the theory of truth in the theory of meaning rattan

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The Theory of Truth in the Theory of Meaning

Gurpreet S. Rattan

1. Introduction

I aim in this paper to explore and establish a quite definite view of therelationship between the theory of truth and the theory of meaning. The viewderives from reflection on the philosophies of truth and meaning of DonaldDavidson and Michael Dummett. The paper tries to make explicit the

conceptions of truth and meaning in that strand of the recent analytic traditionthat takes their views as central.According to the view, the theory of truth and the theory of meaning are

connected in ways such that differences in the conception of what it is for asentence to be true are engendered by differences in the conception of how themeaning of a sentence and its constituents depend upon the meanings of othersentences and their constituents, and on a base of underlying facts. I argue thatthis view is common ground between Davidson and Dummett, and that centraldifferences in their theories of truth emerge from prior differences in the theory ofmeaning. In particular, the dispute over realism springs from the contrast

between Davidsons holism and Dummetts molecularism. I concentrate in thispaper on the connection between molecularism and the antirealist conception oftruth.

I take the value of exploring the view to be three-fold. First there is the value inlaying out the reasoning that constitutes the view and its attendant picture of thedeep interconnectedness of truth and meaning. Because I think that that deepinterconnectedness is generally misunderstood, I will try to offer a new defenceand way to think about it. Second, although others have held the view I aim toestablish,1 there is at least one influential commentator who seems to locate theroot of the disagreement between Davidson and Dummett not in thedisagreement about the holistic or molecularistic nature of linguistic meaning,

but rather in the general explanatory ambitions reductive ambitions ofDummetts theory of meaning. I am speaking here of John McDowell and hisdispute with Dummett over whether the theory of meaning ought to be full-

blooded or modest. I hope to locate precisely where McDowell goes wrong inthese matters. Finally, what I say has some bearing on a thought commonlyespoused by pragmatists who aim to claim Davidson as their own: on thethought that Davidson somehow positions himself outside, somehow transcends,the debate between realism and antirealism. I will argue briefly that thiscommonly espoused pragmatist thought is incorrect.

European Journal of Philosophy 12:2 ISSN 0966-8373 pp. 214243 r Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2004. 9600 Garsington Road,Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK, and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.


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2. Tarski2

Tarski shows how to define a predicate, true-in-L, for various mathematicallywell-behaved languages, a predicate that picks out all and only the true sentences

of the language. This feature of the predicate is built into Tarskis definition oftrue-in-L through his criterion of adequacy for a truth definition, that a truthdefinition satisfy Convention T. An adequate theory of truth for a language L willsatisfy Convention T by implying, for each declarative sentence of the language,instances of the T-schema: implying, that is, as consequences of the definition,sentences of the form

T s is true-in-L if and only if p;

where s is a metavariable which has as values names of sentences of thelanguage for which the definition is being given (the object-language) and p is a

metavariable which has as values translations of the object-language sentence,used, in the language of the definition (the metalanguage). Thus, an adequatedefinition of truth for English, given in English, should yield as a consequencethe sentence

TI 0snow is white0 is true-in-English iff snow is white

and, correspondingly, for every declarative sentence of language. The instancesof the T-schema T-sentences comprise the set of consequences of the definitionof the outlined form, one for each declarative sentence of the language.

The T-schema functions as part of a criterion of adequacy for a truth-definition

because it is a characterization of the concept of truth. The T-schema is meant tosupply an answer to the following question: Why is the definition of somepredicate true-in-L the definition of an expression that expresses the concept oftruth? Tarskis answer is that the definition satisfies Convention T; and this servesas an answer to the question because the T-schema is supposed to capture allthere is to the general concept of truth. Note that this is not to say that the T-schema is supposed to be a definition of the general concept of truth: of coursepart of the point of Tarskis work is that there cannot be any such definition, onpain of contradiction. Nevertheless, the T-schema is supposed to, withoutdefining the concept of truth, illuminate it. It is this idea, of an explication thatilluminates without defining, that I am calling a characterization.

In the remainder of this section, I want to consider some objections andresponses to Tarskis characterization. That will set up the fundamental objectionthat inaugurates the move from Tarski to Davidson and Dummett.

The first objection to consider is that Tarskis view simply gets the extension ofthe concept of truth wrong. Tarskis predicates can apply only to sentences of asingle language; but the concept of truth applies to sentences of many languages.So no one predicate of Tarskis (and of course they are officially different predicates)captures the proper extension. So, no predicate expresses the general concept oftruth. So, Tarskis truth definitions cannot be an account of the general concept oftruth (cf. Davidson 1990: 28586). But this can be overcome. Tarski shows how to

The Theory of Truth in the Theory of Meaning 215

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define language-specific truth predicates true-in-L, for various, but specified,languages L, but we can expand his insight so as to have bearing on the generalconcept of truth. One can think of the metavariables s and p that function inthe T-schema as having as values, respectively, names of all declarative sentences

of all languages, and all declarative sentences-in-use of all languages.3

Thisrequires that we rethink the role of the in-L in true-in-L: the in-L is no longerineluctably attached to the true. The L does not refer to a specific language, butis rather a metavariable which ranges over all languages. Formally, true

becomes a two-place predicate, having as its semantic value a set of orderedpairs, with each pair consisting of a sentence with its language.

It is helpful to represent the idea pictorially. The general truth predicate has asits semantic value the extension of the general concept of truth; this extension isthe union of the extensions of the language-specific truth-concepts. Thelanguage-specific truth-concepts, in turn, have as extensions ordered pairs of

sentences tagged with the language of which they are part:truegeneral

refers to the extension ofthe general concept of truth

Ext(truegeneral)= Union of {Ext(true-in-L)}

each member of which is

{: s is true in L}

In this general setting, then, Tarskis account tells us what it is for any sentence ofany language to have the property of being true: a necessary and sufficientcondition for any sentence of any language to have the property of being true isstated by the very sentence, or a translation of that sentence, in use.

A second line of criticism accepts that Tarskis characterization gets theextension of the general concept of truth right. But the criticism now is thatTarskis characterization of the general concept of truth makes no headway in thecharacterization of the general concept, i.e., in the elucidation of the sense of thegeneral truth predicate, but rather only in the specification of its reference. That is,although the T-schema may give the extension of the general concept of truth bygiving the extensions of the various true-in-L predicates, it does not give anyinsight into the sense expressed by the various truth predicates. At best we havethe extensions of various predicates true-in-L1, true-in-L2, etc., whose union istaken to determine the extension of the general concept, but nothing which tellsus why these predicates express the general concept of truth for all languages.

I think that this objection too can, for the most part, be turned away, and in animportant way. I have said that the T-schema works as a criterion of adequacy fora truth definition by being a characterization of the concept of truth. But it can

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serve as a characterization of the concept of truth only if the sentence used on theright-hand side of the T-biconditional is a translation of the sentence mentionedon the left-hand side. It is worth being explicit how this is supposed tocharacterize the concept of truth. Consider the following biconditional:

TI 0snow is white0 is true-in-English iff snow is white

The mentioned sentence on the left says something, namely that snow is white.The sentence on the right, in virtue of being a used version of the same sentence,or a translation of it, is a way to say what the mentioned sentence says, namely,that snow is white. Now, if things are as a use of the mentioned sentence, or atranslation of it, says they are, i.e., if snow is white, the mentioned sentence istrue; and, if things are not as a use of the mentioned sentence, or a translation ofit, says they are, i.e., if snow is not white, the mentioned sentence is false. That is,

TI 0snow is white0 is true-in-English iff snow is white:

What we have done here is derived an instance of the T-schema from a moregeneral, underlying indeed, platitudinous idea: the idea, namely, that amentioned sentence is true iff things are as a use of the mentioned sentence, or atranslation of it, says they are; in this case, iff, snow is white.4

The objection is turned away by noting that the T-schema does not merely givethe reference of the general concept of truth, but gives it in a specific way; and not

just any way of picking out the extension of the general concept of truth will pickout the extension in way that is in conformity with the platitude about truth thatwe have just uncovered. For example, per impossible, an outright listing of theextension of the concept will not pick out the extension in such a way that allows

one to understand what it is that makes all the true-in-L express the generalconcept of truth. Nor does a set of sentences which redistributes right-hand sidesof T-sentences with the constraint that only true right-hand sides may beswitched with other true right-hand sides, and only false with false. These are

both ways in which the extension of the concept may be given, and thus,according to a Fregean understanding of the notion, particular senses. But it isclear that whichever senses these senses are, they are not the sense which is thegeneral concept of truth.

