the works of john lockes

8/8/2019 The Works of John Lockes

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W O R K SOF

J O H N L O C K E ,I N N I N E VOLUMES.

---cL.

THE TWELFTH EDITIOS.

V O L U M E T H E T H I R D .

LONDON:


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C. Baldwlo, Printer,New Bridge Streef, Londoa


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C O N T E N T SOF T H I S

V 0 L U M E.PAGEA LETTER to the Right Rev. Edward Lord Bishop ofWorcester, concerning some Passages relating to Mr.Lockes Essay of Human Understanding, in a lateDiscourse of his Lordships in Vindication of theTrinity.. ........................................ 1Mr. Lockes Reply to the Bishop of Worcesters Answer

to his Letter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97An Answer to Remarks upon an Essay concerning HumanUnderstanding .................................. 1%Mr. Lockes Reply to the Bishop of Worcesters Answerto his second Letter ..............................91Index.


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A

L E T T E RTO TH E RIGHT REVEREND

E D W A R D ,LORD BISHOP OF WORCESTER,

COSCEHHING SOME PASSAGES RELATISO TO

MR. LOCKES ESSAY OF HUMAN UNDERSTANDING.

IN A

LATE DISCOURSE OF HIS LORDSHIPS, IN VINDICATIONOF THE TRINITY.

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TOL. 111. B


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4 M r. Lockes Let teF to theTr in i ty ; and, I hope, I may say, have gone a littleou t of your w ay t o do me that kindness : for the obli-gation is thereby the greater. A nd if your lordshiphas brought in the mention of my book in a chapter,intitled, Objections against the Trin ity, in Po int ofReason, answered ; when, in my whole Essay, I thinkthere is not to be found any th ing like an objectionagainst the T rinity : I have the more to acknowledget o your lordship, who would not let th e foreignness ofthe subject hinder your lordship from endeavouring toset me right, as to some errours your lordship appre-hends in my book ; when other writers using some no-tions like mine, gave you that which was occasionenough for you t o do me the favour to tak e notice ofwhat you dislike in my Essay.Your lordships name is of so great autho rity in thelearned world, that I who proess myself more ready,upon conviction, t o recant, than I was a t first to pub-lish, my mistakes, cannot pay that respect is due to it,witho ut telling the reasons why I still retain any of mynotions, after your lordships having appeared dissatisfiedwith them. Thi s must be my apology, and I hope sucha one as your lordship will allow, for my examiningwhat you have printed against several passages in mybook, and my showing the reasons why it has not pre-vailed with me to quit them.T h a t your lordships reasonings may lose none ofthei r force by my misapprehending or misrepresentingthem (a way too familiarly used in writings th a t havean y appearance of controversy), I shall crave leave togive th e reader your lordships arguments in the fullstrength of your own expressions ; that so in them hemay have th e advantage to see the deficiency of mypnswers, in any point where I shall be so unfortunateas not t o perceive, or not to follow, the light your lord-ship affords me.Your lordship having in the two cr three precedingpages, justly, as 1 hink, found fault with th e account ofreason, given by theu ni tar ian s and a la te writer, in thosepassages you quote ou t of them ; nd then coming to thenature of substance, and relating what tha t author has


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% ~ i s n o p f Woriester. 5said concerning the minds getting of simple ideas, andthose simple ideas being the sole matte r and foundation.of all our reasonings ; your lordship thus concludes,

C c Then it follows, that we can have no foundation ofcc reasoning, where there can be no such ideas fromct sensation or reflection.

$ N o w this is the case of substance; it is not intro-cc mitted by the senses, nor depends upon the operationc c of the mind ; and so it cannot be within the compass


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6 Mr. Locke's Letter t o th echapter, which you have cited more than once, whereyaur lordship will find these words :

c' When we talk 01' think of an y parti-Human un-aterstanding," cular sort of corporeal substances, as horse,B.5. c. 23. (( stone, &c. though the idea we have of$ 4. " either of theiu be but the complication OP'' collection of those several simple ideas of sensible6' qualities which we used to find united in the thin g6' called horse or stone ; y6t because we cannot conceive6 how they should subsist alone, nor one in another, we'6 suppose them existing in, and supported by some'6 common subject, which support we denote by the6' name substance; though it be certain we have no6 clear and distinct idea of that thing we suppose a' support." And again,('The same happens concerning the ope-"rations of the mind, viz. thinking, reason-5." ing, fearing, &c. which we considering not to subsist6c of themselves, nor apprehending how they can belong" o body, or be produced by it, we are ap t to think" hese the actions of some other substance, which we'6 call spirit : whereby yet it is evident, th a t having no( 6 other idea or notion of matter, but something wherein"tho se many sensible qualities which affect our senses," do subsist ; by supposing a substance, wherein think-'' ing, knowing, doubting, and a power of moving, & c.6' do subsist, we have as clear a notion of the nature or'6 substance of spirit, as we have of body ; he one being'csupposed to be (without knowing what it is) the" substratum to those simple ideas we have from with-$6 out ; and the other supposed (with a like ignorance'6 of what it is) to he the substratum to those opera-'( ions, which we experiment in ourselves within."And again, '' Whatever therefore be the secret nature'(of substance in general, all the ideas we have6.6 of particular distinct substances are nothing but seve-'6 ra l combinations of simple ideas, co-existing in such,$6 though unknown, cause of their union, as makes the4~ whole subsist of itself.''


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&hop ofWwiwten YAad I further say in the same taction, 6' That w&rsuppose these combinations to lest in, and to be ad-heren t to tha t unknown, common subject, which in-'< heres not in an y thing else. A nd tha t our complex'( deas of substances, besides all those simple ideas th ey" are m ade up of, have always th e confused idea ofsomething to which they belong, an d in which they" subsist : and therefore when we speak of any sort of(' ubstance, we say it is a thing having such an d such' 6 qualities ; a body is a thing that is extended, figured,(' nd capable of motion ; a spirit, a thing capable of'( hinking."These, and the like fashions of speaking, intimate,th at the substance is supposed always something, besidesthe extension, figure, solidity, motion, thinking, orother observable idea, though we know not what it io.

' I Our idea of body, I say, is an extended, B, c. %3,cc solid substance ; and our idea of our souls 5 29,(' s of a substance that thinks."as long as there is any such thing as body or spirit in th eworld, I have done no thing towards th e discarding sub-stance out of the reasonable part of the world. Nay , aslong as there is any simple idea or sensible quality left,according to my way of arguing, substance cannot bediscarded ;because all simple ideas, all sensible qualities,carry with them a supposition of a substratum to existin, and of a substance wherein they inhere : and of thisth a t whole chapter is so full, tha t I challenge any onewho reads it to think I have almost, or one jo t dis-carded substance ou t of the reasonable part of the world.And of this man, horse, sun, water, iron, diamond, &c.which I have mentioned of distinct sorts of substancesywill be my witnesses as long as any such th ing remainsin being ; of which I say, cc that the ideas h. ii," of substances are such combinations of 8 6." simple ideas, as are taken to represent'( istinct, particular things, subsisting by themselves," n which the supposed or confused idea of substance'( s always t he first arid chief."If by almost discarding substance out of the s w u a b l epart of the world your lordship means, I that I h i r e ,&

So t h a t

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g M9*.Lockes -Letter66 thestroyed, and almost discarded the tru e idea we have ofB. ii. e. 23. it, by calling it ( substratum, a suppsi- 1. tion of we know not what support of 2. * such qualities as a re capable of producing 3. simple ideas in us; an obscure and re-( ative idea : that without knowing what3.5. c. 13. 19.

