the tilt : the u.s. and the south asian crisis of 1971 (government documents included)

7/30/2019 The Tilt : The U.S. and the South Asian Crisis of 1971 (Government Documents included)

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Tilt: The U.S. and the South Asian Crisis of 1971

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Electronic Briefing Books Main Index

Audio Clip

Nixon and Kissinger onThe Concert for Bangla

Desh

Source: Nixon PresidentialMaterials Project, Conversation

Oval 553

August 2, 1971, 9:45 AM, Oval

Office, The White House. The

Concert for Bangla Desh

Listen to the Audio clip

The former Beatle George

Harrison, encouraged by Ravi

Shankar, organized "The Concert

for Bangladesh" to raise money

for the refugees created by the

political turmoil in East Pakistan.The day after the historic concert,

Richard Nixon and Henry

Kissinger discuss the refugee

situation in East Pakistan and the

potential for war between India

and Pakistan. Among the issues

covered in the conversation are

distribution of economic

assistance and food aid, the

stopping of American aid to

India if a war is started, and the

suggested ramifications if the

U.S. was to "screw Pakistan too

outrageously."

Handwritten note from President Richard M. Nixon

on anApril 28, 1971, National Security Council

decision paper: "To all hands. Don't squeeze Yahya

at this time - RMN"

The Tilt: The U.S.

and the South Asian

Crisis of 1971

National Security Archive

Electronic Briefing Book No.79

Edited by Sajit Gandhi

December 16, 2002

Print this page Jump to documents

WASHINGTON, D.C. - Today, on the 31st anniversary of the creation ofBangladesh, the National Security Archive published on the World WideWeb 46 declassified U.S. government documents and audio clips concernedwith United States policy towards India and Pakistan during the South Asian

Crisis of 1971.

The documents, declassified and available at the U.S. National Archives andthe Presidential Library system detail how United States policy, directed byRichard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, followed a course that becameinfamously known as "The Tilt."

The documents published today show:

The brutal details of the genocide conducted in East Pakistan in Marchand April of 1971

One of the first "dissent cables" questioning U.S. policy and moralityat a time when, as the Consulate General in Dhaka Archer Bloodwrites, "unfortunately, the overworked term genocide is applicable."

The role that Nixon's friendship with Yahya Khan and the Chinainiative played in U.S. policymaking leading to the tilt towardsPakistan

George Bush Senior's view of Henry Kissinger

Illegal American military assistance approved by Richard Nixon and
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Henry Kissinger to Pakistan following a formal aid cutoff by theUnited States

Henry Kissinger's duplicity to the press and towards the Indians vis--vis the Chinese

Background

Pakistan's December 1970 elections, the first free democratic elections for

the National Assembly in Pakistan's history, saw Sheikh Mujibur (Mujib)Rahman's East Pakistan-based Awami League party (AL) win 167 out of169 seats contested in Pakistan's Eastern flank, giving the AL a majority andcontrol of the 313-seat National Assembly. This was the first time thatpolitical power in Pakistan would be concentrated in its Eastern half.(1)

West Pakistan's loss of political power over East Pakistan was devastating.Threatened by this development, on March 1, 1971, with the Assembly set toopen in two days, the military dictator General Agha Muhammad YahyaKhan (Yahya), postponed the opening indefinitely. Outraged by the West'sdisregard for their political rights, the ethnically Bengali East Pakistanis tookto the streets demanding that Yahya and West Pakistan respect the electionresults.

On March 25, 1971, West Pakistani forces, commanded by General Yahyaand the Martial Law Administrator, Lt. General Tikka Khan began a self-destructive course of repressive actions against their fellow Pakistanis in theEast. The Martial Law Administrators did not discriminate, targeting anyonefrom Awami Leaguers to students. Large numbers of Bengalis -- Muslimsand Hindus, businessmen and academics -- were killed during this period ofmartial law. The final tally of the dead, as reported by Mujib wasapproximately three million.(2)

As a result of the violence and instability caused in East Pakistan by thegenocide, an estimated ten million Bengalis had fled across the border toIndia by May 1971.(3) The refugees were problematic for two main reasons:first, they created a strain on the Indian economy, an economy just comingto terms with development. Secondly, a group of refugees known as theMukti Bahini, referred to by the Indians as "Bengali Freedom Fighters" wereusing India as a base from which to launch guerrilla attacks in efforts tofight against West Pakistani oppression.

The refugees became too much for India to handle. Eventually tensionsbetween India and Pakistan grew uncontrollable, and among other things, thelack of a political solution in East Pakistan and Indian support for theguerrilla fighters led to war between the two neighbors. The end result of theconflict was the splitting of Pakistan into two separate states: Pakistan in itspresent form and an independent Bangladesh.

