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Strategic Studies Quarterly ♦ Fall 2007[ 96 ]

Through the Glass DarklyThe Unlikely Demise of Great-Power War

James Wood Forsyth Jr. Col Thomas E. Griffith Jr., USAF

As you know, you have to go to war with the Army you have, not the Army you want. —SecretaryofDefenseDonaldRumsfeld 9December2004

Theformersecretaryofdefense’scommentaboutthestateofarmoredvehiclesinIraqcapturesacritical,ifsometimesforgotten,truthaboutthefutureforcestructureoftheUSmilitary:thechoiceswemaketodayaffecthowthenationwillfighttomorrow.Additionally,radicalchangesinthestructureofthearmedforcescouldinfluencethetypesofadversariestheUnitedStateswouldbewillingtoconfrontinthefuture.InthefaceoftheongoingstruggleinIraqitiseasytolosesightofthesetruthsand,instead,focusontheimmediatesituation.Nonetheless,hiddenamongcontempo-raryargumentsaboutnumbersoftroopsortypesofweaponsneededtofightandwinacounterinsurgencyareunexaminedideasaboutthenatureandfutureofwarfare,andwhileitisimpossibletopredictwithcertaintythenatureofaspecificfutureconflict,itispossibletounderstandtheas-sumptionsthatunderliesuchvisions.1

Infact,muchofwhatwereadandhearaboutthefutureofwarrestsonabeliefthattomorrowwillbearepeatoftoday.Thatis,smallnumbersofhighlydeadly,verycapableUSforceswilltakeonsmaller,largelyout-

JamesWoodforsythJr.earnedhisPhDattheGraduateSchoolofInternationalStudies,UniversityofDenver.Currently,heisprofessorofnationalsecuritystudiesanddepartmentchair,StrategyandLeader-ship,AirCommandandStaffCollege,MaxwellAirforceBase,Alabama.Priortohisarrival,hewasprofes-sorofstrategyandpolicyattheSchoolofAdvancedAirandSpaceStudies(SAASS)atMaxwell.

ColThomasE.GriffithJr.,USAf,isthedeanoffacultyandacademicprogramsattheNationalWarCollege,fortLesleyJ.McNair,Washington,DC.Hehaspublishedonavarietyoftopics,includingtarget-ingstrategiesandmilitaryinnovation,andistheauthorofMacArthur’s Airman.ColonelGriffithhasover2,000hoursinthef-4andthef-15Eandhashadavarietyofoperational,command,andstaffassign-ments.HewaspreviouslythecommandantanddeanatSAASS.

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Through the Glass Darkly

Strategic Studies Quarterly ♦ Fall 2007 [ 97 ]

gunnedopponentseitherinconventionalcombatorinbattleswithter-roristsorinsurgents.Thereistruthtotheseobservations,buttheymightbetruerifthecaveat“forthetimebeing”hadbeenadded.Thetruthis,wecannotbetonfightingonlytoday’senemyinthefuture,particularlywhenweextendthefutureout25or50years.Whatwedoknowaboutthefutureisthatstateshaveoftenmisgaugedit.Wearetold,forexample,thatthereisnofinerexamplethanthatofGreatBritaininthenineteenthcentury.Aforceofjust331,000andabudgetthatamountedtoonly2.4percentoftheBritishgrossnationalproduct(GNP)“safeguardedanem-pirethatcovered25percentoftheglobe.”2Yet,byfocusingonsuchop-erationstheBritishneglectedthechallengesoffightingagreatpowerandhelpedinviteGermanaggressionin1914and1939atastaggeringcost.3Thesamemightbehappeningtoday.Asanalystscontinuetofocusonthechallengesposedbyterroristsandinsurgents,theyoverlookordownplayarealdangerthatmightlieahead:namely,waramongthegreatpowers.Thezeitgeistofourdaytellsusthatgreat-powerwarisdead,butisitreally?

Beforeansweringthatquestion,itisimportanttostressthatthedemiseof great-powerwar ismorallyuplifting,which iswhy it appeals to the“better angelsofournature.”Evenwithinmilitarycircles,wherehard-headedanalysis is theorderof theday,aheadyconsensushasemergedaroundthenotionthatwarhaschanged.InThe Pentagon’s New Map, abookwidelyreadbothbyinsidersatthePentagonandthegeneralpublic,ThomasBarnettarguesthat“bigwarsareout,smallwarsarein.”Heevengoessofarastoconcludethat“state-on-statewarhasgonethewayofthedinosaur.”4Similarly,ThomasHammesinThe Sling and the Stone makesthecasethat the“strategicconcepts,operationalexecution,andtacticaltechniquesoffourth-generationwarfarerequiremajorchangesinthewaywethink”aboutwarandpeace.5Thisviewofwar,whichiscloserincom-parisontoagiantversusapygmythananewwayofwar,incorrectlyanddangerouslyassumesawaythepotentialofgreat-powerwarsinthefuture.Moreover, these authors seem tobelieve that theUnitedStateswill re-main,foranindefiniteperiodoftime,hegemonic.Theideaofhegemonyisanoldone,butthetermcanbemisleading.Generally,itisusedtode-scribethestatemostcapable,intermsofeconomicandmilitarystrength,toorganizerelationsamongother states.Thisdoesnotmean,however,thatthisstatecandoallitwantsallofthetime;nostatecandothat.ThattheUnitedStatescarrieswideswayovereventsthroughouttheworldisnotthesameassayingthatitisaglobalhegemon.Trueglobalhegemony

Strategic Studies Quarterly ♦ Fall 2007

James Wood Forsyth Jr. and Thomas E. Griffith Jr.

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ishardtocomeby.TheAncientGreekswerecertainlyhegemonicintheirrelativelysmallregionoftheworld.TheRomanswere,too,onamuchgranderscale.EvenBritainenjoyedwidelatitudeinthecomingsandgo-ingsofothernations,yet it couldnotget itswaywithin the rebelliousAmericancolonies.from1776to1783,Britain’sprimarymilitaryprob-lemremainedhowtoconqueracountryasvastasNorthAmericawithoutengaginginavastermilitaryandeconomiccampaignthatwasbeyondherlogisticalandmanpowercapacitiestosustain.6WithanongoingwarintheMiddleEast,oneseessimilaritieswiththeUnitedStates.Nodoubt,theUnitedStatesenjoysregionalhegemonywithadocileCanadatoitsnorthandacomplacentMexico to its south.However, even thishege-mony is relative as recent events inVenezuela andotherpartsofLatinAmericaattest.TheuncomfortablefactisthatAmericanleadershipisnotasattractiveoraspowerfulasweoncethought.