$6 it is, it is th at which supports accidents ;cc so t ha t of substance we have no idea of what it is, but only a confused and obscure one, of what i t does ; Imust confess this, and th e like I have said of our idea ofsubstance : and should be very glad to be convinced byy6ur lordship, or any body else, th at I have spoken toomeanly of it. He th a t would show me a more clear anddistinct idea of substance, would do me a kindness Ishould tha nk him for. B ut this is th e best I can hithertofind, either in my own thoughts, or in the books oflogicians : for their account or idea of i t is, tha t i t is6 Ens, or c res per se subsistens e t substans acciden-t ibus ; which in effect is no more, but th a t substance isa being or thin g; or, in short, something they know no twha t, or of which they have no clearer idea, than t ha t itis som ething which supports accidents, or oth er simpleideas or modes, and is not supported itself as a mode oran accident. So tha t I do not see bu t Burgersdicius,Sanderson, an d th e whole t ribe of logicians, must bereckoned with u the gentlemen of this new way of reasoning, who have almost discarded substance out(c of the reasonable part of the world.But supposing, m y lord, tha t I, or these gentlemen,logicians of note in the schools, should own, that t ehave a very imperfect, obscure, inadequate idea of sub-stance: would it not be a little too hard to charge uswith discarding substance out of the world? For whatalmost discarding, and reasonable part of the world,signify3I must confess I do no t clearly comprehend :butlet almost, and reasonable part, signify here what theywill, for I dare say your lordship meant something bythem, would no t your lordship think you were a littletoo hardly dealt with, if for acknowledging yourself to,have 8 very imperfect an d inadequate idea of God, or ofseveral other things which, in this very treatise, you


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'Bishopof JYorcesteP. 9confess our understanding% come short in and cannotcomprehend, you should be accused to be one of thesegentlemen that have almost discarded God, or thoseother mysterious things, whereof you contend we havevery imperfect and inadequate ideas, out of the reason-able wo rld? F o r I suppose your lordship means byalmost discarding out of the reasonable world somethingtha t is blameable, for it seems not to be inserted for acommendation ; and yet I think he deserves no blame,who owns the having imperfect, inadequate, obscureideas, where he has no better : however, if i t be inferredfrom thence, that either he almost excludes those thingsout of being, or out of rational discourse, if that bemeant by the reasonable world ; for the first of thesewill not hold, because the being of things in the worlddepends not on our ideas : the latter indeed is true, insome degree, but is no fau lt ; far it is certain, thatwhere we have imperfect, inadequate, confused, obscureideas, we caunot discourse and reason about those thingsso well, fully, and clearly, as if we had perfect, adequate,clear and distinct ideas.Your lordship, I must own, with great reason, takesnotice that I paralleled, more than once, our idea ofsubstance with the Indian philosopher's he-knew-not-what, which supported the tortoise, &c.This repetition is, I confess, a fault in exact writing:but 1 have acknowledged and excused i t in these wordsin my preface, '' I am not ignorant how little I herein(' onsult my own reputation, when I knowingly let my" Essay go with a fault so apt to disgust the most judi-IC cious, who are always the nicest readers." And therefurther add, c c that I did not publish m y Essay for such'' great masters of knowledge as your lordship ; but" itted it to men of my own size, to whom repetitions" might be sometimes useful." It would not thereforehave been besides pour lordship's generosity (who werenot intended to be provoked by the repetition) to havepassed by such a fault as this, in one who pretends notheyond th e lower ran k of writers. But I see your lord-ship would have me exact and without any faults; and I


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1 0 M r . Locke's Letter t o th ewish I could be so, th e better t o deserve your lordship'sapprobation.M y saying, '' hat when we talk of substance, we" alk like children ; who being asked a question aboutsomething, which they know not, readily give this" atistFctory aywer, that it is something ; yourlordship seems mightily to lay to heart, in these wordsth a t follow :

6G If this be the truth of the case, we must still talk'( ike children, and I know not how it can Be remedied.66 For if we cannot come at a rational idea of substance,Cc we can have no principle of certainty to go upon inthis debate."If your lordship has any better and distincter idea ofsubstance than mine is, which I have given an accountof, your lordship is not a t all concerned in what I havethere said. But those whose idea of substance, whethera rational or not rational idea, is like mine, som ethinghe-knows-not-what, must in that, with me, talk likechildren, when they speak of something they know notwhat. For a philosopher that says, th a t which supportsaccidents is something he-knows-not-what ; and acou ntrym an th at says, the foundation of th e church a tHarlem is supported by something he-knows-not-what ;and a child that stands in the da rk upon his mother'smuff, and says he s tands upon something he-knows-not-what ; n this respect talk all three alike. But if thecountry-man knows, that the foundation of the church a tHarlem is supported by a rock, as the houses aboutBristol are ; or by gravel, as the houses about Londonare ; or by wooden piles, as the houses in Amsterdamare ; t is plain, th a t then having a clear and distinctidea of th e thing th a t supports the church, he does nottalk of this matte r as a child ;nor will he of the supportof accidents, when he has a clearer and more distinctidea of it, than that it is barely something. But aslong as we think like children, in cases where our ideasa re no clearer nor distincter than theirs, I agree withyour lordship, that I know not how it can be remedied,but that we must talk like them.

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Bishop of WorcesteC, 11Your lordships next paragraph begins thus : (( 1do

6 not say, th a t we can have a clear idea of substance,e it he r by sensation or reflection; bu t from hence I( 6 argue, tha t this is a very insufficient distribution of66 the ideas necessary to reason.Your lordship here argues against a proposition thatI know nobody that holds : I am sure the author of theEssay of H um an Unde rstanding never thought, nor inth at Essay ha th any where said, tha t the ideas th at comeinto th e mind by sensation and reflection, are all the ideasth at are necessary to reason, or th at reason is exercisedabout ; for then he must have laid by all the ideas ofsimple and mixed modes and relations, and the complexideas of the species of substances, about which he hasspent so many chapters ; and must have denied th atthese complex ideas are th e objects of mens thoughts orreasonings, which he is fa r enough from. All that hehas said about sensation and reflection is, th at all oursimple ideas are received by them, and th at these simpleideas are th e foundation of all our knowledge, for asmuch as all our coinplex, relative, and general ideas aremade by th e mind, abstracting, enlarging, comparing,compounding, and referring, &c. these simple ideas, andtheir several combinations, one to another ; wherebycomplex and general ideas are formed of modes, rela-tions, and the several species of substances, all whichare made use of by reason, as well as the other facultiesof the mind.I therefore agree with your lordship, that the ideas ofsensation or reflection is a very insufficient distributionof the ideas necessary to reason. Only my agreementwith your lordship had been more intire to th e wholesentence, if your lordship had ra ther said, ideas made useof by reason ;because I do not well know what is meantby ideas necessary to reason. F o r reason being a facultyof the mind, nothing, in my poor opinion, can properlybe said to be necessary to tha t faculty, bu t w hat is re-quired to its being. As nothing is necessary to sight ina man, but such a constitution of the body and organ,that a man m ay have the power of seeing ; so I submitit to your lordship, whether any thing can properly be


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19 M r, Lockes Xetter to t h esaid to be necessary t o reason in a m an, but such a con-stitution of body or mind, or both, as may give himth e power of reasoning. Indeed such a particular sortof objects or instruments may be sometimes said to lienecessary to the eye, but it is never said in reference toth e faculty of seeing, but in reference t o some particularend of seeing ; nd then a microscope and a mite m aybe necessary to the eye, if the end proposed be to knowthe shape and parts of that animal. And so if a manwould reaion about substance, then the idea of sub-stance is necessary to his reason: but yet I doubt notIwt th a t many a rational creature has been, who, in allhis life, never bethought himself of any necessity hisreason had of an idea of substance.Your lordships next words are ; li for besides these,sb there must be some general ideas which the mind doth6 form, not by mere comparing those ideas it has gotc 6 from sense or reflection, but by forining distinct ge-cL neral notions of things from particular ideas.Here, again, I perfectly agree with your lordship, thatbesides the particular ideas received from sensation andreflection, the mind forms general ideas, not by mere6c comparing those ideas it has go t by sensation and reflection; for this I do not remember I ever said.But this I say, ideas become general, by

cc separating froin them the circumstances of time and place, and any other ideas6-I C hat may determine them to this or th at particular( xistence. By this way of abstraction they are made,B. i. c. 11. &c. And to the same purpose I explain 9. myself in another place.You r lordship says, cc the mind forms general ideas,cc by forming general notions of things from particularc6 ideas. And I sap, the mind forms general ideas,cc abstracting from particular ones. So that there is nodifference tha t I perceive between us in th is matter, bu tonly a lit tle in expression.It follows, and amongst these general notions, or6 rational ideas, substance is one of the first ; becausec we find, that we can have no true conceptions of any(6 modes, r accidents (no matter which) but we must

