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The Transformation ofSingapore's Central Area:From Slums to a GlobalBusiness Hub?Tai-Chee WongPublished online: 19 Aug 2010.

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Planning Practice & Research, Vol. 16, No. 2, pp. 155–170, 2001

PRACTICE FORUM

The Transformation of Singapore’sCentral Area: From Slums to a GlobalBusiness Hub?TAI-CHEE WONG

Introduction

Urban morphological change, particularly ofthe city centre, is a historical process (Carter,1982; Whitehand, 1983), often re� ective ofpolitical and economic priorities and, more re-cently, planning directions. These priorities andplanning directions are respectively in� uencedby prevailing ideological thinking and planningconcepts available at the time. In open soci-eties, the scope and scale of change, however,are strongly associated with the urgency of thedevelopment agenda, subjected to domesticpolicy and international circumstances.

An ex-colony and a strategic entrepot ofBritain in the Far East until its independence in1965, Singapore has since adopted a develop-mental approach to boost its export-led pro-duction system through intensive trade linkswith the developed West. It is the developedcountries that the city-state has been stronglydependent upon for multinational investments,market exports and, to a substantial extent,transfer of technology and workforce upgrad-ing.

During the colonial period, the Central Area,located adjacent to the seaport in the south ofthe island, had a typical colonial downtownpattern of a dualistic character. The scenarioshowed a sharp contrast between a high con-centration of working class living in degener-ated housing conditions in coexistence with asmall number of modern trading and � nancialenterprises (McGee, 1967). At the eve of inde-

pendence in the 1950s, the ruling party, thePeople’s Action Party, had built up its grass-root support through anti-colonial labour move-ments. Party leadership was predominantlycontrolled by an English-educated middle-classelite. In the nation-building process, the forma-tion of a grass-root cum middle-class coalitionpaved the post-independence path towards astrong developmental and modernist approach(Wong, 1999). Ideologically, this approach maybe interpreted as a dual-policy of ‘middle-classprogressive regime’ and ‘regime devoted tolower-class opportunity expansion’ (see Taylor,1998, p. 142). The latter devotion would betranslated subsequently into an array of actionplans, aimed at transforming the habitat of thelower-class workers. In parallel, the middle-class political leadership, conscious of the needto improve general progress of the populaceand justify political mandate and commitments,set off to build a striving Singapore. Thus,elimination of dualism in physical structure inthe Central Area became a priority of theirinitial agenda of action.

Starting with slum clearance, the process ofchange has been dramatic in the subsequentthree decades. Through removal of the inher-ited colonial urban land-use structure and thebuilt form, Singapore has seen functional tran-sition from a low-ordered service-oriented cen-tral place to an increasingly higher-orderedservice centre.

Tai-Chee Wong, National Institute of Education, Nanyang Technological University, 1 NanyangWalk, Singapore 637616, Republic of Singapore. Email: tcwong@nie.edu.sg

0269-7459 Print/1360-0583 On-line/01/020155-16 Ó 2001 Taylor & Francis LtdDOI: 10.1080/02697450120077361

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Transformation of Singapore’s Central Area

Since the early 1990s, globalisation has accel-erated and compelled Singapore to face a newchallenge for an enlarged participation in theincreasingly competitive global marketplace.Widespread use of the internet and other ad-vanced telecommunications between Singaporeand global cities such as New York, London andTokyo has called for a constant adaptation ofthe dynamic capitalist business world. Conse-quently, the new downtown core of Singapore isalso subjected to new challenges which it hasnever encountered before.

The present paper examines Singapore’spost-war transformation of its downtown corefrom a dualistic and ‘traditional’ core into aWestern-modelled new � nancial district. Thepaper also traces the agents of change duringthe period 1945–2000, and discussion is div-ided into four phases, each of which has itsown character. Particular attention is focusedon planning as an endorsing force in matchingthe political will to modernise the Central Area.Finally, in the light of the potentially strongdecentralising and deterritorialising effects ofthe information and communications technol-ogy whose use is on the increase, the feasibilityof the current ambitious downtown expansionplan is investigated.

Process and Agents of Change

As suggested above, political imperatives andconvictions in improvements of material stan-dards of living as a symbol of good governanceare often a key driving force towards changingthe old for the new. Locational patterns of landuse follow logically the economic forces inspatial organisation, including the most stra-tegic points such as the central area of cities.The classical views of Brian Berry, a reputedeconomic geographer, have provided evidenceto support this operational mechanism, usingland value as the common denominator andbased on transport and telecommunicationstechnology of the immediate post-war era (seeMurphy et al., 1955; Garner, 1967).

In Singapore, the rise to power of an elitegroup of Western-trained Singaporeans in thelate 1950s imprinted the start of implemen-tation of a modern Singapore. The planningbackdrop was, however, designed by a United

Nations (UN) mission providing technical as-sistance to newly independent nations againstpoverty and deprivation (UN, 1962), as a cold-war strategy led by the US to counter the Sovietexpansion. Administered under the UN Econ-omic and Social Council, the mission’s key taskwas to help national governments to incorpor-ate low-cost housing, urban and basic com-munity development programmes. In the early1960s in Asia and the Far East, 40% of theurban population and 50% of the rural popu-lation were found to be inadequately housed,“living in unsanitary and overcrowded condi-tions … [their] economic, social and physicaldevelopment need to be developed comprehen-sively and in an integrated way” (UN, 1962,pp. 11–12). Among the UN experts, a promi-nent � gure who later led a multinational teamto examine Singapore’s central-area slums wasCharles Abrams.1 His recommendations wereto have strong repercussions in subsequentyears in the redevelopment of Singapore’sdowntown slums (see Abrams et al., 1963).