Nonetheless,throughouttheworld,theideaofagreat-powerwaroc-curringanytimesoon,orevenatall,seemsanachronistic.Aftersome60yearsofpeace,Europeannations,especiallyGermanyandfrance,arein-tentonbuildingamoreunited,peacefulEurope.7 InAsia, though theriftsbetweenChina,Taiwan,Korea,andJapanexist,thecurrentprospectsfor large-scalewarappear tobe remote.8Within theUnitedStates, theideaoffightingalarge-scalewarseemsequallyfarfetched;here,talkofapeercompetitordrawsmockery fromsomeandscornfromothers.9Bymostaccounts,great-powerwarisunthinkable,butisitreally?And,ifso,whatevidenceexiststosupportsuchastrongclaim?Itisimportanttobeclear—manyoftheargumentspresentedherearenotnew.Indeed,mosthavealonghistorywithinthestudyofhistoryandinternationalpoliticsandarefamiliartoacademicspecialistsinthesefields.Inlightofclaimsbeing discussed today, however, it is important for generalists to be asequallyfamiliar,anditistothatendthatwetakeupourtask.

Typically,theargumentsusedtoconsigngreat-powerwartothedustbinofhistoryrestonacosmologyofinterrelatedandhighlyoptimisticassump-tionsregardingtherelationshipamongtechnology,economics,democracy,norms,andmilitaryaffairs.Itisimportanttostressthattheseideasarenotjustacademicmusings.Theyhavealreadytakenholdandformtheback-bone of the United States’ transformation efforts—a set of reforms thathaveinfluencedpolicydecisions,whichwillaffectthenationforyearstocome—launchingwhatoneanalystcallsa“radicalrestructuringofUSde-fensepolicythatisneithernecessarynordesirable.”10Thenecessityordesire



totransformAmerica’smilitaryultimatelyrestswithpolicymakers,butitishightimethatscholarsquestionwhatcanonlybedescribedasawellspringofbeliefthattheeraofgreat-powerwarhasended,lestwefindourselvesgoingtowarwithamilitarythatwedonotwant.

Thisexamination isdivided intofivesections.Thefirstconsiders theeventsofSeptember11andtheeffectsthattheydidand didnothaveoninternationalpolitics.Thesecondlooksattherelationshipbetweentech-nologyanddeterrence.Thethirdsectionfocusesonthesupposedpacify-ingeffectofeconomicsonstatebehavior,whilethefourthdoesthesamefordemocracy.Thefinalsectionconsidersthetrendynotionthatgreat-powerwarisgoingthewayofslavery—thatis,warisbecomingnorma-tivelyprohibited.Attheoutsetweshouldbeclear—thequestionisnotwhethertechnology,economics,democracy,orethicalnormsputabrakeonwar.Insomecasestheydo.Rathertheissueis,doesanyoneofthesemakegreat-powerwarunthinkable?Intheend,whilealloftheseargu-mentsremainappealingintheory,inpracticetheyareatbestoptimistic;attheirworsttheyareunrealistic.

September 11 and International Politics

“We’relivinginawholenewworld,”isthecentralclaimofthosewhotouttheideathattheattacksofSeptember11changedinternationalpoli-tics.11Yet,toclaimthattheworldhaschangedisnotparticularlyillumi-nating.Instead,onemustshowhowtheworldhaschanged.Thereisnodoubtthatwearelivinginadifferentworld.WiththeColdWarover,wehave seenanend to superpower rivalry.Theconclusionof this50-yearstandoffhashadapronouncedeffectoninternationalpolitics.Byradi-callyalteringthebalanceofpower,andhencethebalanceofbothnuclearandconventionalforces,theendingoftheColdWarproducedsystemiceffectswhichmadetheworldlessvulnerabletocatastrophicnuclearwar.Ontheotherhand,theattacksthatbroughtdowntheWorldTradeCen-teranddamagedthePentagonkilledthousands,buttheydidnotchangethebalanceofpower,norhavetheydramaticallyincreasedthepossibilitiesofanothercatastrophicattack.True,theseeventsopenedtheeyesoftheworldtothepossibilityofterrorattacks,buttheyhavebeenwithusforalongtimeandarenotlikelytodisappearanytimesoon.Interestingly,how-ever,theendingoftheColdWarhelpedcreatetheconditionsnecessarytosetinmotionthekindsofterrorattackswehaverecentlywitnessedand



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areprimarilyconcernedwith.AsavastportionofCentralAsiacrawledout from under Soviet domination, strategic pockets opened, allowingthoselikeOsamabinLadentorushin.Itisimportanttonotethatthesamesystemiceffectsthatreducedthechanceofnuclearwarbetweenthesuperpowershaveincreasedthelikelihoodofterrorattackselsewhere.

ThisisnottosaythattheeventsofSeptember11havehadnoeffect.Theactsshockedmuchoftheworld,andstateshavealteredmanyaspectsof theway theydobusiness.Neither domestic nor international travelmayeverbethesameagain.Likewise,concernsoverhomelandsecuritywillaffect—andevendominate—citizens’behavioroverthecomingyears.Butwhilechangesintravelandhomelandsecuritymaydominatepoliticaldiscourseintheshortterm,itiswar—ormorespecificallythethreatofgreat-powerwar—thatcouldprovetobethebiggestdangerintheyearsahead.Why?Becauseattheendoftheday,theworldisstillmadeupofstates,largeandsmall,thatmustlookoutforthemselves.Insuchaworld,wherethere isnoworldgovernmenttoprotectstatesfromtheharmfulintentionsofothers,survival isthenameofthegame,andnothinghasthreatenedthesurvivalofstatesmorethangreat-powerwar.12

Inthepast200yearsgreat-powerwarhasdecimatedempires,laidwastetocountries,andclaimedover60millionliveswithanunmatchedferocity.All told,Napoleon’swarsandtheCrimean,franco-Prussian,andRusso-Turkishwarsclaimedperhapstwotothreemillioncombatants.This,whilesignificant,palesincomparisontotheninemillionsoldiersanduntoldmil-lionsofcivilianswhodiedasa resultofWorldWarI,or the50millionmen,women,andchildrenwhoperishedinWorldWarII.InKorea,theworld’sfirstlimitedgreat-powerwarinthenuclearage,nearlythreemillionfellintheshadowsofthesuperpowers.Allofthesearecolossalnumbersbytoday’sstandards.forexample,625peoplediedasaresultofinternationalterrorismin2003;35wereAmericans.Thisfigureislessthanthe725killedduring2002.13Itshouldbeclear,terrorismisaweaponoftheweak,andasthesenumbersindicate,terroristshaveincrediblewillbutnotincrediblepower.Untilsuchtimeasterroristscanmatchthepowerofthestate,thebiggestdangersintheworldwillcontinuetostemfromthestrongestpow-ers,thesmallestfromtheweakerones.Thisisnotmeanttodownplaytheimportanceofdeterringactsofterrororstoppingterroristsfromacquiringweaponsofmassdestruction(WMD).ThethoughtofOsamabinLadenwithWMDsistrulyterrifying.Itisimportanttopointout,however,thatshouldthedaycomewhenterroristslikebinLadengainaccesstoWMDs,



theywill,inalllikelihood,acquirethemfrommenorwomenwholiveinstates.Despitearguments to thecontrary, states remain importantactorsin international lifebecausetheymonopolizethemostdestructivepowerintheworld.AlthoughtheeventsofSeptember11shockedtheworldandchangedsomeofthewaysinwhichstatesdobusiness,theyhavedonelittletoalterthenatureofinternationalpoliticsandvirtuallynothingtoreducethelikelihoodofgreat-powerwar.

