the taxi recapitalisation programme: some perceptions of
TRANSCRIPT
THE TAXI RECAPITALISATION PROGRAMME:
SOME PERCEPTIONS OF THE
TAXI ASSOCIATIONS IN TEMBA
by
Sekanyane Tys Daisy Mashishi
(Student Number 200736098)
Submitted in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
MASTER OF COMMERCE
in
TRANSPORT ECONOMICS
in the
FACULTY OF MANAGEMENT
at the
UNIVERSITY OF JOHANNESBURG
Supervisor: Dr Vaughan Mostert
Co-Supervisor: Dr Beverley Kujawa
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
In completion of this research study I would like to express my sincerest statements of
thanks to:
Almighty God, the Son Jesus and the Holy Spirit, for giving me life, the strength, healthy
body and wisdom to start and finish this study.
My wife, children, housekeeper, relatives and friends in need and deed for their support and
patience while I was engaged in this study.
My supervisor, Dr Vaughan Mostert for his academic support in mentoring and coaching me
up to the completion of this research study.
My son, Maditse, who helped me to find the relevant literature and internet sources to gather
secondary data about the topic of the study.
Rev NJ Nkona and Mr Solly Ntlhane and others, who provided me with important information
about the historical development of the taxi industry in Temba.
Members of taxi associations in Temba, who participated and co-operated with me and my
assistants in gathering data when using their valuable time to complete questionnaires and
engage in discussions with them to gather primary data for this research study.
Mr S Sedupane who helped me with the quantitative statistical analysis of the completed
questionnaires and others who helped me with technical skills of using the computer.
Ms Esther Phetlho and my son, Maditse, for assisting me in typing this research work.
Mrs Loraine Hartman who edited the study work.
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SYNOPSIS
The Taxi Recapitalisation Programme (TRP) was first announced by the Government in
1999. It was originally recommended by the National Taxi Task Team (NTTT) as a strategy
to transform and regulate the South African Combi-Taxi Industry (SACTI) into a “new” taxi
industry. Its aims were to improve the quality of combi-taxi transport in South Africa by taking
a number of steps, including institutionalising the industry, changing the licencing system,
regulating the industry and replacing old vehicles with new ones. Since that time, however
the TRP has been plagued by controversy and its implementation has fallen behind
schedule.
The study‟s key research aim has been to investigate and assess perceptions of taxi
associations (taxi owners) with regard to the TRP. The study took place in Temba, near
Hammanskraal, approximately 55 kilometres north of Pretoria. Temba is taken as a
“microcosm” of SACTI in that it can be regarded as typical of many other areas in the
country.
A background is provided to the regulatory legislation of the public transport system of the
apartheid Government and the general historical and economic development of the SACTI
prior to 1994. It deals with the periods from 1930-1976, 1977-1985 and 1986-1993, and then
explores the legislative and policy framework of the public transport system of the post-1994
democratic government up to 2008. It introduces the NTTT and its recommendations before
analysing the economic effects likely to be felt by taxi associations following implementation
of the TRP.
The study then presents the results of a brief demographic profile of a sample of taxi owners
and operators in the Temba area and identifies a number of factors that influence their
attitudes towards the industry in general and their perceptions of the TRP in particular. It
assesses the progress made with the implementation of the TRP since its inception and
identifies critical issues that have delayed the project. Having been scheduled to span the
five years from 2001 to 2005, the date of completion of the TRP was later extended to 2007.
By 2010 the project was still only partially complete. Due to repeated delays, the project
appeared to be running aground and was perceived by many as a fruitless and wasteful
exercise. Indeed, these delays have undermined the goals of transport regulation which,
inter alia, were intended to promote the welfare of the public (safety, security, satisfaction,
health and protection of property) and to improve the quality of public transport generally.
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By linking the demographic profile of the taxi owners with the various perceptions, the study
has been able to draw conclusions and make findings intended to contribute towards the
successful implementation of the TRP and thereby assist SACTI to play a more effective role
in the overall transport situation in South Africa.
The study concludes that taxi associations in Temba have perceived the TRP to be a good
proposal but difficult to implement. It therefore makes a number of recommendations that will
hopefully assist in the transformational process of changing SACTI “old” taxi industry into a
“new” taxi industry, and so enhance the economic strength of taxi owners and operators, as
well as improve the welfare of the users of taxi transport services, not only in Temba but
throughout the country.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
CHAPTER 1 ..................................................................................................................... 1 OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY ............................................................................................ 1 1. Introduction ......................................................................................................... 1 1.1 The problem statement of the study .................................................................... 2 1.2 The purpose of the study ..................................................................................... 4 1.3 Methodology ........................................................................................................ 4 1.4 Rationale and significance of the study ............................................................... 5 1.5 Division of chapters ............................................................................................. 6
CHAPTER 2 ..................................................................................................................... 8
LITERATURE REVIEW ..................................................................................................... 8 2. Introduction ......................................................................................................... 8 2.1 The perennial problem of transportation .............................................................. 8 2.2 The regulatory legislation of the public transport system prior to 1994 ................. 10 2.2.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................... 10 2.2.2 The historical and economic development of SACTI and its
struggle against public transport regulation prior to 1994 ..................................... 11 2.2.3 Meanings of “business regulation” ....................................................................... 11 2.2.4 Types and goals of transport regulation ............................................................... 12 2.2.5 Public transport regulation: 1930 – 1976 ............................................................. 13 2.2.6 Limited regulation: 1977-1985 ............................................................................. 14 2.2.7 Extensive deregulation: 1986-1994 ..................................................................... 15 2.3 The economic role played by SACTI ................................................................... 16 2.3.1 Economic contributions to taxi owners ................................................................. 16 2.3.2 Economic contributions to taxi drivers and other employees ............................... 17 2.3.3 Economic contributions to vendors/hawkers at taxi ranks .................................... 18 2.3.4 Economic contributions to taxi users ................................................................... 19 2.3.5 The challenge of SACTI to the new South African Government ........................... 20 2.4 The post-1994 public transport legislative and policy framework ......................... 20 2.4.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................... 20 2.4.2 White Paper on National Transport Policy ........................................................... 20 2.4.3 Moving South Africa report .................................................................................. 21 2.4.4 Various items of transport legislation ................................................................... 22 2.5 The National Taxi Task Team (NTTT) ................................................................. 29 2.5.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................... 29 2.5.2 The mandate given to NTTT and its recommended vision ................................... 30 2.6 Intervention by Government - Taxi Recapitalisation Programme ......................... 32 2.6.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................... 32 2.6.2 Institutionalisation ................................................................................................ 32 2.6.3 Eligibility for scrapping allowance ........................................................................ 33 2.6.4 Administrative procedures ................................................................................... 34 2.6.5 Electronic Management System (EMS) ............................................................... 34 2.7 The “Win-Win-Win” strategy and the National Passenger
Road Plan (NPRP) ............................................................................................. 36 2.8 Public financial management ............................................................................... 37 2.8.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................... 37 2.8.2 Public Financial Management Act (PFMA) No 1 of 1999 ..................................... 37 2.9 Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 38
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CHAPTER 3 ....................................................................................................................40
THE TAXI INDUSTRY IN TEMBA: A MICROCOSM OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN COMBI-TAXI INDUSTRY (SACTI) ......................................... 40
3. Introduction ......................................................................................................... 40
3.1 Location of Temba and its population .................................................................. 40 3.2 Historical development of Temba and its taxi industry ......................................... 42 3.2.1 Founders of Temba (pre 1960) ............................................................................ 42 3.2.2 Development of modes/forms of transport in Temba (post 1960) ........................ 42 3.2.3 People from villages and farms found new settlement in Temba ......................... 43 3.2.4 Existence of Bophuthatswana 1977-1994 ........................................................... 44 3.2.5 Provincial Governments post 1994 ...................................................................... 45 3.3 Taxi Associations in Temba ................................................................................. 49 3.3.1 The situation as at the end of 2008...................................................................... 51 3.4 Summary ............................................................................................................. 52
CHAPTER 4 ....................................................................................................................53
METHODOLOGY (PROCEDURES AND METHODS) OF THE STUDY ............................ 53 4 Introduction ......................................................................................................... 53 4.1 Conceptual clarification ....................................................................................... 53 4.2 Methodology ........................................................................................................ 54 4.2.1 Research design ................................................................................................. 54 4.2.2 Research procedures and methods ..................................................................... 55 4.3 Summary ............................................................................................................. 58
CHAPTER 5 ....................................................................................................................59 ANALYSIS AND TRIANGULATION OF DATA .................................................................. 59 5. Introduction ......................................................................................................... 59
5.1 Biographical and business data of taxi owners in Temba .................................... 60
5.1.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................... 60 5.1.2 Gender of taxi owners in Temba .......................................................................... 60 5.1.3 Ages of taxi owners in Temba ............................................................................. 61 5.1.4 Level of formal school education of taxi owners in Temba ................................... 63 5.1.5 Home ownership of taxi owners in Temba ........................................................... 64 5.1.6 Financial position and performance of taxi businesses in Temba ........................ 65 5.1.7 Years of experience and sources of funding of taxi owners in Temba ................. 66 5.1.8 Number of taxis currently owned by individual taxi owners in Temba .................. 69 5.1.9 Makes of taxis owned by taxi owners of Taxi Associations in Temba .................. 70 5.1.10 Purchases and ages of taxis found in Temba ...................................................... 71 5.1.11 Passenger capacity of taxis operating in Temba.................................................. 72 5.1.12 Trip frequency of taxi owners in Temba ............................................................... 73 5.1.13 Causes of accidents recorded by taxi owners in Temba ...................................... 75 5.1.14 Understanding of the aims of the TRP by taxi owners in Temba .......................... 77 5.1.15 Phasing out of 9 to 16-seater “old” combis by the owners in Temba .................... 78 5.1.16 Operating licences of taxi owners in Temba ........................................................ 78 5.1.17 Income tax compliance by taxi owners in Temba................................................. 79 5.1.18 Registration of taxi drivers (employees) by taxi owners in Temba ....................... 80 5.1.19 Forms of business favoured by taxi owners in Temba ......................................... 81 5.1.20 Taxi co-operatives and the opinion of taxi owners in Temba ............................... 81 5.1.21 Scrapping of taxis (combis) ................................................................................. 82 5.1.22 TRP compliant taxis bought by taxi owners in Temba ......................................... 83 5.1.23 Awareness of the Government‟s “Win-Win-Win” strategy
among taxi owners in Temba............................................................................... 84
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5.1.24 Understanding of the network contract system by taxi owners in Temba ................................................................................................. 84
5.2 Assessment of the TRP by taxi owners in Temba ................................................ 85 5.2.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................... 85 5.2.2 Analysis of the assessment form ......................................................................... 86
5.3 Summary ............................................................................................................. 87
CHAPTER 6 ....................................................................................................................88
THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE MAIN FINDINGS OF THE STUDY .................................... 88 6. Introduction ......................................................................................................... 88
6.1 Factors that retarded and /or undermined the TRP .............................................. 88
6.1.1 Economic effects of ageing taxi owners ............................................................... 89 6.1.2 Level of formal education of taxi owners .............................................................. 89 6.1.3 Financial position of taxi owners .......................................................................... 90 6.1.4 Make of taxis in Temba ....................................................................................... 90 6.1.5 Taxi cooperatives ................................................................................................ 90 6.1.6 Lack of alternative self-employment or employment ............................................ 90
6.2 TRP success in laying a foundation for transforming the “old” taxi industry ......................................................................................................... 91
6.2.1 Institutionalizing the taxi industry ......................................................................... 91 6.2.2 Legalisation and registration of taxis with the
Provincial Taxi Registrars .................................................................................... 91 6.2.3 Registration of taxi associations .......................................................................... 91 6.2.4 Scrapping of “old” combis .................................................................................... 91 6.2.5 TRP compliant taxis in Temba ............................................................................. 92 6.3 Areas where the TRP needs attention to complete the project ............................ 92 6.3.1 Establishment of Taxi Industry Cooperatives ....................................................... 93 6.3.2 Financial affordability to purchase new TRP compliant taxi vehicles.................... 93 6.3.3 Installation of EMS in TRP-compliant-taxi vehicles .............................................. 93 6.3.4 Taxi owners in need of subsidies ......................................................................... 93 6.3.5 Limited knowledge and lack of information about the
National Passenger Road Plan (NPRP) .............................................................. 94
6.4 Findings according to the grading form ................................................................ 94 6.5 The success of the TRP ...................................................................................... 96 6.6 Summary, conclusions and recommendations .................................................... 98
6.6.1 Chapter 1 ............................................................................................................ 98 6.6.2 Chapter 2 ............................................................................................................ 99 6.6.3 Chapter 3 ............................................................................................................ 100 6.6.4 Chapter 4 ............................................................................................................ 100 6.6.5 Chapter 5 ............................................................................................................ 101 6.6.6 Chapter 6 ............................................................................................................ 101
6.7 Summary of the main findings ............................................................................. 102
6.7.1 Main issues ......................................................................................................... 102 6.7.2 TRP successes ................................................................................................... 102 6.7.3 TRP shortfalls ...................................................................................................... 103
6.8 Common findings countrywide ............................................................................. 103 6.9 Recommendations .............................................................................................. 104
6.9.1 Recommendation No 1 ........................................................................................ 104
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6.9.2 Recommendation No 2 ........................................................................................ 105 6.9.3 Recommendation No 3 ........................................................................................ 105 6.9.4 Recommendation No 4 ........................................................................................ 106 6.9.5 Recommendation No 5 ........................................................................................ 106 6.9.6 Recommendation No 6 ........................................................................................ 106 6.9.7 Recommendation No 7 ........................................................................................ 107
6.10 Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 109
SOURCES OF REFERENCE .......................................................................................... 111
ANNEXURE A................................................................................................................... 115 ANNEXURE B................................................................................................................... 116 ANNEXURE C .................................................................................................................. 117 ANNEXURE D .................................................................................................................. 120 DECLARATION ................................................................................................................ 133
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LIST OF FIGURES
Page Figure 5.1 Gender of the taxi owners (in the taxi industry) in Temba ......................... 61
Figure 5.2 Ages of the (sampled) taxi owners in Temba ........................................... 62
Figure 5.3 School education levels of taxi owners in Temba as at 2007/8 ................. 64
Figure 5.4 Home ownership of taxi owners in Temba in 2007/8 ................................ 65
Figure 5.5 Temba taxi owners and their number of years in the business ................. 67
Figure 5.6 Sources of initial investment of taxi businesses in Temba ........................ 68
Figure 5.7 Number of taxi vehicles owned by individual taxi owners
(November 2007) in Temba ..................................................................... 69
Figure 5.8 Makes of taxi vehicles operating in Temba ............................................... 70
Figure 5.9 Patterns of Purchases of Taxi vehicles in Temba from 1980 to 2007 ....... 71
Figure 5.10 Number of trips per day to different destinations from Temba .................. 73
Figure 5.11 Number of accidents ................................................................................ 75
Figure 5.12 Possible causes of taxi accidents ............................................................. 76
Figure 5.13 Taxi owners (respondents) having taxi operating licences ....................... 79
Figure 5.14 Compliance with tax requirements of taxi owners in Temba ..................... 80
Figure 5.15 Number of taxis scrapped to receive R50 000 .......................................... 82
Figure 5.16 Number of new TRP compliant taxis per taxi owner ................................. 83
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LIST OF TABLES
Page Table 2.1 Permit applications and licences granted in Johannesburg,
1984 – 1990 ............................................................................................. 15
Table 3.1 Number of Taxi Associations, membership, combis and their
drivers as at September 2007 .................................................................. 49
Table 4.1 Guidelines for Sample Size ...................................................................... 57
Table 5.1 Gender of the taxi owners (in the taxi industry) in Temba ......................... 60
Table 5.2 Ages of the (sampled) taxi owners in Temba ........................................... 61
Table 5.3 School education levels of taxi owners in Temba as at 2007/8 ................. 63
Table 5.4 Temba taxi owners and their number of years in the business. ................ 67
Table 5.5 Sources of initial investment of taxi businesses in Temba ........................ 68
Table 5.6 Passenger capacity of taxis operated in November 2007. ........................ 72
Table 5.7 Number of trips per day to different destinations from Temba .................. 73
Table 5.8 Number of accidents ................................................................................ 75
Table 5.9 Possible causes of taxi accidents ............................................................. 76
Table 5.10 Understanding of the TRP by taxi owners in Temba ................................ 77
Table 5.11 Knowledge displayed by respondents about phasing out of
9 to16-seater “old” combis ....................................................................... 78
Table 5.12 Taxi owners (respondents) having taxi operating licences ....................... 78
Table 5.13 Compliance with tax requirements of taxi owners in Temba ..................... 79
Table 5.14 Respondents‟ willingness to register their taxi drivers .............................. 80
Table 5.15 Respondents in favour of Close Corporations .......................................... 81
Table 5.16 Respondents in favour of taxi co-operatives ............................................. 81
Table 5.17 Respondents in need of subsidies............................................................ 83
Table 5.18 Awareness of taxi owners of Government‟s “Win-Win-Win” strategy ........ 84
Table 5.19 Understanding of the network contract system by taxi owners
in Temba .................................................................................................. 84
Table 5.20 Assessment of the success of TRP by taxi owners in Temba ................... 85
Table 6.1 Number of taxis owned by the taxi owners in Temba ............................... 89
Table 6.2 Areas where TRP has succeeded and areas that need attention ............. 95
Table 6.3 Ratings of respondents ............................................................................ 97
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LIST OF ACRONYMS USED IN THIS DISSERTATION
ABS ................. African Bus Service BTH ................. Botlhaba Transport Holdings BufCit-MTA ................. Buffalo City Mega Taxi Association Capt-MTA ................. Cape Town Mega Taxi Association CBTI ................. Commuter Bus and Taxi Industry CC ................. Close Corporation CPTR ................. Current Public Transport Records CSIR ................. Council for Scientific and Industrial Research CTMLG ................. City of Tshwane Metropolitan Local Government DoT ................. Department of Transport DTI ................. Department of Trade and Industry EFCS ................. Electronic Fare Collections System Ekur-MTA ................. Ekurhuleni Mega Taxi Association EMS ................. Electronic Management System eThek-MTA ................. eThekwini Mega Taxi Association GAAP ................. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles GP ................. Gauteng Province GRENTA ................. Greater North Taxi Association HATO ................. Hammanskraal Taxi Organisation ITP ................. Integrated Transport Plan Jo-MTA ................. Johannesburg Mega Taxi Association KUTA ................. Kentucky United Taxi Association LRTBs ................. Local Road Transportation Boards Mangu-MTA ................. Mangaung Mega Taxi Association MAUTA ................. Makapanstad United Taxi Association Mbom-MTA ................. Mbombela Mega Taxi Association MCS ................. Monitoring and Control System MINCOM ................. Ministerial Committee of Ministers of Transport MOU ................. Memorandum of Understanding MRTS ................. Mass Rapid Transport System MSPPM ................. Measurable Success Principles of Project Management Msundu-MTA ................. Msunduzi Mega Taxi Association NAAMSA ................. National Association of Automobile Manufacturers Nels-MTA ................. Nelson Mandela Mega Taxi Association NPRP ................. National Passenger Road Plan NQF ................. National Qualifications Framework NTPS ................. National Transport Planning System NTR ................. National Transport Register NTTT ................. National Taxi Task Team NWP ................. North West Province NWPG ................. North West Provincial Government
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OLS ................. Operating Licences Strategies PFMA ................. Public Finance Management Act Polok-MTA ................. Polokwane Mega Taxi Association PRPTS ................. Public Road Passenger Transport System PTAP ................. Public Transport Action Plan PTC ................. Provincial Taxi Council PTR ................. Provincial Taxi Registrar QFI ................. Qualifying Financial Institution RBOLS ................. Route Based Operating Licence System RBPTI ................. Road Based Public Transport Industry RBPTS ................. Road Based Passenger Transport System RDP ................. Reconstruction and Development Programme RDs ................. Registration Documents REAL ................. Revenue, Expenditure, Assets and Liabilities RPS ................. Radius Permit System RSC ................. Regional Services Council RTC ................. Regional Taxi Council Rusti-MTA ................. Rustenburg Mega Taxi Association SABTA ................. South African Black Taxi Association SACTI ................. South African Combi-Taxi Industry SANTACO ................. South African National Taxi Council SAQA ................. South African Qualifications Authority SARS ................. South African Revenue Services SASS ................. South African Statistical Services SPPM ................. Success Principle of Project Management SPSS ................. Software Package of Social Sciences TETA ................. Taxi Education Training Authority TRP ................. Taxi Recapitalisation Programme Tshwane-MTA ................. Tshwane Mega Taxi Association TTA ................. Temba Taxi Association VITRS ................. Vehicle Identification Tracking and Recovery System
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CHAPTER 1
OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY
1. Introduction
The South African Combi-Taxi Industry (SACTI) forms a huge and complex part of the South
African public passenger transport scene. Its business operations and activities can be
described as largely informal and unregulated, being a fabric of economic relations between
taxi owners, taxi drivers, taxi users, government, vehicle manufacturers and other transport-
related businesses. The core of these operations is the conveyance of people from different
points of departure to destinations all over the country, mainly by 9-16 seater taxi vehicles
known as “combi-taxis”.1
Since the 1980s SACTI has captured a bigger market share than other modes because of its
apparent ability to reduce the “generalised cost of travel” of its users.
This term is used by Bruton (1985:27), who explains that any person making a trip will
compare the benefit of such a trip not only in terms of the time taken and the direct cost but
also in terms of factors such as frequency, convenience, safety, security and comfort. This
combination of factors is termed the “generalised cost of travel”. Even though SACTI faces
many problems, the level of support that it enjoys among the travelling public would indicate
that to them, its “generalised cost of travel” is lower than other modes and it has thus
captured the biggest share of the passenger market.
Despite its historically important role, however, the transport operations of SACTI have
traditionally been informal by nature, and for many years its activities were regarded with
suspicion by the authorities. Initially SACTI was regarded as a business belonging to people
in the lower social classes. The authorities did not take the industry very seriously and
indeed tried to discourage its development.
The regulatory measures and legislation of the public transport system of the apartheid
Government had a profound impact on the character of the present public transport system.
When the National Party came to power in 1948, it began with a programme to relocate
Blacks, Coloureds and Indians to settlements on the urban peripheries and away from socio-
1 The terms “combi”, “combi-taxi”, “mini bus taxi” and “taxi” will be used interchangeably in this study.
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economic opportunities. These time and distance gaps between the settlements of the
Blacks and socio-economic developments in the cities are still a challenging problem to the
post-1994 democratic Government, which has passed legislation and has adopted strategies
to transform and integrate the sub-optimal public transport system in order to benefit all
South Africans. One of these strategies is the Taxi Recapitalisation Programme (TRP).
1.1 The problem statement of the study
The TRP is a critical strategy in transforming and integrating the public transport system.
The Government has, however been faced with the problem of implementing the programme
which is not progressing as expected. The completion of the TRP project was initially
scheduled for five years from 2001 to 2005 and was subsequently extended to 2007. The
project has been delayed and there has been no final acceptable agreement between the
Government and taxi owners on the implementation of the TRP.
Behind the government‟s wish to replace the “old” taxi industry were a number of problems,
all of which have already been documented in other studies. An early, ground breaking
investigation into the taxi industry was carried out by McCaul (1990); this document will be
referred to in subsequent chapters of this study. High on the list of problems were conflicts
and violence between drivers as they vied for passengers on particular routes. Illegal entry
into SACTI and non-compliance with the laws was problematic, with poor maintenance of
ageing taxi vehicles resulting in high levels of dissatisfaction among users. Apparent
ignorance or ignoring of road safety standards by drivers has led to an increasing number of
road accidents involving taxis. On the other hand, many of these problems were caused by
the taxi owners, whose need to pay for the vehicles and make a profit led to their being
exploited and abused, resulting in a surplus of taxis on some routes, shortage of time or
cash to maintain the vehicles, overloading of vehicles, and aggressive attitudes and
disrespect towards passengers.
The TRP aimed at formalising, regulating and phasing out the current 9 to 16-seater fleet of
combis and replacing them with 18 to 35-seater TRP taxi vehicles that complied with
government specifications, including the fitting of an Electronic Management System (EMS)
to control and regulate the business activities of the “new” taxi industry. The overall aim of
the EMS requirement was to satisfy the need for risk mitigation by the financiers and taxi
owners, through electronic monitoring and control of movement, hours driven, fares and
other transactions. This was part of a wider initiative that sought to institutionalise SACTI and
forms a partnership with the government. It was felt that legalising and registering taxi
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vehicles by changing the Radius Permit System (RPS) to a Route Based Operating Licence
System (RBOLS) would end taxi conflict and violence. Regulating the taxi industry, it was
argued, would also produce safe, efficient and effective public passenger transport services
and bring it into compliance with labour laws and tax requirements. Phasing out the combis
and phasing in compliant new taxi vehicles would reduce the number of vehicles and
accidents on the routes, improve the quality of the transport service and reduce the
generalised cost of travel.
