number of costly campaigns:200 ships under Cimon destroyeda large Persianfleet at theEurymedon Thuc. 1.100; Plut. Cim. 12; later, 200 ships were involved in a lengthy operationin Egypt Thuc. 1.104, 109f; perhaps100 or more Athenian and allied ships servedin a war against Aegina.14 A further 200 ships were later led by Cimon against CyprusThuc. 1.112. Although we do not know the exact length of any ofthesecampaignsthe war in Egypt lasteda full six years,but someofthe Leagueships may have been transferredbefore the end, the

Anab. 7.1.27. The emphasisThucydidesplaces on the tribute portion of Athens’total income would seemratherodd if it generallyamountedto little more than a thirdof the total somewhatless than 390T-a maximum estimate-out of more than1,000T; it would be naturalif it comprisednearly 60% 600r out of overl,000r.

12 Plut. Per. 12; for discussionof further evidencein the StrasbourgPapyruscf ATLIII 281; H. T. Wade-GeryandB. D. Meritt, Hesperia26 [1957] 163-88 seeR. Meiggs,The AthenianEmpire Oxford 1972 515-18, andC. W Fornara,Archaic Times to theEndof the PeloponnesianWar Cambridge1983 95-97 no. 94. It is possiblethat the5,000T expendeddid not representthe total amountof the accumulatedreserve.

"Thuc. 8.45. With the sharpbiddingcompetitionfor sailors,pay seemsto haverisento 1 drachmaper day by the time of the PeloponnesianWar: Thuc. 1.21, 3.17.4, 6.8.1.The figure of 200 men per trireme is implied by Thucydides; cf Meiggs supra n.12259, 427. Theseestimatesseemfully consistentwith the recordof expendituresfor theSamian revolt: cf A. French, "The Tribute of the Allies," Historia 21 1972 1-20,esp. 5.

‘ Thuc. 1.105 reportsthat the Athenianscaptured70 Aeginetanships in a majornaval battle; since the Aeginetanswere renownedfor their naval excellencecf Htd.8.93, it seemslikely that more than 100 Athenian and allied ships were involved.However, it must be admitted that we cannot be sure that the Delian League wasofficially involved.


RON K. UNZ 25

total cost of theseoperationsmust havebeen considerable,perhaps5,500T.15 This period also saw wars against various rebellious members of the Delian League,such as Thasosand Naxos: the total costhere must havebeen 1,500-2,500T.’6 Some of theseexpensesmayhave been defrayed through the sale of capturedslavesor booty-though many actions, notably the last stagesof the catastropheinEgypt, did not lend themselvesto profitable looting.17 When we addthe cost of maintaining peacetimepatrols, constructing new ships,and fighting such minor campaignsas thoseat Eion, Scyros, Sestus,Byzantium, and Carystus Thuc. 1.98, we are left with a likely netexpenditureto the Leagueof at least 10,000T in the 29 yearsfrom478/7 to 450/49.18

If we useThucydides’ figure of 460T for the first tribute assessment, and if we take the rise in tribute between478/7 and 450/49due to new membersjoining the Leagueand old membersshiftingfrom the ship-contributingclass to the cash-contributingclass to beabout lOOT,’9 then tribute in 450/49 was roughly 560T. If we use

15 Very rough estimates:in the Eurymedoncampaign,200 ships x 0.5T/monthx 8month campaigningseason= 800T; in the Aeginacampaign, 100 ships x 0.5r/monthx 8? months = 400r; in Egypt, 100 ships a conjecturalaveragestrengthx O.5Tper month x 70 months= 6 full years, since crews would have to be paid duringwinters, or equivalentlyfed = 3,500T or more; Cyprus campaign,200 ships x 0.5Tper month x 8 months= 800T: a total of 5,50th. Our estimatecould be substantiallychangedby manyunknowns, e.g. if the Athenian-Aeginetanwar were not an affair ofthe League,our total would be reducedby 400T; if 200 ships hadremainedin Egyptduring the full six years, our total would be raisedby 3,500T; but overall it is probablyconservative,especiallysince we areassumingthat sailors were paid only half adrachma per day, which may be low. It is important to note that allied ships participatinginLeague operationswould almost certainly havedrawn their pay from Leaguefundsjustas Athenian ships did. The major ship-contributing statessuchas Samos,Chios, andLesboswould havedemandedequalitywith Athenson this point at the foundationofthe League,andwould havetakenconcertedactionagainstanychangein the terms.

16 Over two years of siege at Thasos-astrong state-probablycame to at least1,500-2,00th,sincea nine-monthsiegeof Samoscost 1 ,200T, andthe more thantwoyearsof siege at Potidaeacost 2,000r. The cost of the Naxos revolt is unclear, thoughwe do know that therewas anaval blockadeandsiege Thuc. 1.137.

‘ In onecelebratedincident, Cimon obtaineda huge sum of money by ransoming* the high-rankingPersiannobleswhom he hadcapturedat Eion andByzantium Plut.

Cim. 9; the moneywas enough to maintainhis fleet for four months.Assuming thatCimon’s force included 50 ships since there was no Persiannaval opposition at thistime, a large fleet would havebeenunnecessary,he raisedover lOOT.

0 We might also considerthe cost of the operationsin the First PeloponnesianWarduring this period, though it is difficult to determinewhetherLeaguefundswere drawnupon. The overall figure of 10,000T is subject to much uncertainty, but is probablyconservative;cf supra nn.15 and 16.

‘9 This is rather more conservativethan the figure of 135+T estimatedin ATL III239-43,andwidely accepted.The ATL figure is basedon the assumptionthat Persianpower in Thracedid not collapseso rapidly as to allow inclusion of AenosandAbderain the first assessmentof 478/7; but Htd. 7106.2 seemsto imply that it did, as does



51 OT as the approximateaveragetribute for the 29 years [= 0.5 x46OT + 560T], we get a total tribute income for the period of about14,79OT. Subtracting the 1O,000T in Leagueexpendituresyields areserveof just under 5,000T in 450/49, the figure for the actualreserveat that time. That our estimatesyield an answerso close tothe correct5,000T is simple coincidenceandhas no significance;whatis important is that a 5,000T reservein 450/49 is compatiblewith thetribute income figuresof Thucydides.

On the other hand, if we use the tribute quota records we getnonsense.Tribute was under 390T in 450/49, and probably averaged300-35OT or less from 478/7 to 450/49, yielding a total tribute income of well under 1O,000T: less than the League’sprobableexpenditures during theseyears. The Delian Leaguemust havebeen onthe verge of bankruptcythroughoutthis period; an accumulatedsurplus of 5,000T is impossible.2°

Fluctuationsin the new tribute surplus generatedbetween449/8and 431/0 tend to support this verdict. Thucydidestells us that theAthenian cash reserve reacheda maximum of 9,700T sometimebefore 433/2.21 It is clear that Athens made little or no distinctionbetweenher own fundsand thoseof the Leagueafter the reorganization following the Peaceof Callias in 45Ø/49*22 Since all or nearly allpreviouscashwas used in the building projectsat Athens, and sinceno tribute was collectedfor the reservein 449/8,we mayassumethatthe later accumulation began in 448/7, drawing upon each year’ssurplus of tribute and non-tributecashincome. Between 448/7 and

the absenceof any recordedcampaignagainstthesewealthy andimportant cities. Theirpresencein the first assessmentwould reducethe later increaseby 27T. Furthermore,forty of the cities that probablyjoined between478/7 and 450/49 were small inlandCariantowns, often sporadic in their paymentandapparentlyremovedfrom the rollsaround441 presumablybecausethey were not worth the effort of collection; if wesubtractthe defaulting portion of their total assessmentof about26T, the net increasein tribute comesto some10th.