B. ii. c. 3.


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'Bishop of IVorcester. 11' conceive a substratum, or subject wherein they are.'(Since it is a repugnancy to our first conceptions ofI' things, that modes or accidents should subsist by'' themselves ; and therefore the rational idea of sub-'' stance is one of the first and most natural ideas in our6 ' minds."Whether the general idea of substance be one of thefirst or most natural ideas in our minds, I will not dis-pute with your lordship, as not being, I think, verymaterial to th e matter in hand. B ut as to the idea ofsubstance, what i t is, and how we come by it, yourlordship says, (' t is a repugnancy to our conceptions of'' things, that modes and accidents should subsist by" hemselves ; and therefore we must conceive a sub-'' stratum wherein they are."And, I say, c c because we cannot con- B. i. c , 123 ,('ceive how simple ideas of sensible quali- 8 *,' I ties should subsist alone, or one in another,('we suppose them exis ting in, and supported by, some'' comnion subject." Which I, with yourlordship, call also substratum.W hat can be more consonant to itself, than w hat yourlordship and I have said in these two passages is conso-nan t to one anothe r? Whereupon, my lord, g've meleave, I beseech you, to boast to the world, that what Ihave said concerning our general idea of substance, andthe way how we come by it, has the honour to be con-t im e d by your lordship's authority. And tha t fromhence I may be sure the saying, [that the general ideawe have of substance is, t ha t it is a substratum or s u pport to modes or accidents, wherein they do subsist : andtha t th e mind forms it, because it cannot conceive howthey should subsist of themselves,] has no objection in itagainst th e Trinity ; or then your lordship w i l l not, Iknow, be of that opinion, nor own it in a chapter whereyou are answering objections against the Trinity ; how-ever my words, which amount to no more, have been (Iknow not how) brought into th a t chapter : though whatthey have to do there, I must confess to your lordship,I do not yet see.

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14 &lr. Locke's Letter t o th eIn the next words your lordship says, '( ut we are

'1 still told, th a t our understanding can have no other'' ideas but either from sensation or reflection."The words of that section your lordship quotes, arethese: '' the understanding seems to me,

" not to have the least glimmering of any'' ideas, which it doth not receive from one5.6 of these two. Ex terna l objects furnish th e mind*' with the ideas of sensible qualities, which a re all those''different perceptions they produce in u s : and the*' mind furnishes the understanding with ideas of its' own operations. These, when we have taken a fullI' survey of them, and their several modes, and the6 coinpositions made out of then), we shall find to con-'$ tain all our own stock of ideas ; and t hat we have no-'' thing in our minds which did not come in one of those6' two ways. Let any one examine his own thoughts,'' and thoroughly search into his own uuderstanding,6' and then let him tell me, whether all th e original6c ideas he has there, are any other tha n of th e objects" of his senses, or of the operations of his mind, con-'' sidered as objects of his reflection ? and how great a*' mass of knowledge soever he imagines to be lodged" here, he will, upon taking a strict view, see, that he'( as not any idea in his mind but what one of these" wo have imprinted, though, perhaps, with infinite'( ariety compounded and enlarged by th e understand-'' ing, as we shall see hereafter."These words seem to me to signify something difTe-rent from what your lordship has cited out of them ; ndif they do not, were intended, I am sure, by me, tosignify all those complex ideas of modes, relations, andspecific substances, which how the mind itself forms o u tof simple ideas, I have showed in the following part ofmy book ; and intended to refer to it by these words,'' as we shall see hereafter," with which I close thatparagraph. But if by ideas your lordship signifies simpleideas, in the words you have set down, 1 gran t then theycontain my sense, viz. " hat our understandings can'( ave (that is, in the natural exercise of our faculties)

B. i. c. 1.


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Bishop o Worcesfep. I$no other simple ideas, but either from Bemation org reflection.Your lordship goes on : ( nd [we are still told] th a t6 L herein chiefly lies the excellency of mankind above brutes, th a t these cannot abstract an d enlarge ideas,( s men do.H a d your lordship done me th e favour to have quotedthe place in my book, from whence you had taken thesewords, I should not have been a t a loss to find them.Those in my book, which I can remember any wherecome nearest to them, run thus :(This, I think, I may be positive in, tha t the power of abstracting is not at all in brutes ; and tha tu th e having of general ideas is tha t which puts a perfect distinction betwixt man an d brutes ; and s an excellency which the faculties ofcc brutes do by no means attain to.Though, speaking of the faculties of the humanunderstanding, I took occasion, by the by, to conjecturehow far brutes partook with men in any of the intel-lectual faculties : ye t it never entered into m y thoughts,on th a t occasion, to compare th e utmost perfections ofhuman nature with that of brutes, and therefore was farfrom saying, cc herein chiefly lies th e excellency of(mankind above brutes, th a t these cannot abstract and enlarge their ideas, as men do. For it seemsto me an absurdity I would not willingly be guilty of,to say, (( th a t th e excellency of mankind lies chiefly, or any ways in this, th a t brutes cannot abstract. Forbrutes no t being able to do an y thing, cannot be an yexcellency of mankind. T h e ability of mankind doesnot lie i n the impotency or disabilities of brutes. Ifyour lordship had charged me to have said, tha t hereinlies one excellency of mankind above brutes, viz. th a tmen can, and brutes cannot abstract; I must haveowned it to be my sense; but what I ought to sap towhat your lordship approved or disapproved of in it, Ishall bette r understand, when I know to what purposeyour lordship was pleased to cite it.The immediately following paragraph runs thus :I but how comes the general idea o f substance to be

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16 M i. Locke's Letter to thefram,ed in our minds? " Is this by ci abstracting and

'c enlarging simple ideas ? " no, but it isB. ii. 23. cc by a complication of many simple ideas4c together : because not imagining how'( hese simple ideas can subsist by themselves, we'' accustom ourselves to suppose some substratum

( 6 wherein they do subsist, and from whence they do'' result, which therefore we call substance." Andis this all indeed, tha t is to be said for the being ofsubstance, '' tha t we accustom ourselves to suppose aL~ substratum ? " Is that custom grounded upon truereason, or no t? If not, then accidents or modes must6 subsist of themselves, and these simple ideas need notortoise to support them : for figures and colours, &c.Cc would do well enough for themselves, but for some" fancies men have accustomed themselves to."Herein your lordship seems to charge me with twofaults; one, that I make '' the general idea of substance" to be framed, no t by abstracting and enlarging simple'' ideas, but by a complication of many simple ideas(' ogether: " the other, as if I had said, t he being of'substance had no other foundation but the fancies ofmen.A s to the first of these, I beg leave to remind yourlordship, that I say in more places than one, and parti-cularly those above quoted, where ex professo I treat ofabstraction and general ideas, th a t they are all made byabstracting ; and therefore could not be understood t omean, tha t that of substance was made any other way ;however m y pen might have slipped, or th e negligenceof expression, where I might have something else thanth e general idea of substance in view, make me seemto say so.T h a t I was no t speaking of th e general idea of sub-stance in the passage your lordship quotes, is manifestfrom the title of that chapter, which is, ';of th e com-ic plex ideas of substance.'' And the first section of it,which your lordship cites for those words you have setdown, stands thus :B. ii, c. 25, " The mind being, as I have declared, 1. ICurnished with a great n u m b of the