The platitude underlying the T-schema can be put in the following succinct way:

Plat if s means-in-L that p; then s is true-in-L iff p

Since in a T-sentence, the used sentence p is constrained to mean what thementioned sentence s means, T-sentences are guaranteed to be true. The platitudeunderlies the T-schema in the sense that the platitude articulates clearly how the T-schema is to be understood and why its instances are so compelling.

I think that this is a sufficient response to the objection as it stands. But theobjection can be pursued from a slightly different perspective. It is essential tothis way of understanding how the T-schema captures the content of truth thatwe be able to say what the mentioned sentence says by having it, or a translationof it, at our disposal. But it is a consequence of understanding the concept of truthin this way that it will not be available for providing an account of either the




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concept of meaning or of the meaning of particular sentences, for the concept of aparticular mentioned sentence meaning what it does is taken as unanalyzed inthe account of the concept of truth. But should we be content with an account oftruth that outlaws the use of the concept of truth in an account of meaning?

3. Davidson on Truth and Meaning

These quick thoughts suggest a second, redirected, line of criticism that can beleveled against Tarski. The problem with the T-schema is that the concept itcharacterizes can play no role in the theory of meaning, because thecharacterization takes the concept of meaning as theoretically and conceptuallymore basic, as already given. But it is not clear that we can account for meaningwithout the use of the concept of truth, and indeed it may seem that we need the

concept of truth to understand meaning.In general, the claim that an account of meaning must deploy the concept oftruth is difficult to justify at the outset, in advance of further theoreticalconsiderations. The platitude linking meaning and truth (Plat) reflects the factthat a central use of language is to represent how things are. But that on its owndoes not suffice to show that the representational role of language is central to atheoretical description of the language. What would help to show that is to showhow other uses and aspects of language could be explained through thinking ofthe representational role as central (cf. Dummett 2003: 12). A detailed discussionof this would take us too far afield.5 But, focusing on the central, representational

use reflected in (Plat), at least the following can be said. (Plat) tells us that it is anecessary condition for two sentences to share meaning that they shareconditions for truth; and its platitudinous character tells us that this connection

between meaning and truth is conceptually fundamental, rather than derivative.This suggests that sameness of truth conditions is not only necessary forsameness in meaning, but figures more crucially in understanding the concept ofmeaning. So, even if meanings can be accounted for in some way that does notseem at first to use the concept of truth, that account must ultimately beconstrained to determine conditions for truth, so as to connect up with ourunderstanding of the concept of meaning. If these initial and vague thoughts areright, we are left with the result that if truth is to be fully comprehended throughthe T-schema, its use in understanding meaning cannot be allowed without goinground a tight circle. The characterization of truth provided by the T-schemaprecludes substantial accounts of meaning.

These thoughts are crystallized in Davidsons thinking in a particularly clearway. Davidson famously proposed that a meaning theory for a natural languagetake the form of a Tarskian truth-definition, reinterpreted to function as ameaning theory. But what is the nature of the reinterpretation? Whereas Tarskisdefinition of truth is a purely a priori inquiry, Davidsons interest in providingmeaning theories for natural languages requires the theories to be dependentupon the use of the language by actual speakers in the following sense: the claims




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that theories of this kind make about the languages of individuals, about whatwords mean in the mouths of individuals, have their truth conditions based on are made true by the use of those words by those individuals (on which therewill be much more to say later). What we have seen in our short discussion of

Tarski is that the a priority of Tarskis inquiry is secured by an appeal to (what isfor Tarski) the conceptually prior notion of meaning: it is only because it is takenas an unanalyzed given that la neige est blanche means that snow is white, andsimilarly for all other declarative sentences, that satisfying Convention T is aconstraint on a truth-theory. But since Davidson wishes to provide a substantialgeneral theory of meaning and to give the meanings of sentences through astatement of their truth conditions, he cannot make a prior appeal to the conceptof meaning, and to the information that a certain sentence means what it does, inthe understanding of truth. Davidson can make no use of the characterization oftruth provided through the T-schema and Convention T.

Before carrying on any further, it is important to make explicit a distinctionthat has been implicit throughout. Dummett, David Lewis, Martin Davies andothers distinguish between a meaning theory and the theory of meaning.6 A meaningtheory is, in its application to speakers of a natural language, an empirical theory.It is, in the form under consideration here, a specification (or derivation from atheory of reference) of the truth-conditions for each declarative sentence of aparticular language. By contrast, what I am calling the theory of meaning, is ana priori theory which outlines both the form of meaning theories, and the generalprinciples that determine the correctness conditions for specifications of, in theform under consideration here, the truth conditions for sentences of any

language. An analogous distinction should be made between a truth definition(a truth theory) and the theory of truth. Both a theory of meaning and a theory oftruth are map[s] of a certain region of philosophical space7 in which theconcepts of meaning and truth are located in the form of principles of applicationthat implicitly define them. (More on this later in this section).

Returning to Davidson: the received view about how Davidson reinterpretsTarskis truth definition runs as follows. According to Davidsons proposal, aTarskian truth theory is a meaning theory, but that Davidson, in his use of suchtheories, inverts Tarskis procedure: whereas Tarski takes the concept of meaningor translation as primitive and goes on to give a truth definition, Davidson takesthe concept of truth as primitive and goes on both to characterize the conceptmeaning and to give the meanings of particular sentences through a statement oftheir truth conditions.8 I think that the received view oversimplifies.

It needs to be acknowledged that there must be room left to say somethingwhich although does not define, nevertheless illuminates; it is important to see,as Davidson has recently, that taking the concept of truth as indefinable, does notmean that we can say nothing revealing about it (Davidson 1996: 263; cf. alsoDavidson 1990). As Davidson admits, he was slow to come to these realizations;his mistake was to think that we could both take a Tarskian truth definition astelling us all we need to know about truth and use the definition to describe anactual language (Davidson 1990: 286).9




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The general nature of Davidsons recent insight into the concepts of truth andmeaning is at base an analytic insight: we can come to obtain a characterization of

both the concepts of truth and meaning by understanding better the form ameaning theory for a natural language ought to take and the conditions under

which any such theory is correct. A theory of meaning places the concepts of truthand meaning in map of philosophical space; it lays out, as Davidson puts it, the

geography of the concepts, the lay of the conceptual land. If there is some viableanalytic insight here, it will allow steering a middle path between the twoextremes we have already encountered: on the first hand, the Tarskian account,which can provide an account of the general concept of truth only by foreclosingon the possibility of a substantial general theory of meaning; and on the otherhand, the received view of Davidson, which allows a general theory of meaning,

but only by foreclosing on the possibility of a substantial general theory of truth.The metaphors of a conceptual geography and a map of philosophical space are

meant to suggest a model of analysis for accomplishing both tasks at once.Now these metaphors are helpful, but something more explicit is needed. Howdoes the theory of meaning give insight into the sense of the general truthpredicate? The general idea, which is all that I want to convey here, is that thetheory of meaning can be used to functionally or implicitly characterize itsfundamental theoretical concepts. These will include at least the concepts of thepropositional attitudes, the concept of assertion, and, crucially, the concepts oftruth and meaning. The directionality of analysis that is characteristic of allimplicit characterizations is important here. A theory of meaning does not say: ameaning theory satisfies certain constraints because its theorems are instances of

the T-schema. The T-schema does not stand as an independent benchmark,informed by an independent understanding of the concept of truth and/ormeaning, through which a meaning theory may be certified as correct orincorrect. Rather, a theory of meaning says: the theorems of a meaning theory areinstances of the T-schema because that theory satisfies certain constraints. Part ofthe general thought here is well captured by David Lewis when he says:

Karl might have no beliefs, desires, or meanings at all, but it is analyticthat if he does have them then they more or less conform to theconstraining principles by which the concepts of belief, desire, andmeaning are defined. (Lewis 1974: 112)

The thought is that the principles of interpretation, such as the Principle ofCharity, are related to meaning and intentionality in an a priori fashion. However,this idea can be extended to the concept of truth itself, and it is in the extension ofLewiss idea that we can see an elucidation of the sense of a general truthpredicate. What can be said in that case is: there is no such thing as being aninstance of a meaning-delivering theorem of a meaning theory that takes the formof a truth theory of a meaning theory whose theorems look like, and really just areinstances of the T-schema without meeting the a priori empirical and formalconstraints on a meaning theory. We also may put it like Lewis and say:




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Karl might not have a grasp of the concept of truth, but it is analytic that ifhe does have it, the theorems of a meaning theory (that takes the form of atheory of truth) conform more or less to the constraining principles thatimplicitly characterize the concepts of truth, meaning, belief, and desire.

