the unintended consequences of kingpin strategies
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The unintended consequences of kingpin strategies:
kidnap rates and the Arellano-Flix Organization
Nathan Jones
Published online: 16 January 2013# Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013
Abstract Kingpin strategies the targeting of the top-levels of terrorist or drug
trafficking organization hierarchieshas become a centerpiece of US and Mexican
efforts to combat drug trafficking. This study addresses the unintended consequen-
ces of these strategies by assessing the impact of the arrest or deaths of Arellano
Felix Organization leaders on kidnap and homicide levels from the late 1990s to
2011. Based on the study, the arrest of important AFO lieutenants increased
kidnap rates. Arrests or the deaths of organization kingpins did not result in
increased homicides or kidnappings, if respected successors were ready to fill
leadership vacuums. When leadership succession was in question, the arrest of
kingpins did result in internecine conflict and thus increased homicide and
kidnapping rates. Following internecine conflict, kidnap and homicide rates
dropped, but not to pre-conflict levels. This is likely attributable to the use of
kidnapping and homicide as a dispute resolution mechanism in the growing Tijuana
consumer drug market.
Keywords AFO.Arellano Felix Organization.Counternarcotics.Decapitation
strikes.High value targets. Kidnapping.Kingpin.Mexican drug trafficking
organizations.Second order effects.Tijuana Cartel
Introduction
Decapitationorkingpin strategiesplay an important role in counter-narcotic and
counter-terror policy in both the United States and Mexico (Dudley 2011).
Trends Organ Crim (2013) 16:156176
DOI 10.1007/s12117-012-9185-x
N. Jones (*)
Alfred C. Glassell III Postdoctoral Fellow in Drug Policy, Rice Universitys James A. Baker III
Institute for Public Policy, 6100 Main Street, Rice University, Baker Hall, Suite 120, Houston,
TX 77005, USA
e-mail: [email protected]
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Decapitation strikes involve targeting for arrest the highest levels or core leadership
of terror or criminal networks. While kingpin strategies can be highly effective in
disrupting both terror and drug trafficking organizations (DTOs), they can also have
unintended consequences (Johnson 2010). In the course of in-depth archival and
interview-based research on the history of the Arellano Felix Organization (TijuanaCartel), these consequences, including increased homicide and kidnap rates, became
apparent (Jones and Cooper2011).1
This is not a polemic against the use of kingpin strategies, but rather an attempt to
understand the negative externalities associated with them. Kingpin strategies in
the fight against the Arellano Felix Organization in the early 2000s resulted in
internecine conflict that caused homicide and kidnap rates to surge by 2008 (Jones
2011b). With the destruction of one faction, which emphasized kidnapping in its
business model, kidnap rates have since declined, but remain higher than their pre-
2008 levels (Jones2011a,b).
Kingpin strategies
A kingpin strategy is the term US law enforcement uses to refer to the targeting for
arrest of the leadership of drug trafficking organizations (DTOs). The strategy can
also be applied to counterterrorism; referring to the strategy of targeting terrorist
leaders in an attempt to disrupt illicit networks (Dudley2011; Pachico2011). These
strategies are embodied by the
Consolidated Priority Organization Target
(CPOT)programs of the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), which identifies important DTOs
and their leadership (DEA 2006a, b; DEA OCDETF 2010). While these strategies
disrupt network operations, they can also disrupt them to the point of creating
internecine conflict, resulting in spikes in homicides as various factions and lieuten-
ants vie for control of illicit networks. This has become commonplace in Mexico
among the various cartels as violence surges following the arrest of important
leaders (Guerrero Gutierrez2010; Jones2011a,c). The Mexican government argues
that violence in areas where the military is present is the result of preexisting
conditions (Escalante Gonzalbo2011; Rios2011). Mexican scholars have countered
that following the removal of major DTO leaders like Arturo Beltran-Leyva, homi-
cides have surged only to return to lower levels; but not as low as the periods before
their removal (Guerrero Gutierrez2010). For supporters of these strategies, the logic
is cut off the head of the beast and the body ceases to function:
In March 2002, the Office of the Attorney General announced a comprehensive
six-part drug enforcement strategy designed to identify and target the worlds
most significant drug supply organizations and their related components. The
central element of the strategy was the development of the CPOT List, a rogues
gallery of international kingpins who were responsible for the command and
1 The author would like to thank the Institute for Global Conflict and Cooperation, which funded 9 months
of fieldwork in Mexico; the Department of Political Science at the University of California, Irvine, and the
Center for Global Peace and Conflict Studies, which funded preliminary research trips; and the James A.
Baker III Institute for Public Policy, where much of the editing of this project was completed.
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controlof the most sophisticated and far reaching drug trafficking and money
laundering organizations (DEA2006a,b; DEA2010).
The above exert from the US attorney general illustrates the emphasis and dom-
inance of kingpin strategies in counternarcotics and counter-terror operations. Butwhat are the unintended consequences that policy-makers and public officials must
be aware of when utilizing these strategies? Before we can answer that question, we
must understand the existing literature on the structures of illicit networks, examine
the history and sociology of kidnapping in Tijuana, and analyze the kidnap rates in
relation to important decapitations.
