the terrorist attacks in norway, july 22nd 2011 · the attacks), and the royal family, the prime...

236 Norsk filosofisk tidsskriftvol. 49, nr 3–4, s 236–261

©2014 universitetsforlagetISSN 0029-1943

The Terrorist Attacks in Norway, July 22nd 2011

– Some Kantian Reflections –

Helga VardenAssociate professor in the Departments of Philosophy and

Women and Gender Studies, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.

Email: [email protected]

English abstract p. 283

This paper provides a Kantian interpretation of core issues involved in the trialfollowing the terrorist attacks that struck Norway on July 22nd 2011. Why didthe wrongdoer’s mind strike us as so endlessly disturbed? Is the Norwegian le-gal system able to deal with cases involving extreme violence, including ascommitted by psychologically impaired mass murderers?

Introduction1

The unthinkable happened on July 22nd

2011: a Norwegian citizen bombed a build-ing («Høyblokka») in Oslo’s GovernmentQuarter and opened fire on hundreds of peo-ple gathered on the small island of Utøya in alake just outside of Oslo. The 950 kg bombwas placed in a car in front of Høyblokka.When it went off, at least 250 persons wereinside the targeted building and 75 more werein the immediate vicinity of the car. The per-petrator – Anders Behring Breivik (hereafter:ABB) – intended the bomb to kill as manypeople as possible. He succeeded in killingeight and seriously injuring nine more.

Roughly 200 more suffered less serious inju-ries. After detonating the bomb, ABB traveledto Utøya, where a total of 564 people – most-ly teenagers and young adults – were gath-ered for the annual meeting of the Labor Par-ty’s youth division (“Arbeidernes Ungdoms-fylking,» or «AUF»). ABB, posing as a policeofficer in a fake uniform transported himselfand his weapons to Utøya by the AUF-ferry.Once on the island, ABB shot and killed (byindividual gunshots) 67 people of whom onlyseven were over the age of 25. Fifty-six wereunder the age of 21; 33 were under the age of18; and 14 were only 14 or 15 years old. Twomore people fell to their deaths as they at-tempted to escape. ABB shot and injured an

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additional 33 people, and many more wereinjured trying to escape or save others.2

When the police arrived in Utøya 80 minutesafter ABB, he surrendered without resistance.

In his testimony during the ten-week trial(May-June, 2012), ABB admitted to all theactions listed above and described, in detail,his reasons, his plans, and his actions. Hisultranationalist manifesto, 2083 – A Euro-pean Declaration of Independence also con-veys much of this information. This mani-festo, ABB claims, was written at the requestof a secret order called «Knights Templar,»to serve as the program for a new, revolu-tionary contrajihadist European network,similar in its decentralized, one-cell struc-ture to Al-Qaeda. This mix of personalnotes from his life and his terrorist agendaincludes extensive quoted or plagiarizedmaterial from other sources, such as Theod-ore Kaczynski’s Unabomber’s Manifesto.The manifesto describes the supposed prob-lems of «cultural Marxism» and «multicul-turalism,» such as the «colonization» of Eu-rope by Muslims. Additionally, it describesthe planned attacks, predicts likely respons-es to the attacks, and envisions Europe’s andNorway’s futures, where, for example, the«proper,» «traditional» male and femaleroles (currently «perverted» by feminism)would be reestablished and Norway wouldyet again be «pure.» The attacks were di-rected at the Labor Party, in power at thetime and the most influential political partyin Norway since World War II. By attackingHøyblokka (where the office of the PrimeMinister and Minister of Justice were locat-ed) and Utøya (where the future leaders ofthe Labor Party were gathered), ABB sawhimself attacking the heart of the Labor Par-ty – and, so, the center of the «culturalMarxism» that «corrupts» Norway from

within. Moreover, to injure the Labor Partyas much as possible and make the assaultspectacular (maximize the «propaganda ef-fect»), ABB aimed to kill as many as possi-ble. Because of delays encountered whileelectronically distributing his manifesto tonewspapers and politicians, as well as trafficdelays on the morning of the attack, it waslate afternoon by the time ABB arrived atHøyblokka. Many had already left for theday, and there were fewer people on thestreets than he had planned for.

During the trial, ABB claimed that if hehad succeeded in killing more people atHøyblokka, he would have abandoned thesecond stage of the plan (Utøya). He alsomaintained that his original goal had beento arrive at Utøya before that day’s mainspeaker, Gro Harlem Brundtland, departed.Brundtland is nicknamed «Mother Nor-way» (“landsmoder»), in part because she isconsidered the most influential Prime Min-ister in postwar Norway. ABB planned tofilm himself decapitating Brundtland whilereading an ultranationalist statement andmake the video available on the Internet. Be-cause of the delays, however, Brundtlandleft Utøya two hours before he arrived. Ad-ditionally, ABB had initially planned to usethe cold water around the island of Utøya asa «weapon of mass destruction» against an-yone who tried to swim to the mainland.This strategy failed; many who fled werestrong swimmers, and people on the main-land learned what was happening and spedtowards the island in their private boats tosave these swimmers. According to ABB, helet himself be captured by the police becauseit was the best strategy for the next, «prop-aganda» stage of his revolutionary plan.

Upon capture, ABB immediately claimedto have acted under emergency right, since

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he was protecting himself and Norway fromcomplete «cultural destruction.» At trial,ABB explained that he had expected to betortured and killed after capture, either bythe police, by lynch mobs, or by prisonguards and inmates after a treason convic-tion. Despite some familiarity with the con-cept of emergency right, ABB didn’t seemaware that torture and killing of prisonersby the police are illegal, or that Norway hasno death penalty.3 Once the Norwegianpeople understood what had happened,however, their immediate reaction to thetragedy was not violence but, simply, grief.The youth at Utøya came from all over Nor-way, and Norway’s size (a population of 5million) entailed that many knew or wererelated to the family or friends of at leastone of the victims. After the attacks, the me-dia and the public also tried, with varyingdegrees of success, to give the many peoplewho were personally affected space for theirgrief, with ABB-free editions of newspapersand news programs. In addition, spontane-ous and planned public gatherings allowedpeople to grieve together, in smaller commu-nities and as a nation. At «rose marches,»people carrying roses (the political symbolfor the Labor Party) walked together in thestreets before gathering in public squares toshare their grief – crying, holding each other,listening to speeches, and singing. Variouspublic figures – members of the royal family,government officials, former and active pol-iticians, religious leaders, artists, and so on –helped create these public spaces for peopleto grieve together. These figures also grievedpublicly for those killed, for the bereaved,for their own losses, for those they knewwho were suffering, and for the nation. Forthe first time in history, the King (Harald)cried during a public speech (his first after

the attacks), and the royal family, the PrimeMinister, and various public figures cried asthey hugged survivors and victims’ lovedones. And of course, to Norwegians, itwould have been strange indeed if theyhadn’t cried.

During the first couple of weeks after theattacks, little attention was paid to the per-petrator. It was simply a period of grief, as itshould be. After this immediate period ofmourning was over, however, the public’sfocus naturally shifted to include ABB.Though Norwegians were bewildered anddisoriented in the grief-stricken aftermath ofthe attacks, their bewilderment dramaticallyincreased over the next few months as thephenomenon of ABB was revealed. In fact,most people appeared deeply perplexed dur-ing the trial, because it was difficult to un-derstand what we were witnessing. My aimin this paper is to apply Kant’s moral philos-ophy to some of these perplexing issues, andthereby contribute to the public discussionof the case. In my view, only by better un-derstanding what happened – the kind of vi-olence the attacks exposed us to; the ethical,legal, and political principles upheld duringthe trial; the question of which principles weshould uphold in the future – will it be pos-sible to heal and move on as a nation, wherethat includes taking on the challenging taskof considering possible legal and political re-forms. After a brief sketch of the trial itself(section 1), I proceed (section 2) to present aKantian suggestion of why the wrongdoer’smind struck us as so profoundly disturbed.4

The Kantian perspective, I argue in section3, also helps us understand why it was soimportant to respond to the violencethrough the legal system and to treat ABB sorespectfully before, during, and after the tri-al. Finally, in section 4, I address the contro-



versial issue now facing Norway as we moveforward: how capable is the Norwegian le-gal system to deal with cases involving ex-treme violence, including the violence com-mitted by psychologically impaired, deeplydisturbed mass murderers?

1. The Trial

The confusions surrounding the trial weremany and complex, so let me first sketchthem. The first confusion began when theCourt (“Oslo Tingrett») obtained the psy-chiatric evaluation of ABB (standard legalprocedure). The Court first authorized ateam of two leading psychiatrists to evaluatethe legal sanity of ABB during the attacks.Their work, begun in August of 2011, yield-ed a psychiatric report in November, ac-cording to which ABB had been in a psy-chotic state when performing the actions.ABB, the report says, has normal cognitiveand intellectual capacities, but suffered amental breakdown in 2006 from which hehas never recovered. In 2006, ABB movedback into his mother’s home; withdrewfrom society, family, and friends; and occu-pied himself primarily with the computergame «World of Warcraft.» Later, his focusshifted to composing his extremist religious-political manifesto and, later still, to plan-ning and preparing for the attacks. Duringthis period, the report maintains, ABB be-came a paranoid schizophrenic with grandi-ose and bizarre (logically or factually impos-sible) delusions. For example, he viewedhimself as a crusader engaged in a great warbetween good and evil (a grandiose delu-sion); as someone with the right to decidewho should live and who should die (anoth-er grandiose delusion); and as a participantat a meeting of a (non-existent) organiza-

tion, «The Knights Templar,» where he wasauthorized to write a religious-politicalmanifesto to unify the revolutionary war ef-forts of the organization (a bizarre delu-sion). According to Norwegian law, a para-noid schizophrenic with grandiose delusionsis psychotic (mentally ill), and must receiveforced mental health treatment instead ofpunishment. A commission of experts onpsychiatry and psychology (“Den Rettsme-disinske Kommisjonen,» hereafter «theCommission») subsequently evaluated thereport (also standard legal procedure), andunanimously approved it with only minorcomments.