Technology Will Not Deter Great-Power War

Anotherlineofreasoningsuggestingthatgreat-powerwarisathingofthepastoftenbeginswithastatementassertingthatimprovedmethodsofwagingwarhavecreatedunbearablecosts,thelikesofwhichwehaveneverseen.14furthermore,thesecostsareunambiguousandtransparent,cleartoeveryonewithanyinterestinaggression.Nodoubt,technologicalshiftshavecontinuouslyalteredthemethodsofwar—themachinegun,the submarine, and the airplane changed the way of war, and nuclearweapons, some argue, raised both the psychological and physical costsofwartoalevelmoststatesareunwillingtopay.Thereistruthtotheseobservations.NuclearweaponscontributedtothelongpeacebetweentheUnitedStatesandtheSovietUnionduringtheColdWar.Whatisoftenoverlooked,however,isthatnuclearweaponsalsogavethesuperpowersmanyopportunities to vent their aggressions, including thepractice ofcoercivediplomacy,militaryinterventions,andproxywars.15Yet,deter-renceheld.Why?

Althoughnuclearweaponsplayedaroleinkeepingthesuperpowersincheck,politicalarrangements,theby-productofthedistributionofnuclearpoweramongthetwokeyprotagonists,alsoloomedlarge.16Deterrencewasalsosimplifiedbecausetherewereessentiallyonlytwoplayersinthegame.17Thesuperpowerscouldaccuratelygaugeeachother’sresponsesandcalcu-laterisksmoreeasilybecausetheyonlyhadtofocusoneachother.Whiletherewereplentyofotherproblemstocontendwith,attheendofthedaypolicymakersonlyhadtotrulyworryabouttheactionsofonestate.Therewasnothirdsuperpowertoappealto,nobalancercapableofreconcilingdifferences.Inshort,bipolarityincreasedthefreedomofactionbetweenthesuperpowers,enablingthemtobalanceagainstoneanotherandmakingitclearwhattheothersidewasdoing.18Thatnuclearweaponssustainedthe



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ColdWarpeaceisnotdeniedhere,but,intheend,thepoliticalstructurethatresultedfromthemmatteredmorethantheweaponsthemselves.

Althoughnuclearweaponsarenolongerthecenterpieceofdeterrence,there are those who still insist weapons matter more than political ar-rangementsandwhoputtheirfaithintechnologyandtheRevolutioninMilitary Affairs.19 Improvements in information, precision, and stealthhaveincreasedtheabilitytouseforceinanoffensivemannerandatarea-sonablecost.DuringtheGulfWar,thef-117Afighter-bomberflewonly2percentofUSsortiesbutaccountedfor40percentofthedamagedonetostrategictargets.furthermore,thef-117’seffectivenessvastlyexceededotheraircraft.forexample,f-111EsusingunguidedMk-82bombsde-stroyedtwotargetsin12sortieswith168bombs,whilef-117sstruck26targetsintheir12sortieswith28precision-guidedweapons.20InAfghani-stan, the introductionofUSairpower, togetherwith specialoperationsforcestroopsontheground,tippedthescalesinfavoroftheNorthernAl-lianceagainsttheTaliban,breakingupabrutalandwastefulstalemateonthebattlefieldthathadgreatsimilaritytothetrenchesofWWI.DuringOperationIraqifreedom,precisionattackspummeledIraqiRepublicanGuardtankdivisionsastheytriedtomoveunderthecoverofablindingsandstorm.21

Theseareremarkableresultsbyanystandard,butamorepressingcon-cernought tobewhether advanced conventional technologiesproducethekindsofpoliticalstructuresnecessarytoenhancedeterrence.22Thatisanopenandimportantquestion.Ontheonehand,onemightconcludethattheUnitedStateshasalreadyachievedconventionaldeterrence,evi-dencedbythefactthatnostateappearstobeseriouslythinkingofattack-ingtheUnitedStates,atleastconventionally.Indeed,theentireasymmet-ricdebaterunsonthislogic.However,thereiseveryreasontobelievethatadvancedconventionaltechnologies,bythemselves,arenotasstabilizingasnuclearweaponsand,therefore,maynotenhancedeterrence.Indeed,asconventionalweaponsbecomestealthier,deterrencemaybecomemoredifficult.forexample,theemphasisonspeedandlethality,whichareonlytwocharacteristicsofadvancedconventionalweapons,maydecreasethelikelihoodofescalationbreakpointswhichwouldallowtimeforanenemyto reconsider its actions and,perhaps,backdown.Lightning-fast com-munications technologiesonly further complicatemattersbecause theyheightentheexpectationthatsomethingcanand,therefore,mustbedoneinstantly.Inshort,becauseoftheiroffensivenature,advancedtechnologies



maycomplicatediplomaticinitiativestoresolveconflictsshortofwar,ren-deringtheirdeterrentattributesirrelevant.Intheend,politicalarrange-mentsmatter,andthedeterrenteffectofanyweaponshouldbeevaluatedwithinthecontextofthestructureoftheinternationalsystem.23

Today,theinternationalsystemseemstobetransitioningfromunipolaritytomultipolarity,where threeormoregreatpowerswillcompeteandcon-tend.AstheendoftheColdWarremindsus,historicglobalchangecancomequicklybutonlysomewhatpredictably.Thatis,whilehistoryindi-catesthatstateswillbalanceagainstoneanother,itofferslittleinthewayofpredictingwhenpowertransitionsliketheonethatoccurredin1989willtakeplace.Whoarethecontendersthatwillshapethefutureofinter-national politics?Germany andChina are certainly candidates.With apopulationof82millionandaGNPof2.2trilliondollars,Germanyout-stripsalloftheotherEuropeanpowers.franceissecondwithapopula-tionof59millionandaGNPof1.47trilliondollars.TheUnitedKing-dom,Italy,andRussiaallfallbehind.InAsia,ChinaistherisingpowerwithaGNPof1.18trilliondollarsandapopulationof1.24billion.IfChinamanagedtoequalSouthKorea’spercapitaGNP,theChineseGNPwouldbe10.6trilliondollars.IfithadjusthalfofJapan’sthefigurewouldriseto20.6trillion,andifChina’spercapitaequaledJapan’sitwouldsoarto40.08trillion.Inshort,ChinahasthepotentialtosurpasstheUnitedStates,whichleadstheworldwithaGNPof7.9trilliondollars.24Thisiscertainlynotanexhaustivetreatmentofpotentialcompetitors,butitdoesindicatepotentialfuturetrends.