Flat versus hierarchical networks
There have been extensive debates about the value of flat versus hierarchical illicit
networks in the post 9/11 discussions of terrorism and drug trafficking. Kenney has
argued that flatter networks, with fewer layers of management, are more nimble
and adaptive than their hierarchical bureaucratic state counterparts (Arquilla
and Ronfeldt 2001; Kenney 2007a, b). Others like, Privette, have pointed to the
advantages hierarchy provided the Cosa Nostra in surviving the arrest or killing of
key leadership figures (Privette2006). But in reality, all illicit networks have varying
degrees of hierarchy and centralization as they, like governments, face the challenges
of managing the free flow of information and the security compartmentalizationprovides (Kenney 2007a). This study provides detail to this debate by specifying
when a semi-hierarchical illicit network suffered following decapitation strikes.
Increased homicide and kidnap rates are signs of internal network weakness because
they are signs of profit-starvation and internecine conflict. Thus, this study provides
lessons learnedon how decapitation strikes weaken illicit networks and when illicit
networks prove themselves resilient to these strategies.
Kidnapping in the context of Mexican drug trafficking
Kidnapping has been an intrinsic part of Mexican drug trafficking since at least the
1980s. Traffickers held members of other organizations to collateralize delivery or
payment of cocaine. Kidnapping has many variants and has taken on a more nefarious
tone in drug trafficking in Mexico since 2005. According to the former head of Anti-
Organized Crime Unit of the Mexican Federal Attorney Generals Office (SIEDO),
the Arellano Felix Organization was the first major Mexican drug trafficking organi-
zation to significantly increase its kidnapping prior to President Calderons offensive
against the cartels beginning December 2006 (Blancas 2008).
Kidnapping can serve numerous functions in drug trafficking. Kidnapping is ameans by which to (1) enforce the payment of drug transactions in the illicit
underworld, (2) enforce the payment of protection services or extortion in the illicit
world, (3) enforce extortion payments in the licit business world and, finally, (4) as a
profit-seeking enterprise in and of itself. Recently, Mexican DTOs have adopted a
tactic of kidnapping journalists for the purpose of having their videos broadcast on
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air. This would suggest that kidnapping can also be used for political purposes; a
possible fifth function of kidnapping. This is however a new and untested phenomena
and how widespread it is remains to be seen (Malkin 2010). According to law
enforcement sources that specialize in the AFO, kidnapping may be as profitable as
drug trafficking and is motivated by the need of the network to pay the largeoverhead they have due to the number of enforcers they employ (Duncan 2009).
Kidnapping is notoriously difficult to study systematically due to a lack of accurate
data. Most kidnapping data comes from the state, but it is also estimated that 90 % of
kidnappings go unreported because Mexicos public does not trust law enforcement
institutions (Thompson2004). One telling statistic is that it is estimated that Mexican
police do not solve 98.5 % of crimes (Shirk1999,2006; Shirk and Donnelly2009).
Thus, inference becomes important in attaining a picture of kidnapping in Mexico in
specific geographic locations. What are typical stories of kidnappings? What patterns
emerge among these stories from primary sources? And what will this tell us aboutthe structure of the organization and its business model?
Tijuana kidnapping in the 1990s
In Mexico, kidnapping has long been famous as a means by which to enforce the
payment of drug transaction debts; particularly in the state of Sinaloa. This could
involve the kidnapping of the individual who owes money to a drug trafficking
organization or the capture of his family members or business partners. Sometimesvalued cartel members were held as collateral to enforcement the payment of debts
between Mexican and Colombian trafficking groups. Kidnapping expanded into a
means by which to enforce protection/extortion payments in the illicit world. How-
ever in the Tijuana area, controlled by the Arellano-Felix Organization, the practice of
kidnapping expanded into the extortion of licit businesses and as a business in and of
itself in the years preceding 2008. Most of these kidnappings were attributed to the
El Teo faction of the organization, led by Eduardo Teodoro Garcia Simental (El
Teo). Before we can discuss this spike in kidnappings, a history of the illicit net-
works use of kidnapping must be elucidated for context (Duncan2009).
The AFO was profit-starved in the immediate aftermath of the killing of Cardinal
Arch-Bishop Posadas Ocampo in 1993. AFO gunmen attempting to kill Chapo
Guzman of the rival Sinaloa Cartel had mistakenly killed the Cardinal at the Guada-
lajara airport in his white Grand Marquis (Caldwell 2007a,b). From 1993 to the late
1990s, all top-level AFO leadership were laying low, some in the United States,
some engaging in legitimate occupations in rural Mexico. In this period, they made
calculated top-down decisions to engage in kidnapping, typically as neededand for
high-profile targets. Prior to 1993, the AFO rarely engaged in kidnapping, deriving
nearly all profits from drug trafficking (Duncan 2009).
These high-profile kidnappings required intelligence on the targets habits, sur-
veillance of the target, safe-houses and the capability to hold the victim for long
periods of time. Typically, the AFO had inside-information about the target and a
corrupted official within the Mexican anti-kidnap unit. Usually, someone on the
targets security detail would make a commission from the ransom for providing
information. Thus, the intelligence often came to the AFO based upon their
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reputation for violence and their reputation for paying commissions to those who
provided intelligence (Duncan2009).
The AFO had offices where enforcers were expected to be ready to work each
morning. No advance warning would be given to those participating in a kidnapping.
