The Journal o f Value Inquiry 19:153-154 (1985). �9 1985 Martinus Ni/hoffPublishers, Dordreeht. Printed in the Netherlands.

THE USES AND ABUSES OF UTILITY: A REPLY TO SLEINIS

RICHARD FARR University of Reading

E.E. Sleinis (Journal o f Value lnquiry 16, 7 5 - 7 7 ) lays claim to a "quite devastating object ion" against utilitarianism. This would be news indeed: in fact, however, the objection only - and literally - devastates itself.

Sleinis imagines the circumstances of a utilitarian in a non-utilitarian society which is upset by his views to such an extent that utility would be better served if he renounced them.

What ought the utilitarian to do? The question brooks no equivocation. He ought as a utili tarian to give up his utilitarianism. If he cannot do so by act of will, then he ought to put himself in the hands of a good brainwasher.

This case is surely fatal to utilitarianism. It articulates an empirically pos- sible case in which a utilitarian on purely utilitarian grounds would be en- joined to abandon utilitarianism~

Well. To be precise, three options may be open to anyone who finds himself up this particular creek:

(1) He can actually renounce utilitarianism. But that someone's utilitarianism has negative util i ty cannot of itself be the reason for his rejection of it: he will only actually reject it if he decides that it is mistaken. Sleinis assumes that one follows from the other in the present case; as we shall see, this is a confusion.

(2) He can pretend to renounce utilitarianism. Assuming that he can bring it off, why won' t this do? Given that the alleged reason for (1) is a utilitarian reason - the consideration of disutility - a perfect deception is equally acceptable since it has the same consequences. But of course to feign renunciation is not to re- nounce.

This shows that the disutility of utilitarianism is not a sufficient condition for its falsehood.

(3) I f insufficiently confident of his Thespian talents to contemplate (2), he should get brain-washed. But notice that this cannot constitute rejecting consequentialism. First, the only reason he has for allowing someone to tamper with his brain is a

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reason of consequence: but then the act of submitting to this ordeal is proof that his views are unchanged. Secondly, it would clearly be incorrect to say after the event that he now rejects his former views. Certainly they have been hidden well, perhaps even from him; but it is not correct, now, to assert that he holds any moral view o f his o w n at all. Brain-washing isn't a subtle kind of rational persuasion: on the contrary, it's brain-washing.

A utilitarian acts as he does for utilitarian reasons: he does not have it in his power to believe what he does for utilitarian reasons. If he remains a utilitarian, he will react to the disutility of this fact in a utilitarian fashion - because he is a

utilitarian, having been unconvinced of any contrary view. If, on the other hand, he actually has been persuaded that utilitarianism is false, then his reasons for acting are no longer the same. And if that has happened we can't say anything at all about what the ex-utilitadan ought to do until we know what moral principles he is converted to. Sleinis not only can't have it both ways; he can't have it either way.

In fact his case collapses a little further still, because if the non-utilitarian popu- lation is rational enough to understand the utilitarian's position as I have described it they may just decide to put up with him as he is: If they are only offended by the espousal of utilitarianism, they will hope he opts for (2) or (3), but they will be aware that in these cases nobody has really changed their opinion. If, on the other hand, they can't even cope with the thought of there being a closet-utilitarian in their midst, only (1), an actual change of opinion, will suffice to satisfy them. But, as I have said, they can't bring about this change by making pointed references to utilitarianism's disutility; rather, they need to adduce some argument to show that it is mistaken. And of all the possible candidates for this job of persuasion, the only one which may be discounted from the start is, precisely, the one with a utilitarian premise: the disutility of utilitarianism, far from providing a "de- vastating objection", is the one consideration which must be irrevocably useless as a basis for deciding whether we Ought or ought not be utilitarians - since in an argument 'for', consideration of utility creates a circularity, and, conversely, re- liance on it renders any argument 'against' self-defeating.