The U.S. Tilt Towards Pakistan

Discussing the martial law situation in East Pakistan during March of 1971,President Richard Nixon, in his February 9, 1972 State of the World report toCongress indicated that the "United States did not support or condone thismilitary action." Nevertheless, the U.S. did nothing to help curtail the
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genocide and never made any public statements in opposition to the WestPakistani repression.(4)

Instead, by using what Nixon and Kissinger called quiet diplomacy, theAdministration gave a green light of sorts to the Pakistanis. In one instance,Nixon declared to a Pakistani delegation that, "Yahya is a good friend."Rather than express concern over the ongoing brutal military repression,Nixon explained that he "understands the anguish of the decisions which[Yahya] had to make." As a result of Yahya's importance to the China

initiative and his friendship with Nixon and Kissinger, Nixon declares thatthe U.S. "would not do anything to complicate the situation for PresidentYahya or to embarrass him. (Document 9)." Much like the present situationpost 9/11, Washington was hesitant to criticize Pakistan publicly out of fearthat such a tactic might weaken the dictator's support for American interests

As the conflict in the Sub-continent began to grow, so did criticism ofAmerican policy leanings toward Pakistan. The administration denied thatany specific anti-India policy was being followed. Declassified documentsshow that in addition to tilting towards Pakistan in its public statements, theU.S. also followed a pro-Pakistan line in the UN, in discussions with China,

and on the battlefield as well.

Not only did the United States publicly pronounce India as the aggressor inthe war, but the U.S. sent the nuclear submarine, U.S.S. Enterprise, to theBay of Bengal, and authorized the transfer of U.S. military supplies toPakistan, despite the apparent illegality of doing so.(5) American Militaryassistance was formally cutoff to both India and Pakistan. A combination ofNixon's emotional attachment to General Yahya and his dislike for IndiraGandhi, West Pakistan's integral involvement with the China initiative andKissinger's predilection for power politics greatly influenced Americanpolicy decision-making during this conflict.

New Documentation

The fact that the conflict occurred over 30 years ago makes it possible nowto look at United States actions and policy through documents released at theNational Archives under the U.S. government's historical declassificationprogram. The record is far from complete: numerous materials remainclassified both by the State Department, CIA and other agencies as well asthe Nixon Presidential Materials Project. Nevertheless, the availabledocuments offer many useful insights into how and why Richard Nixon andHenry Kissinger made important decisions during the 1971 South Asian

Crisis.

Highlights from this briefing book include:

Cable traffic from the United States Consulate in Dacca revealing thebrutal details of the genocide conducted in East Pakistan by the WestPakistani Martial Law Administration. In the infamous Blood telegram(Document 8), the Consulate in Dacca condemns the United States forfailing "to denounce the suppression of democracy," for failing "todenounce atrocities," and for "bending over backwards to placate theWest Pak[istan] dominated government and to lessen any deservedly
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negative international public relations impact against them."[Documents 1-8, 10-11, 26](6)Details of the role that the China initiative and Nixon's friendship withYahya (and dislike of Indira Gandhi) played in U.S. policymaking,leading to the tilting of U.S. policy towards Pakistan. This includes aMemorandum of Conversation (Document 13) in which Kissingerindicates to Ambassador Keating, "the President has a special feelingfor President Yahya. One cannot make policy on that basis, but it is afact of life." [Documents 9, 13, 17-21, 24-25]

Greater insight into the role played by the United States in South Asia.While the United States tried to ease the humanitarian crisis in EastPakistan, it did not strongly endorse to Yahya the need for a politicalsolution, which would have allowed the peaceful and safe return ofrefugees. While some historians believe the roots of the 1971 warwere sown following the 1965 India-Pakistan war, the declassifieddocuments show that the 1971 war had its own specific causes: atremendous refugee flow (approximately 10 million people), Indiansupport to the Mukti Bahini, and continued military repression in EastPakistan. All these causes were exacerbated by the lack of publicWhite House criticism for the root cause of the South Asian crisis, the

abrogation of the December 1970 election results, and the refugeecrisis that ensued following genocide. [Documents 12, 16, 22, 27, 46]Henry Kissinger's duplicity to the press and toward the Indians vis--vis the Chinese. In July of 1971, while Kissinger was in India, he toldIndian officials that "under any conceivable circumstance the U.S.would back India against any Chinese pressures." In that same Julymeeting Kissinger said, "In any dialogue with China, we would ofcourse not encourage her against India." However, near the end of theIndia-Pakistan war, in a highly secret 12/10/1971 meeting with theChinese Ambassador to the UN Huang Ha, Kissinger did exactly thisencouraging the PRC to engage in the equivalent of military actionagainst the Indians. [Documents 14-15, 30-32]Details of U.S. support for military assistance to Pakistan from China,the Middle East, and even from the United States itself. HenryKissinger's otherwise thorough account of the India-Pakistan crisis of1971 in his memoir White House Years, omits the role the UnitedStates played in Pakistan's procurement of American fighter planes,perhaps because of the apparent illegality of shipping Americanmilitary supplies to either India or Pakistan after the announcedcutoff.(7) Of particular importance in this selection of documents is aseries of transcripts of telephone conversations from December 4 and16, 1971(Document 28) in which Kissinger and Nixon discuss,among other things, third-party transfers of fighter planes to Pakistan.

