The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 5 | Issue 4 | Article ID 2411 | Apr 02, 2007

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The Unprecedented Shift in Japan's Population: Numbers,Age, and Prospects

Vaclav Smil

The Unprecedented Shift in Japan’sPopulation: Numbers, Age, andProspects

Vaclav Smil

Three recent statistical releases have ledme to revisit the future of Japan’spopulation. On December 20, 2006 theNational Institute of Population andSocial Security Research (NIPSSR)published its latest long-range forecast ofthe country’s population that showed,once again, a faster decline thanpreviously anticipated: the mediumvariant projects the total population ofonly about 90 million (89.93) people by2055, the figure that both Asahi Shimbunand Mainichi Shimbun found “shocking”[1]. On March 13, 2007 the UnitedNations Population Division (UNPD)revealed the latest revision of its officiallong-range population estimates andprojections with detailed forecasts for allof the world’s countries up to the year2050 [2]. And on March 22, 2007 theMinistry of Internal Affairs andCommunications published its latestnationwide estimate of Japan’s population[3].

As the country’s census takes place everyfive years on October 1 (during the yearsending with 0 and 5) these official

intercensal numbers are cued to thatdate [4]. As of October 1, 2006 Japan had127,769,500 people, just 1,500 more thana year earlier. But the number ofJapanese had actually declined by 50,500while that of foreign nationals (totaling1,615,000) increased by 52,000. Thismeans that 2006 was the second year inwhich Japan’s population declined, theindisputable beginning of a long-expectedtrend. Japan’s population (includingforeign residents) peaked in December2004 at 127,838,000 people and only astunning, not just surprising, turn ofdemographic fortunes can prevent thecombination of relatively rapid populationdecline and of unprecedented aging ofthe country’s population.

This trend has been anticipated, as itturned out rather accurately, since 1992.Between 1947 and 1957 Japan’s totalfertility rate (TFR) was more than halved,from 4.54 to 2.04; between 1957 and1973 i t s t agna ted c l o se t o thereplacement level, and in 1973 itresumed (at a slower rate) its seculardecline [5]. Little was made of this duringthe 1980s as nearly all of Japan’s socio-economic indicators were then pointingrelentlessly toward greater prosperityand a greater role in global affairs.Japan’s media noticed only when the TFRsank to an all-time low of 1.57 in 1989,

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and after another low (1.53) was reachedin 1991 the Institute of PopulationProblems concluded that the continuationof this trend would see the beginning ofpopulation decline by about 2005 andhalving of the total population size withina century [6].

Japan is not unique in facing a shrinkingand aging population as most of theEuropean countries have seen verysimilar rates of falling TFR, and as manyof them, most notably Italy [7], anticipatepopulation declines and hardly lessworrisome rates of aging and increases ofdependency ratios (children andretirees/economically active population).But, as in other instances of economicand social trends (persistence of Japan’svery low interest rates and the extent andduration of stock market collapse are twoobvious post-1989 examples), theexpected continuation of Japan’spopulation decline and aging will take thecountry into an unprecedented, and trulyextreme, demographic territory, makingit an involuntary global pioneer of a newsociety.

The UNPD’s latest medium forecast for2050 envisages 102.51 million Japanese,the lowest expected total of the biannualseries, and 10 million below the mediumvariant of the 2004 revision that put thetotal at 112.19 million [8]. UNPD’s latestlow variant forecasts for Japan’spopulation in 2050 is just 88.65 millionand the high estimate 118.27 million,ranging from 13.5% below to 15.3%above the mean value. The mediumvariant of the forecast prepared by theNational Institute of Population and

Social Security Research (NIPSSR) in2002 put the 2050 total at 100.59 million,and the low and the high estimates at,respectively, 92.03 and 108.25 million, atighter range of just -8.5% and +7.6% [9].If these forecasts prove accurate, thenJapan’s population will have charted onlya slightly asymmetrical arc (peaking in2004) during the 100 years between 1950and 2050 (Fig. 1), and the total of about100 million would mean that the country,now the world’s tenth most populousnation, would not even rank among thetop 15 in 2050 [10].