Key to the conversion was making the taxi industry aware of future government plans to
integrate the taxi industry into the better regulated Road Based Public Passenger Transport
System (RBPTS). However, taxi owners rejected the advocacy of the government and it
became evident that some were purchasing new non-TRP compliant combis irrespective of
the progression of the TRP. This had the potential for making the TRP more problematic
because taxi owners would not easily allow their new non-complaint combis to be scrapped
at the value of R50 000. These actions indicated open resistance to the TRP, and it seemed
clear that there were still doubts and different perceptions amongst owners with regard to the
economic effects that were likely to accrue to them from the TRP. By the time the project‟s
implementation was in its seventh year, the TRP was behind schedule and appeared to be
faltering.
The TRP had faced long delays owing to disagreements between the government and
SACTI, with the result that the project eventually seemed to some to be a fruitless and
wasteful exercise. Sections of the media noted that the original process of the TRP had first
been announced in June 1999 and the new generation taxis were supposed to be on South
African roads from 2000 onwards. However, taxi owners had repeatedly rejected the
approach of the Government in the implementation of the TRP (Engineering News, 23
November 2004:1).
In November 2004 Transport Minister Jeff Radebe announced a “new” way forward for the
TRP when he announced that the original TRP project would be replaced by a programme
where taxi operators could buy any vehicle of their choice provided it adhered to a new set of
safety standards. Radebe added that the previous programme had been neither affordable
to the national fiscus nor profitable to the operators, and would subsequently have filtered
down to commuters by means of rapidly rising taxi fares.
Minister Radebe further announced that the replacement programme would be implemented
from the beginning of the 2005/6 fiscal year, unfolding over a period of seven years, i.e. from
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2005/6 to 2011/12. However, during the first three years it was still not apparent that taxi
owners were responding positively to the new proposals and in 2008 there were still many
old combis on South African roads. The main concern was that the project would not be
completed as planned because its original intentions had been corroded by a continuous
stream of complaints from taxi owners.
1.2 The purpose of the study
Against this background, the purpose of the study is to:
profile a sample of taxi owners in Temba
investigate their perceptions of the TRP
establish the extent to which they believe that the TRP has been successful in
achieving its objectives so far
make recommendations that will contribute to faster implementation of the TRP.
The recommendations of the study are intended to contribute to the debate over
implementation of the various aims of the TRP summarised above.
1.3 Methodology
It was necessary to use a combination of quantitative and qualitative approaches. The
former were used to establish a statistical basis for understanding the taxi industry, its
employers and employees and the extent of the business. On the other hand, since it
involves human beings and aims to understand perceptions regarding attempts to
restructure the business, the latter, qualitative methods were also pertinent. The variation of
methods of data collection conforms with triangulation, whereby each is used to cross-check
the others and so contribute to the reliability and validity of the data.
Firstly, a literature review was conducted of the many treatises concerned with SACTI.
Books, journals and the Internet were consulted in order to access the latest relevant
findings on research into the topic, as well as revealing a gap in the research which this
study seeks to fill.
A letter from the University (Annexure A) confirming the registration of the research student
was used to obtain permission to conduct the study among taxi associations and their
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members residing in Temba. The purpose of the study was clearly stated in the letter, which
was given to executive committees of the associations. The researcher assured the
executive committees on ethical considerations that names of participants would not be
revealed in the documents, tape recordings and reports emanating from this research project
would be confidential and transcripts and interpretations would be made available to
participants if they wished to see them. Copies of the final report could be made available to
associations and/or all levels of government and all participants would be treated with ethical
consideration and complete confidentiality, i.e. respecting all participants and acknowledging
their privacy. For their part, participants would be requested not to disclose their identities in
filling out the questionnaire and schedules.
The study was conducted at the Taxi Association offices in Temba, where office bearers
were interviewed, and at the homes or business sites of participating members. The
researcher also visited different areas in the North West, Gauteng, Mpumalanga, KwaZulu
Natal and North West provinces to conduct oral, unstructured and informal interviews.
Villages around the following towns were visited:
Makapanstad, Brits, Rustenburg, Swartruggens, Zeerust, Lichtenburg, Mafikeng,
Vryburg, Taung, Klerksdorp and Potchefstroom in the North West Province
Soshanguve, Ga-Rankuwa, Mamelodi, Vosloorus, Tokoza, Duduza, Katlehong and
part of Soweto in Gauteng Province
Moloto, Kwamhlanga, Marapyane, Witbank and Middleburg in Mpumalanga
Province
Bela-Bela, Modimolle, Mookgophong, Mokopane, Lebowakgomo and Polokwane in
Limpopo Province
Empangeni, Newcastle and Durban in KwaZulu Natal Province.
1.4 Rationale and significance of the study
The rationale behind the study is the belief that all parties (taxi owners, taxi drivers, users of
taxi transport services and the government) should economically benefit and promote the
welfare (safety, security, socio-economic satisfaction and good health) of all South Africans
by complying with the regulatory and safety standards of the transport system.
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SACTI has features of an informal economy with capabilities of reducing the “generalised
cost of travel” of many Blacks who use the public passenger transport system, and for this
reason the study seeks to make contributions to the transformational change of SACTI into a
“new” taxi industry. It will therefore investigate the perceptions of taxi owners about the TRP
project and use the investigation results to give generally acceptable recommendations as to
how it should be implemented to economically benefit taxi owners, taxi drivers, taxi users,
the government and public at large. It may also prove useful for policymakers and others
who wish to know the viewpoints of stakeholders on the transformation of the regulatory
system of the taxi industry. More importantly, the report will make taxi associations aware of
the regulatory role that the government has to play in attaining the goals of regulation in
private enterprises and the public transport system.
1.5 Division of chapters
The study consists of six chapters, each with its objectives aligned to the overall aim of the
study:
Chapter 1 sets out the background of the study and outlines its rationale, purpose and
methodology.
Chapter 2 reviews the literature on the South African Public Transport legislation framework
and policies prior to 1994 and the general historical and economic development of the South
African Combi-Taxi Industry (SACTI) from 1930 to 1993. It examines the challenges that
faced the post-1994 democratic Government and its public transport legislation and policies,
with a focus on recommendations by the National Taxi Task Team (NTTT), the Taxi
Recapitalisation Programme (TRP), and the “Win-Win-Win” strategy and the National
Passenger Road Plan (NPRP). The statutory framework on public financial management in
the process of implementing the TRP is examined.
Chapter 3 describes Temba, the area where the study took place and which has been
considered as a microcosm of SACTI.
Chapter 4 presents in more detail the methodology (procedures and methods) used to
gather data, using a mixed quantitative and qualitative approach, for the study.
Chapter 5 presents and analyses the data.
Chapter 1
7
Chapter 6 reviews the aims of the TRP, explains the main findings, makes recommendations
and concludes the study.
8
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
2. Introduction
The purpose of the study is to investigate perceptions of taxi owners in Temba towards the
TRP and to make recommendations that will contribute towards its successful
implementation. In support of these objectives, Chapter 2 reviews relevant literature relating
to the topic in order to establish a base to support the research. The following has been
reviewed:
The essence and perennial problem of transportation
The regulatory legislation of the public transport system prior to 1994
The economic role played by SACTI
The public transport legislative and policy framework after 1994
The National Taxi Task Team (NTTT)
The mandate given to NTTT and its recommendations
Intervention by the Government–Taxi Recapitalisation Programme (TRP)
The “Win-Win-Win” strategy and the National Passenger Road Plan (NPRP)
Public financial management.
This has been undertaken to provide an overview of South African Public Transport
Legislation and Policy, both before and after 1994, and to lay the foundation for the
discussion of the taxi industry in Temba that follows in Chapter 3.
2.1 The perennial problem of transportation
According to Bhat and Koppelman (2003:39), since the beginning of civilization the viability
and economic success of communities have been, to a large extent, determined by the
efficiency of the available transportation infrastructure, i.e., the economical allocation and
utilization of transport resources. In the 20th and 21st century, developments in
Chapter 2
9
transportation systems have provided an enhanced level of local and international
competitiveness for communities and nations of the world. Increased mobility has clearly
accelerated development in many countries over the past century. Furthermore, the
increased use of space in urban areas has facilitated the development of residential and
industrial areas along with associated commerce and trade.
Wilkinson (2002:2) states that travel needs, and hence the demand for transport provision, is
derived from the geographical separation of primary activities in urban areas, particularly
those that are home-based and those that are work-based. The demand for the fulfillment of
mobility has, however, had unintended ramifications with which policymakers are grappling
on a day-to-day basis. This is of particular relevance in the South African context, with the
country‟s historical legacy of racial separation and service under-provision in the poorer,
formerly racially segregated townships and homelands.
Because transportation is one of the determinants of socio-economic development in
different countries, its problems are of concern for transport policymakers and planners. The
reality of the economic problem of transportation is the efficient allocation and utilization of
resources for the provision of transport services and facilities. This would lead to a reduction
in the costs of providing transport services and increasing the efficiency of utilizing economic
resources that would result in the reduction of costs of the industry‟s activities and the
“generalised cost of travel” of the people.
Although transportation is one of the many challenges currently being addressed by the
authorities, it deserves more focused attention since addressing transport backlogs can help
with the social and economic development of both urban and rural areas.
Transportation presents a unique problem for national policymakers because of its intimate
relation to community life. Unified government is difficult to conceptualise in the absence of
an adequate means of transportation and communication. Throughout history the body
politic has found it necessary to participate directly in the supply of transport facilities. Even
in countries where the highest possible level of development of private enterprise has
prevailed, public intervention has been necessary. It has therefore been seen as advisable
for the South African Government to intervene to transform SACTI to benefit the taxi owners,
taxi drivers and the users of the taxi transport service.
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10
2.2 The regulatory legislation of the public transport system prior to 1994
2.2.1 Introduction
The sub-optimal public transport system that many South Africans are currently using is
partly a legacy of the apartheid Government transport policy, which was based on the
premise of the enforced spatial engineering of people, neighbourhoods and systems of
physical interaction. The National Party Government, when it came to power in 1948, began
with a programme to relocate Blacks, Coloureds and other non-white minorities to
settlements on the urban periphery and away from centres of socio-economic opportunity.
Residents of areas such as Sophiatown and District Six, which were situated on well-located
land near urban centres, were forcibly removed to townships.
Transport corridors were used to separate Black and White areas. In addition, the transport
policy played a part in the creation of Bantustans and “self-governing” territories, created in
order to thwart the urbanization of such (mainly) rural areas. This “influx control” was
introduced in order to provide cheap labour to White-controlled industries in urban areas. All
these measures created a temporal, spatial and cost burden to commuters, as they were
expected to commute long distances for longer times and at greater “generalised costs of
travel”. This was economically unfavourable to the Black majority as their areas were located
far from places of employment.
With regard to public transport, two key items of legislation passed by the apartheid
government to give effect to its racially-based transport policy were the Native Transport
Services Act, No. 53 of 1957 and the Transport Services for Coloureds and Indians Act, No.
27 of 1972. The purpose of the former was to provide for the payment of contributions by
employers towards the cost of transport services for their native employees, and for the
establishment of a Native Transport Services Account. An employer was defined as a
person who employed one or more adult male natives. The purpose of the latter act was “to
provide for the payment of contributions by employers towards the cost of transport services
for their Coloured or Indian employees”. This law was similar in many respects to that of the
1957 Act. The definitions of a Coloured and Indian person were as provided for in the
provisions of the Population Registration Act, No. 30 of 1950. The result of these laws was
that the majority of Blacks and most other racial minorities were expected to commute long
distances to work, as they were forced to live in townships on the urban periphery and were
dependent on government-controlled transport schemes (such as subsidised commuter
buses and railway transport).
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The transport system under apartheid did not escape the anti-apartheid struggle, however,
and various mass actions against the oppressive transport system took place. Bus and rail
boycotts against an inefficient, costly and insensitive transport system were recorded in
almost every urban centre in South Africa. The transport system in the townships was seen
by many as a pillar of the apartheid machinery that needed to be destroyed. In the 1980s
and early 1990s the urban transport system suffered its worst setbacks, as bus services
went into decline due to political conflicts, trade union activity and increasing political risk
associated with subsidizing modes (bus and rail) that were facing economic setbacks. The
latter was the result of a decline in commuter numbers in subsidised modes and the financial
losses incurred due to the physical destruction of buses and trains. As these modes became
increasingly unavailable, SACTI grew to fill the void.
2.2.2 The historical and economic development of SACTI and its struggle against public transport regulation prior to 1994
The economic growth of SACTI took place through certain periods. This study considers the
periods from 1930 – 1976, 1977 – 1985 and 1986 – 1994, after which the new South African
government began with its democratic intervention strategies to regulate and transform
SACTI. The objectives of this section are to:
Provide some perspectives of the SACTI struggle against the regulatory laws of the
previous government
Describe the economic contributions made by SACTI towards Black communities
Explain problems caused by SACTI resulting in government intervention to
transform SACTI, hence the Taxi Recapitalisation Programme (TRP).
The key concept in this section is “transport regulation”, the meaning of which is key to this
study and therefore justifies a detailed explanation.
2.2.3 Meanings of “business regulation”
According to Pegrum (1973:63), the term “business regulation” has three different meanings:
The first meaning in the broadest sense covers all of the laws that govern the
activities of business. From this point of view, all businesses as legal persons are
regulated, since they are subject to rules of conduct prescribed by the state. This,
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however, is no different from any other aspect of human behaviour subject to the
law. In other words, business organizations, like human beings, are subject to the
law of their country.
The second meaning arises from the imposition of rules of conduct by legislative
actions designed to limit the freedom of activity of business enterprise. These
regulations arise because competition is not perfect and because economic forces,
working without legislative guidance or restriction, are an independent means of
achieving social objectives. Such regulations are designed to channel economic
motivation by establishing conditions designed to maintain competition and to
eliminate monopoly power as far as is feasible.
The third and narrowest meaning is used to describe the control which has been
developed to deal with industries such as transportation, public utilities and
communication. Regulation in this sense means the positive direction of business
practices through control of the prices which are charged for the services, possible
limitation of profits, restriction of the right of entry, withdrawal and other devices
which are considered necessary to implement the primary objectives of public
policy. These devices could include limits to the passenger carrying capacity of
vehicles and the number of licences issued. It is this restricted definition of
regulation that gives rise to the distinction commonly made between transportation
which is regulated and that which is not.
2.2.4 Types and goals of transport regulation
Broadly speaking there are three inter-twined facets of the regulatory system:
Regulation by social policy and Acts or laws of the country - the governing of natural
as well as legal persons
Regulation of the physical aspects of transport - control over the condition of
transport facilities and equipment
Economic regulation - the control of prices, and entry of new firms, businesses and
services.
The general goals of transport regulation encompass social, physical and economic aspects
of regulation which target; firstly the protection of the public, i.e. the public must not be
Chapter 2
13
exploited in price or service or their property be damaged, and secondly the promotion of the
most efficient and effective transport system (Davis, Farris & Holder Jr., 1983:22).
While it is easy to state these general goals, their implementation is considerably more
difficult as they contain some inherent conflict. As a result, these goals of regulation are
probably never completely fulfilled, with the public not completely protected nor the most
efficient and effective transport system fully attained. The public transport regulatory
legislation of the apartheid government did not adequately address the meaning or
implications of the general goals of transport regulation, as explained by Davis et al.
(1983:22).
2.2.5 Public transport regulation: 1930 – 1976
During the period 1930 – 1976, the Government regulated and protected the public transport
industry, especially rail transport and (mainly white-owned) bus companies. The then
Minister of Railways and Harbours called the pre-1930 period an era of “wasteful
competition” (Khosa, 1991:37). To avoid “wasteful competition” in the public transport
industry, the Government embarked on regulatory protection of the public transport industry,
a period that was to last for almost 46 years. During this era, taxis were not recognized as
part of public passenger transport, while their activities were informal and not regulated in
the way other businesses were. White-owned bus companies, railway-owned buses and
passenger trains monopolized the passenger market and were formalized and subsidised
(Welgemoed Commission, 1983).
Prior to 1976, the policy of the government was to discourage Blacks from trade and
business in South African townships by using various and repressive strategies, including
the infamous “One man – One Business” (Khosa, 1991:234). This meant that a Black could
be given only one business. Taxi businesses were using 4 - 6 seater sedan taxis that were
regarded as an illegal means of transporting people. Despite the existence of oppressive
legislation to stifle the taxi industry, the government found it difficult to implement and the
1975 Van Breda Commission (quoted in McCaul, 1990) was launched to investigate the
public transport industry issues and formulate solutions. The Commission found that South
Africa had reached a stage of economic industrial development that enabled it to move
towards freer competition in transportation (McCaul, 1990:38), and recommended a more
limited regulation of public transport.
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2.2.6 Limited regulation: 1977-1985
During the period 1977 – 1985 the Government moved away from rigid regulatory protection
towards a more flexible limited regulation of the public transport industry. This implied that
public passenger transport services could be sold and purchased in a much more
competitive environment. The results of limited regulation expanded the operations of
SACTI.
Following the Van Breda Commission, The Road Transport Act of 1977 (No. 74 of 1977)
opened the way for the introduction of the legal combi to be used to carry up to 8
passengers, in place of sedan taxis. These gradually began to capture an increasing share
of the Black commuter market and by 1982 more than 90% of Black-owned taxis were
combis (McCaul, 1990:35-39).
Some established public passenger transport carriers were struggling in the competitive
environment of the 1980s, with passenger trains and buses losing a substantial share of the
passenger market as SACTI improved theirs due to the convenience they provided to their
users through speed and higher frequency of service. Shaw (1998:8) found that the modal
shift from bus and rail to taxis was mainly attributable to the “poor levels of service provided
by the formal modes of buses and trains”. The success of the taxi operators in the transport
industry resulted in the bus companies becoming increasingly concerned about the
competition, and while the latter fought to retain their monopoly the growing groundswell in
favour of limited regulation (deregulation) of the transport industry eventually led to the
Welgemoed Commission of Inquiry in 1980.
A draft bill based on the Welgemoed recommendations was circulated in 1983. According to
McCaul (1990:43) it proposed that taxis be defined as vehicles carrying no more than 4
passengers and a new category of “small bus” be created for vehicles carrying 5 to 25
passengers, operating on fixed routes with timetables and approved tariffs. In addition it
recommended that licenced combis be phased out over 4 years and all all taxis be fitted with
meters. The draft bill was opposed by the South African Black Taxi Association (SABTA), the
private sector and even the National Association of Automobile Manufacturers (NAAMSA)
(McCaul, 1990:45), and was not passed as a National Policy or Act. Over and above these
pressures, the then Minister of Constitutional Development, Chris Heunis was pressurised to
initiate a new transport inquiry.
This led to the National Transport Policy Study (NTPS), which was mandated to bring
transport policy in line with national policy and constitutional development, and to rationalise
Chapter 2
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the transport sector in general. The NTPS was more innovative than most Government
inquiries up to that time and the investigations brought about the first major shift in South
African transport policy (McCaul, 1990:47). The NTPS‟s final recommendations on taxis
were that 16 seater minibuses be allowed to operate as taxis and that central government
stipulate the number of taxis each Regional Services Council (RSC) could allow. Taxi
numbers were to be controlled on a quota basis in each RSC area, with the RSC to decide
on the maximum numbers in its area. The quota should be based on a formula which
included considerations such as rank space and the applicant should no longer need to
prove the need for a service.
As SACTI was then an officially recognised element of the South African transport system,
the Competition Board suggested a complete deregulation of the industry and proposed
making licences and permits more readily available (McCaul, 1990:50).
Table 2.1 (below) illustrates the increase in taxi licences and permits granted in
Johannesburg between 1984/85 and 1989/90 (Khosa, 1991:235).
Table 2.1 Permit applications and licences granted in Johannesburg, 1984 – 1990
Year Applications Sedan licences
Granted Combi licences
Granted Total licences
Granted
1984/85 29 788 389 12 401
1985/86 33 733 379 307 686
1986/87 45 630 3 600 750 4 350
1987/88 57 552 89 6 898 6 987
1988/89 48 521 291 4 602 4 893
1989/90 56 248 2 070 13 090 15 160
Source: Khosa, 1991:235
This trend, which was evident in all cities, towns, townships and rural areas of South Africa,
led to an oversupply of combi-taxis in the market, in turn causing a decline in the profit
margins of taxi businesses. As a further consequence, the quality of the taxi transport
service and their safety standards were also compromised (McCaul, 1990:54).
2.2.7 Extensive deregulation: 1986-1994
During the early part of 1986, the apartheid government agreed in parliament that Local
Road Transportation Boards (LRTBs) should licence combi-taxis to carry 15 passengers
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instead of limiting them to eight (Ford, 1989:93) and all the estimated 60 000 pirate or
unlicenced taxis should be licenced. This would raise R6 million for the treasury, with safety
being improved through the growth in control over the majority of legal operators and
reduction in illegal vehicles (Ford, 1989:93). All of these recommendations, coupled with the
advocacy of the free market system and organizations against the Welgemoed Commission,
gave taxi owners sufficient ammunition to withstand pressures from the government, seeing
SACTI continue to expand rapidly (Ford, 1989:91).
2.3 The economic role played by SACTI
SACTI grew from a body concerned with small-scale informal operations into the dominant
player in the public passenger transport industry, by 2000 accounting for an estimated 65%
of passenger journeys, counted in the millions per day (Oosthuisen & Mhlambi, 2001:1). The
most direct beneficiaries of SACTI were taxi owners, taxi drivers, taxi users, vehicle
manufacturers, fuel, insurance and advertising companies, finance houses, stockvels
(informal mutual cooperatives), taxi licence consultation agencies, music shops, motor
mechanics and auto electricians. Many unemployed people conducted their businesses at
taxi ranks to eke out a living (Ford, 1989:107-125). The taxi industry can therefore be seen
to affect a much wider sector of the economy (formal and informal) than simply
transportation.
2.3.1 Economic contributions to taxi owners
Operations of SACTI were born out of informal economic activities. In order to understand
SACTI it is therefore important to understand the definitions of the informal economy on a
global scale and specifically in the South African context.
Porter, Castells and Benton (1989:11-12) define informal economic operations as those
which simultaneously encompass flexibility, libertarianism and greed, with owners displaying
aggressive entrepreneurship and employing vulnerable workers to exploit poor clients. The
informal economic sector is characterized by processes of income generation which are not
regulated by the institutions of society in a legal or social environment of regulation.
In a more South African context, the informal economic sector has been defined as: “all
types of economic activities which conceptually are to be underestimated or not measured at
all, due to the informal business styles of vendors and enterprises that are not officially
known” (Martins and Ligthelm, 1995:4). An instance of this is the lack of regulation of SACTI
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operations compared to those of bus companies, which had to abide by rules and
regulations ranging from driving qualifications to economic accounting. The industry was
generally characterised by one-man businesses, managed by an owner who evaded tax and
ran operations from his or her home to avoid office rental costs. They employed unregistered
drivers who received commission wages and drove vehicles that were neither regularly,
properly or formally maintained nor insured. Some were non-passenger vehicles bought
from scrap merchants and rebuilt as taxis and little or no investment was made in purchasing
new vehicles. Furthermore, taxi operators on certain routes charged a flat rate, irrespective
of the distance travelled, so that the revenue was the full fare multiplied by the number of
passengers per trip. The charge was the same for the full distance, point A to point F, as
between those and any intermediate points B, C, D or E. Such attempts to cut down on
operating costs and maximize fare revenue meant most owners made abnormally high
financial returns with lucrative profits that were not formally recorded.
Taxi owners received cash on a daily basis and in the context of Black South African income
levels they were rich and becoming richer. Many could afford to drive expensive private
motorcars and developed lifestyles that involved spending cash on fuel and the drivers‟
commission wages whilst starting savings accounts in the bank for their personal
enrichment. Such economic attitudes towards untraceable business cash flows, combined
with personal agrandisement, have become a mindset which is difficult to change.
Many more operators have subsequently entered the market with the goal of making quick
and easy money, and have had to bribe government officials to be able to operate (ILO,
2003:9). The environment of readily available cash, habitual bribery and aggression, coupled
with abuse of workers (e.g. many drivers are not employed in accordance with labour laws)
and disrespect for taxi users, has become the legacy of SACTI.
2.3.2 Economic contributions to taxi drivers and other employees
About 185 000 people work in the SACTI (ILO, 2003:1), the largest group being the taxi
drivers. In addition, there are queue marshals, vehicle washers and administrative workers.
In some parts of the country there are also fare collectors. About 99% of workers in SACTI
are Black, with less than 2% being women, many of whom do administrative work for the
Taxi Associations. About 5% of all staff are queue marshals and fare collectors (ILO,
2003:1). Most of the taxi drivers work for taxi owners and are generally paid commission
wages. Taxi drivers are the first recipients of the day‟s takings in the business, and if not well
supported and monitored they may steal and so cheat taxi owners of their full potential
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income (ILO, 2003:5). Of significance here is that the drivers are accustomed to having cash
in their hands on a daily basis. This procedure of collection has contributed to a way of
thinking amongst drivers that they must have readily available cash to pay for certain
operating expenses, including their meals, dry-cleaning and fares for their own transport
home after work.