Also of note is a cable from the Embassy in Iran dated December 29,1971 (Document 44) which suggests that F-5 fighter aircraft,originally slated for Libya but which were being held in California,were flown to Pakistan via Iran. [23, 26, 28, 29, 33-45]

Note: The following documents are in PDF format.You will need to download and install the free Adobe Acrobat Readerto view.

Document 1

U.S. Consulate (Dacca) Cable, Selective Genocide, March 28, 1971,
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Confidential, 2 pp.Source: Record Group 59, Subject Numeric File 1970-73, Pol and Def, Box 2530

Consul General Archer Blood reports of "a reign of terror by thePak Military" in East Pakistan. Blood indicated that evidence issurfacing suggesting that Awami League supporters and Hindusare being systematically targeted by the Martial LawAdministrators.

Document 2Memorandum for Dr. Kissinger, Situation in Pakistan, March 28, 1971,Secret, 2 pp.Source: NPMP, National Security Council Files, Country Files, Middle East, Box 625

NSC official Sam Hoskinson tells Kissinger that events in EastPakistan have taken a turn for the worse. More significantly, thismemorandum acknowledges both American recognition of the"reign of terror" conducted by West Pakistan, and the need toaddress the new policy issues that have been created as a resultof the terror.

Document 3U.S. Embassy (New Delhi) Cable, Selective Genocide, March 29, 1971,Confidential, 1 pp.Source: Record Group 59, Subject Numeric File 1970-73, Pol and Def, Box 2530

Ambassador Keating expresses his dismay and concern atrepression unleashed by the Martial Law Administrators with theuse of American military equipment. He calls for the U.S. to"promptly, publicly, and prominently deplore" the brutality.Washington however, never publicly spoke out against WestPakistan.

Document 4

U.S. Consulate (Dacca) Cable, Killings at University, March 30, 1971,Confidential, 3 ppSource: Record Group 59, Subject Numeric File 1970-73, Pol and Def, Box 2530

Blood reports an American's observation of the atrocitiescommitted at Dacca University. The observer indicates thatstudents had been "shot down in rooms or mowed down whenthey came out of building in groups." In one instance, the MLAset a girls dormitory on fire and then the girls were "machine-gunned as they fled the building."

Document 5U.S. Consulate (Dacca) Cable,Extent of Casualties in Dacca, March 31,1971, Confidential, 2 pp.Source: Record Group 59, Subject Numeric File 1970-73, Pol and Def, Box 2530

Blood reports that an estimated 4-6,000 people have "lost theirlives as a result of military action" since martial law began onMarch 25. He also indicates that the West Pakistani objective "tohit hard and terrorize the population" has been fairly successful.


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Document 6

U.S. Consulate (Dacca) Cable, Sitrep: Army Terror Campaign Continues inDacca; Evidence Military Faces Some Difficulties Elsewhere, March 31,1971, Confidential, 3 pp.Source: Record Group 59, Subject Numeric File 1970-73, Pol and Def, Box 2530

Blood indicates that Martial Law Administrators are nowfocusing on predominantly Hindu areas. "Congen officer heardsteady firing of approximately 1 shot per ten seconds for 30

minutes." Cable also reports that naked female bodies found"with bits of rope hanging from ceiling fans," after apparentlybeing "raped, shot, and hung by heels" from the fans.

Document 7

U.S. Department of State Cable, USG Expression of Concern on EastPakistan; April 6, 1971, Confidential, 8 pp.Source: Nixon Presidential Materials Project (NPMP), National Security Council Files, Indo-

Pak War, Box 578.

During a conversation with Assistant Secretary Sisco, PakistaniAmbassador Agha Hilaly asks that "due allowance be made for

behavior of Pak officials and others during what had amountedto civil war for a few days," because the "army had to killpeople in order to keep country together." Expressing concernover the situation and bloodshed as well as use of U.S. arms inrepression, Sisco observed that the US is "keenly sensitive toproblems and feelings on developments [in East Pakistan]."

Document 8

U.S. Consulate (Dacca) Cable,Dissent from U.S. Policy Toward EastPakistan, April 6, 1971, Confidential, 5 pp. Includes Signatures from theDepartment of State.