A lieutenant of the organization would arrive at the office on the morning of akidnap operation and give minimal instructions to enforcers participating in the
kidnapping. Generally, these were instructions on what to wear, what arms to carry,
and what type of vehicle to drive. This is an example of information compartmen-
talization through procedures within the organization. It is also an example of the
need for security coming into conflict with the need for information flows within an
illicit network. The AFO failed in some of their attempts to kidnap high profile targets
during this period, likely due to the compartmentalization of information. It also
likely survived this period intact without large numbers of major arrests because of its
compartmentalization (Duncan2009).
The new kidnap wave (mid-2000s)
The early 2000s was a period in which the AFO was considered one of the most
profitable DTOs in Mexico. It was at this time that it suffered major arrests and the
events of September 11th resulted in increased US border enforcement. This made
drugs more difficult to traffic across the border and forced some elements of the
organization to diversify their activities into retail drug sales and kidnappings. In theearly to mid-2000s, an AFO lieutenant, El Cris, began kidnapping more individuals
for smaller and smaller ransoms. In 2004, he was arrested but his brother El Teo
continued the practice with his enforcer cells. This would lead to one of the most
important splits within the AFO (Marosi2008a,c; Ojeda2008; Reza Gonzalez2011;
Zeta2010a,2007).
Eduardo Teodoro Garcia Simental (El Teo) relied heavily on kidnapping as a
revenue source. It should be noted that it is universally recognized that El Teo
engaged in a much larger use of kidnapping than other factions as per media sources,
and interviews with journalists, local citizens, and law enforcement in Mexico and the
United States (Marosi2008a).
The kidnapping operations were not sophisticated, though they did include a large
number of people, cell phones, and safe-houses. Most of the people operating these
kidnap cells were mugrosos young teenagers doing the dirty work of the cartel.
There was very little previously collected intelligence on the targets and they were
typically not held for very long period; usually 4 to 5 days. The victims were often
killed. The advantage to the strategy of using mugrosos is that an illicit network
relying on them is highly resilient because they can be constantly recruited and
replaced, due to a large number of highly impoverished young people in Mexico
(Anonymous Tijuana business leader2011).
Holding the victims for short periods allowed an increase in the number of
kidnappings that could be undertaken. Once the El Teo faction began kidnapping
professionals and petit bourgeoisie, e.g. taco stand owners, doctors, and engineers,
they were kidnapping for much smaller amounts, usually $5,00010,000 US dollars.
This dramatically increased the number of people who could be kidnapped and the
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number of people in Tijuana who had been touched by the phenomena. The psycho-
logical impact upon the victims was devastating. Female victims were raped repeat-
edly and would never be the same.The sense of security of all of the victims was
shattered (Anonymous Tijuana resident2009; Duncan2009; Ramos2011).
Determining the patterns of kidnappings in Tijuana in the 2000s was very difficult.Initially, it seemed likely that extortion moving from the illicit to the licit worlds targeted
certain industries where the line between the licit and illicit blurred, e.g. an auto-shop
can also be used as achop-shopby breaking down stolen cars and selling their parts.
Anecdotally, there did appear to be a pattern to the businesses which were targeted,
which included many auto-shops. However, based on interviews of Tijuana residents
and business-owners, the apparent patterns came about very differently.
According to multiple Tijuana citizens and confirmed by anonymous government
officials, kidnap victims, usually business-owners, would be abducted and held for
ransom. They often negotiated their own ransom and were asked for exorbitantamounts. The victim would offer a lower amount which they could produce. The
kidnapping cell would accept the lower amount on the provision that the victim
provide ten names of people who could pay the same amount. In this fashion, the
kidnappings occurred along the lines of social networks, e.g. an auto-mechanic
knows other auto-mechanics and those of similar socio-economic status. Eventually,
kidnappings entered the professionally educated class including doctors, engineers,
and lawyers and triggered a societal backlash (Anonymous Tijuana resident 2010;
Anonymous Tijuana business leader2011).
To avoid being kidnapped, an illicit or licit business owner was usually given anopportunity to pay cuota(tax) regularly (the tax is also sometimes referred to aspiso
orplaza). Again, anecdotally, the pattern appeared to be that the business-owner had a
protectorwhom he could contact to arrange payments. Sometimes payments would
become dramatically larger when for example the boss has a birthday coming
(Anonymous Tijuana businessman2011). If a business-owner wanted to shut down
his business, he had to arrange a final payment; usually larger than his regular
payments. This was not uncommon in the period in which the Fernando Sanchez
Arellano El Ingeniero faction and the El Teo faction of the AFO were in
internecine conflict from 2008 to 2010. One business owner lamented being told
by police that it was not a good time to be in business,fatalistically acknowledging
that they could not keep the business safe (Anonymous Tijuana business leader
2011). Business people payingcuota,or extortion tax, were also given an opportunity
to provide ten names of people that would not be kidnapped based on this arrange-
ment. This usually included immediate family and employees. There were also
anecdotal accounts of kidnap victims being asked for lists of names of other potential
kidnap victims (Anonymous Tijuana business leader2011).