In parallel with the urban renewal introducedby the UN, the newly independent nation-state’s heavy involvement was decisive, and itsactions were demonstrated in two areas. The� rst, classi� ed as market critical, aimed at cor-recting market inef� ciencies inherited from theBritish colonial economy characterised by alarge low-level productive informal sector,highly concentrated in the Central Area. Thesecond was targeted at physical transformation,using planning as a vehicle to address the‘derelict’ areas or slums marginally but posi-tively attached to the world economy (Gold-blum, 1998; Taylor, 1998). These two coursesof action went hand in hand with the large-scale, multinational corporation-led industrialdevelopment, modernisation of the administrat-ive system and infrastructure provision fromthe mid 1960s, laying a foundation in upliftingSingapore to become a newly industrialisingeconomy in East Asia in the 1980s.

Phase 1: Prelude to Urban Renewal, 1945–

1959

Well before the outbreak of World War II, theCentral Area was a congested core most visiblewith ‘coolies’, petty traders who were inter-

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twined with a small number of white-collaremployees working in more dominatinggovernment buildings, banks, trading agenciesand merchant houses. The phase 1945–1959was a transitional period characterised by pol-itical unrest and a practically inactive colonialgovernment under pressure for the transfer ofpolitical power to local elites.

Dilapidated Housing Stock

Little was done to the dilapidated housing stockin the Central Area inherited from World WarII, which had worsened for lack of maintenanceand an expansion of the slums. In 1947, out ofSingapore’s population of 938 000, 700 000were living in the municipal area of about 8100hectares with 38 440 buildings. Extensivesquatter settlements were characterised by “nosanitation, water or any of the elementaryhealth facilities. [Many people] lived in hutsmade of attap,2 old wooden boxes, rusty corru-gated iron sheets and other such salvage ma-terial” (Housing and Development Board(HDB), 1963, pp. 2–3).

However, the Rent Control Act of 1947,which aimed to protect tenants from exorbitantlandlords and to secure social stability, had alsoprevented landlords from improving theirproperties.3 Population densities in certainquarters were so high that overcrowding hadthreatened the health of the residents. In thetwo- to three-storey shophouses of residentialblocks, population densities reached between1220 and 1700 people per hectare (Urban Re-development Authority (URA), 1989, pp. 10–

11). Such overcrowding was a consequence ofsubletting by tenants or landlords who parti-tioned living space into cubicles for rent tolow-income households. To save living ex-penses, a whole family might then be living ina cubicle smaller than 10 square metres. Spacefor laundry, cooking and dish washing wasshared outside the cubicles. Hawking and pettytrading were a main source of simple livelihoodand apparently the only outlet for many whohad little skill and savings.

Under colonial rule, housing for the publicwas basically a ‘private affair’. The SingaporeImprovement Trust (SIT), which was formedin 1927, had a limited role focused on the

control of land subdivision, land and buildinguse, and sanitary improvement. It had no statu-tory powers of a general housing authority,but concentrated its tasks, for example reclaim-ing swampland to eliminate mosquito breed-ing. Among the limited numbers of publicresidential blocks it built, there was a provisionof backlanes to give rear access to buildingsfor installation of modern sanitary facilitiesand garbage clearance and other maintenancepurposes (Singapore Improvement Trust,1958).

Master Plan Preparation

Although little attention was given to publichousing, the 1950s saw a preparatory effort fora major planned development by use of a mas-ter plan. It is argued that colonial administratorsmight not be visionary enough to look after thelong-term interests of colonies; they nonethe-less followed courses of action initiated andexercised back home. Physical land-use plan-ning was atypical in Singapore.

With the start of the Cold War and thecoming into power of the Labour Governmentin Britain in the late 1940s, the welfare ofcolonies received slightly more attention. Forpractising planners, colonised territories weretesting grounds of new planning concepts fromhome to abroad (see Bristow, 2000, p. 139).Overcrowding in Singapore’s Central Areawas no doubt seen as a human plight thatneeded improvement, and an island-wide mas-ter plan was conceived as necessary for a moresystematic growth and development. Undersuch circumstances, and devoid of a planningauthority, the humble SIT was required underthe Singapore Improvement Ordinance inJanuary 1952 to form a Preliminary IslandPlan team to conduct a diagnostic survey forthe � rst master plan to guide future develop-ment.

For the Central Area, a detailed survey wascarried out to record the structural conditions ofbuildings and their materials, existing land useand population density. The objective was pri-marily to identify areas (570 hectares) neededfor redevelopment, which involved 142 000residents or 45% of the population in the Cen-tral Area.