20 This discrepancybetweenthe figuresof the tribute quotalists and the size of theaccumulatedreserveis fully notedby ATL III 238. The authors resort to the hypothesis that during the first threedecadesof the League’sexistence,"little, if any" of theincoming phoroswas actually spenton campaigningexpenses,but storedaway, instead,to producethe remarkablylarge5,000r reservetotal mentioned.

21 2.13. Probablya few years earlier: the building of the Propylaea,which eventuallycost 2,012r, was begunin 437/6; it was probably aroundthis date that the 9,700rmaximumwas reachedand the reservebeganto decline. 433/2 is the latest possibledate:cf Fornarasupran.12132f no. 118.

22 Pericles essentiallyadmitted as much, according to Plut. Per. 12. The permanenttransferof the treasuryto Athens, the Peacewith Persiawhich removedthe purposeof the Delian League,andthe uses to which Athens put Leaguefundsall make thisclear.


RON K. UNZ 27

433/2, Athenian forceswere involved in heavy fighting precedingtheThirty YearsTruce, and in suppressingrebellions in Euboea,Samos,and Byzantium. The Samos/Byzantiumcampaignalonecost at least1 ,400T, thoughmuch of the expensemayhavebeenrepaid by 433/2throughthe Samianindemnity.23

The total cost of theseefforts, togetherwith peacetimepatrolsandthe construction of new ships, could hardly have been less than3,000T*24 Thucydides’ tribute figures of 600’r in 431/0 and perhaps56th’ in 448/7, combinedwith about 400T in other Athenian revenue,25would yield a gross income of about 15,680T by 433/2 [ 0.5x 960T + 1,000T x 16 years]. When we subtractjurors’ pay, thecost of festivals, building maintenance,and other regular expenditures of the Athenian state, together with the military expenseof3,000T or more describedabove, a balanceof 9,700T in the reserveseemslikely.

In contrast, the tribute lists report a gross annual income of atmost 390T from 448/7 to 433/2, generallyaveragingquite a bit less.If we use the figure of 400T in other Athenian revenue,26then the

23 Thuc. 1.112-17. It is generally agreedthat the Samian revolt cost Athens about1,200T, while concurrent operationsagainst Byzantium brought the total to l,400rthough the latter figure may actually correspondto the costs of Samosalone; theevidence is summarizedand discussedby Meiggs supra n.12 192; Fornara supran.12 112 no. 113, and"On the Chronologyof the SamianWar," JHS99 1979 7-19.A TL III 334f suggestedthat the Samian indemnity came to SOT per year, but this ispure speculation:since Samosappearsto be paying as late as 414/3, the rate cannothavebeengreaterthansomeSOT per year,andmay havebeenmuchless.

24 At most, some350T of the Samian indemnity could have beenpaid by by 433/2;the net cost of the Samos-Byzantiumrevolt would have beenat least 1,100T at thispoint. The expenseof the other Athenianoperationsprior to the Thirty Years Peacecan have beenno lessthan l,000T if we add the cost of Pericles’ Black Seaexpedition,ca 436 Plut. Per. 20. Thereis, moreover,the disputedissue of the peacetimepatrolsof at leastsixty triremesthat Periclesis saidto havemannedfor eight monthsof everyyear in orderto provide employmentfor Atheniancitizens Per. 11. Evenallowing forpublic holidays,this would cometo I 5O-200Teachyear. Although we arenot told justwhen Pericles beganthis policy, and since military actions would havefilled manyofthe yearsfrom 448/7 to 433/2 when these sixty triremeswould havemade up part ofthe Athenianbattle fleet without creatingany additional burden, the total extracost ofthesepatrolsmust haveapproached1,000T; cf Meiggs supra n.12 427. When we addthe cost of constructingnew ships and maintaining old onesduring this sixteen-yearperiod, a total of 3,000T for military expensesseemsconservative.

25 Cf Thuc. 2.13; Xen. Anab. 7.1.27.26 The figure of 400T in non-tributeAthenian revenueis admittedly questionable,

since it is derivedby subtractingthe 600T tribute figure of Thuc. 2.13 from the 1,000Ttotal income figure of Xen. Anab. 7.1.27: i.e., we areassumingthat Xenophon’sfigurewas based on knowledge consistentwith Thucydides’. However, it seemsinherentlyunlikely that Athens’ non-tributeincome wasmuchgreaterthan 400T in anyevent cfsupra n.11. Furthermore,Aristophanes’ Wasps,producedin 422, puts the total Athenian income at that time at between1,500 and2,000T Vesp.656-64; probably closer



maximum possible total Athenian income during this period wouldhave been about 12,64OT E= 390T + 400T x 16 years], whichseemsonly remotely possible.It would require that total Athenianexpendituresin this 16-year period were less than 3,000T-very low,consideringthat our rough estimateof military costs alone came tomore than this. By 422, Athenianjuries were absorbing 15th eachyear Ar. Vesp. 662f, and even if the yearly cost of earlier jurieswere only half that, the subsequentsixteen years would have involved a total cost of 1,200T. Our ignoranceof the magnitude ofother Athenian civil expenditures27makes it difficult to reacha defensible total, but the 390T tribute figure seemsto be ruled out by areserveof 9,700T. The size of Athens’ accumulatedsurplus thusstrongly supportsThucydides’tribute figures; it all but excludesthoseof the tributequotalists.

IIIt seemsevident that Thucydides’ cash tribute totals are just what

they are representedto be, and are probably correct. The nature andfunction of the tribute quota lists remain a problem.28 Even casualexaminationrevealsanomalies.According to Thucydides, the Athenians were severe in exactingtribute, "insisting on obligations beingmet exactly," with failure to produce the agreed amountof tributebeing tantamountto revolt.29 Yet the quota lists are disturbinglyvariable, with tributary statesproducingtheir assessmentsonly abouthalf ! the time.3° Athens may have been willing to toleratenon-

to the high figure; if we combinethis with the 1,46OT tribute total in the Assessmentof 425 which, as we will argue below, was probably close to the true income, weobtain results fully consistent with an approximately constant400T in non-tributerevenue.

27 Ath.Pol. providessomefigures e.g. 42.3, 49.4, 50.1, 52.2, but they are incompleteandoften dubious.

20 Many of the argumentsmade in this section are directly parallel to those ofGommesuprani 275ff andFrenchsupra n.13. Cf n.35 infra.