Fig. 1. Japan’s past and future population:1950-2050 arc.

Source: NIPSSR 2006 (ref. 12).

The loss of more than 25 million peopleby the year 2050 will have numerousinternal repercussions. Most obviously, itwill further accelerate the alreadysubstantial decline and demise of villagesand small towns as the countrysidedepopulates and as the populationconcentrates even more in a fewextensive conurbations [11]. But asmaller population does not have to havea commensurate negative effect on a

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country’s international standing andhistorical evidence confirms that therehas been no obvious (and not even astatistically faintly discernible) linkbetween the size of a nation’s populationand the imprint it has left on the courseof human affairs. City states of classicGreece, renaissance Florence and earlymodern Venice are among the extremeexamples of social, political, cultural andmilitary influence that was quiteincommensurable with small populationsof these elite polities, while East Asiaprovides some excellent post-1950examples of relatively small societiesgaining worldwide renown for theireconomic prowess (Hong Kong,Singapore, Taiwan).

Consequently, there is no inherent reasonwhy Japan of 100 million could notcontinue to exert influence that goes farbeyond its share of global populationwhich will be most likely just 1% by 2050(it is nearly 2% today). After all, Japan ofabout 47 million defeated Russia in 1905,Japan of 67 million launched its attack onChina in 1931, Japan of 72 millionfatefully challenged the United States in1941 while Japan of 100 million emergedas a new g loba l manufactur ingsuperpower during the 1960s [12].Japan’s fundamental population problemwill not be the loss of 25 (or perhaps even35) million people by 2050, but anunprecedented aging of its populationthat will accompany this decline. Thisaging will result from the combination ofwhat appears to be a permanently lowTFR and continuing gains in l i feexpectancy.

Japan’s TFR has been below 1.3 since2003, and given the entrenched trendstoward less marriage and later marriageage [13] and consequently higher age ofthe first birth (now at 30 years), it ishighly unlikely that TFR could be revivedenough to reach at least 1.8-1.9, or just10-15% below the replacement level. Infact, the medium variant of the latestNIPSSR forecast assumes TFR of just1.26 in 2055 (Fig. 2).

Fig. 2. Japan’s total fertility rate, 1950-2050.Plotted from data in

Ogawa and Retherford (ref. 5) and Kaneko et al.(ref. 1).

As for increasing longevity, Japan has ledthe global ranking for decades, and thiswill almost certainly continue. Thecountry’s median age is expected toincrease by a decade, from just over 43years in 2007 to more than 52 years in2050 (it was just 22 years in 1950), andNIPSSR forecasts Japan’s life expectancyto rise from 78.3 years for males and 85.5years for females in 2007 to, respectively,80.95 and 89.22 years by 2050; menwould thus gain about 2.6 years, women

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3.7 years. According to NIPSSR’smedium variant, by 2050 about 36% ofJapanese will be older than 65 years, theUNPD’s medium variant puts that shareat almost 38%, and NIPSSR’s low varianthas it as high as 39% (in 2000 their sharew a s 1 7 . 4 % i n 2 0 0 6 2 0 . 5 % ) .(file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Yayoikoi/Desktop/New%20Folder/smil.j.pop.send.doc.htm#_msocom_1) Japan’sunprecedented rate of aging is bestillustrated by comparing the country’sage-sex distribution as it has shifted froma pyramidal shape characteristic ofsocieties with high TFR (graphs for 1930and 1950) to a barrel-shaped profile by2000 and to a cudgel-like distribution by2050 (Fig. 3).

(file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Yayoikoi/Desktop/New%20Folder/smil.j.pop.send.doc.htm#_msocom_1)

(file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Yayoikoi/Desktop/New%20Folder/smil.j.pop.send.doc.htm#_msocom_1)

Fig. 3. Changes of Japan(file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Yayoikoi/Desktop/New%20Folder/smil.j.pop.send.doc.htm#_msocom_1)’s age-sex population distribution,

1930-2050.An animated version of these distributions is

available(file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Yayoikoi/Desktop/New%20Folder/smil.j.pop.send.doc.htm

#_msocom_1)here(http://www.ipss.go.jp/site-ad/TopPageData/Pyram

id_a.html).