Source: RG 59, SN 70-73 Pol and Def. From: Pol Pak-U.S. To: Pol 17-1 Pak-U.S. Box 2535

In one of the first "Dissent Cables," Blood transmits a messagedenouncing American policy towards the South Asia crisis. Thetransmission suggests that the United States is "bending overbackwards to placate the West Pak [sic] dominated governmentand to lessen likely and deservedly negative international publicrelations impact against them." The cable goes on to questionU.S. morality at a time when "unfortunately, the overworkedterm genocide is applicable."

Document 9

Memorandum for the President, Policy Options Toward Pakistan, April 28,1971, Secret, 6 pp. Includes Nixon's handwritten Nixon noteSource: NPMP, NSC Files, Country Files: Middle East, Box 625

Kissinger presents Nixon with U.S. policy options directedtowards the crisis in East Pakistan. Nixon and Kissinger bothfeel the third is the best as it, as Kissinger writes, "would havethe advantage of making the most of the relationship withYahya, while engaging in a serious effort to move the situationtoward conditions less damaging to US and Pakistani interests."At the end of the last page Nixon writes, "To all hands: Don't


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squeeze Yahya at this time."

Document 10Memorandum of Conversation (Memcon) M.M. Ahmad, Agha Hilaly, HenryKissinger and Harold H. Saunders May 10, 1971, (3:05 - 3:30 p.m.), Secret/NODIS, 4 pp.Source: Nixon Presidential Materials Project (NPMP), National Security Council Files, Indo-

Pak War, Box 578.

U.S. and Pakistani officials discuss the potential for a politicalsolution in East Pakistan. Kissinger indicates Nixon's "highregard" and "personal affection" for Yahya and that "the lastthing one does in this situation is to take advantage of a friendin need." He also offers American assistance so as to notcompound "the anguish" that Pakistan "is already suffering," asa result of the repression in East Pakistan.

Document 11Memcon The President, M.M. Ahmad, Agha Hilaly, and Harold H.Saunders, May 10, 1971, (4:45 - 5:20 p.m.), Secret /NODIS, 4 pp.Source: Nixon Presidential Materials Project (NPMP), National Security Council Files, Indo-

Pak War, Box 578.

Nixon and Pakistani officials discuss a potential politicalsolution in East Pakistan. Nixon expresses sympathy forPakistan by indicating that "Yahya is a good friend," andseemingly in response to the genocide like repression in theEast, says he "could understand the anguish of the decisionswhich [Yahya] had to make." Nixon also declares that the U.S."would not do anything to complicate the situation for PresidentYahya or to embarrass him."

Document 12Department of State, Memorandum for the President, Possible India-Pakistan War, May 26, 1971, Secret, 4 pp.Source: Nixon Presidential Materials Project (NPMP), National Security Council Files, Indo-

Pak War, Box 575.

As early as May 1971 the State Department became aware that awar was possible between India and Pakistan. Thismemorandum denotes three causes that may lead to an India-Pakistan war: (1)continued military repression in the East, (2)the refugee flow into India, and (3) Indian cross-border supportto Bengali guerillas (the Mukti Bahini).

Document 13

Memcon Kenneth Keating, Henry Kissinger, and Harold Saunders June 3,1971, (4:00 P.M.). Attached to Cover Sheet Dated June 21, 1971, Secret/NODIS, 6 pp.Source: Nixon Presidential Materials Project (NPMP), National Security Council Files Country

Files: Middle East, Box 596.

Kissinger, Keating, and Saunders discuss the situation inPakistan and American military assistance. Kissinger indicatesthat Nixon wants to give Yahya a few months to fix the


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situation, but that East Pakistan will eventually becomeindependent. Kissinger points out that "the President has aspecial feeling for President Yahya. One cannot make policy onthat basis, but it is a fact of life."

Document 14

Memorandum for RADM Daniel J. Murphy,Dr. Kissinger's Reports ofConversations in New Delhi, July 7, 1971, Top Secret/Sensitive/Eyes Only, 4pp.

Source: Nixon Presidential Materials Project (NPMP), National Security Council Files, HaigChron, Box 983.

Relaying his impressions of his visit to India, Kissingerdescribes the strong feelings about the heavy burden placedupon India by the refugees from East Pakistan. In his meetingswith Indian officials, Kissinger discussed the East Pakistansituation, military assistance to Pakistan, and China. He assuresthe Indians that the U.S. "would take the gravest view of anyunprovoked aggression against India."

Document 15

Memcon, Dr. Sarabhai, Dr. Haksar, Dr. Kissinger, Mr. Winston Lord, July 7, 1971, (1:10 - 2:50 p.m.), Secret/Sensitive, 4pp.Source: NPMP, NSC Files, Pres/HAK Memcons, Box 1025

Just days before Kissinger's secret trip to China, Indian and U.S.officials discuss numerous issues, including the Soviet Union,the situation in East Pakistan, arms transfers to Pakistan, andChina. During the conversation, Kissinger assures the Indiansthat "under any conceivable circumstance the U.S. would backIndia against any Chinese pressures." He also states that "In anydialogue with China, we would of course not encourage her

against India."