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Outside the Central Area, self-containedcommunities were planned in the suburbs, sup-plemented by shopping areas, schools and rec-reational space. Conceptually, in keeping muchof the island as rural areas, the PreliminaryIsland Plan had retained the classical pre-warcore–periphery relationship where industry wasnot to become a major employer of workforcein the colonies. It may be also argued that theteam found little evidence that massive indus-trialisation, which required the support of alarge-scale capital formation, and technical andmanagement training of the local workforce,was available in Singapore to cope with suchgrowth. Consequently, the Diagnostic SurveyTeam drafted a plan which emphasised self-support in food supply to ‘its fullest extent’, soas to cut down food import and as a means toabsorb surplus labour (Colony of Singapore,1952, pp. 32–36).

The Preliminary Island Plan was drafted by agroup of colonial of� cers whose role was not toproduce a blueprint for an emerging nationstate. The Preliminary Island Plan, submittedas a draft plan in 1955, rejected tall buildingsfor cost considerations and its liability ingenerating car traf� c congestion. This viewwas discarded in 1958 when the master planwas formally adopted as a guiding plan forland-use development. The plan had, however,reinforced the zoning concept introduced inthe 1920s (see Yeoh, 1996), in consideration ofa possible traf� c congestion in the CentralArea.

Phase 2: The Early Stage of Urban Renewal,1960–1970

This phase marks the beginning of the Singa-pore self-government’s highly interventionistapproach in 1959 which replaced the laissez-faire attitude of the colonial government (Teo& Savage, 1991, p. 327). Following this, theHDB was created in 1960 to replace the SITand to assume the state’s role as the mainpublic housing developer. With a tight sched-ule, the HDB’s option for a comprehensiveredevelopment was perceived administrativelyas an effective means of regeneration of hous-ing stock, equipped with more updated, easy-to-manage facilities.4

In need of medium- to long-term planningstrategies, a Planning Department was set upunder the direct jurisdiction of the Prime Minis-ter’s Of� ce in February 1960 to oversee island-wide planning matters.5 Replacing theSingapore Improvement Ordinance of the col-onial government, the Planning Departmenttook over all of the planning role previouslyassumed by the Singapore Improvement Trust(Ministry of National Development (MND),1963). The HDB’s � rst task was to begin withthe Central Area through a series of renewaland resettlement programmes.

Urban Renewal in Concept and Action

Urban renewal was seen as a post-war modern-ist idea and one of the mainstream urban plan-ning concepts of progressive change (Oc &Tiesdell, 1997). Moreover, it was a socialhousing reform for the urban poor, involving adrastic transformation of the built form. Thepost-war clearance of residential slums waspartly argued on the grounds of their structuraldegeneration, vulnerability to � re and healthhazards, and other negative externalities suchas environmental pollution. More importantly,it arose from their functional obsolescence, andtheir weaknesses in responding to the chal-lenges of a modern city epitomised in therevaluation of prime lands, with pro� t maximi-sation being the yardstick of city performance(Sim, 1982; Smith et al., 1991). In ef� ciencyand modernist terms, comprehensive redevel-opment was a preferred action to cut downdelay of deliverables, rather than rehabilitationmeasures. Correspondingly, more modern andhigher-density, higher-rent-paying buildingsmatching the rising land values justi� ed thereplacement of lower-density shophousesand slums. The pre-war two- to three-storeyshophouses and low-value shelters were thusseen as an obstacle to progress and economicef� ciency in the government’s attempts toexploit functionally and rationally new oppor-tunities that a modern city could offer andproblems that it could solve (Jensen-Butler& van Weesep, 1997; Oc & Tiesdell, 1997,p. 6).

Hence, slum clearance became a direct res-ponse to accommodate the new user demand

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with a more functional built form. The userdemand was a representation of internationaland regional central-area market values inwhich the agents of spatial change includedSingapore’s pro� t-oriented government-linkedcompanies, local private developers and inter-national investors. The redevelopment of theCentral Area in the 1960s was accompanied bya two-pronged strategy in line with the newlyset up Economic Development Board’s indus-trialisation objectives. First, dispersal was aforce of change symbolising opportunities forbetter quality of housing and improved pro-vision of basic social services to the populace.There was a need to decentralise the over-crowded population in the city centre closerto newly planned industrial estates in Jurongand other smaller light industrial estatesadjoining the outlying new towns. The renewalwas perceived not as an action in isolationbut as having “an island-wide scale … andbe integrated with housing, trade, and indus-trial development programmes” (URA, 1989,p. 13).

In the Central Area itself, attention was fo-cused on transforming the largely low-skilled,labour-intensive sectors through intensi� cationof commercial and business activities. The pro-cess was expedited following the adoption ofthe export-oriented strategy when Singaporebecame an independent city-state in 1965 afterlosing Malaysia as its hinterland for manufac-ture exports. Slum clearance became stronglyjusti� able under the circumstance of economicsurvival dependent on trade and multinationalinvestments to create jobs badly needed to � ghtthe double-digit unemployment rates of thetime (Lee, 2000).

