the turkish referendum: democratic consolidation or political conflict?

8/8/2019 The Turkish Referendum: Democratic Consolidation or Political Conflict?

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Summary: The campaign under-

way before the Turkish referen-

dum on constitutional amend-

ments has been intense. While

the results of the referendum will

have important implications for

the powers of the presidency and

the make up of the Constitutional

Court, the struggle between thegovernment and the opposition

is not about defending or op-

posing the current constitution.

It may be considered a struggle

between different versions of a

“Good Society” as envisioned by

different political forces. Turkey

is experiencing a legitimacy crisis

whereby the secular credentials

of the AKP are called into ques-

tion by the opposition on the one

hand, while the conservatives,

the AKP elite included, question the commitment of the opposi-

tion parties to civilian supremacy

over the military command on the

other. A kulturkampf that reinforc-

es the crisis of legitimacy, which

in turn undermines trust between

the major actors in Turkish

politics, now denes the political

atmosphere in Turkey.

Analysis

Te long-standing urkish

kulturkampf between secular-modernist and traditional, conserva-tive and Sunni Muslim values has onceagain come to dene the main issueson the political agenda. When it rstcame to power in 2002, the Justice andDevelopment Party (AKP) govern-ment acted with caution; its approachresembled a orm o good governance.It tested the waters on such issues ascriminalizing adultery, legalizing thetürban,1 and turning orested areas

into residential zones. It only alteredits initial positions when it ran intoa torrent o criticism. However, withthe start o the election process o thepresident o the republic in the urkishGrand National Assembly (BMM)in 2007, the style o the AKP govern-ment began to change dramatically. Itsleader, Prime Minister Erdoğan beganto emphasize legislative supremacy and his personal representation o thenational will (milli irade), and madereerences to the Democrat Party (DP)o the 1950s as its ideological prede-

1 Türban refers to a style of wearing a headscarf that

covers a woman’s hair, ears, neck, shoulders, and bosom.

Several court cases have resulted from female students

insisting on donning the türban at medical and nursing

schools instead of nurse uniforms. It seemed as if they

are not alone in this struggle, with many men also sup-

porting them at rallies and demonstrations. They have

made attempts to register the türban as a legal right,

which the Turkish administrative courts and eventually the

European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) have rejected.

The Turkish Referendum: Democratic

Consolidation or Political Confict?

by Ersin Kalaycıoğlu

September 3, 2010

Washington, DC• Berlin • Paris • Brussels

BelgraDe • ankara • BuCharest

O f f i c e s

cessor. From 2007 onwards a majori-

tarian style o discourse and conductthat substituted good governance withanger, accusations, and conrontationsbegan to characterize the actions o theAKP leader and his ollowers.

Te decisions o the ConstitutionalCourt in 2007 and 2008 on thequorum o the BMM or the electiono the president o the republic, thelegal status o the türban, and the AKPconstituting the ocal point o activi-

ties to undermine secularism, seemedto contribute urther to the develop-ment o that style o politics. Tepolitical milieu was also inuenced by the sweeping arrests o ormer mili-tary commanders, ocers on duty, journalists, rectors o universities,non-Muslim clerics, businesspersons,and trade union leaders in 2007.Tose arrested were charged withestablishing an organization, alleg-edly called Ergenekon, to topple theAKP government. Te AKP acted asi it believed that there existed a grandconspiracy o the secular political elitesas well.

It is a matter o act that the AKP andother parliamentary parties have allencompletely apart over the Ergenekoncourt cases and a host o other politica

Analysis



Analysis

2

Analysis

issues. In act, the decision o the Constitutional Court

concerning the AKP in 2008 delivered an indelible blow tothe secular credentials o the AKP. It is also a matter o actthat the AKP has been struggling to cast doubt over thedemocratic credentials o its main opponents, the Repub-lican People’s Party (CHP) and the Nationalist MovementParty (MHP). In the meantime, on several occasions, theopposition parties have declared that they do not trust theAKP and its leadership. Tereore, it seems as i urkey isexperiencing a legitimacy crisis whereby the secular creden-tials o the AKP are called into question by the secularopposition on the one hand, while the conservatives, theAKP elite included, question the commitment o the CHP

and the MHP to civilian supremacy over the military command on the other. A kulturkamp that reinorces thecrisis o legitimacy, which in turn undermines trust betweenthe major actors in urkish politics, now denes the polit-ical atmosphere in urkey.