As Germany and China continue to grow economically and expandtheirinfluenceinEuropeandAsia,securitypressuresmaymountinsidebothcountries.Astheyseektomakethemselvesmoresecure, theywilllikely consider expanding their military forces—which could, in turn,contributetotheinsecurityofothers.Contrarytooptimisticassertions,thepresenceofnewoffensive,conventionaltechnologiesinsuchaworldmay not enhance deterrence. Why? As alluded to above, conventionalweapons do not seem to produce the same deterrent effects as nuclearones.Nuclearweapons,bytheirverynature,aresodestructiveeveryonebuttheinsanegraspstheirdeterrentpotential.25further,asourexperiencewithnucleardeterrencesuggests,itiseasiertoachieveandenhancewhentherearefewerplayers inthegame.Smallnumbersclarifyrelationshipsand,asaresult,reducethedangersofmiscalculationandoverreaction.26



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Insuchaworld,statescompetingforpowercandooneofthreethings:buildtheirownmilitaryforcestostrengthentheirrelativeposition;addtotheirpowerthroughalliances;orwithholdtheirpower,thusweakeningopponents.DuringtheColdWar,thesuperpowerschosethefirstoptionandsoughttomaintainthebalancebybuildingupconventionalandnu-clearforcesthatcouldbothfightanddeterwar.Thisisanexpensivepolicyaffordabletoonlythegreatestofpowers,whichiswhystates,inaworldofthreeormoregreatpowers,oftenchoosefromoptionstwoandthreeandrelyonalliances.Inthemselves,alliancesarenotacauseforalarmoracauseofwar,buttheydoincreaseinterdependence,decreaseinteractionopportunities among states, and increase the likelihood of wider warsshouldwarcome.Tightalliancesystems,suchastheTripleEntenteandtheTriple Alliance mutual defense pacts that existed in Europe beforeWorldWarI,areespeciallydangerousbecausetheyincreasetheincentivesfor preventivewarwhich,while local at the outset, can spreadquicklythroughthealliancestructure.

Extendingthislogictoexistingconditionstoday,weoughttoexpectanalliancestructuretoemergethatwillbalanceagainsttheUnitedStates.Infact,therearealreadysignsofwhatsomeanalystsarecallingsoftbalanc-ing.27Indeed,priortotheoutbreakofOperationIraqifreedom,france,Germany,andRussiasoughttobalanceagainsttheUnitedStatesusingthemosteffectivemeansavailable—theUnitedNations.Inthefuture,ChinaandRussiamightcooperatewitheachothertocheckAmericanpowerinAsia.Should thatoccur, Indiawould, in all likelihood,growevencloserto theUnitedStates tocheckaChinese–Russian-dominatedSouthAsia.ShouldUS forces leaveGermany, aEuropean security arrangementmayemerge,whichcouldpotentiallyincludeGreatBritainandtheotherEuro-peanpowers.However,shouldthatfailtomaterialize,anequallylikelysce-nariowouldbeaGerman-francosecuritypact,whichcouldleaveBritainvulnerable.Unlesswearereadytomakeacollectiveleapoffaithandassumethat thisvulnerabilitywillalways takethe formofsomethingother thancoercivediplomacyorpreventiveattack,somethingwehaveseeninthepastinthispartoftheworld,theoptimismthatsurroundsthehopethattheal-liancesoftodaywillextendintothefutureoughttobehedged.

It isalsoworthrememberingthatpreventivewarhas longbeenfearedamonggreatpowers.Lessthan100yearsago,in1914,withtheriseofGer-manpower,therelativepositionofBritainandfrancedeclined.Ethnicten-sionsinsidetheAustro-Hungarianempire,stemmingfromSerbiannation-



alism,threatenedthestabilityofthatempireaswellasofthealliancesystemitself.Respondingtowhatwasthoughttobelocalpressures,EmperorfranzJosephlaunchedapreventivewaragainstSerbia,whichwasbelievedwouldquellSerbnationalism.Asaresult,aseeminglylocalconflicteruptedintotheunthinkableandusheredinthetwentiethcentury’sfirstglobalwar.

Thereisnocompellingreasontobelievethatadvancesinconventionalweaponstechnologycanstopsuchslidestowar.forexample,duringtheCubanmissilecrisis, theUnitedStatescameperilouslycloseto launch-ingapreemptivestrikeagainstCubawiththehopesofdestroyingSovietnuclear missiles as well as halting Soviet aggression in the hemisphere.Hadthecrisistakenthattrajectory,theSovietsmighthavefollowedwithanattackonAmericanbasesinTurkey.Presumably,USforceswouldhaveresponded,perhapswithanuclearstrike,andanall-outnuclearexchangecouldhaveresulted.28InOctober1962,thegreatpowerscameclosetoworldwardespitethepresenceofnuclearweapons,whichtrulyrevolu-tionizedmilitaryaffairs.Howwaswaravoided?PresidentKennedychoseadecidedlypoliticaloption,electingtoblockadeCubaratherthantoin-vadeorattackher.Ineffect,peacebecameanextensionofpolitics.Cer-tainlythefearofnuclearwartemperedKennedy’sdecision,butsodidtheabilitytofocusononlyoneadversary.Yet,theworldstillcameclosetoanuclearexchange.29

Globalization Will Not Bring Eternal Peace

Someauthorsfocusontechnologyforanotherreason—thegrowinginter-connectednesscommonlycalledglobalization—anditspeacefulattributes.fewissueshavecapturedtheattentionofpolicymakersandpunditslikeglobalization. During the Clinton years, the word globalization meantmore than amere shift in economicpolicies; itwas transforming staterelationsandremaking internationalpoliticsrightbeforeourveryeyes.One cannot deny that globalization is occurring. foreign trade, travel,andcommunicationseemtobechangingtheworldintoanopen,globaltradingbazaarforgoodsandserviceswherewaramongthegreatpowersappearslessandless likely.Butwhileinternationaleconomicsmightbechanging, internationalpoliticsarenot.Theworldremainsananarchicplacewherestatesmustlookoutforthemselves.

Economicinterdependencedoesbringnationsclosertogether,butinter-dependencedoesnot seemtobecapableofaltering thebasicnatureof



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internationalrelations,whichdeals inthecurrencyofpolitics,noteco-nomics.Globalistsfailtoseethisbecausetheymisconstruetherelation-shipbetweenpeaceandeconomics,orcauseandeffect.Internationalpeace,whichisunderwrittenbythegreatpowers,producesinterdependence—andnottheotherwayaround.30

Globalistshavelongarguedthattradepromotespeace.NormanAngellinThe Great Illusioncontendedthateconomicinterestswouldusurppoliti-calinterestsbecausetheworldof1914wasbecomingmoreprosperousandpeaceful.31Thomasfriedmaninhisnationalbestseller,The World is Flat, makesasimilarcase,believingthattheworldinwhichwearenowlivingistiedtogethereconomicallyandelectronically.32Barnettmakesthestrongestargument, prophesying that “extending globalization’s rule sets lead ulti-mately to less violence” and that failing to do so “forfeits globalization’spromiseofeternalpeace.”33Asloftyandappealingastheseideasmightseemintheory,theyhaveneverworkedinpracticebecauseinterdependencehasfailedtoproducepeace.Instead,ithasproducedinsecurity.