Document 16Department of State, Cable, Indo-Pakistan Situation, July 15, 1971, Secret, 7pp.Source: Nixon Presidential Materials Project (NPMP), National Security Council Files, Indo-

Pak War, Box 578.

Indian Ambassador to the United States L.K. Jha and ActingSecretary John Irwin discuss the East Pakistan situation, apossible political solution, American military assistance to

Pakistan, and the role of the UN in refugee camps.

Document 17Memorandum for Dr, Kissinger,Military Assistance to Pakistan and the Tripto Peking, July 19, 1971, Secret, 2 pp. Includes handwritten Kissinger noteon bottom of second page.Source: NPMP NSC Files, Indo-Pak War, Box 574

Saunders discusses U.S. Aid to South Asia, specifically notingthe connections between U.S. military assistance to Pakistan andPakistan's role in the China initiative. Kissinger writes, "But it is


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of course clear that we have some special relationship toPakistan."

Document 18

Memorandum for the Presidents File, President's Meeting with AmbassadorJoseph Farland, July 28, 1971, Secret, 5 pp. Attached to Cover MemorandaSource: NPMP, NSC Files, Country Files: Middle East, Box 626

Nixon expresses his concern over the South Asian conflict to

Ambassador Farland, "not only for its intrinsic tragedy anddanger, but also because it could disrupt our steady course in ourpolicy toward China."

Document 19

NSC Paper, South Asia: Cutting of Military and Economic Assistance, July30, 1971, Secret, 5 pp.Source: Nixon Presidential Materials Project (NPMP), National Security Council Files, Indo-

Pak War, Box 570.

The NSC staff discusses Congressional reaction to the conflictin East Pakistan and American military assistance. The

Administration has chosen quiet diplomacy as means to motivateYahya to avert famine and create conditions in which therefugees may return from India. "We have not openlycondemned Yahya. He appreciates this."

Document 20

Handwritten Letter from President Nixon to President Yahya, August 7,1971, 4 pp. Attached to cover page.Source: RG 59 PPC S/P, Directors Files (Winston Lord), Box 330.

Nixon writes to personally thank Yahya for his assistance inarranging contacts between the U.S. and China. At a time whenWest Pakistani troops were engaging in a repression of EastPakistan, Nixon told Yahya that "Those who want a morepeaceful world in the generation to come will forever be in yourdebt."

Document 21Memorandum for the Record: The President, Henry Kissinger, John Irwin, Thomas Moorer, Robert Cushman, Maurice Williams, Joseph Sisco,Armistead Seldon, and Harold Saunders, August 11, 1971, Secret, 7 pp.Source: NPMP NSC Files, Indo-Pak War, Box 578

The NSC Senior Review Group discusses the situation in EastPakistan and increasing tensions between India and Pakistan.The President indicates that "the big story is Pakistan," and heexpresses his concern from the standpoint of human suffering.While Nixon suggests that some Indian and Pakistani interestmight be served by war, it is not in American interests as "thenew China relationship would be imperiled, probably beyondrepair." While stating that the Indians are more "devious" thanthe "sometimes extremely stupid" Pakistanis, the U.S. "must not-cannot-allow" India to use the refugees as a pretext for breakingup Pakistan. Despite the conditions in the East, which


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Ambassador Blood described as "selective genocide," Nixonstates that "We will not measure our relationship with thegovernment in terms of what it has done in East Pakistan. Bythat criterion, we would cut off relations with every Communistgovernment in the world because of the slaughter that has takenplace in the Communist countries."

Document 22

Department of State, Cable,Letter from Prime Minister Gandhi, August 14,1971, Secret, 4 pp.Source: Nixon Presidential Materials Project (NPMP), National SecurityCouncil Files, Indo-Pak War, Box 578.

Indira Gandhi, in a letter to President Nixon, notes that therefugee flow has not slowed, and has reached approximatelyseven million. She questions U.S. efforts to work towards apolitical solution in East Pakistan as well as American armstransfers to Pakistan.

Document 23

Memorandum for the President, My August 16 Meeting with the ChineseAmbassador in Paris, August 16, 1971, Top Secret/Sensitive/Eyes Only, 16pp. Includes Memorandum of Conversation between Huang Chen, TsaoKuei Sheng, Wei Tung, Henry Kissinger, Vernon Walters, and Winston LordDated August 19, 1971.Source: RG 59, PPC S/P, Directors Files (Winston Lord), Box 330.

Kissinger in a memorandum to Nixon describes his talks withthe Chinese Ambassador in Paris. Kissinger explains to theChinese that the U.S. is prevented from giving any militaryassistance to Pakistan because of Congress, but supportsChinese assistance by stating that the U.S. would "understand it

if other friends of Pakistan will give them the equipment theyneed." He also declares that the U.S. "will do nothing toembarrass the government of Pakistan by any publicstatements."