Expanded Courts and an Uncertain Presidency

By March 2010, the AKP had moved toward an overhaul o several articles o the 1982 Constitution.2 Tis was not therst time that the AKP has attempted to amend it. Te lastmajor overhaul o the constitution was in 2004, as part o

EU-motivated political reorms, or which the oppositionpolitical parties in the urkish Parliament had also extendedtheir support. However, the current constitutional amend-ments are opposed by all o the parliamentary oppositionparties and a large swath o nongovernmental organizations(NGOs). Te rest o the country seems to be split down themiddle about what the reerendum stands or.

Te timing o the move to amend the constitution seemedto coincide with rumors about a second indictment to banthe AKP on charges o violation o Article 2 o the consti-tution concerning secularism. Te AKP appears to havemoved swily to deny party closures through proposedconstitutional amendments. Te AKP has also complained

2 Turkey experienced its last referendum on constitutional amendments on October 21,

2007. That referendum focused on the status of the president, and the constitutional

amendments were regarding the tug of war between the AKP and its opponents over the

right of the AKP to name its own candidate freely for the presidency and get him elected

in the TBMM. On two earlier occasions the party leaders had selected themselves as can-

didates and were successfully elected as presidents. There was nothing of signicance

that pertained to democratization per se in the 2007 referendum. However, the overall

impact of that referendum, which received the approval of 70 percent of the electorate,

will have a major and dire inuence on democracy in Turkey for many years to come.

about the “tutelage o the High Courts,” and has oen

declared complete distrust o them in public. Te move tochange the composition o the Constitutional Court and theSupreme Board o Prosecutors and Judges (HSYK)3 seemsto kill two birds with one stone. I more conservative judgescould be elected to serve on both the Constitutional Courtand HSYK, the higher courts would become more avorablydisposed toward the AKP. At the same time, there wouldnot be enough votes to close down the party i a ban were tobe motioned by the chie prosecutor at the ConstitutionalCourt.

Te amended article concerning the Constitutional Courtincreases the number o judges serving on the benchrom 11 to 17, while the president will have some role inappointing 14 out o 17 judges, each or a period o 12 yearson the bench. However, the constitutional status o the pres-ident, which was altered by the reerendum o October 21,2007, is still unclear. It would have been much more logicalto dene the new status o the president rst and thenentrust him with new responsibilities, i that new status sorequired or permitted. I the new status o the presidentwere to be just symbolic, as in Iceland or Singapore, would

3 The HSYK is an administrative organ that handles the hiring, appointment, promotion,

and ring of all prosecutors and judges. It had been autonomous from the executive

branch of the government prior to the 1982 Constitution, but came under the inuence

of the Ministry of Justice since that constitution came into effect. Ironically, the EU had

demanded that the minister of justice and his undersecretary be taken off that board

to render it autonomous from executive rule. The current amendment would probably

enhance the representational credentials of the HSYK, though the status of the minister

and the undersecretary in that council would hardly be altered.

A kulturkampf that reinforces

the crisis of legitimacy, which in

turn undermines trust between

the major actors in Turkish

politics, now denes the political

atmosphere in Turkey.



Analysis

3

Analysis

it not be awkward or the presidency to be involved in the

high politics o the appointment o judges and prosecutors?

Furthermore, in 2003 when dealing with a totally diferentpresident, the same AKP government planned a constitu-tional amendment, which never materialized, that wouldhave decreased the number o presidential appointmentson the same Constitutional Court. It now looks as i theAKP has diferent constitutional provisions or diferentincumbents o the presidency, making it appear partisan,ideological, and personal, and not necessarily democrati-cally virtuous. Te other 25 amendments included in thereerendum are generally believed to be marginal, added onwith haste and oen as a orm o sweetener or some lobby

group to attract their support.