Since the legitimate wage from owners is made on a commission basis, driving fast,
overloading passengers and working long hours have become the modus operandi by which
most drivers increase their income and take-home pay. Some are not interested in monthly
salaries and as a result they tend to cling to their taxi driving jobs rather than seeking
alternative employment, albeit they might switch from one taxi-owner to another.
SACTI, like many informal businesses, does not always register its workers. In the 1980s the
number of taxis increased to about 126 000 combis (International Market Insight Reports,
1999:2), with taxi driving being regarded as a better job than working on farms or gardens or
housekeeping in terms of wages per week. Many unemployed young men saw SACTI as
offering better pay than provided by salaries from farmers or home owners, and a
consequent boost to their standard of living.
Whilst some drivers succeeded in working and saving their way to become taxi owners themselves, the number of queue marshals increased and employment was created for backyard mechanics, panel beaters and electricians. Some succeeded in formalising their businesses and so created employment for many people. Economic
contributions to vehicle manufactures and other businesses
According to Ford (1989:107–126), the market share of motor vehicle manufacturers of 9 to
16- seater taxi vehicles used by SACTI was estimated to comprise two main models, the
Nissan E20 (45%), and Toyota Hi-Ace (45%), with most of the remainder divided between
Isuzu Relay (5%) and Volkswagen (4%). Vehicle manufacturers had high expectations of the
buying power of taxi owners and as SACTI experienced an economic boom during the
1980s, vehicle manufacturers scrambled to increase their market share.
2.3.3 Economic contributions to vendors/hawkers at taxi ranks
During the 1980s, taxi ranks became economic hubs for many kinds of informal businesses
that mainly benefitted the poorer sectors of the community. People began to sell fruit,
vegetables, small appliances, clothing and other consumables to taxi users. The taxi users
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saved time, energy and money by not having to travel to distant shops, and the certain
behavioural patterns developed that would be difficult to change. By the same token, the
hawkers are used to the existing environment created by SACTI and trying to change this
environment would be seen as a threat to their business and so likely to be fiercely resisted.
2.3.4 Economic contributions to taxi users
The operations of SACTI have penetrated cities, towns, townships, semi-urban, rural and
deep rural areas, providing transport on routes the scheduled bus and train services could
not operate. Many taxi users have come to enjoy flexible, door-to-door taxi transport service,
with fares that are reasonably affordable. The taxis are readily available and have adapted to
bad road conditions, facilitating the daily transportation of larger numbers of people between
a wide range of destinations.
These taxi services have spread to most corners of South Africa and even across borders to
neighbouring countries, as they meet the growing travelling needs and demands of the users
(Bosman, 1992:2). Based on passenger numbers, it was estimated that SACTI‟s turnover in
2003 was around R11 million per day and over R12 billion a year (ILO, 2003:10). At the
present time the turnover will be considerably more than that estimated in 2003.
Taxi users have benefited economically in terms of a reduction in the “generalised costs of
travel”, as a result of flexibility and door-to-door service. This reduction effectively increased
the income of the transport users, either directly, by leaving them with more money to spend
on other commodities, or indirectly, by increasing the time available for earning more income
somewhere else or doing other things. For instance, if the time saved were spent on adult
education this could provide a longer-term economic benefit to the taxi user (Bruton,
1985:28).
Secondly it enabled taxi users to find employment opportunities in places where formal
transport (buses and trains) could not reach. Bus and rail services were regarded as
inadequate and inefficient, as they forced the majority of Blacks to spend hours each day in
transit, spending a substantial amount of their income on travel expenses. In other words,
the “generalised cost of travel” for taxi users was less than that of bus and rail users. Taxi
users therefore have become accustomed to fast travel, reduced waiting times and flexibility
in times and stopping places. With fares generally regarded as reasonable, and not subject
to regular increases, the cumulative culture of SACTI has created a legacy which would not
be easy to change.
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2.3.5 The challenge of SACTI to the new South African Government
As indicated above, prior to 1994 the “old” taxi industry had created a legacy of conflict and
violence; illegal entry into SACTI and non-compliance with the law; ageing and poorly
maintained vehicles; a declining level of quality of transport service; ignorance of road safety
standards and increasing road accidents; declining profit margins, oversupply of taxis on
routes and overloading habits; aggressive attitudes and disrespect for users; exploitation
and abuse of drivers by owners; libertarianism and greediness of owners; cash readily
available cash on a daily basis to run taxi activities; and a lack of professionalism and certain
skills amongst owners and drivers. The post-1994 government felt compelled to introduce a
new legislative and policy framework to transform this system, the steps of which are
discussed in the next sections (Sections 2.4 to 2.8).
2.4 The post-1994 public transport legislative and policy framework
2.4.1 Introduction
In the light of the abovementioned challenges and opportunities, this section illustrates the
post-1994 government‟s attempts to meet them. The following documents are summarised
here as evidence of the ongoing process of transport reform in the country over a long
period.
2.4.2 White Paper on National Transport Policy
In September 1996, the government published a White Paper on National Transport Policy
(NTP) as a means of addressing the daunting transport challenges facing South Africa. It
was intended to provide a framework for a national transport policy and a long-term vision for
transport, based on the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) which sought
simultaneously to address the socio-economic needs of the disadvantaged and also build up
the economy. The vision was that transport, as a system in South Africa, would provide safe,
reliable, effective, efficient and fully integrated transport operations and infrastructure which
will best meet the needs of freight and passenger customers at improving levels of service
and cost in a fashion which supports Government strategies for economic and social
development whilst being environmentally and economically sustainable.
In addition, it recognized that a key ingredient to future success will be the sharing of this
vision by all key role players, backed by co-ordinated and integrated planning and decision
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making. As a way towards achieving this vision, the White Paper determined national
transport policy goals to support, inter alia, the goals of the RDP to meet the needs of
customers requiring transport for people or goods; to address safety and security; to improve
South Africa‟s competitiveness and its infrastructure and operations; and to address
environmental sustainability. In addition to setting goals for the achievement of the stated
vision, broad policy principles for the attainment of the goals were set out, including the
reversal of the dominant government role as “a regulator of bureaucratic detail, a provider of
infrastructure and a transport operator” and the future development of an institutional
framework on transport matters, which would also include non-government or statutory
transport bodies and inter-governmental relations.
The strategic objectives for land passenger transport which are applicable at a local level
identified by the White Paper on National Transport Policy (1996) were dedicated funding for
passenger transport infrastructure (subsidies and affordable transport), operations and law
enforcement (safety and security), and efficient urban land use structures to correct spatial
imbalances (to improve accessibility and mobility and limit walking distances to less than one
kilometre in urban areas). Promotion of reliable public transport (especially for commuters,
the elderly, scholars, the disabled) over private car travel was also prioritised.
2.4.3 Moving South Africa report
The White Paper on National Transport Policy (1996:47) stated that “in the longer term,
specific goals, strategies, and action plans to proactively lead the South African transport
system into the desired vision of the future will be developed through the Department of
Transport “Vision 2020” project. The advent of a Moving South Africa project was a result of
this “Vision 2020”‟ and also the need to rectify a deficiency in raw data and information with
regard to the country‟s transport system. Empirical data and information were required for
the implementation of “Vision 2020”. So the national Department of Transport commissioned
an 18-month study to research, analyse and recommend a transport strategy for 2020. The
Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) was tasked with this assignment and
produced a report in September 1998, which covered the strategic challenges and
performance gaps facing the transport system, viz. the Freight Transport System, the Urban
Passenger Transport System, the Rural and Long Distance Passenger Transport Systems,
the Tourism Passenger Transport System, the Special Needs Passenger Transport System
and cross-cutting issues affecting the long-term sustainability of the transport system as a
whole. This project was mainly data-driven, with the primary unit of analysis being the
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customers and their needs, including the needs of the nation as a customer. It was intended
that the project should come up with long term strategic trade-offs and choices which would
be essential for the fulfillment of the goals set out in the White Paper on a National Transport
Policy. In the light of the above, the report came up with 32 key strategic challenges facing
the transport sector, of which seven are applicable at a local level, namely:
Integration of spatial planning
Affordable basic access for the stranded
An attractive public transport system
The management of projected 2020 car usage
Transport planning and regulation
Adequate public funding for roads and public transport
The stabilization of destructive competition in private sector industries (minibus
taxis).
2.4.4 Various items of transport legislation
The White Paper on National Transport Policy (1996:46) stated that
traffic legislation will be harmonized in accordance with the relevant agreements
between the provinces and the national Department of Transport. The Department of
Transport will take the necessary steps to ensure the road traffic laws will be
harmonized in the Southern African region.
This process of harmonization is encapsulated in the revision, amendment and repeal of
legislation, to be discussed below. The following pieces of legislation are relevant to this
study: the National Road Traffic Act, No. 93 of 1996; the National Land Transport Interim
Arrangements Act, No. 45 of 1998; and the National Land Transport Transition Act, No. 22 of
2000. There were a host of amendment Acts passed during the above period (1940-2000),
but most of these were of a technical nature and therefore do not warrant more discussion
here.
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a) National Road Traffic Act, No. 93 of 1996
The National Road Traffic Act, No. 93 of 1996 was enacted as a result of the White Paper on
National Transport Policy (1996) to replace the outdated Road Traffic Act, No. 29 of 1989.
The objective of the new legislation was to promote road traffic safety and discipline, in
addition to protecting the expensive capital investment in the road system and enhancing the
administrative and economic order in the field of road traffic and transport. Above all, the
purpose of the Act was to “provide for road traffic matters which shall apply uniformly
throughout the Republic of South Africa.”
b) National Land Transport Interim Arrangements Act, No. 45 of 1998
The National White Paper on Transport Policy (1996) clearly promoted land use and spatial
development in support of land passenger transport. In terms of this policy, planning was to
be made at the lowest possible level of government, or by the relevant transport authorities.
Hence, the purpose of the Act was to “make arrangements relating to transport planning and
public road transport services within metropolitan transport areas declared under the Urban
Transport Act, 1977, and to the designation of core cities under that Act…”
c) National Land Transport Transition Act, No. 22 of 2000
The purpose of the National Land Transport Transition Act, No 22 of 2000 was “to provide
for the transformation and restructuring of the national transport system of the Republic of
South Africa,” with more emphasis on public transport so as to give effect to the White Paper
on National Transport Policy. This legislation was transitory in nature and part of a wider
move to harmonize the national, provincial and municipal laws. With the restructuring of the
local government system complete (in particular following the passing of the Municipal
Structures Act, No. 32 of 2000), the time had come to start finalizing a single all-
encompassing transportation law for all spheres of government. This new legislation took
into account “Vision 2020” as envisaged in the Moving South Africa project.
The National Land Transport Transition Act, No. 22 of 2000 was divided into four chapters:
Chapter 1: Introductory matters; Chapter 2: Matters of national concern; Chapter 3: Matters
of provincial concern and Chapter 4: General matters. Chapter 1, 2 and 4 set national norms
and standards for the whole country and were applicable to all provinces. It was thus
designed for the effective handling of the restructuring and transformation of the land
transport system as contemplated in section 146 (2) of the Constitution of the Republic of
South Africa Act, No. 108 of 1996. Chapter 3 provided for matters of provincial concern, and
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was applicable to all provinces unless the relevant provincial legislature were to pass
legislation to replace and provide for the same matters as contemplated in the chapter. This
meant that provincial law could not provide for any matter which wuold be deemed
contradictory to the provisions of Chapter 3.
The Act set out the main principles of the National Land Transport Policy relevant at the local
level, and included the following:
Public transport services must be aimed at providing affordable transport to the
public and be designed to achieve integration of modes; cost efficiency and service
quality; the optimal allocation and utilization of available resources; and the
development of markets
Public transport services must be designed so that appropriate modes are selected
and planned for on the basis of where they have the highest impact in reducing the
total systems cost of travel, and in such a way that subsidies are aimed at assisting
currently marginalized users and those who have poor access to social and
economic activity, and at addressing the needs of special categories of passengers
An effective land transport system must be achieved through integrated planning,
provision and regulation of services and infrastructure, as well as diligent, effective
law enforcement
Safety and effective law enforcement must be promoted as vital to managing and
regulating land transport and the efforts of all involved must be coordinated to
prevent duplication
For the purposes of land transport planning and the provision of land transport
infrastructure and facilities, public transport must be given higher priority than
private transport
Land transport functions must be integrated with land use and economic planning
and development through measures such as corridor development, densification
and infilling; transport planning must guide land use and development planning.
The White Paper on National Transport Policy (1996:47) has formed the basis for all
transport institutions – government, statutory and private – to harmonise and tailor their
individual policies and strategies. In addition, it has allocated the execution of certain
important functions to the provinces, inter alia, land passenger transport legislation,
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delineation and designation of passenger transport areas and transport authorities,
implementation, monitoring and revision of provincial passenger transport policy,
coordination of land use and transport planning at the provincial level, and law enforcement.
All these functions impact directly on the local level in all respects. Hence, the Gauteng
Department of Transport and Public Works has adopted its own White Paper on Transport
Policy to begin the process of reforming, shaping and managing the valuable transport
industry in the province. This exemplifies the way transport has become a concurrent
function between national, provincial and local spheres of government.
d) Gauteng White Paper on Transport
The Gauteng White Paper on Transport Policy forms the basis for the legislative reform that
has taken place in the province since 1996. The White Paper sought to promote public
transport as it relates mainly to the development of certain transport corridors, mixed land
use to minimize travel, the prioritization of facilities and infrastructure, financial assistance for
public transport and the enhancement of safety. In addition, rural passenger transport,
training, skills development and capacity building within the public transport industry were
also promoted.
The co-ordination of transport modes and services required the overseeing and
management of the financial support of different modes of transport, the monitoring
of levels of service provision, the standardization of road traffic and inter-provincial
liaison. In addition, the White Paper provided for the promotion of airports and other
transport facilities, as well as overarching legislation.
Provision, maintenance and operation of transport infrastructure was highlighted as
it related mainly to the classification, development and maintenance of the road
network and was mainly concerned with road links between poor and marginalized
areas or communities to new residential developments. The administration and
facilitation of road construction within poor and marginalized areas was a priority,
along with recognition of the needs of the disabled.
Finally, the White Paper sought the integration of land-use and transport with
undertaking of land use and transport planning, the coordination of planning by
municipalities, the provision of transport-related input for land use and rezoning
proposals and applications. In addition, partnerships were to be made between the
public and private sector to develop identified transport corridors.
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e) Overview of the provincial land transport legislation
The aim of the White Paper was to lay the basis for a single overarching Gauteng Transport
Act. Since 1996, interim legislative modules have been produced progressively in terms of
their perceived urgency, which should lead, in time, to final legislation. The following are
particular instances of legislation:
i) The Gauteng Road Transportation Amendment Act No. 6 of 1997
The purpose of the Gauteng Road Transportation Amendment Act, No. 6 of 1997 was to
amend the Road Transportation Act No. 74 of 1977 in so much as it applied to Gauteng
Province, to provide for the appointment of a Provincial Taxi Registrar and also to provide for
the registration of minibus Taxi Associations, their members and non-members. In addition,
it provided for special measures in respect of minibus taxi services in certain areas, e.g.,
vehicle impounds and regulation of routes. Industry players hailed this Act as the first
measure by Government to normalise the taxi industry, though it was to be repealed by
Section 58(3) of the Gauteng Interim Minibus Taxi-type Services Act No. 11 of 1997.
ii) The Gauteng Provincial Road Traffic Act No. 10 of 1997
The purpose of this Act was “to consolidate and amend the provisions relating to road traffic
which should apply in the province of Gauteng…”.
iii) The Gauteng Interim Minibus Taxi-type Services Act, No. 11 of 1997
This Act sought “to provide for the interim regulation of minibus taxi-type services; to provide
for the establishment of a Provincial Transport Commission and a Provincial Taxi Registrar;
to exclude the provisions of the Road Transportation Act, No. 74 of 1977, from applying to
minibus taxi-type services…” In terms of section 59(3), the Gauteng Interim Minibus Taxi-
type Services Act “shall terminate on date of commencement of more comprehensive
provincial public passenger legislation.”
iv) The Gauteng Interim Road Transport Act, No. 2 of 1998
An aim of this Act was “to provide for the interim regulation of public passenger road
transport other than minibus taxi-type services, and…” It was of a technical nature and was
meant to clarify the existing provisions of the Road Transportation Act No. 74 of 1977 in the
light of the constitutional changes. Major changes were in reference to classes of persons,
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freight transport, appeals, measures to combat taxi violence and the processing of permit
applications by non-minibus taxi-type operators as well as taxi operators.
In terms of section 41(1) of the Gauteng Interim Road Transport Act No. 2 of 1998, the Road
Transportation Act No. 74 of 1997 was repealed insofar as it applied in Gauteng Province.
Section 104(1)(b) of the Gauteng Public Passenger Road Transport Act No. 7 of 2001 also
repealed the Gauteng Interim Road Transport Act No. 2 of 1998.
v) The Gauteng Transport Framework Act, No. 8 of 1998
This Act sought to provide a framework for the integrated planning and provision of the
transport system in the Gauteng Province; the establishment of transport authorities and
transport authority funds; the administration and utilization of the provincial land transport
fund; the preparation of integrated transport plans.
In terms of sections 10 and 22 of the Act, there was a requirement that transport authorities
should take responsibility for the environmental impact of transport development and the
implementation of integrated transport plans. In addition, there was to be consistency
between the integrated transport plan and the transport development chapters of integrated
development plans prepared in terms of the Local Government Transition Act No. 209 of
1993. The Gauteng Transport Framework Act No. 8 of 1998 was repealed by section 38(1)
of the Gauteng Transport Framework Revision Act No. 8 of 2002.
vi) The Gauteng Public Passenger Road Transport Act, No. 7 of 2001
The purpose of this Act was to change the law governing public passenger road transport in
Gauteng Province, and for that purpose, to provide for a public passenger road transport
system as a part of an integrated system of land transport for Gauteng Province, compatible
with the national land transport system and the land transport systems of other provinces; to
provide for the planning of public passenger road transport operations and infrastructure
integrated with land use planning; to establish institutional structures to achieve these
objectives; to repeal the Gauteng Interim Road Transport Act, No. 2 of 1998; to bring
provincial public passenger road transport legislation into line with Chapter 2 of the National
Land Transport Transition Act, No. 22 of 2000 and to replace Chapter 3 of the Act as
regards provincial public passenger transport matter.
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(vii) The Gauteng Transport Infrastructure Act No. 8 of 2001
The Act set out to consolidate the laws relating to road and other types of transport
infrastructure in Gauteng Province; and to provide for the planning, design, development,
construction, financing, management, control, maintenance, protection and rehabilitation of
provincial roads, railway lines and other transport infrastructure in Gauteng Province.
In essence, it regulated all matters in the Road Ordinance, No, 22 of 1957. The Gauteng
Transport Infrastructure Act, No. 8 of 2001 as amended by the Gauteng Transport
Infrastructure Act No. 6 of 2003 in order to provide for the necessary land use rights with
respect to stations and for the necessary powers of the MEC [Member of the Executive
Council] to enter into contracts for roads and rail projects; to amend the procedure in relation
to route determination; to make a second environmental investigation at the stage of
preliminary design of a road or railway unnecessary where the competent environmental
authority decides that the environmental investigation at the stage of route determination is
adequate.
viii) The Gauteng Transport Infrastructure Revision Act, No. 8 of 2002
This Act was intended to provide a framework for integrated planning and provision of a
transport system in the Province [of Gauteng]; to provide for founding agreements for
transport authorities and the establishment thereof; to provide for the governance of
transport authorities including the finances of such authorities; to provide for the preparation
of various transport plans; to establish the Gauteng Transport Consultative Forum and the
Gauteng Transport Co-ordination Committee.
The continuous transformation of the South African public transport system is apparent from
the degree of legislative and policy change that have taken place. For the first time in the
history of South Africa, the country has a transport policy focused on customers or users of
the transport system, compared to previous policies which focused on suppliers of transport
infrastructure and operators (both public and private). The major thrust of these post-1994
laws and policies is that transport must be integrated with other sectors of the economy,
whilst bearing in mind the customers (individuals and businesses). By being a customer-
driven policy, the White Paper on a National Transport Policy and the „Moving South Africa‟
project has the potential of bringing the economic development of the country to new
heights. The challenge is to involve private sector investors who would help play their part in
making the transport system work. The policy and legislative framework to realize this has
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been put into place. The National Land Transport Transition Act No. 22 of 2000 provides for
the preparation of the following plans at municipal level:
Integrated Transport Plan (ITP)
Rationalisation Plan
Operating Licences Strategies (OLS)
Current Public Transport Records (CPTR).
Intended to meet the current and future transport needs of local communities, these extract
information on the opportunities and challenges facing the local system and suggest
alternative solutions to local transport problems. The involvement of the private sector may
help to accelerate the implementation of these laws and policies on the ground. All users of
the transport system in South Africa (and Gauteng Province specifically) stand to benefit
from an effective and efficient transport system.
The post-1994 legislative and policy framework that has been discussed in the preceding
sections has a direct impact on reasons for the government at national, provincial and local
level to intervene in the transformation of SACTI. To this end, it is important for the
structures of the taxi industry such as SANTACO to understand and be well informed about
the statutory framework.
2.5 The National Taxi Task Team (NTTT)
2.5.1 Introduction
The following section examines the recommendations of the National Taxi Task Team
(NTTT) and the Taxi Recapitalisation Programme (TRP), in particular their possible
economic implications, along with the strategic implementation plan for the TRP and the
installation of the Electronic Management System (EMS) in the new vehicles of the
envisaged “new” taxi industry.
The national Department of Transport established the NTTT in November 1994, consisting
of nine members of SACTI representing all nine provinces, nine government officials
representing all three levels of government (local, provincial and national) and nine specialist
advisers. It made its findings known to government and the public at large, reflecting
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concerns about SACTI amongst taxi owners, drivers, users and the public at large.
According to the Department of Transport (1996:4-6) these concerns included conflicts and
violence involving taxi drivers and issues relating to the economic instability of the taxi
business (e.g. soaring taxi vehicle purchase prices to unaffordable levels because of the
increasing demand for vehicles). With an average lifespan in excess of ten years, many
combis were in bad physical condition and owners had difficulty accessing funding to renew
them. An oversupply of vehicles and competition from subsidised buses had resulted in
inadequate income for many owners, while the regulation and fleet control of the industry
had lagged behind for many years, resulting in informal operations becoming
unmanageable.
The findings also revealed that empowerment of taxi owners and drivers was being
neglected and there was a resultant deterioration in customer service. Labour relations in the
industry were not regarded as an important issue with the result that drivers were exploited
and unfair labour practices were rife. An infrastructure, such as sheltered taxi ranks and
facilities for people with disabilities, was poor or on-existent, with rural roads and bridges
often being neglected. This caused an increase in maintenance and operating costs that in
turn resulted in decreasing profit margins for most taxi businesses operating in rural areas.
More important issues of safety and service quality were ignored, leading to an escalation in
taxi accidents. Users‟ expectations of the quality of services declined and people became
afraid of using taxi transport. Nevertheless, since the majority of the users remained in the
lower socio-economic scale, they remained a captive market for SACTI.
2.5.2 The mandate given to NTTT and its recommended vision
The mandate given to NTTT was to investigate problems and issues within the taxi industry
and formulate solutions and/or policy options for recommendations to the National Ministerial
Committee of Ministers of Transport (MINCOM) to ensure the short and long term
sustainability of the industry so that it can play an equitable and economically competitive
role in order to promote an effective and efficient public transport system.
The long-term vision of the NTTT was to create a “new” taxi industry that would establish
formal legal structures representing all registered taxi associations in the country and
provide safe transport by reducing taxi violence and wars and rural accidents. It was to
legalise and formalise taxi businesses and encourage owners to be law-abiding citizens, so
that their businesses could be equitably subsidised and become an integral part of the
mainstream public transport system. Encouragement was to be given to owners to
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continuously invest and re-invest in new vehicles every five years of effective operation so
as to provide high-quality transport services to both local and international users. If the
business became effective and efficient it would able to compete for Government tenders
and attract new entrepreneurs. To this end opportunities would arise to equip owners and
their drivers with effective interpersonal, managerial and financial skills to sustain the taxi
business, helping to create a culture that would improve the image of the industry locally and
internationally (NTTT summary of process and final recommendations, August 1996).
There were to be measures taken to formalise, regulate and control aspects relating to
registration and the permit system, with special legalisation measures.
An improvement of infrastructure (building new roads, upgrading existing roads, improving
roads and facilities along them, emergency services) would be coupled with facilities for
people with disabilities and an improvement of traffic safety by setting up provincial
databases for Taxi Associations. Establishment of taxi co-operatives would enhance the
economic effectiveness of the industry and training would be provided for industry personnel
in all categories. Complaints were to be dealt with by the taxi office and investigations made
of accidents involving taxis.