Document 24Memorandum for the President,Implications of the Situation in South Asia,August 18, 1971, Secret, 4 pp.Source: NPMP NSC Files, Indo-Pak War, Box 570

Kissinger discusses the developments in South Asia includingYahya's stand to not grant independence in the East, the serious

insurgency movement underway in East Pakistan, and thecontinued flow of refugees into India. He suggests thatAmerican strategy give Yahya a face-saving way of taking thepolitical steps necessary to re-establish normal conditions.While Kissinger wrote in his memoirs, "We had no nationalinterest to prevent self-determination for East Pakistan," thedocuments show he believed otherwise. In this record, at a timewhen rapprochement with China was in the national interest,Kissinger suggests that "a U.S. effort to split off part of Pakistanin the name of self-determination would have implications forTaiwan and Tibet in Peking's eyes."


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Document 25U.S. Embassy (Islamabad), Cable,Arrests of East Pakistan Intellectuals,September 17, 1971, Confidential, 3 pp.Source: Nixon Presidential Materials Project (NPMP), National Security Council Files, Indo-

Pak War, Box 576.

Indicates that repression of intellectuals in the East continues,but on a reduced scale. Ambassador Farland advises that the best

policy is to continue the current practice of "persistent but quietpressure on GOP toward better treatment of East Pakistanis inall categories."

Document 26Memorandum for General Haig, Pakistan/India Contingency Planning,Secret/Eyes Only, November 15, 1971, 3 pp. Includes JCS Cable.Source: NPMP, NSC Files, Indo-Pak War, Box 570

The U.S. disguising the movement of the nuclear aircraft carrier,the USS Enterprise into the Bay of Bengal for evacuationpurposes, gladly lets the ship movement represent possible

American involvement in the conflict, especially if it expandedto a superpower confrontation. Admiral Welander from the NSCStaff indicates that the JCS has approved, for planning purposesonly, the CINCPAC concept to ready a USS attack carrier todissuade "third party" involvement in the South Asia crisis.

Document 27

United States Embassy (Islamabad) Cable, Pakistan Crisis, November 18,1971, Secret, 9 pp. Attached to Presidents Saturday Briefing and includesUnited Stated Embassy (New Delhi) Cables Dated November 15 and 16,1971.Source: Nixon Presidential Materials Project (NPMP), National Security Council Files, Indo-

Pak War, Box 570

Keating suggests that Gandhi is trying to "cool" the politicalclimate in India while continuing to exert pressure on Pakistan.The Presidents Briefing indicates however, that India is steppingup its support for the guerillas fighting in East Pakistan, actionthat could "goat" the Pakistanis into a full scale war.

Document 28White House, Telephone Conversations (Telcon), Dated December 4 andDecember 16, 1971, 11 pp. Includes Cover Sheet Dated January 19, 1972Source: NPMP, NSC Files, Country Files: Middle East, Box 643.

These telcons show Nixon and Kissinger's knowledge of thirdparty transfers of military supplies to Pakistan. Haig summarizesthe Telcons to Kissinger by writing that the telcons, "confirmthe President's knowledge of, approval for and, if you will,directive to provide aircraft to Iran and Jordan," in exchange forproviding aircraft to Pakistan. The telcons also show thatKissinger and Nixon, following the advice of Barbara Walters,decide to put out a White House version of the facts involvedwith the South Asian crisis through John Scali. Nixon express


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his desire to, "get some PR out on the- - put the blame on India.It will also take some blame off us."

Document 29

National Security Council Memorandum for Henry Kissinger, JordanianTransfer of F-104's to Pakistan, Secret, December 7, 1971, 7 pp. IncludesState Department Cable to Jordan, State Department Memo to Kissinger, andUnited States Embassy (Amman) cable. First page has handwritten Kissingernote in which he, in reference to the title and secrecy of the issue, suggests "that title should have been omitted."Source: NPMP, NSC Files, Indo-Pak War, Box 575

Saunders discusses Yahya's request for military equipment fromthe U.S. and other sources, specifically Jordan. He also observesthat "by law," the U.S. "cannot authorize" any military transfersunless the administration was willing "to change our own policyand provide the equipment directly." This would rule out anytransfer of American military equipment for Pakistan, suppliedby the U.S., or any third party.

Document 30Background Briefing with Henry Kissinger, December 7, 1971, 14 pp.Source: NPMP, NSC Files, Indo-Pak War, Box 572

As a result of American media criticism towards the U.S.position on the India-Pakistan conflict, Kissinger in an attemptto straighten the record conducts a "background" press briefing.Kissinger presents the U.S. position using many questionablefacts.