Consider Europe prior to World War I. Before that war, many be-lieved that increases in trade, travel, and communication were makingwar improbable.Anewcosmopolitanism—characterizedbytheuniver-sallanguagemovementEsperanto—wastransformingtheoldworldintosomethingnew.Thisnewworldwouldbeonecharacterizedbyanever-increasingqualityoflife.CertainlytheincreaseintradeamongBritain,france,andGermanyindicatedanewinterdependence.34Infact,globaltradingwastheorderoftheday.Accordingtooneexpert,“Inrelationtooutput,exportsofbothmerchandiseandcapitalreachedvolumesnotseenagainuntilthe1980s.”35Likewise,thetechnologyofthattimeplayedaroleasthesteamengine,locomotive,andtelegraphbroughtpeopleclosertogether. But as increases in trade, travel, and communication increas-inglyintertwinedEuropeans,suspicionsandantagonismsresultingfromchangesinthebalanceofpowerdrovethemfurtherapart.Intheend,thenationsofEuropebecamemoreinsecureasinterdependenciestightened.

Germany’sexperienceillustratesthistrend.In1913,44percentofitsforeign investmentwas inEurope.Yet, asGermany’s economybecamemoreintegratedwiththerestofthecontinent,itbecamelesssecure.Asitgreweconomically, itdevelopedlaborandcapitalshortages—helpingtopropelGermanytowar.Aslateas1911,Germanywasdraftingonly53percentofitsavailablecandidatescomparedtofrance’s84percent.36Similarly, the cost of naval armaments strained Berlin’s ability to keep



pacewithitsambitiousarmsbuildup.Thecostofthreearmoredcapitalshipsrosefrom4.5millionmarksin1893to9.6millionin1898,whilefranceandBritainsawsimilarincreases.37Whatwastheresultofallofthis?fear,asGermanycouldnotmusterthemenitneededtofulfillitssecurityrequirementsaslaidoutintheSchlieffenPlan.InterdependencedidnotmaketheGermansfeelsafer.ThechangesthatcameaboutinsideGermanytoensuresecurity—relianceonreserves,incentivestomobilize,offensivedoctrines,andadeliberateexaggerationofrivalstates’capabili-ties—didnotresultinpeace.Instead,theyresultedinwar.Inthiscase,interdependence created perceived vulnerabilities. That a state gains inaneconomictransactionisnevertheissue.Theissueisalwayswhogainsmore.38InthecaseofGermany,whileforeigninvestmentgrew,feelingsofinsecurityinrelationtotheothergreatpowersroseaswell.

Ingeneral,therelationshipbetweeninterdependenceandpeacemightbemoreapparentthanreal.OntheeveoftheGreatWar,theEuropeaneconomywasmoreintegratedthaneverbefore.Yet,warcame.Why?SomethinkwarwastheresultofnationalisticpressuresmountingintheBalkans.Othersarguethatthewarwasahorriblemistake,afailureofleadership.Botharepartiallycorrect.However,theunderlyingcauseofWWIwasthechangingnatureofthebalanceofpower,ashiftthatwasexacerbatedbytheincreasinginterdependenceofthegreatpowers.Second,theideathatcosmopolitanism—aresultoftrade,travel,andcommunication—producespeacealsoseemstobeincorrect.ThecosmopolitanismthatexistedwithinEurope—alongwith theEsperantomovement—vanishedasmen racedofftoanswertheirhomestates’callsformobilization.Lastly,theideathatwarresultsfromignoranceorwantisalsomisguided.Whileitistruethatignorantpeoplefightwarsandpoorpeoplefightwars,wemustnotlosesightofthefactthatitisthewell-educated,richcountriesthathavetheresourcesandthepowertowagethedeadliestwars.Whatconclusionscanbedrawn?In1914,warcametoEuropeinspiteofhighlevelsofeconomicinterdependence.Today,asglobalizationcontinuestooccur,itisappro-priatetowonderifgreat-powerwarwillfindaway.Ifthepastisanyguide,interdependence,alone,cannotguaranteepeace.

Democracies Will Not Guarantee Tranquility

A third reasoncitedbymanywhobelieve thatwar among thegreatpowersisunthinkablehastodowithdemocracy.Democracyhashadan



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impactoninternationallife;ithasbothcausedandeffectedthepromo-tionofliberalcapitalism.Nodoubt,democracyandfree-marketcapital-ism have taken hold of the world, and the apparent peace among theworld’sdemocraticstates—bothlargeandsmall—constitutesthe“closestthingwemighthavetoanempiricallawofinternationalbehavior.”39Putsimply,democraciesdonotfightoneanother.Whynot?

Somebelievedomesticinstitutionsguardagainstthebellicosebehaviorsofkings,emperors,ortyrants.40Democraticleaders,iffornootherreasonthanself-preservation,tendtohedgeagainstriskywarsbecausetheirownfortunesaretiedeithertomaintainingthestatusquoorassuringavictory,orboth.Othersareconvincedthatdemocraticstatesseemtopreferadjudicationandbargainingtofighting.41Inshort,itisnotthatliberalstateswouldrathertradethaninvade,asinterdependencetheorysuggests,itisthatliberalleaderspreferto“jaw,jawratherthanwar,war”asChurchillmighthaveputit.

Ascompellingasbothexplanationsmightseem,neithercapturestheessenceofgreat-powerpolitics,andneithercomesclosetoaccuratelyde-scribing what a democracy is like when it goes to war. Democracy, asGeorgeKennanputit,fightsinanger.Democracy“fightsfortheveryrea-sonthatitwasforcedtogotowar.Itfightstopunishthepowerthatwasrashenoughandhostileenoughtoprovokeit—toteachitalessonitwillnotforget,topreventthethingfromhappeningagain.Suchawarmustbecarriedtothebitterend.”42Democracyalsofightswithvengeance,whichis why democratic wars resemble crusades, characterized by unlimitedmeans,ultimateends,andpopularcallsforunconditionalsurrender.

Aboveall else, relationsbetweendemocratic statesarenotbydefaultpeacefulbecausedemocraciesarestates,andallstates,presumably,haveinterests,nottheleastofwhichissurvival.Itisdifficulttoimagineaworldofstates—betheydemocraticorotherwise—wherethepossibilityofwardoesnotexistandtheneedformilitarydefensesismoot.Wheninterestscompete, as they tend to do, conflict arises—regardless of the form ofgovernment.Waristheextensionofthatprocess.Thus,peaceamongtheworld’sdemocraciesmaynot,bydefault,lastforever.Democracieshaveintereststhatwillinevitablycomeinconflictwithotherdemocracies.Infact, contrary to proponents of the democratic-peace thesis, the list ofwarsamongdemocraciesislong.Dependingonhowonechoosestode-finedemocracyorwar,orboth,acasecanbemadethattheWarof1812,theAmericanCivilWar,theBoerWar,theSpanish-AmericanWar,andevenWorldWarIIsawdemocraciesfightingagainstotherdemocracies.