After the experience of narco-juniors in the 1990s, Tijuana society wanted a
separation between polite society and the criminal under-world; although there
were some who may have blurred the line. The Rhon family and other Tijuana elites
are reported to have functioned as the money-laundering side of the illicit criminal
world in Tijuana, though this has never been proven (Bergman2000). The criminal
world was allowed to function and was largely ignored provided thatpolite society,
the elites of the licit world, went unmolested (Anonymous Tijuana business leader
2011; Anonymous Tijuana resident2010).
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Kidnappings of those who were uninvolved in illegitimate activities and owners of
middle-class businesses, were shocking to Tijuana society. Doctors installed panic-
rooms in their offices and threatened to refuse to treat police officers and the public,
until the kidnappings of doctors ended (Anonymous family member of Tijuana doctor
2009; Marosi2008b). The abduction of Dr. Guzman the general surgeon of a leadingTijuana hospital, was a turning point:
Guzmans abduction came amid a plague of crime targeting the citys medical
community. About 20 doctors have been kidnapped and dozens have received
calls demanding as much as $50,000, according to the citys medical associa-
tions (Marosi2008b).
In response to the kidnappings, civil society groups representing doctors mobilized
and threatened a strike. Shortly thereafter, Dr. Guzman was released (Marosi 2008b).Kidnapping was at the center of the split between the El Teoand the Fernando
Sanchez Arellano El Ingeniero factions in April of 2008. The El Ingeniero
faction believed the Teo cells were calentando la plaza, that is heating up the
turf,with too many kidnappings and drawing negative attention which could hurt the
drug trafficking business. El Teo believed El Ingeniero was a weak leader who had
inherited leadership from his uncles; a spoiled child not from the Tijuana streets and
unworthy of leadership in the organization. He also needed the profits kidnapping
brought his faction, while El Ingeniero needed a calm plaza to traffic drugs and
operate money laundering front-businesses. Neither El Teo nor El Ingeniero waspresent for the violent April 2008 gun-battle on the streets of Tijuana that marked
their split (Fox News2009; Marosi2008c).
Most Tijuana citizens attributed kidnappings to the El Teo faction of the
Arellano Felix Organization. This is consistent with media reports which suggested
that El Teo had a network of kidnapping houses and kidnap cells throughout Tijuana
(Anonymous Tijuana businessman2011; Anonymous Tijuana resident2009; Marosi
2008a). He also had a higher propensity for violence and the public use of
violence. He employed El Pozolero who used acid to dissolve the bodies of cartel
victims. El Teo is rumored to have had a drug-use problem though this is uncon-
firmed (cristalor methamphetamine). This, in addition to his youthful and inexperi-
enced leadership, could have contributed to higher levels of violence (Marosi 2008a).
El Teo had many advantages in the internecine conflict with El Ingeniero. First, he
and his brothers were Tijuana natives. They had grown up within the city and had
operated as enforcers there for most of their lives. It is reported that El Teo and his
brother began their illicit careers in human-smuggling, guiding undocumented aliens
across the border on foot. Second, El Teo was able to establish a 6-month alliance
with the Sinaloa cartel led by Chapo Guzman and Mayo Zambada. Widely consid-
ered the most powerful cartel in Mexico, this alliance provided El Teo with the drug
connections he lacked. The Sinaloa cartel had already taken control of Mexicali by2004, facilitating this alliance. Third, El Teo had extensive contacts within the local
police force (Anonymous Tijuana resident 2009). Fourth, El Teos use of public
violence was very high (Carroll 2010; Ellingwood 2009; Jones 2011a; Marosi
2008c). He was known for leaving the decapitated heads of victims on top of vats
of acid where their bodies were dissolved. This, in effect, defeated the purpose of
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having aPozolero to hide the carnage, but had a strong psychological impact upon
rival cartels and the local population (de Mauleon 2009; Dudley 2010; Marosi
2008a). He was known for having many local police on his payroll but also for
killing police that did not cooperate with him.2 Such violence was a double-edgedsword for this faction. It terrorized and cowed the population into submission, but
also led to a societal backlash (Kenney 2007a) Fig.1.
Figure2shows average registered monthly kidnappings in Tijuana for the years
from January 2006 to September 2011 and makes the relationship between interne-
cine illicit network conflict and kidnapping clear (SSP 2012). Before 2008, the
average number of monthly kidnappings was 2.5 and 1.17 in 2006 and 2007,
repectively. It spiked dramatically in 2008 to 7.67 and 2009 to 7.92, coinciding with
the AFOs internecine conflict. The average number of monthly kidnappings in 2010
was 5.67, lower than the internecine conflict period, but still higher than previousyears. By 2011, average monthly kidnapping were down to 4.33 (data through
September 2011) (SSP 2012). There are multiple explanations for this new higher
rate of kidnapping following the AFOs internecine conflict (Jones2011c).
The first has to do with the data. Following the Calderon administrations waron
organized crime, local governments received federal money if their area was identi-
fied as prone to organized crime violence. Thus, the issue may be that local and state
2 Before El Teos arrest in January 2010, I visited Tijuana in 2009 and noticed that municipal police always
travelled in groups of two trucks, with at least two men each sitting in the truck bed with automatic
weapons. Motorcycle police, that typically enforce traffic violations individually, rode in groups of three.
Seven months after Teos January 2010 arrest, Police appeared calmer and rode in their trucks with one
partner in the cab with them and no one in the truck bed. This is evidence of the impact that Teos arrest had
on the Tijuana psyche. It has calmed municipal police by reducing the daily threat of police assassination
(Anonymous Tijuana resident2009).