If we think now that the T-schema captures something deep about the concept oftruth, as I would like to recommend, it does so conceptually parasitically ratherthan primitively. It is parasitic upon the satisfaction of the constraints that licensethinking about any biconditional of the form s is true iff p as being an instanceof the T-schema. In effect, the empirical and formal constraints on a meaningtheory are a characterization of the sense of the general truth predicate.10

So the question of how Tarski is to be reinterpreted so as to allow the possibilityof a substantial theory of meaning, without swinging to the far extreme of thereceived view of Davidson, is answered as follows. The biconditionals that serve

to provide the extension of the concept of truth and to give the meanings ofsentences of object languages are the theorems of meaning theories that satisfy theconstraints on meaning theories specified in the theory of meaning. Theseconstraints are constraints upon the proper ascription of a meaning theory to anindividual, and thus a characterization of the concept of meaning. Since theplatitude that connects the concept of truth and meaning allows a meaning theoryto take the form of a theory of truth, and does so non-accidentally, the constraintson meaning theories are at the same time constraints on truth theories, and thusalso characterize the concept of truth. So the concept of truth and the concept ofmeaning are each characterized in such way that substantial characterization of

the other is not pre-empted. So the extremes of the Tarskian view and the receivedview of Davidson are avoided. To revert again to the metaphors: the principleswhich constrain a proper meaning theory serve to locate a region of philosophicalspace in which both truth and meaning reside; the theory of truth and the theoryof meaning describe a single tract of the conceptual geography.

It is for these reasons that the concept of truth takes its life from a theory ofmeaning that specifies certain a priori principles of correctness for empirical meaningtheories, which themselves take the form of truth theories that Davidson says:

It bears emphasizing: absent this empirical connection, the concept oftruth has no application to, or interest for, our mundane concerns, nor sofar as I can see, does it have any content at all. (Davidson 1996: 277)

4. Dummett on Truth and Meaning

I will begin my discussion of Dummett by showing that the ideas that I have putforth here are ones to which he also subscribes, and indeed of which he wasperhaps the principal originator.11 But, as we will also see, there is a philosophicalorientation that derives from Davidson.




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Dummett states some general requirements on an adequate meaning theorywhen he says:

y[a] meaning-theory itself must make no appeal to our prior under-

standing of the object-languagey

In such a case, therefore, the fact (if itbe one) that all instances of [the T-schema]yhold good is one of whichwe can take no official noticeyThe intelligibility of the meaning-theory,and the fact that it serves the purposes of a meaning-theory cannotdepend upon our awareness that [the T-schema] is satisfied.

I have tried to emphasize these points by noting that the satisfaction ofConvention T, assuming uncritically as it does the concept of translation, does notserve as a usable, or primitive, constraint on a meaning theory. Continuing withDummett:

Rather the significance of the word true, as employed in the meaning-theory, will depend jointly upon the specification of the conditions forsentences of the object-language to be true and those other principles ofthe meaning-theory that are expressed by means of the predicate true,namely, the connections established by the meaning-theory between theproperty of being true and the use that speakers make of the sentence.

I have made this point by showing that the concept of truth is not characterizedby the T-schema, but rather by its functioning in the theory of meaning, inparticular by the principles of interpretation which provide the correctness

conditions for meaning theories, and which, thereby, implicitly characterize theconcept. There are differences between Dummett and Davidson on this point, butthere is agreement on what it is to characterize truth; the difference resides inwhat this characterization ought to be (see 6). Finally:

Conversely, therefore, an explanation of the use of true by means of anoutright stipulation that each instance of [the T-schema] is to holdycan-not be part of, or be extended to, any general account of how thelanguage functions, precisely because it depends on and exploits theprior understanding of those sentences to which the predicate true is to

be applied. (Dummett 1991a: 6869)

Dummetts point here is that truth is not characterized by the T-schema, nor canits proper characterization be arrived at by extending the T-schema, because theT-schema itself presupposes a prior understanding of the meaning of thesentences to which its instances ascribe truth. But to provide an account ofspeakers understanding of sentences just is the explanatory task of a meaningtheory. Exploiting a prior understanding of the sentences to which the truthpredicate applies is thus a problem; it prevents the concept of truth from figuringin an account of the meaning of particular sentences, and more generally, of howthe language functions.




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I hope that this short sketch of Dummetts views shows that Davidsonunderestimates Dummetts ideas on truth when he says, unfavourably, thatDummett is trying to provide a brief criterion, schema, partial but leadinghintyattempts at substitutes for definitions of truth.12 If indeed Dummett is

trying to do this, he is moved to do so by methodological reflections very similarto Davidsons own. We might put the point by saying that Dummett andDavidson agree that the concept of truth is to receive a form of implicitcharacterization; they disagree about the details of the implicit characterization,and about what property realizes the implicit characterization.

These are some of the details upon which Dummett and Davidson agree andwhich, as matter of the history of these ideas, seem to stem from Dummett. Butthere is a philosophical orientation here that derives from Davidson. Opening hisWhat is a Theory of Meaning? (I) Dummett adopts the following, Davidsonian,view as his own:

According to one well-known view [Davidsons], the best method offormulating the philosophical problems surrounding the concept ofmeaning and related notions is by asking what form should be taken bywhat is called a theory of meaning for any entire language [a meaningtheory, in the terminology of this paper]yIt is not that the construction ofa [meaning theory], in this sense, for any one language is viewed as apractical project; but it is thought that, when once we can enunciate thegeneral principles in accordance with which such a construction could becarried out, we shall have arrived at a solution of the problems concerningmeaning by which philosophers are perplexed. (Dummett 1975: 1)13

Now my recommendation for understanding both Davidson and Dummett onthe concept of truth is to see that the characterization of the general concept oftruth is also to be arrived at by considerations in the theory of meaning, inparticular, of the principles which specify the constraints on ascription of ameaning theory to an individual or group of individuals. It is in these principlesthat the deep interconnectedness of truth and meaning is to be found.14

I think that it is fair to say that Dummett describes the nature of Davidsonstheory of meaning, in particular the way in which the T-schema and ConventionT do not and cannot function in a meaning theory as well as, as far as I know,

anywhere Davidson does himself. My interpretation of Davidson, along theseexplicitly Dummettian lines, then, can be seen as an attempt to bring Davidsoninto line with the conception of the interconnectedness of truth and meaningwhich has long been at the centre of his own work.

5. Manifestation, Full-bloodedness, and Modesty

Despite much agreement, Dummett and Davidson disagree on the characteriza-tion of truth that emerges from the theory of meaning on the details of how thenotion that is to function in meaning theories is to be understood. Truth is




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characterized by the general principles that link the meaning theory to the use ofthe language; it is in the details of the description of these constraints thatDummetts differences from Davidson emerge.

According to Dummett, a theory of meaning should answer not only what it is

that a competent speaker of the language knows when she understands thelanguage, but also the constitutive question of in what understanding a language

grasp of the concepts that its expressions can be used to express consists. But whatdoes this involve?

In What is a Theory of Meaning? (I) Dummett takes the constitutive questionto demand that the theory of meaning make accessible to one who is withoutconcepts the concepts expressed by expressions of the language.15 The theorywould explain, then, how creatures, initially bereft of language, could come to belinguistically competent.16 It seems clear that a philosophical theory by itself isill-suited to execute this task, as it clearly depends heavily upon empirical

considerations. But the demands of the constitutive account are weakened in theLogical Basis of Metaphysics; speaking initially of the distinction between modestyand full-bloodedness (on which more below), Dummett says:

Such a demand would obviously be exorbitantyA modest meaning-theory assumes not merely that those to whom it is addressed have theconcepts expressible in the object-language, but that they require noexplanation of what it is to grasp those concepts. A more robustconception of what is to be expected of a meaning-theory is that itshould, in all cases, make explicit in what a grasp of those conceptsconsists the grasp which a speaker of the language must have of theconcepts expressed by the words belonging to it. (Dummett 1991a: 108)

Unfortunately, in the context of the dialectic I have set up, it is precisely thisformulation of what a constitutive account of meaning involves that it makeexplicit in what a grasp of concepts consists that needs explaining andsupplementation.