In an attempt to further improve safety, examination was to be made of vehicles and
roadworthy certificates issued or declined. The implementation of a professional drivers‟
permit system and establishment of special local authority liaison units would be
accompanied by recognition of Taxi trade unions. Such moves were designed to regulate the
industry while at the same time empowering the legitimate operators. Legislation would
ensure that a minimum wage for taxi workers was paid and that those registered with the
Department of Labour which would provide basic conditions of employment. Awareness was
to be created among both employers and employees of their rights and obligations in terms
of labour legislation and the country‟s constitution (Basic Conditions of Employment Act
1997).
It was further envisaged that training courses for skills development for both taxi owners and
drivers would include change management, cross-cultural awareness, conflict management,
negotiating skills and management of cooperatives, management of taxi business, driving
skills, customer care, first aid, traffic management, legislation and vehicle maintenance. All
training courses were to be linked to the National Qualifications Framework (NQF) and the
Taxi Education Training Authority (TETA), so that training was accredited and recognised in
the labour market in terms of the South African Qualifications Authority Act (SAQA) of 1995.
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The NQF would give drivers the opportunity to follow recognised career paths of their own
choice and encourage the industry to offer learnerships at the level of co-operatives (Skills
Development Act 1998 and Skills Development Levies Act 1999). Finally, government was
seen as a partner of the taxi industry, with the NTTT recommending that its proposals be
implemented in such a light.
The strategic plan for implementing the above NTTT recommendations was embodied in the
TRP.
2.6 Intervention by Government - Taxi Recapitalisation Programme
2.6.1 Introduction
The implementation of the TRP project began in 2001 but has not been completed to date
(2001-2009). It was to involve the phasing out of the “old” taxi industry vehicles and their
replacement by the envisaged new 18- and 35-seater vehicles of the “new” taxi industry,
supposedly to be fitted with Electronic Management Systems (EMS).
When the TRP was put into operation it was intended that its inputs and processes would
have outputs and, equally importantly, outcomes. For example the increasing number of taxi
businesses paying tax would be the output, and the use of those taxes by the government
would be the outcome. Such a move, however, would require considerable change in the
thinking of drivers and owners across the country.
2.6.2 Institutionalisation
Institutionalisation of the taxi industry would be achieved by democratically electing local,
regional and provincial councils to form a South African National Taxi Council (SANTACO),
which in turn would form a partnership with the government. Liaison and communication
would take place between government and SANTACO through regular meetings, with a view
to facilitating and reaching agreement on the implementation of the TRP. The
communication strategy was concerned with making both SANTACO and government
exchange views and information on the taxi industry.
Critical phases of institutionalisation have to be in place to support the strategies of the TRP,
and these involved establishing a National Transport Register (NTR) and Provincial Taxi
Registrars (PTRs) to register all taxis and their owners establish a database to incorporate
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their particulars, to enforce traffic rules on the roads and to empower taxi operators. The
strategy would necessitate development of enforcement capacity, including a doubling of the
number of road transport inspectors to check adherence to speed limits, roadworthiness of
vehicles and possession of legitimate driver‟s licences, as well as stopping overloading,
alcohol abuse, and drinking and driving. Finally, all taxis were to be registered with the
Provincial Registrar to ensure all were operating in terms of proper authorizations (Transport
Portfolio Committee: Palmer Development Group on National Transport Transition Act – 23
October 2002).
Request for tenders for the manufacture of purpose built 18- and 35-seater “new” taxi
industry diesel vehicles which could also cater for people with disabilities was offered to
vehicle manufacturers. On 20 September 1999, the DTI called for tenders and fourteen
bidders responded. Initially six were shortlisted then this number was cut down to four,
namely Tata Motors, Daimler Chrysler S.A., Iveco and Kwoon-chung. The DoT decided to
stop the tender process which was aimed at selecting a single organisation to manufacture
the new vehicles (Business Day, 27 June 2003: Taxi recapitalisation tenders may be
combined).
2.6.3 Eligibility for scrapping allowance
In order to be eligible for a scrapping allowance to enable the taxi owner to purchase an 18-
seater and/or a 35-seater, the owner had to be registered with the PTR, be lawfully
registered as a taxpayer with the South African Revenue Service (SARS) and hold a valid
motor vehicle registration certificate to which the application related. In 1999 the TRP
replacement program was estimated to involve about 126 000 combis, which would cost
between R4 and R6 billion, a figure later increased to R7,7 billion (Engineering News, 23
November 2004:1), equivalent to R61 000 per vehicle. The Government was set to pay a
proposed R50 000 per individual registered combi in scrapping allowances to taxi owners to
subsidise the purchase of the TRP-compliant vehicles. (Engineering News, 28 July 2005:1).
The Government strongly believed that investment in the TRP and the envisaged “new” taxi
industry would promote passenger transport and play a significant role in the economy of the
country. This was based on a belief that an economical system of transportation would lead
to a reduction in the cost of providing transport services and the “generalised cost of travel”
of users. This would in turn lead to an increase in the productivity of physical and human
capital and more efficient and effective utilisation of economic resources with an associated
reduction in production costs (Pegrum, 1973:10-16).
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Government would set up and maintain the National Transport Register, which was a
consolidated database of the local transport permit system (LTPS) and the Registrar‟s
System (RS). For the purposes of the administration of the applications for scrapping
allowances, there might be a direct interface with manufacturers.
The slow rate of progress with the implementation of the TRP continues up to the present.
By the beginning of 2010, “33 000 minibus taxis out of estimated fleet of 135 000 vehicles
have been scrapped …. says Deputy Transport Minister Jeremy Cronin”. (Engineering
News, 7 April 2010). This is in contrast to the undertaking of the Government in 2007 that
80% of the taxi fleet would be recapitalized by the 2009/10 financial year.
2.6.4 Administrative procedures
The administrative procedures for a taxi operator who wished to obtain a scrapping
allowance to purchase an 18-seater and/or a 35-seater required presenting the manufacturer
with the original permit, registration certificate, certificate of registration of the motor vehicle
and roadworthiness certificate, collectively referred to as Registration Documents (RDs). The
vehicle to which the registration documents related were to be delivered to the manufacturer
for inspection, with relevant credit information provided, as requested by the Qualifying
Financial Institution (QFI) selected by the taxi operator, if the operator required financial
assistance. The QFI could not turn away an operator on account of a loan credit history or
any blacklisting with the credit bureau.
Before extending any offer to a taxi owner/operator to sell a 18-seater or a 35-seater, the
manufacturer would inspect the vehicle to ensure that it corresponded with the vehicle
registration, engine and identification numbers on the registration document, and was the
same make of vehicle. The manufacturer also had to validate the taxi owner‟s registration as
a taxpayer with SARS. A written application for a scrapping allowance could be submitted to
the DTI, signed by or on behalf of the taxi operator, and nominating the QFI in whose trust
account the allowance could be deposited. If eligibility of the operator was confirmed and the
DTI had granted the taxi operator‟s application, then the taxi operator was to deliver the
vehicle together with its original documents for scrapping.
2.6.5 Electronic Management System (EMS)
Installation of an EMS in the 18- and 35-seater vehicles was based on the overall aim of the
EMS requirement, namely to satisfy the need for risk mitigation by the financiers. Risk
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mitigation would be provided by the EMS through electronic monitoring and control of the
taxis, as well as control of the fares and other transactions. An important requirement was
that the EMS should be integrated with the new taxi vehicle to ensure the integrity of the
EMS.
The objectives of the EMS within the TRP project were to promote and support an
intermodal transport system comprising bus, rail and new taxi vehicles. It was intended to
effectively harness current technological development in the electronic payment and
transaction field, doing away with cash, and make optimum use of existing infrastructure and
ensure a fully comprehensive system to serve the widest possible spectrum of customers.
The EMS presented an opportunity to collect valuable information for transport planning, as
it monitored compliance with regulations and provided information on routes, speed
violations, overloading, driver working hours and data required by regulatory authorities such
as the DTI, the DoT and law enforcement agencies. Benefits were also seen as accruing to
financiers, including all the persons and institutions who provided funding to finance the
purchase of the new taxi vehicles; the South African Reserve Bank, which was the
regulatory authority for money transactions; vehicle manufacturers, who were responsible for
supplying and maintaining the taxis; and last but not least the users.
The three components of the EMS were each unique but could function as a whole. The first
was an Electronic Fare Collection System (EFCS) based on the use of „smart card‟
technology that gave operators greater security regarding the collection of fares and
provided information for fleet management. The collection of revenue into a single account
for each operator also lowered the risks run by financial organizations. The second was a
Monitoring and Control System (MCS) to monitor the vehicular environment and provide
information on loading, speeding, harsh acceleration or deceleration and other driving data.
This system was able to shut down the engine if certain parameters were exceeded. The
third component of EMS was a Vehicle Identification Tracking and Recovery System
(VITRS) to help in fleet management and reduce the risks to financial and insurance
organisations.
Integrated packaging of the system was envisaged with a central database to be developed
and an effective method of managing and distributing fare revenue devised. Regulations with
respect to the use of electronic money would have to be adhered to.
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2.7 The “Win-Win-Win” strategy and the National Passenger Road Plan (NPRP)
Between late 2006 and the early part of 2007, the Government released a number of policy
documents for public comment and input. These include the so-called “Win-Win-Win”
strategy, the Public Transport Action Plan (PTAP) and the National Passenger Road Plan
(NPRP).
The “Win-Win-Win” document was representative of all the documents in terms of its findings
and recommendations. In its executive summary, it conceded that the public transport sector
in South Africa in 2006 was at a strategic crossroads, and over the following decade would
either remain a third class service for captive users that would lose ridership to private cars,
an unsustainable future, or undergo a phased overhaul (between 2007 and 2020) to form an
integrated mass rapid network that would be a viable competitor to motorcars for all citizens
in any city or district.
It was also recognized that much of the problem could be traced to the negative role of
transportation officials and consultants. In the 10 years since the White Paper on National
Transport Policy (1996) had committed Government to a thorough transformation of the land
passenger transport sector, the promise to transform and upgrade public transport, walking
and cycling, and to manage and control car use had not been adequately implemented. In
addition, whilst the first important steps had been taken in the late 1990s, from a user
perspective these had proved to be complicated and slow, as in taxi recapitalization from
1999 to 2006, the establishment of only one (relatively under-funded and hence ineffective)
Transport Authority from 2001 to 2006, and the only half-completed bus tendering system
from 1998 to 2006. The steps had also been ineffective and negligible, for example, public
transport law enforcement, and contrary to the spirit of policy, with the roads authorities
politely ignoring the 1998 call to manage car use and promote public over private transport.
In short, the transport policy and strategy of 1996 to 2000 had not been effectively translated
into practice.
The “Win-Win-Win” strategy outlined a roadmap for public transport for the period 2007 to
2020, based on a number of critical building blocks. Along with the establishment of
transport authorities, city-wide transport networks would be established to run 16 to 24 hours
a day, 7 days a week. A gross cost contracting system would allow for through-ticketing and
extend to the minibus-taxi sector, and improvements would be made in marketing, maps,
timetables and image-building. To help pay for the reforms, financial assistance to public
transport would double from its existing R5 billion to R10 billion. However all of these steps
Chapter 2
37
also needed to be underpinned by strong local public sector network control and
management, which the “Win-Win-Win” strategy has conceded is relatively weak.
The findings and recommendations were nevertheless taken further in the PTAP and the
NPRP, which also introduced the Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) concept. The NPRP estimated a
practical timeframe for implementation and the increased subsidy costs of fully integrated
and regulated road-based public transport industry in 12 urban areas (Johannesburg,
Tshwane/Pretoria, eThekwini, Cape Town, Ekurhuleni, Nelson Mandela, Buffalo City,
Mangaung, Rustenburg, Polokwane, Mbombela and Msunduzi). At the time of writing, the
systems are still in various stages of development, with responses from taxi-owners not
altogether favourable and strikes not uncommon.
2.8 Public financial management
2.8.1 Introduction
The process of implementing the TRP involves a large amount of public funding. It has
therefore been necessary and relevant for the study to briefly review literature on the
statutory legislation framework for managing its use. Such knowledge of the accounting
would help Taxi Associations, their elected Regional Councils and SANTACO to be
responsible and accountable. The statutory framework provides legal requirements that
public officials and other stakeholders have to adhere to in the execution of their duties. For
example, if the officials of the DoT and SANTACO, or any other taxi association
representatives, are provided with funds to facilitate the process of the TRP, according to the
Public Financial Management Act 1 of 1999 as amended, they must be able to provide
financial statements to account for the public funds used. Furthermore, the post-1994
Government‟s statutory framework for public financial management includes a number of
policies that have a direct bearing on the way in which financial management is dealt with by
the different spheres of government. The following act is briefly discussed as it is relevant to
the functions to be performed by the taxi industry councils.
2.8.2 Public Financial Management Act (PFMA) No 1 of 1999
The Public Finance Management Act (PFMA) No 1 of 1999 (as amended by Act 29 of 1999)
gives effect to section 213, 215, 216, 217, 218 and 219 of the Constitution of the Republic of
South Africa (Act 108 of 1996) and focuses specifically on the national and provincial
Chapter 2
38
spheres of government. It replaces or supersedes the various national and provincial
Exchequer Acts and the Reporting of Public Entities Act that was previously in place. Its
aims were to regulate financial management in national and provincial government; ensure
that all Revenue, Expenditure, Assets and Liabilities (REAL) of government were managed
efficiently and effectively; and provide for the responsibilities of persons entrusted with
financial management in government. The Act signalled a need to secure transparency,
accountability and sound management of the REAL of institutions, including SANTACO and
its regional councils. The partnerships between the taxi industry and the three spheres of
government would at certain stages be directly or indirectly required to manage their
finances accordingly. In addition, the South African Revenue Service Act 34 of 1997 required
economic entities, including taxi businesses, to pay taxes.
2.9 Conclusion
This chapter has established a baseline to support the research study. It has described a
paradigm shift on regulatory legislation before and after 1994 in the South African public
passenger transport system, with SACTI a bone of contention throughout. NTTT was
established and mandated to investigate public transport in South Africa and make
recommendations, one of which was that SACTI be transformed from an “old” taxi industry
into a “new” taxi industry. The TRP had its roots in the recommendations of the NTTT, and
its main aim was to address public concerns about the state of affairs found in SACTI and
transforms it to the benefit of taxi owners and drivers, taxi industry workers, government, taxi
transport users and the public in general. In support of the TRP, the government has
produced the NPRP to transform the “old” subsidised commuter bus industry into the “new”
integrated and fully regulated passenger transport system, including the taxi industry and
BRT system with a sustainable system of subsidies in 12 urban areas by 2010.
In summary, the key areas of this literature review of the study have highlighted the impact
of the public transport legislation framework and policies of the government prior to 1994, as
well as the historical and economic development and contributions of SACTI and its struggle
during that time. Conflicts and violence have characterized much of the SACTI, and a public
transport legislation framework of the post-1994 governments has attempted to improve
management of public funding and the transport system in general. Implementation of the
TRP and the NPRP as strategic cases of transforming, integrating and fully regulating the
public passenger road-based transport system has met with varied success, and as the
literature reflects, success of many of the reforms still hangs in the balance.
Chapter 2
39
The next chapter (Chapter 3) will focus on Temba, the area in which the study took place.
40
CHAPTER 3
THE TAXI INDUSTRY IN TEMBA: A MICROCOSM OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN COMBI-TAXI INDUSTRY (SACTI)
3. Introduction
Chapter two provided a detailed overview of the legislative and regulatory background to the
issues facing SACTI, and the influence of transport policy on its development. Before
proceeding to Chapters 4 and 5, which present the methodology of the survey and its
findings respectively, this chapter gives a brief description of the area in which the study took
place.
This study suggests that the conditions encountered in Temba and the challenges faced by
taxi operators in the area can be regarded as typical of those faced in many other parts of
South Africa. Their perceptions may therefore be of value in providing input to addressing
the problems of the industry as a whole.
3.1 Location of Temba and its population
Temba lies to the north of Pretoria and west of the N1 highway and road R101 to
Polokwane.
Tshwane (Pretoria) and Johannesburg are approximately 55 kilometers and 120 kilometres
from Temba respectively. Temba is about 1260 hectares in area and had a population
estimated at 69 000 in November 2007, as indicated in the records of the Temba Municipal
Offices.
The area known as Temba is shown in more detail on the accompanying map (below) of the
City of Tshwane Metropolitan Local Government (CTMLG).
Chapter 3
41
Map 3.1 North East Region of CTMLG
Chapter 3
42
3.2 Historical development of Temba and its taxi industry
3.2.1 Founders of Temba (pre 1960)
To a casual observer driving through the area, Temba is a typical semi-rural residential area,
dotted with modest houses lining both tarred and unpaved streets. There is very little local
industry and no farming activities, so employed residents of the area have to travel long
distances to reach their places of work.
Interviews and discussions with older residents still living in Temba, reveal that the
settlement came into existence in the early 1940s, with most inhabitants originating from
Masakeng near Alexandra, and later from Eastwood and Lady Selborne in Pretoria in the
1950s. These people named the new settlement “Sofa Sonke”, meaning “We are all going to
die”. The same powerless people later changed their minds and agreed to have hope and
trust in their survival in their new settlement and gave it the name of “Temba liya philisa”
translated as “Trust will make us survive”. The name Temba was then taken as the official
name of their new settlement. In the 1960s, people from Wallmannsdal, about 20 kilometres
north east of Pretoria/Tshwane were forcibly resettled in Temba.
Most inhabitants have worked for building construction companies, South African Transport
Services, the Iron and Steel Corporation, factories, shops, petrol filling stations, garages and
workshops of different types, or as domestic workers in Pretoria and Johannesburg. Some
worked in shopping complexes along the roads to these cities, others in small towns or
farms in the area. During the week, most of the employed remained near their workplace
and stay in hostels, back rooms rented from other people or servants‟ rooms on their
employer‟s property. Nevertheless, the movement of workers from Temba to the
Hammanskraal railway station, and thence to Pretoria and Johannesburg continued. People
needed transport to and from Temba and its surroundings to Pretoria, Johannesburg and
other places of work.
3.2.2 Development of modes/forms of transport in Temba (post 1960)
At first, most people walked the 7 kilometres from Temba to the Hammanskraal railway
station, with some using pirate vans at the end of the month to reach railway passenger
trains and buses at the station. The main modes of transport used to get to work in Pretoria
and Johannesburg were railway passenger trains and buses. There was also a railway bus
service from Hammanskraal via Temba and other villages to Makapanstad. This railway bus
Chapter 3
43
service was commonly called “must come back”, meaning that the bus was definitely
returning to take them, irrespective of a longer waiting time.
Interviews and discussions with elderly persons indicated that there was a developing need
for transport from villages via Temba to Hammanskraal, and on to Pretoria and
Johannesburg. Some taxi operators based in Johannesburg and Pretoria townships
originally identified this need. Some of them came from Mamelodi and Atteridgeville near
Pretoria, where 4 to 6-passenger taxi vehicles were already operating. The first 5 to 6-seater
taxis (1948 sedan Chevrolets) started operating in Temba in the late 1950s. They were
owned by a Mr. N.J. Nkona, who originally came from Atteridgeville and later settled in
Temba. These sedan taxis were registered in Pretoria and were issued with radial route
licences of 10 to 20 kilometres to operate from Temba to Hammanskraal and Temba to
Bosplaas and other villages nearby. Many more taxi transport entrepreneurs submitted
applications and radial route licences were issued, albeit at a snail‟s pace. The supply of
passenger transport was inadequate to meet the increasing demand so pirate transport and
use of private cars increasingly became an alternative form of transport to and from Temba,
Hammanskraal, Pretoria and Johannesburg.
3.2.3 People from villages and farms found new settlement in Temba
Temba continued to grow as people from villages and farms around Temba took up
residence in Temba. In the late 1960s and early 1970s the African Bus Service (ABS)
company started operating in Temba. There was also the Mazine Bus Transport Service
operating from nearby villages to the railway station at Hammanskraal in the 1970s.
Travel demand to and from villages to Hammanskraal via Temba increased. Railway bus
services, Black bus transport services and the African Bus Service were not enough to cope
with the demand for travel. The 4 to 6-seater sedan taxi transport services and pirate
transport increased at a higher rate than formal ones. According to Bosman (1989:2), the
economic growth of the taxi industry was evident from the 1970s to 1980s, when the public
passenger transport services rendered mainly by trains and buses began to be inadequate
to meet the growing Black travel needs and the demand for transport to the economic bases
of employment.
The time and distance gaps of travel between Temba as a residential area and many other
places of employment were large. For example, many people from Temba walked to and
from Hammanskraal and schools around Temba and Babelegi. People working as far as
Chapter 3
44
Rosslyn industrial sites, Pretoria and Johannesburg had commuting problems. Because of
the shortage of transport, many retrenched people used their employment packages and
seized the opportunity to buy combis to meet the transport demand, either legally or illegally.
3.2.4 Existence of Bophuthatswana 1977-1994
In 1977, Bophuthatswana came into existence as an independent state and Temba was
incorporated into it. The ABS was replaced by the Botlhaba Transport Holdings (BTH) bus
service. In the early 1980s railway passenger trains from Pretoria to Hammanskraal were
withdrawn but BTH remained in competition with the taxis in the provision of public
passenger transport services. In the same year (1977) the Road Transport Act of 1977
(No.74 of 1977) allowed taxis to increase the number of passengers from a maximum of four
to nine, including the driver.
The growth of SACTI in the late 1970s accelerated in the 1980s because it had become an
officially recognised element of the South African transport system. As discussed in Chapter
2, the Competition Board had suggested a complete deregulation of the industry and
proposed making licences and permits more readily available (McCaul, 1990:50). For
example, the number of taxi permits granted in Johannesburg rose from 401 in 1984/85 to
15 160 in 1989/90 (Khosa, 1991:235). This trend was evident in all cities, towns, townships
and rural areas of South Africa and led to an oversupply of combi-taxis on the market.
Consequently, the profit margins and quality of service of taxi businesses declined, along
with safety standards (McCaul, 1990:54).
Temba was not an exception to these trends. The Bophuthatswana homeland government
also issued a substantial number of radial licences to many applicants in Temba, with the
result that combis began to crowd the routes. The problem was exacerbated by illegal
operators.
Throughout South Africa, taxi owners started identifying their common problems and
interests and organized themselves to form organizations and associations. By then it was a
common philosophy among taxi owners that taxi associations would meet the many
challenges faced by the industry. These included the regulatory system of the government,
passenger transport competition, acquisition of land and facilities for taxi ranks, route
structures and conditions, pricing and rate making, finance and credit issues, and the need
for assistance in case of deaths of their members.
Chapter 3
45
Unfortunately, as in the rest of the country, the taxi association in Temba did not fully
consider as priorities the issues of business management, forms of ownership, corporate
and operational management, marketing of taxi transport services, public relations, taxi
vehicle selection, taxi transport subsidies, human relations, personnel management and
training, labour relations, collective bargaining and the legal and political dimensions of
transport locations.
3.2.5 Provincial Governments post 1994
After the ousting of the Bophuthatswana Government in 1994, Temba became part of the
North West Province (NWP), which in turn became involved in the advocacy of NTTT and
the eventual implementation of the TRP in Temba.
In 2006 Temba became part of the Gauteng Province (GP) and the City of Tshwane
Metropolitan Local Government (CTMLG) demarcated its area into five regions. The
following three maps illustrate the five regions of CTMLG sequentially as listed below. Map
3.5 illustrates the North East Region where Temba is located.
The main economic areas or bases of employment in Temba are Babelegi and Rosslyn
industrial sites, Pretoria, Johannesburg and other business complexes in Hammanksraal,
farms and surrounding villages. Schools and other Governmental institutions also form part
of the economic work base of Temba. As a result the taxi transport services in Temba near
Hammanskraal are now mainly linked to Mabopane Railway Station in the North West
Region of CTMLG and Pretoria in the Central Western and Eastern Regions of CTMLG.
Chapter 3
46
Map 3.2 The Central Western Region of CTMLG
Chapter 3
47
Map 3.3 The North West Region of CTMLG
Chapter 3
48
Map 3.4 The Eastern Region of CTMLG
Chapter 3
49
3.3 Taxi Associations in Temba
The main suppliers (operators) of public passenger transport services in Temba are the taxi
associations, namely the Botlhaba Bus Company and private hire transporters. This section
will examine the taxi associations in more detail.
There were four active Taxi Associations in Temba at the time this study was conducted.
These were:
Temba Taxi Association (TTA). Its taxi routes were for trips from Temba and
surrounding villages to Hammanskraal and return
Hammanskraal Taxi Organisation (HATO). Its taxi routes were for the trips from
Hammanskraal to Pretoria/Tshwane and return
Kentucky United Taxi Association (KUTA). Its taxi routes were from Hammanskraal
to Johannesburg and return
Greater North Taxi Association (GRENTA). Its taxi routes were from Hammanskraal
to Mokopane/Potgietersrust and return.