This psychiatric report created public up-roar and deeply offended ABB, who claimedthat it was filled with «200 lies». The Courtultimately responded by appointing a sec-ond team of psychiatrists to evaluate ABB.They completed their work between Febru-ary and March of 2012. Their report, issuedin April, maintains that ABB was not suffer-ing from paranoid schizophrenia with gran-diose and bizarre delusions and was not psy-chotic during the attacks. According to thisreport, ABB’s descriptions of Europe shouldbe understood in the context of his extremepolitical views. Since such descriptions arecommon among extremists of his type, theydo not qualify as delusional. Moreover, thisreport argues that ABB was not delusional(psychotic), but rather that he exaggerated,fantasized, or lied (and still does) in his var-ious descriptions of the Knights Templar or-ganization. He is, they argue, an aggressive,extreme political activist suffering from anarcissistic personality disorder (NPD),namely, a dissocial personality disorder in-volving self-absorption and the consequentinability to be empathetic and respond ap-propriately to other persons’ points of view.


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An aggressive NPD and extreme politicalviews do not make one legally insane, andhence, this report concludes, ABB is punish-able. The majority of the Norwegian peopleseemed relieved by this second report andsupported it. ABB was likewise happy aboutits basic claim that he was legally sane.

Once the Commission completed its offi-cial evaluation of the second report, newconfusion arose. No one – not the Court,the lawyers, the media, nor anyone else –could figure out whether or not the Com-mission actually had approved it.5 Absent adecision about which report the Courtshould use, the ten-week trial began in Mayof 2012 with both psychiatric teams presentin the courtroom. In their opening state-ments, the prosecutors explained that theywould defend the claim that the defendantwas legally insane during the attacks (in ac-cordance with the first report), whereas thedefense attorney declared that he wouldchallenge this and argue for his client’s legalsanity (in accordance with both the secondreport and ABB’s wishes).

The first week of the trial was devoted toABB’s own statement and follow-up ques-tions from the prosecutors, defense attor-ney, and the judges. Lars Gule, a Norwegianphilosopher and expert witness on extremistpolitical ideologies, described feeling as if«the gates of hell» were opened when ABBspoke, especially when he recounted the kill-ings at Utøya. The newspaper reported thateven the public officials, all of whom werewell prepared psychologically for ABB’s tes-timony, looked pained as they kept theiremotions in check while the worst detailswere given. ABB, in contrast, was largelydispassionate. He became spirited onlywhile describing his planning and the at-tacks themelves. Though passionate when

explaining his extremist political ideology,he withdrew or became angry or annoyedwhen questioned about his childhood, up-bringing, or psychological state rather thanhis ideology or the preparation and execu-tion of the attacks. Sometimes he laughed –either sarcastically at the prosecutors or wit-nesses, or self-consciously when he realizedhe had said something particularly stupid.ABB had tears in his eyes only twice: on thefirst day, when clips were shown from thepropaganda film he made to broadcast hismanifesto, and later when his mother wasreferenced for the first time. Otherwise, heshowed no signs of regret, remorse, or anyother emotions appropriate to the circum-stances. He never had to fight to control hisemotions when describing what he haddone, facing his victims, or listening to thetestimony of his victims’ loved ones. Notonce was there reason to think that he un-derstood, in the ordinary moral sense of theword, what he had done. He repeatedly de-scribed his actions as «gruesome, but neces-sary,» which, with his gestures, communi-cated his conviction that his actions revealedpsychological strength. When questionedabout his apparent inability to experienceempathy, he maintained that he had trainedhimself not to feel emotions (by «dehuman-izing others»), and explained that he couldnot allow himself to experience empathy be-cause then he would «break down.» Whenfurther questioned about whether he coulddeliberately choose to feel empathy, he re-fused to answer.

As the trial developed, it became evidentthat most (if not all) of us couldn’t under-stand what we were observing. It wasn’t sostrange, as it turned out, that there were twoconflicting psychiatric evaluations of ABB.No one seemed capable of convincingly ex-



plaining what we were seeing, despite themany bombastic statements about ABB’spsychological profile made during the trial,by psychiatrists, psychologists, reporters,philosophers, legal scholars, and historians,among others. In any case, once ABB toneddown the grandiosity of his account, he andthe prosecution disagreed over only four sig-nificant factual points,6 while he and hisown defense lawyer disagreed over two. Theonly point of discrepancy between ABB’s de-scriptions of the events and those of the sur-vivors concerned some survivors’ claimsthat ABB expressed thrill (e.g., yelled «wo-hoo!») while he was shooting at the youth atUtøya. Neither the defense nor the prosecu-tion noted this difference in their final pro-ceedings.

In their closing statement, the prosecutorsexplained that they were not certain regard-ing the issue of legal sanity, but found it cor-rect to uphold their original claim (follow-ing the first psychiatric report) that ABB hadbeen in a psychotic state during the attacks.The trial and the second psychiatric reportprovided insufficient reason, they argued, tothink that ABB was «merely» an extremepolitical activist with an NPD.7 Neverthe-less, ABB’s two acts of terror, the prosecu-tors continued, should be understood aspunishable according to the Penal Code’s§§147a, 148, and 223.8 Hence, the prosecu-tion contended that if the Court ruled thatABB was legally sane during the attacks,then he should be punished with the legalmaximum in Norway for any crime: 21years in prison under the category of «for-varing» (“safekeeping»). «Forvaring»means that even after having served a sen-tence, a prisoner cannot be released unlesspsychiatrists deem him or her no longer adanger to society.9 The prosecution further

argued that when doubt exists in a legal pro-ceeding, Norwegian law requires that thedoubt benefit the defendant. Since it isworse to sentence a mentally ill individual toprison than to force a mentally healthy indi-vidual to receive mental health treatment,the latter option should be chosen. Still, theyconcluded, since ABB was legally insanewhen performing his actions (psychotic), heshould be admitted to forced treatment in amental health facility according to PenalCode §39.

Also the defense expressed a lack of com-plete confidence regarding the issue of ABB’slegal sanity, but continued by explaining thathe and his team still found it correct to deemABB legally sane. In addition, the defenseformally presented (but did not defend)ABB’s claim that he was not guilty in thecharges against him, and presented as plau-sible ABB’s claim that he decided to carryout the attack at Utøya only after hearingabout the Høyblokka-bomb’s ineffectivenesson the radio. The defense also defendedABB’s view that he should be given the mild-est possible punishment (prison) if foundguilty, and not «forvaring» (safekeeping), asthere was good reason to believe that hewould now politically protest by means ofthe pen only. Most of the defense attorney’sclosing statement focused, however, onABB’s claim that he was legally sane duringthe attacks.10 The defense argued that sincethe two psychiatric reports were inconsist-ent, the Court stood free to disregard them.Moreover, he emphasized the human right toassume responsibility for one’s actions andmaintained that being forced to receive men-tal health treatment when healthy is just asbad as being forced into prison when men-tally ill. The defense then endorsed the sec-ond report’s claim that ABB was suffering


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from a lack of empathy (of the kind associat-ed with NPD) in combination with extremepolitical views, rather than delusions. Theevidence for this claim was the absence of asignificant history of violence (for ABB) andABB’s decision not to kill three people atUtøya whom he identified as innocents rath-er than as «political targets.»11 The defensealso argued that the evidence supported thesecond report’s claim that ABB mistakenlybelieved in a colonizing war between Euro-peans and Muslims (as is common in theseextremist political milieus) and that ABB hadexaggerated, fantasized, or lied about the ex-istence of the Knights Templar. The defensealso emphasized mistaken beliefs that ABBhad corrected, such as his misapprehensionabout torture in Norwegian prisons. The de-fense further argued that ABB’s behaviorshowed that he clearly knew it was wrong«in our culture» to kill. ABB «chose to kill»because the end (the revolution) legitimatedthe means (the killings), a classic line of rea-soning of terrorists. Additionally, severalprofessionals who had evaluated ABB in theperiod after his surrender (such as the psy-chiatrist who evaluated his risk of suicideand the experienced prison guards who werearound him) did not observe any signs ofpsychosis (and so did not treat him as a py-chotic). Finally, the defense supported thesecond report’s claim that ABB’s withdrawalin 2006 was not caused by a mental break-down, since during this withdrawn periodABB was still able to make a lot of money(legally and illegally), participate in onlinepolitical forums and the World of Warcraftcommunity, and manage his relationshipswith family and friends, all while keeping histerrorist project a secret.

The final verdict came down on August24, 2012: the Court deemed ABB legally

sane during the attacks and sentenced himto 21 years of «forvaring,» specifying thathe must spend a minimum of 10 years inprison. Undoubtedly, most were relievedthat the Court followed the second report’sdetermination of legal sanity, and that thesentence was for «forvaring.» Even thosewho agreed with the prosecution that ABBshould be deemed legally insane found thatthe trial had settled this issue legitimately. Itwas clear, however, that most people didn’tfully understand their own responses or ex-actly what had happened in the trial. Manyalso experienced significant frustrationover the fact that ABB might one day befree, whether they were personally and di-rectly affected by his crimes or not. Manywere uncomfortable with the attention ABBhad received throughout the trial, which al-lowed him to express his «propaganda»and offensive thoughts. Some were puzzledby the respect ABB was accorded, not onlyin light of his horrendous acts of violence,but also his at times offensive courtroombehavior. Still, both during and after the tri-al most people, including victims and vic-tims’ loved ones expressed deep gratitudefor the way most of those involved in thetrial conducted themselves, in particular thejudges, the prosecutors, the defense, andmuch of the media. Clearly, too, many ex-pressed admiration for the incredible cour-age the victims displayed in helping eachother during the attacks and in facing andtestifying against ABB during the trial. Fi-nally, most found it hard to find ways tocapture the seemingly bottomless tragedy ofit all, a tragedy compassing ABB and hisfamily and friends. In the following sec-tions, I use Kantian philosophical theory toprovide a unified account of these varied re-sponses to the trial, in the hope of contrib-



uting to the continuous, public discussionsurrounding it. I’ll begin with the centralquestion of ABB’s legal sanity.