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Bishop of Worcester. 174 simple ideas conireyed in by the senses, as they a re'6 found in exterior things, or by reflections on its own6 operations : takes notice also, that a certain number66 of these simple ideas go constantly together ; which6' being presumed to belong to one thing, and wordsbeing suited to common apprehension, an d made use6 c of for quick dispatch, are called, so united in onecc subject, by one name; which, by inadvertency, we'' are apt afterward to talk of, and consider as one sim-'( le idea, which indeed is a complication of inany ideas'' ogether : because, as I have said, not imagining how'' these simple ideas can subsist by themselves, we ac-IC ustom ourselves to suppose some substratum, wherein" they do subsist, and from which they do result ;whichtherefore we call substance."In which words, I do not observe any t ha t deny thegeneral idea of substance to be made by abstraction;nor any th a t say, " it is made by a complication ofci many simple ideas together." B ut speaking in th a tplace of the ideas of distinct substances, such as man,horset gold, 85c. I say they are made up of certaincombinations of simple ideas ; which combinations arelooked upon, each of them , as one simple idea, thoughthey ar e m a n y ; and we call it by one name of sub-stance, though made u p of modes, from the custom ofsupposing a substratutn, wherein that combination doessubsist. So that in this paragraph I o d y give an ac-count of the idea of distinct substances, such as oak,elephant, iron, & c. how, though they are made up ofdistinct complications of modes, yet they are looked onas one idea, called by on e name, as making distinctsorts of substances.B u t tha t my notion of sullstance in general is quitedifferent from these, and has no such combination ofsimple ideas in it, is evident from the immediatelyfollowing words, where I s a y ; 'I the ideacc of pure substance in general is only a 8 2,'' supposition of we know not what support" of such qualities as are capable of producing simple" ideas in us." And these tw o I plainly distinguish allalong, particularly where I say, 6c whatever therefore

B. ii. c. 23.

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18 '' be th e secret and abstract nature of sub-" stance in general, all th e ideas we have of6.

6 particular distinct substances, are nothing but several4 combinations of simple ideas, co-existing in such,6 though unknown, cause of their union, as inakes the6 whole subsist of itself."T h e other thing laid to m y charge, is, as if I took thebeing of substance t o be doubtful, or rendered it SO bythe imperfect and ill-grounded idea I have given of it.T o which I beg leave to say, th a t I ground not the being,but th e idea of substance, on our accustoming ourselvest o suppose some substratum ; or it is of th e idea alone Ispeak there, and not of th e being of substance. Andhaving every whcre affirmed and built upon i t , tha t aman is a substance ; I cannot be supposed to question o rdoubt of the being of substance, till I can question ordoubt of my own being. Further I say, '' that sensa-

'' tion convinces us that there are solid" extended substances : and reflection, that. ii. c. 23.(' lierc are think ing ones." So tha t Ithink the being of substance is not shaken by what Ihave said : and if the idea of i t should be, ye t (the beingof things depending not on our ideas) the being ofsubstance would not be at all shaken by my saying, we

had but an obscure imperfect idea of it, and tha t tha tidea came from our accustoming ourselves to supposesome substratum ; r indeed, if I should say, we had noidea of substance at all. Fo r a grea t many things m aybe and are grante d to have a being, and be in nature, ofwhich we have no ideas. For example; i t cannot bedoubted but there are distinct species of separate spirits,of which we have no distinct ideas at all : it cannot bequestioncd but spirits have ways of communicatingtheir thoughts, and ye t we have no idea of i t a t all.The being then of substance being safe and secure,.notwithstanding any thing I have said, let us see whe-ther the idea of it be not so too. Y ou r lordship asks,with concern, " and is this all indeed th a t is to be said

for th e being" (if your lordship please, let it be theidea) '' of substance, that we accustom ourselves to'( uppose a substratum? Is that custom grounded

M r. tocke's Letter t o t h e

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II Bishop of JVorccster, 19' 6 upon true reason, or no? " I have said,tha t it is grounded upon this, '' ha t we can-'' not conceive how simple ideas of sensible" qualities should subsist alone, an d therefore we sup-'' pose them to exist i n , and to be supported by, some" common subject, which support we denote by the'(name substance." Which I think is a true reason,because it is the same your lordship grounds th e suppo-sition of a substratum on, in this very page ; even on" repugnancy to our conceptions, that inodes and acci-'' dents should subsist by themselves." So tha t I havethe good luck here again to agree with your lordship :and consequently conclude, I have your approbation inthis, th a t the substratum to inodes or accidents, whichis our idea of substance in general, is founded i n this," hat we cannot conceive how inodes or accidents can" subsist by themselves."

The words next following, are : rc if it be grounded(' pon plain and evident reason, then we must allow an" dea of substance, which comes not in by sensation or" reflection ; and so we may be certain of something" which we have not by those ideas."These words of your lordship's contain nothing, thatI see in them, against me: for I never said tha t th egeneral idea of substance comes in by sensation and re-flection; or, that it is a simple idea of sensation orreflection, though it be ultimately founded in them : fori t i s a complex idea, made up of the general idea ofsomething, or being, w ith t he relation of a support toaccidents. F o r general ideas come not into th e mindby sensation or reflection, but are the creatures or in-ventions of the understanding, as, I think, I B, iE. c, s*have shown; and also, how th e mind makesthem from ideas, which it has got by sensation and re-flection : and as to the ideas of relation, how the mindforms them, and how they are derived from, B. ii. c. 25 .and ultimately terminate in, ideas of sensa- 8ztion and reflection, I have likewise shown.But tha t I may not be mistaken what [ mean, whenI speak of ideas of sensation and reflection, as the ma-terials o f all our knowledge ; give me leave, my lord, ts

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Bishop of IVo cester. 81cc grounded upon plain and evident reason, then w emust allow an idea of substance, which comes not inby sensation or reflection :" This is a consequencewhich, with submission, I th ink will not hold, becauseit is founded on a supposition which, I think, will nothold, viz. th a t reason and ideas are inconsistent ; for iftha t supposition be not true, then the general idea ofsubstance may be grounded on plain and evident reason :and yet it will not follow from thence, that it is no tultimately grounded on, and derived from, ideas whichcome in by sensation or reflection, and so cannot be saidto come in by sensation or reflection.T o explain myself, and clear my meaning in thismatter : all the ideas of all th e sensible qualities of acherry, come into my mind by sensation ; the ideas ofperceiving, think ing, reasoning, knowing, &c. comeinto my mind by reflection : the ideas of these qrialitiesand actions, or powers, are perceived by the mind to beby themselves inconsistent with existence ; or, as yourlordship well expresses it, " we find that we can haveno true conception of any modes or accidents, but we" must conceive a substratum or subject, wherein they'< are ; i. e. th a t they cannot exist or subsist of them-selves. Hence the mind perceives their necessary con-nesion with inherence or being supported ; which Iieinga relative idea superadded to the red colour in a cherry,or to th inking in a man, the mind frames the correlativeidea of a support. For I never denied, that the mindcould frame to itself ideas of relation, but have showedthe quite contrary in my chapters about relation. Butbecause a relation cannot be founded in nothing, or bethe relation of nothing, and the thing here related as asupporter or support, is not represented to the mind byany clear and distinct idea ; therefore th e oh cure, in-distinct, vague idea of thing or something, is all that isleft to be th e positive idea, which has th e relation of asupport or substratum to inodes or accidents; and thatgeneral determined idea of something, is, by the all-straction of the mind, derived also from the simple ideasof sensation and reflection : and thus the mind, from thepositive, simple ideas got Iiy sensation or reflection,


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8 1 Mr. Lockes Letter to t h ecomes to the general relative idea of substance ; which,without the positive simple ideas, it would never have.