EncouragingandsupportingdemocracyisanoblegoalandonethattheUnitedStateswillnodoubtcontinuetopursue,butweshouldnothopethatdoingsowilleliminategreat-powerwar.

Norms Are Not Enough

Lastly,therearethosewhobelievethatthenormsgoverningtheaccept-ablebehaviorofstateshavemadewaruntenable,comparingthechangeinnormsaboutwartoviewstowardsslavery.43Agreatdebaterageswithinthehallsofacademiaregardingtherolenormsplayininternationalpolitics.44Some thinknorms tame state behavior.Often attributed to institutions,whichdolowertransactioncostsbetweenstatesbyestablishingformalandinformalsetsofrules,normsareatworkinnearlyeveryareaofinternationalcooperation. from the environment to arms control, norms—not inter-ests—explainwhystatesstrikebargainswithoneanother.TheNorthAtlan-ticTreatyOrganization(NATO)isoftencitedasanexampleofaninstitu-tionthatprovidesbotheconomicandmilitarysecurityforitsmembers.Thenormativeresultofthisarrangementisbelievedtobeapeace-proneEurope.Insum,thosewhothinkwarhasbecomeobsoletebelievethatwaramongtheEuropeanpowers is unthinkablenotbecauseofmilitary capabilities,whichareanessentialelementofdeterrence,butbecausewarisconsideredtobea“bad”thing.Othersremaindoubtfulastothepowerofinstitutionsandnorms,believingthestructureoftheinternationalsystemdictatesstatebehavior.forthem,NATO,whichwasoriginallydesignedtohaltSovietaggression,remainsintactbecauseofUSinterests.Putsimply,iftheUnitedStatesweretopullout,NATOwouldfold.Ofcourse,theUnitedStateswillnotpulloutbecauseitwantstoremaininfluentialwithinEurope,whichiswhycurrentplanscallforreducingthenumberofUStroopsinEurope,noteliminatingthemaltogether.

Essentially,theargumentaboutnormsisanargumentaboutpowerandtheroleitplaysininternationallife.EdwardHalletCarrobserved,“Whilepoliticscannotbesatisfactorilydefinedintermsofpower,itissafetosaythatpowerisalwaysanessentialelementofpolitics.”45Thus,whenstatesseektocooperatewithoneanotheronissueslikepostalortransportservices,theyareworkingwhatcanbecalled“nonpolitical”or“technical”issues.When,however,anissueariseswhichinvolves,oristhoughttoinvolve,thepowerofonestateoveranother,thematterbecomespolitical.Inaveryrealway,those who advocate the importance of norms downplay the importance



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ofpower.fornormstoplaythedeterminingroleininternationalpoliticswouldrequireapoliticsdevoidofpower.Thatisneverthecase.Allpolitics,asCarrarguedbeautifullyinThe Twenty Years’ Crisis, arepowerpolitics.

Nonetheless, thosewhoargue for the importanceofnorms to stopwaroftenusetheanalogyofthedisappearanceofslaverybecauseitbe-camenormativelywrong.Thisargument,however,ignoresthefactthatslavery,atleastwithintheUnitedStates,didnotgoawaybecauseitbe-camenormativelyprohibited.Instead,itwassmashedbyawarthatwasasbrutalasanythingwehavetocompareitto.Ineffect,slaverywentthewayofotherheinouspoliticalmovementslikeNazism.Itwasdrawnandquarteredbyaliberatingarmythatwasledbyanidiosyncraticgeneralwhoriskedthelivesofhistroopsbymarchingthemdeepintoenemyterritoryinordertorightawrong.Thisphenomenonhasbeendescribedaswarandmoralstatecraft,anditjustmightbethelong-lastinglegacyofdemocraticarmiesonthemarch.46Thus,contrarytothosewhoarguethatwarservesnomoralpurpose,great-powerwarcanandoftendoesserve moral ends. The world would be a very different place had theConfederatesortheNaziswon.47

Moreover,normsoffernoguarantees.Indeed,theanalogyofslaveryhav-ingbecomeanormthat isobservedrestsonaselectiveandnarrowviewoftheissue.Indeed,slaverystillexistsintheworldtoday,asnotedbytheUnitedStatesDepartmentofStateinitsannualTrafficking in PersonsReporttoCongress:“ThisReportisintendedtoraiseglobalawarenessandspurfor-eigngovernmentstotakeeffectiveactionstocounterallformsoftraffickinginpersons—aformofmoderndayslavery.”48Certainlytheideaofowninghumanchattelhasacquired,atleastinmanycountries,anopprobriumthatwasnotthecase200yearsago.Yet,thisnormhastobeenforcedthroughlawsandtheactionsofpeoplewhowillenforcethoselaws.

This last point strikes at the heart of a two-pronged problem withnorms.Aslongastheworldismadeupprimarily,thoughnotexclusively,ofstates,wherethereisnoworldgovernmenttoprotectcitizensfromtheevil intentions of others, states and statesmen must be on their guard.Clearly,thepossibilityforevilexists,anditistragicthatweneededtheeventsofSeptember11toremindusofthisfact.Indeed,thenumberoftyrannicalleadersthroughouthistoryisstriking.MenlikeAttila,Alexan-der,Caesar,Napoléon,andHitlerhadonethingincommon:theywereintentondominatingothers.Thisleadstotheconclusionthatwaramongthegreatpowersisnotunimaginable.Indeed,themostpressingstrategic



concernfortheUnitedStatestodayistofigureouthowitwillliveinaworldwherethreeormoregreatpowers—oneofwhichmightberuledbysomeoneseekingtoenslaveordestroyusall—competeforinfluenceintheinternationalsystem.

Conclusions

TheUnitedStates cannotprepare toputdownanyandallpotentialrivals.Thecostsofsuchanundertakingwouldquicklyprovetobeenor-mous,especiallywhendomesticspendingonprogramslikesocialsecurityandMedicarearefactoredintothesecurityequation.Overthelonghaulrivalswillemerge,andthereislittletheUnitedStatescandoexceptbal-anceagainst them,as theywillpreparetobalanceagainstus.Insuchaworld,wherestatescompeteforpower,onemustbeconcernedwithsur-vival.Thatbeingthecase,itisworthrememberingthatthemostseriousthreats to the great powers have historically stemmed from other greatpowers. In the years ahead, as strong challengers emerge, conflicts willarise,makingwaramongthegreatpowersmore,notless,likely.49

Contrarytopopularbelief,wearenotlivinginawholenewworld.TheeventsofSeptember11andthewarsthathavefollowedhavehadapro-nouncedeffectonUSforeignanddefensepolicy,buttheyhavenotdoneawaywiththestatesystem.Theworldisstillmadeupofstatesthatmustlookoutforthemselves.Topretendotherwiseistoneglecthistoryortofallpreytopresentism—somethingcommonamongpunditsbutdangerousforstatesmenandmenandwomenofthearmedforces.Historically,themostefficientandeffectivewaytoensurestatesecurityisthroughmilitarymeans.Thus,theimportanceofthebalanceofpower,whichexiststopreventonegreatpowerfromdominatingtherest,hasnotdiminished.Instead,ithasbeenreinvigoratedasstatesareremindedoftheneedtodefendthemselves.