Fig. 1 Kidnappings in Tijuana as reported by the SSP (2012) Baja California
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governments have been incentivized to keep better or inflate counts of violent crimes
(Ilescas2011).
A second explanation has to do with the remnants of the El Teo faction. Not
every member of the illicit network has been arrested or killed following this period.
Some were annexed by the Sinaloa Cartel in a highly compartmentalized fashion
(Borderland Beat2010; Zeta2011). Others were killed or rejoined the Cartel Arellano
Felix. Still others likely continue to free-lance as kidnap cells without paying taxes or
tribute to a larger trafficking network. Finally, the environment of legal impunity created
likely encouraged newcomers and amateur cells (Jones2011b; Zeta2010a,b,c,2011).
AFO spin-off kidnap cellsLos Palillos
Kidnapping can also serve to assist in the cannibalization process of the illicit
network. The case ofLos Palillos or the toothpicksis illustrative. The kidnap cell
leadership had a personal conflict with AFO leadership. They relocated their oper-
ations to the United States to kidnap wealthy members of the AFO residing in the
United States. They utilized their knowledge of those involved in the network to
spin-off into their own group, which could profit from the exploitation of their
knowledge. They were eventually captured by authorities that were notified by the
wife of a victim in the United States.Los Palilloscould be considered an example of
spillover violence from Mexico into the United States. It should be noted that this
spillover violence is typically directed toward members of the illicit network
Fig. 2 Average monthly kidnappings Tijuana as reported by SSP (2012)
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themselves. The Los Palillos story is also an example of self-cannibalization of
compartmentalized illicit networks. In the words of one cross-border taskforce
member, these guys make their own enemies (Duncan 2009). The need for
security, results in a compartmentalization of an illicit network into cells, which
are loyal to each other, but not necessarily to the larger network (Kenney2007a).
Kidnapping in Tijuana post AFO conflict
Following the AFO internecine conflict, kidnapping in Tijuana also appears
linked to narcomenudeo or retail drug trafficking. Kidnapping is used to
enforce payment on drug trafficking debts among those involved in selling
drugs locally in Tijuana. A recent case is illustrative. A mother and son were
kidnapped in an urban area in Tijuana. According to a Baja California statekidnap unit representative, they were both involved in local drug trafficking and
distribution (Jones 2011b). Drug consumption has been on the rise in Mexico
due to a number of factors including the emergence of methamphetamine as an
inexpensive synthetically produced drug, the hardening of the US border, and a
deliberate strategy by MDTOs to diversify their consumer markets beyond the
US consumer (Jones 2011b).
The relationship between
decapitation strikes
and the kidnap rate in BajaCalifornia
I attempt here to establish a relationship between the removal by arrest or killing of
key AFO leaders and the kidnapping rate in Baja California by analyzing the ICESI
kidnap data for Baja California and SSP state and local data, in the context of
disruptive events within the AFO and based upon what position within the hierarchy
they occupy. The general argument is that when the AFO is profit-starved,
enforcers raise funds by engaging in more kidnapping. This argument was identi-
fied in interviews of law enforcement officers who had, in turn, learned about the
phenomenon from interrogations of Arellano Felix Organization members and during
wiretapped conversations (Duncan2009).
The removal of high-ranking AFO leaders with critical business ties can increase
the networks propensity for kidnapping. In addition to demonstrating the importance
of those with business connections in the organization to the kidnap rate and total
kidnappings, the analysis revealed that charismatic enforcement-oriented leaders
provided control over enforcer cells and their removal also accelerated kidnappings.
Using the logic of John Stuart Mill for establishing causation, proper time-order,
correlation, and a causal mechanism are needed to demonstrate a link between
internal AFO events and changes in the number of kidnappings in Baja California
(Mill2009).
Figure3shows the number of kidnappings in Baja California from 1997 to 2009
as reported by Instituto Ciudano de Estudios Sobre la Inseguridad (ICESI) with
important AFO decapitations marked. Baja California data provides a better basis
of analysis over a longer time-span than solely Tijuana kidnap data for numerous
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reasons. First, it includes Tijuana. Second, the AFO plaza or territory at different
points in this epoch included Rosarito, Ensenada, and, at different points, Tecate and
Mexicali
all of which are included in Baja California. Third, ICESI aggregate datais more accessible (ICESI2010).
All of these statistics should be considered suspect due to underreporting, probably
by a factor of 10. Historically, in Mexico there has been a lack of trust in local and
state police many of which are feared to be involved in kidnapping. Also, threats to
victims and their families may result in underreporting by victims.3 Nonetheless, this
graph demonstrates data and trends that fit with the qualitative history of the AFO, the
accounts of local citizens, and the relationship of profit-starvation to increased
kidnappings.
The arrest in 1997 of Kitty Pez, a key AFO lieutenant and leader of a narco-
junior cell in Tijuana, had a detrimental effect on the AFO. It led directly to Jesus
Blancornelas, editor ofZeta Magazine, publishing stories on the AFO which David
Barron Corona, an important enforcer lieutenant and connection to the Logan Street
gang and La Eme prison gang, decided to kill him for. In the attempt, Corona was
killed by ricochet fire and died. The loss of these two important figures could explain
the spike in kidnappings in the area in the following year. Kitty Pez had married an
important Tijuana businessmans daughter. He had important business connections
and profitable narco-juniors working for him (Caldwell 2007a,b).