Document 31

United States Embassy (New Delhi) Cable, U.S. Public Position on Road toWar, Secret, December 8, 1971, 3 pp.Source: NPMP, NSC Files, Indo-Pak War, Box 572.

Responding to a news story based on Kissinger's backgroundbriefing, Keating argues that many of Kissinger's statements cannot be supported. Specifically, Keating questions Kissinger'sreference to Indian requests for a relief program, the Pakistanioffer of amnesty to Awami Leaguers, and his claim thatWashington has favored autonomy for East Pakistan.

Document 32Event Summary by George H.W. Bush, December 10, 1971, 7 pp.

Source: George Bush Presidential Library. George H.W. Bush Collection. Series: UnitedNations File, 1971-1972, Box 4.

UN Ambassador Bush describes the December 10 meetingbetween Kissinger and the Chinese delegation to the UnitedNations. While discussing the India-Pakistan crisis, Kissingerreveals that the American position on the issue was parallel tothat of the Chinese. Kissinger disclosed that the U.S. would bemoving some ships into the area, and also that military aid wasbeing sent from Jordan, Turkey, and Iran. Some of this aid wasillegally transferred because it was American in origin. Bush


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also reports that Kissinger gives his tacit approval for China toprovide militarily support for Pakistani operations against India.Bush expresses his personal doubts in the administration's "TwoState Departments thing," and takes issue with Kissinger's style,in one instance calling him paranoid and arrogant.

Document 33

NSC List, Courses of Actions Associated with India/Pakistan Crisis , TopSecret/Sensistive, December 8, 1971, 2 pp.

Source: NPMP, Country Files: Middle East, Box 643.

Possible American courses of action with regards to theIndia/Pakistan crisis included notification to China that the U.S.would "look with favor on steps taken" by Beijing to"demonstrate its determination to intervene by force if necessaryto preserve the territorial integrity of West Pakistan to includesubtle assurance the Government of the United States will notstand by should the Soviet Union launch attacks against thePRC."

Document 34Department of State Cable, Pakistan Request for F-104's, Secret, December9, 1971, 2 pp.Source: NPMP, NSC Files, Indo-Pak War, Box 573.

The transfer of F-104 planes to Pakistan from both Jordan andIran is under review at "very high level of USG."

Document 35

Defense Intelligence Agency Intelligence Appraisal, Communist China'sCapability to Support Pakistan, Secret, December 9, 1971, 3 pp.Source: NPMP, NSC Files, Indo-Pak War, Box 572.

The DIA assesses the limits and possibility of Chinese supportto the Pakistanis. It opines that while Chinese support will belimited to political, diplomatic, and propaganda for the timebeing, the PRC could initiate small attacks in the highmountainous areas in the East, and therefore occupy Indiantroops without "provoking Soviet retaliatory moves."

Document 36

Memcon, Huang Ha, T'ang Wen-sheng, Shih Yen-hua, Alexander Haig,Winston Lord, Top Secret/Sensitive, Exclusively Eyes Only, December 12, 1971 (3:50-4:20), 9 pp.

Source: RG 59, PPC S/P, Directors Files (Winston Lord), Box 330.

In a discussion of the India-Pakistan situation, Haig declaresthat the U.S. is doing everything it can do to facilitate transfersof fighter planes and military supplies from Jordan, Iran, andSaudi Arabia to Pakistan.

Document 37

Department of State of Cable, Carrier Deployment in Indian Ocean, Secret,December 14, 1971, 2 pp.Source: NPMP, NSC Files, Indo-Pak War, Box 578


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Indian Ambassador Jha expresses his concern over Americandeployment of a Nuclear Carrier in the Indian ocean.

Document 38Department of State, Situation Report #41, Situation in India-Pakistan as of0700 hours (EST), Secret, December 14, 1971, 4 pp.Source: NPMP, NSC Files, Indo-Pak War, Box 573

The State Department sees the possibility of a ceasefire in the

East; Notes that Eleven Jordanian F-104 fighter aircraft havepossibly been sent to Pakistan.

Document 39

Department of State, Situation Report #44, Situation in India-Pakistan as of0700 hours (EST), Secret, December 15, 1971, 4 pp.Source: NPMP, NSC Files, Indo-Pak War, Box 573

Heavy fighting is turning in favor of the Indians, while cease-fire plans continue to be in the works. A controversy is brewingwith regards over the U.S. decision to send a nuclear carrier intothe Bay of Bengal.

Document 40United States Embassy (Islamabad) Cable, Top Secret/ Exclusive Eyes Only, December 15, 1971, 1 pp.

The present trickle of Mig-19's and F-104's will not hold off theIndians. Handwriting next to Mig-19's notes "China" and next toF-104's notes "Jordan."