29Thuc 1.99.1: airta 8 AAa TE -o-au r&v arooraoEup ai l.uyurra a rwvfrpiruv vwv EKbaaL Ka XL1Toarpn.ov a rw yvEro oi yip AOivaoL tiKpljloc"7rpao-aoKaL Xlnrpoi ‘oav 013K awOoo-u’ oi8 ovXosvoc raXaiirwpv lrpoaayovrec iic ?lvayKas. The exact meaning of Thucydides’ words is analyzedin Gommesuprani 283.

30 Cf ATL III 265-74 and Meiggs supra n.12 524-30 both make unconvincingattemptsto minimize the degreeof tribute paymentvariability. Of the more than 200membersof the League in the period 453-439, the numberapparentlypaying anytribute at all in a given year rangedfrom 140 to 173, averagingabout 160. Worsestill,


RON K. UNZ 29

paymentoccasionallyunder specialcircumstances,3’but it is difficultto believe that sheremainedcontentto rule an empireof incorrigibledead-beats.During the PeloponnesianWar, Athenian armies weresent into the hills of inland Lycia and Caria to exact tributemeasuredin minai from villages which, as often as not, fought and killed thetribute collectors Thuc. 2.69, 3.19. Would Athens have toleratedregular default by wealthy islands defenselessbefore the Atheniannavy?32

Even more puzzling are thosegreat cities subject to Athens thatseemto have paid little or no tribute. Many of Athens’ proudestpossessionsfall into this category:Naupactus,capturedin perhaps461 and madean importantnaval base,33paid no tribute; Sestus,oneof the strongestand richest cities on the Hellespont,paid only 500 or1,000 drachmaper year and often nothing;34 Thasos,a large andpowerful city used as a base for Athenian ships, paid only 3T intribute until 443, when the figure rose to a more reasonable30T;35

a largenumber of thesepaid only a fraction of their assessedtribute. The authorsofA TL speculatethat somecities may have continued to furnish ships insteadof cashearly in this period, othersmay have beenincluded in the payments of a larger citynearby, and somemostly in upland Caria may simply have defaulted.But even themost generousestimatesof the numbersin eachof thesecategoriesfails to bring thenumberof cities paying or otherwiseaccountedfor into line with the numberof citiesassessed.And in eachfull panel, manycities we would expectto seepresentaremissing. See the Appendix for a brief listing of cities exhibiting severe irregularity inpayment.

31 Thus in 430 Methone, an Athenian subject city that Perdiccasof Macedoniaclaimed within his sphereof influence, had its tribute remitted except for the tokenpaymentof the quotaduethe Goddess.The Methonedecreesmake referenceto thedelicatepolitical situation betweenAthensandMacedonia,andthis is undoubtedlythecauseof Athens’ unusualdecision. Cf ATL III 133-37;Thuc. 2.29.6, 2.80.7.

32 The writers of A TL incline to believe so. Aegina, for example, is said to have"made a partial payment in 449 andprobably none at all in 477 [sic: read 4471 and446" ATL III 303: this abouta rich island without walls or ships andwithin sight ofAttica cf Thuc. 1.108. In fact, it is not certain that Aeginawas absentfrom the 447and446assessments;but the statementexemplifiesthe weak position A TL is forced totake regardingcities missingfrom the quotalists.

‘ A squadronof twentyships underPhormio was stationedthere at the start of thePeloponnesianWar Thuc. 2.80. Later, Demosthenesbasedhis expedition into Aetolia from NaupactusThuc. 3.94.

Sestus’greatnessis describedat Hdt. 9.114-17; it was the PersiangrandeesfromSestusandByzantiumfor whom Cimon receivedthe large cash ransommentionedinPlut. Cim. 9: cf supra n. 17.

Thasos’ enormouswealth is detailed in Htd. 6.46f. The authorsof A TL III 258fargue that after stripping Thasosof its minesandother mainland possessions,Athensdemandedonly 3T per year from the island itself, but this seemsunlikely. Plut. Cim.14 statesthat the gold mines seizedby Athens werethoseon the mainland,alongwiththe other Thasian possessionsthere; yet according to Herodotus, perhapsa third ofThasos’ wealth was derived from mines on the island itself. Thus, Thasian public



and Samos,largestand strongestof Athens’ subjects,and Amphipolis, Athens’ most importantpossessionin Thrace-describedby Thucydides4.108 as an importantsourceof revenue- paid no tribute atall, if we are to trust the evidenceof the tribute lists.36

Clearly, we cannot rely upon the epigraphicalevidenceas a complete record of Athens’ tribute income. As to what the lists actuallyrepresent,a simple answersuggestsitself: they record the quota paidto Athena on the surplus of each year’s tribute, the aparche on thephoros that was sent to Athens rather than spent in the field byshipyards, squadronsstationedat naval bases, or garrisons.37Thisexplanationhasmuch to recommendit. It would have been muchmore efficient for Athenian squadronsbasedat major cities to drawsomeor all of their pay from the tribute of that city, rather than forthe phoros to be transportedto Athens eachyear and then returnedfor local use, with the risk of theft or loss in either direction.38 It

revenue excluding taxes of any sort must have remainedat well over SOT in anaverageyear, rising to perhapslOOT during peak years. Athens would have drawnmore than 3T from a statewith a financial basethis large. Furthermore,Thasoswas alarge island, close to Samosin size; evenwithout its gold-mining revenue,we wouldexpectit to contribute more than the 3T paid by small islands such as Cythnos. Thesuddenincreasein Thasiantribute from 3T to 30T is commonlyascribedto an Athenian return of the mainland mines to Thasos,but this seemshighly implausible. Athenswould have beenimprobablygenerousto forego 80T or more in mine income inreturn for 27T in extra tribute. Returnof the mines would have done little more thandoubleThasos’public revenue;this could hardly explaina tribute rise of 900%.

86 Samoshadmannedsome70 ships on short noticeduring her revolt Thuc. 1.116;after defeat,shewasforced into what wasclearly the standardtributary relationshipcfThuc. 7.57.4, yet no tribute seemsever to havebeenpaid. Samoswas forced to makegood the cost of the revolt as indemnity, leadingto the commonbelief amongmodernhistoriansthat Athens was content to receiveonly this money, without demandingactual tribute from Samos. This seemsimplausible:repaymentof war expenseswouldhave beenmeaninglessas a merereplacementfor regular tribute. The revolt in 440/39hadcost Athens over 1,200T, and it seemsthat Samoswas still paying installmentsatleast as late as 414/3: this translatesinto indemnity payments of less than SOT peryear-possiblymuch less, since we haveno meansof determiningthe closing date ofthe payments.This amount is not unduly high for a city of Samos’ wealthand size,probablyno more than we would haveexpectedSamos’ ordinary tribute to have been,andperhapson the low side following a hard andbitter campaignand siege in whichthe SamiansbrandedcapturedAtheniansandAthens returnedthe mutilation in kindPlut. Per. 26.