2. Mental vs. Moral Illness

The two psychiatric reports disagree, as wesaw above, about whether ABB was suffer-ing from paranoid schizophrenia with gran-diose and bizarre delusions (the first report,which the prosecution found most persua-sive) or from a narcissistic personality disor-der (NPD) in combination with aggressive,extreme political views (the second report,which the defense favored). I will argue thatpeople who suffer from mental illness can-not be punished because their conditionsmake it impossible for them, by their owndevices, to correct their mistaken beliefs andso to act as persons responsible for their ac-tions. I then distinguish mental illness frompersonality disorders (such as NPD) by char-acterizing the latter as conditions that sub-jectively challenge (but do not make impos-sible) one’s ability to act morally, or «as aperson.» When a person gives in to the chal-lenges associated with such a personality dis-order, we may say, that he becomes morallyill.12 Understanding ABB as suffering from acondition posing subjective, constitutionalchallenges to his ability to act morally (as aperson) can explain two things: (1) why weboth hold him legally responsible for his ac-tions (since he can assume responsibility forhis mistaken beliefs) and (2) why a normalprison sentence would be insufficient to dealwith the danger he poses as long as he doesnot take on the job of learning how to regaincontrol over his psychological condition. Ialso argue that if we set aside questionsabout the possible mental state of ABB at thetime of the crime, his aggressive NPD ex-

plains not only his racist and sexist beliefs,but his particular way of envisioning the fu-ture of Norway. Finally, if we assume thatthis is also the correct diagnosis of ABB atthe time of the crime, then, I maintain, the«forvaring» (safekeeping) clause in the pris-on sentence was appropriate.

2.1 Mental Illness and Legal InsanityHow is it that we can understand those suf-fering from paranoid schizophrenia with de-lusions mentally ill in such a way that theycannot be responsible and punished for theirwrongful actions? The paranoid schizo-phrenic with grandiose delusions is mentallyill in the sense that she cannot understandwhat is really going on; she fundamentallymisperceives factual reality without havingthe ability to correct her mistaken beliefsabout the world. Such a person cannot as-sume responsibility for her actions, since itis impossible for her to perceive the world asit actually is and so her actions as they actu-ally are.

The first psychiatric team believed ABBwas suffering from this condition because ofthe way in which he explained himself andhis actions when they first encountered himjust after the attacks; his behavior then, theyargue, only makes sense on the assumptionof grandiose and bizarre delusions (ratherthan correctible, mistaken beliefs). Themost worrisome of these, I take it, were notthe grandiose delusions, since ABB was of-ten willing to tone these down, but the bi-zarre ones, including ABB’s claims about theexistence of the «Knights Templar» organi-zation and his meeting with its leaders – adescription shown by the police to be false.The first psychiatric team maintained thatABB genuinely believed this when they firstmet him, and since he didn’t budge on this


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point during cross-examination, the prose-cution found that they had to follow thefirst report, despite their significant doubtsabout its correctness.

2.2 Moral Illness and Legal SanityABB’s behavior in the courtroom corre-sponds to that of a person suffering from anaggressive narcissistic personality disorder(NPD), which was the diagnosis of the sec-ond report, and the one supported by thedefense and affirmed by the Court. In fact,such a diagnosis explains much of what wasso terrifying about ABB’s behavior in thecourtroom. ABB’s detailed descriptions (andvery accurate memory) of his extreme vio-lence were deeply frightening, as was hislack of empathy, sadness, compassion, orany emotional or cognitive struggle whiledescribing his actions or when confrontinghis victims and their loved ones.13

Yet we must wonder what it is about peo-ple with an aggressive NPD that makes themless able to experience various morally ap-propriate emotions, such as affection, empa-thy, and compassion. How is it that they arelegally responsible for their actions even ifthey cannot easily experience these morallyappropriate emotions? In what follows, Ielaborate on the idea that suffering from anNPD should be understood as sufferingfrom a condition that constitutionally, sub-jectively challenges one’s ability to have thekind of focus and moral, affectionate emo-tions constitutive of being a person. If notdealt with and kept under control, such acondition can spiral into deeply morally dis-turbed ways of being, as happened in thiscase. I argue that, because those sufferingfrom these conditions can correct their be-liefs (at all times) and so are making choicesto set aside societal norms as they commit

their wrongful actions, they are legally re-sponsible for them. This explanation of themoral responsibility associated with aggres-sive NPD also explains how the accountmakes sense of the «forvaring» clause.

Having an NPD is commonly understoodto involve extreme self-absorption: it is apsychological condition characterized by anexcessive sense of self-importance, a lack ofempathy, and a radical preoccupation withoneself and one’s own concerns. Surprising-ly, then, my Kantian analysis attributes thiskind of moral disorder to the lack of ahealthy sense of self. That is why it’s a per-sonality disorder: this condition subjective-ly, constitutionally challenges a human be-ing’s ability to be a person.14 According toKant, having a healthy moral self involvesbeing capable of setting and pursuing endsof one’s own, in a manner determined byone’s own reason. When one acts in thisway, one’s actions are compatible with eve-ryone else acting in the same, reciprocallyrespectful way at all times, whether in thepursuit of one’s individual ends or endsadopted jointly with others. There are, how-ever, various conditions or aspects of such ahealthy self that come prior to it and enableit to flourish through the choices it makes.The absence of these prior elements requiresa person to concentrate too much on con-structing the self itself – of creating a senseof self, a sense of existing – instead of con-centrating on ends to be pursued in theworld (on one’s own or together with oth-ers). The person with an NPD has only par-tially developed some of these prior featuresof a healthy self, which makes her so easilypreoccupied with herself.

The healthy way to respond to the factthat one’s reactions and preoccupationsseem a little off as compared to those of oth-



ers – the fact that others seem more stableand at ease with themselves, including whenthey are emotionally upset – is, of course, toget some of the missing bits in place. This isthe work of therapy, and for most it requiressome psychological or psychiatric guidance.A person who does not compensate for hisinabilities with this kind of work has an un-stable basis in himself and thus a constantneed to turn the focus onto himself. He maytry to flee away from interactions and hisown self altogether through drugs, alcohol,dangerous activities, intense entertainment,and the like. In addition, such a person turnsaggressive when he makes others to pay at-tention to him and make him their primaryproject. The preoccupation with himselfconstantly challenges or makes unstable hisability to love, respect, and care for others inthe right way, in a way consistent with oth-ers having ends of their own too.15

Normative yet psychological features en-able us to be healthy, functioning emotionalpersons. These personal and social featuresinclude our unreflective personal and socialidentities (who we are), and they concernhow we are fundamentally grounded in theworld, how we feel safe in the world as thepersons we are. These ways that we sponta-neously, naturally, or automatically perceiveor emotionally orient ourselves in the worldas a normative space are unreflective, incontrast to how we reflectively think aboutor act in the world. For example, many ofmy moral emotions (what I love, grieve,take pride in, am ashamed of, etc.) arelinked to my identity as a Norwegian wom-an with a particular family and set offriends. These parts of me are not things I’vesimply chosen, but features of me that I’veeither been given (nationality, family) andhave affection for or found myself affection-

ately drawn to (close friends). Such unreflec-tive identities give us a sense of being in agood world in which we have a good place,a place that is ours and that is affirmed byothers. Insofar as these identifies arehealthy, they are part of what makes us feelexistentially secure, so that we can confi-dently and playfully set and pursue ourprojects. They compose the assumed, unre-flective background that gives us the confi-dence to act as persons in the world. Just aswe are oriented toward the countries andpeople in the world that are part of who weare – those we love and deeply care for – thepeople of those countries and the people welove are similarly oriented toward us. We allassume such a background as we go aboutour lives in the world in good ways.

Morally healthy persons (for our purpos-es here: those who are not suffering fromNPDs) always already (unreflectively) as-sume that they are being seen and paid at-tention to even if they are not the explicitobjects of others’ attention. They relate tothe world as a safe place where they can in-teract with others as the people they are. Asa result, their confidence to act in the is notconditional on others explicitly focusing onthem or being about them. In contrast, mor-ally challenged persons (again, here: personswith NPDs) do not always or easily (unre-flectively) assume that they are seen and tak-en into account when they are not explicitlythe object of others’ attention. Nor do theyalways assume that the world is a safe place– a world that is theirs to enjoy, where theyshould challenge themselves and pursuetheir projects. Instead, they experience theworld as an uneasy, unsafe place that for-gets, ignores, or attacks them; they readilyfeel unimportant or disregarded, thoughthese feels have no factual basis. As a result,


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these people are morally challenged in thesense that their basic orientation in theworld is not one of carefree, healthy engage-ment, but one that makes it hard for themnot to make their own selves their mainproject, instead of other projects. Personsstruggling with NPDs are self-absorbed be-cause they lack a sufficient self; without thisstable foundation they get preoccupied withthemselves, and require the affirming atten-tion of others.