Document 41United States Embassy (New Delhi), Cable, Deployment Carrier Task Forcein Indian Ocean, Secret, December 15, 1971, 2 pp.Source: NPMP, NSC Files, Indo-Pak War, Box 573

Keating describes his difficulty in explaining the rationalebehind the deployment of a carrier task force. He also suggeststhat the decision to send the task force into the Indian Ocean hasonly encouraged Yahya to continue the Pakistani military effort.

Document 42

Central Intelligence Agency, Intelligence Memorandum,India-PakistanSituation Report (As of 1200 EST), Top Secret, December 16, 1971, 6 pp.Source: NPMP, May Release, MDR# 4.

India has ordered a unilateral cease fire upon the unconditionalsurrender of West Pakistani forces in East Pakistan. Despite thecease-fire, American officials in Dacca report that "no oneseems to be in effective control of the situation," and thatfighting continues "between Bengalis and scattered"Mujahid/Razakar/West Pakistani elements." Also, in a heavilyexcised paragraph, the CIA reports that a squadron of Americanorigin, Jordanian F-104's was delivered to Pakistan on 13December, despite an American embargo on military supplies toboth India and Pakistan. This embargo includes third party


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transfers of American equipment to either of the parties.

Document 43

Department of State, Cable, Supply of Third Country US Arms to Pakistan,Secret, December 23, 1971, 1 pp.Source: NPMP, NSC Files, Indo-Pak War, Box 575

Secretary Rogers suggests that Keating neither confirm nor denyallegations that the U.S. endorsed Jordanian and Iranian transfer

of American arms to Pakistan.

Document 44

United States Embassy (Tehran), Cable, F-5 Aircraft to Pakistan, Secret,December 29, 1971, 3 pp. Includes DOD cable.Source: NPMP, NSC Files, Indo-Pak War, Box 575

Embassy Iran reports that three F-5A Fighter aircraft, reportedlyfrom the United States, had been flown to Pakistan to assist inthe war efforts against India. A Northrop official matches theaircraft to a group of planes originally slated for sale to Libya,but which were then diverted to USG control in California. This

information suggests that not only did Washington look theother way when Jordan and Iran supplied U.S. planes toPakistan, but that despite the embargo placed on Pakistan, itdirectly supplied Pakistan with fighter planes.

Document 45

National Security Council, Notes, Anderson Papers Material, January 6,1972, 5 pp.Source: NPMP, NSC Files, Country Files: Middle East, Box 643.

The Nixon administration, during the East Pakistan crisisconvened meetings of the Washington Special Action Group(WSAG) to discuss the situation in South Asia. Records of thesemeetings were kept, and somehow leaked to Syndicatedcolumnist Jack Anderson. Anderson's articles, based onclassified WSAG minutes became contentious, not only becausethey quoted from leaked classified material, but also for theirracy content. Kissinger and others in the administration becameupset at Anderson's exposure of White House policies because,among other things, it revealed the tilt towards Pakistan, despitethe genocidal conditions in the East.

Notes

1. Anderson, Jack with George Clifford. The Anderson Papers. (New York:Random House, 1973) 214.

2. Brown, W. Norman. The United States and India, Pakistan, andBangladesh. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972) 217. Other publicestimates of the final death toll range from one to three million.

3. Ganguly, Sumit. Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions since 1947.(New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2001) 61.


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4. Anderson: 215.

5. American military assistance was cutoff to Pakistan following thecommencement of violence in East Pakistan. Then in early December 1971,when the conflict grew to an India-Pakistan war, aid to India was alsosuspended. See documents 23 and29. In the former, Kissinger acknowledgesthat American assistance to Pakistan is forbidden by Congress, whereas inthe latter Harold Saunders observes that "by law," the U.S. "cannotauthorize" any military transfers, including third party transfers, unless theadministration was willing "to change our own policy and provide theequipment directly."

6. Document 8, a cable transmission from Consul General Archer Blood tothe State Department has been very controversial. Known as the "BloodTelegram," its low classification (Limited official use) led to its highdissemination among government officials. The day after it was sent, theState Department reclassified the message as secret, in efforts to limit itsspread. Blood's role in the transmission of this cable has been blamed for hisbeing transferred out of Dacca by the Administration. Kux, Dennis. TheUnited States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies. (Washington,

D.C.: Woodrow Wilson/Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001); Blood,Archer. Oral history interview, Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection.Georgetown University Library, June 1990.

7. SeeNote 5.

8. See Also Burr, William ed. The Kissinger Transcripts. (New York: TheNew Press, 1998); Ganguly, Sumit. Conflict Unending: India-PakistanTensions since 1947. (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2001); Hitchens,Christopher. The Trials of Henry Kissinger. (New York: Verso Books,2001); Sisson, Richard and Leo E. Rose. War and Secession: India, Pakistan,the United States, and the Creation of Bangladesh. (Berkeley: University ofCalifornia Press, 1990); Kissinger, Henry. The White House Years. (Boston:Little Brown and Co., 1979).

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