Table 3.1 Number of Taxi Associations, membership, combis and their drivers as at September 2007
Name of association Member-ship Combis Drivers Routes of operation
Temba Taxi Association (TTA) 150 464 ±464
Hammanskraal to Temba and villages around (local routes)
Hammanskraal Taxi Organisation (HATO) 68 249 ±249 Hammamskraal to
Pretoria Kentucky United Taxi Association (KUTA) 33 54 ±54 Hammanskraal to
Johannesburg
Greater North Taxi Association (GRENTA) 32 42 ±42
Hammanskraal to Mokopane and Polokwane
Total 283 809 ±809
Temba Taxi Association (TTA) was the earliest of the four to come into existence.
Prior to 1975 the Temba taxi owners loosely grouped themselves to consult
attorneys who would submit their applications for licences to transport authorities in
Pretoria. In 1975 TTA was formed, with routes endorsed in Temba and surrounding
villages. Routes from Hammanskraal to Stinkwater, Mabopane, Makapanstad,
Chapter 3
50
Pretoria (Tshwane), Potgietersrust (Mokopane) and Pietersburg(Polokwane) also
fell under the ambit of TTA.
Between 1977 and 1985, the government changed from providing full regulatory
protection to limited regulation of the public transport industry. As discussed in
Chapter 2, this meant that public passenger transport services could be sold and
purchased in a much more competitive environment (Road Transport Act No.74 of
1977). The results of limited regulation expanded the operations of TTA and it gave
rise to the other Taxi Associations in the villages around Hammanskraal and
Temba.
Following the report of the Breda Commission, the Road Transport Act of 1977 (No.
74 of 1977) opened the way for the introduction of the legal combi to be used to
carry up to eight passengers. The combi was used instead of sedan taxis and it
gradually began capturing an increasing share of the Black commuter market
(McCaul, 1990:35). This also happened in Temba.
Limited regulation of the public transport industry expanded the operations of TTA.
Automatically taxi vehicles were recapitalised, i.e. taxi owners phased out 4- to 6-
seater sedan taxi vehicles and replaced them with combis. Taxi transport became
abundantly available from 3:00 am to 11:00 pm (20 hours) every day on the TTA
taxi routes. Passenger trains with departures only at 04:00, 05:00 and 06:00 from
Hammanskraal to Pretoria lost many commuters to TTA. Botlhaba Bus Transport
was also introduced and operated around Temba to Hammanskraal and from
Hammanskraal to Pretoria. As a result, passenger trains were withdrawn in the
early 1980s, though TTA remained in competition with Botlhaba Bus Transport
Service.
The management of branch associations and operational activities became
cumbersome for a single body and a decision were made that all branch Taxi
Associations of TTA would be independent and self-supporting. The following
additional associations therefore came into existence in the early 1980s.
Hammanskraal – Pretoria Taxi Association. Its office is in Temba and it was
called the Hammanskraal Taxi Organisation (HATO)
Hammanskraal – Johannesburg Taxi Association. Its office is in Temba and it
was renamed Kentucky United Taxi Association (KUTA)
Chapter 3
51
Hammanskraal - Petersburg Taxi Association. Its office is Temba and it was
called Greater North Taxi Association (GRENTA)
Hammanskraal – Makapanstad Taxi Association. Its office is in Makapanstad
and it was named Makapanstad United Taxi Association (MAUTA)
Hammanskraal – Stinkwater – Mabopane Taxi Association. Its office is in
Stinkwater.
The last two associations will not be considered further in this study.
The Temba area was not spared the conflicts associated with taxi operations in many parts
of the country and taxi-related conflicts and violence in the Temba area and surrounding
villages also brought about an economic slump. Some legal taxi operators left the taxi
industry, and some lost their lives as illegal taxis increased and disputes over routes flared
up. The profit margin and safety and security declined, as a spike in conflict and violence in
the industry coincided with the new democratically elected government of 1994. The new
government felt compelled to act and established NTTT and TRP as an intervention strategy
to transform SACTI.
3.3.1 The situation as at the end of 2008
TTA currently operates a high number of trips on a frequent basis. Most taxis start operating
at 04:00 and stop at 18:00 in winter (14 hour spread) or 19:00 in summer (15 hours). Prior to
taxi conflicts, violence and criminality, TTA local taxi operations started at 02:00 and ended
at 23:00 (21 hours). The decline in hours of operation has had negative economic
implications for the users of the taxi transport service and has undermined the profitability of
the business. Trip frequencies have, however, increased recently due to larger numbers of
taxis on the routes and the waiting time for users has therefore decreased.
HATO operations were also curtailed due to taxi conflicts and violence. Most taxis from
Hammanskraal to Pretoria started at 03:00 and stopped operating at 20:00 (17 hours of
operation). The contraction was 4 hours due to criminal activities that increased during taxi
conflicts and wars. Nevertheless, trip frequency (if not availability) has more recently
increased due to higher demand on the Hammanskraal - Pretoria taxi route.
KUTA operations from Hammanskraal to Johannesburg were also curtailed. Prior to taxi
violence most taxis started as early as 04:00 from Hammanskraal to Johannesburg and
stopped operating as late as 21:00 (17 hours of operation). They operated for 19 hours from
Chapter 3
52
the morning until very late in the evening with a lower frequency than HATO. During taxi
conflicts KUTA was the most affected taxi association. It operated from 06:00 to 18:00, but
still with a low trip frequency. The contraction was 7 hours due to the unsafe situation.
Nevertheless, trip frequency has recently increased due to an increase in the number of
taxis on the Hammanskraal - Johannesburg taxi route(s).
Due to a more stable demand on the GRENTA routes from Hammanskraal to Mokopane
(Potgietersrust) and Polokwane (Pietersburg), there were no fluctuations in service levels.
On some days there may have been only one or two trips from Hammanskraal to Polokwane
or even fewer. Currently the association has operational problems due to divided taxi
owners, some being based in Hammanskraal and others in Mokopane.
3.4 Summary
Chapter 3 has described Temba, the area where the study took place. It presented its
location, its historical and economic development and the establishment of taxi associations
in the area. It characterized the Temba taxi industry as a microcosm of SACTI and indicated
that the area has been affected by conflict and violence in the same way as many other
areas. The study now investigates perceptions of taxi owners in Temba about the economic
effects that are likely to accrue to them due to the TRP. To this end, Chapter 4 presents the
methodology (procedures and methods) of the study which was considered to be
appropriate to produce findings and recommendations that could be put forward to address
the problems faced by the entire taxi industry across the country.
53
CHAPTER 4
METHODOLOGY (PROCEDURES AND METHODS) OF THE STUDY
4. Introduction
The purpose of this study is to investigate some perceptions of taxi owners in Temba with
regard to the TRP. Chapter 4 will therefore firstly clarify the meaning of “perception” and
“perceivers”, in order to design an appropriate methodology (procedures and methods) for
this study, then present the procedures and methods used to investigate and assess
perceptions about the TPR amongst members of taxi associations in Temba.
4.1 Conceptual clarification
It is important to understand the meaning of perception so as to design appropriate
procedures and methods for the study.
According to the Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary (2000:864), “perception” means the
ability to understand the true nature of something or a situation. According to Scott,
Warshaw and Taylor (1985:133), perceptions are actions taken by a motivated consumer as
influenced by his or her senses about the situation. This implies that perception determines
people‟s behaviour (Nicolsen, 1995:409).
The importance of perception lies in the idea that people‟s behaviour is based on their
perception of what reality is and not on reality itself. Perceptions are critical in that they
represent interactions of feelings towards something or a situation and can be regarded as a
general predisposition towards actions. Different people may look at the same thing yet
perceive it differently (Scott, et.al., 1985:133). A number of factors operate to shape, or
sometimes distort, perception. These factors may reside in the perceiver, in the thing being
perceived and in the context of the situation in which the perceptions create a motive.
Chapter 4
54
A motive is an aroused need, which in turn acts as a force that activates behaviour intended
to satisfy that aroused need. According to Stanton and Futrell (1987:114), perceptions
influence the direction or path of behavioural action. Perception is therefore defined as the
power whereby human beings receive stimuli (information) through the five senses,
recognise information and then assign a meaning to it. In other words, perception is the
meaning people give to stimuli or the way they interpret stimuli. This interpretation is shaped
by the socio-cultural and socio-economic environment and by psychological conditions and
educational influences. Behaviour, in turn, is determined by what stimuli one responds to
and how one interprets them. Behaviour is thus determined by our perceptions (Stanton &
Futrell, 1987:114).
The key perceivers in this research study are taxi owners. The things perceived are the
legacy created by SACTI and its operational behaviour versus the TRP as based on the
NTTT recommendations. Their perceptions are also influenced by the thinking and the
legacy created in the environment in which they live. More importantly, perceptions of taxi
owners are influenced by socio-economic factors such as profit making, cost savings, safety
and the welfare of people in the transportation sector. In this context, partnership between
taxi owners and government is indispensable.
This study draws on the theory that perceptive opinions of taxi owners can provide valuable
inputs into the process of addressing problems in the implementation of the TRP. It is
therefore essential to use some perceptions of members of taxi associations found in Temba
to establish their opinions about the legacy created by SACTI versus the TRP strategy to
transform SACTI into a “new” taxi industry.
4.2 Methodology
The objective of this section is to explain firstly the research design, and secondly the
research procedures and methods used to achieve its aims as set out in Chapter 1.
4.2.1 Research design
Taxi owners operate their taxi businesses in a complex situation leading to equally complex
behavioural patterns. To be more confident of the results of the study, it was necessary to
use a combination of quantitative and qualitative designs. The quantitative approach was
undertaken through a structured survey while in-depth interviews formed the basis of the
qualitative methodology.
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55
In the quantitative design, standardized measurement procedures are used to assign
numbers to observations and statistics are used to summarise findings and results (Dooley,
1984:288). The quantitative researcher, therefore, believes that the best way of measuring
the properties of certain phenomena is through quantitative measurement that assigns
numbers to the perceived qualities of things (Babbie & Mouton, 2001:49). The emphasis is
on the idea that quantification makes the observation more explicit (Babbie & Mouton,
2001:36).
On the other hand, qualitative design involves interactive and non-interactive approaches.
The interactive design is a mode of inquiry in which researchers collect data in face-to-face
situations by interacting with selected persons in their natural settings and describes and
analyses people‟s individual and collective actions, beliefs, thoughts and perceptions
(McMillan & Schumacher, 2001:395). Its non-interactive design involves concept and
historical analysis.
Parasuraman (1991:254) states that while the terms “qualitative” and “quantitative”
distinguish between two different forms of research, the dichotomy (i.e., two contrasted
groups) is not quite so clear-cut. This means the interpretation of quantitative data is often of
a qualitative nature. The combined use of various approaches in research, sometimes
referred to as triangulation, is important in that it employs the use of more than one method
and data source, such as questionnaires, interviews, in-depth discussions, analysis of
documents and materials. It also involves use of more than one observer or information-rich
respondent, and draws on several different theories.
A combined quantitative and qualitative (triangulation) approach which involves a survey and
in-depth interview design and multiple methods was the most appropriate method to use for
the intended purpose and available resources of this study.
4.2.2 Research procedures and methods
Methods, or particular ways of doing something, included the following:
a) Drawing up the questionnaire (Annexure D)
The questionnaire had five sections:
Section A: Biographical and demographic data
Section B: Data on taxi business
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56
Section C: Data on the TRP
Section D: Respondent‟s answers to open questions on the TRP data and
Structured interview schedule.
b) Drawing a sample to pilot the study
A sample was drawn up to pilot the study, consisting of information-rich participants who
were knowledgeable about the matters and issues of the taxi industry and the TRP. The pilot
study was necessary to determine whether the methodology, sampling and instrument
(Annexure D) were adequate and appropriate for the main inquiry. It was therefore
necessary to pre-test the feasibility of the study by exploring the actual situation where the
investigation would be executed in relation to the objectives of the study, resources
(finances, materials, transport, tools/equipment and assistant data collectors) to be used and
the time needed to conduct it. It drew on literature and treatises dealing with SACTI and the
TRP (Chapter 2), the experience of experts in providing comprehensive information on
SACTI and the TRP, and the measuring instruments (questionnaires and interview
schedules).
The pilot study enabled the researcher to write, edit and modify all items that caused
confusion and misunderstanding prior to the main study. The budget of resources was also
appropriately estimated.
c) Drawing up the study sample
The sample size was determined in accordance with De Vos (2002:201), as reflected in
Table 4.1 (below):
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57
Table 4.1 Guidelines for Sample Size Population % suggested Sample size
20 30 50
100 200 500
1 000 10 000
100 000 200 000
1 100 80 64 45 32 20 14 4,5 2 1
2 20 24 32 45 64 100 140 450 2 000 2 000
Source: De Vos 2002:201
The sample consisted of 100 respondents drawn from the 283 registered members of taxi
associations found in Temba (Table 3.1).
This sample was drawn by using the probability random sampling method (De Vos,
2002:204). Additional respondents were obtained by purposeful and snowball non-
probability sampling methods (McMillan & Schumacher, 2001:166-175).
d) Collection of data
As outlined in Chapter 1, the study drew on standardised questionnaire and interview
schedules as discussed above, with discussions, written transcripts, photographs and
observations as sources of primary data. Libraries and the Internet were the starting points
for collecting secondary data.
e) Administering the questionnaire and schedule
Even an excellent research survey plan, with the best designed sample, may be of little use
if the administering of field operations is not performed correctly. A proper research design
will eliminate numerous sources of error, but careful execution of the field work is necessary
to produce results without substantial error. Against this background, the researcher used
two to assist in using questionnaires to collect data. These people were carefully recruited,
selected and trained on how to make initial contact with respondents and secure the
interviews; administer the questionnaire and clarify survey questions if responses needed
clarification; record responses that were not covered in the questionnaire; and courteously
terminate the interview with respondents.
Chapter 4
58
Careful supervision of data collectors (fieldworkers) was done. Questionnaires were
gathered each day, edited and primarily focused on the richness of the data to give valuable
information. This study addressed the reliability (consistency) of the interview instrument by
using a pilot study to determine the clarity and understanding of the questionnaire and
training of assistant interviewers in interviewing techniques.
f) Data analysis procedures and interpretation
The purpose of conducting a qualitative study is to produce findings on which to report, with
qualitative data analysis transforming voluminous raw data into findings and valuable
information. The study has, therefore, made data analysis easier by recording collected data
according to plan and organising and managing it accordingly. The researcher wrote memos
explicitly and searched for alternative explanations, whilst generating categories, themes
and patterns prior to coding the data, making a preliminary analysis and drafting a report.
The aim of the research study is to analyse data which was mainly collected by
questionnaires, interviews with written memos and transcripts, maps, observations and
discussions. It is important to note that data analysis is a specialized area of any research
procedure, therefore, a software package for Social Science (SPSS) was used to present
the information in either pie-chart or bar-chart form (or both).
4.3 Summary
This chapter has described a survey as a relevant and appropriate design for the purposes
of the study, with triangulation of quantitative and qualitative approaches to complement one
another in analyzing and interpreting the collected data through interviews, discussions and
observations.
The next chapter (Chapter 5) presents the raw data that was obtained in the interviews with
respondents, and provides an analysis of these findings.
59
CHAPTER 5
ANALYSIS AND TRIANGULATION OF DATA
5. Introduction
Having outlined in Chapter 4 the procedures and methods used as the basis to obtain the
data, Chapter 5 describes the findings in detail. The collected data is analysed and
interpreted, while the questionnaires, interviews and discussions that took place with taxi
owners (respondents) are triangulated. There is also a report on the empirical investigation
in the form of a cross-sectional survey to validate information. This is a survey that gathers
raw data only once from a sample and triangulates it with interviews and discussions with
other non-sampled taxi owners of the same associations. The survey was conducted to
address the following research objectives:
To determine a profile of taxi owners based in Temba
To determine the extent to which taxi owners are knowledgeable about the TRP
To assess taxi owners‟ perceptions of the implementation of the TRP.
The study used questionnaires, interviews and discussions with the respondents (sampled
taxi owners) to collect primary raw data, which was supplemented by the combined use of
descriptive, inferential and evaluative observations and Internet and media sources for
increased reliability.
The questionnaire was used to collect data through the use of multiple-choice variable
statements with and/or YES/AGREE or NO/DISAGREE questions. These permitted the use
of quantitative data analysis, that is, the frequency of responses to be plotted and statistically
analysed and interpreted in terms of measures of central tendencies (mean/average, mode
and median), measures of variability (range, standard deviation, variance and normal curve)
and measures of correlation if necessary. The collected data was divided into three
categories:
Biographical data that covered aspects of gender, age, formal education level,
home ownership and status of financial position of taxi owners and their taxi
businesses
Data on general knowledge and experiences of taxi owners about SACTI
Chapter 5
60
Data on specific knowledge of taxi owners about the TRP and assessment of their
perceptions on the resultant economic effects that is likely to accrue to them due to
the implementation of TRP.
5.1 Biographical and business data of taxi owners in Temba
5.1.1 Introduction
The biographical and business data gave valuable information on the respondents who
participated in the study. The information helped to establish the profile of taxi owners in
regard to gender, age, education, home ownership and discussions about their financial
position in relation to SACTI and the TRP. These interviews were carried out between
November 2007 and January 2009.
The survey consisted of 47 questions divided into five categories, including biographical and
demographic data, details of the taxi business and details of respondents‟ attitude to the
TRP. A specimen questionnaire is included as Annexure D.
5.1.2 Gender of taxi owners in Temba
The responses from the sample indicated that 76% of taxi owners were male as against 24%
female.
Table 5.1 Gender of the taxi owners (in the taxi industry) in Temba
Statistics Gender NValid Missing
91 3
Statistics
Frequency Percent Cumulative
Percent Valid Male Female Total Missing System Total
69 22 91 3
94
73.4 23.4 96.8 3.2
100.0
75.8 100.0
Chapter 5
61
Figure 5.1 Gender of the taxi owners (in the taxi industry) in Temba
Figure 5.1 indicates that the taxi industry in Temba is dominated by males. Some females
were interviewed, with several indicating that they had inherited their taxi businesses from
their deceased husbands. They complained that it was not easy for them to run the business
and they doubted that other women would join them in the industry.
5.1.3 Ages of taxi owners in Temba
Both male and female taxi owners in Temba fell into the following age profile:
Table 5.2 Ages of the (sampled) taxi owners in Temba
Age Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent
Valid 21 to 30 31 to 40 41 to 50 51 to 60 61 & above Total
4 5
29 28 28 94
4.3 5.3 30.9 29.8 29.8
100.0
4.3 9.6 40.4 70.2
100.0
Gender
Missing
Female
Male
Chapter 5
62
Figure 5.2 Ages of the (sampled) taxi owners in Temba
The age group between 21 and 30 years made up less than 5% of owners, and ages
between 31 and 40 less than 6% of the total. Most of the young taxi owners had not initiated
their own taxi businesses, but had inherited them from their parents. Young people, between
21 and 40 years of age who inherited taxi businesses from their parents made up less than
10% of taxi owners. Some of the young owners were less interested in taking over taxi
businesses from their parents, some citing the reason that they wanted to work
independently of their parents because partnership contracts with them were not properly
formalised. Those “outsiders” who were interested in investing in the industry said that they
were “locked out” by the entry fees demanded by the associations and by the government
regulatory laws.
It was found that over 90% of the respondents were over 41 years old, and perhaps worrying
that so many were above 61. Some of those interviewed indicated that they could not cope
with the challenges of the TRP because their physical as well as intellectual abilities were
weakening due to old age. They also indicated that as they grew older they would have
fewer or no alternative job opportunities, which meant that they were confined to the taxi
industry.
Some of them had only one or two taxis, which were to be scrapped if they were to receive
R50 000 and make a deposit on a new the TRP compliant taxi. They indicated that if a
deposit of R50 000 were made for a new the TRP-compliant taxi it would be difficult for them
to raise the money for installments, estimated at R8 000 per month. Worse, some of them
said that they were no longer creditworthy for larger amounts of money with commercial
Age
Age
61 & Above51 to 6041 to 5031 to 4021 to 30
Fre
quen
cy
40
30
20
10
0
Chapter 5
63
banks, due to their age. They therefore showed an unwillingness to purchase new TRP-
compliant taxis.
5.1.4 Level of formal school education of taxi owners in Temba
School education is designed to lay a solid foundation for all skills. It is a process of
increasing knowledge and developing conceptual, interpersonal and technical skills that
would make the scholar understand and be able to process information about his/her
environment. The study assessed formal school education levels of taxi owners in Temba in
order to establish the extent to which their educational foundation could support the
understanding of why the government had to intervene to regulate the taxi industry, and
therefore initiate the TRP strategy to transform SACTI.
Table 5.3 School education levels of taxi owners in Temba as at 2007/8
Statistics School education NValid Missing
87 7
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent
Valid Below Std 8/Grade 10 Std 9/Grade 11 Std 10/Grade 12 Total Missing System Total
39 22 26 87 7
94
41.5 23.4 27.7 92.6 7.4
100.0
44.8 70.1
100.0
Chapter 5
64
Figure 5.3 School education levels of taxi owners in Temba as at 2007/8
Of the participants, 94 responded to the questionnaire but 7 did not complete questions
about their educational school level, leaving 87 (92,6%) who did. It was found that 45% had
reached Standard 8 (equivalent to Grade 10), while 25% had reached Standard 9
(equivalent to Grade 11), and 30% had reached Standard 10 (equivalent to Grade 12). None
indicated having either a technical college or university qualification. Nor did they indicate
having any Adult Based Education Training at certificate level. This shows that generally the
basic school educational level of most taxi owners may have to be raised significantly for
them to understand concepts of regulatory intervention of the government in dealing with
socio-economic issues in the taxi industry. It further implies that a substantial amount of
money would be needed to train taxi owners and boost their conceptual, interpersonal and
managerial skills to cope with transformational policies and Acts of Government. Because it
is not easy for them to understand regulatory strategies of the government, they are always
in doubt about, and fear of, anything that may affect their business. This would contribute to
their suspicion of any initiatives taken by the authorities.
5.1.5 Home ownership of taxi owners in Temba
There was a question in the survey about ownership of houses to try and establish the
economic value of taxi businesses. Only 39 out of 94 (41.5%) respondents answered the
question; thus 55 out of 94 (58.5%) did not respond. Interviews with some of them indicated
School Education
Grade 12 Grade 11 Below Grade 10
50
40
30
20
Chapter 5
65
that the question was sensitive to them in that it required information about their private
possessions and financial positions of their taxi businesses.
Figure 5.4 Home ownership of taxi owners in Temba in 2007/8
Of the 39 respondents to the question, 33 (85%) lived in houses owned by themselves which
were neither bonded nor rented. The rented, bonded and RDP home ownership categories
were very low, that is 2% lived in rented houses, 2% in bonded houses and 2% in the RDP
ones. Those who lived in their own accommodation tended to be older and had been in the
taxi business for a longer time. Interviews and discussions with some of them indicated that
in the 1980s the taxi industry was still highly profitable, with some owners becoming
relatively wealthy and so able to afford farms and suburban houses near the cities.
5.1.6 Financial position and performance of taxi businesses in Temba
With regard to their financial position, very few (only 24 out of 94, or 25% of the
respondents) answered the questionnaire, while 75% did not. Interviews and discussions
with some indicated that most of their taxi businesses were sole (one man) businesses and
that the financial position of the business was not clearly separated from their personal
finances. Furthermore, it was indicated that their management of financial records was not
properly done in accordance with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP).
Nevertheless, they indicated that they did keep records of expenses and operating costs for
tax and other management purposes. They also indicated that very few of them used
bookkeepers to draw up their financial statements.
Rented ( 2, 2.1%) Bonded ( 2, 2.1%)
Own (33, 35.1%)
RDP (2, 2.1%)
(55, 58.5%)
Housing Share of Taxi Owners in Temba
Chapter 5
66
In discussion, most owners indicated that they were managing their businesses themselves.
When asked about the financial position of their businesses in regard to property, most
indicated that they used their homes as “land and buildings” of their businesses. Two homes
of taxi owners were visited and it was found that their home premises were full of taxis and
scrapped combis. The second home had a big garage to park taxis and store equipment.
They indicated that their land and homes did not belong to their businesses.
Most of the owners had tools and equipment and were able to estimate the value of their
equipment. They also knew how to ask vehicle dealers to estimate book values of their
vehicles. It was difficult for them to disclose their bank balance, nevertheless some gave an
estimate of cash-in-hand. They were also able to trace their debtors, while most of their own
current liabilities (their creditors are commercial banks) were for financing and purchasing
their taxi vehicles.
Interviews with some owners indicated that they were not sure of the income and profit they
made per vehicle. Their drivers were the first recipients of their income and therefore they
were not certain of the exact return of income per vehicle per week, per month or per year.
They did not calculate their profit but merely deposited the income in a bank. Their own
home expenses and that of the business were fused together and they estimated their
income when paying tax. Even though most taxi owners lack a professional approach to
handling the finances of their businesses, some showed considerable skill in doing so
efficiently. Some respondents explained that they re-invested very slowly in new taxi
vehicles. Re-investment was generally made on cheap and used vehicles. Some were
bought from scrap yard businesses and rebuilt as taxi vehicles.