This shift will mean that by 2050 thecountry would have about 3.3 times asmany people 65 and older as children ofless than 14 years of age. That alonewould be a remarkable transformation –-in 2006 that ratio was less than 1.5 –- butthe reality would have some even morestunning elements. According to thelatest UNPD forecast in 2050 Japan’spopulation of people 80 years and oldercould be 37% larger than that of thecountry’s children. There is, of course, noprecedent in history for a populationwhere the numbers of octo- andnonagenarians would surpass those ofchildren. By 2050 Japan could havenearly 5 million people in their 90s andthere could be more than half a million ofcentenarians, some 90% of them women.

And it is a very safe bet (contrary to sci-fi-like claims of the coming era of healthyaging and life spans reaching into 120s)that most of these very old people willneed considerable help. A recent study of304 Tokyo centenarians (using standardassessment methods to classify physicaland mental functions) provided arevealing glimpse of reality [14]. Just five

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individuals (less than 2%) were in theexceptional category, with all of theirfunctions graded as excellent. About 15%were normal, that is maintaining goodcognitive ability and mobility. But 55%were frail, impaired either cognitively orphysically, and 25% were fragile, withmuch deteriorated physical and mentalfunctions. There is no need to belabor thepublic health aspects of this situation.This enormous challenge will come ontop of exorbitant pension obligations andeconomic challenges (including changesin savings and investment rates), asaddressed in a number of recentpublications [15].

Japan’s old-age dependency ratio(assuming the productive age populationbetween 15 and 54 years of age) will soarf rom 0 .32 in 2007 ( tha t i s 3 .08economically active persons per retiree)to 0.66 in 2050, or just 1.5 productiveworkers per retired person. By far themost effective step to address thischal lenge would be to ra ise ther e t i r e m e n t a g e t o 6 9 .(file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Yayoikoi/Desktop/New%20Folder/smil.j.pop.send.doc.htm#_msocom_2)Old-agedependency ratio for the productive agebetween 20 and 69 years of age wouldstill more than double, from 0.23 in 2007to 0.51 in 2050, but the latter figurewould obviously translate into a muchless onerous ratio of nearly two employedpeople per retiree.

Population decline and aging areprojected to continue during the secondhalf of the 21st century: by 2100 Japan’spopulation of less than 65 million would

be back to the total it reached in 1930,shortly before the invasion of China. Suchvery long-range forecasts can be wide ofthe mark –- but the forecasts looking justa generation ahead can be expected to befairly accurate, and in Japan’s case thegeneration is now 30, rather than 20 or25, years. Most of the Japanese femalesthat will give birth during that period arealready alive, and hence the only twofactors that could shift the projectiondrastically are either a surge in fertility(a highly unlikely shift in today’s Japan)or a catastrophic spell of mortality( c a u s e d b y a p a n d e m i c o r a nextraordinary natural disaster). Or, ofcourse, a change that is not at all a partof Japan’s official long-range populationforecasts: an open door to large-scaleimmigration from neighboring countries.

Consequently, there is a very highprobability that Japan of 2037 willcontinue along the down slope of itsgrand secular population arc (see Fig. 1)while its population becomes moregeriatric than that of any other society inhistory. Readers young enough to bealive three decades from now will have afascinating opportunity to judge if thattrend will prove to be more challenging,indeed more crippling, for Japanesesociety than the one on which the US hasbeen embarked on for a generation, thatis the continuation of relatively vigorouspopulation growth based on substantiallegal, but above all on far more massive(and seemingly uncontrollable) illegal,immigration.

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Vaclav Smil is Distinguished Professor,University of Manitoba, Canada. Hisinterdisciplinary research has roamedbroadly over issues of environment,energy, food, population, economics, andpolicy studies.

He wrote this article for Japan Focus.Posted on April 19, 2007.