Theimplicationsofacknowledgingthepossibilityofagreat-powerwarareeasiertograspthantoimplement.DespitetheurgencyofthewarinIraq,weneedtothinkseriouslyaboutwhatagreat-powerwarwouldlooklike,howitcouldoccurandbeprevented,andhowitwouldbefoughtsothatwecangainsomeunderstandingabouttheequipmentandforcesneeded tofight andwin.Thegroundwork for the technologiesneededforsuchacontestneedstobelaidtoday.ThedifficultiesinputtingarmoronvehiclesforIraqpaleincomparisontocreatingtheleadtimeand



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resourcesneededtofightagreat-powerwar.failingtodosoriskslivesandjeopardizesUSsecuritygoals.

Thisdoesnotmeanthatweshouldignorecurrentthreatsoroverlooktheneedtorelievemiseryandsufferingaroundtheworld,whatonestrategistterms“mindingthegap.”50Ascitizens,weshouldbeconcernedwiththepo-liticalandhumanconsequencesofpoverty,ecologicaldegradation,andpopu-lationgrowth.Wemustalsofullyaddresstheproblemofterrorism.Butasrealastheconsequencesofpoverty,ecologicaldegradation,populationgrowth,andterrorismmightbe,itishardtocomeupwitharealisticscenarioinvolv-ingthesetragediesthatwouldalterthebalanceofpower.51Putsimply,inanageoftransformation,wecannotneglectthebasics.ShouldtheUnitedStatesfinditselfinanothergreat-powerwar,thingsthataretakenforgrantedtoday,likeairsuperiorityorcontrolofsealanes,mightcomeupshorttomorrow.Thattechnology,economics,democracy,andnormsplayaroleinpreventinggreat-powerwarisnottheissue.Theissueiswhethertheymakeitunthink-able.Regrettably,theydonot,andbecausetheydonot,great-powerwarhasabrightfuture,howevertragicthatmightseem.

Notes

1. TheauthorswouldliketothankSteveChiabotti,KevinHolzimmer,TomHughes,J.T.LaSaine,RichMuller,JeffRecord,GarySchaub,andHalWintonfortheircarefulthoughtsandsuggestions.

2. MaxBoot,“TheStruggletoTransformtheMilitary,”Foreign Affairs84,no.2(March/April2005):104.

3. Ibid.,118.4. ThomasP.M.Barnett,The Pentagon’s New Map (NewYork:G.P.Putnam’sSons,2004),

271,passim.Barnett’stheoryandpolicyprescriptionsarebasedontheideathatstatewarfareisextinct.

5. ColThomasX.Hammes,The Sling and the Stone (St.Paul,MN:ZenithPress,2004),5,passim.

6. PaulKennedy,The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (Amherst,NY:HumanityBooks,1976).

7. RobertKagan,Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order (NewYork:AlfredA.Knopf,2003),passim.

8. KennethN.Waltz,“TheEmergingStructureofInternationalPolitics,”International Se-curity 18,no.2(fall1993):44–79.

9. Withinmilitarycircles,talkofgreat-powerwarhasbeensubsumedbytalkaboutterror-ismandtheRevolutioninMilitaryAffairs.Infact,onescourstheprofessionalliteratureinvaintofindanythingwrittenonthepossibilityofgreat-powerwar.Thisisnotsurprising.AsYalefergusonandRichardMansbachmadeclear,thestudyofinternationalpolitics,andparticularlysecurityanddefensestudies,tendstoreflectthespiritoftheirage.SeeYaleH.fergusonand



RichardW.Mansbach,The Elusive Quest: Theory and International Politics (Columbia,SC:Uni-versityofSouthCarolinaPress,1988).

10. StephenBiddle,Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle (Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress,2004),4.

11. ThisthemereverberatesthroughoutJamesMann’sdiscussionofthehistoryoftheBushwarcabinet.SeeJamesMann,Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush’s War Cabinet(NewYork:Viking,2004).

12. Thisisessentiallyarealistclaim,andweareobviouslysympathetictoit.Therearemanyrealist authors and many forms of realism. The classical argument begins with Thucydides,ThomasHobbes,andNiccoloMachiavelli.ThetheologicalargumentisfoundintheworksofReinholdNiebuhrandHerbertButterfield.NicholasSypkemanandA.T.Mahanrepresentthegeopoliticsschool.ThemodernaccountbeginswithHansMorgenthau,E.H.Carr,andGeorgeKennan.TheEnglishSchoolisbestrepresentedintheworkofMartinWightandHedleyBull.The contemporary argument is found in thewritingsofKennethWaltz, JohnHerz,RobertTucker,RobertOsgood,andJohnMearsheimer.

13. Itisdifficulttoobtainprecisecasualtyfiguresforthesewars.Countingbattlefielddeathsoftenproves problematic, and civiliandeaths in great-powerwars are evenmore difficult tocompute.Asjustoneexample,thereisnoconsensusonwhetherthedeathsfromtheinfluenzaepidemicin1918–19shouldbecountedaspartofthetollfromWorldWarI.Thefigurescitedabovecomefromanumberofsourcesandrepresentgenerallyagreeduponnumbers:SpencerC.Tucker,ed.,World War I Encyclopedia(SantaBarbara,CA:ABC-CLIO,2005),273;I.C.B.Dear,generaled.,The Oxford Companion to World War II(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1995),289–92;JacobBercovitchandRichardJackson,International Conflict: A Chronological Encyclopedia of Conflicts and Their Management, 1945–1995(Washington,DC:CongressionalQuarterly,Inc.,1997),67–68;andAndreCorvisier,ed.,A Dictionary of Military History and the Art of War(Cambridge,MA:BlackwellPublishers,1994),463–71.forfiguresonterrorismdeaths,seeUSDepartmentofState,OfficeoftheCoordinatorforCounterterrorism, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003,annualreport (Washington,DC:USDepartmentofState,April2004),1,180.

14. SeeScottD.SaganandKennethN.Waltz,The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate (NewYork:W.W.NortonandCompany,1995).Waltzarguesthatmorenuclearweaponsmightbebetterforworldstability.Saganarguestheopposite.

15. ThisisoneofSagan’smostcriticalpoints.16. ThisthemereverberatesthroughoutWaltz’swritings.However,hedoesdistinguishbe-

tweenweaponsandpoliticalstructures.Again,seeSaganandWaltz,Spread of Nuclear Weapons.See also Bruce Bueno de Mesquita andWilliam H. Riker, “An Assessment of the Merits ofSelectiveProliferation,”Journal of Conflict Resolution 26, no.2(June1982):283.forotherper-spectives,seeStephanVanEvera,“PrimedforPeace:EuropeaftertheColdWar,”International Security 15,no.3(Winter1990/91):54;andBarryR.Posen,“TheSecurityDilemmaandEth-nicConflict,”Survival 35,no.1(Spring1993):44–45.