The scenario and concept of cash flow was discussed with some of the owners and it was
revealed that they did not have a cashbook to indicate their receipts and payments or to
determine their cash flow. Most of their financial activities were crudely recorded, but gave a
general idea of the finances of their businesses. Most of them claimed to be unaware of the
concept of “the management of the cash flow and statement thereof”.
5.1.7 Years of experience and sources of funding of taxi owners in Temba
Although most taxi owners seemed to have limited conceptual and interpersonal skills, they
had survived quite a number of crises. At least 88% of taxi owners in Temba had been
running taxi businesses for five years or more.
Chapter 5
67
Table 5.4 Temba taxi owners and their number of years in the business. Number of Years Running Taxis
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent
Valid 1 2-4 5-7 8-10 11 & more Total
7 4
17 19 47 94
7.4 4.3 18.1 20.2 50.0
100.0
7.4 11.7 29.8 50.0
100.0
Figure 5.5 Temba taxi owners and their number of years in the business
Only 7.4% were new entrants in the industry in 2007, but 4.3% had two to five years
experience, 18.1% had five to seven years, 20.2% had eight to ten and 50% had 11 years
and more. After numerous interviews and discussions with several more experienced and
less experienced owners it was found that most of the less experienced were economically
weaker than the more experienced ones. They further indicated that most of the new
entrants owned one or two old taxis and did not have the financial means to scrap their old
taxis to make a deposit for a new TRP compliant taxi vehicle. They indicated a higher
probability of resisting the TRP because most of them did not have alternative businesses to
pursue. They were “locked into” their taxi businesses.
Number of Years Running Taxis
11 & more 8-10 5-7 2-4 1
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Chapter 5
68
The sources of their initial investment in the taxi business are indicated below:
Table 5.5 Sources of initial investment of taxi businesses in Temba Source of Initial Investment
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent
Valid Income Savings Savings & Loans Package Income Pension Total Missing System Total
28 13 41 1
83 11 94
29.8 13.8 43.6 1.1 88.3 11.7
100.0
33.7 49.4 98.8
100.0
Figure 5.6 Sources of initial investment of taxi businesses in Temba
Of the respondents, 33.7% invested from saved income, most of whom were in the older age
group, while 15.7% invested from loans. Most had joined the industry in the 1980s, during
which decade the commercial banks recognized that the taxi industry was experiencing an
economic boom. Another 49.4% invested from private income, savings and retrenchment
packages. This group of investors was largely responsible for the growth in the taxi industry,
having entered either illegally or legally while searching for an alternative employment.
Only 1.2% invested in taxi businesses from pension funds. This group indicated that they
joined the industry to keep themselves active in their old age and to support their
grandchildren, most of whose parents were unemployed. They mentioned that with a lump
sum of pension funds in their hands it was easy to start a taxi business and earn a
Pension Package Income Savings & Loans Income Savings
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Source of Initial Investment
Chapter 5
69
reasonable income from the day of commencement. In certain instances taxi operations
started illegally whilst the owners were waiting for licences.
5.1.8 Number of taxis currently owned by individual taxi owners in Temba
Figure 5.7 Number of taxi vehicles owned by individual taxi owners (November 2007) in Temba
The number of taxis owned as of November 2007 to January 2008 by the sampled taxi
owners were reflected in five categories, indicated in Figure 5.8 (below).
Group 1 - 19 % of respondents owned one taxi vehicle
Group 2 - 31 % of respondents owned 2-4 taxi vehicles
Group 3 - 35 % of respondents owned 5-7 taxi vehicles
Group 4 - 12 % of respondents owned 8-10 taxi vehicles
Group 5 - 3 % of respondents owned 11 and more taxi vehicles.
Interviews and discussions with individuals in each group indicated that groups 3 to 5 (i.e.,
five or more taxis) showed a higher probability of supporting the TRP. Most of them were
willing and ready to scrap some of their taxi vehicles. They indicated that they would scrap
old models that were probably valued at less than R50 000. Some individuals revealed that a
certain wealthy taxi owner owned 20 vehicles and had scrapped more than 10 of these to
benefit economically from the TRP. For scrapping 10 old taxis he was able to make
R500 000. In other words, the TRP scrapping allowance economically advantaged the more
11 & more 8-10 4-7 2-4 1
40
30
20
10
0
Number of Taxis Owned
Chapter 5
70
well-off taxi owners but disadvantage those with one or two taxi vehicles as they would have
to wait without earning any taxi income during the process.
Most of group 1 and some in group 2 perceived the TRP as a strategy of the government
and richer taxi owners to get rid of the poorer owners. One individual in group 1 gave a
detailed scenario of his negative perception of the TRP scrapping allowance: “I have only
one 1986 Toyota Super 16 and three children, two in primary and one in high school. My
wife is not working. I drive the taxi; I am making an average of R400 per day for seven days
a week. I am making a weekly income of R2 800 minus operational costs to make a living for
my family. If I scrap this taxi I have to wait to get R50 000 to make a deposit for a TRP
compliant taxi vehicle. The big questions are what will happen to my family during the
waiting period and how am I going to afford paying a deposit of R50 000 and a monthly
installment of more R7 000 for the new TRP compliant taxi vehicle? The worst thing about
this is that I am not creditworthy in terms of making a loan at the commercial banks and I
cannot find alternative employment.” The respondent further indicated that most of groups 1
and 2 were likely to resist the TRP. This implied that small owners were more resistant to the
TRP than larger ones.
5.1.9 Makes of taxis owned by taxi owners of Taxi Associations in Temba
As indicated above, the makes of taxis operating in Temba as at November 2007 were
predominantly Toyota and Nissan. Figure 5.8 (below) shows the dominance of this marque
over others:
Figure 5.8 Makes of taxi vehicles operating in Temba
MAKE
otherKia
MitsibushiMazda
FordIsuzu
VolkswagenNissan
Toyota
Num
ber o
f Veh
icle
s
100
80
60
40
20
0
Chapter 5
71
80% of the respondents favoured Toyota and interviews and discussions with most taxi
owners confirmed that Toyota was their favourite make, with sentimental value to them.
Nissan was the second favourite, followed by others which were less favoured. The following
models of Toyota have been in evidence at all taxi ranks in Temba and Hammanskraal:
1979 Toyota Hi-Ace
1984 Toyota Hi-Ace
1986 Toyota Super 16
1993 Toyota Venture
1999 Toyota Super 10
2002 Toyota Super 16
2004 Toyota Condor
2005 Toyota Siyaya
2007 Toyota Quantum.
5.1.10 Purchases and ages of taxis found in Temba
Figure 5.9 (below) shows purchase patterns and ages of the taxis in Temba:
Figure 5.9 Patterns of Purchases of Taxi vehicles in Temba from 1980 to 2007
Year of the Model
2006-20072000-2005
1996-19991990-1995
1986-19891980-1985
Before 1979
Num
ber o
f Veh
icle
50
40
30
20
10
0
Chapter 5
72
After the announcement of the TRP in 1999, purchases of taxis started to increase, as
indicated by the year of models (Figure 5.9, above). Nevertheless, older models continued to
operate and even though purchases of new taxis increased, there were still many models of
the 1980s – 1990s (some 20 years old) on Temba taxi routes, which were more numerous
than the models of the 2000 – 2008 period (some already eight years old).
5.1.11 Passenger capacity of taxis operating in Temba
Table 5.6 (below) shows passenger capacity of taxis in Temba as of November 2007:
Table 5.6 Passenger capacity of taxis operated in November 2007. Statistics
Passenger capacity
NValid Missing
89 5
Passenger Capacity
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent
Valid 10 11 to 16 Total Missing System Total
15 74 89 5
94
16.0 78.7 94.7 5.3
100.0
16.9 100.0
Of the taxis that operate in Temba, respondents indicated that 78% were 11 to 16-seater
combis and 16% were 10-seaters. Most 9 to 10-seater combis operated short route
distances of 10 to 30 kilometres, while the 11 to 16-seaters were operating on the medium
and longer routes of 31 or more kilometres. Most experienced taxi owners perceived that
bigger combis were ideal for medium and longer distances and proposed that TRP could
have piloted or started with one longer distance route in each province, then followed by
medium and perhaps shorter distances later. In-depth triangulated discussions with them
indicated that TRP could have been divided into three sub-projects, starting firstly with:
Recapitalisation of longer distance taxi operators, followed by
Recapitalisation of medium distance operators, and lastly
Recapitalising short distance operators.
Chapter 5
73
5.1.12 Trip frequency of taxi owners in Temba
Respondents were asked to indicate how many trips their taxis made per day on the routes
that they serviced.
Table 5.7 Number of trips per day to different destinations from Temba Statistics
Number op trips per day
Number of accidents
NValid Missing
92 2
72 22
Number of trips per day
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent
Valid 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Total Missing System Total
5 3
26 4 1
11 20
8 14 92
2 94
5.3 3.2
27.7 4.3 1.1
11.7 21.3 8.5
14.9 97.9 2.1
100.0
5.4 8.7 37.0 41.3 42.4 54.3 76.1 84.8
100.0
Figure 5.10 Number of trips per day to different destinations from Temba
Number of Trips per Day
Number of Trips per Day
1098765432
Per
cent
30
20
10
0
Chapter 5
74
Taxis operating on local short distance routes (5-15 kilometres), such as Temba –
Hammanskraal and villages around Temba – Hammanskraal indicated a high rate of trip
frequency (between 5-10 trips per day), with a shorter waiting time of around 10 minutes
during weekends and around 15 minutes on weekdays. Waiting times were determined by
the fluctuating travel needs of the passengers. If they were queuing at the taxi ranks the
waiting time would be relatively short but if there were only a few the waiting time would be
longer. This was because drivers operating over longer distances did not want to go without
passengers between point A and point B. This applied to taxis operating from
Hammanskraal to Pretoria, which waited until they were fully loaded. The number of taxi
passengers is therefore a major determinant of the waiting time for taxis for longer distances
(60 kilometres or more). For medium distances of 20 to 60 kilometers, and shorter distances
of below 20 kilometres, drivers take a chance when they leave taxi rank A with few or no
passengers to travel to taxi rank B where passengers might be queuing for taxi transport.
Taxis operating on local short distance routes from Temba and surrounding villages to
Hammanskraal Kopanong taxi rank showed a high rate of trip frequency, with mostly less
than 10 minutes waiting time. Respondents indicated that they made a better income in the
early and late hours of the day by charging flat rate fares. Those operating on medium
distances from Hammanskraal to Pretoria (45-55 kilometers) and Hammanskraal to
Johannesburg showed a lower rate of trip frequency (2-4 trips per day and averaging 15 and
more minutes waiting time during weekends and 30 minutes or more on weekdays.
Hammanskraal to Mokopane/Polokwane (150-250 kilometers) indicated a very low rate of
trip frequency (0-2 trips per day), also with as much as an hour or more waiting time during
quiet periods.
Interviews and discussions indicated that there were many taxis on routes and as a result
many of the trips were not fully loaded, so earning lower income and narrowing the profit
margins. Some had financial difficulties in paying their installment for new taxis, another of
the factors that retarded the TRP progress or caused taxi owners to resist its
implementation.
Chapter 5
75
Number of accidents of taxi owners in Temba
Table 5.8 Number of accidents Number of Accidents
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent
Valid 2 3 4 5 6 Total Missing System Total
19 15 16 14 8
72 22 94
20.2 16.0 17.0 14.9 8.5 76.6 23.4
100.0
26.4 47.2 69.4 88.9
100.0
Figure 5.11 Number of accidents
Out of 72 taxi owners who responded to this question, every one (77% of the 94 survey
participants) had been in an accident. In fact, all had been in accidents at least twice in
2006/7, and most had been in 3 to 4, some even 6 accidents in 2006/7. The accidents were
not only minor but also fatal.
5.1.13 Causes of accidents recorded by taxi owners in Temba
With regard to the accidents in which the Temba owners‟ taxis were involved, outlined in the
previous section, this section highlights possible causes.
6 5 4 3 2
30
20
10
0
Chapter 5
76
Table 5.9 Possible causes of taxi accidents Statistics
Possible causes of accidents
Valid Missing
72 22
Possible causes of accidents
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent
Valid Negligent driver Mechanical Condition Negligent Motorists Unknown Total Missing System Total
28 24 8
12 72 22 94
29.8 25.5 8.5 12.8 76.6 23.4
100.0
38.9 72.2 83.3
100.0
Figure 5.12 Possible causes of taxi accidents
According to the respondents, accidents were mainly attributed to negligent driving (39%),
mechanical condition of taxi vehicles (33%) and negligence of other motorists (11%). “Other”
causes contributed to 17% of the accidents.
Even though the TRP has improved the road safety situation to a certain degree, some well-
off taxi owners indicated that it was vital that the industry should have taxi driving schools
that would issue accredited taxi driving certificates to improve the situation. They proposed
50
40
30
20
10
0 Negligent Mechanical Negligent Unknown Driver Condition Motorist
Possible Cause of Accidents
Chapter 5
77
that the TRP should be much clearer on the issue of driving skill development for drivers.
Even though respondents claimed that new taxis had fewer accidents, the fact remained that
some were involved in accidents due to negligent driving. They further indicated that most of
the taxi drivers were “locked into” the taxi industry because they had no skills for other
alternative self-employment or for other available jobs in the labour market.
5.1.14 Understanding of the aims of the TRP by taxi owners in Temba
The majority of the Temba taxi owners indicated in their answers to the questionnaire and
during interviews and discussions that:
They were aware that it was the responsibility of the government to formulate laws,
policies and regulations to regulate the total transport system, including the taxi
transport system (70% of the respondents)
They knew about the TRP and its aims of transforming the “old” taxi industry into a
“new” taxi industry (94% of the respondents)
They found the TRP concept to be clear and understandable (96% of the
respondents).
Table 5.10 Understanding of the TRP by taxi owners in Temba TRP clear and understandable
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent
Valid Yes No Total Missing System Total
85 4
89 5
94
90.4 4.3
94.7 5.3
100.0
95.5 100.0
Out of the 94 respondents, 85 (90%) indicated an understanding of the TRP but felt that
there was a problem with its implementation.
Chapter 5
78
5.1.15 Phasing out of 9 to 16-seater “old” combis by the owners in Temba
Table 5.11 Knowledge displayed by respondents about phasing out of 9 to16-seater “old” combis
Knowledge of TRP to phase out 9- to16-seaters
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent
Valid Yes No Total Missing System Total
85 5
90 4
94
90.4 5.3
95.7 4.3
100.0
94.4 100.0
The table above indicates that 94.4% of the respondents knew that the TRP was aimed at
phasing out 9- to16-seater “old” taxis and replacing them with the TRP compliant “new”
ones.
Of these respondents:
50% indicated that the aims of the TRP were not easy to implement or attain
100% indicated that they knew about the existence of SANTACO, their provincial,
regional and local councils, and indicated that they fully participated in electing their
council members
80% indicated they had permits and operating licences.
5.1.16 Operating licences of taxi owners in Temba
Table 5.12 Taxi owners (respondents) having taxi operating licences
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent
Valid Yes No Total Missing System Total
73 19 92 2
94
77.7 20.2 97.9 2.1
100.0
79.3 100.0
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Figure 5.13 Taxi owners (respondents) having taxi operating licences
From the answers of the respondents it seems that the majority of taxi owners in Temba had
applied for operating licences. Of the respondents, 77% of taxi owners had operating
licences.
5.1.17 Income tax compliance by taxi owners in Temba
The data provided in Figure 5.14 (below) shows the Temba taxi owners‟ compliance with tax
requirements in the percentage of the respondents that had registered to pay tax (98%).
Table 5.13 Compliance with tax requirements of taxi owners in Temba
Taxi businesses registered to pay tax
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent
Valid Yes No Total Missing System Total
90 2
92 2
94
95.7 2.1
97.9 2.1
100.0
97.8 100.0
No
Missing
Yes Taxi owners with operating licences
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Figure 5.14 Compliance with tax requirements of taxi owners in Temba
98% of the respondents claimed to be tax compliant.
5.1.18 Registration of taxi drivers (employees) by taxi owners in Temba
The data provided in Table 5.14 (below) shows the Temba taxi owners‟ willingness to
register their employees and the percentage of the respondents that had registered their
drivers (99%).
Table 5.14 Respondents‟ willingness to register their taxi drivers
Good for taxi owners to register drivers
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent
Valid Yes No Total Missing System Total
91 1
92 2
94
96.8 1.1
97.9 2.1
100.0
98.9 100.0
Therefore, 99% of the respondents indicated that it was “good” for owners to register their
drivers.
Taxi business registered to pay tax
Missing
Yes
No
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5.1.19 Forms of business favoured by taxi owners in Temba
The preferences of the respondents regarding the close corporation as business form are
shown in Table 5.15:
Table 5.15 Respondents in favour of Close Corporations
Close corporations are economically good
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent
Valid Yes No Total Missing System Total
65 23 88 6
94
69.1 24.5 93.6 6.4
100.0
93.9 100.0
Of these respondents, 69% were in favour of close corporations (CCs). Although not shown
in the above table, 100% were in favour of private companies and 50% were in favour of
public companies. The implication is that they regarded the abovementioned forms of
businesses as helpful in assisting them to receive subsidies from the government to improve
the efficiency of their taxi businesses.
5.1.20 Taxi co-operatives and the opinion of taxi owners in Temba
Table 5.16 Respondents in favour of taxi co-operatives
Taxi cooperatives are good
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent
Valid Yes No Total Missing System Total
91 1
92 2
94
96.8 1.1
9739 2.1
100.0
98.9 100.0
Of the respondents, 99% indicated a need for establishment of taxi cooperatives, or felt that
they were a good idea.
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5.1.21 Scrapping of taxis (combis)
With regard to the purchasing of TRP compliant taxi vehicles, the respondents answered as
follows:
65% indicated a willingness to purchase TRP compliant taxi vehicles
31% indicated that they were still undecided
4% indicated that they would definitely not purchase TRP compliant taxi vehicles.
Figure 5.15 (below) indicates the number of taxis scrapped by the respondents in Temba to
receive R50 000. 25% had scrapped one taxi, 48% two, 23% three and 1% four or more.
Figure 5.15 Number of taxis scrapped to receive R50 000
4 2 1
60
50
40
30
20
10
0 3 5
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83
5.1.22 TRP compliant taxis bought by taxi owners in Temba
Figure 5.16 Number of new TRP compliant taxis per taxi owner
Of the respondents:
17% had bought one TRP compliant taxi vehicle, 70% had bought two, 4% had
bought three and 9% had bought four or more
100% however indicated a need for either capital or operational subsidy in their taxi
businesses. The implication is that the scrapping allowance was not sufficient to
finance the capital needs of taxi owners.
Table 5.17 Respondents in need of subsidies
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent
Valid Yes Missing System Total
92 2
94
97.9 2.1
100.0
100.0
1 3 4+ 2
Number of new taxis TRP compliant
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5.1.23 Awareness of the Government’s “Win-Win-Win” strategy among taxi owners in Temba
Table 5.18 Awareness of taxi owners of Government’s “Win-Win-Win” strategy
Awareness of the “Win-Win-Win” strategy
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent
Valid Yes No Total Missing System Total
27 44 71 23 94
28.7 46.8 75.5 24.5
100.0
38.0 100.0
Of the respondents:
62% were not aware of the Government‟s ”Win-Win-Win” strategy document that
supported:
a doubling of subsidy to public transport
including taxi transport in the contract system
operating taxis on a formal route network.
5.1.24 Understanding of the network contract system by taxi owners in Temba
As can be seen from Table 5.19 (below), the responses indicated that most taxi owners did
not understand how the network contract system works.
Table 5.19 Understanding of the network contract system by taxi owners in Temba
Understanding of how the network contract system works
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent
Valid Yes No Total Missing System Total
24 47 71 23 94
25.5 50.0 75.5 24.5
100.0
33.8 100.0
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Of the respondents, 66% did not know how the contract system would work in terms of
schedules, routes, rosters and tickets.
5.2 Assessment of the TRP by taxi owners in Temba
5.2.1 Introduction
At the end of the questionnaire there was a separate section requiring each individual
respondent to assess and rate the success of the TRP in accordance to their perceptual
opinion. The assessment form indicated a scale of five ratings given below:
Rate 5 means outstanding and ranges from 81% -100%. This means that the
respondent is “very happy” about the objective achieved by the TRP
Rate 4 means good and ranges from 61% - 80%. This means that the respondent is
“happy” about the objective achieved by the TRP
Rate 3 means acceptable ranging from 41% - 60%. This means that the respondent
is neutral towards the objective achieved by the TRP
Rate 2 means “not happy” and needs improvement. This ranges from 21% - 40%.
This means that the respondent is unhappy about the objective achieved by the
TRP
Rate 1 means “very unhappy” and needs serious and urgent attention. This ranges
from 1% - 20%.
Table 5.20 (below) shows the assessment of the success of TRP by the responding taxi
owners as indicated on the assessment form provided.
Table 5.20 Assessment of the success of TRP by taxi owners in Temba Achievement Ratings
Aim/Objective of TRP 1 2 3 4 5 Did not answer
1. Institutionalise SACTI by establishing structures: registering taxi associations to elect Regional Taxi Councils (RTC), Provincial Taxi Councils (PTC) and the South African National Taxi Council (SANTACO)
8 5 70 7 4
2. Legalise and register taxi businesses to reduce taxi conflicts and violence through Provincial Taxi Registrars allocating specific routes to taxis and doing away with radial licences and putting in place route based operating licences
10 67 14 3
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Achievement Ratings
Aim/Objective of TRP 1 2 3 4 5 Did not answer
3. Regulate the taxi industry to promote safe public passenger transport service and formalize taxi businesses to comply with tax and abide by labour laws to register taxi drivers
1 3 31 54 1 4
4. Establish Taxi Industry Co-operatives to empower taxi owners economically. To this end TRP aimed at establishing taxi cooperatives and taxi close corporations (CCs) as economic thoroughfares to advantage taxi associations by lowering costs of spares, fuel and other related costs. In addition TRP aimed at enabling taxi CCs to tender for route contracts and receive subsidies.
2 40 37 10 3 2
5. Phase out combis of the “old” taxi industry and phase in the new TRP compliant taxi vehicles of the “new” taxi industry to reduce accidents and improve the quality of taxi transport services: reducing the “general cost of travel”, promoting safety and security in transit, and increasing reliability, frequency and comfort for the users of taxi transport service
7 37 39 4 3 4
6. Installation of EMS in the TRP compliant taxi vehicles to mitigate risk of the industry and commercial banks as creditors of the industry.
28 21 25 12 2 6
7. Integrate the taxi industry with other aspects of the mainstream Road Based Passenger Transport System (RBPTS) of passenger bus and train transport services
25 27 34 1 2 5
5.2.2 Analysis of the assessment form
While Table 5.20 (above) reflects the ratings of the respondents with regard to their opinions
on the success of the TRP, the following section will analyse these findings.
Analysis of the assessment form indicated that:
9% of the respondents indicated that the institutionalisation (aim No.1) of the TRP
needed improvement, while 6%, 78% and 7% rated it as acceptable, good and
outstanding respectively. Only four of the 94 respondents did not respond.
All respondents rated aim No.2 positively - 11% acceptable, 74% good and 15%
outstanding. Only three of the respondents did not make a rating.
1% indicated that aim No. 3 had not been achieved and 3% that urgent
improvement was needed to aim No.3. 34% rated this aim as acceptable, 60%
good and 1% outstanding. Four respondents did not make a rating.
2% indicated urgent support and 43% urgent improvement to aim No. 4. Others
rated this aim as follows: 40% acceptable, 11% good and 3% outstanding. Two
respondents did not rate this aim.
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87
7% and 41% rated aim No. 5 as needing urgent support and improvement
respectively while 43%, 4% and 3% rated acceptable, good and outstanding
respectively for aim No. 5. Four respondents did not rate the aim.
32% and 24% rated aim No. 6 to be in need of urgent support and improvement.
28%, 14% and 2% rated acceptable, good and outstanding respectively. Six
respondents did not rate the aim.
28% and 30% indicated lack of knowledge of aim No. 7 whilst 38%, 1% and 2%
rated acceptable, good and outstanding respectively. Five did not rate the aim.
5.3 Summary
This chapter has described the main features of the survey conducted among taxi owners
and thus participants in the Temba Taxi Association. It has also indicated the taxi owners‟
assessment of the success or otherwise of the TRP in terms of their ratings on a scale of 1
to 5. In the process it has identified a number of factors that influence the perceptions of taxi
owners towards the TRP.
The following chapter will interpret these implications and develop these findings into a set of
recommendations that may be of use to the authorities in the ongoing roll-out of the TRP.
88
CHAPTER 6
THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE MAIN FINDINGS OF THE STUDY
6. Introduction
The study has investigated perceptions of taxi owners in Temba in order to establish the
extent to which the legacy of SACTI has retarded, undermined and/or delayed the TRP. It
has also explored their understanding of the economic effects that are likely to accrue to
them due to the TRP.