David Barron Corona was an important enforcer lieutenant commanding loyalty
within the AFO and likely control over many other soldiers recruited from his
3 Voluntary and anonymous surveys conducted regularly throughout Mexico might help to provide a more
accurate picture of the kidnapping problem than reports based on statistics provided by law enforcement
institutions that lack the faith of the populace. Indeed, websites like www.notecalles.org.mx appear to
attempt to address this issue in this fashion by allowing Mexican citizens to self-report crime anonymously
(No Te Calles - No+Inseguridad2010).
Fig. 3 Kidnappings and kidnap rates per 100,000 Baja California (ICESI2012)
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Logan Street Gang andLa Emeprison gang. The loss of these two figures represented
the loss of profits and control over enforcers within the organization. According to
law enforcement interviews, with lower profits and the same number of enforcers to
be paid, the organization found alternative sources of profit. Kidnapping for ransom
was one of those alternatives according to California Department of Justice Investi-gator Steve Duncan, a member of the AFO taskforce (Duncan2009).
Without Corona, there may not have been sufficient control over low-level soldiers
to prevent the rise in kidnappings in 1998. The year 1999, however, sees a drop in
kidnappings, which suggests that the AFO may have reasserted control over the
organization to minimize kidnappings, which draw negative attention to the drug
trafficking business.
The arrest of Jesus ChuyLabra Aviles, chief financial adviser to the organization
and Ismael Higuera Guerrero, formerly the operational head of the organization for
Tijuana while Benjamin and Ramon were laying low in the 1990s, saw a slightincrease in the number of kidnappings in Tijuana in 2000 (Duncan2009).
The most interesting finding of the analysis is the most counterintuitive. The loss
of the most important figures in the organization saw no increase in the number of
kidnappings, but rather a slight decrease. Benjamin Arellano Felix was the strategic
head of the organization and his brother Ramon was the chief enforcer. They were
arrested and killed, respectively, in short order in March 2002. This lack of a surge in
kidnappings following their removal can be attributed to the control maintained by
their brother El Tigrillo who was very experienced by 2002 and was able to maintain
firm control over the organization. This suggests Privettes view that hierarchyprovides advantages in terms of clear lines of succession that allow criminal organ-
izations to continue to function efficiently is accurate (Privette 2006).
Another possible factor may have been the funneling of profits upward. If Ramon
and Benjamin, at the top of the AFO, were owed a great deal of payments from below
as a form of internal taxation, the removal of these figures and replacement with El
Tigrillo may have reduced the payments owed to the peak of the AFO by consoli-
dating two payments into one. It should be noted that these are plausible but
speculative explanations.
The greatest spike in kidnappings is attributable to a split in the organization, a
direct result of the removal of El Tigrillo and later El Doctor from leadership
positions in the AFO. This allowed El Teo to fragment the organization into interne-
cine conflict and focus his business model on kidnapping, in part, because he had
little access to drug profits. The drop in kidnappings in 2009, though they remained at
a higher level than previous years, could be attributed to the truce established between
the two factions as they reinforced their organizations after high levels of violence in
2009. Part of that truce may have included the reduction of kidnappings to reduce
societal backlash. This interpretation is consistent with media and law enforcement
reports at the time (Zeta2011; Marosi2008a,c,2009). See the Fig.4, below, for an
illustration of monthly kidnap, homicide, and extortion cases with the arrest and
killing of key AFO figures noted. The data was entered by hand into a spreadsheet
from PDF files from the Baja California Secretary of Security Website (SSP 2012).
Once kidnapping is widespread, as it became in 2008 (as depicted in Fig. 4), it is
likely to remain high. There are, and will continue to be, many kidnap cells operating
without access to drug trafficking profits in Tijuana. They will continue until they are
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arrested or killed. This is likely to occur even if kidnap cells do not have permission
from cartel leaders that have been weakened by internecine conflict. Many kidnap-
ping cells may be operating as free-lance cells, with no permission to kidnap from
larger trafficking networks and no affiliation with them. This may explain manyrecent arrests of kidnapping cells. Larger trafficking organizations with superior
intelligence may provide this intelligence to police to remove these cells and garner
support from the population, as insurgencies do (Brands 2009).4
The relationship between the removal of cartel figures and the number of kidnap-
pings appears to be caused by a combination of (1) the importance of figure being
removed, (2) his ability to produce profits, and (3) his ability to exert control over
enforcers for the organization. Interestingly, it is not the removal of top figures that
increases the number of kidnappings (if successors are in place) nor is it the countless
number of low-level enforcers who are arrested daily. Rather, it is the removal of mid-level lieutenants that appeared to most increase kidnappings. This finding is logical
given the important operational role these lieutenants play in compartmentalized drug
trafficking organizations (Kenney2007a).