But, though we have come around a circle, we have learned something in thetrip. Dummetts thought that a philosophical account of in what meaning consistsought to explain how it is that that a creature becomes linguistically competent issurely too strong; but perhaps the point is the weaker one that a philosophicalaccount of what is constitutive of meaning and having a language must be able toembed into an account of how it is that a creature becomes linguisticallycompetent. We do acquire the language, and the account of what meanings areconstitutively needs to be consistent with that.

To further understand the more general point being made here, considerDavidsons ideal radical interpreter. For all we have said so far, meaning might beconstituted by any kind of fact. But the point of Davidsons ideal radicalinterpreter is to restrict the kinds of facts that might serve as the constitutive basisof meaning to what an interpreter could find out. To focus further, the radical andideal nature of the interpreter impoverishes her as much as possible with respect




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to the notion under study meaning so as to be able to reconstruct it ab initio, asit were, while idealizing her with respect to other valuable informational andcomputational resources. But what are the philosophical ends of this elaborateset-up? I think that what is on Davidsons mind here are issues about the

interaction of the metaphysics and epistemology of language. Since speakers canand do come to know meanings even in the very worst case of a radicalinterpreter it must be that the facts about meaning are knowable. Meaning must

be made out of what the radical interpreter, idealized, needs to have access to inorder to come to know meanings.

I think that the upshot of the Dummettian and Davidsonian accounts can beput like this: the philosophical account of what is constitutive of meaning must

be able to embed into an explanation of the epistemic situation of speakers anexplanation of the fact that speakers know, and come to know, the meanings ofexpressions.17 And their positive thought, following people like Wittgenstein and

Quine, is the following: that the constitutive facts about meaning are facts aboutuse. These facts are available to real speakers and hearers real interpreters intheir actual epistemic situation, as well as to the radical interpreter, in herepistemically impoverished situation. So the thought is that a use theory ofmeaning is the theory of meaning that can ultimately embed in a philosophicalexplanation of our knowledge of meaning.18

This brings us to Dummetts Manifestation Constraint and to his distinctionbetween full-blooded and modest theories of meaning.

A theory of meaning meets the Manifestation Constraint iff it gives adescription of the abilities to use the language that constitute speakers

knowledge of a meaning theory.

These abilities provide (ideally) necessary and sufficient conditions for a speakerto know a particular meaning theory T. Full-bloodedness is a constraint on thedescriptions of manifestation; it is to be understood as follows:

A theory of meaning is full-blooded to a greater or lesser degree to theextent that it provides a description in an idiom lesser or greaterintentional or semantic of the abilities to use the language that constitutesspeakers knowledge of a meaning theory.

In other words, a theory of meaning will be full-blooded to the extent that thedescriptions of manifestation employed eschew unexplained or primitiveintentional and semantic resources. The requirement of full-bloodedness onmanifestation can thus be seen as the Dummettian analogue of the radicalcharacter of the Davidsonian interpreter. Ill assume for the purposes of thispaper that intentional and semantic resources cannot be completely eschewed; thatis, Ill assume that a reduction of semantic competence to an austere

behaviourism is not in the cards. The question then will be how, and how muchof, the intentional and semantic is to be invoked. This possibility is captured bythe definition in that it allows full-bloodedness to be a matter of degree: a theory




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of meaning can be more or less full-blooded. Finally, the less full-blooded atheory of meaning is, the more modest it is.

Dummetts Manifestation Constraint, I will argue below, is recognized byDavidson and McDowell as well. The constraint derives from and interprets both

Wittgensteins slogan that meaning is use and Freges idea of the third realm.19

It is what the speaker is able to do that makes it the case that she possesses aparticular competence. So it is important to note that the ManifestationConstraint expresses a philosophical postulate, the postulate that semanticcompetence is, to use Gareth Evanss phrase, a logical construction out of use.20

Ill follow Evanss usage to denote this philosophical postulate. The postulateseems to be accepted by many in the philosophical community (or at least thatpart of the philosophical community that works in the paradigm of philosophyinitiated by Frege and influenced by Wittgenstein).21 The crucial Fregean idea iswhat Dummett calls the extrusion of thought from the mind that thought is

constituted, somehow, by what one can do, ones abilities, with particularprominence given to ones linguistic abilities.22 I associate this postulate partlywith Frege, not because the idea is in Frege explicitly, but because it is a directdescendant of Freges idea of the third realm and the objectivity andcommunicability of sense.23

The postulate is contentious. Of course there will be some basic distinctions,proposed by both those who work within and without the Fregean framework,that need to be recoverable from a conception of competence as a logicalconstruction out of use; for example some distinction like that made by Quine

between being guided by rather than merely acting accordance with rules or like

that made by Chomsky between competence and performance would berequired by any theory of meaning which has meaning theories figure astheories of semantic competence.24 As well, accepting the postulate forces one toface a substantial problem in accounting for the distinction between use andmisuse (see Kripke 1982). I think that it is a substantial and pressing problem forthe adherent of the postulate to show that it is consistent with these distinctions.25

6. Truth and Manifestation

It is well known that Dummetts concern with meaning and truth are but part ofhis larger, overall project of bringing a new tractability to the traditionalmetaphysical questions of realism and antirealism. Dummetts overall project can

be seen as comprised of two parts. The first links the theory of meaning to thequestion of realism. For Dummett, the question of whether to be a realist orantirealist about a particular discourse is a question about the notion of truth thatfigures in an account of the meaning of the sentences of the discourse; theconcern is no longer with objects, but rather, with objectivity, in particular with theobjectivity of the statements which comprise the discourse. The notion of truthappropriate to a particular discourse will be an index of the objectivity of, andhence an index of our metaphysical attitude towards, the discourse. This first




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part of Dummetts project just is the link between the concepts of meaning andtruth described in 2 and 3 of this paper, a link that allows conclusions about thenature of truth and objectivity to follow from claims about the nature of meaning.

The second part of Dummetts overall project tries to establish what it might be

for a particular concept to be an appropriate notion of truth for a particulardiscourse. Here Dummetts Manifestation Constraint becomes important.Dummett extracts from the constraint a general antirealist orientation for theconcept of truth, where antirealist signifies any epistemically constrained notionof truth. According to Dummett, a meaning theory that employs a concept ofverification-transcendent truth overdescribes (the term is Wrights) a speakerscompetence by ascribing to her a competence that she cannot possibly manifest.One cannot, Dummett claims, manifest a knowledge of the truth-conditions of asentence when one is unable, in principle, to tell that they obtain, or that they donot; there is nothing that one can do to ground the idea that that meaning has been

grasped, those truth conditions, rather than some more conservative meaning,one which is provided by some epistemically constrained notion such asconditions which warrant assertion.26

However, even if these points do push us to some epistemically constrainednotion, it is important to see that the notion which is to function in a meaningtheory must be, even if epistemically constrained, a notion of truth: the notion oftruth is indispensable to a meaning theory.27 So there are at least two conceptionsof truth a realist and an antirealist conception that can figure in a meaningtheory; and it would clearly, thus, be question-begging at this point simply toassume that the concept of truth is realist and epistemically unconstrained.

Now Davidson, it seems, begs the question in precisely this way. It is anecessary condition for the construction of a meaning theory that utterances beinterpreted in accordance with the Principle of Charity, given, as I have claimed,that the principles of interpretation are a priori true of meaning, belief, etc. I donot wish to get into the debates about the proper formulation and extent of thePrinciple, except to say that, despite other disagreement, both Quine andDavidsons version of the Principle ascribes to speakers an adherence to classicallogic; any behaviour which looks like evidence for disbelief in an aspect ofclassical reasoning on the part of a speaker is always better interpreted asevidence for poor interpretation.28

One might wonder, as Dummett does, with what justification it may becontended that interpretation contrary to the strictures of classical logic may beruled out. Presupposing classical logic in this way is merely to refuse to face thedemands of the Manifestation Constraint; nothing that a speaker could do couldcount as reason to ascribe to her classical logic, as opposed to the moreconservative intuitionistic logic. There is temptation here to see Davidson asretreating within, as endorsing psychologism the view that the meanings aresomehow there in the head, even if they never do or could come out in behaviour and giving up the idea that meaning is a logical construction out of use, as it isexpressed in the Manifestation Constraint. Unless there is some reason to thinkthat Dummetts version of the Constraint is unduly restrictive, it will indeed look




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as though Davidsons use of charity has been indiscriminate and that he has norecourse but to the psychologism which he officially disavows.