This your lordship (without giving Ly retail all theparticular steps of th e mind in this business) has wellex pr es ed in this more familiar way :(6 W e find we can have no t rue conception of any

c modes 01 accidents, but we must conceive a substra- 6 turn or subject wherein they are ; since it is a repug-(6 nancy to our conceptions of things, that modes or6 accidents should subsist by themselves.Hence your Iordsfiip calls it th e rational idea of sub-stance : and says, (I grant that by sensation and re-

6 flection we come to know the powers and properties(6 of things : but our reason is satisfied th a t there must( r be something beyond these, because i t is impossilile(6 that they should subsist by themselves. So tha t ifthis be th a t which your lordship means by the rationalidea of substance, I see nothing there is in it againstwhat I have said, th a t it is founded on simple ideas ofsensation or reflection, and that it is a very obscureidea.Your lordships conclusion from your foregoingwords, is, c L and so we may be certain of some things6 which we have not by those ideas ; which is a pro-position, whose precise meaning your lordship mill for-give me if I profess, as it stands there, I do not under-stand, For it is uncertain to me, whether your lordshipmeans, we may certainly know the existence of some-thing which we have not by those ideas ; or certainlyknow the distinct properties of something which wehave not by those ideas ; or certainly know th e truth ofsome proposition which we have not by those ideas : fort o be certain of something, may signify either of these.B u t in which soever of these it be meant, I do not seehow I am concerned in it.P o u r lordships n e s t paragraph is as followeth :

(6 The idea of substance, we are told again, is no-sc thing but the supposed, but unknown support of(6 those qualities we find existing, which we imaginecannot subsist, sine re substante; which, according tothe true import of the word, is in plain English


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Bishop of Worcester. 9%' 4 standing under or upholding. But very little weight' is to be laid upon a bare grammatical etymology,6 when th e word is used in another sense by th e best('authors, such as Cicero and Quintilian; who take' substance for the same as essence, 8s Valla hathGc proved; and so th e Greek word imports : B u t Boe-thius, in translating Aristotle's Predicaments, rather(' hose the word substance, as more proper t o express'' a compound being, and reserved essence for what was'' simple and immaterial. And in this sense, substance'(was not applied to God, but only essence, as 9t." Augustine observes."Trow lordship here seems t o dislike m y taking notice,that the derivation of th e word substance favours th eidea we have of i t : an d your lordship tells me, '( h at" very little weight is to be laid on a bare grammatical'' etymology." Tho ug h little weigh t were to be laidon it, if there were nothing else to be said for i t ; yetwhen it was brought to confirm an idea which yourlordship allows of, nay, calls a rational idea, and says isfounded in evident reason, I do not see what your lord-ship had to blame in it. For though Cicero and Quin-tilian take substantia for th e same w ith essence, as yourlordship says ; or for riches and estate, as I think theyalso do ; yet I suppose i t will be true, th a t substantia isderived a substando, and th a t th a t shows the originalimport of th e word. For, my lord, I have been long ofopinion, as may be seen in my book, that if we knewthe original of all the words we meet with, we shouldthereby be very much helped to know the ideas theywere first applied to and made to stand for : and there-fore I must beg your lordship to excuse this conceit ofmine, this etymological observation especially, since i tha th nothing in i t against the truth, nor against yourlordship's idea of substance.B u t your lordship opposes to th is etymology th e useof th e word substance by th e best authors in ano thsense; aiid thereupon give the world a learned accouof the use of the word substance, in a sense wherein i t isnot taken for th e stibstratuni of accidents : howekr , ?:think it a sufficient justification of myself to your lord-


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24 MT. ockes Letter to t h eship, tha t I use it in th e same sense your lordship does,and th a t your lordship thinks not fit to govern yourselfby those authorities ; for then your lordship could notapply the word substance to God, as Boethius did not,and as your lordship has proved out of St. Augustine,tha t i t was not applied. Though I guess i t is the con-sideration of substance, as it is applied to God, thatbrings i t into your lordships present disconrse. Elit ifyour lordship and I (if without presunlption I may joinmyself with you) have, in the use of th e word substance,quitted the example of the best authors, I think theauthority of the schools, which has a long time beenallowed in philosophical terms, will bear us out in thismatter.In the remaining part of this paragraph it follows :I C but afterwards the names of substance and essencewere promiscuously used with respect to God and hisc c creatures ; and do imply th a t which makes th e realbeing, as distinguished from modes and properties.c c And so the substance and essence of a man are thesame ; not being taken for the individiial substance,(which cannot be understood without particular modescc and properties ; but th e general substance or natureor man, abstractedly from all the circumstances ofc person.H e re your lordship makes these terms general sub-stance, natu re, and essence, to signify the same thing ;how properly I shall not here inquire. Your lordshipgoes on.And I desire to know, whether, according to true( eason, that be not a clear idea of man ;not of Peter,IC James, or John, but of a man as such.This, I think, nobody denies : nor can any body denyit, who will not say, that the general abslract ideawhich he has in his mind of a sor t or species of animalth at hecalls man, ought not to have that general nameman applied to it : for that is all (as I humbly conceive)which these words of your lordsliip here amount to.This, your lordship says, I C is not a mere universalcc name, or mark, or sign. Your lordship says it isan idea, an d every body must gran t i t to be an idea ; nd


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Bishop of Worcester, 25therefore i t is, in my opinion, safe enough from beingthought a mere name, or mark, or sign of that idea.For he must think very oddly, who takes the generalnam e of any idea, to be the general idea itse lf: it is amere inark or sign of i t w ithout doubt, an d nothingelse. Your lordship adds :'' But there is as clear and distinct a conception'( f this in our minds, as we can have from any such'' simple ideas as are conveyed by our senses."If your lordship means by this, (as the words seem tome to import) th a t we can have as clear and distinct anidea of the general substance, or nature, or essence ofthe species man, as we have of th e particular colour aridfigure of a man when we look on him, or of his voicewhen we hear him speak, I must crave leave to dissentfimi your lordship. Because the idea we have of t hesubstance, wherein the properties of a nian do inhere, isa very obscure idea : so i n th a t part, our general idea ofinan is ohscure an d confused: as also, how that sub-stance is differently modified in the different species ofcreatures, so as to have different properties and powerswhereby they are distinguished, th a t also we have veryobscure, or ra ther no distinct ideas of a t all. B ut thereis no obscurity or confusion a t all in the idea of a figurethat I clearly see, or of a sound that I distinctly hear ;and such are, or may be; the ideas that are conveyed inby sensation or reflection.

" I do not deny that the distinction of particular(( substances, is by the several modes and properties of'( hem, (which they niay call a coniplication of simplecc ideas if they please) : but I do assert, tha t th e general" dea which relates to the essence, without these, is'( o just and true an idea, that without it th e corn-'' plication of simple ideas will never give us a right'( otion of it."Here, I think, that your lordship asserts, (' hat the'( eneral idea of the real essence (for so I understand' general idea which relates to t he essence) without the" modes and properties, is a j u s t and true idea." F o rexample ; he real essence of a thing is tha t internal con-stitution on which the properties of th a t th ing depend.

It follows :


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96 &IT. Lockez Letter t o t h eN ow your lordship seems to me to acknowledge, thatthat internal constittition or essence we cannot know ;for your lordship says,


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Bishop of Worcester. ngother species, is that which makes the real being ofthat species abstractly from the individuals of thatspecies. B y general substance here, I suppose, yourlordship means th e general idea of substance : and thatwhich induces me to take the liberty to suppose so, is,that I think your lordship is here discoursing of the ideaof substance, and how we come by it. A nd if yourlordship should mean otherwise, I must take the libertyto deny there is any such th ing in rerum natura, asa general substance that exists itself, or makes anything.Tak ing it then for granted that your lordship says,that this is the general idea of substance, viz. ( 6 that i t( s that which makes the real being of any thing ;your losdship says, c 6 tha t it is as clear and distinct a( onception in our minds, as we can have froni an ysuch simple ideas as are conveyed by OUT senses.Here I must crave leave to dissent from your lordship.Your lordship says in the former part of this page, th a t substance and essence do imply t ha t which makes; the real being. N ow what, I beseech your lord-ship, do these words, that which, here signify more thansom ething? And the idea expressed by something, Iam ap t to think , your lordship will not say is as clearand distinct a conception or idea in the mind, as the ideaof the red colour of a cherry, or the bitter taste ofwormwood, or the figure of a circle brought into themind by your senses.Y our lordship farther says, < it makes (whereby, Isuppose, your lordship means, constitutes or is) ( he real being, as distinguished from modes and pro-< perties.Fo r example, m y lord, strip this supposed general ideaof a man or gold of all its modes and properties, andthen tell me whether your lordship has as clear and dis-tinct at1 idea of what remains, as you have Qf the figureof the one, or the yellow colour of the other. I mustconfess th e remaining something, to me affords so vague,confused and obscure an idea, that I cannot say I haveany distinct conception of i t ; for barely by being some-thing, it is not in m y mind clearly distinguished fmm