Gommesupra n.1 273-80andFrenchsupra n.13 7-20 arrive independentlyatmuch the same conclusion, that the quota lists cannotbe considereda complete accountingof the tribute paid. Eacharguesthat cashor suppliesprovidedto locally-basedAthenianforcesoften went unmatchedby paymentof aparchai to Athena; Frenchgoesso far as to suggestthat "the [tribute displayedat the Dionysial was treatedmore likethesurplus on last year’soperationsthanas the incomefor thefollowing year" 19. Butneitherextendsthis simple idea to its logical conclusion:namely, that the tribute listsserveas areasonablyaccuraterecordof the surplus tributebroughtto Athenseachyear.

38 So Frenchsupra n.13 ii.


RONK.UNZ 31

seemsmore than pure coincidence,for example, that the seven-shipAthenian squadronbasedat Thasosin 424 Thuc. 4.105 would haveconsumedroughly 28T in tribute during an eight-monthcampaigningseason-almostexactly the difference betweenThasos’ ‘correct’ payment of 30T and the 3i or less that it pays for a number of years.The transferof this squadronfrom Thasosto anothercity and backagain would explain irregularities in the amount of tribute reachingAthens. The samereasoningwould apply to paymentfor garrisonsorship-building at allied shipyards. In fact, Plutarch explicitly tells usthat the Atheniansacceptedempty shipsfrom their tributary allies inplace of cashpayment.39

The religious questionis more difficult to analyze:few mattersareas difficult to reconstructas the unwrittenobligationsof piety. It can,of course,be arguedthat the Athenianswould have felt a religiousobligation to pay to Athena an aparche on tribute expendedin thefield as well as on tribute brought back to Athens. It seemsequallyplausiblethat a quota was generallypaid only on the surplustribute,sinceit was only this sum that, after being broughtto Athens,wouldhave been placed under the Goddess’ protection.4° A number oftribute rubrics have been invoked as evidence against this latterhypothesis.The headingatb iroAtç Karab’rXoi3o-t T6P 4xpov "thesecities presenta voucher for tribute" has been restoredin Lists 25and 26 for 430/29and 429/8 ;41 with the aid of further restorationthe cities of Myrina, Imbros, and Sestusappearunder this headinginboth years, along with Alopoconnesusin the latter only.42 This isusually understoodto mean that thesecities contributedtheir phorosto local Athenian forces and were given vouchersso certifying, butpaid their quotasto Athenanonetheless.This reconstructionis plausible, but far from certain. Another rubric, pw96v re’Xeotrap at&tiTO TOV c/3opovT17 tirpartçt "thesecities furnishedpay for a militaryforce out of their tribute", is much clearer.43 The syntely centeredon Erythrae is restored under this headingfor 430/29, Lampsacusand Byzantium for 428/7, and the cities of Lemnos and Imbros for421/O. The rubric ua-O6zi &e’Aorap atb airo TOt’ EXXYJOITOPTLOV

38 Cim. 11; cf n.57 infra.40 Admittedly, the caseof Methone,which wasrequiredto payonly the quotaon the

tribute, is unusual.Given thequestionsof internationalprotocolinvolved supra n.3i,Athens may havewished to use the quotapaymentas a face-savingdevice, allowingher to claim nominal if not defactocontrol.

41 ATL I 449f.42 Supra n.41.43 ATL 1454.‘ Supra n.43.



/xpov "thesecities furnishedpay out of the Hellespontinetribute"is restoredover a long list of importantHellespontinecities Chalcedon, Cyzicus, Lampsacus,Elaeus, Abydus, Byzantium, Parium, Madytus, and Dardanusfor 430/29and 429/8 Alopoconnesusis addedin the former year.

Taken together, this rubric evidencemight seemto indicate thatpiety would compel Atheniansto pay a quota to the Goddesson alltribute, whetherspent in the field or brought to Athens; if so, thenthe lists of aparchaipaid would be equivalentto any recordof tributecollected. However, this argumentis far from conclusive.One mightequally well supposethat paymentof quotason tribute expendedinthe field representsan exceptionto standardprocedure.In all but oneinstancethe entries in question occur in the first few years of thePeloponnesianWar, and none earlier. Except for Erythrae, all thecities involved are in or aroundthe Hellespont.The lack of standardized wording in the rubrics may indicatethe uncommonnatureof thesituation.46

The explanationof theseunusualpaymentsmay be a very simpleone: the extreme piety of some individual. Perhapsthe Atheniancommanderin the areaduring theseyears-theman who would havecollectedand spentthe tribute mentionedby the rubrics-consideredit impious to deny the Goddessher usual share and so reservedasixtieth part of the moneyfor this purpose.47Similarly, pious individuals or local authorities might occasionally have paid their city’stributequotathemselvesor reservedsomeof the tribute for this use,persuadingthe local Athenian officials to agree.

More serious difficulty hasbeen seenin the poor correlation between irregular tribute paymentsand the presenceof large Athenianmilitary forces in the vicinity.48 For example,during the yearsthatsaw large Athenian fleets besiegingSamosand Byzantium 440/39?andPotidaea432-429, irregularitiesin tribute quotapaymentsfromneighboring cities including partial paymentand actual default areno more severethanthosefor the samecities in more normal years.

ATL I46 It seemslikely that the three distinct rubric headingsrefer to essentiallythe same

situation. Cf ATL III 88.The story of Nicias, whosesuperstition concerningan eclipse of the moon ledto

the annihilation of the large Athenianarmy in Sicily Thuc. 7.54, is well known. It isnot difficult to imaginesucha man sendingaparche to Athenaon tribute he hadspentin the field, evenif this were not customary.This neednot imply that Nicias himselfwasconnectedwith any of the anomalousquotapayments.

48 Cf Frenchsupra n.13 13-16. It is this difficulty that convincesFrenchto abandon his tentativestepstowardaffirming the surplus tribute hypothesis.


RON K. UNZ 33

This suggeststhat Athenian forces either did not regularly draw onthe tribute income of nearbycities, or that they did so but still sentthe tribute quota to Athens. However, we need not assumethat alarge Athenian task force would always find it worthwhile to ‘scourclean’ the surplustribute of nearbycities. In the siegesof SamosandPotidaea,the Athenian forceswere enormous,consuminga hundredor more talentsin pay eachmonth;49 their size andimportancewouldhave required that they were well and regularly suppliedwith fundsfrom the central Athenian reserve,and not expected to subsistonthe paltry tribute available from nearbycities. In this situation, anAthenian commanderwould havehad little reasonto detachseveralships to ply the coast in order to supplementhis hundredsof talentsin silver by four or five talents more.5° In any case, spontaneousexactionsby local commanderswould havetendedto increaseconfusion, hindering tribute collection and making verification of properpaymentdifficult. For the sake of orderly bookkeeping,the hellenotamiai would have frowned on such haphazardand piecemealexactions,in contrastto the regular expenditureof local tribute moneyon locally-basedsquadrons,garrisons,and shipyardwork in amountspreviouslydecidedat Athens.