This chapter will summarise the findings and suggest areas that should receive attention. It
will draw conclusions based on the findings and will make recommendations designed to
contribute towards the successful outcome of the TRP.
The findings of the study are divided into the following areas:
Factors that retarded and/or undermined the TRP
What the TRP has done well in laying the foundation for transforming the “old” taxi
industry
Areas where the TRP needs improvement to complete the project
The implications of the assessment and evaluation of the success of the TRP.
6.1 Factors that retarded and /or undermined the TRP
The following factors have been found to have high probabilities of retarding and/or
undermining some aspects of the TRP. They include:
The economic effects of ageing taxi owners
The level of formal education of taxi owners
Financial strength of taxi owners
Make of taxi and taxi cooperatives
Lack of alternative self-employment or re-employment.
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89
6.1.1 Economic effects of ageing taxi owners
Only 40% of taxi owners were less than 50 years old, while 30% were between 51 and 60
and 30% were 61 or older. Those interviewed indicated that they could not cope with the
physical and financial challenges of the TRP because their physical and mental stamina
(intellectual abilities) were weakened through age, nor were they considered as creditworthy
by commercial banks. They also said that as they get older they had fewer alternative job
opportunities and so found themselves “locked in” to the taxi business. Some owned one or
two old combis but were neither prepared to scrap these nor willing to exit the taxi industry.
Table 6.1 Number of taxis owned by the taxi owners in Temba
Number of taxis owned (ranges from 1 to 11)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Low probability of support for
the TRP
Moderate probability of
support for the TRP
High probability of support for the TRP
There was a correlation between the age of owners, the number of taxis owned and support
for the TRP. Taxi owners who were older and owned fewer than four combis had a low
probability of supporting the TRP, as indicated in the Table 6.1 (above). Owners of one, two
and three taxis did not, in general, support the TRP. Those who owned four, five and six
taxis showed moderate support for the TRP, whereas owners of seven, eight and more taxis
had a high probability of supporting the TRP.
6.1.2 Level of formal education of taxi owners
The study evaluated the level of school education of the sampled taxi owners in Temba to
establish the extent to which their basic formal educational foundation could support their
understanding of why the government had to intervene to regulate the taxi industry and to
transform SACTI. Generally, they had a low level of school education, with 45% of those
sampled having Standard 8 (Grade 10), 25% Standard 9 (Grade 11) and 30% Standard 10
(Grade12). None indicated having a technical college or university certificate or any
certificate in Adult Based Education Training (ABET). Interviews and discussions with some
revealed too low a level of education to properly understand the TRP regulatory strategies,
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90
and as a result they were always in doubt and fear about anything that might have an impact
on their taxi businesses. This raised their likelihood of retarding or resisting the TRP as they
lodged complaints and expressed continual dissatisfaction with the TRP processes.
6.1.3 Financial position of taxi owners
Some taxi owners who owned two combis indicated that if one were to be scrapped in
exchange for a R50 000 payment to be used as a deposit of R50 000 on a new TRP
compliant taxi vehicle, it would be difficult for the new taxi to generate enough income to pay
the monthly installments of R8 000 by itself. The financial risk was deemed to be higher
when only one combi was scrapped. Owners‟ perceptions were that the government should
suspend the TRP and negotiate around the issue of the scrap value of R50 000.
6.1.4 Make of taxis in Temba
Taxi owners regarded the R50 000 scrap value allowance as too little to make a deposit on
their favoured make of Toyota, in particular the Sesfikile. In other words, the main issue that
retarded or resisted the TRP was the issue of “affordability”.
Emerging from discussions about home-ownership, financial position and operating costs of
some of the taxi owners, was that many had a negative perception about pledging their
houses as security for their loans with commercial banks. Nor did they like to discuss the
financial position of their taxi businesses or envisage hiring clerks to keep records for them
and draw up their financial statements (balance sheet, income and cash flow statements).
This had a negative effect on their perceptions of the TRP.
6.1.5 Taxi cooperatives
Although many taxi owners were in favour of taxi co-operatives, it was found that they had
limited capabilities in the management of their finances and some were suspicious of taxi co-
operatives as a channel for subsidies. This perception undermined their view of the TRP.
6.1.6 Lack of alternative self-employment or employment
Most respondents perceived possible unemployment to be the main factor that forced them
to remain in the taxi industry. Their perception was that it would be difficult for the TRP
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91
strategies to reduce the oversupply of taxis in the industry, due to the high rate of
unemployment. This also contributed to their resistance towards the TRP.
6.2 TRP success in laying a foundation for transforming the “old” taxi industry
In spite of the factors that retarded and/or undermined the TRP stated in the previous
section, taxi owners in Temba also had positive perceptions of the TRP. They indicated that
the TRP did well in laying a foundation for its endeavors to transform the “old” taxi industry
into the “new” taxi industry and in realising its basic aims as indicated below:
6.2.1 Institutionalizing the taxi industry
The general opinion is that the TRP has assisted the SACTI to form organized structures, at
the level of taxi associations and to establish regional, provincial and national bodies.
6.2.2 Legalisation and registration of taxis with the Provincial Taxi Registrars
Responses indicated that the TRP has done well in the process of legalizing most taxis and
converting their Radius Based Permits (RBP) to the new Route Based Operating Licences
(RBOL) as a foundation for the modernization of the taxi industry.
Respondents also felt that RBOLs had significantly reduced taxi conflicts and violence over
taxi routes in Temba.
6.2.3 Registration of taxi associations
Interviews and discussions with taxi owners indicated that most of them paid tax to SARS.
This is evidence that the TRP has broken through the informal “old” taxi industry mindset.
Most of the respondents claimed to be tax-compliant.
6.2.4 Scrapping of “old” combis
The main aim of the TRP was to remove the combis of the “old” taxi industry and to replace
them initially with the 18- and 35-seater TRP compliant taxi vehicles of the envisaged “new”
taxi industry. Most taxi owners lodged complaints and expressed their dissatisfaction to the
extent that then Minister Jeff Radebe discarded the “original TRP” and introduced the “new
TRP”. The success of this “new TRP” in Temba was indicated by a number of taxi owners
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92
scrapping old combis and receiving a R50 000 scrap allowance to make a deposit on the
new TRP compliant taxis.
The findings indicated that the scrapping of old taxis took place in Temba as follows: 25% of
the respondents each scrapped one, 48% each scrapped two, 23% each scrapped three
and 1% scrapped four or more. This represents approximately 200 vehicles in all – about
40% of the vehicles operated by the Temba Taxi Association.
6.2.5 TRP compliant taxis in Temba
17% of owners bought one TRP compliant vehicle, 70% bought two, 4% bought three and
9% bought four or more. It appears that more taxis were scrapped than replaced. This
supports one of the objectives of the TRP, which was to reduce the number of taxis in the
industry.
6.3 Areas where the TRP needs attention to complete the project
As indicated by the findings in Section 6.3, the government and the taxi industry in
partnership achieved notable success in institutionalizing, formalizing, legalizing and
registering taxi owners and taxi businesses. However, findings indicated that some of the
critical aspects of the TRP needed more attention. Inter alia, these included the following:
Establishment of Taxi Industry Co-operatives
Assistance of taxi owners financially to purchase “new TRP compliant taxi vehicles”
Installation of the Electronic Management System (EMS) in the new TRP compliant
taxi vehicles
Taxi owners‟ knowledge and information about the National Passenger Road Plan
(NPRP) contract system and types of subsidies that are likely to accrue to them
Tax owners‟ limited knowledge and lack of information about the National
Passenger Road Plan (NPRP).
Each of these aspects is discussed below.
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6.3.1 Establishment of Taxi Industry Cooperatives
The TRP aimed to establish taxi cooperatives and taxi close corporations (CCs) as
economic thoroughfares to advantage taxi associations by lowering costs of spares, fuel and
other related items. In addition, the TRP aimed to enable taxi CCs to tender for route
contracts and be in the position to receive subsidies. Taxi owners in Temba indicated
however that the establishment of taxi cooperatives was not noticeable in the industry and
that they lacked knowledge about route contracts and issues of subsidies. To date, no route
contracts have been awarded anywhere in Temba or other parts of South Africa.
6.3.2 Financial affordability to purchase new TRP compliant taxi vehicles
The TRP requires that taxi owners use the R50 000 scrap allowance to pay a deposit for a
new TRP compliant vehicle. However, in the scrapping process, taxi owners did not disclose
their balance sheets to show their financial capacity for creditworthiness and ability to pay
the installments for the new TRP compliant vehicles. Responses to the questionnaire
indicated that 65% of the taxi owners were willing to purchase the TRP compliant vehicles,
31% were undecided and 4% indicated that they would definitely not purchase TRP
compliant vehicles. It was found to be a critical problem that the TRP did not probe into the
financial positions of each and every taxi business during the process of scrapping to assess
whether each and every taxi owner could financially afford the deposit and installment of a
new TRP compliant taxi vehicle. The study has found that the issue of affordability and of
financial positions of taxi businesses should be revisited to assess financial viability of taxi
owners.
6.3.3 Installation of EMS in TRP-compliant-taxi vehicles
Although responses in the questionnaire indicated that EMS was perceived to be
economically favourable to taxi owners, some indicated that most taxi owners were used to
receiving cash on a daily basis for the needs of their business operations and families. This
habit has created a degree of resistance to the installation of EMS in the TRP vehicles.
6.3.4 Taxi owners in need of subsidies
Although 98% of respondents indicated that they were in need of subsidies for their taxi
businesses, they indicated limited knowledge about the processes for receiving them. It is
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94
important to note however that no direct subsidies have been paid to taxi operators in
Temba or South Africa at the time of this study.
6.3.5 Limited knowledge and lack of information about the National Passenger Road Plan (NPRP)
Although the sampled taxi owners in Temba wished to be subsidised, they had limited
knowledge of the NPRP or the “Win-Win-Win” strategic plan for transforming and upgrading
both the “old bus commuter industry” and the “old” taxi industry into a more sustainable
Commuter Bus and Taxi Industry (CBTI), with subsidised contracts for road based public
transport networks.
Of the respondents, 62% were unaware of the “Win-Win-Win” strategy and 66% did not
understand the contract system.
6.4 Findings according to the grading form
In Chapter 5, section 5.2.2, the findings of the assessment form revealed that:
9% of the respondents indicated that the institutionalization (aim No. 1) of the TRP
needs improvement, while 6%, 78% and 7% rated it as acceptable, good and
outstanding respectively. Four of the 94 participants did not respond.
All respondents indicated that aim No. 2 was positive - 11% found it acceptable,
74% good and 15% outstanding. 3 did not respond.
1% indicated urgent support and 3% urgent improvement to aim No. 3. Others rated
this aim 34% acceptable, 60% good and 1% outstanding. Four did not respond.
2% indicated urgent support and 43% urgent improvement to aim No. 4. Others
rated this aim 40% acceptable, 11% good and 3% outstanding. Two did not
respond.
7% and 41% rated aim No. 5 as needing urgent support and improvement
respectively while 43%, 4% and 3% rated it acceptable, good and outstanding
respectively. Four did not respond.
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95
32% and 24% rated aim No. 6 as needing urgent support and improvement
respectively. 28%, 14% and 2% respectively rated it acceptable, good and
outstanding. Six did not respond.
28% and 30% rated lack of knowledge of aim No. 7 whilst 38%, 1% and 2% rated it
acceptable, good and outstanding respectively. Five did not respond.
Table 6.2 Areas where TRP has succeeded and areas that need attention
Aims of TRP
Total of Ratings 3, 4
and 5 of respon-dents
Comments
1. Institutionalise SACTI by establishing structures: registering taxi associations to elect Regional Taxi Councils (RTC), Provincial Taxi Councils (PTC) and South African National Taxi Council(SANTACO)
91% 3 Taxi owners in Temba indicated that the TRP had successfully institutionalized the taxi industry
2. Legalise and register taxi businesses to reduce taxi conflicts and violence through Provincial Taxi Registrars by allocating specific routes to taxis and doing away with radial licences and introducing route-based operating licences
100% 4 Taxi owners in Temba also indicated that most of them had legalized and registered their taxi vehicles and had received operating licences
3. Regulate the taxi industry to produce safe public passenger transport services and formalise taxi businesses to comply with tax laws and abide by labour laws to register taxi drivers
95% 5 Taxi owners indicated that their businesses have been formalised to pay tax and their vehicles were in good condition to produce safe public passenger transport services
4. Establishment of Taxi Industry Co-operatives to empower taxi owners economically. To this end TRP aimed at establishing taxi cooperatives and taxi close corporations (CCs) as economic thoroughfare to advantage taxi associations by lowering costs of spares, fuel and other related costs. In addition the TRP aimed at enabling taxi CCs to tender for route contracts and receive subsidies
54% 6 Success in establishing taxi co-operatives was not high and this needs urgent support and improvement, as indicated by 45% of the respondents.
5. Phasing out combis of the “old” taxi industry and phasing in the new TRP compliant taxi vehicles of the „new taxi industry‟ to reduce accidents and improve quality of taxi transport service in terms of reducing the “general cost of travel” and promoting safety and security in transit, increasing reliability, frequency and comfort for the users of taxi transport service
50% 7 The TRP has not satisfactorily achieved this aim. 44% rated urgent need of support and improvement. 43% accepted that the TRP was doing fairly well, only 4% and 3% indicated good and outstanding.
6. Installation of EMS in the TRP-compliant taxi vehicles to mitigate risk of the industry and commercial banks as creditors of the industry.
44% 8 32% and 24% indicated difficulties in supporting and improving installation of EMS in their taxis in Temba and surrounding villages. Only 28%, 14% and 2% indicated that the TRP would succeed in installing EMS in taxis
7. Integrate the taxi industry with other mainstream Road Based Passenger Transport System (RBPTS) of passenger bus and train transport
41% 9 28% and 30% indicated that TRP did not satisfactorily inform taxi owners about the National Plan of integrating the taxi industry with other mainstream elements of the Road Based Passenger Transport System and tendering for network contracts in the system. Only 38%, 1% and 2% indicated positively about the success of the TRP in meeting this aim
Total Average 475/7= 67,86
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96
6.5 The success of the TRP
Section 6.5 indicated how taxi owners in Temba rated the success of the TRP regarding the
achievement of its aims and objectives. The aim of this section was to test whether or not
the TRP had been succeeding.
According to Steyn et. al. (2005:8), a project would be deemed successful when completed
within budget, within schedule and with the deliverables meeting all requirements. This
indicates that project management has a three-dimensional goal that measures cost
(budget), time and deliverables expected. The fact that all three dimensions exist, implies
that the project manager must make decisions regarding the trade-offs among the different
dimensions of the goal. Sometimes project managers choose one of the following:
The project could meet the requirements and stay within the budget – but need
more time
The project could be done within the time and meet the objectives – but need more
money
The project could stay within the budget and the schedule – but not meet the
required objectives.
Although the know-how to manage projects exists, project managers often still fail to meet
the abovementioned three-dimensional goal. Despite the fact that the project might not meet
all its objectives, it can still be regarded as an overall success if (1) and (2) of the three-
dimensional goal are met. This implies that deliverables are most important in a public
project like the TRP. (1) and (2) forms two-thirds or 66.67% (67%) of the three-dimensional
goal. For the purpose of this study the “Principle of the three-dimensional goal of Project
Management” has been used to measure the success of the TRP. This implies that if the
average of respondents‟ rating is greater than 67% then the TRP is succeeding, whereas if it
is less, the TRP is not succeeding. If the project is meeting (3) but only one of (1) or (2), it
cannot be considered a success because there are no “returns”. So in this study taxi owners
in Temba indicated that the TRP had earned them certain “returns”. The level of these
“returns” would be considered acceptable if the average of the ratings of the respondents is
equal to or greater than 2/3 or 67% as determined from (1) and (2) of the three-dimensional
goal of the project.
A well-managed project would perform according to the requirements of the abovementioned
three-dimensional goal. This means it would meet the requirements (deliverables) within the
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97
planned time and within the allocated budget to achieve 3/3=100%. If the project could meet
2/3=67% in terms of (1) and (2) of the three-dimensional goal, it might still be considered
successful, especially in a “public” project like the TRP. Table 6.2 shows ratings of
respondents versus 67% of the three-dimensional goal of the project.
Table 6.3 (below) shows ratings of respondents versus the measurable success principle of
meeting 67% of the three-dimensional goal of the project management.
Objectives which are rated above or equal to 67% are deemed successful and less than
67% are not.
Table 6.3 Ratings of respondents
Objectives of TRP Ratings
by respon-dents
Expected “Project Management”
successful rating > 67%
1. Deliverable 1: Institutionalise SACTI by establishing structures: registering taxi associations to elect Regional Taxi Councils (RTC), Provincial Taxi Councils (PTC) and South African National Taxi Council (SANTACO)
91% 91% > 67% meant that the sub-project was successful
2. Deliverable 2: Legalise and register taxi businesses to reduced taxi conflicts and violence through Provincial Taxi Registrars for allocating specific routes to taxis and doing away with radial licences and put in place route based operating licences
100% 100% > 67% meant that the sub-project was successful
3. Deliverable 3: Regulate the taxi industry to produce safe public passenger transport service and formalize taxi businesses to comply with tax and abiding by labour laws to register taxi drivers.
95% 95% > 67% implied that the sub-project was considered successful
4. Deliverable 4: Establishment of Taxi Industry Co-operatives to empower taxi owners economically. To this end the TRP aimed at establishing taxi cooperatives and taxi close corporations (cc) as economic thoroughfare to advantage taxi associations by lowering costs of spares, fuel and other related costs. In addition the TRP aimed at enabling taxi CC to tender for route contracts and receive subsidies.
54% 54% < 67% implied the sub-project was considered unsuccessful
5. Deliverable 5: Phasing out combis of the “old” taxi industry and phasing in the new TRP compliant taxi vehicles of the “new” taxi industry to reduce accidents and improve quality of taxi transport service in terms of reducing the “general cost of travel” and promoting safety and security in transit, increasing reliability, frequency and comfort for the users of taxi transport service
50% 50% < 67% which meant that the sub-project was considered unsuccessful
6. Deliverable 6: Installation of EMS in the TRP compliant taxi vehicles to mitigate risk of the industry and commercial banks as creditors of the industry.
44% 44% < 67% which meant that the sub-project was considered unsuccessful
7. Deliverable 7: Integrate the taxi industry with other mainstream Road Based Passenger Transport System (RBPTS) of passenger bus and train transport
41% 41% < 67% which meant the sub-project was considered unsuccessful
Average 475/7 = 67,86%
67,86% > 67% which meant on average the TRP project was succeeding by a margin of 67,86% - 67% =0,86%
Table 6.3 indicates that taxi owners in Temba perceive the success of the TRP in terms of:
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98
Institutionalising SACTI by establishing structures: registering taxi associations to
elect Regional Taxi Councils (RTC), Provincial Taxi Councils (PTC) and South
African National Taxi Council (SANTACO)
Legalising and registering taxi businesses to reduce taxi conflicts and violence
through Provincial Taxi Registrars for allocating specific routes to taxis, doing away
with radial licences and replacing them with route-based operating licences
Formalising taxi businesses to comply with both tax and labour laws (to register taxi
drivers)
On the other hand they perceived that the TRP needed more attention in:
Establishing taxi cooperatives to assist with the objectives of formalizing
the industry
Phasing out combis of the “old” taxi industry and phasing in new TRP-
compliant vehicles of the “new” taxi industry to reduce accidents and
improve quality of taxi transport services in terms of reducing the
“generalised cost of travel” and promoting safety and security in transit,
increasing reliability, frequency and comfort for the users of taxi transport
services
Installating of EMS in the TRP-compliant taxi vehicles to mitigate risk in the
industry and commercial banks as creditors of the industry
Integrating the taxi industry in the mainstream Road-Based Passenger
Transport System (RBPTS) in conjunction with passenger bus and train
transport.
6.6 Summary, conclusions and recommendations
This section summarises all the chapters, draws conclusions and makes recommendations.
6.6.1 Chapter 1
Chapter 1 provides the synopsis and background orientation of the research study. The
chapter explains the meaning of “generalised cost of travel”. It identifies the Temba taxi
industry, where the study took place, as a microcosm of SACTI. The chapter explains that
difficulties encountered with the implementation of TRP are the study problem. It describes
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99
the methodology to be used to investigate perceptions of the taxi owners on the economic
effects that they believe the TRP will have on them. The final part of this chapter explains the
purpose, rationale and significance of the study.
6.6.2 Chapter 2
Chapter 2 reviews the literature on the public transport regulatory legislation prior to 1994. It
also reviews the historical and economic development of SACTI and its struggle against the
public transport legislation of the apartheid government prior to 1994. Furthermore chapter 2
gives a literature review on the post-1994 public transport problems as well as the legislation
and policy framework established to transform the public transport system, in particular
SACTI. It furthermore discusses the National Taxi Task Team (NTTT) and its
recommendations that resulted in the development of the TRP as a strategic plan intended
to transform SACTI. It reviews the importance of the post-1994 government‟s statutory
framework for the management of public funds in partnership with the government and the
taxi industry.
The key areas of the literature review of the study highlighted the effects of:
The public transport legislation framework and policies of the government prior to
1994 and the impact on SACTI
The historical and economic development and contributions of SACTI and its
struggle against the pre-1994 Government
The conflicts, violence and „wars‟ that ravaged SACTI
The public transport legislation framework of the post-1994 government not only to
improve the public transport system in general, but the situation in SACTI in
particular
The statutory framework of public financial management of the post-1994
government to improve the use of government funds in the partnership between the
government and the taxi industry.
The literature review created a baseline for the study. The questionnaires and other
questions for discussion were based on the literature review of the study to assess some
perceptions of taxi owners about the economic effects that were likely to accrue to them due
to the TRP.
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100
6.6.3 Chapter 3
Chapter 3 describes Temba, the area where the study took place, as a microcosm of SACTI
and explains its location, its historical and economic development and the establishment of
taxi associations in the area. The chapter furthermore indicates that the economic boom in
the taxi industry in Temba during the 1980s turned into a decline in the 1990s due to taxi
conflicts, violence and “wars” in the same way as other parts of SACTI countrywide. The
chapter also explains the TRP as a Government strategic intervention to transform SACTI in
Temba.
6.6.4 Chapter 4
Chapter 4 introduces the survey that was carried out in Temba. The survey makes use of
triangulation of quantitative and qualitative approaches to supplement one another in
analyzing and interpreting the collected data through interviews, discussions and
observations. The use of triangulation in the study was important in that it employed:
Data triangulation which means the use of more than one data source such as
questionnaires, interviews, in-depth discussions, analysis of documents and
materials
Observer triangulation which means the use of more than one observer or
information-rich respondent in a single study
Theory triangulation which means the use of multi-perspectives to interpret a single
data set
Methodological triangulation which means the use of multi-methods to study a
single topic
Triangulation of measures and interpretation, such as a researcher giving both
multiple choice and open-ended questions to the same respondent.
The chapter also explains the methodology of the study that was considered appropriate to
produce valid and reliable findings that would be generalized to solve the identified problem
in the study and make acceptable recommendations for the transformation of the taxi
industry countrywide.
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101
6.6.5 Chapter 5
Chapter 5 makes use of quantitative data analysis which is supplemented by the
researcher‟s qualitative analysis. This researcher uses the Software Package of Social
Sciences (SPSS) to analyse the quantitative data. The analysis results of quantitative data
are triangulated with the qualitative data to supplement one another in order to derive valid
and reliable findings. Findings were produced as a result of the investigation into some
perceptions of taxi owners about the economic effects that were likely to accrue to them due
to the TRP. Furthermore the chapter establishes the extent to which the legacy of SACTI
retarded the TRP.
6.6.6 Chapter 6
Chapter 6 encapsulates the aims of the TRP and detemines the “Success Principle of
Project Management (SPPM)” to measure the success of the TRP. The SPPM was
determined as follows:
According to Steyn et. al. (2005:8), project management always has a three-dimensional
goal:
The project could meet the requirements and stay within budget - but would need
more time
The project could meet time requirements and meet the specifications (deliverables)
- but would need more money (budget)
The project could stay within budget and time scales - but not meet the
requirements (deliverables).
The respondents rated the TRP 67.86%, which indicates a marginal success of 1.19% of the
TRP in Temba. (67.86% - 66.67%). This showed that the respondents regarded the TRP as
resulting in only a marginal improvement, due to limited financial affordability from the side of
taxi owners to purchase “new” TRP compliant vehicles.
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102
6.7 Summary of the main findings
6.7.1 Main issues
The study lists the following concerns stated in the main findings:
Economic effects of ageing taxi owners (section 6.1.1)
Level of formal education (section 6.1.2)
Financial position of taxi owners (6.1.3)
Make of taxis in Temba (6.1.4)
Taxi Co-operatives (6.1.5 and 6.3.1)
Lack of alternative self-employment (6.1.6)
Financial affordability to purchase “new” TRP compliant taxi vehicles to phase out
combis (6.3.2)
Installation of EMS in TRP compliant taxis (6.3.3)
Lack of subsidies (6.3.4)
Limited knowledge about the “Win-Win-Win” strategy (6.3.5)
Marginal success of the TRP (6.5 and 6.6) in relation to its inputs versus its outputs.