However, Dummetts requirements do indeed seem restrictive; it looks asthough one has very little room to manoeuver. John McDowell develops a

reading of Dummett according to which an acceptable degree of full-bloodednessrequires, to put it in Fregean terminology, a description of the manifestation ofknowledge of the theory of sense without an invocation of elements from thetheory of force. McDowell argues that descriptions of manifestation that fail toinvoke force notions will prove inadequate to meet the Manifestation Constraint.Ill discuss McDowells objections in 7 below, but for now we can note thatMcDowell takes this inadequacy to imply, erroneously I will argue, thatsatisfaction of the Manifestation Constraint for knowledge of the truth conditionsof some sentence s requires describing manifesting uses as assertings that, as in,

M X asserted that p

where p is the proposition expressed by s.29 But this is unacceptable for Dummettbecause precisely the effect of the Manifestation Constraint, for him, is to put intojeopardy the possibility of saying, with some problematic sentence s, that p,where this content or proposition determines, or is constrained by, classicallyconceived truth conditions. From Dummetts perspective, to construe manifesta-tions as taking the form (M) is, like with Davidson, to fail to take the antirealistchallenge seriously; the view evades, rather than illuminates, the issues andproblems the theory of meaning poses for truth and realism.30

But, reconsideration of the definition of full-bloodedness may suggest not that

there is little room to maneuver, but that there is no room. What is required,according to that definition, is a description of the manifestation of competence;and, it is required, that such a description uses the intentional idiom to somedegree (this is the anti-behaviourist idea). The first portion of the requirementalready pushes us to McDowells answer: of course, what it is that a competentspeaker can do that one that is not cannot is utter, say, the noises There is a tablein the hall, to assert none other than that there is a table in the hall. One can haveno qualm with this other than to wonder whether some deeper, non-trivial,account can be given; but, it seems that the second portion of the requirementforecloses on the possibility of saying more, for what is required are descriptionsof manifestation given in the intentional idiom. The sense of conceptualclaustrophobia felt here can be put in the form of a question: How can something

be described in an intentional idiom, without appealing to the contents ofexercises of intentionality? What else is it to describe in the intentional idiom?

Davidson provides an answer to precisely these questions. We may eschewattempts of reduction, and thus remain in the idiom of the intentional, withoutappealing to contents, by employing non-individuating attitudes.31 A non-individuating attitude is an attitude that a speaker may take to a sentence thus a sentential rather than a propositional attitude and which does not in itself,thus, presuppose recognition of the content of the sentence to which the attitudeis directed. For example, one may recognizably hold-true or prefer-true a sentence




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without it being recognizable, by the interpreter, what the sentence means. Aspeaker, ascribed a competency via an ascription of a certain meaning theory, willmanifest that competency, then, by holding-true, or preferring-true, certainsentences under certain conditions, and it is this information which is

summarized by the ascribed meaning theory. If one sees holding-true as apassive form of assertion, the point may be put in the following Fregean way:although appeal must be made to elements from the theory of force, one is notthereby committed to appealing to elements of the theory of sense. We can hold

back from this latter move. A speaker may have to be described as asserting asentence, but that is not to describe her as asserting thaty, where in place of theellipsis is a description of the content of the assertion. This points to the space thatneeds to be occupied by the full-blooded theorist of meaning, and to the lacuna inMcDowells reasoning for the contention that descriptions of manifestation musttake the form of a description of the types of speech acts, with their propositional

content, that speakers can effect.32

The manifestation consists, rather, in taking theattitude of holding-true or preferring-true a sentence.The austerity of the resources employed by Davidson, the austerity, in

particular, of the notion of a non-individuating attitude, reveals a way of meetingthe Manifestation Constraint in a way considerably more full-blooded thanMcDowells (whom we may take as the standard of modesty, as providing ameaning theory of minimal full-bloodedness). One might speculate, given theconfined conceptual quarters within which manifestation must be described, ascarcity of conceptual space which urges upon one, at least in the first instance,the apparent inevitability of the McDowellian response, that Davidsons theory

discharges the Manifestation Constraint with maximal full-bloodedness.

33

7. Holism and Molecularism

I want to further elaborate on this conclusion by considering the overall proposalof Davidsons in which the non-individuating attitudes figure. I will also try tomake clear my difference with McDowell on the matter.

We can learn more about this overall proposal by considering McDowellsarguments to the effect that any attempt to describe manifestation in terms

sparser than his own leads inevitably to a rule-following scepticism aboutmeaning. Any description of a saying that the table is in the hall in lesser terms,say as a disposition to assert The table is in the hall when there is, ceteris paribus,a table in the hall, could be taken as manifesting the belief, say, that The table isin the hall means that the table is in the hall and 25 2, instead of as manifestingthe knowledge that The table is in the hall means that the table is in the hall.McDowell says:

Of course no one, confronted with what is plainly a speaker ofEnglishywill so much as entertain any of the competing candidates.But with what right does one ignore them? It is illicit at this point to




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appeal to someone who is plainly a speaker of English: the issue isprecisely whether someone could make it manifest (plain) in his

behaviour that it is this rather than that language as characterized,supposedly, by a full-blooded theory of meaning that he is speaking.

(McDowell 1987: 9697)

Now, McDowells response to the claim that we are confronted with a speaker ofEnglish is surely well founded; but does this mean that we are doomed to a rule-following scepticism? We would not be if we thought of manifestations, in additionto functioning in a logical construction out of use, as being evidence for a hypothesisabout what the speakers words mean.34 That is, although uses are ultimately goingto be constitutive of meaning, particular uses can also serve as evidence forhypotheses about meaning. But McDowell dismisses this idea, on the grounds thatto make a meaning theory a hypothesis is to commit oneself to a view of semantic

competence akin to the code conception of meaning, in which linguistic behaviouris the outward manifestation of an inner realm of concepts and contents which arethemselves contentful in a way logically prior to their manifesting linguistic

behaviour.35 To put it in the terminology of this paper, McDowell thinks thatconstruing meaning as a hypothesis commits one to a denial of the thought thatmeaning is a logical construction out of use. Now, it is certainly true that, if one iscommitted to the code conception of meaning, that a meaning theory, constructedon the basis of publicly observable linguistic behaviour, becomes a hypothesis aboutwhat is going on in the now private mental domain.36 But it is the converse thatmatters to McDowell in this context, and it does not hold; namely a commitment to

the code conception of meaning does not follow from the construal of a theory ofmeaning as a hypothesis. The hypothesis does not concern what is going on inside,but what would go on outside. One hypothesizes, in ascribing a particular meaningtheory to a speaker, that the speaker would, or is committed to, use words in theway that the meaning theory says that she would, i.e. that she would, or she iscommitted to, hold-true, or prefer-true such and such sentence under such-and-such conditions (conditions which might include a demand that one hold-truecertain sentences on the basis of other sentences held-true). And since the meaningtheory ascribes an infinite capacity, it will always be an epistemic question as towhether one is speaking the language ascribed. Of course, when a speaker employs

the language in accordance with the ascribed meaning theory over a great length oftime, the assurance that the meaning theory has been correctly ascribed is very high as high, and no higher, than the confirmation the theory has received from thelinguistic behaviour of the speaker. But this is how it should be.37

Davidson deploys the non-individuative attitudes in a theory that construesmeaning facts in a holistic way. However, one must be careful, especially in the lightof these most recent remarks about the evidential basis for a theory of meaning,about how holism is to be understood. Davidson writes that it is holism that allows

very thin evidence in support of each of a potential infinity of points [to]yield rich results, even with respect to the points. By knowing only the




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conditions under which speakers hold sentences true, we can come out,given a satisfactory theory [of truth], with an interpretation of eachsentence. (Davidson 1973: 137)38

Nothing short of conformity with the theory in all its implications entitles one tosay conclusively that the speaker has that particular semantic competence. In thissense, a meaning theory is always a hypothesis, and always subject to revision.39

(This follows from the empirical nature of a meaning theory.) But Davidsons talkof evidence for a meaning theory may mislead one into thinking that he ismaking a merely epistemic point. The epistemic point is the point that matters formeaning-theories. But the point is not merely epistemic, but rather alsometaphysical; that is, the point is also a point in the theory of meaning, aboutwhat meaning is. Construed as such, the question that Davidson is answering isthe constitutive question of in what our understanding of the language consists,

of what it is that constitutes ones competency. Talk of holding- and preferring-true behaviour is, in effect, Davidsons attempt at a logical construction ofsemantic competence out of use.40

In this setting, holism and molecularism are views about the way that thelogical construction is to be carried out. I think it is illuminating to think ofholism and molecularism as competing interpretations of Freges contextprinciple. In Grundlagen, Frege counsels us to never ask for the meaning of aword in isolation, but only in the context of a proposition. Suppose we renderhere meaning as Fregean sense, and proposition as Fregean Thought.41 Ipropose to understand the context principle as conceptually privileging the right-

hand side over the left-hand side in the following Identity Constraint on meaningtheories:

Identity Constraint: the sense of a subsentential expression is the contri-bution made by the subsentential expression to the senses of sentences inwhich it takes part.