In the meantime, the amendment rendering party closures virtually impossible ailed to be adopted by the AKPmajority in the BMM and got dropped rom the list o amendments. Te CHP appealed and requested that theConstitutional Court strike down the current amend-ments as unconstitutional. Te Constitutional Court didconsider the CHP’s appeal, but only changed the votingprocedure or the Constitutional Court and the HSYK, andtook nonlawyers of the list o potential candidates or theHSYK. Tat decision by the Constitutional Court wouldmake it more dicult or the president to appoint conserva-tive members. I the reerendum passes, the ConstitutionalCourt will have more members picked by the currentpresident rom a list o lawyers, who would be elected by all the judges and prosecutors o the land, each or a periodo 12 years. It is still possible that the Constitutional Courtcould get enough conservative members so as to be dividedinto two roughly equal groups o judges, conservative andsecular. I that were to happen, there is a risk o judicial

stalemate, or several decisions would require more than a

simple majority on the bench.

An Intensely Political Contest

Te campaign or the reerendum has been intense. TeAKP leadership is mainly using the traditional discourseo the conservative right, condemning the authoritarianrule o the CHP in the 1940s, raising racist allusions, andemphasizing its anti-military posture and its commitmentto democracy. Te secular CHP campaigns on corrupt prac-tices o the AKP, attacks the style and image o the primeminister, and pays homage to le-o-center slogans. Te

urkish ethnic nationalist MHP has attacked the interna-tionalist stand o the AKP, including its dealings with theEU and the purported inuence o the United States. TeKurdish ethnic nationalist Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) has completely boycotted the reerendum, eventhough Kurdish voters seem to exhibit a variety o opinions.Te reerendum campaign now runs through Ramadan,and the reerendum will take place right aer the Bayram (athree-day-long religious holiday). It seems as i the religiousmonth has made no impact on the discourse o the politicalelites. However, one act stands beyond dispute or now: theparties have not been providing much inormation about

what the reerendum is all about.

One fact stands beyond dispute

for now: the parties have not been

providing much information about

what the referendum is all about.

The struggle between the

government and the opposition is

not about defending or opposing

the current Constitution. It may

be considered a struggle between

different versions of a “Good

Society” as envisioned by different

political forces.



Analysis

4

Analysis

Finally, it is also a matter o act that since the adoption

o the 1982 Constitution, not a single political party hasbeen avorably predisposed toward it. Tereore, those whooppose the amendments are doing their best to empha-size that they are also against the constitution, thoughthey are more opposed to the kinds o changes the AKPhas proposed. Indeed, on August 9, 2010 the leader o theCHP Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu published a declaration in theinuential daily Hürriyet arguing exactly this point. Whatthese arguments point to is that the struggle between thegovernment and the opposition is not about deending oropposing the current Constitution. It may be considereda struggle between diferent versions o a “Good Society”

as envisioned by diferent political orces. However, thatmessage seems too weak to be widely noticed. I thesetrends continue, the reerendum will be little more than a vote o popular condence or the party leaders, the govern-ment, and the opposition.

Dr. Ersin Kalaycioglu, Professor, Sabancı UniversityDr. Kalaycioglu is a Full Proessor o Political Science at Sabancı Uni-

versity Faculty o Arts and Social Sciences. Between August 2004 and

September 2007 Pro. Kalaycioglu unctioned as the Rector (President)

o Işık University, Istanbul, urkey. Pro. Kalaycioglu is a student o

comparative politics and specializes in political representation and

participation. Dr. Kalaycioglu co-edited Turkey: Political, Social and

Economic Challenges in the 1990s, authored Turkish Dynamics: A Bridge

Across Troubled Lands, co-authored Turkish Democracy Today: Elections,

Protest and Stability in an Islamic Society and Rising Tide of Conservatism

in Turkey with Ali Carkoglu o Sabanci University, as well as editing and

writing other publications in urkish. Currently, Pro. Kalaycioglu is

carrying out studies o socio-political orientations and attitudes towardpolitics and voting behavior in urkey in collaboration with Ali Cark-

oglu o Koç University, Istanbul, urkey, and conducting annual national

social surveys as part o the International Social Survey Program.

About GMF

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