6.7.2 TRP successes
General opinion showed that the TRP has done well in the following areas:
Institutionalising SACTI by establishing structures, registering taxi associations to
elect Regional Taxi Councils (RTC), Provincial Taxi Councils (PTC) and the South
African National Taxi Council (SANTACO)
Legalising and registering taxi businesses to reduce taxi conflicts and violence
through Provincial Taxi Registrars for allocating specific routes to taxis, doing away
with radial licences and putting in place route based operating licences
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103
Regulating the taxi industry to produce safe public passenger transport service,
formalising taxi businesses to comply with tax requirements and abiding by labour
laws to register taxi drivers.
6.7.3 TRP shortfalls
General opinion showed that the TRP has not done well in the following areas:
Establishing taxi industry cooperatives to empower taxi owners economically. To
this end the TRP aimed at establishing taxi cooperatives and taxi close corporations
(CCs) as economic thoroughfare to advantage taxi associations by lowering costs
of spares, fuel and other related costs. In addition the TRP aimed at enabling taxi
CCs to tender for route contracts and receive subsidies
Phasing out combis of the “old” taxi industry and phasing in the new TRP compliant
taxi vehicles of the “new” taxi industry to reduce accidents and improve quality of
taxi transport services in terms of reducing the “generalised cost of travel”,
promoting safety and security in transit and increasing reliability, frequency and
comfort for the users of taxi transport services
Installation of EMS in the TRP compliant taxi vehicles to mitigate the risk of the
industry and commercial banks as creditors of the industry
Integrating the taxi industry with other elements of the mainstream system of
passenger bus and train transport.
6.8 Common findings countrywide
Although the formal study took place only in Temba, informal observations and discussions
with other taxi owners in areas both near and far from Temba indicate common findings
countrywide. The observation of reality and information received from media such as
television and newspapers echo similar sentiments about the TRP. The general
observations and unstructured oral interviews and informal discussions with some taxi
owners, taxi drivers and users of taxi transport services in many different areas also mostly
echo similar sentiments about the TRP. These areas included the following:
North West Province: Makapanstad, Brits, Rustenburg, Swartruggens, Zeerust,
Lichtenburg, Mafikeng, Vryburg, Taung, Klerksdorp and Potchefstroom
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104
Gauteng Province: Soshanguve, Ga-Rankuwa, Mamelodi, Vosloorust, Tokoza,
Duduza, Katlehong and part of Soweto
Mpumalanga Province: Moloto, Kwamhlanga, Marapyane, Witbank and Middleburg
Limpopo Province: Bela-Bela, Modimolle, Mokgophong, Mokopane, Lebowakgomo
and Polokwane and
KwaZulu Natal Province: Empangeni and Newcastle.
It was also noted that “old” combis still made up the majority of taxis on the roads. Many taxi
drivers indicated that the TRP was not satisfactory to them because they indicated that they
were not registered. On the other hand, taxi users approved of the new taxi vehicle, but
many indicated that new taxi vehicles were not to be found in their villages.
Because of the common sentiments expressed by so many taxi industry participants in
different areas, the study therefore makes a number of recommendations in section 6.9
(below) to address the situation in the taxi industry countrywide.
6.9 Recommendations
To improve the situation regarding the implementation of the TRP, the study makes the
following recommendations to address the concerns summarized in section 6.7 of this
chapter.
6.9.1 Recommendation No 1
Young entrepreneurs in Temba and elsewhere should be encouraged and persuaded economically to venture into the “New South African Taxi Industry” in the form of co-operatives, private companies and close corporations.
Motivation for the recommendation
It has been found that most of the taxi owners were ageing and if young entrepreneurs are
economically persuaded to join the industry they might cope better with the regulatory issues
in the taxi business. Cooperatives, private companies and close corporations would be in a
better position to compete professionally without violence against each other. Compliance
with tax laws would be improved. Establishment and management of taxi cooperatives would
also be easier, more effective and efficient as a means of enhancing black economic
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empowerment in the taxi industry. A number of jobs would be created in the taxi co-
operatives and their sub-businesses such as auto-spares, fuel stations, service stations,
motor mechanics and other related ventures. Some of the taxi owners who want to exit the
taxi market might find alternative jobs in taxi cooperatives. More importantly, subsidies from
the government budget would effectively be managed via the taxi co-operatives, private
companies and close corporations. The government should consider providing financial
assistance in terms of the “Win-Win-Win” strategy (Section 2.7) to taxi cooperatives and in
turn the taxi co-operatives would distribute subsidies to its member companies and CCs.
6.9.2 Recommendation No 2
Taxi owners should improve their basic formal education.
Motivation for the recommendation
Most taxi owners in Temba had a basic level of formal education below Standard 8, (Grade
10). The taxi owners who lack basic formal education should be encouraged and sponsored
by the government and the taxi industry to attend Adult Based Education and Training
(ABET) programmes to improve their education and/or further their management skills in the
Further Education and Training (FET) colleges to be more literate and numerate to manage
their businesses.
6.9.3 Recommendation No 3
Taxi owners who wish to leave the industry should be helped to find alternative employment to exit the industry (without being forced) in order to reduce the oversupply of taxis on certain routes.
Motivation for the recommendation
The research has established that some taxi owners are “locked into” the taxi business
because they do not have the necessary knowledge and skills and capital to enable them to
take up alternative employment. The government should provide for and assist those who
want to exit the industry to find alternative businesses or ways of earning income without
hardships as experienced in their taxi businesses. Perhaps the scrapping allowance for a
taxi could be increased by a certain amount over and above the current R50 000 if the owner
undertakes to leave the industry permanently.
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6.9.4 Recommendation No 4
The Government should commence with the implementation of the “Win-Win-Win” strategy document without delay, particularly with regard to making additional funds available to assist public transport.
Motivation for the recommendation
The early implementation of the “Win-Win-Win” strategy could have major beneficial
implications for the SACTI. The “Win-Win-Win” strategy supports the principle of a doubling
of subsidy to public transport from its present R5 billion to R10 billion. This study suggests
that much of the increase could be allocated to SACTI to enable it to improve its service.
Pilot projects could be introduced in different areas to test various concepts, such as new
forms of ownership, new routes, new ticketing methods, and a marketing campaign.
Recommendations 5, 6 and 7 that follow, are developments of this recommendation.
6.9.5 Recommendation No 5
Taxi owners should be encouraged to change the form of ownership of their taxi businesses from sole traders/operators to co-operatives, close corporations (CCs) or private companies.
Motivation for the recommendation
The research has found that most taxi businesses are one-man businesses and as a result
their taxi assets are not legally separated from their personal assets. It is therefore not easy
for them to determine their financial position to enable them not only to manage their
businesses more professionally, effectively and efficiently, but also to receive financial
assistance from the government. The disciplines imposed by more formal organizational
structures would assist in this regard.
6.9.6 Recommendation No 6
The national Department of Transport should enter into contracts with taxi operators to operate “guaranteed” services at fixed times on routes where frequencies are currently poor.
Motivation for the recommendation
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107
This research has already referred to the “Win-Win-Win” strategy of the government which
has accepted that one of the ways in which the taxi industry must be formalised is the
awarding of contracts to taxi operators to run at fixed times. Despite the lip-service paid to
the concept, however, this research has not come across any such contracts anywhere in
South Africa for example paragraphs 3.3.1 and 5.1.12 have drawn attention to the infrequent
service that operates between Hammanskraal and Polokwane, sometimes as few as twice a
day. Although there is a demand for transport, passengers on this route may have to wait
several hours before the taxi is full enough to leave, a situation that applies on many of the
longer routes in South Africa. This research suggests that rural routes of this type should be
considered as initial candidates for contractual assistance. The experience gained on such
routes can then be used to extend the contract system into the urban areas, starting with
those suburbs where car ownership is high and/or where population density is low. As an
extra incentive to taxi owners to acquire new vehicles, such contracts should stipulate that
only new vehicles may be used, and the contract rates should allow for the higher costs of
the new vehicles.
6.9.7 Recommendation No 7
The National Department of Transport and the taxi industry should agree on the formation of
Mega City Taxi Associations (MTAs) in the larger cities as envisaged by the government in
its National Passenger Road Plan (NPRP) and “Win-Win-Win” strategy and should also form
Mega Rural Taxi Associations in the nine provinces. The MTAs should also have ownership
shares to invest in Mass Rapid Bus Transport and Passenger Transport Systems envisaged
by the government.
Motivation for the recommendation
The NPRP and “Win-Win-Win” strategy support the transformation of the existing subsidised
commuter bus route contracts into a more sustainable system of public funding for integrated
road based public transport networks and also set out procedures for the restructuring of the
subsidised contracts in the commuter bus industry to be integrated with the regulated “new”
taxi industry. The transformed commuter bus industry and the “new” taxi industry would be
integrated into a single sustainable regulated Road-Based Public Transport Industry (RBPTI)
that could be more efficiently subsidised than the existing fragmented arrangements. The
new Commuter Bus and Taxi Industry (CBTI) could in all likelihood be subsidised in
Johannesburg, Tshwane, eThekwini, Cape Town, Ekurhuleni, Nelson Mandela, Buffalo City,
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108
Mangaung, Rustenburg, Polokwane, Mbombela and Msunduzi. To this end Mega Taxi
Associations could be formed as follows:
Johannesburg Mega Taxi Association (Jo-MTA)
Tshwane Mega Taxi Association (Tshwane-MTA)
eThekwini Mega Taxi Association(eThek-MTA)
Cape Town Mega Taxi Association (Capt-MTA)
Ekurhuleni Mega Taxi Association (Ekur-MTA)
Nelson Mandela Mega Taxi Association (Nels-MTA)
Buffalo City Mega Taxi Association (BufCit-MTA)
Rustenburg Mega Taxi Association (Rusti-MTA)
Mangaung Mega Taxi Association (Mangu-MTA)
Polokwane Mega Taxi Association (Polok-MTA)
Mbombela Mega Taxi Association (Mbom-MTA)
Msunduzi Mega Taxi Association (Msundu-MTA).
The operational and economic significance of the Mega Taxi Associations in the envisaged
“new” taxi industry would be that:
SANTACO would include members nominated from each Mega Taxi Association
and would include areas that are not part of these associations which should be
grouped to form mega taxi associations to be represented in SANTACO. By so
doing the whole “new” taxi industry would be represented in the national structure
The Mega Taxi Association would have operational structures to enable it to
manage the operations of every taxi on its allocated routes and this would reduce
taxi violence among the existing taxi associations
Each Mega Taxi Association should establish its own taxi co-operatives to enhance
its economic endeavours such as financial affordability to purchase a TRP-
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compliant taxi vehicles, receiving of subsidies, installation of EMS, and cascading
information from government about NPRP, RBPTS and BRTSP. Each Mega Taxi
Association should establish training centres for both taxi owners and drivers and
will be subsidised by the government. To this end “train the trainer” programmes will
be important.
6.10 Conclusion
The purpose of the study has been to investigate some perceptions of taxi owners in Temba
to establish how they understand and experience the economic effects that are likely to
accrue to them due to the TRP. It has also researched the extent, if any, to which the legacy
of SACTI has retarded the TRP and has investigated some factors that are retarding and/or
compromising its progress.
The study wanted to make useful recommendations that would contribute towards faster
implementation of the TRP and make the taxi industry aware of government plans to
integrate the industry into the better regulated PRPTS. This would have the positive effect of
enhancing the economic empowerment and welfare of suppliers and users of the PRPTS
respectively, other motorists, pedestrians and society at large. This would be achieved,
firstly, by reducing taxi violence and road accidents and, secondly, promoting efficient and
effective taxi transport systems which would economically empower taxi owners, taxi drivers
and all workers in the taxi industry and therefore reduce the “generalised cost of travel” of
users of taxi transport services.
In carrying out the study, a limited demographic analysis of the respondents was
undertaken. This analysis, consisting of over twenty characteristics, was set out in Chapter
5.
The findings of the study, which include both positive and negative aspects, were set out in
Chapter 6. Some of the successes of the TRP were listed here, as well as some of the areas
where respondents felt that the aims of the TRP were being undermined. Based on these
findings, a number of recommendations have been made. These were also set out in
Chapter 6.
The author expresses the hope that these recommendations will be implemented firstly, to
enhance the socio-economic welfare of taxi owners, taxi drivers and taxi transport users,
while at the same time empowering taxi owners in managing their businesses and raising
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110
standards in the industry and secondly to improve the quality of life of all residents of South
Africa.
This study is not the final word on this subject. Hopefully other researchers and academics
will be challenged to continue investigating an industry that is of vital significance to all the
people of South Africa.
111
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Schönteich, M & Louw, A. 1999: Crime trends in South Africa 1985-1998. http://www.csvr.org.za/papers/papmsal.htm. Accessed: 2005-11-07.
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115
ANNEXURE A
LETTER FROM THE UNIVERSITY OF JOHANNESBURG
116
ANNEXURE B
GENERAL LETTER TO TAXI ASSOCIATIONS IN TEMBA
117
ANNEXURE C
LETTERS FROM TAXI ASSOCIATIONS
1. Letter from Temba Taxi Association (TTA)
118
2. Letter from Hammanskraal Taxi Organisation (HATO)
119
3. Letter from Hammanskraal Great North Taxi Association
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ANNEXURE D
QUESTIONNAIRE TO TAXI ASSOCIATIONS IN TEMBA
The Taxi Recapitalisation Programme: Some perceptions of Taxi Associations
Respondents are kindly requested to read and understand the following information about this questionnaire.
The questionnaire is part of a Master‟s thesis at the University of Johannesburg.
The aim of this questionnaire is to determine your valued opinion and input on
various questions or statements about taxi industry issues and the Taxi
Recapitalisation Programme (TRP).
Participants are requested not to disclose their identities and all information given
by respondents will be treated with complete confidentiality.
Please read each question/statement carefully and respond to all of them.
This questionnaire is divided into four columns and five sections.
121
Question/statement column
1. A column of variables
2. A column for you to make a √ for your appropriate answer of you own choice from the variable column.
3. A column where you can make comments to provide more information.
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QUESTIONNAIRE
1. Section A: Biographical and demographic data
2. Section B: Data on taxi business
3. Section C: Data on Taxi Recapitalisation Programme (TRP)
4. Section D: Respondent‟s answers to open questions on Taxi Recapitalisation Programme (TRP) data
5. Section E: Assessing the success of TRP.
The questionnaire is user friendly and easy to complete
Please read each question/statement carefully and respond to all of them.
All the answers you give/write will never be wrong, but will be informative.
If you do not understand any question/statement please the researcher at
076 512 8662 (cell) 012 717 8507 (landline).
Your participation in this questionnaire is highly appreciated
GOOD LUCK TO YOU AND YOUR FAMILY
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SECTION A
Biographical and demographic data
QUESTIONS/STATEMENT VARIABLE MAKE A √ FOR YOUR ANSWER
MAKE COMMENTS TO PROVIDE
MORE INFORMATION
1. What is your gender category? Male Female
Under which category is your age?
Under 20 21-30 31-40 41-50 51-60 61 and above
2. What is your formal level of school education?
Below Std 8/Grade 10
Std 9/Grade 11
Std 10/Grade 12
3. What is your level of Technical/FET college education
N1/N3 Commerce Engineering
N4-N6 Commerce Engineering
Diploma
4. What is your level of Technikon/University of Technology education?
Diploma Degree
5. What is your level of Adult Based Education and Training (ABET)
Below level 4
Level 4 6. What category of a house you
own? Own house
Bonded house
Rented house
RDP house Other
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SECTION B
Data on general knowledge of Taxi owners about their taxi business
QUESTIONS/STATEMENT VARIABLE MAKE A √ FOR YOUR ANSWER
MAKE COMMENTS TO PROVIDE
MORE INFORMATIO
N 1. For how many years have you been
running a taxi business? Only one 2-4 5-7 8-10 11 and more
2. What was the source of your initial investment on taxi business?
Employment income savings
Income savings and loans
Employment package income
Employment pension
3. Currently how many taxis do you own?
Only one 2-4 5-7 8-10 11 and more
4. What is/are the vehicles(s) make of your taxi/taxis?
Toyota Nissan Volkswagen Isuzu Ford Mazda Mitsubishi Kia Other
5. What is/are the vehicle model of your taxi/taxis
Before 1979 1980-1985 1986-1989 1990-1995 1996-1999 2000-2005 2006-2007
6. What is passenger capacity (seats) of your taxi/taxis?
10 seats or less
11-16 seats 17-25 seats 26-35 seats
7. Is the taxi business your only Yes
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QUESTIONS/STATEMENT VARIABLE MAKE A √ FOR YOUR ANSWER
MAKE COMMENTS TO PROVIDE
MORE INFORMATIO
N source of income? No
8. Do you still pay installment on your taxi(s) which are not TRP compliant?
Yes No
9. Do you have a business site and office where you manage your taxi business?
Yes No
10. Do you have a computerised system to manage your records for the taxi business?
Yes No
11. Do you have office administration assistant(s) for your taxi business?
Yes No
12. Which is your route of operation? Temba – H/skraal
Villages around Temba – H/skraal
H/skraal – Pretoria
H/skraal – Johannesburg
H/skraal – Mokopane & Polokwane
13. How many trips do you make per day per taxi on the route you ticked in question 19?
2 trips 3 trips 4 trips 5 trips 6 trips 7 trips 8 trips 9 trips More than 10 trips
14. How many times did your taxi meet with accident for the past two years (2006 & 2007)
Once 2 times 3 times 4 times 5 and more times
15. If your taxi did meet with an accident, what was the possible cause?
Negligence of the driver
Mechanical condition of the taxi
Negligence of other motorists
Unknown cause
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QUESTIONS/STATEMENT VARIABLE MAKE A √ FOR YOUR ANSWER
MAKE COMMENTS TO PROVIDE
MORE INFORMATIO
N 16. Do you keep records of your costs
(expenditure) of your taxi business? Yes No
17. What is the general state of safety on the routes where your taxis operate?
Excellent Good Poor
18. The general goals of transport regulation are the protection of public (people) and the promotion of the best possible efficient and effective transport system. Answer question 25.1, 25.2 and 25.3
19. The Government is responsible to formulate laws and policies to regulate transportation system to attain the two above-mentioned goals
Yes No
20. These goals are easy to attain Yes No
21. Taxi Recapitalisation Programme is one of the strategies towards transforming the taxi industry to attain the two above-mentioned goals
Yes No
22. Is your taxi business a…….? Answer the following questions 22.1 to 22.5
22.1 One-man business Yes No
26.2 Partnership Yes No
22.3 Close corporation (CC) Yes No
22.4 Private company Yes No
22.5 Public company Yes No
23. Do you know that you and your association have elected your executive, regional, provincial and national taxi council?
Yes No
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SECTION C
Data on taxi recapitalisation programme (TRP) questions
QUESTIONS/STATEMENT VARIABLE MAKE A √ FOR YOUR ANSWER
MAKE COMMENTS TO PROVIDE
MORE INFORMATION
1. Do all your taxis have operating licences?
Yes No
2. Is your taxi business registered to pay tax?
Yes No
3. Do you know that one of the aims of Taxi Recapitalisation Programme is to phase-out 9-16 seater combis and replace them with 18 and /35 seater taxi vehicles
Yes No
4. How many taxis have you scrapped to receive R50 000.00
1 2 3 4 5 and more
5. How many new taxis that are TRP compliant have you purchased?
1 2 3 4 5 and more
6. How likely are you to purchase taxi vehicles that are is/are TRP compliant?
Will definitely purchase one
Undecided Will definitely not purchase
7. Is the process of TRP clear and understandable to you
Yes No
8. The Electronic Management Systems that are to be fitted in the TRP compliant taxis seem to be economically good for the taxi owner
Yes No
9. It is good for taxi owners to register taxi drivers
Yes No
10. It is good for taxi owners to pay taxes on income earned.
Yes No
11. It is economically good for taxi owners to form taxi companies/close co-operatives partnerships
Yes No
12. It is good for taxi owners to establish taxi co-operatives and receive subsidies and other benefits that are likely to accrue from taxi
Yes No
128
QUESTIONS/STATEMENT VARIABLE MAKE A √ FOR YOUR ANSWER
MAKE COMMENTS TO PROVIDE
MORE INFORMATION
co-operatives 13. Do you want your taxi business to
be subsidised? Yes No
14. Are you aware of the Government‟s win-win-win strategy indicated in the National Passenger Road Plan(NPRP) document that suggests: a doubling of subsidy to public transport including taxi in the contract system operating taxi on formal route network
Yes No
15. Do you understand how does the contract system work in terms of schedule, route, roster and tickets?
Yes No
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SECTION D
Please write full sentences to answer the following open questions (from questions 43 and 44 each with 5 sub-questions, questions 45, 46 and 47) about taxi recapitalisation programme (TRP). Write your answers on these pages of the questionnaire.
1. What are the economic advantages that are likely to accrue to taxi owners due to Taxi Recapitalisation Programme. Specifically in regard to:
1.1Registration of taxi vehicles:
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
1.2Formalisation of taxi business
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
1.3Regulation of taxi operations
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..
1.4Receiving scrap value of R50 000.00 per scrapped combi
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
1.5 Phasing-out 9-16 seater combis and replacing them with taxi vehicles that are TRP compliant
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
1.6 What are the economic disadvantages that are likely to accrue to taxi owners due to Taxi Recapitalisation Programme. Specifically in regard to:
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
1.7Registration of taxi vehicles
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……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
1.8Formalisation of taxi business
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
1.9Regulation of taxi operations
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
1.10Receiving scrap value of R50 000 scrapped combi
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..
1.11 Phasing-out 16 seater combis and replacing them by taxi vehicles that are TRP compliant
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
1.12 What are the successes made by the Government, South African National Taxi Association Council (SANTACO) and all taxi provincial structures in regard to the implementation of Taxi Recapitalisation Programme?
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
1.13 What are the areas that need attention in the implementation of Taxi Recapitalisation Programme:
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
1.14 What do you recommend about the implementation of Taxi Recapitalisation Programme?
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
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SECTION E
Assessing the achievements of TRP
In this section you are required to assess the achievements of TRP.
Read the following bulleted sentences carefully and make a tick ( ) for an appropriate answer of your choice under the relevant columns of achievement ratings marked 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5 in the table below.
Rate 5 means outstanding and ranges from 81% - 100%. This means that the
respondent is happiest about the objective achieved by TRP and is rated 5
Rate 4 means good and ranges from 61% - 80%. This means that the respondent is
happy about the objective achieved by TRP and is rated 4
Rate 3 means acceptable ranging from 41% - 60%. This means that the respondent
does not feel very good but good enough about the objective achieved by TRP and
is rated 3
Rate 2 means not happy and needs improvement. This ranges from 21% - 40%.
This means that the respondent is unhappy about the objective achieved by TRP
and is rated 2
Rate1 means very unhappy and needs serious and urgent attention. This ranges
from 1% - 20%). This means that the respondent is unhappiest about the objective
achieved by TRP and is rated 1.
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Table of assessing the success of the TRP in Temba Achievement Ratings
Aim/Objective of TRP 1 2 3 4 5 Did not answer
1. Institutionalise SACTI by establishing structures: registering taxi associations to elect Regional Taxi Councils (RTC), Provincial Taxi Councils (PTC) and the South African National Taxi Council (SANTACO)
2. Legalise and register taxi businesses to reduce taxi conflicts and violence through Provincial Taxi Registrars allocating specific routes to taxis and doing away with radial licences and putting in place route based operating licences
3. Regulate the taxi industry to promote safe public passenger transport service and formalize taxi businesses to comply with tax and abide by labour laws to register taxi drivers
4. Establish Taxi Industry Co-operatives to empower taxi owners economically. To this end TRP aimed at establishing taxi cooperatives and taxi close corporations CC as economic thoroughfare to advantage taxi associations by lowering costs of spares, fuel and other related costs. In addition TRP aimed at enabling taxi CC to tender for route contracts and receive subsidies.
5. Phase out combis of the “old” taxi industry and phase in the new TRP compliant taxi vehicles of the „new taxi industry‟ to reduce accidents and improve the quality of taxi transport services: reducing the “general cost of travel”, promoting safety and security in transit, and increasing reliability, frequency and comfort for the users of taxi transport service
6. Installation of EMS in the TRP compliant taxi vehicles to mitigate risk of the industry and commercial banks as creditors of the industry.
7. Integrate the taxi industry with other aspects of the mainstream Road Based Passenger Transport System (RBPTS) of passenger bus and train transport services
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR COMPLETING THIS QUESTIONNAIRE
GOD BLESS YOU!
Declaration
133
DECLARATION
I, Sekanyane Tys Daisy Mashishi hereby declare that the research dissertation titled „THE
TAXI RECAPITALISATION PROGRAMME: SOME PERCEPTIONS OF THE TAXI
ASSOCIATIONS IN TEMBA‟ is my own work and that all reference sources have been
accurately reported and acknowledged.
This dissertation has not been previously submitted for a degree at another university.
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