Those who have aggressive versions ofthis moral disorder need to ensure that oth-ers focus on (are oriented towards) them atall times. Unless they are drawing theworld’s attention, they get an unnervingsense that they do not exist at all – and sothey turn aggressive. Moreover, this funda-mental self-absorption makes such personsstruggle with other-directed moral emo-tions, such as affection, empathy, sympathy,and compassion. Such emotions presupposethat one is fundamentally also other-oriented.The person who lets her self-absorption de-velop unrestrainedly – by being unwilling tofigure out why she keeps ending up in trou-bles in her relationships with others or bynot wanting to figure out how to get it allunder control – will not see her own lack ofother-directedness as a problem. Instead,she will tell a story according to which it isthe world, and not her, that is the problem.The person who gives up in these ways is nolonger only morally challenged, but morallyill. Such lack of emotional orientation to-wards others is not something one can sim-ply think oneself in or out of; it is notchangeable by such reflective means. Ourcapacity for reflection makes it possible forsomeone to take up the fight against the per-sonality disorder – to get or keep it undercontrol – since it makes it possible for us to

recognize it and relate to it rationally. Muchof the repairing or healing work itself is un-reflective in nature, however, and it is ena-bled by therapists, psychologists, and psy-chiatrists.16

If we reconsider ABB at this point, wemay note four things. First, during the trialit became clear that ABB is aware that hedoesn’t have moral emotions like empathyin the way others do. Second, during the tri-al he also remarked that if he did open up tothese emotions again, he would be de-stroyed by what he had done and that this iswhy he’s chosen not to be open to them.Third, ABB claimed that he is different fromother people with regard to such emotionsbecause he trained himself not to experiencethem; he argued that his inability to experi-ence these emotions reflects his psychologi-cal strength. Relatedly, he didn’t (anddoesn’t) understand that such moral emo-tions are not something about which onecan simply choose; that one cannot simplychoose to keep them at a distance or havethem. What he understood as his psycholog-ical training of «dehumanizing» others wasin reality giving in to or furthering his con-dition. His inability to experience theseemotions is therefore not a reflection of howstrong he is, but of how morally ill he hasbecome. Fourth, viewing ABB as morallysick makes intelligible otherwise inexplica-ble aspects of his killing spree on the island.ABB was elated and expressed joy when hethreatened, terrified, and killed the peopleon the island because having such powerover them – having their sole attention – fedthe void his lack of self creates. It supplied asense of being alive, of intensely existing.

Being morally challenged in this way – be-ing subjectively, constitutionally encum-bered in one’s ability to act and interact as a



person – makes personal, including intimatehuman love, a complex moral emotion, dif-ficult. Although persons suffering from anNPD can love in the sense of being passion-ately oriented toward the world and beingsin it, their self-absorption gives them troubleloving persons as persons and being lovedthemselves as persons, that is, as beings whopursue ends of their own. Someone who isnot self-absorbed wants to be loved by peo-ple who also flourish through their own, in-dependent projects in the world. Beingdrawn to a different person as a person,therefore, requires that one has a sufficientlystable, confident self. The person sufferingfrom an NPD faces the constant risk of los-ing confidence in herself, and she is threat-ened both by the lack of explicit attentionfrom the other and by the very process of af-firming the other. Focusing on the other per-son makes her feel as if she loses herself. Lov-ing such a self-absorbed person therefore be-comes a draining emotional experience.

Moreover, when self-absorption turnsaggressive, the failure to affirm the other’sdifference becomes a drive to destroy theother’s difference and independent sense ofself. The person suffering from aggressiveNPB will assert his sense of self and makeothers stay focused on him through anyavailable means, including threats, coer-cion, and violence. Although we are moral-ly committed to treating morally ill personsrespectfully (what the Kantian accountwould call practical or moral love) thosewho are aggressive towards others are un-lovable in this sense: being affectionately oremotionally open to them is self-destruc-tive. One can and should love them morally(respect them), but not affectionately (beemotionally open to them). A similar dis-tinction holds when we move from the inti-

mate, personal self to the social aspect ofthe self, such as one’s love for one’s country.The love a morally healthy person has forher country presupposes that the country isa country for persons, where everyone setsand pursues ends of their own, in the waysthat makes life meaningful for them. Inso-far as her country is not yet this, she willalso be angry at and ashamed of her coun-try – making it in part exactly her job to im-prove it; it’s her county. The morally chal-lenged or sick person, in contrast, may pas-sionately love her country, but not in a waythat presupposes the country as essentiallybeing, again, a country by and for persons;instead her love of country is what Kantcalls pathological love, in that she views thecountry as something whose purpose is sim-ply to affirm her sense of self.

It is revealing, then, that ABB has neverhad an intimate, loving relationship of anykind as an adult, and even his long-termfriendships from childhood were not partic-ularly developed, mature, or deep. In addi-tion, during the trial, he appeared to haveemotive reactions revealing affective loveonly twice, namely, when his propagandafilm was shown and when his mother wasmentioned for the first time.17 At all othertimes, he reacted with anger or withdrawalto anything said about him or his private lifeand childhood. Moreover, his love for theNorway he fantasized and his mother can-not be understood as expressions of a ma-ture, healthy love of country and of persons.Rather, it is a pathological love fundamen-tally at odds with our human nature andmorality (practical reason). First, take hislove for his (now late) mother. This lovingrelation was, as far as we can tell, funda-mentally asymmetrical. His mother neverchallenged how he lived in her home, he did


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not provide any care for her even though shewas frail and sick (she passed away in theyear after the trial), and he yelled at herwhen she didn’t «respect his space.»

Second, consider his love of country. «Hiscountry» is not an ideal of our current coun-try – a state constitutionally committed torespecting all citizens as free and equal – buta fantasy, fascist, totalitarian version of it,where a similarly asymmetrical love is real-ized. In his «ideal» Norway, ABB himselfwould be adored by all Norwegian citizens.In this imaginary society his (and every «re-al» man’s) manhood would be affirmed byall women, including in the intimate person-al spheres. Women would live up to what heconsiders the true, traditional gender ideal:lacking an independent sense of self, womenwould instead obtain their sense of selfthrough affirming their men and theirprojects. Any woman who would not lovehim and other men in this way should andwould be punished, according to ABB’s log-ic. Moreover, not only would his manhoodbe affirmed in these ways, but he himselfwould be affirmed as the leader of this greatnation: he is the as-of-yet unrecognized buttrue patriarch of Norway, its real «landsfad-er» (“Father Norway»). Rather than con-front the instabilities in his psychologicalconstitution, ABB let them develop into afull-fledged, aggressive self-absorption,which is of course incompatible with genu-inely loving anyone, including himself, as aperson. His conceptions of manhood andethnicity are therefore based on the partialor full denial, or even destruction, of certainother persons as persons. Presumably anyhuman beings who can interact with othersas persons would be in danger in ABB’sNorway since they would necessarily yieldresistance to him and his vision.

No one quite knows why some personssuffer from NPDs, let alone the aggressivekind. Most, however, believe that they arefrequently intertwined with psychologicallyabusive, disturbed, or challenged child-hoods. This certainly seems true in the caseof ABB, though it is not a complete explana-tion. People with much worse childhoodsthan his do not end up struggling with NPDsor become morally ill. The backstory ofABB’s life is sad, but not tragic. He grew upin one of the richest parts of Oslo, yet camefrom a home of limited means. He had onesibling and a somewhat psychologically un-stable mother on welfare: his father aban-doned the family early on.18 His teenageyears and young adult life involved a seriesof failures: dropping out of high school; fail-ing in politics after attempting to rise in theranks in the populist Norwegian rightwing,libertarian political party (“Fremskrittsparti-et»); and proving inadequate as a contribu-tor to public debate when newspaperswouldn’t publish his political writings. Theseparticular failings parallel central theses inhis «manifesto,» which recasts these failuresas consequences of the world’s perverted val-ues. The manifesto envisions a changed so-cial world, a world he has changed throughhis choices. In this new world – which heposits as the original, real world – genderroles and «true Norwegianness» are changedso that his greatness is realizable and recog-nized. This world affirms him instead of re-jects him. The manifesto expresses limitlessself-absorption and fantasizes an aggressive,morally disturbed world in which ABB islovingly adored as a great man (by whateverwoman he would share an intimate life withand generally, by all women) and as a greatleader (by all Norwegians): a fantasy of be-ing truly seen and therefore really existing



for the first time. For his fantasy to cometrue, ABB first had to eliminate everyone tiedto the current social and political reality ofNorway. This project would, if necessary, in-volve imprisoning or killing all morallyhealthy Norwegians, as they would not af-firm him. The bombings, shootings, andplanned beheading were a logical beginningof his revolution: by killing the current andfuture leadership of the Labor Party as wellas «mother» Norway (Brundtland), hewould take the first symbolic step towardridding Norway of its multicultural, Marx-ist, feminist corruption and replacing it withthe «true» Norwegian values and Norway’strue patriarch: himself.