Under the HDB, clearance was executed byits Lands Department, assisted by its Buildingand Resettlement Departments. The � rstHDB’s 5-Year Plan (1960–1965) put up anestimate that a quarter of a million inhabitantsin Chinatown, part of the Central Area, wouldrequire immediate rehousing. A quarter of amillion in degenerated housing areas fromTelok Blangah in the west to Geylang Geraiin the east would be gradually rehoused. Afurther quarter million living at the fringes ofthe Central Area would be resettled in a num-ber of phases (Teo & Savage, 1991). Only a

small proportion of the households would beresettled within the HDB estates within theCentral Area; the ‘surplus population’ wouldbe shifted to outlying areas in self-sustainednew towns. Small industries, almost all family-based, were offered resettlement sites whenthey had to be cleared for redevelopment. Newindustrial sites in Redhill and Tanglin HaltIndustrial Estate, Alexandra Industrial Estate,at Leng Kee Road, Bendemeer Road, Kam-pong Empat and Kallang Reclamation site,Tanjong Rhu and Toa Payoh were used toresettle affected small industries (HDB, 1963,pp. 26–27).

Land acquisition, a facilitator and catalyst inurban change, began with the setting up of theUrban Renewal Unit in 1964 as part of theHDB. This unit was upgraded in 1966 to be-come a more powerful Urban Renewal Depart-ment (URD) in acquiring private lands,following the amendment of the colonialgovernment’s Land Acquisition Act that year.The URD undertook two pilot projects on statelands at the peripheral precincts of the CentralArea, known as North 1 and South 1, to resettlefamilies affected by clearance in the heart ofthe Central Area.

The 1947 Rent Control Act

As stated earlier, the Rent Control Act wasintroduced by the colonial government in theimmediate post-war era to protect tenants at atime of severe housing shortage. Thus, theurban renewal in the Central Area would beineffective unless landlords were motivated toredevelop their land parcels and subsequentlymaintain the premises. Further to the 1961amendment of the act, the Singapore govern-ment adopted a new Control Premises (SpecialProvision) Act in 1969. The new act allowedlandlords to terminate tenancy and repossesstheir property in areas identi� ed by the Minis-try of National Development. In return for theincentive given, however, landlords had to sub-mit plans for areas for redevelopment for ap-proval. The rent decontrol provided incentivesto business interests in the Central Area, andwas a prelude to a new phase of developmentforwarded by a more ambitious Concept Plan

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prepared with the assistance of another UNteam.

From the 1958 Master Plan to the 1971 Con-cept Plan

The 1958 Master Plan prepared by the colonialgovernment was largely rejected by both theUN team6 and the Singapore government. Thelatter wished to pursue a drastic transformationrather than conserve much of the colonial past.The 1958 Master Plan did see the need for acomprehensive redevelopment of the CentralArea (MND, 1963, p. 5), but was overall per-ceived as lacking vision by projecting Singa-pore as a medium-sized city surrounded by arestrictive green belt around its most dynamicCentral Area. The UN consultants Abrams,Kobe and Koenigsberger (1963, pp. 57–58)criticised it as out of date, inappropriate for amodern metropolis with a rapid growth of cars.Both parties agreed that a series of actionprogrammes were needed to expedite its indus-trialisation programme and that strong supportof the � nancing system was required. Anef� ciently run business and � nancial districtwas seen as crucial for attracting foreign capitaland mobilising local savings. This � nancialdistrict was ideally to be built on the basis ofthe existing infrastructure in the Central Areaaround Shenton Way, Raf� es Place and CecilStreet.

The UN team had con� dence that Singapore,given its dynamics, would grow rapidly botheconomically and demographically. Too rapidpopulation growth was, however, their worry,as a high dependency ratio would cancel offavailable resources needed to support economicgrowth (Abrams et al., 1963). Singapore’s sep-aration from Malaysia in 1965 proved a ‘bless-ing in disguise’ in terms of urban planning inlater years (Chua, 1996, p. 208). It made slumclearance an easier task because expansion ofslums, a common phenomenon in Third-Worldprimate cities where rural–urban migrationmakes control almost impossible, had beenavoided in Singapore.

In September 1967, the Singapore govern-ment signed a Plan of Operation with the UN toprepare a comprehensive long-range island-wide Concept Plan. Under this State and City

Planning Project, a UN team was sent to workwith local counterparts seconded from the Plan-ning Department, the Public Works Departmentand the HDB. In 1969, the State and CityPlanning Project produced a Ring Concept Planlinking functionally the whole island by a densenetwork of communication lines between newtowns, as well as other active sectors such asthe Jurong Industrial Site in the west. A sub-project was formed in May 1970 to studydetailed planning of the Central Area as anextension of their island-wide planning work.This Central Area Sub-Project was, however,attached to the Urban Renewal Department ofthe HDB. The Central Area Concept Plan, alsoknown as Structural Concept Plan, focused onthe distribution of different activities such ascommunication lines, government services andcommerce and banking which were planned ascentral activities (MND, 1970, pp. 19–27). TheConcept Plan, adopted by the government inApril 1971, was to produce longstanding im-pacts on land-use development in Singapore.