For another important report on Japanesepopulation, see Roger Goodman andSarah Harper, Japan in the New GlobalDemography: Comparative Perspectives(http://japanfocus.org/products/details/2472)

Notes

[1] This projection will be eventuallyposted on the NIPSSR website. It is nowavailable only in a journal article inJapanese: Kaneko, R. et al. 2007.Population projection for Japan:2006-2055, with Long - range PopulationProjections: 2056-2105. Jinko mondaikenkyu (Journal of Population Problems63(1): 29-71. For the reaction see:Foreign Press Center Japan. Projection ofa 30% population drop by 2055 alarmsJ a p a n . D e c e m b e r 2 5 , 2 0 0 6 .(http://www.fpcj.jp/e/mres)

[2] United Nations Population Division(UNPD). 2007. World PopulationProspects : The 2006 Rev i s ion .(http://esa.un.org/unpp/) New York:UNPD.

[3] Population in 2006 hovers around 128m i l l i o n(http://www.japantoday.com/jp/news/401

563). Japan Today, March 27, 2007.

[4] Preliminary results of the October 1,2005 census showed the total of 127.76million.

[5] Ogawa, N. and R.D. Retherford. 1993.The resumption of fertility decline inJapan: 1973-92. Populat ion andDevelopment Review 19:703-741.

[6] Institute of Population Problems.1992. Population Projections for Japan:1991-2090. Tokyo: Ministry of Health andWelfare.

[7] OECD. 2004. Ageing and EmploymentPolicies – Italy. Paris: OECD.

[8] UNPD. 2005. World PopulationProspects: The 2004 Revision. New York:UNPD.

[9] National Institute of Population andSocial Security Research (NIPSSR). 2002.Population Projections for Japan:2001-2050. Tokyo: NIPSSR.

[10] In 1950 Japan had the world’s fifthlargest population (China, India, USSR,USA, Japan). In 2007 its population wassurpassed by those of China (1329million), India (1169), USA (306),Indonesia (232), Brazil (192), Pakistan(164), Bangladesh (159), Nigeria (148)and Russia (142 million). By 2050 thecountries ahead of Japan will also includeCongo, Ethiopia, Philippines, Mexico,Egypt and Vietnam.

[11] Depopulation of rural Japan isalready starkly evident not only inregions remote from major cities whereentire villages are nearing abandonment

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and where shrinking population forcesmunicipalities to merge in order to boosttheir tax base: a few years ago I wasoffered (if I agreed to move in) a large,well-built house on a wooded slopeoverlooking a lovely valley in a smallvillage only a little more than one hournorth of Kyoto that had already lost itspost office, its elementary school and allbut a score of its aging inhabitants. Seealso: Onishi, N. “Aging and officialabandonment carries a Japanese villaget o e x t i n c t i o n . ” J a p a n F o c u sjapanfocus.org/products/details/2003

[12] Past population totals are takenfrom: NIPSSR. 2006. PopulationS t a t i s t i c s o f J a p a n 2 0 0 6(http://www.ipss.go.jp/p-info/e/PSJ2006.pdf). Tokyo: NIPSSR. (this is a massive20.9 Mb file). In 1964, the year of TokyoOlympics and of the first shinkansen,Japan had 97 million people, and thecount topped 100 million three yearslater.

[13] Retherford, R.D., N. Ogawa and R.Matsukara. 2001. Late marriage and lessmarriage in Japan. Population andDevelopment Review 27: 65-102.

[14] Gondo, Y. et al. 2006. Functionalstatus of centenarians in Tokyo, Japan:Developing better phenotypes ofexceptional longevity. Journals ofGerontology Series A - BiologicalSc iences and Medica l Sc iences61(3):305-310.

[15] Coulmas, F. 2007. PopulationDecline and Ageing in Japan: The SocialConsequences. New York: Routledge;MacKellar, L. et al. 2004. The EconomicImpacts of Population Ageing in Japan.Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar;Okamoto, A. 2004. Tax Policy for AgingSocieties: Lessons from Japan. New York:Springer-Verlag; Traphagan, J.W. and J.Knight, eds. 2003. Demographic Changeand the Family in Japan’s Aging Society.Albany, NY: State University of New YorkPress. See also: Masaki, H. 2006. Japanstares into a demographic abyss(file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Yayoikoi/Desktop/New%20Folder/japanfocus.org/products/details/1864). JapanFocus