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28 M r. Lodes Letter to t hethe figure or voice of a man, or the colour or taste of acherry, for they are something too. If your lordshiphas a clear and distinct idea of that c c something, whichcc makes the rea1 being as distinguished from all itsmodes and properties, your lordship must enjoy theprivilege of the sight and clear ideas you have : nor canyou be denied them, because I have not th e like; th edimness of my conceptions inust not pretend to h inderth e clearness of your lordships, any more than the wantof them in a blind man can debar your lordship of theclear and distinct ideas of colours. The obscurity I findi n my own mind, when I exam ine w hat positive, general,simple idea of substance I have, is such as I profess, andfurther than tha t I cannot go : but what, and how clearit is in th e understanding of a seraphim, or of an ele-vated mind, that I cannot determine. Your lordshipgoes on. I must do that right t o th e ingenious author of thecC Essay of Human Understanding (from whence these

cC notions are borsowed to serve other purposes tlian h r( c intended them) that he makes the C R S ~f spiritual andsc corporeal substances to be alike, as to their ideas.6 And that we have as clear a notion of a spirit, as wecc have of a body; the one being supposed to be thec c substratum to those simple ideas we have from with-(( out, and the other of those operations we find withinAnd that it is as rational to affirm, therec is no body, because we cannot h o w it s essence, as i tcc is called, or have no idea of the substance of matter ;(( as to say there is no spirit, because we know not itscc essence, or have no idea of a spiritrial substance.(From hence it follows, th a t we may be certain th a tc c thcre are both spiritual and bodily substances, althoughcc w e can have no clear and distinct ideas of them. Butc c if our reason depend upon our clear and distinct ideas,how is this possible? W e cannot reason withoutcc clear ideas, and yet we may be certain without them :c can we be certain without reason? Or, dot11 our(( reason give us true notions of things, without these(( ideas ? If i t be so, this new hypothesis about reason! must appear to be very unreasonable.

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Bishop of Worcester. 99T h a t which your lordship seems to argue here, is,that we m ay be certain without clear and distinct ideas.W ho your lordship here argues against, under the title

of this new hypothesis about reason, I confess I do notknow. For I do not remember that I have any wfiereplaced certain ty only in clear and distinct ideas, bu t inthe clear an d visible connexion of any of our ideas, bethose ideas what they will ; as will appear to any onewho will look into B. iv. c. 4. $ 18. and B. iv. c. 6.0 3. of iny Essay, in the latter of which he will find thesewords : c c certainty of knowledge is to perceive th e agreement or disagreement of ideas, as expressed in6 any pro~~osition.A s in th e proposition you r lord-ship mentions, v. g. th a t we iiiay be certain there a respiritual and bodily substances ; or, that bodily sub-stances do exist, is a proposition of whose truth we maybe certain ; and so of spiritual substances. Let u s nowexamine wherein the certainty of these propositionsconsists.First, as to the existence of bodily substances, I knowby my senses th a t soinething extended, and solid, andfigured does exist; for my senses are the utmost evi-dence and certainty I have of the existence of extended,solid, figured things. These modes being then know nto exist by our senses, the existence of them (which Icannot conceive can subsist without something to sup-port them) makes me see the connexion of those ideaswith a support, or, as it is called, a suliject of iiihesion;and so consequently the connexion of that support(which cannot he nothing) with existence. And thusI come by a certainty of the existeuce of that some-thing which is a support of those sensible modes, thoughI hare but a very confused, loose, and undeterminedidea of it, signified Iiy the same substance. After thesame manner experilrienting thinking in myself, by theexistence of thought in me, to which something thatthinks is evidently and necessarily connected in m ymind; I come to lie certain that there exists i n mesomething that thinks, though of th a t something whichI call substance also, I have but a very dxcure im-perfect idea.


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90 Mr. Locke's Letter t o theBefore I go any farther, it is fit I return my acknow-ledgetqents to yo ur lordship, for the good opinion youare pleased here to express of th e " author of the Essay

66 of Human Understanding," an d th a t you do not im-pute to him the ill use some may have made of hisnotions. But he craves leave to say, that he shouldhave been better preserved from the hard an d sinisterthoughts , which some men are always ready for, if inwhat you have here published, your lordship had beenpleased to have shown where you directed your discourseagainst him, and where against others, from p. 234 top, 262 of your Vindication of the Trinity. For no-thing bu t my book and my words being quoted, th eworld will be apt to think that I ain the person w h oarg ue against the Trin ity, and deny mysteries, againstwhom your lordship directs those pages. And indeed,m y lord, though I have read them over with great at-tention, yet, in many places, I cannot discern whether itbe against me or any body else, th a t your lordship isarguing. T h a t which often makes th e difficulty is, th a tI do not see how what I say does a t a ll concern the con-troversy your lordship is engaged in, an d ye t I alone amquoted.'' Let us suppose this principle tr, be true," tha t thesimple ideas by sensation or reflection a re th e sole m atte rand foundation of all our reasoning: (' ask then how" we come to be certain, th a t the re are spiritual sub-(' tances in th e world, since we can have no clear an ddistinct ideas concerning them ? Can we be certain," without any foundation of reason ? This is a newsort of certainty, for which we do not envy those pre-Lc tenders to reason. B u t methinks, they should not a t" he same time assert the absolute necessity of these'( deas to our knowledge, and decIare that we may'( ave certain knowledge without them. If there be'' any ather method, they overthrow their own prin-IC ciple ; if there be none, how come they to any cer-6 c tain ty th a t there a re both bodily an d sp iritual sub-'( tances? ''This paragraph, which continues to prove, tha t wemay have certainty without clear and distinct ideas, I

Your lordship goes on :


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Bishop of Wwcester . a twould flatter myself is not meant against me, because itopposes nothin g th a t I have said ; and so shall not sayany thing to it, but only set it down to do your lordshipright, tha t the reader may judge. Th oug h I do notfind how he will easily overlook me, and think I am notat all concerned in it, since my words alone are quotedin several pages immediately preceding and following :and in th e very next paragraph i t is said, '' how theycome to know ; ' which word, they, must signify somebody besides the author of Christianity not mysterious ;and then 1 hink, by the whole tenour of your lordship'sdiscourse, nobody will be left but me, possible t o betaken to be the other : for in the same paragraph yourlordship says, '' the same persons say, th at notwithstand-'' ing their ideas, it is possible for m at ter to-think."I know not what other person says so but I ; but ifan y one does, I am sure no person but I say so in mybook, which your lordship has quoted for them, viz.Human Understanding, B. iv. c. 3. This, which is ariddle to me, the more amazes me, because I find it ina treatise of your lordship's, who so perfectly under-stands the rules and methods of writing, whether incontroversy or an y other way. B ut this which seemswholly new to me, I shall better understand when yourlordship pleases to explain it. In the mean time I men-tion i t as an apology for myself, if sometimes I mistakepour lordship's aim, and so misapply niy answer. W hatfollows in your lordship's next paragraph is this :