Thus, the relationship between the cartel figure removed through arrest or death
and kidnapping is parabollically related to his importance in the organization; the
more in the middle a figure is, the more his arrest will increase kidnappings. The
exception to this rule is when a top level leader is removed and his successors lack
4
This argument posits that certain factions of the organization became profit-starved while others may havecontinued to thrive. The profit-starved factions began to focus on the taxation of territory and the expansion
into high impactcrime like kidnapping and extortion. This was especially true in the internecine conflict
period where the enforcers of the Teo faction attempted to take control of the territory and network. Thus,
the argument is not dependent upon a commensurate reduction in drug trafficking, which might be
measured or correlated with a reduction in confiscated drugs at the border. Rather drug confiscations at
the border would represent an irrelevant variable because another portion of the illicit network continued to
traffic.
Fig. 4 Homicides, kidnappings and extortion cases in Tijuana (SSP2012)
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sufficient legitimacy within the organization to prevent internal conflict from profit-
starved lieutenants in need of new revenue streams. Also, the presence of kidnap cells
with no access to drug trafficking profits will keep kidnapping at a higher level until
they are removed from the system, which may be a long and daunting process
(Duncan2009).It is important to rule out the possibility that these surges in kidnappings are not
attributable to other causes. One alternative hypothesis is that the surges in kidnap-
ping in Tijuana were not attributable to what was happening inside the AFO, but
resulted from broader economic trends. The Mexican peso collapse of 1994 was a
severe economic dislocation that might have had a delayed impact upon kidnap rates
in Mexico; potentially explaining increases in petty crime and kidnappings for profit
in 1998. However, as Fig. 5 illustrates, Tijuanas kidnap rate surges cannot be
explained by national kidnap rates; thus ruling out the economic dislocation alterna-
tive hypothesis.During the internecine conflict between El Teo and El Ingeniero, the Sinaloa Cartel
established a presence and cells inside Tijuana. Some suggest that the arrest of El Teo
was arranged by the Sinaloa cartel (his one time ally) to reduce violence in the
Tijuana corridor, though this is not verifiable. Remembering its violent split with the
Beltran-Leyva Organization, the Sinaloa Cartel kept its Tijuana affiliates operating
autonomously and in competition with each other (Zeta2011). Based upon reduced
violence levels, arrests, statements from the arrested and interviews of Tijuana
businessmen, the Sinaloa Cartel appears to have achieved some sort of arrangement
with the remaining elements of the AFO to minimize violence; despite their longhistory of animosity (Jones2011d).
Notably absent from this discussion is the role of the state security institutions
including the military and municipal police in the reduction of kidnapping. These
Fig. 5 National and Baja California kidnap rates (ICESI2011)
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institutions played a role in reducing kidanapping, but did so in the context of
assisting in the elimination of the El Teo faction. In this sense, the successes of the
state had less to do with an improved capacity to address kidnapping and more to do
with swaying the results of the internecine conflict in favor of groups that did not
engage in the activity (Jones2012b). Thus, even though the state security apparatusplayed a role in reducing kidnappings, it was in the context of illicit network
internecine conflict dynamics, the level of analysis used here.
Through early 2012 the AFO and the Sinaloa cartel maintain a presence in Tijuana.
Despite the presence of two large illicit networks, Tijuana has lower levels of
violence than the internecine conflict era. This suggests that the two illicit networks
are not in open conflict with each other and have achieved some sort of truce. The
November 2011 arrest of Juan Francisco Sillas Rocha a key enforcer lieutenant for El
Ingeniero and his statements to police appear to confirm the truce assessment and also
suggest that the AFO is stronger than many believe (Jones2011d). The extemely lowlevels of kidnappings in early 2012 further suggest that kidnapping is a crime illicit
networks in Tijuana strongly discourage (Jones 2011d,2012a).
Conclusions
Kingpin strategies can effectively disrupt and fragment an illicit network, whether it be
insurgent or profit-seeking. However, the consequences of that disruption can be dire for
the society in which these illicit networks are embedded. Consequences may includeincreased kidnap, extortion, and homicide rates. Homicide rates increase as members of
the network struggle to fill the leadership vacuums left by the removal of leadership
figures. When there are clear successors, this does not occur until a network is decapitated
to the point that it has no clear succession. Hierarchy thus can have advantages for illicit
networks in addition to increasing their vulnerabilities (Kenney 2007a; Privette2006).
An identifiable hierarchy becomes more susceptible to decapitation strike, but can
prevent internal succession struggles when the network loses leadership figures.
Kidnap rates generally change when cells within a network are profit-starved.
Sometimes this is the result of a lack of trafficking connectionsbe they source or
distribution connectionswhich would allow them to become highly profitable drug
traffickers (Duncan2009; Kenney2007a).
Decapitation or kingpin strategies may be most disruptive to kidnap rates when key
lieutenants who provide control over low level enforcers, or lieutenants who generate
profits for the network, are removed. For example, the arrest of Kitty Pez and the death
of David Barron Corona appear to have resulted in the increase in kidnapping the next
year according 1998 ICESI data which shows a significant spike in kidnappings. Thus,
the removal of lieutenants who serve as key managers and control the periphery of the
network for the core may be more important for understanding kidnap spikes than the
removal of strategic leadership (Kenney2007a) (seeAppendix).
The removal of the strategic leadership appears to be most important when there is
a lack of legitimate succession depth as the analysis of SSP data demonstrated.