Now, in itself, the Identity Constraint is a constraint on all meaning theories, andis partly constitutive of the notion of sense (by being a constraint on theinterrelations amongst senses). As such, a semantic atomist, like early HartryField 1972 or Jerry Fodor 1990, a Dummettian molecularist, and a Davidsonianholist can all endorse it. However, if the context principle is a correct thesis in thetheory of meaning, it will serve to rule out the first of these, for one way tocharacterize the semantic atomist is as giving conceptual priority to the left-handside of the Identity Constraint. Now the holist further interprets the contextprinciple as saying that the sense of a subsentential expression is an abstractionfrom the senses of all sentences in which it occurs, and thus the sense of everysentence in which the expression occurs is partly constitutive of the sense of thesubsentential expression. The molecularist, by contrast, privileges the senses of aset of sentences as constitutive of the sense of a particular expression, andmaintains that the occurrence of the expression in other sentences must be faithful




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to the sense of the expression, partly determined, as it is on her account, by theoccurrence of the expression in the privileged set.42

A speakers semantic competence is a logical construction out of the use thatspeaker makes of the language. Holism is an interpretation of this idea. An

ascription of a particular meaning theory to a speaker, i.e., a particularassignment of senses and significance to semantically basic expressions andconstruction serving to determine the senses of semantically complex expres-sions, is done in such a way that the assignments made to compositionally basicexpressions and constructions are determined by a speakers use, both actual andpossible, ofevery sentence of the language. To put the point in other words, this isto say that there is no proper subpart of the language such that it would besufficient for two speakers to agree in their use of that subpart in order to beascribed the same meaning theory. In short, the full-bloodedness of Davidsonstheory is achieved by conceiving of use as the asserting or holding-true (or not) of

sentences under certain conditions; the holism enters in considering the holding-true use, actual and potential, of every sentence as partially constitutive of thesense of each expression of the language.

Let me contrast this understanding of holism with McDowells. According toMcDowell, holism is simply the inextricability of meaning, belief, and desire.43

But inextricability is one thing, holism, at least as it is being thought of here,another (although closely and interestingly related) thing. The point mostrelevant to our concerns here is that McDowell does not connect Davidsonsholism to his logical construction of meaning out of use, or at least does not do soin a way that recognizes the particular form of descriptions Davidson employs to

meet the Manifestation Constraint.

44

So McDowell cannot see Davidsons holismas that which allows him, if indeed it does, to meet the Manifestation Constraintwith an epistemically untainted truth-conditional conception of meaning.

Dummett has been very critical of holism; and he has opposed to it his ownmolecularist view of language, in which the meanings of at least someexpressions are constituted independently of the meanings of the rest. Thisallows there to be a level of semantic competence that does not presuppose othersemantic competence. In other words, there is some subpart of the language inthe use of which two speakers can agree that suffices to determine the semanticvalues and contributions of the compositionally primitive expressions andconstructions that figure in an account of their semantic competence. This followsfrom the account of molecularism together with some conception of the idea thatmeaning is a logical construction out of use. Dummetts antirealism results fromthe existence (or possible existence) of sentences that stand at the lowest level ofsemantic competence, but for which there is no way to manifest an epistemicallyuntainted truth-conditional conception of their content. Sentences may standhigher up in the network of sentences, in which case their deductive andevidential connections to other sentences can be exploited to manifest semanticcompetence; other sentences may stand at the lowest levels in the network, andpossess a kind of content competence with which can be manifested by arecognition of the obtaining, or not, of the condition for truth. Antirealism is




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generated by the existence (or possible existence) of sentences at the lowest levelsof the network that are supposed to possess contents whose truth conditionsobtain undetectably.

In short, the thought is that a molecularist view in the theory of meaning

entails anti-realism about truth. Explicitly, the argument for this runs as follows:

P1. Suppose molecularism. Molecularism requires that semanticcompetence with at least some set of sentences, S, does notpresuppose semantic competence with other sentences. (assump-tion; definition of molecularism)

P2. Semantic competence needs to manifested in ability. The manifesta-tion of semantic competence with some set of sentences S1ySn isaccomplished in use; quite generally the relevant uses are eitherthose of other sentences containing the constituents of S1ySn, or

the uses of S1y

Sn in response to the recognition of the obtaining ornot of the truth conditions of S1ySn. (Manifestation Constraint,together with an elaboration of kinds of use.)

C1. Semantic competence with the sentences in S must be manifestedwithout the use of other sentences; more specifically, semanticcompetence with the sentences ofS is to be manifested through acapacity to recognize the obtaining or not of the truth conditions ofthe sentences in S. (P1, P2)

P3. There are, or can be, sentences, suppose S1ySn in S, whose

meaning is given by recognition-transcendent truth conditions.(assumption for reductio)

C2. There are, or can be, sentences, in particular S1ySn in S, semanticcompetence with which requires the recognition of the obtaining ofrecognition-transcendent truth conditions. But this is absurd. (C1,P3)

C. The notion of truth relevant to semantics must be recognitionally or more generally, epistemically constrained. (P3, C2)

My point is not to endorse the argument, but rather just to make clear what it is.45

But what should be noted for the purposes of this paper is that everything in theargument ought to be completely acceptable to Davidson everything, that is,except P1. But P1 is crucial to securing the antirealist conclusion. It should beclear that the argument does not show that holism suffices for realism; that is aseparate question that I do not take up here in any detail. But at the very least, wecan see that the hope of the holistic view lies in the fact that there is an extradegree of freedom such that for every set of sentences S1ySn, this extra degree offreedom the use of other sentences can be exploited to manifest a realist truthconditional competence with S1ySn (and their constituents). That extra degree of




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freedom may make room for realist truth. So, in sum, my point is that the disputeabout truth turns, at least partially, if not wholly, on the dispute aboutmolecularism and holism.

This is how I wish to describe Dummetts position. McDowell, however, does

not see things this way. McDowells reading of Dummett revolves around theidea that an account of content must be given from outside content (McDowell1987). But, as we have seen, this does not have the implications that McDowelltakes it to have. This blinds McDowell from seeing Dummetts antirealistorientation as a product of a molecularist logical construction of semanticcompetence from use. And because McDowell cannot see the role of Dummettsmolecularism, he cannot make any sense of Dummett except as being so faroutside content that he is a crude behaviourist, attempting to reduce thesemantic and intentional to non-intentionally characterized behaviour. McDowellthus sees Dummett as still trying to effect the logical construction of semantic

competence out of use, but in way that is doomed from the beginning.In sum, then, my difference with McDowell is the following. McDowellinterprets the break between Davidson and Dummett over the question ofrealism as grounded in the division of intentional versus non-intentional logicalconstructions of semantic competence out of use; that is why Dummett, unlikeDavidson, is attempting a construction from outside content. Remaining withinthe intentional makes realism possible for Davidson, but rejecting the intentionalmakes only antirealism possible for Dummett. It is this understanding of theissues that I oppose. I have assumed, with McDowell, that an account fromoutside content makes meaning or content altogether impossible. But on my

view, the divide between Davidson and Dummett lies elsewhere; it lies within thespace of intentional logical constructions of semantic competence out of use.They divide over whether the constructions are holistic or molecularist in nature.This can be seen by making clear the basis of the antirealist argument inmolecularism, and the prospect of realism through the extra degree of freedompresent in holism. If that is right, McDowell will have got neither Dummett norDavidson exactly right: Davidson is not as modest, and Dummett not as full-

blooded, as McDowell would have us think.46

This was, and still is, the tenor of McDowells criticisms of Dummett.47 I havetried to give an interpretation of Dummett, and of Davidson, that understands theirdisagreements against a larger background of agreement than McDowell allows.