' As to these latter (which is my business) I must'' inquire farther, how they come to know there are"such? T h e answer is, by self-reflection on those" powers we find in ourselves, which cannot come fi.om" a mere bodily substance. I allow the reason to be'; very good ; but the question I ask, is, whether this'( rgument be from th e clear and distinct idea or not ?" We have ideas in ourselves of the several operations" of our minds, of knawing, willing, considering &c." which cannot come from a bodily substance. Very'' rue; but is all this contained in the simple idea of'" hese operations? Mow can that be, when the same" persons say, that, notwithstanding their ideas, it i s

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3% &Ir. Lockea Letter t o the6 possible for matter to think ? F or it isHuman LJn- LL said-that we have th e ideas of matter

amtanding u and thinking , bu t possibly shall never beB . ii. e. 3. able to know whether any material k i n g thinks or not ; it being impossible for lis,8 6. by the contemplation of our own ideas, withorit rc-6 velation, to discover whether oninipotency hath not6 given to some systenis of matter, fitly disposed, a(6 pow er to perceive or think.-If this be true, then forgc all that we can know by our ideas of matter and6 thinking, matter may have a power of thinking: and6 if this hold, then it is iiiipossible to prove a spiritual6 substance in us, from the idea of thinking : or how6 can we be assured by our ideas, th a t God ha th not( iven such a power of think ing to matter so disposed6 as our bodies a r e ? Especially since it is said,-that(( in respect of our notions, it is not much more reniotc6 from our comprehension to conceive th a t God can, if66 he pleases, super-add to our idea of matter a faculty( 6 of thinking, tha n th a t he should, super-add to it an-66 other substance, with a faculty of thinking.-Who-(6 ever asserts this can never prove a spiritual substance b in us from a faculty of thinking ; because he cannot6 know from the idea of matter and thinking, that6 matter so disposed cannot think. And he cannot beLL certain, that God hath not framed th e matter of our6 bodies so as to be capable of it.These words, my lord, I am forced to take to rnysclf;for though your lordship has put it the same personssay, in the plural number, yet there is nobody quotedfor th e following words, but my Essay : nor do I thinkany body but I has said so. But so it is in this presentchapter, I have the good luck to be joined with othersfor what I. do not say, and others with me for what Iimagine they do not say ; which, how it came about,your lordship can best resolve. But to the words them-selves: in them your lordship argues, that upon myprinciples it cannot be proved that there is a spiritual ubstance in us. To which give me leave, withsubmission, to say, that 1 think it may be proved fromm y principles, and I think I have done it ; an d the proof


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Siskop tf Pmeste4.. . 88in my b o k stands thus: First, we experiment in our-selves thinking. T h e idea of this action or'modeofth inking is inconsistent with the idea of self-subsistence,and therefore has a necessary connexion with a upportor subject of inhesion : he idea of tha t s u p p d iS whatwe call substance ; and so from thinking exprimenfeedin us, we have a proof of a thinking substance in us,which in my sense is a spirit. Against this your lord-ship will argue, th a t by what I have said of the possi-bility that God may, if he pleases, super-add to m atte rB faculty of thinking, it can never be proved that thkreis a spiritual substance in us, because upon that suppo-sition it is possible it may be a material substance tha tthinks in tis. I grant it ; ut add, th at the general ideaof substanck being the same every where, the modifica-tion of thinking, or th e power of thinKing joined to it,makes it a spirit, without considering what other mo-difications it has, as whether it has the modification osolidity qr no. As on the other side, substance, tha thas the modification of solidity, is matter, whether ithas the modification of thinking or no. A n aif your lordship means by a spiritual an imm aterial sub-stance, f grant I have no t proved, nor upon my princi-ples call it be proved, (your lordship meaning, as Ithink you do, demonstratively proved) tha t there is a nimmaterial substance in us tha t tsume, from what I have said abposition of a system of matter thin(which there demonstrates th at God is im-material) will prove it in the highest degree probable,th at the think ing substance in us is immaterial. B u tyour lordship thinks not probability enough ; and bgcharging the want of demonstration upon my principles,that the thinking thing in us is immaterial, your lord-ship seems to conclude it dem onstrable from principlesof philosophy. T h a t dem onstration I should with joy

1 receive from your lordship, or any one, Fo r thoughall the great ends of moralityand religionare well enough secured without it, as I 3. v. o 3,have shown; et it would be a grea t advanceof Our knowledge in na ture and philosophy,

V O L 1XIv P


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54 M Y.Lockes Letter t o t h eTo #whatI have said in m y book, to show th a t all th egreat ends of religion and morality are secured barely byth e immortality of the soul, without a necessary s u p

position th a t th e soul is imm aterial, I crave leave to add,that immortality may and shall be annexed to that,which in its own nature is neither immatesial nor immor-tal, as the apostle expressly declares in these words ; or(his corruptible must pu t on incorruption,1c0rxv*53* (( and this mortal must pu t on immortality.Perhaps my using the word spirit for a think ing sub-stance, without exclud ing materiaIity out of it, will bethought too great a liberty, an d such as deserves censure,because I leave immateriality out of the idea I make ita sign of. I readily own tha t words should be sparinglyventured on in a sense wholly new ; and nothing butabsolute necessity can excuse the boldness of using anyterm, in a sense whereof we can produce no example.B u t in the present case, I think, I have grea t authoritiest o justify me. T h e soul is agreed, on all hands, to betha t in us which thinks. And he th a t will look intoth e first book of Ciceros Tusculan questions, and intoth e sixth book of Virgils B ne ids, will find th a t thesetw o grea t men, who of all th e Rom ans best understoodphilosophy, thought, or a t least did not deny, th e soult o be a subtile matter, which might come under th ename of aura, or ignis, or sether ;and this soul they bothof them called spiritus : n th e notion of which it is plainthey included on!y tho ught and active motion, withou tthe total exclusion of matter. W hether they thoughtright in this, I: do not say : hat is not the question ; butwhether they spoke properly, when they called an active,thinking, subtile substance, out of which they excludedonly gross an d palpable matter, spiritus, spirit. I thinkthat nobody will deny, that, if any amo ng the Romanscan be allowed to speak properly, Tully and Virgil areth e two who may most securely be depended on for it :an d one of them, speaking of th e soul, says, d u msspiritus hos regit artus ;I and th e other, ( ( vita con-tinetur corpore & spiritu. Where it is plain, bycorpus h e means (as generaIIy every where) only grossmatter that may be felt and hiindled ; s appears by those


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Bishop of Worcester. 35words :si cor, aut sanguis, au t cerebrum est animus,~c certe, quoiiiam es t corpus, interib it cum reliquo cor-( ore ; si anima est, forte dissipabitur ; si ignis extin-cguetur. Tusc. Quaest. 1. i. c. 11. H e re Ciceroopposes corpus to ignis and anima, i. e. aura or breath :and th e foundation of that his distinction of the soul,from that which he calls corpus or body, he gives a littlelower in these words ; I tanta ejus tenuitas ut fugiatcaciem. it). c . 22.Nor was it the heathen world alone that had this no-tion of spirit; the most enlightened of all the ancientpeople of God, Solomon himself, speaks after the samem ann er: T h a t which befalleth the sonsof men befalleth beasts, ere n one th ing FF1es*iii*(befalleth them ; as the one dieth so dieththe other, yea they have all one spirit.late the Hebrew wordthe very next verse but one ; (Who know-e th the spirit of a man th a t goeth up-ward, and th e spirit of a beast th at goeth down t o th ee a rt h ? In which places it is plain that Solomonapplies th e wordnly , an d our translators of him, theword spirit, to a substance, out of which immaterialitywas not wholly excluded, (unless the spirit of a beast( th a t goeth downwards to the earth be immaterial.Nor did the way of speak ing in our Saviours time va ryfrom this: St. Luke tells us, that when ourSaviour, after his resurrection, stood in the Chap.7, xxiv.midst of them, (hey were affrighted, and upposed that they had seen ~ucCpa, the Greek wordwhich always answers spirit in English; and so thetranslators of the Bible render it here, they supposedthat they had seen a spirit. B u t our Saviour saysto them, Behold my hands and my feet, hat it is I myself, handle me and see ; for a spirit hath not flesh and bones, as you see me have.Which words of our Saviour put the same distinctionbetween body and spirit, tha t Cicero did in the placeabove cited, viz. tha t the one was a gross cornpages that~ ~ l de felt and handled ; and the other such as Virgildescribes the ghost or soul of Anchises, Lib.


