the tor project
TRANSCRIPT
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The Tor Project
Our mission is to be the global resource for
technology, advocacy, research and
education in the ongoing pursuit of freedom
of speech, privacy rights online, and
censorship circumvention.
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● Online Anonymity– Open Source– Open Network
● Community of researchers, developers, users and relay operators.
● U.S. 501(c)(3) non-pro%t organization
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Estimated 2,000,000+
daily Tor users
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Threat model:what can the attacker do?
Alice
Anonymity networkBob
watch (or be!) Bob!
watch Alice!
Control part of the network!
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Anonymity isn't encryption: Encryption just protects contents.
Alice
Bob
“Hi, Bob!”“Hi, Bob!”<gibberish>
attacker
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Anonymity serves different interests for different user groups.
Anonymity
Private citizens“It's privacy!”
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Anonymity serves different interests for different user groups.
Anonymity
Private citizens
Businesses
“It's network security!”
“It's privacy!”
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Anonymity serves different interests for different user groups.
Anonymity
Private citizens
Governments Businesses
“It's traffic-analysis
resistance!”
“It's network security!”
“It's privacy!”
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Anonymity serves different interests for different user groups.
Anonymity
Private citizens
Governments Businesses
“It's traffic-analysis
resistance!”
“It's network security!”
“It's privacy!”
Human rightsactivists
“It's reachability!”
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The simplest designs use a single relay to hide connections.
Bob2
Bob1
Bob3
Alice2
Alice1
Alice3
Relay
E(Bob3,“X”)
E(Bob1, “Y”)
E(Bob2, “Z”)
“Y”
“Z”
“X”
(example: some commercial proxy providers)
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But a central relay isa single point of failure.
Bob2
Bob1
Bob3
Alice2
Alice1
Alice3
Evil
Relay
E(Bob3,“X”)
E(Bob1, “Y”)
E(Bob2, “Z”)
“Y”
“Z”
“X”
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... or a single point of bypass.
Bob2
Bob1
Bob3
Alice2
Alice1
Alice3
Irrelevant
Relay
E(Bob3,“X”)
E(Bob1, “Y”)
E(Bob2, “Z”)
“Y”
“Z”
“X”
Timing analysis bridges all connections through relay ⇒ An attractive fat target
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Tor's safety comes from diversity
● #1: Diversity of relays. The more relays
we have and the more diverse they are,
the fewer attackers are in a position to do
traffic confirmation. (Research problem:
measuring diversity over time)
● #2: Diversity of users and reasons to use
it. 50000 users in Iran means almost all of
them are normal citizens.
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Transparency for Tor is key
● Open source / free software
● Public design documents and
specifications
● Publicly identified developers
● Not a contradiction:
privacy is about choice!
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But what about bad people?
● Remember the millions of daily users.
● Still a two-edged sword?
● Good people need Tor much more
than bad guys need it.
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Myth #1
● “I heard the Navy wrote Tor
originally, so how can I trust it?”
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Myth #2
● “I heard the NSA runs half the
relays.”
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Myth #3
● “I heard Tor is slow.”
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Myth #4
● “I heard Tor gets most of its money
from the US government.”
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Myth #5
● “I heard 80% of Tor is bad people.”
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Myth #6
● “I shouldn't use Tor, because if I do
the NSA will watch me.”
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Myth #7
● “I heard Tor is broken.”
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Onion Service
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Onion service properties
● Self authenticated
● End-to-end encrypted
● Built-in NAT punching
● Limit surface area
● No need to “exit” from Tor
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About 3%
● <show graph showing that 1gbit/s
is about 3% of Tor's traffic> –
onion services are still in the
“neat toy” stage
● Terbium labs (and others) found
about 7000 useful onion sites
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SecureDrop
https://securedrop.org/directory
Today, 30+ organizations use SecureDrop
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Ricochet
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OnionShare
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Services and Tools
https://help.riseup.net/en/tor#riseups-tor-hidden-services
All Riseup.net services are available using hidden service
... and many others
Package repository
apt-get install apt-tor-transport
http://vwakviie2ienjx6t.onion/
...
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Anonymous updates are awesome
● Evil package repository can't
target you with a bad update,
because they don't know it's you
● Local observer can't learn what
you're updating, so they can't
target you for being out of date
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HS Directory
Hashring
HSDirn
Desc IDrep0
Desc IDrep1
HSDirn+1
HSDirn+2
HSDirn
HSDirn+1
HSDirn+2
Desc ID = H(onion-address | H(time-period | descriptor-cookie | replica))
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New keys => longer onion addresses
nzh3fv6jc6jskki3.onion
From 16 characters:
... to 52 characters:
a1uik0w1gmfq3i5ievxdm9ceu27e88g6o7pe0r,dw9jmntwkdsd.onion
(ed25519 public key base32 encoded)
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Network-wide shared random value
● The six HSDirs for a given onion address
are predictable into the future
● So bad guys can run six relays with just
the right keys to target a specific future
day...to censor it or to measure popularity
● People – we don't know who – were doing
this attack in practice
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Network-wide shared random value
● The solution: make the HSDir mapping
include a communal random value that
everybody agrees about but that nobody
can predict
● The directory authorities pick this value
each day as part of their consensus voting
process
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HSDirs get to learn onion addresses
● The onion service descriptor (which gets
uploaded to the HSDir) includes the
public key for the service (so everybody
can check the signature)
● So you can run relays and discover
otherwise-unpublished onion addresses
● “Threat intelligence” companies have
been trying to do just that
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HSDirs get to learn onion addresses
● The solution: the new cryptosystem has a
cool feature where you can sign the onion
descriptor with a subkey
● So everybody can check the signature but
nobody can learn the main key from the
subkey
● Should finally kill the arms race with
jerks running relays to gather onions
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Rendezvous Single Onion Services
Rendezvous Point
Proposal 260
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OnionBalancehttps://onionbalance.readthedocs.org
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Vanguards (Tor proposal 271)
● Tor clients use a single relay (called a
Guard) for the first hop in all their paths,
to limit exposed surface area
● But there are relatively easy attacks to
learn a user's guard, and for onion
services that can be especially bad.
● Multiple layers of guards protect better
against Sybil+compromise attacks
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Deployment timeline
● HSDir side:
● Client side:
● Service side:
Try it at: <git url coming soon>
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Tor isn't foolproof
● Opsec mistakes
● Browser metadata fingerprints
● Browser exploits
● Traffic analysis
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“Still the King of high secure,
low latency Internet Anonymity”
“There are no contenders for the throne”