Finally, it shouldbe emphasizedthat surplustributecollectedfromsubjectcities and sent to Athens perhaps300-350Tper year, according to the tribute quota lists was merely a local surplusand did notnecessarily represent a net annual increment to the accumulatedreserve.Fleetsbasedat the Piraeuswould havedrawn their pay fromcentral funds at Athens, and especially large expeditionary forceswould havedone the same.For this reasonthe surplusphoros could

‘ Cf supra n.i6.50 In the case of the Samian revolt, the thirty-two "nearby" cities listed by French

supra n.13 13f shouldprobably be reducedto the fifteen or so on the coastor withina fifty miles’ sail of Samos; for these, the maximum yearly surplus tribute was apparentlyjust overtwenty talents. In any given year, only part of this would havebeenavailable, and this sum would not have beencollected in full until the time of theDionysia. During most of the year,a fund-raisingdetachmentwould havebeenforcedto sail hundredsof miles to over a dozencities along the coast in return for a half-dozen talents of silver at most. These figures for the number of nearby towns andthe maximumamount of total surplus tribute available are roughly the same in thecase of Potidaea:cf French16, but note that he lists severalcities a hundredmilesor more distant. Finally, in the case of Byzantium, Thuc. 1.116f gives little indication that any serious fighting took place; and in view of the considerableforceAthens had concentratedagainst Samos over 215 ships from Athens, Chios, andLesbos, few remaining triremes would have beenavailable for use against Byzantium-probablyno more than thosenormally stationedin the Hellespontinearea.Oncemighty Samos had beendefeated,Byzantiumprobablysubmittedpeacefully cf Thuc.1.117.



haveheldconstantat 35th or so during the early yearsof the PeloponnesianWar, while the Athenian reserveshrank by hundredsoftalentsa year.

IIIIt is appropriateat this point to turn to predictionsbasedon the

theory we are presenting,to determinehowwell or how poorly theyare borne out by the evidenceavailable. Unfortunately,only a smallnumberof tributeassessmentfiguressurvive. In the ninth assessment425/4,we haveindividual recordsfor mostof the islandsandperhapstwo dozenother cities, alongwith a numberof area totals; we haverecordsof about twentycities from the tenth assessment421 and ahandfulof figuresandfragmentsfrom variousotherassessments.5’Formany of the subjectcities the assessmentsshow implausibly high increasesover the tribute paymentsimplied by the tribute quota lists,precisely as we would expect if in many cases the quota paymentscorrespondto only a portion of the tribute paid. In the ninth assessment, Abdera rises from lOT to 75T; Maronea, from 3T to 21+T;Samothrace,from 2T to 1ST; Aenus,from 4T or total absenceto 20T;Caunus,from 3,000dr. to lOT; Eretria,from 3T to 1ST; Chalcis, from3T to lOT; Ceos and Coresia, from 3T to lOT; Tenos, from 2i tolOT.52 Given the forceful languageof this particular decree,53wewould expect a substantialincreasebetweenthe paymentsof 429/8and 425/4. Indeed, total assessmentsrose just over 100°Io between432/1 and 425/4 if we assumethat Thucydides’ figure of 600T forannual phoros was close to the actual assessmentof the time;54 but

5’ Much of the following material is derived from ATL I registerof tribute quotasandassessments;II 79-83 additions andcorrectionsto the register, 122-24 indexto the amountsof tribute, 442-60supplementsto the register, including namevariations, fragments,syntely lists, andrubrics; andMeiggs supra n.12 324-50,538-61.

52 In eachcase the first figure is basedupon the latestsurviving quotapaymentpriorto 425/4 generallyfrom 429/8. I have not included here the numerousincreasesof200% or less.

"[As to the tribute, since] it hasbecometoo little [The] tribute is not [to beassessed]for any [city for less] than [the amountit previouslyhappenedto pay] unlessthereappearsto be [impoverishmentso that] its area is unable[to pay more.]" Penalties for malfeasanceare threatenedat every turn. The translationis that of Fornarasupra n.12 154 no. 136; cf Meiggs supra n.12 325-32.

This is not to imply that assessedfigurescorrespondedexactly to tribute actuallyreceived;this point seemsobvious, but helps to removeone apparentinconsistencyfrom the surplus tribute hypothesis.As arguedabove, the phoros in the first assessment cameto 460T. If we addto this sum the roughly 70T in phoros from cities probably not includedin the first assessmentbut known to have beentributary by the end


RON K. UNZ 35

a tribute increasefor an individual city of 400% or 500% is highlysuspicious.

The assessmentsubtotalsseemto confirm thesedoubts. The distribution of tribute payment amongregional groupings differs radically betweenquota records and assessmentrecords. The subtotals for the ninth assessmentare: Hellespontine district, 250-300T;Thracewarddistrict, 31O-35OT; Island district, close to lSOT; Actaeanand Euxine cities, perhaps100-15th; lonian-Cariandistrict, roughly55O-580T.55The latest tribute quota figures prior to this assessmentmostlybasedon 429/8 and earlier showthe distribution: Hellespontine district, 85T; Thraceward district, 12OT; Island district, 63T;lonian-Carian district, 11th with lonia contributing about SOT andCaria about60T.56Leaving out the Actaeanand Euxine cities, whichappear not to have paid tribute before the 425/4 assessment,thedistribution of tribute may be tabulatedas follows for 430/29 theapparentassessment,basedon that of 429/8 to show the apparentincrease:

of the PeloponnesianWar, togetherwith the 39T from Naxos andThasoswhich hadmoved into the phoros-contributingcategory,we obtain a total assessmentfor thesestatesof some570T in 432. This figure might seemto conflict with Thucydides’ 600Tin total phoros income after we haveadded the large additional tribute payments bySamos,Naupactus,andAmphipolis for which we havearguedabove.However, Thuc.2.13 refers to the 600T as the averageamount of incoming phoros, not the officialassessment,andif we assumesay a 90% collectionrate, the assessedtribute in 432may havebeenas high as 667T. It is also conceivablethat the first assessmentof 478/7included cities perhapsin Cyprus which were no longer paying phoros in 432; cfMeiggs supra n.12 56-58.

Owing to difficulties of restoration,the subtotalsfor the HellespontineandThraceward regionsareuncertain.Although we lack the Islandsubtotal, it can be obtainedbyadding the individual assessments,nearly all of which survive omitting Melos, whichAthensapparentlytried but failed to coerce into Leaguemembershipat this time. Thesubtotal for the Actaeanand Euxine cities is an estimatebasedon surviving assessmentsandfragments;cf Meiggs supra n.l2 328f. Subtractingall thesesubtotalsandMelos’ 1ST from the surviving grand total of l,460r yields the approximatesubtotalfor lonia-Caria. This figure might have to be reducedif other cities, such as Naupactus,not in anyof the previously-mentionedsubtotals,paid tribute.