As we have seen, persons suffering fromNPDs struggle to experience the other-direct-ed emotions constitutive of being a person,and they are more likely to fail in their effortsto develop full, healthy ethical characters.Those who have lost this struggle, whichNPD makes harder, and become self-and oth-er-destructive (aggressive) in their actions arewhat I have called morally ill. The morallychallenged and the morally sick are nonethe-less ethically and legally responsible for theiractions. They either already know or can ob-tain knowledge about why their moral emo-tions and ways of acting are importantly dif-ferent than those of other people – why theykeep getting into related trouble or underper-form by normal standards – and they havethe subjective, including emotional resourcesavailable to correct their mistaken beliefs.Hence they have a duty to obtain insight intotheir own condition so that they can resist,control, or overcome it. They remain ethical-ly and legally responsible for their beliefs (in-cluding the mistaken ones) and for the ac-tions they base on these mistaken beliefs. TheABB case illustrates this responsibility, at

least it does right now. During the trial, ABBexplained that he knows that his emotionallife is not quite like that of others, and espe-cially with regard to feelings like empathy.Yet he didn’t deny that he has known thesefeelings to some extent in his life, and hisspontaneous expressions of sadness when hismother was mentioned for the first time andwhen his affection for his country was stimu-lated also affirm the assumption that al-though impaired, the capacity for such emo-tional orientation is not completely absent.19

The trial also showed, many times, that ABBcan correct mistaken beliefs – as the defenseattorney pointed out.20

During the trial his defense attorney (whoknew him very well by the time of the trial)affirmed that ABB sometimes lies (and soknows the difference between truth andlies). In fact, assuming that ABB lies ex-plains each of the four factual points whereABB refused to yield during cross-examina-tions: 1) the existence of Knights Templar;2) the beginning of the planning of the at-tacks and the writing of the manifesto; 3)the truth of the first psychiatric team’s re-port of their conversations with ABB afterthe attacks; and 4) the question of whetherABB would have proceeded to Utøya if he’dsucceeded in killing more people at Høy-blokka. Given ABB’s aim, namely to contin-ue a «propaganda stage» from within theprison, lying about all four makes strategicsense: 1.) Lying about the existence ofKnights Templar presents ABB to other dis-turbed minds as a great leader of a move-ment of historical proportions; 2.) Lyingabout when he began writing of the mani-festo (claiming an earlier origin) upholds hisself-image as a strong leader with tremen-dous self-control and planning skills; 3.) Ly-ing about the first report conceals both the


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extent of his narcissism and the possibilitythat he is legally insane; 4.) Lying about hav-ing already decided to complete both stepsof the plan forestalls the moral outrage atthe Utøya killings expressed even by veryextremist rightwing milieus; after all, killingchildren with automatic guns is neither cou-rageous nor easily construed as the firststage of a great moral revolution. In fact,during the trial when ABB was pushed onthis point, his main response was not to saythat it was OK to kill children; instead hekept trying to resist the descriptions of the«children» by saying they «looked older»and by upholding the mantra that they were«gruesome, but necessary» actions. ABBwas willing to correct all the other «grandi-ose» and «bizarre» statements that were in-cluded in the first psychiatric report andthings about which he was factually mistak-en were also correctible by him.

At least by the time of the trial, therefor,ABB knew that his emotional life is notquite like that of others (and somewhatchanged from earlier stages of his life) andhad the ability to correct mistaken beliefs.He seems also to have had this ability to atleast some extent right after the killings(when he corrected beliefs about torture inprison, for example). He was and is terriblymistaken in some of his views, but he hasthe ability to correct them. If he could alsoself-correct at the time of the crimes andpreparations for them, he is responsible forhis choice not to investigate the truth ofthese beliefs, since he had the abilities need-ed to enable him to do so. If second report iscorrect and hence ABB’s described accurate-ly how he reasoned at the time of the kill-ings, ABB is responsible for each time he de-cided to kill yet another person on the is-land. He told us, chillingly, that as he left the

ferry he thought that it was «now or never,»that now he had to either go through with itor not – and he chose to go through with it.Again, assuming there were no delusionshere and his account is accurate, he made achoice each time he decided to pull that trig-ger – and he is responsible for having doneso; he could have done otherwise, as indeedhe showed himself capable of doing fourtimes (when he decided he wouldn’t killthree individuals and chose to surrenderwhen the police arrived).21

Let me end this section by explaining whythe defense was mistaken to argue that be-cause ABB is likely to use the pen ratherthan violent aggression to express his politi-cal views in the future, ABB should be givena normal prison sentence instead of «forvar-ing.» This part of the defense’s argumentcontradicts the second psychiatric report,which maintains that ABB is still aggressiveand dangerous and which I believe is cor-rect. Let me focus first on the dangerous di-mension of ABB’s current psychology. If myanalysis of ABB’s psychological status is cor-rect, then there is no reason to think that hewill not act in the same way again. Further-more, ABB revealed further the aggressiveelement at play in his being through his ex-pressions of thrill and joy. Finding joy in theexecution of terrible crimes only makessense on two possible assumptions: eitherABB was in a psychotic state (the first re-port, which ABB and the defense deny) orABB obtains an immensely elated sense ofself (thrill) by experiencing total destructivepower over other persons (the second re-port). Other manifestations of aggressiveself-absorption demonstrate similarly ag-gressive forms of NPD over which the per-petrators have lost control: men who feelempowered, important, profoundly justi-



fied, or thrilled by abusing their families(their girlfriends, wives, children, etc.), orpeople who obtain pleasure and excitementby torturing or killing people of differentsexual identities or orientations. Such peo-ple are not «merely» suffering from NPD,and they are no longer merely morally chal-lenged or unstable. Rather, they are danger-ous and aggressive; they are morally ill. Forthis reason, the appropriate legal sentencealso for them is «forvaring»; they cannotsimply be released into society again oncetheir sentence is served.

It follows from the above that onlytrained professionals can establish that it issafe to release people suffering from NPDs,professionals who not only can help peoplelearn how to deal with their NPDs and howto get them under control, but who can alsoevaluate the success of the treatment. Giventhe disagreement among trained profession-als in Norway concerning this issue and theutter confusion surrounding the Commis-sion’s handling of the case, it seems that wedo not currently have available the kind ofpsychiatric expertise that the legal-politicalsystem of punishment requires to functionproperly. Proper functioning would include,presumably, requiring prisoners voluntarily(as no one can be forced to do the kind ofpsychological work required) to undergotherapy appropriate to their conditions be-fore they are considered for release – andhaving available the kind of treatment need-ed for such a system to function. Currently,there therefore seems to be both a lack ofprofessional understanding of these kinds ofcases (reflected in the two psychiatric re-ports and the Commission’s handling of thecases) and the corresponding psychiatricand psychological treatment system suchcriminals need.

3. Upholding Our Humanity through Legal Procedures

Most Norwegians are grateful for the re-spectful way public officials and witnessesparticipated in the trial, and yet it remainspuzzling to many exactly why treating ABBrespectfully was so important. After all, notonly did he commit some of the worstcrimes possible, but his behavior in thecourtroom itself was morally disturbing (hisfascist morning salutes) and profoundly of-fensive (his condescending laughter at theofficials or the victims). It is also puzzlingwhy most who disagreed with the final deci-sion concerning ABB’s legal sanity still con-sidered the verdict legitimate. I address thesetwo puzzles in this section by, once again,drawing upon Kant’s moral philosophy,though here with a special emphasis on hisphilosophy of right. In particular, I drawupon Kant’s conceptions of respect for hu-manity, the role of public officials, the pur-pose of punishment, and «wrongdoing inthe highest degree.»

The starting point for Kant’s liberal theo-ry of justice is that commitment to justice re-quires us to subject our interactions to uni-versal laws of freedom. Moreover, as equals,we do not have a right to put ourselves up asjudges over each other’s lives and actions. Inaddition, we neither do nor can know whichpunishments people objectively deservewhen they act wrongfully (since we cannotaccess their first personal perspectives).Consequently, any individual who decidesto punish another for her wrongful actionsthereby wrongfully subjects that person toher individual choice rather than to univer-sal laws of freedom. For Kant, therefore,rightful punishment requires a public au-thority, or an artificial, institutional person


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that represents our general, united will andthereby enables rightful punishment withinthe legal-political framework of a liberalstate. As public officials, the judges (and ju-ry, if there is one) constitute the court actingon behalf of all of us, including the wrong-doer, in order to determine guilt and decideon punishment. As a result, the punishmentdoes not result from the choice of any pri-vate individual, but from a legal, public in-stitution that is set up so as to enable a rep-resentation of an «us» – all of us, includingthe wrongdoer. Not only is this the best wecan do, but it is what we have a duty to doinsofar as we are committed to the norma-tive ideals of our liberal states, or our statesas constitutionally bound to regard each cit-izen as having a right to be subject only touniversal laws of freedom and not each oth-er’s arbitrary choices. Thus, the public au-thority is entrusted to act on our behalf byapplying the relevant laws to determine aparticular case. The court’s reasonable andrespectful adherence to the law at all timesand reflected in the behavior of all of its of-ficers, enabled us all to relate to the case andto ABB in a way consistent with our deepestmoral commitments of justice, in spite ofABB’s own flagrant disrespect for these ide-als (with regard to himself, his terrible treat-ment of himself, and everyone else).

Situations like this one have, in otherwords, no morally uncomplicated way out.On any plausible liberal theory of right, noperson has a right to kill the innocent, andeveryone acts within her rights when shestops a person from doing so, even whenthat requires employing lethal force. If anyof the young people on Utøya who tried tostop ABB had succeeded, they would nothave wronged ABB in so doing, eventhough, in a just state, no one but the police

has a right to use coercion. In this case, sincethe police were de facto unavailable (as theone police officer on the island was amongthe first to be killed), the young peoplecould have considered themselves «depu-tized» (to temporarily act as police officers)to use force to stop the killer.22 Most liberaltheories make sense of such self-defensiveuses of violence. Kant suggests, however, isthat it remains fundamentally the case thatno private individual has a right to use coer-cion unilaterally against another. Moreover,performing any action that is generallywrong, such as killing someone alwayscomes at a moral cost, even when we do notwrong anyone in particular. That is to say, ifthe young people had succeeded in killingABB (as deputized agents of a just state),they would not have wronged him, but theiraction would have come at a significantmoral cost, even though it resulted from asituation forced upon them.