Phase 3: Concept Plan Implementation—Urban Redevelopment 1971–1990

The approval of the Concept Plan in 1971provided a legal blueprint, paving the way for asteadily planned redevelopment of the CentralArea. The state’s role shifted from beingstrongly regulatory to that of a law enforcementagency but occasionally mediator in the pursuitof a world-class Central Business District(CBD). The URD’s renewal activities rose overthe subsequent years to cover the developmentand management of the commercial propertiesin the Central Area. In 1974, the URD wasdetached from the HDB to become the UrbanRedevelopment Authority, an autonomousstatutory board under the Ministry of NationalDevelopment. By the mid 1970s, followinglarge-scale resettlement and the erection ofpublic housing and higher-income private resi-dential blocks as well as retail and of� ce prem-ises, the Central Area’s population had declinedrapidly. Concomitant with this, the incorpora-tion of higher-value-added business-related ac-tivities saw at the same time resettlement ofindustries and warehousing from the Central

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Area to the Jurong industrial zone and otherlight industrial estates adjacent to HDB newtowns.

Higher environmental standards were intro-duced, for example the greenery concept wasinfused in the resettlement process. Sizeabletracts of open space were incorporated in theCentral Area as a softener and harmoniser inthe midst of tall concrete blocks, whether inresidential or in of� ce areas7 (URA, 1976/1977,p. 32).

The most drastic changes occurred in theGolden Shoe area, where the � nancial andbanking sector was most concentrated. In ad-dition to the 1969 Control of Premises (SpecialProvision Act) which replaced the 1947 Controlof Rent Premises Act and had given privatelandowners incentives to redevelop their lands,the Golden Shoe area was further allowed in1979 to redevelop in an anticipation of risingdemand for of� ce space. The results were posi-tive. Developments took place at Raf� es Place,Cecil Street, Robinson Road and Shenton Way.Landmark buildings in these areas, such as theChartered Banking Building, Overseas UnionBank Centre, Treasury Building, MonetaryAuthority of Singapore Headquarters Building,Raf� es City, Marina Centre, etc. were erected.The Orchard Road Corridor was turned into amain tourist and shopping district. Aestheticand architectural norms were applied as ameans of redevelopment control to ensure a“systematic approach to beautify the urban en-vironment and promote a more gracious lifestyle” (URA, 1983/1984, p. 3).

This phase also saw land reclamation com-pleted at the Marina Centre and Marina South.At the end of 1983, 17 hectares of land at theMarina Centre were sold by the URA throughits Sale of Sites Programme to build a largehotel, shopping complexes and convention fa-cilities. By 1984, the Central Area had trans-formed itself into an area which wascompletely different from that of the 1960s. Inthe words of the URA chairman, Kor CherSiang, the Central Area had become a placewhere Singaporeans

eat in clean and hygienic cookedfood centres, shop in modern com-plexes, relax in landscaped gardens

and walk along tree-lined pedes-trian malls segregated from heavyvehicular traf� c. They go to workin modern, well-designed of� cebuildings and park their cars inmulti-storey stations in CentralArea. A decade ago, all these de-velopments were almost non-exis-tent. (URA, 1983/1984, p. 2)

Concept Plan Implementation

In 1982, the Planning Department completed aComprehensive Land and Building Use Surveycovering the whole island. The survey showsthat substantial change had occurred in theisland-wide land-use distribution as a result ofrapid industrialisation over the period 1967–

1982, as detailed in Table 1.Table 1 shows that sustained economic de-

velopment and expansion of the HDB newtowns had required more road construction andother related facilities which had used up sub-stantial amounts of land, including areas previ-ously under agriculture and natural habitat.There was, however, a low 16% of additionalland-take for housing and this was attributed tothe construction of high-rise HDB apartments,despite a large relocation of population fromthe Central Area and population growth.

The survey also completed a permissible plotratios8 study for the Central Area, which pro-vided a basis for further intensi� cation of build-ing land use. In sites less restricted by technicalheight clearance, a higher plot ratio was al-lowed. Buffer-zone guidelines were introducedfor the Central Area in early 1983. Sea adjacentto the Central Area was substantially reclaimedduring this phase, including Marina East andMarina South, as extended land parcels of theCentral Area for future expansion.

Conservation

Although recognised as an indispensable el-ement in the Concept Plan of 1971, conser-vation measures only became effective after theearly 1980s, statutorily institutionalised in 1989with a Conservation Master Plan for action(URA, 1993). Extensive redevelopment under-taken in the last three decades has raised the

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TABLE 1 Land-use change in Singapore, 1967–1982

1967 1982 PercentageMain land-use categories land area (ha) land area (ha) change

Residential 7485 8715 1 16.5Industrial 730 3345 1 359.4Transportation 2655 7455 1 180.8Swamp/water/ 8350 5930 2 29.0

wooded areaAgricultural 14 280 8100 2 43.3Vacant (including under 9385 9320 2 0.7

clearance)

Note: Figures are rounded to the nearest 5. Source: MND (1983, p. 4).

ated in the Central Area Development GuidePlan (DGP) to search and restore the traditionaltraits in potential sites. Conserved structures arepredominantly traditional two- to three-storeyshophouses and selected institutional buildingswith unique architecture, enriching local his-torical and cultural heritage (MND, 1989;URA, 1991a; Boey, 1998; Keung, 1998).Conservation guidelines were revised in 1996to give owners more leeway and � exibilityin readapting old buildings to new uses, andinnovative restoration was encouraged to helpcreate more localised character in conservedsites.