56 It hasnot escapedthe noticeandcuriosity of scholarsthat the greatandpowerfulcities of lonia, so vividly described by Herodotus, paid a total tribute of only SOT,seeminglyproving Ionia to be the poorest by far of the League’stribute districts. Atheorypostulatingthe economicdeclineof Ionia hasbeenthe result: cf Meiggs supran.i2 270f. This view may containsometruth, but it must be emphasizedthat in theonly actual assessmentwe possess the ninth, lonia exhibits no sign of economicdeclinewhatever,producingtogetherwith Caria the lion’s shareof tribute. Admittedly,tribute assesseddoesnot alwayscorrespondto tribute paid,as in the caseof Melos; butAthenianassessorscertainly hada muchbetter ideaof lonia’s economichealththanwedo, and if they chose to set Ionia’s assessmentas roughly the same as thoseof, e.g.the Thracewarddistrict, it was becausethey believed that the cities of Ionia could payas much.



Region 430/29 425/4 IncreaseIon.-Car. hOT 29% ca 565T 43% 414%Thrac. 120T 32% ca 330T 25% 175%Helles. 85T 22% ca 21ST 21% 224%Island 63i 17% ca 150T 11% 138%

Total 378T ca l32OT 250% avg.

The startling rise in the relative contribution of lonia-Cariais especially difficult to accept at face value. The surplus tribute hypothesisprovidesa reasonablesolution: the quotalists ignore muchof lonia’stribute becausemany of the greatlonian cities, such as Samos,Miletus, and Erythrae,were being heavily utilized as naval basesor shipyards,57 and hencesent little or noneof their tribute to Athens. Thestrengthof this proposition is bestdemonstratedthrough a case-by-casereview of the evidence.58

It seemsunlikely that Athens would havefailed to makeuseof the valuableshipyardsin lonia andelsewhere;andin fact, accordingto Plutarch, "As time went on, theallies continuedto pay their contributions to the war against Persia, but they did notprovide men or ships on the scale that hadbeenlaid down for them. They soon tiredof foreignexpeditions,for they felt they no longer neededto fight, andonly wantedtolive in peaceandtill their lands. The barbarianshadgone away andno longer troubledthem andso they neither providedcrews for their warshipsnor sentout troops .[Cimon] did not bring force to bear upon any of theGreeksandhe acceptedmoneyorempty ships from all thosewho were unwilling to serve abroad" Cim. 11, tr. ScottKilvert. If Plutarchhadavalid sourcefor this substitutionof "empty ships" for tributepayment, thena largesum of missing tribute is accountedfor. In 483 a triremecost ITAth.Pol. 22.7. If ship-buildingexpensesrosealongwith most other prices e.g. jurors’pay, soldiers’ pay in the general inflation of the next fifty years cf Meiggs [supran.12] 331, atrireme may havecostclose to 2T by the beginning of the PeloponnesianWar. Since Athens maintainedabout 300 ships, andthe averagelifetime of a triremeseemsto have beenabout 20 years cf Eddy [supra n.2] 189, some 15 new shipswould have beenneededeach year. This figure should probably be raisedto 30-40when damagefrom fighting andloss in battle are taken into accountperhaps80% ofthe years from 478/7 to 405/4 saw Athenianships involved in significant naval combat. Therefore,70T worth of new shipswould havebeenproducedon the average;ifallied shipyardsreceivedhalf the business,a sizable portion of the ‘missing’ tribute isaccountedfor.

58 Cf Eddy supra n.2 189-94, who argueson strong empiricalgroundsthat paying1 T in tribute was consideredequivalent to providing one trireme to a League fleet; -

aside from severalof the lonian mainland cities whose tribute quotapaymentsappearanomalouslylow andweakenEddy’scase,his evidenceseemsfairly conclusive.In anyevent, there must have been some recognized conversion factor betweencash and -

ships in order to havemade the original assessmentprocessas objective and fair aspossible;andfrom the exampleswe have, the ratio seemsto havebeenon the orderof1.0-saybetween0.7 and 1.3. Esthetics,which havealwaysplayeda role in suchmatters, would probablyhaveensuredthat a ratio of exactly 1.0 waschosen.It is importantto emphasize,contra Eddy, that contributing a ship almost certainly did not meancontributing its operatingcosts; these would have cometo the considerable4-8T percampaigningseason,andwere presumablypaid out of League fundscf Plut. Cim. 11;Thuc. 1.99.


RON K. UNZ 37

Miletus was the greatest of the Greek cities on the Anatoliancoast, and had contributed 80 ships to the Greek fleet at Lade, acontingent larger than that of Samos 60 ships or Lesbos 70and exceededonly by the Chian force 1OO. Miletus’ resourceswould have been considerablyreducedby the destructioninflictedby the Persiansfollowing Lade, but we would still expect to seeMiletus paying 25-30T as a member of the League.°°Instead, wefind payment of 3T by a Milesian suburb in 454/3; Miletus payslOT in 450/49, then ST fairly regularly from 443/2 to 439/8; a payment of some sort is made by the sameMilesian suburbin 427/6;and paymentsof lOT by Miletus more or less regularly from 421/0to 418/7. These improbably low figures are most often explainedpolitically: it is arguedthat Miletus revolted ca 454/3, was subduedafter hard fighting that damagedthe city’s economichealth hencethe low lOT figure, revolted again in the 440’s, was again suppressedwith further damage-reducingher viability to such an extent that Athens subsequentlydemandedonly ST in annualphoros.6’The revolts may haveoccurred thoughthe evidencefor the secondis thin, but the tribute reductionsseem unlikely. History is notreplete with examplesof imperial powers magnanimouslyreducingtheir tribute demands of a province damaged in an unsuccessfulrevolt. Payment of a large Athenian garrison out of Miletus’ owntribute offers a much better explanationof the statistics.62 Use of

Htd. 6.7f. Miletus was admittedly the driving force behind the Ionian Revolt andprobablymadea greaterrelativeeffort than either Samosor Lesbos,whosecontingentsprovedtreacherousor faint-heartedin the battle Htd. 6.l3f. Still, Miletus mustat thistime havebeenclose in strengthto thesegreatisland states.

60 Ancient cities were notoriously resilient, andoften quickly regainedtheir formerstrengthafter the allegedannihilation of the bulk of their population.The location ofmost cities was largely determinedby geographicalresources;major cities remainedmajor cities. And since populationwas usually limited by availableland andby warfare,a generationof peacewas generally sufficient to make good even the most cripplingmanpowerlosses.Argos, which was said to havelost the overwhelmingmajority of itsmen in a war with Cleomenesof Sparta, was within a few decadesagain challengingSpartafor dominancein the PeloponneseHdt. 6.76-83. In the caseof Miletus, theforty yearsbetweenLadeand454 should havebeentime enoughto repair the devastation vividly recordedby Htd. 8.18-22.My figure of 25T-30r is as low as it is onlybecausethe 80 shipsat Lade representedMiletus’ maximumstrength,and its assessedstrengthwould probablyhavebeenlessthan half that.

61 Cf Eddy supra n.2 190f; Meiggs supra n.12 112-18,562-65.62 There is mention of a garrison in the Miletus decree A TL II Dl 1; tr. Fornara

[supra n.12] 92-94no.92,generallyascribedto 450/49 or so. After the allegedunrestor revolt in the 440’s, the garrison may have beenaugmented;this would explain thedrop in surplus tribute sent to Athens.Assuming pay of 4 obols per day attestedinthedecreeandquite reasonablefor garrisontroops, iT would fund 25 men for ayear;the ST reductionin Miletus’ surplus tribute would correspondto 125 additional meningarrison.