On Kant’s account, we experience the un-dertaking of such violent actions in non-ide-al conditions as fundamentally inconsistentwith what our commitment to justice ideallyrequires of us. We experience ourselves,Kant says, as «do[ing] wrong in the highestdegree» (MM, 6: 307f)23 when we use vio-lence against one another, including, ofcourse when we subject another, aggressingperson to lethal violence.24 In this case, an-yone committed to justice would want tostop ABB before he managed to kill anyoneand to bring him, as we say, «to justice» –which, as explained above, ideally meansbringing him to trial, where the court willdecide what should be done (whether heshould be punished or forced to receivemental health treatment). Following that,the police and other public officers (prisonguards or high-security mental health work-



ers) enforce this decision on behalf of all ofus. This is the process we ideally want whenwe seek to bring perpetrators to justice. Inthe counterfactual case in which people hadmanaged to stop ABB by killing him, theywould experience having killed him as com-ing at a moral cost because such lethal vio-lence conflicts with our own commitment tohumanity or to regarding persons as havinginviolable worth. Killing ABB on Utøya, al-though legally justified, would have in-volved one person deciding to end anotherperson’s life, which is something we do notview ourselves as having the moral authori-ty to do with regard to one another.25

These are the reasons why, then, onKant’s account, it was so important to sub-ject ABB to justice in the public court sys-tem, where everyone involved – except theaccused – affirmed the rules and norms ofrespect constitutive of the courtroom. Thatbehavior made it possible for us all to up-hold our commitment to humanity and tointeracting rightfully at all times. In otherwords, by so interacting with ABB, we up-held the humanity in him that he himselfproved so utterly incapable of upholding.We also treated him in accordance with thelaws that govern all our interactionsthrough the authority of public representa-tives of the people, namely, court officialswhose actions themselves are delineated bythe law. The public officials lived up to theauthority entrusted to them by ensuring thatthe law was followed at all times; they werenot there as private persons but as publicrepresentatives of all of us who were author-ized to evaluate the wrongdoer’s actions oneveryone’s, including ABB’s, behalf. Thewitnesses, in turn, helped the public author-ity perform their task by truthfully and re-spectfully telling them the facts. As each sur-

viving witness and each bereaved familymember took the stand, their ability to up-hold the ideals of humanity and enable thecourtroom to function – despite the wayABB so brutally violated those ideals forthem personally – filled us with the deepestrespect and gratitude. Those of us who havenot had a similar experience have no cer-tainty that we would be able to behave asthey did; we only know that they showed usboth how to do it and the importance of do-ing it. The witnesses and the public officialsat trial enabled us all to uphold our owncommitment to our humanity and to thepublic, legal institutions that ABB had so vi-olently attacked.

The way the trial was conducted was im-portant, then, because, we experienced apublic authority that functioned as a repre-sentative of us all, composed of public per-sons who reasoned and acted in ways deter-mined by the public laws, whose aim was toprotect each citizen’s rights without subject-ing them to private opinions of right andwrong. The legal system enabled us to deter-mine rightful use of force, either punishmentor forced mental health treatment, in re-sponse to ABB’s violent transgressions of thelaws. Moreover, this case illustrates how im-portant the role of the public authority iswhen we face situations where crucial factsare uncertain, which in this case, waswhether ABB was legally sane during the at-tacks. We lacked the facts to settle this ques-tion, and the Court-appointed experts disa-greed. These non-ideal circumstances alsomake the ideal solution – the public rule oflaw – the most pragmatic solution. Giventhe difficult or non-ideal circumstances con-cerning our knowledge of ABB’s legal sanity,all we could do was to ensure that the best(psychiatric and legal) expert judgments


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were employed to investigate the issue, andthen entrust the court, as our final publicrepresentatives, to determine the correct ap-plication of the law in this particular case.This Kantian account of why we need tobring people to justice by subjecting them tothe public rule of law and the way this caseproceeded explains why even those who dis-agreed with the court’s ruling on ABB’s legalsanity considered the verdict legitimate.

4. The Difference between Retributive Punishment and

Forvaring

In this section, I take the controversial standthat the current Penal Code in Norway is un-able to deal with particularly heinous crimes,which undermines the legal system’s abilityto restore justice after certain serious crimeshave been committed – something revealedalso in this case. I argue that the legal systemmust be able to guarantee its citizens that ifthey are subjected to terrible crimes and theyremain committed to the legal system in theirresponses to these crimes, then once the trialis over, their exposure to the violator must beover too. Currently, the Norwegian legal sys-tem is unable to do this, and so it is unable toguarantee victims the necessary space togrieve and heal. Despite all its merits, the le-gal proceedings could not bring the full,right kind of closure to the case.

Many Norwegian citizens, including vic-tims of these crimes, continue to find it mor-ally offensive that the punishment for ABB’scrimes is only 21 years (even though theclause of «forvaring» makes it practicallyunlikely that he will ever be free again). Inmy view, Norwegians are rightfully offend-ed about this. A maximum limit of 21 yearsin prison for any imaginable crime makes

little sense. The current Norwegian PenalCode likely grew out of theories popular inthe 60s and 70s, theories according to whichcrime is the result of lamentable socio-eco-nomic conditions and the aim is always torestore the criminals fully to society. Ofcourse, poor socio-economic conditionscontribute to crime and typically our aimshould be to see punishment as leading torestoring people as members of the commu-nity. Assuming that ABB is legally sane, it isquite possible that his lack of a healthy senseof self (his NPD) is due at least partially tohis less than ideal childhood. Conceivably,Norwegian child protective services shouldhave intervened early in ABB’s life in orderto protect his rights, in which case we allfailed him at that point.26 The relationshipbetween problematic childhoods – whichwe all, through the public authority, have aresponsibility to do something about – andpersonality disorders may provide us withyet another reason to eschew the death pen-alty27 and offer ABB therapy. After all, per-haps only by such interventions do we takeinto account the complex stories behindcrimes that involve the failures of the stateand society to protect vulnerable children.Nevertheless, it remains the case that tohave an NPD is not to be incapable of legalresponsibility.28 Such crimes involve manychoices. Even this extreme situation, if wego by ABB’s own report of his stream ofconsciousness as he undertook the killings,involved many decisions – and ABB was andis responsible for these choices.

Kant is famous for defending a retributivetheory of punishment, according to whichthe automatic, corresponding punishmentfor choosing to kill another innocent personshould be death (or, in my considered Kan-tian view, life in prison).29 To me, the inabil-



ity of the current legal system to bring fullclosure to this case should cause us to revisitthis currently unpopular line of reasoningwith regard to punishment. The retributiveargument is simple: If you kill another inno-cent person, the life you took is not equiva-lent to 21 years of your own life. You areequals, and both of your lives are invalua-ble. There is no price tag on another’s life; ifyou murder an innocent person, then yourlife as a free person should be over too.

Perhaps there are reasons to equate onelife sentence to 21 years, but we have to jus-tify the equation, not simply assume it. It issimply incorrect that 21 years of imprison-ment is a life-sentence (one that lasts the restof one’s life, or what traditionally was called«livstid» or «lifetime» sentence in Norwe-gian). Regardless of whether a lifetime inprison is best understood as equivalent to 21years, I believe that the way in which thecurrent Norwegian Penal Code limits pun-ishment for any crime to 21 years in prisonis unjustifiable. However heinous a crimeone commits and however many people itaffects, one cannot be sentenced in a singletrial to more than 21 years. Assuming goodbehavior and no «forvaring» condition onthe sentence, one has the right to be consid-ered for release after completing 2/3 of one’ssentence, or 14-15 years. This is, in my view,deeply problematic and morally offensive asit cannot be reconciled with each person’sequal right to freedom.

One way to illustrate the problem goeslike this: ABB killed 77 people, and eachkilling becomes equivalent to 1/77th of 21years, or 0.273 years or a little over threemonths, according to the current Norwe-gian Penal Code. If we include the numberof other people who were physically harmedby ABB, the punishment for each killing be-

comes even less, and so even more absurd. Ifwe consider the fact that ABB also under-took terror attacks against the state (soagainst all of us, or public crimes), then thepunishment he received for each crime be-comes even less, and even more absurd still.Again, this sentence fails to treat each citi-zen as having inviolable worth equal to thatof any and all other human beings. Instead,the current Penal Code in Norway weighseach of ABB’s victims’ value as 1/nth, where«n» is the number of victims involved in thetrial. The resulting punishment cannot, inprinciple, match the wrongdoing, which, Ibelieve, is one reason why so many arerightly upset with the legal system’s inabilityto bring proper closure to this case – tobring ABB to justice for his crimes. Hence,even if a life sentence may, for some reason,be deemed 21 years, then for each life onetakes, one should get one life sentence. Itshould not be legally neutral whether onekills one, two, or many – each life shouldcount as one when we measure punish-ment.30Of course, one might agree with thisprinciple, but maintain that ABB is punishedfor each crime by paying for all of them con-currently (at the same time) rather than con-secutively (one life sentence after another). Ifind this analysis unconvincing. Concurrentsentences may be plausible in some cases, asin lesser crimes or in non-bodily crimes,such as thefts. When we are dealing with in-tentional killing of other people and espe-cially where each particular person is killedintentionally and particularly heinously (asin this case), there seems to be no good rea-son to appeal to the logic of concurrent sen-tencing.