Concept Plan Revision

Following the master plan update in 1985, theMinistry of National Development in 1987moved on to revise the island-wide ConceptPlan in a substantive and comprehensive man-ner. Much attention was focused on the CentralArea, where commercial developments consist-ing of of� ces, shops and hotels were highlyconcentrated and had been growing steadilysince 1970 following large-scale land acquisi-tions, slum or squatter clearance and land recla-mation.9

Rapid changes in redistribution of the popu-lation, and economic and technological devel-opment, such as the provision of a public transitsystem (MRT) and highways island-wide, havecalled for changes in planning concepts and

material quality of life but certain features ofthe ‘good old days’ have been permanently lostin the Central Area, such as the thriving anddynamic nightlife in the open air of the 1950sand 1960s. These losses have been compen-sated by other gains, such as cleaner streets anddrains, and more hygienic living and rec-reational space. But what has been lost, such asthe local street culture, old-established com-munities and traditional lifestyles, is not recov-erable (The Straits Times, 1998; Dale, 1999).The current conservation of a limited numberof pre-war buildings constitutes a socialcompromise to make up for the loss of culturaland distinctive Asian identity and character as aresult of large-scale renewal and fast-changinglandscape in the downtown area.

Learning from this experience, conservationhas now been perceived as an integral compo-nent of urban planning in providing “a sense ofhistory, a memory of place, an identity and asoul to the city” (URA, 1993, p. 6). Greatefforts are, however, needed to make the newand the old compatible in the physical land-scape, yet minimise opportunity costs in theprime Central Area.

The conservation of entire historic districts,such as the ethnic enclaves of Chinatown, LittleIndia and Kampung Glam, and the EmeraldHill Areas, Singapore River and the HeritageLinks in 1989, which cover 4% of the CentralArea and a total of 260 hectares, is symbolic ofsuch efforts. Action plans have been incorpor-

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strategies in the provision of commercial andof� ce space, and their locations. For example,appropriate facilities have to be provided at ashorter distance from consumers who live inthe new towns. In the hierarchy of services, itwas conceived that the Central Area shouldoverwhelmingly maintain the top of the hier-archy. Service decentralisation to outside theCentral Area would be concentrated at the des-ignated regional, subregional and fringe centresand other MRT station sites (Commerce Sub-Committee, 1988). Where state-owned vacantsites were available, their release for privatecommercial developments would follow theconceived strategies, and market demand.

In September 1989, the URA merged withthe MND’s Planning Department and Researchand Statistics unit to become a new URA, astatutory board as the national planning andconservation authority. The new authority as-sumed in a more effective manner the compre-hensive and integrated planning for the wholeisland. Its role was to enhance Singapore’simage as a world city, and in particularrevise comprehensively the 1971 Concept Planwith the following objectives (MND, 1989,pp. 14–15):

· to increase the island’s land stock throughreclamation;

· to provide a greater variety of housing tomeet greater expectations of the population;

· to decentralise commercial activities to re-gional centres;

· to provide more housing, especially qualityhousing in the Central Area;

· to provide more amenities and schools inresidential areas;

· to upgrade parks, green space and waterfrontbodies to enhance the quality of recreationalareas.

The Concept Plan revision, being strategic andconceptual in character, was accompanied bystudy of DGPs as a local planning tool. Each ofthe 55 DGP areas de� ned for the island willhave clear indications as to its land use andintensity controls according to the principleslaid down in the Concept Plan, such as anoptimal mix of land uses, a balanced variety ofhousing, communal and recreational facilities,an ef� cient transport network at local level and

commercial activities, by a hierarchical orderbased on the national decentralisation policy(Prasad, 1998, p. 17).

The revised Concept Plan was approved bythe Singapore Cabinet in 1991. Since then, thisdeepened stage of urban development has beeninfused with environmental and economic sus-tainability ideas in an attempt to make the CBDone of Asia’s dynamic and key � nancial hubsas well as an attractive place for quality living.

Phase 4: Post-Revised Concept Plan, After1991

By the 1990s, Singapore as a city ranked fourthin foreign exchange market size after London,New York and Tokyo, and is now one of thekey international � nancial centres, handling an-nually over US$500 billion of Asian dollars(Lee, 2000, p. 19). However, rising operatingcosts, land limitations and the need to build itsown multinational corporations in order to en-hance corporate competition in the internationalmarketplace have all exerted pressure on Singa-pore to move towards a new stage of develop-ment. This is characterised by a regionalisationdrive through exporting investment capital andmanagement expertise to selected countries inAsia. Back home, a greater emphasis has beenplaced on strengthening Singapore’s position asa regional, if not global, � nancial hub for inter-national business and headquarters in prep-aration for the knowledge economy.

In this new challenge, it is considered that ahigh-quality and gracious living environment isneeded to support the new globalisation chal-lenge, where attracting internationally sought-after talent and capital will be a crucial factorof sustained success. In line with this pursuit,the URA is committed to ensure an adequatesupply of commercial space in the key businessareas, especially the new downtown core (Tan,1999, p. 145).