Miletus as a shipyardor naval basemay alsohavebeena contributingfactor.

Similarly, Priene had sent 12 ships to Lade, yet it apparentlypaidonly lT in phoros, and eventhat sumfar from regularly. Teos had 17ships at Lade, but seemsto have paid only 6T in phoros. In boththesecases,the balancewas probably used for ship constructionor aspay for garrisontroops.

We have less solid evidenceconcerningErythrae,but here againthe tribute paid seemssuspiciously low. Its syntely including Sidousa, Pteleon, Boutheia, and Polichna, along with Elaeusa controlled an area largerthan Samos,yet paid an irregular figure rangingfrom just under 8T to just over lOT. To be sure, Erythraehadprovided only 8 shipsat Lade,but we haveno reasonto believethat thiswas anythingbut a token effort.

Phocaeahad sentjust 3 ships to Lade,but this too was probably amere gesture.Before the Persianconquest,the territory of Phocaeahad been large enoughto allow it to maintain a fleet of some 120penteconters;evenwith a sizablereductionin its holdingsand population, 3 triremes would representa relatively minor effort.63 Afterthe Persianshad beendefeatedand Phocaeahad becomea memberof the Delian League, its paymentswere surpisingly low, rangingfrom 1 T 5,250dr. to 3T. Again, contributionsin ship-buildingmay bethe explanation.

In view of all these cases-alongwith rich Ephesus, which, togetherwith its suburbs,paid only 7T down to 433/2-it is difficult tomakesenseof this SOT tribute total for lonia. Conversely,it is easyto imaginean lonian contributionof perhaps35OT aboutone-quarterof all the tribute in the only surviving assessment.64

Furthersupport for the surplustribute hypothesismaybe found inthe surviving evidenceof Athens’ accounting procedurefor tributepayments.The decreeof Cleinias generallydated 448/7 requiredthe allied cities to sendan accountbook to Athens,to be readin the

63 Htd. i.163-68 tells us that the Phocaeans,undersiege by the Persians,despairedof retainingtheir independenceandplannedto sail en masseto Corsica. In the event,less than half the Phocaeanfleet carried through with the plan, and reachedCorsicawith 60 fifty-oared galleys. This would make the Phocaeanfleet of this periodgreaterthan 120 penteconters,equivalentto perhaps30 triremes.

64 As analyzedabove, the ninth assessmentapparently includes an lonian-Cariansubtotalof some565T. The casesdiscussedhere Samos,Miletus, Priene,Teos, Erythrae, andPhocaeasuggestthat most of this, perhaps350T, camefrom lonia. The onlysurviving Ionian city assessment,that of Elaeusain the Erythraesyntely, supportsthisconclusion.The entire syntely normally paid some8T to lOT, of which Elaeusawasresponsiblefor only 100 dr.; but in the assessmenther paymentjumps an astonishing60-fold to iT.


RON K. UNZ 39

boule as the tribute was being counted.65Underorthodox theory, thismakeslittle sense.If virtually all phoros was to be sent to Athens,itwould be easy for the boule to determinewhether a city’s paymentwas corrector not: eachcity’s assessmentwas publicly postedon theAcropolis, and the boule undoubtedlyhad a written copy. At most, asingle figure might be sentwith eachpaymentof phoros, attestingtothe amount; this, togetherwith the sealson the chestcontainingthetribute, would have beensufficient to distinguish cases of partialpayment from casesof embezzlementby the couriers. An accountbook seemssuperfluous.

On the other hand, such a record would be an obvious necessitywithin the framework of the surplus tribute hypothesis.A particularcity might have provided pay for garrison troops, supporteda smallnaval squadronbased in the area, built a few new ships at Athens’request-thensentthe balanceof the tribute to Athens around thetime of the GreaterDionysia, the closing point of the League’sfinancial year.6° An accountbook would be essentialin order to keeptrackof these various contributions and to distinguish honesttributariesfrom anyclaiming fictitious expenses.Evenwith such a system, therewould be a strong temptation to cheat, as the Cleinias decreesuggests58-66:

All thosewho havebrought payment [to Athens andwho on thenoticeboard] are listed as owing [- - -18- - -] publish to the people [- - -20- - - If] any of the cities [raisesany disputeaboutthetribute] payment,claiming to have paid it [- - -16- - -] the government of the [city - - -20- - -1 the cities and [- - -20- - -]

not be permittedE- - -25- - -] let theliability be the [accuser’s].

The text is fragmentary,but seemsto describea disputeover a city’sclaim to havepaid part of its tribute for local military expenses.

Considerationsof efficiency andthe needto preventfalse claimsbysubjectcities would, in most cases,havecausedAthens to regularize

65 ATL II SOf andp1. II; tr. Fornarasupra n.12 107-09 no. 98; cf Meiggs supra* n.l2 212f.

66 None of this implies that most cities did anything but send all their tribute toAthens; in the overwhelmingmajority of cases,involving small cities producingtrivialamountsof phoros, the quotaprobablycorrespondsexactly to the tribute paid. Generally, only the largercities would have beenutilized as land or naval basesor as shipyards:clearly, it would not havebeenworth the effort for a strategoswith ten ships todock at a town assessed1,000dr. in order to collect half aday’s payfor his sailors.Onemay also speculatethat Athenian field commandersneededspecial authorizationfromthe Athenian governmentbefore making unplannedexactionsof phoros from alliedcities. It is well known that the Atheniandemosscrutinized the behaviorof its militaryofficials carefully, and, exceptin extremesituations,would haveviewed with the utmost distrustanyindependentauthority to collectandspendrevenue.



such local expenditures.It seemslikely that individual cities wereassigneda specific numberof ships to build eachyear for a specificnumber of years. Similarly, the size of the squadronstationedateach naval base would have tended to remain constant,as wouldthe size of any garrison.This would accountfor whateverconsistencywe find in the surplus tribute paymentof many cities in the tributequota lists.67 During a period in which squadronmovementsandtransferswere irregular and dictated by unplannedopportunities asin the initial stages of a war, we would expect increasedirregularities in the surplus tribute payments,and indeed this predictionseemsto be confirmed in the first few years of the PeloponnesianWar.68

Perhapsthe moststriking supportfor the surplustribute hypothesiscomes from Isocrates’ criticism of the arroganceof the Athenianstowardstheir allies in the First AthenianEmpire 8.82:69

OVTW yap àKpljJwc dpicrwov cv &vOpwmx 1thur’ cv .wn9eEv, Wf7T’ JJ4I&7aVTO TO 1rEpLyyP LPov EK TWP opwvapytpwv, &XOPTc KaTz rakavrov, Lc rv op’qo-Tpap roZc Awvvrnois tovpu’ 1Tt&CP ITXpc T3 Oe’arpov KaL TOV’T’ &olOVV, KaL 1rapur’tyov ro’c rra&zc Ton v TO? 1TOXEp TTEXEVT11-

KOTWv, àu4orE’poc EITL6EUvlovl-c rOLç /LEP vzuou racrqc oioiaç ai’r/v TO uu&orwv eEpoPc, ro&c 6’ XXoç"EkXo-& r irXOoq TOW Op3aPWVKaL ras cn/2çbOpacrac &a T57V

1rXeovEuzPravr’qv yyvoi’ac.