Yet perhaps consecutive or concurrentsentencing is simply inappropriate for somecrimes, like the one we are dealing with


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here. Some crimes are such that the idea ofthe criminal once again becoming one of us(our community) as an equal again is moral-ly perverted or absurd. For some crimes –like those committed by ABB – the idea of aterminate sentence of any kind is in itself amoral perversion or absurdity; we cannoteven envision what such an appropriatepunishment could possibly be. All we doknow is that the moral idea of becomingequal members of society again is impossi-ble; it simply makes no sense, and this iswhy most Norwegians remain profoundlyupset about this aspect of the trial. Somecrimes are so heinous and vast in their im-pact that once the trial is over, unchosen ex-posure to the criminal in question must alsoend, and end for good. These kinds ofcrimes threaten to undo or unground peopleby robbing them either of their loved onesor of their trust in the world exactly becausethey are healthy human beings. The victims(first and foremost those who were directlyattacked and their loved ones, and then allof us, as Norwegians) have a right to the si-lence and peace required to heal and returnto life. The legal system doesn’t functionwell if it cannot guarantee the kind of peacevictims of such heinous crimes need, to findtheir way forward again. The current systemupholds principles according to which vic-tims have a duty of justice to face or interactwith the perpetrator once again, as a freeperson; perhaps on the street or in the gro-cery store as a free citizen – possibly in 15years time. But any determinate number ofyears to be served in prison is wrong, sincethere cannot be an «after the sentence isserved» in these cases. The state cannot pre-sume that its citizens have such a duty ofjustice to prepare for interaction as equals insociety again. Sometimes interaction must

be over for good, and this is one of thosetimes. Those who were subjected to ABB’sviolence should have been able to know thatafter the trial they would never have to beexposed to or interact with him ever again.Whether or not they will interact should bea question over which they have control(such as choosing to visit him in prison, say,as part of the healing process).31 We allshould remain committed to ABB beingtreated respectfully in prison, but it shouldnot be the case that his victims are requiredto start mentally preparing for having toface him again, even relatively soon, as afree man in society. That the legal systemcannot guarantee this, I believe, is a pro-found failure.32

It may be objected at this point that real-istically ABB will never again be a free citi-zen, since the Penal Code has the category of«forvaring» exactly to ensure justice by pre-venting morally ill people like ABB from be-ing released. I believe this argument is mis-taken. The category of «forvaring» is thecorrect one to use to secure society againstpersons whose unwillingness to deal withtheir aggressive personality disorders makesit impossible to release them safely back intosociety. In legal systems that are committedto the principle that mentally ill peopleshould not be punished for illegal violent ac-tions, it seems correct to have a legal catego-ry that ensures that morally ill persons whohave committed violent crimes have accessto mental health services to control the ag-gressive aspects of their personality disor-ders. In fact, my impression is that the «for-varing» clause is increasingly applied exact-ly in cases where the crimes are impossibleto explain except on the basis of some basicmoral illness, such as in cases of domesticabuse of spouses and children. The account



above is correct, it can explain why thesepeople are legally responsible and yet shouldhave access to the mental health servicesthey need to deal with their problems. Still,the legal clause of forvaring deals with themoral illness, not with the question of retri-bution for the crime committed and forwhich they are legally responsible. Althoughthe category of forvaring should be used incases involving aggressive NPDs, it shouldnot be a replacement for punishment, themeans by which we restore rightful rela-tions. The category of «safekeeping» ad-dresses the moral illness involved, but can-not remedy an insufficiently retributive sen-tence that fails to express proper respect forthe victims and their rights. The «forvaring»clause and the prison sentence are two cate-gories that do independent work.33

Conclusion

One of the most terrifying aspects of AdolfEichmann was the banality of his thinkingregarding his wrongdoing, as HannahArendt argues in her Eichmann in Jerusa-lem.34 Any plausible account of him, shemaintained, had to account for the fact thathe was, by any reasonable standard, a mostmediocre man who seemed unable to thinkproperly and so to know the difference be-tween right and wrong. In his mind, he wassimply following orders and obeying the lawas he built a career for himself. Even thoughEichmann was «perfectly incapable of tell-ing right from wrong» (Arendt 26, cf. 287)and found himself «under circumstancesthat make it well-nigh impossible for him toknow or to feel that he was doing wrong»(Arendt 1992: 276), it was right that he waspunished, Arendt maintained, because he«carried out, and therefore actively support-

ed, a policy of mass murder.» (Arendt 1992:279) Eichmann had to hang because, despitehis lack of wrongful intent, «no one, that is,no member of the human race, can be ex-pected to want to share the earth» with him(ibid.). Although it’s obvious that someonewho has acted as horrifically as Eichmanndoes not «have a right to live» in a profoundsense, something about Arendt’s account, asmany have argued before me, doesn’t addup. If you don’t know what you’re doing,you can’t distinguish right from wrong, andyou live in circumstances where the «cul-ture» around you can’t help you, then whyis justice still done when you are subjectedto the death penalty? Something doesn’tseem quite right in the argument, includingthe interpretation of Eichmann’s character.

The account above can be seen as one at-tempt at giving a more nuanced account ofthese kinds of criminals, one that can ex-plain why people like Eichmann and ABB,whose crimes are not motivated by self-in-terest and whose actual intent is, in theirminds, not wrong, still remain responsiblefor their crimes. More specifically, I havesuggested that part of what is so terrifyingabout ABB is also that, like Eichmann, he isa most mediocre person. Any interpretationof what we saw that ascribes to him impres-sive powers of any kind is irreconcilablewith the facts. ABB’s simple reasoning frommistaken beliefs is also banal through andthrough. I only differ from Arendt in offer-ing a somewhat more complex account ofthis banality. To start, one difference is myemphasis on the way that ABB’s and Eich-mann’s banal reasonings are matched byequally simple emotional lives. A secondmain difference is my suggestion that a lackof self (their moral illness) explains theirlack of proper engagement with their beliefs


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and the shockingly simple nature of theiremotional lives. ABB is driven by the senseof being seen, of being alive that he getsfrom having a leading active role in his pre-sumed political project. The informationArendt gives us about Eichmann suggestssomething similar. The main differenceseems to be that Eichmann didn’t shareABB’s elation at committing the direct,physical destruction of other human beings,or this aggressive element of ABB’s NPD.

Otherwise, Eichmann and ABB both ap-pear to lack a healthy sense of self and henceare utterly self-absorbed. This self-absorp-tion explains why Eichmann, in Arendt’s ac-count , finds it so very difficult to «thinkfrom the standpoint of someone else»(Arendt 1992: 49), feels so easily «elated»when he tells the story about himself interms of «stock phrases,» wants to getcaught (so that he got to tell his story incourt), and keeps writing his biography(during his years in Argentina and in prisonin Israel). Both Eichmann and ABB lack ad-equate interpersonal emotions; feel elatedwhen they describe their projects by stockphrases (the core one being variations of«obeying the law» for Eichmann and a corerole in «protecting Norwegian culture fromdestruction» by «gruesome, but necessary»actions for ABB); wanted to get caught sothat they could tell their stories in court; andthey found it tremendously important towrite the history (biographies) about their«great» lives. And, of course, both tookthemselves to be key elements of great mor-al-political projects of German and Norwe-gian self-realization. Eichmann took himselfto be the «expert» on the Jewish questionand ABB took himself to be the leader ofboth the European contrajihadist movementand Norway.

Given these analogies, I have argued, incontrast to Arendt, that both Eichmann andABB had the ability to correct the mistakenbeliefs upon which their actions rested, andthis is why they both have been legally re-sponsible for their actions. Neither has ahistory of no interpersonal emotions everpresent (revealing no capacity for such emo-tions) and both had many facts within reachthat simply didn’t fit the stories they weretelling themselves. For example, when askedat trial if he would kill his own father if toldto do so by his leaders, Eichmann repliedthat he certainly would if the case had beenproven against his father. He was then askedif the case against the Jews he sent to theconcentration camps had been proven, andhe had (of course) no answer. Similarly,when asked what was possibly heroic aboutshooting defenseless children, ABB alsodidn’t have an answer, but only awkwardlysaid that they didn’t really look that young.Moreover, both courts proved that Eichmanand ABB were able to correct mistaken be-liefs. One might argue that self-correctionwas harder in Eichmann’s case, since somany around him supported what he did,whereas ABB had much resistance in theculture surrounding him. However, not onlydid Eichmann’s own physical reactions re-sist what he was doing (the violence in theconcentration camps made him physicallyill), but he was surrounded continuously bydesperate people. He chose to act on whatmade him feel important and set aside eve-rything in his reality that resisted thatchoice. For that decision he is responsiblejust as ABB was responsible for identifyingthe «true» culture as being the extremist cul-ture he could find via the web.

The trials gave both men opportunities tostart relating to what they have done in a



truthful way, one that tracks reality as it ac-tually is, not as it might be described tomake one feel smarter than everyone elseand a part of a big project and not in a waythat block challenges to what one is doing.Eichmann failed to seize this opportunityand so went to the gallows repeating hisstock phrases, and ABB also failed to startthis process in court. Their failures, howev-er, do not lessen our duty to hold them and

ourselves to this standard of truthfulnessand respect for each person, the standard ofhumanity. If the analysis in this paper is cor-rect, then if ABB ever starts this process, thestandard of humanity involves the principleof forvaring and we must give him access tothe mental health care he will need to do theseemingly impossible: find a way to livewith what he has done.

Noter1 Thanks to Ingrid Albrecht, Lucy Allais, Marcia

Baron, Jennifer K. Oleman, Sarah Broadie, Hugh Chandler, Antony Duff, Barbara Herman, Paul Hurley, Ernst Horgen, Arnt Myrstad, Martha C. Nussbaum, Leonard Randall, Barbara Sattler, Martin Sticker, David Sussman, Julie Tannen-baum, Nicolaus Tideman, Jens Timmermann, Ekow N. Yankah, Shelley Weinberg, Kirstin Wil-cox, the Department of Philosophy at Pomona College, the Kant reading group at the University of St. Andrews; and Kjersti Fjørtoft and Jonas Ja-kobsen at Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift for having helped me in various ways in writing this paper. Which is not to say that they agree with my anal-ysis or to deny in any way that the mistakes re-main only mine. Thanks also to the Department of Philosophy and the Center for Advanced Stud-ies at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Cham-paign; the University of St. Andrew’s Centre for Ethics, Philosophy and Public Affairs; and the Brady Scholars Program in Ethics and Civic Life at Northwestern University for having funded this research project.