The New Downtown Core

For the island city-state of Singapore with anarea of only 640 square kilometres, geographicdispersal of CBD activities will be restricted tothe outlying new towns. Further spill-over toneighbouring Malaysia and Indonesia is less

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FIGURE 1. CBD zone structure plan, year 2000. Source: URA (1991b).

probable, given Singapore’s current strong link-ages with the developed West and the nature ofits export-led development strategy reliant onthe whole world as its marketplace rather thanits neighbouring countries.

The new downtown core will comprise theexisting Golden Shoe and the new reclaimedland of Marina South further south, covering anadditional area of 360 hectares. In the revisedConcept Plan, the extended Marina South hasbeen planned in four stages, Years 2000, 2010,2030 and X,10 each stage having a greater landarea put to productive use (see Figures 1, 2, 3and 4). The three key objectives are to: (a) meetfuture needs for commercial space; (b) create avibrant hub for entertainment and cultural activi-ties, functionally linked with the existing CBD;and (c) accommodate a sizeable number of qual-ity apartment blocks in support of a lively anddynamic night life. In design, the commercialcum residential environment will be accessibleby mass transit integrated with a more pedes-

trian-friendlyatmosphere, ample open space anda thin green belt along the coastline (URA, 1992,pp. 7–8; 1996/1997, p. 15).

By Year X, when Singapore’s populationreaches 4 million, the new downtown core(Golden Shoe plus Marina South) will supplya total commercial � oor area which hasincreased from the present 2.1 million to6.1 million square metres. Of the latter, 2.8million will come from Marina South, where26 000 quality apartment units will also bebuilt. In the URA’s ambitious statement,the new downtown core will be “a truly inte-grated working, living and recreational areawith an ef� cient transportation network andall weather pedestrian linkages” (URA,1996, p. 4). This ambitious plan has called fora re-examination of whether there will be aneed for a high concentration of commercialactivities in the 21st century, in an age ofaccelerated use of information and telecommu-nications technology (ICT).

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FIGURE 2. CBD zone structue plan, year 2010. Source: URA (1991b).

Singapore’s New City Centre in the Globalisa-tion Era

With globalisation and widespread use of infor-mation technology being intensi� ed in the 21stcentury, Singapore, as a potential global city ingeneral and a business core in particular, isexpected to experience greater competition attwo levels. The � rst is the international orinter-city level, where it has to compete withother key centres in the Asian Paci� c such asHong Kong, Taipei, Shanghai, Beijing andSydney for a place as a � nancial hub. Globalcompetition between cities today is largelybased on market dominance in the form of� nancial transactions, commodity exchangesand provision of highly specialised services(Jensen-Butler & van Weesep, 1997).

The second level of competition is the levelof intra-city competition between Singapore’sCentral Area and its self-contained outlyingnew towns. The issue is whether the CentralArea could maintain its lead against decentral-ising and deterritorialising forces attributable to

the increasingly expanding use of ICT in theglobal city network, which is tending to drainits resources in favour of the outlying sub-cen-tres. Already in the last three decades, higher-level retail services have contracted anddispersed out of the Central Area. Except forbanking and � nancial services, the vitality ofthe Central Area has since declined as a resultof population loss and a high concentration ofaged residents with weak spending power.11

There is no certainty as to how the future ofSingapore’s city core will actually develop,even though the CBD has been structurallyplanned in the long term. It is generally be-lieved that, on the basis of time–space conver-gence, great advancements in transportinfrastructure and ICT in business, institutionaland household contacts will favour greater dis-persal and working from home (Wong, 1996;Short & Kim, 1999).

Despite dispersal of economic activities, theincreasing global integration has favouredworld cities of great dominance. Cities

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FIGURE 3. CBD zone structure plan, year 2030. Source: URA (1991b).

equipped with ef� cient conventional infrastruc-ture will still enjoy a rightful competitive edge.According to Sassen, these cities will “functionas command points in the organization of theworld economy; as key locations and market-place for the leading industries … and as sitesfor the production of innovations in those in-dustries” (1998, p. 134). Logically, an individ-ual city’s centrality index corresponds with itseffectiveness of agglomeration economies aswell as the dynamics of specialised functions inmost up-to-date � nancial and corporate ser-vices. Sassen (1995, 1998, 1999) further assertsthat the more globalised the economy becomes,the greater the agglomeration effects that thecentral positions will produce in global cities.

This new form of centralisation of top-levelmanagement and activities would act as a newcentral place conducting globally integrated op-erations. The centrality of a globally in� uentialCentral Area will be underlain by a spatialdimension characterised by a strong embedded-ness of information � ow, a highly interactivehub of business and non-business activities.This implies that much of these high-level ac-tivities would occur in the CBD, whose role islikely to continue to be important.