Accordingto the decreereferredto here, Athens usedhired portersto carry "the surplusof the moneyfrom the tribute" or "the surplusmoneyfrom the tribute" into the orchestra,talent by talent, duringthe City Dionysia-undoubtedlyas a demonstrationto the allies ofAthens’greatnessandthe wealthof her empire.

Accordingto the orthodoxtheory of Athens’ methodsof collectingtribute, the phrase"the surplus moneyfrom the tribute" is difficultto explain: for Athens spent far more than she received in tributeduring the early yearsof the ArchidamianWar, when the decreewas

67 For example,Thasospays 3T fairly regularly until after 448/7, andthen generallypays30T after 445/4. Cf supra n.35.

68 Too little of the 43 i/O list is extant for analysis; but in the 430/29 quotas,of 85cities whose paymentssurvive 22 made irregularpayments. In 429/8, there appear6irregularpaymentsin a total of 37, though far fewer records remainof the ThracewardandHellespontinestates,where most of the irregularitiesof 430/29 occurred.By contrast, a typical list suchas that for 442/I had3 irregular paymentsin a total of 165cities.

69 I am indebtedto the discussionof this passagein A TL III l6f andMeiggs supran.12 433-44.


RONK.UNZ 41

probablypassed.7°It is also unlikely that the phraserefers to the totalaccumulatedsurplus tribute, i.e., to the reserve:for the size of thetotal reservewould have required many thousandsof porters, eachcarrying the fifty pountsof silver making up a talent. Moreover, theswiftly-waning size of the reserveduring the years of the ArchidamianWar would haveresultedin a markedly reduceddisplay eachyear, giving the allied representativesan embarrassingimpressionnotof strength, but of progressiveenfeeblement.As Meiggs shrewdlyobserves,a display of 2,000T would not have reassuredthosealliedrepresentativeswho rememberedthe 6,000T reserveof 431.

Theseproblemscould be resolved by unnaturally interpreting thephrase rn ITptytyv6p.Evoi.’EK TOn’ /xpwv pyzptovas "the annuallyincomingtribute money."7’ Or we can grant to Isocrates’words theirplain meaningconsistentwith the surplustributehypothesis,allowingthem to acquirethe comfortablyunexceptionablecharacterof a well-worn cobblestoneon a familiar path.

APPENDIX: SevereVariationsin theTribute Lists

Of the following list seesupra n.3O it shouldbe emphasizedthat most ofthe city and tribute restorationsare uncertain,and were generallyarrived atby assumingmaximum regularity in tribute payment; therefore, the actualrecords almost certainly showed substantiallymore irregularity than thosegivenhereabsent= absentfrom full panel; *

= tribute restored;? = citynamerestored.ABDERA: 12T 5,120 dr. in 454/3; 15T in 452/1 and 450/49; 14T in 448/7;iT + 15T*? in 447/6 the iT is presumablyan arrearspaymentfrom thepreviousyear; 15T in 445/4; absentin 443/2; 1ST8 in 442/1; 1ST8 in 436/5;1ST in 435/4 and433/2; lOT in 432/1 and 430/29; 1OT* in 429/8; assessedat75T? in 425/4 this assessmentincluded the towns around Abdera, whichusuallypaid 3,000dr..ARGILuS: lOT 3,000 dr. in 454/3; iT in 446/5 to 443/2; 1T* in 442/1 to440/39; IT in 438/7; absentin 435/4; 1,000 dr. in 433/2; absentin 432/1;

* 1,000dr. in 430/29and 429/8.BYZANTIUM: 1ST in 450/49; an irregularpaymentof some size in 448/7; 4’r4,800 dr. + 3T 5,840 dr. + __*? in 447/6; 15T 4,300 dr. in 443/2 and

* 442/1; l5T 469 dr.? in 441/0; 18T 1,800 dr. in 433/2; 21T 4,740 dr. +; 8T900 dr.? in 430/29; 1ST 90 dr. in 429/8; 20T 1,170 + dr.? in 428/7.

70 The text refers to wartime, andAr. Eq. 313 with schol. indicatesthat Cleon wasthe authorof the decreeandthat it waspassedshortly after thedeath of Pericles.

71 As doesA. E. Raubitschek,"Two Noteson Isocrates," TAPA 72 1941 356-62,esp. 360.



CHALCEDON: 7T 3,010dr. in 452/1; 3T in 450/49; 9i in 448/7, 447/6, and445/4; 9T8 in 444/3and 443/2; 9T in 442/ito 440/39; 9T? in 439/8; 6T8 in434/3; 6T in 433/2; 6T8 in 432/1; ST 5,100 dr. + 900 dr. in 430/29; 5T5,100dr. + 900 dr.? in 429/8.MARONEA: iT 3,000dr. moreor less regularlyuntil 437/6; lOT from 436/Sto 433/2; absentin 432/i; 3T in 430/29 and 3T8 in 429/8; assessedat 21+Tin 425/4.SELYMBRIA: 6T from 451/0 to 447/6 moreor less; ST from about 443/2 to439/8; 900 dr. from about435/4 to 432/1; 9T in 430/29.SERMYLIA: iT 4,320dr. in 454/3; two restoredpayments,one of which wasover 4T, in 453/2; ST 5,500 dr. in 451/0; 3T in 448/7 and 447/6; 5T fromabout446/S to 440/39; 4T 3,000dr. in 435/4 and 434/3; absentin 432/i and430/29.TENEDOS: 4T 3,000dr. in 452/1; 21’ 5,280 dr. + iT 3,720dr. in 450/49;anirregularpaymentin 448/7; 2T 5,280 dr. + 3,240dr. + 2,160 dr. in 447/6;4’r 3,000dr. in 445/4 and 4T 3,000dr.8 in 444/3; 2T 5,280dr.8 in 443/2 and2T 5,280 dr. in 442/1 and441/0; 2T 5,020dr.? in 440/39; 2T 5,280 dr. fromabout435/4 to 429/8.THAsos: 3T from about454/3 to 451/0; 2T 2,760dr.8 in 448/7; 3,240 dr. +two otherpayments,oneof which may be 3T, in 447/6; 301’ in 444/3;absentin 443/2; 3OT from about440/39 to 429/8; assessed60T? in 425/4.72

STANFORD UNIVERSITYFebruary, 1985

72 I wish to thankHarvard University, the WestinghouseCorporation, andthe Winston Churchill Foundationfor financial support during the preparationof this paper. Ithank also John Barron, Paul Cartledge,and several anonymousreferees for theirhelpful commentson an earlier draft. Most of all I expressmy sinceregratitude toMortimer Chambers,without whose advice and encouragementthis paperwould nothavebeenwritten.


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