The War for Helmand, 2006-11

Task Force Tour Size

16 bde Apr-Oct 06 3,150 (4,500)

3 cdo Oct 06-Apr 07 5,200

12 mech Apr-Oct 07 6,500

52 bde Oct 07-Apr 08 7,750

16 bde Apr-Oct 08 8,530

3 cdo Oct 08-Apr 09 8,300

Helmand

First Cut

From enemy-focused to population-centric

Focus on fighting, 2006-07

• 16 bde: ‘attrition of Taliban forces’

• 3 Cdo: ‘keeping the Taliban at bay’

• 12 Mech: taking the offensive

Brigade Troops in contact

16 Air Assault 537

3 Commando RM 821

12 Mechanised 1096

52 brigade: new approach

• Prize = the population

• Main effort = win their consent

• Approach = rebalance kinetic and non-kinetic activity

Explaining change

1. New people, new ideas2. Switch in Taliban tactics3. Increased resources

Task Force Tour Size

16 bde Apr-Oct 06 3,150 (4,500)

3 cdo Oct 06-Apr 07 5,200

12 mech Apr-Oct 07 6,500

52 bde Oct 07-Apr 08 7,750

16 bde Apr-Oct 08 8,530

3 cdo Oct 08-Apr 09 8,300

More please…

Second cut

Evolution of British approach

Game changer

The War for Helmand, 2006-11

Top 5 takeaways

1. Boots on the ground

This is the main COIN platform

Small wars require big armies

Flooding the South

Afghans want these guys

ANSF numbers

The best counterinsurgents

2. Unity of command

The man and his plan

3. Bloody business

COIN requires MCO

No pain, no gain

Best avoid big battles in towns

4. The bad guys

…ain’t 10 feet tall

The other side of the Hill

5. The 80%

Developing COIN capability

Security first, governance foremost