In summary, the CBD is likely to remain asa key nodal point for face-to-face businessinteractions, particularly for decision makingand energy conservation, and as a lively corearea if young middle classes are attracted tolive there. But the form of centrality enjoyed bythe conventional CBD will be reshaped by theimpacts of digital highways linking major citiesas nodal points. These points will be wellconnected in the form of cross-national urbansystems in the realm of a wired regional orglobal village. Their intensity of linkage willcorrespond with the extent of interdependencyin global trade or other selected exchanges(Brunn, 1992; Knox, 1994). Each urban systemis expected to remain hierarchical, and an indi-vidual city’s position in the system will bedictated by its organisational power, its� nancial power, its capability to provide veryspecialised goods and services, and its attrac-tiveness to key multinational corporations forestablishing headquarters and to internationalorganisations for convening conferences, exhi-bitions, etc.

Finally, quite unique to Singapore, which isa city-state and a territorialised institution, theCBD stands out visibly as a centre of economic

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FIGURE 4. CBD zone structure plan, year X. Source: URA (1991b).

diffusion of Western urban planning ideasmade implementable through the contributionsof UN experts with the support of local coun-terparts’ commitment and hard work. Thechange has been guided by a series of plans, themost signi� cant of these being the 1971 Con-cept Plan. The sustained economic growth ofthe 1970s and the 1980s generated new aspira-tions for better material comfort (more cars,better and larger housing units and improvedquality of life, etc.), and this called for a com-prehensive revision of the Concept Plan in thelate 1980s. The revised Concept Plan has linkedthe enhancement of quality of life directly witheconomic growth, linked increasingly with theglobalising marketplace in which Singapore hasbeen strongly integrated.

Globalisation and intensi� ed use of ICT,however, have cast doubt on the future role ofthe CBD. It is widely believed that the CBD islikely to stay as a central place for businessinteractions and specialised goods and services,despite the decentralising functions exerted byadvanced technology. More important for Sin-gapore, the CBD is a representation of econ-omic power upon which it relies for itscontinued prosperity and ascent to the status ofglobal city.

power, based on which it operates and assertsits in� uence on the neighbouring regions. As aglobal city in transition, the city-state mustdemonstrate its ability to attract and controlmultinational corporations, acting as deterritori-alising institutions and knowing no borders, ina de� ned and speci� ed territory. If it fails to dothis, the global city status will be at stake.

Concluding Remarks

Physical development in the Central Area ofSingapore over the last four decades hasdemonstrated radical transformation of a� nancial heartland, as a result of the modernis-ation efforts of a newly independent city-state.From a dualistic and congested downtown core� lled with dilapidated housing, the CentralArea has transformed itself into an ef� cientmodern � nancial district comparable to anyeminent Western city.

At the expense of cultural heritage and tra-ditional lifestyle, the transformation has been aprocess of social change underlain by a strongpolitical will based on a middle-class cumgrass-root alliance in pursuit of city imageenhancement and material progress. Comple-mented by a continuity of planning and im-plementation, the evolution is also a process of

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Acknowledgements

The author wishes to thank the Academic Re-search Fund, National Institute of Education,Nanyang Technological University, Singapore,for the grant (RP14/96WTC), and Mr AdrielYap for his assistance in preparing the maps.

Notes

1. Professor of Department of City Planning, Mas-sachusetts Institute of Technology, Boston, MA.

2. Roof material made of coconut leaves. It was acheap, locally available material commonly usedin traditional Malay settlements.

3. Under the 1947 Rent Control Act, landlords werenot allowed to collect rentals higher than the 1939level, and repossessions by landlords were highlyrestricted.

4. Britain’s post-war Abercrombie regional strategyhad had spill-over effects to its colonies. The strat-egy led to the passing of a comprehensive system ofcontrol, the Town and Country Planning Act of1947, which favoured population dispersal throughslum clearance and creation of self-contained newtowns outside the city area (Gibson & Landstaff,1982, pp. 26–27). In Singapore, the building of newtowns in outlying zones by the HDB in the early1960s was practically a dispersal of over-congestedpopulation from the Central Area accompanied bycomprehensive urban renewal programmes.

5. Under the new Planning Ordinance, a Chief Plan-ner was appointed as the chief land-use controllerand implementer of land-use policies, as laiddown in the master plan. He also chairs themonthly-held master plan committee meetings re-lating to state land allocations, with the involve-ment of representatives from other relevantgovernment departments and statutory boards.

6. The UN team was led by Charles Abrams,Susumu Kobe and Otto Koenigsberger.

7. In 1976, under the URA’s new norm of open-space provision, the standard was increased from0.3 ha per 1000 people to 0.6 ha per 1000 people.

8. The ratio of � oor area to land area. For example,the plot ratio of the Golden Shoe area ranges from5 to 10 (highest in the island), meaning that thetotal � oor area is allowed to be 5 to 10 times thatof the land parcel proposed for development.

9. In 1982, for instance, the Central Area provided53% of the total commercial � oor space (8.8 millionsquare metres), and 71, 37 and 56% of the island’sof� ce, shopping and hotel � oor space respectively.

10. Year X is an unknown year when the populationreaches the ultimate optimal capacity of 4 million.The current population is 3.5 million.

11. The last 30 years have witnessed a gradual ex-odus of young couples leaving for outlying newtowns to form nuclear families as soon as theybecame eligible under Singapore’s home owner-ship scheme for an HDB apartment. The schemeis supported by a forced saving system known asthe Central Provident Fund, towards which bothemployer and employee have to contribute a � xedpercentage of the salary.

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