Eventually, if sufficient state or rival network pressure is applied, the line of succes-
sion is exhausted and internal struggles raise violence in terms of homicide and
kidnap rates, as the need to establish new revenue streams arises for enforcer-heavy
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networks (Duncan 2009; Privette 2006). A similar pattern is apparent in the split
between the Gulf Cartel and Los Zetas. The split was structurally preconditioned on
the arrest and later extradition of leader Gulf Cartel leader Osiel Cardenas Guillen in
2007. While actual fighting between the two did not occur until 2010, the conflict
would not have been possible had Cardenas not been extradited from his Mexicanprison cell, resulting in the Zetas declaring independence in 2007 (Insight Crime
2010). The Los Zetas business model emphasizes kidnapping and extortion more
than that of the long-time traffickers of the Gulf Cartel. Just as decapitations of the
AFO resulted in more kidnapping by one faction of the AFO, a Gulf Cartel decap-
itation led to an increase in kidnappings by Los Zetas. Thus, this analysis appears to
have broader applicability; especially in the Mexican context.
This analysis has provided important insights into the unintended consequences of
kingpin strategies that law enforcement and counter-terror agencies should consider
when arresting or killing leadership figures of various levels and social networkpositions. It adds specificity to debates about the advantages offlatversus hierarchical
network resilience (Arquilla and Ronfeldt2001). More studies of a wider variety and
number of illicit networks could help to glean further lessons from the relationship
between decapitation strikes and increased kidnap and homicide rates in the regions
wherein illicit networks function. Studies of this kind could help to increase understand-
ing of the unintended consequences of kingpin strategies and how to prepare for them.
Acknowledgments I would like to take this opportunity to thank my dissertation committee members
Professors Caesar Sereseres, Etel Solingen, Kamal Sadiq and Louis Desipio. I would also like to thankSteve Duncan of the California Department of Justice for opening important doors for me in the course of
my research on the AFO. Finally, I would like to thank the Institute Global Conflict and Cooperation
(IGCC), the UC Irvine Center for Global Peace and Conflict Studies (CGPACS) and the UC Irvine
Department of Political Science for funding various phases of research on which this analysis is based.
Appendix
Data
ICESI annual kidnap data
1997 28 1
1998 72 3
1999 23 1
2000 47 2
2001 25 1
2002 22 12003 20 1
2004 9 0
2005 9 0
2006 38 1
2007 20 1
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2008 115 4
2009 103 3
2010 79 2
2011 64
ICESI Baja/National Kidnap Rates
Year Kidnap Rate Baja California Kidnap Rate National
1997 1 1
1998 3 1
1999 1 1
2000 2 12001 1 1
2002 1 0
2003 1 0
2004 0 0
2005 0 0
2006 1 1
2007 1 0
2008 4 1
2009 3 1.1
2010 2 1.1
Secretaria de Seguridad Publica (SSP) data on homicides, kidnappings and extortion
cases in Tijuana.
Homicides - Tijuana Kidnappings Tijuana Extortions in Tijuana
2006-1-January 25 3 10
2006-2 -February 27 3 5
2006-3-march 20 1 4
2006-4-april 26 3 5
2006-5-may 27 4 10
2006-6-june 28 1 23
2006-7-july 25 5 17
2006-8-august 29 3 21
2006-9-September 32 0 23
2006-10-october 26 3 20
2006-11-november 23 1 7
2006-12-December 26 3 19
2007-1-January 22 0 13
2007-2 -February 27 0 19
2007-3-march 24 2 12
2007-4-april 25 2 5
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2007-5-may 22 1 7
2007-6-june 32 0 7
2007-7-july 22 4 7
2007-8-august 27 1 7
2007-9-September 24 0 11
2007-10-october 23 1 6
2007-11-november 38 2 8
2007-12-December 24 1 6
2008-1-January 30 11 5
2008-2 -February 33 11 7
2008-3-march 48 10 11
2008-4-april 42 10 10
2008-5-may 21 5 17
2008-6-june 33 3 29
2008-7-july 28 5 14
2008-8-august 29 5 4
2008-9-September 32 7 11
2008-10-october 87 7 23
2008-11-november 123 16 19
2008-12-December 71 2 17
2009-1-January 56 7 14
2009-2 -February 36 9 14
2009-3-march 47 12 21
2009-4-april 38 7 9
2009-5-may 43 15 9
2009-6-june 31 3 9
2009-7-july 41 3 9
2009-8-august 51 5 18
2009-9-September 45 5 26
2009-10-october 32 5 17
2009-11-november 38 12 22
2009-12-December 98 12 18
2010-1-January 99 9 19
2010-2 -February 51 3 19
2010-3-march 57 4 23
2010-4-april 54 5 25
2010-5-may 50 6 25
2010-6-june 44 6 22
2010-7-july 52 6 202010-8-august 45 9 16
2010-9-September 58 5 21
2010-10-october 50 3 14
2010-11-november 69 7 13
2010-12-December 59 5 15
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2011-1-January 51 4 18
2011-2-February 27 11 13
2011-3-March 45 4 9
2011-4-April 28 4 16
2011-5-May 42 4 6
2011-6-June 41 5 8
2011-7-July 35 1 14
2011-8-August 38 0 11
2011-9-September 33 6 14
Oct-11 28 4 12
Nov-11 24 1 11
Dec-11 26 1 19
Jan-12 39 1 19
Feb-12 22 0 26
Mar-12 24 1 16
Apr-12 26 0 12
May-12 27 1 14
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