8. Conclusion: A Partial Reduction of the Debate Over Truth

It is not my aim in this paper to decide whether a molecularistic or holisticpicture of language is the correct one; what I hope is that it is clear that it is, atleast partially, the holism/molecularism issue upon which the question of theproper characterization of the concept of truth rests. Let us review the steps thathave led to this conclusion. We saw that the T-schema, as Tarski might haveunderstood it, takes us quite far in understanding the concept of truth; but it falls




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short in taking translation as primitive in the account of truth, and thusforeclosing on the possibility of using the concept of truth in the account of mean-ing (2). For this reason, we found that the T-schema, again as Tarski might haveunderstood it, plays no role in Davidsons theory of meaning (3): it does not

provide any insight into the concept of truth, at least none of which we can takeofficial notice, and, consequently does not provide any usable constraints on ameaning theory. I remarked on the fact that these are points on which Dummett isin agreement, and in fact which he has made himself (4). This leaves it a questionas to what is to be the method of a proper characterization of truth; the answer,according to both Dummett and Davidson, is to describe the general constraints ona meaning theory in which the concept of truth is to do its work (3, 4). This linksthe concept of truth to other important philosophical concepts, including meaning,

belief, and desire. Truth is to be characterized in a functionalist fashion, with theimplicitly characterizing theory being a theory of meaning (or more generally, a

theory of interpretation). These, then, are all general points of agreement betweenDummett and Davidson. But it is within the details of this general agreement thatthe disagreements crop up; in particular, it might be thought, that it is in thedemands made by the requirement that understanding of the language bemanifested (5, 6). But even this is not the real point of contention. Looking moreclosely, we see that it is the requirement that understanding be manifested within acertain picture of the metaphysics of meaning, namely a molecularist picture, inwhich the understanding of at least some sentences must be manifestableindependently of the ability to use other sentences, or a holistic picture, in whichno such asymmetrical constraint on manifestation is imposed (7). The former,

because certain ground-level sentences do not allow for the manifestation ofepistemically untainted truth-conditional content, necessitates a concept of truthwhich is epistemically constrained; the latter, on the other hand, having an extradegree of freedom, holds out the possibility that truth is epistemically untainted(but of course, on this point the holist is obligated to say more hence the partialreduction of the debate). But the issues turn on which model of the metaphysics ofmeaning, molecularistic or holistic, is correct.48

In a paper in which he interprets Davidson as a contributor to the pragmatisttradition in philosophy, Richard Rorty writes:

y[O]n my view the futile metaphysical struggle between idealism and

physicalism was superseded, in the early years of this century, by ametaphilosophical struggle between the pragmatists (who wanted todissolve the old metaphysical questions) and the anti-pragmatists (whostill thought there was something first-order to fight about). This latterstruggle is beyond realism and anti-realismySo, despite his occasionalpledges of realist faith, is Davidson. (Rorty 1986: 149)

Bjrn Ramberg echoes this view when he says:

[The realism/antirealism] debate has endured, in only slightly differentgarb, for centuries, and it is not my intention to contribute to it here. The




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present point is that on my reading, Davidson is not a party to it,Dummetts polemic notwithstanding. (Ramberg 1989: 46)

But if I am right about the importance of the molecularism/holism debate, and ifDummett is right, in the context of a molecularist picture of language, that therequirements of manifestation determine truth to be constrained epistemically,thereby making us antirealists, then it may be that the only way to be realist is theway that Davidson is a realist.49 So Davidson is not outside the dispute; hemakes, instead, precisely the required meaning-theoretic moves to sustain realism.

Now, of course Rorty and Ramberg are both right in claiming Davidson to beoutside the debate in the sense that he has dropped the essential premise ofmolecularism (or less) upon which the debate has, at least within recent history,

been conducted.50 But, given the view I have been trying to make clear and defendhere about the deep interconnections between the theories of truth and meaning, Isee no reason not to think of ones views about meaning and its constitution aspregnant with consequences of a recognizably and deeply metaphysical sort.51

Gurpreet S. RattanDepartment of PhilosophyUniversity of Toronto215 Huron St.Toronto, M5S 1A1Canada

[email protected]

NOTES

1 The interdependency of the holism/molecularism debate and the debate aboutconceptions of truth is discussed in Bilgrami 1986.

2 I do not intend the claims of this section as serious Tarski scholarship. My aim,rather, is to set a background from which the projects of Davidson and Dummett can beseen to emerge.

3 Of course issues of paradox loom large here. The point must be restricted to avoidthem. To do so, we may assume that the metavariables do not to take on as values namesof expressions and expressions from the language in which the account is being given. I

will assume such a qualification throughout, especially in the construction immediatelyfollowing.

4 Cf. McDowell 1987: 2 and 1981: 3. Cf. also Crispin Wrights closely related outlineof the argument in the introduction to Wright 1993: 18, and the rather opaque formulationof the idea in Davidson 1967: 23. For ease of exposition, I follow McDowell, Wright, andDavidson in abstracting away from various details concerning context-dependence andvagueness.

5 Issues about the compositionality of meaning are also relevant here. The fact that atruth conditional semantics can illuminatingly reveal semantic structure and help toexplain the productive character of language counts in favour of casting truth orrepresentation in a central role. Cf. Davidson 1967: 1920.




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6 Dummetts formulation of the distinction occurs in Dummett 1991a. It is implicit, aswell, in the opening paragraph of Dummett 1975: 1. David Lewis formulates thedistinction explicitly in the opening pages of Lewis 1975; Martin Daviess formulationcomes from his classic Davies 1981: 3. I depart from Dummetts 1991a usage of the theoryof meaning, as he uses it to mean, roughly the philosophy of language. I use the phrasemore restrictively, to denote inquiries into the form and correctness conditions of empiricalmeaning theories. In this way, my use of the expression follows much more closelyDaviess use.

7 See Davies 1981: 27. Davies is actually there speaking of the theory of meaning, butthe point can be extended to the theory of truth.

8 The received view originates with Davidson himself (although, as I will argue below,he no longer adheres to it). See Davidson 1974: 150. For other expressions of the receivedview see Schantz 1993, and Ramberg 1989: 54.

9 This is a fundamental matter on which Davidson and Dummett have converged overthe years (this paper describes their post-, not pre-convergence views). Davidson movesfrom a compatibilist position, in which the T-schema is a full characterization of the concept

of truth and truth plays a role in a meaning theory, to an incompatibilist inflationist view, inwhich truth plays a role in a meaning theory and is thus not fully characterized by the T-schema. Dummett 1959 also moves to the inflationist position, but from a differentincompatibilist position, in which the characterizing role of the T-schema implies that truthdoes not play a role in a meaning theory. The shuffling is profitably seen as an attempt tocome to grips with a fundamental dilemma about the theories of truth and meaning thatDummett 1959 poses. These issues are discussed in Rattan (ms1).

10 I think that this point is missed in David Wigginss excellent Wiggins 1997. Wigginspoints out how the questions of what makes a meaning theory a correct meaning theory,and what makes a truth theory a correct truth theory arise symmetrically (12, 14), and healso thinks that it is essentially Davidson who put us on track to arrive at the answers. But

Wiggins describes Davidsons strategy as the invert-Tarski strategy (19, 26). This doesnot seem to provide the required illumination on the concept of truth. Although thepresent work was composed before seeing Wigginss work, the view espoused here bearsclose affinities to it, and to Wiggins 1980.

11 These themes make their appearance as early as Dummett 1959.12 Davidson 1996: 276. Davidson there levels these charges at others as well; I mean

only to defend Dummett.13 Cf. also Dummett 1991a: 22. Here Dummett acknowledges that the idea stems from

Davidson.14 The deep interconnectedness here speaks against the deflationary view of truth.

Very quickly, the problem is the following. Either the deflationist accepts that meanings

determine truth conditions, or he does not. If he does, then it seems as though the purityof truth (see Horwich 1990: 12) is lost; if he does not, he has undercut the basis for his ownview, in which something like the T-schema provides a full account of truth. For thethought that the T-schema says anything about truth, let alone everything about truth, iscompletely parasitic on the idea that meanings determine truth conditions. These thoughtsare elaborated and generalized in Rattan (ms2).