2 See http://www.nrk.no/contentfile/file/1.8025126!tiltalen227.pdf for a redacted version of the charges against ABB.

3 ABB might have thought this because after World War II, there was a death penalty for treason and it was applied to some of the leading «Nasjonal Samling» (NS) leaders after the war. (NS was the fascist, nationalist political party led by Vidkun Quisling in Norway before and during the war.)

4 I have included these more descriptive parts in the paper so as to enable non-Norwegians to follow the analysis and engage the arguments.

5 The Commission originally asked for a clarifica-tion from the psychiatrists, but even after it was provided, the Commission’s view was unclear. During the trial, when the Court questioned members of the Commission, it became apparent that in asking for the additional clarification from the second team of psychiatrists, the Commission had not «approved» the second report and that the Commission regarded the second report as weaker than the first.

6 First, there was disagreement over the existence of and his meetings with the leaders of the Knights Templar organization; when confronted with what appeared to be overwhelming evidence that the or-ganization has never existed, ABB simply disa-greed. Second, the prosecution argued that ABB lied when he claimed to have begun preparing for his attacks in 2002, since there is no evidence for (and much evidence against) this. On the basis of the first psychiatric report, reports from family and friends, and police interviews with ABB, the prosecution concluded that the writing of the man-ifesto began around 2007 and that the planning of the actual attacks started in 2009. Third, the pros-ecution maintained that ABB himself lied when he accused first team of psychiatrists of telling «200 lies» in their report of his statements during Au-gust 2011, because they had no reason (and very many reasons not) to lie. Fourth, the prosecution maintained that the evidence does not support ABB’s claim that if he had succeeded in killing


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more people at Høyblokka he would not have pro-ceeded to Utøya. The defense agreed with the pros-ecution on the second and third points, and with ABB on the first and fourth.

7 The prosecutors emphasized that though in doubt they were more convinced by the first psychiatric report because it had evaluated ABB closer to the actual event, the Commission regarded it as the stronger report, and overall, it fit better with how friends and family had described ABB’s with-drawal starting in 2006.

8 The Penal Code’s §147 has never before applied in a Norwegian trial. Penal Code §147a outlaws acts of terror intended to undermine a central function in society, by, for example, incapacitat-ing government activity or public works, or creat-ing serious fear among the population. The pros-ecution argued that ABB’s acts of terror also em-ployed methods outlawed in Penal Code §148 (which forbids setting explosions that could lead to the loss of human life or the extensive destruc-tion of others’ property) and Penal Code §223 (which concerns intentional killing under «sharp-ened conditions,» conditions that make the kill-ing especially heinous).

9 For the prosecution’s procedure, see: http://nrk.no/227/dag-for-dag/rettssaken---aktoratets-prosedyre-1.8213456

10For the defender’s procedure, see: http://nrk.no/227/dag-for-dag/forsvarets-sluttprosedyre-1.8216158

11These were the captain of the ferry, a 10-year old boy, and a young man whom he identified (pre-sumably due to his «preppy» appearance) as «be-longing to them,» meaning ABB’s ultranationalist «kind.»

12 I am grateful to David Sussman for having sug-gested this phrase to me and for patiently discuss-ing many of the issues in this section with me.

13 One question that keeps puzzling me (a non-expert on psychology/psychiatry) is whether someone suffering from a psychosis actually can have such clear memories of the crimes as ABB does and also not struggle (emotionally or cognitively) when facts disputing their sense of reality are presented.

14My account is inspired by recent work in Kantian moral psychology, especially that of Ingrid Albre-cht, Lucy Allais, Barbara Herman, and David Sussman.

15 We all, of course, have some of these tendencies, and some of us have more than others because of having been subjected to abusive behavior. Hence,

at times, we all need to pay extra attention to our-selves to heal wounds or care a little especially for bits that have been badly trampled on. These nor-mal features of a fragile human life differ from the experience of someone who is struggling with an NPD. Such a person does not only experience her-self as sometimes more vulnerable or defensive, but as generally struggling to experience appropriate moral emotions. The all-encompassing nature of the struggle is why its existential challenges are so significant and difficult to face.

16 In my view, these ideas reflect the relationship Kant envisions between morality and human na-ture, as in the Religion within the Boundaries of mere Reason (6: 26-9). According to Kant, the predisposition to good in human nature has three elements to it: The first (to «animality») concerns our basic, unreflective social nature; the second (to «humanity») concerns our susceptibility to how others conceive of us (which requires simple comparative uses of reason); and the third (to «personality») concerns our susceptibility to mo-rality and its demands (which requires reflective, practical uses of reason). In the analysis in the pa-per, the first idea informs the way in which I de-scribe a healthy self as being personally and so-cially identified (“animality»), the second in-forms the idea of how a health self assumes being seen by others (“humanity»), and the third in-forms the idea of how reflection enables us to both correct beliefs and behavior (“personality»). Going into these exegetical aspects of Kant is ob-viously impossible, but notice that my analysis can be supported by any theory that has such a three-fold combination of unreflective and reflec-tive elements of our basic emotional life.

17We never saw how he would interact with his friends since they needed him to leave the room when they testified; his mother naturally never testified.

18When he was a little boy (4 years old) the Norwe-gian child services were alerted and undertook psychiatric evaluations of him; the relevant court sessions were conducted behind closed doors for confidentiality reasons.

19Hence, this account is compatible with maintain-ing that some types of psychopaths completely lack the capacity for other-directed emotions of any kind (see, for example, Jeffrie G. Murphy’s article «Moral Death: A Kantian Essay on Psy-chopathy,» Ethics, Vol 82:4, 1972: 284-98 for such an analysis of psychopathy; see especially



pp. 294ff.); my claim here is simply that ABB is not one of these.

20 I’m especially grateful to Duff, Herman, and Yan-kah for making me clarify this point.

21 It may be impossible for anyone today to actually settle the issue of ABB’s legal sanity at the time of the actions since obtaining this knowledge would require access to ABB’s mind both at the time of the crimes and during the interviews, which is im-possible. In addition, the original interviews were not recorded electronically.

22For such a deputy interpretation, see Sussman’s «On the Supposed Duty of Truthfulness: Kant on Lying in Self-Defense,» in The Philosophy of De-ception, ed. Clancy Martin (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2009, 225-43).

23Kant, Immanuel The Metaphysics of Morals, transl. and ed. by M. Gregor (Cambridge Univer-sity Press: Cambridge, 1996).

24On this reading of Kant, to kill someone is to do a generally wrong action – it involves, in «Kan-tianese,» acting on a rule (maxim) that cannot hold as a universal law. Hence, choosing that ac-tion (killing) makes the option of interacting un-der universal laws impossible. This is why the ac-tion of killing the killer is experienced as coming at a moral cost even though it does not wrong the killer. I defend this approach in «Kant and Lying to the Murderer at the Door… One more Time: Kant’s Legal Philosophy and Lies to Murderers and Nazis,» The Journal of Social Philosophy, Vol. 41, No. 4, Winter 2010: 403-421. A main al-ternative reading of Kant on this point could ar-gue that since one is forced into the situation where killing the other is the only option, killing the other is not to do wrong in the highest degree and does not come at a moral cost.

25 In fact, this may be a reason to think that Kant is wrong in thinking we can have the death penalty. Perhaps the death penalty, though morally appro-priate in the sense of fitting the crimes, requires people to do something that no morally healthy human being can do or can feel authorized to do (namely, execute another, now defenseless per-son). Hence the death penalty may be both mor-ally necessary and morally impossible. I am grate-ful to David Sussman for helping me clarify my thoughts on this issue.

26 The extent to which this is indeed the case depends upon psychiatric evaluations of ABB conducted at the time, but the public does not – as it should not – have access to such confidential documents.

27 At this point in time, it seems over-determined that imposing the death penalty in a well-functioning legal system is simply unjustifiable, but going into this issue here would take me too far afield.

28 If my analysis is correct, then it is not the case that serious violent crimes of this kind will go away even in very affluent societies (like Norway). And, indeed, current research does not indicate that Norway – now the richest welfare state in the world – has fewer people struggling with person-ality disorders than other countries. Its high levels of domestic abuse equal those of other countries.

29See note 25 for explication of why I believe that the death penalty should be taken off the Kantian table.

30 The prosecutors’ closing argument is that the actu-al punishment will be the same regardless of whether or not ABB is charged only with Penal Code paragraph 147a (public crime, or a crime against the state) or also with Penal Codes 148 (a public crime) and 223 (77 counts of private crimes, or crimes against private citizens). It seems to me, however, that he should be charged with all of these charges as well as with x number of counts of each one (one or two counts of 147, one or two counts of 148, and finally 77 counts of murder un-der «sharpened conditions»). Each of these counts should carry a life sentence and he should be charged for each count of physical injury.

31As pointed out to me by Broadie and Yankah, a full account of this probably engages the histori-cal category of being banished from societies, but for reasons of space I set aside this question here.

32 I’m most grateful to Duff, Herman, and Sussman for helping me clarify my thoughts on punish-ment here.

33 One may object that Norway has never had to deal with mass murderers post-WWII and we should not change the system in response to only one case. My claim, however, is that we should change the law not because of this one case, but because the law is incorrect. This case has only made obvious problems that have existed for a long time.

34See both Hannah Arendt’s Eichmann in Jerusa-lem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (Penguin books, 1992) and Margarethe von Trolla’s 2012 film Hannah Arendt about the writing and publi-cation of this book. My revised analysis of Eich-mann is also consistent with relevant sections of Bettina Stangneth’s Eichmann before Jerusalem: The Unexamined Life of a Mass Murderer (Knopf: New York, 2014).

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