17. AlthoughWaltzdoescontendnuclearweaponsdeter,hisanalysiscentersonthestruc-tureoftheinternationalsystem.forthedefinitiveaccount,seeKennethWaltz,Theory of In-ternational Politics (NewYork:McGraw-HillPublishing,1979).SeealsoJohnJ.Mearsheimer,“Backtothefuture:InstabilityinEuropeaftertheColdWar,”International Security 15,no.1(Summer1990):5–56.

18. forthecompletediscussion,seeWaltz,Theory of International Politics,161–93.



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19. foranoptimisticaccount,seeAdmBillOwenswithEdwardOffley,Lifting the Fog of War (Baltimore:JohnsHopkinsUniversityPress,2000).forapessimisticaccount,seeBiddle,Military Power.

20. JohnOrme,“TheUtilityofforceinaWorldofScarcity,”International Security22,no.3(Winter1997/98):138–67.

21. HowardD.Belote,“ParalyzedorPulverized?ThefalloftheRepublicanGuard,”Joint Forces Quarterly37(April2005):40–45.

22. Deterrence,asWaltzhasnoted,isapolicyformulatedaroundthenotionofcompellingpeoplenot todosomething. In internationalpolitics,deterrence frightensa stateaway fromattacking,notbecausetheattackitselfmightbedifficulttocarryout,butbecausetheexpectedreactionoftheopponentwouldresultinone’sownseverepunishment.Contrarytothosewhomightthinkofdeterrenceintermsofitsrationality,successfuldeterrencepoliciesrestontheassumptionthatanopponentiscapableofreasoning.

23. Here itcanbearguedthat theprocurementofaweapon like thef-22 inaunipolarworldwouldallowtheUnitedStatestolockinitsstrategicadvantageforsometimetocome.Thus, thedebateaboutaweaponlikethef-22shouldnotrevolvearoundwhetherornot itshouldbefieldedbutwhatnumberissufficienttoensureitsdeterrenteffect.

24. JohnJ.Mearshimer,The Tragedy of Great Power Politics(NewYork:W.W.NortonandCompany,2001),397–98.

25. SeeSaganandWaltz,Spread of Nuclear Weapons,98.26. Mearshimer,Tragedy of Great Power Politics,343–44.27. RobertPape,“SoftBalancingagainsttheUnitedStates,”International Security30,no.1(Sum-

mer2005):46–72.forcriticism,seeStephenBrooksandWilliamWohlforth,“HardTimesforSoftBalancing,”International Security30,no.1(Summer2005):72–108.

28. GrahamAllisonandPhilipZelikow,Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis,2ndedition(NewYork:Longman,1999),201.

29. foranaccountofAmerica’searlynuclearwarfightingthinking,seeMarcTrachtenberg,A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945–1963 (Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress,1999).

30. Waltz,Theory of International Politics,chap.7.31. NormanAngell,The Great Illusion: A Study of the Relation of Military Power in Nations to

Their Economic and Social Advantage (London:WilliamHeinemann,1910).32. ThomasL.friedman,The World is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-first Century (New

York:farrar,StraussandGiroux,2005).33. Barnett,Pentagon’s New Map,82,224.34. David M. Rowe, “WorldWar Economic Expansion and National Security,” Interna-

tional Organization 53,no.2(Spring1999):195–233.35. Niallferguson,“SinkingGlobalization,”Foreign Affairs84,no.2(March/April2005):64.36. Rowe,“WorldWarEconomicExpansion,”passim.37. Ibid.,207.Rowearguesthatcostsroseduetotheincreasedexpenseofnewtechnological

innovations,thehighercostofmanufacturedinputsandlabor,andthedesireforgreaterprofits.38. Waltz,Theory of International Politics,104–6.39. JackLevymakesthisobservationin“TheCausesofWar:AReviewoftheEvidence,”in

Behavior, Society and Nuclear War, eds.PhillipE.Tetlock,JoL.Husbands,RobertJervis,PaulStern,andCharlesTilley(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1989).

40. Theliteratureondemocracyandwarisvoluminous.forthephilosophicalargument,seeMichaelDoyle, “Kant,LiberalLegacies, andforeignAffairs, Parts I and II,”Philosophy and Public Affairs 12,nos.3and4(Summer/fall1983):205–35,323–53.foraquantitative



account,seeRudolphJ.Rummel,“LibertarianismandInternationalViolence,”Journal of Con-flict Resolution 27,no.1(March1983):27–71.foranexampleofthestructuralaccount,seeCliftonT.MorganandSallyCampbell,“DomesticStructure,DecisionalConstraints,andWar:SoWhyKantDemocraciesfight,”Journal of Conflict Resolution 35,no.2(June1991):187–221.

41. Similarly,seeBruceRussett,Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post–Cold War World (Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress,1993),aswellasTriangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence and International OrganizationswithJohnOneal(NewYork:TheNortonSeriesinWorldPolitics,2001).

42. GeorgeKennan,American Diplomacy (Chicago:TheUniversityofChicagoPress,1951),66.43. forthestrongestaccount,seeJohnMueller,Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of

Major War (NewYork:BasicBooks,1989).SeealsoJamesLeeRay,“TheAbolitionofSlaveryandtheEndofInternationalWar,”International Organization3(Winter1989):405–39.

44. foranoptimisticaccount,seeRobertO.KeohaneandLisaMartin,“ThePromiseofIn-stitutionalistTheory,”International Security20,no.1(Summer1995):39–51.forapessimisticaccount,seeJohnJ.Mearshimer,“ThefalsePromiseofInternationalInstitutions,”International Security19,no.3(Winter1994/95):5–49.

45. EdwardHallettCarr,The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919–1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations (NewYork:HarperandRowPublishers,1939).

46. VictorDavisHanson,The Soul of Battle(NewYork:freePress,1999).47. WearenotsuggestingthatSouthernerswerethe“same”asNazisorthatConfederate

soldiersfoughtforwhatwemightcall“unjust”reasons.WearesuggestingthattheinstitutionofslaveryandNationalSocialismwereevil,intheordinarysenseoftheword.Moreover,evilssuchasthesetendtoincreasethelikelihoodofwar.

48. USDepartmentofState,Trafficking in Persons Report, Publication11252 (Washington,DC:OfficeoftheUnderSecretaryforGlobalAffairs,June2005),5.

49. Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (Amherst, NY: HumanityBooks,1976);andRobertGilpin,War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1981).

50. Barnett,Pentagon’s New Map, passim.51. Theexception,ofcourse,isaballisticmissileattackfromanonstateactor.Should,how-

ever,anyactor—person,state,orotherwise—launchanuclearmissileattheUnitedStates,thatactorwouldbetargetedanddestroyed.Whatismore,statesknowthisinadvance,whichiswhywewillnotseeanythingclosetowhatasymmetricdoomsayersclaim.

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