15 I am indebted to Haim Gaifman for making me appreciate some of the delicaciesinvolved in understanding Dummett on these points. See Gaifman 1996: 388389.

16 I have here exploited Dummetts endorsement of some version of a priority-thesisof language over thought to rewrite his views about what is initially a requirement onthought as one on language. This is, I think, a subtle and difficult topic, and no doubt, a




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further account of the matters discusssed in this paper would contain some discussion ofthe priority thesis. I will not attempt that here. For more on these topics, see Dummett1991b, and Peacock 1997.

17 Cf. Wrights 1986: 215216 idea of reconstructive analytic epistemology as anidealized epistemology of understanding.

18 I think that constitutive accounts of meaning must be able to embed into anexplanation of our actual epistemic situation. I have severe doubts about whether any usetheory of meaning is able to do so. I say little more about this below, but, in general, this isnot the place to pursue the scepticism. For some more on this see Rattan 2002a: Chapter 4.

19 Dummett is explicit that this is the ancestry of the Manifestation Constraint; seeDummett 1976: 91.

20 See Evans 1981: 335. Evanss full idea is that the theory of which we have tacitknowledge is a logical construction out of the use of whole sentences. See also ElizabethFrickers discussion of the metaphysical perspective, in Fricker 1983: 1.

21 We might include in this group, authors as diverse as Dummett, Quine, Davidson,McDowell, and Evans; as well as those theorists who wish to give a constitutive grasp of

meaning or concepts according to their conceptual role: authors like Bilgrami, later Field,Horwich, Peacocke, Ned Block, and no doubt many others. This should also allay fearsthat the Manifestation Constraint and the demand for full-bloodedness necessarily involvea crude behaviourism.

22 See Dummett 1993b: Chapter 4. Dummett takes Freges idea to point to a particularrole for the social in the very idea of objective thought; but I do not think that Freges ideaneed take that particular form. I will not argue for an alternative here.

23 George 1997 argues that although the objectivity of sense is explicit in Frege, there isnot much evidence for the idea of the communicability of sense. This would imply thatthere is a substantial gap between Frege and Wittgenstein, between the objectivity of sense,and the idea that meaning is use. This last point further relies on the assumption that

communication, and not (or not merely) the expression of thought, is what is important inuse. For discussions of these latter topics see Dummett 1989. There is, however, even ifGeorge is correct, still a point to understanding things this way.

24 For an example of a denial of the postulate, see Noam Chomskys discussion ofknowledge and ability in Chomsky 1980: 51ff.; in Chomsky 1986: 9ff. and 1921; and, mostrecently, in Chomsky 2000: 5052. For Chomskys (related) idea of the distinction betweencompetence and performance, see Chomsky 1980: 205 and the opening pages of Chomsky1965. For the distinction between being guided by a rule and merely having ones

behaviour conform to a rule, see Quine 1972.25 In fact I do not think that the challenge can be met; in Rattan 2002a: Chapter 4, I get

started on arguments aimed to show that use theories of meaning are not able to recover

these crucial distinctions.26 I do not mean to imply by this formulation that all that one can do in order to

manifest ones understanding is to be able to tell whether the conditions which render trueor false a sentence obtain. There are of course other abilities that might manifest onesunderstanding of a sentence, perhaps involving ones abilities with other sentences. So, itis important to note that it is not required that the understanding of each sentence have itsown, isolated, quasi-behavioural manifestation. But, to anticipate some of the discussion

below, one of the implications of holding a molecularist view of language is that thiscannot everywhere be the case.

27 Thus, it cannot be the simple notion of warranted assertibility through which theconcept of sentence meaning is elucidated; a dawning recognition of this idea led




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Dummett to say in the Preface of Dummett 1978a: xxiii, while the notion of truth will notbe fundamental, in the sense [that a commitment to determinate truth-values and theprinciple of bivalence requires], it will be crucial; and in Dummett 1991a this view isextended so as to see the concept of truth as essential to a meaning theory. Dummettadduces there reasons for this view, reasons which are well documented in Gaifman 1996:382. But if these points are to cohere, there must be some reason to think that there can besuch a thing as an epistemically constrained notion of truth; that is, it needs to be shownthat epistemically constrained truth is possible. I do not think that Dummett has shownthat. Crispin Wrights construction and defence of superassertibility can be seen asattempting to answer the question of how an epistemically constrained account of truth ispossible. See Wright 1992: Chapter 2, 5.

28 I think that Davidson is firm on this point; see Davidson 1973: 136137.Quine, however, has wavered on it over the years. For the view in which everythingis revisable see Quine 1951; for the view respecting the sanctity of classical logic seeQuine 1954.

29 See for example, McDowell 1981: note 21 and McDowell 1987: 5, 7. One can

understand, if McDowells account of Dummettian full-bloodedness is correct, why hethinks that Dummett cannot steer between psychologism and behaviourism. Despiteprotestations to the contrary, Dummett does seem headed here towards behaviourism, forunlike in the view outlined below, in which the notion of what it is to assert a sentence istaken as basic, Dummett seems to want to reconstruct that as well (cf. Dummett 1991a: 5254). And then it seems that the only appeal to be made is to non-intentionally described

behaviour. I suggest re-reading Dummett in such a way that the project of reconstructingforce notions is given up. In that case, he can both avoid behaviourism, and retain hisconception of truth and thus, his antirealism. I will be arguing that this is a better way tounderstand Dummett, as well as a better way to understand Dummetts dispute withDavidson.

30 As we will see in the next section, McDowells views here are of a piece with hisinterpretation of Davidson as a modest theorist of meaning.

31 This phrase occurs in Davidson 1991, although the idea behind it dates back toQuines notion of prompted assent. This is also the root of the idea used by Paul Horwich the idea that the metaphysical basis of meaning is the use property of accepting sentencesunder certain conditions. See Horwich 1998.

32 See the closing remarks of his discussion of Quine and Dummett in McDowell 1981:8 for a relatively clear example of McDowell missing this alternative. I propose to readDummett as following Davidson in this regard, and thus as appreciating that assent

behaviour is not, in McDowells words, presupposition-free.33 For a very insightful discussion of these themes that links them to the questions of

rule-following, the indeterminacy of interpretation, and the very possibility of theorizingabout meaning, see Bilgrami 1986: 8.

34 This is not to say that generally, the observation of uses is what entitles a speakersknowledge of meaning when she has such knowledge.

35 This is McDowells view in McDowell 1987: 97; 100. McDowell 1981 also dismissesthe idea of meaning-as-hypothesis, and again on generally anti-psychologistic grounds. Inthe latter paper (which was written earlier), McDowell connects the criticism moreexplicitly to issues in the epistemology and phenomenology of understanding.

36 For a discussion of this point see Dummett 1978b: 102. Dummett commits himselfthere to only to the one-way implication, although he does take it that if meaning were to

be a hypothesis, that communication would not be possible.




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its plausibility. Given this, and since my focus is to understand how molecularism bringsantirealism - any antirealism - in its wake, a weaker rather than stronger formulationserves my purposes better. The issue deserves a more extended treatment (see thefollowing note as well). Thanks to Crispin Wright and Bernhard Weiss for valuablediscussion and correspondence.

46 Indeed, I think that McDowells understanding of Dummett leaves unexplainedwhy Dummetts view ends up in antirealism, where the fundamental notion of a meaningtheory that notion in terms of which sentence meaning is given is epistemicallyconstrained truth, rather than in the kind of eliminativism or irrealism about meaning thatone might plausibly read into Quine 1951 and 1960: Chapter 2, according to which there is,properly speaking, nothing for a meaning theory to be a theory of. I agree with McDowell1981: 8, however, that understanding the relation between Quine and Dummett (andKripke 1982, I would add) would benefit from a more extended treatment.

47 See McDowell 1987 and, more recently, McDowell 1997. But in partial defence ofMcDowell, see note 29.

48 My point complements that to which Bilgrami arrives at the end of 3 of Bilgrami

1986. His point there, as he sums it up, is that it is misleadingy

to think of [Dummetts]anti-holism as something established independently of the critique of the truth-theoreticconception of realism. I

the theory of truth in the theory of meaning rattan

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