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36 Mr. Lockes 2;etter 50 theTer conatus ibi collo dare brachia circum,Ter frustra comprensa manus effugit imago,

66Par levibus ventis volucrique similliina somno.I would not be thought here to say, th a t spirit neverdoes signifjr a purely imm aterial substance. In t h a tsense the scripture, I take it, speaks, when it says,( od is a spirit ;and in t ha t sense I have used it ; ndin th at sense I have proved from my principles, thatthere is a sp iritual substance; and am certain th at there

is a spiritual immaterial substance : which is, I humblyconceive, a direct answer to pour lordships question inthe beginning of this argument, viz. c H ow come we(6 to be certain that there are spiritual substances, sup-cposing this principle to be true, th a t th e simple ideas6 by sensation and reflection are the sole matter and6 foundation of all our reasoning ? But this hindersnot, but that if God, th a t infinite, omnipotent, an dperfectly immateria l spirit, should please to give a systemof very subtile matter sense and motion, it might, withpropriety of speech be called spirit ; hough materialitywere no t excluded out of its complex idea. Pour lord-ship proceeds : It is said indeed elsewhere, that it isBa iv* cg lo. (repugnant to the idea of senseless matter, 59 t h a t it should pu t into itself sense, per- 6 ception, and knowledge. But this doth not reach6 the present case; which is no t what matter can do of6 itself, but what matter prepared by an omnipotent6s hand can do. An d what certainty can we have th at h e ha th not done i t ? We can have none from the6; ideas, for those are given up in this case ; an d conse-6 quently we can have no cer tain ty upon these princi-$6 ples, whether we have any spiritual substance within6 us or not.Your lordsliip in this paragraph proves, that fromwhat I say, we can have no certaintyB. v* lo* (whether we have any spiritual substances 5. i n us or not. If by spiritual substanceyour lordship means an imm aterial substance in us, as youspeaka little farther on, I grant what your lordship says is


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Bishop of Worcester. $7true, that it cannot, upon these principles, be demon-strated. But I must crave leave to say at the sametime, that upon these principles it can be proved, tothe highest degree of probability. If by spiritual sub-stance your lordship means a thinking substance, I mustdissent from your lordship, and say, th a t we can have acertainty, upon my principles, th a t the re is a spiritualsubstance in us. In short, my lord, upon my principles,i. e. from the idea of thinking, we can have a certain tythat there is a thinking substance in us ; rom hence wehave a certainty tha t there is an eternal thinking sublstance. This think ing substance, which has been frometernity, I have proved to be immaterial.This eternal, immaterial, thinking sub-stance, has put into us a thinking substance, which,whether it be a material or im material substance,cannot be infallibly demonstrated from our ideas ;though from them it may be proved, th a t it is tothe highest degree probable that it is immaterial.This, in short, my lord, is what I have to say on thispoint ;which may, in good measure, serve for alp answerto your lordships nex t leaf or t w o ; which I shall: setdown, and then tak e notice of some few particularswhich I wonder to find your lordship accuse me of.Your lordship says : But we are told, th at from the opera- B. ii. c. 23.$15. ions of our minds, we are able to frame a complex idea of a spirit. How can hat be, when we cannot from those ideas be assured,but th at those operations may come from a matefid ubstance ? If we frame an idea on such grounds, itis at most but a possible idea; for it may be other-wise, and we can have 110 assurance from oar ideas, t h a t it is not : so tha t the. most men may c o w to il[pthis way of ideas, is, that it is possible it may be so, a n d it is possible it may not ; but that it is impossiblefor us, from our ideas, to deteim ine either way. AndkI!&his arr admirable way Qobring w to a certaintyE( ctf Eeason ?*I am very glad to find th e idea of a sp i r i i t d suba a made w5 corrsistent an d i.t&&&, 8s that e$ I)

B. v.


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38 Mr. Lockes Letter to thecorporeal :--For as the one consists of a cohesion Of

olid parts, and th e power of communicating motion(by impulse, so the other consists in a power of think-( ng and willing, and moving the body ;and th a t th e cohesion of solid parts, is as hard27.


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Bishop of Worcester. 9966jec ting a doctrine proposed to us as of divine revela-6 tion, because we cannot comprehend the manner of6 i t ; especially when i t relates to th e divine essence. F o r as th e same autho r observes,-our g 33,sq 35.& & i d e af God is framed from the complex(6 ideas of those perfections we find in ourselves, butenlarging them so, as to inakc theni suitable to anc( infinite being ; as knowledge, power, duration, &c.c 6 And th e degrees or extent of these whichwe ascribe to the sovereign being, are allcc boundless and infinite. For it is infinity, whichjoined to our ideas of existence, power, knowledge,&c. makes tha t complex idea, whereby we representcc to ourselves, the best we can, the supreme being.Now, when O U T knowledge of gross material sub-& & stances is so dark ; when the notion of spiritual substances is above all ideas of sensation ;when the higher(any substance is, the more remote from our know- edge ; bu t especially when th e very idea of a supreme(( being implies its being infinite and incomprehensible ;& I know not w hether it argues more stupidity o r arro-gance to expose a doctrine relating to the divinec c essence, because they cannot comprehend th e manner6 c of it : but of this more afterwards. I ani yet uponcc the certainty of oiir reason, from clear and distinct id ea s: and if we can attain to certainty withoutc c them, and where it is confessed we cannot have them,(as about substance; then these cannot be th e solematter and foundation of our reasoning, which iscc pereniptorily asserted by this late author.H ere , after having argued, that notwithstanding whatI say about oiir idea of a spirit, i t is impossible, from ourideas, to determine whether t ha t spirit in us be a materialsubstance or no, your lordship concludes the paragraphthus : c and is not this an admirable way to bring US to acertainty of reason ?I answer; I think it is a way to bring us to a cer-tainty in these things which I have offered as certain,but I never thought it a way to certainty, where wenever can reach certainty; nor shall I think the worseof it, if your lordship should instance in an hundred

5; 36.


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40 Mr. Lockaa Letter t o th ethings, as well as the immateriality of the spir i t ina, herein this way does not bring US to a certainty ;UnleSS, a t the sam e time, your lordship shaU show US an-other way th a t will bring us to a certainty in those P in ts ,wherein this way of ideas failed. If your lordship, O rany bodp else, will show me a better way to a certaintyin them, I am ready to learn, and will lay by tha t ofideas. T h e way of ideas will not, from philosophy, af-ford us a demonstration, that the thinking substancein us is immaterial. W hereupon your lordship asks,6 and is not this an admirable way to bring us to a cer-6 b i n t y of reason ? T h e way of argument which yourlordship opposes to the way of ideas, will, I humblyconceive, from philosophy, as little afford us a demon-stration, th at the thinking substance in us is immaterial.Whereupon may not any one likewise ask, and is not th i s an admirable way to bring us to a certainty of6 ~ a ~ ~ ~ Is any way, I beseech your lordship, to becandemned as an ill way to bring us to certainty, de-monstrative certainty, because it brings us not to i t in apoint where reason cannot attain to such cer tainty?Algebra is a way to bring us to a certainty in mathema-tics ; but must it be presently condemned as an ill way,because there are some questions in mathem atics, w hicha man cannot come to certainty in by the way ofAlgebra ?In page 247, after having set down several confes-sions of mine,


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Bishap of Warcester. 41before and after this your lordships appeal to the reasonof mankind. A nd now I must appeal to your lordship,whether you find any such proposition in my book?If your lordship does nQt, I too must then appeal to thereason of mankind, whether it be reasonable for yourlordship to bring so many confessions out of my book, toconfute a proposition tha t is no-where in it ? There is,no doubt, reason for it ; which since your lordship doesnot, that I see, declare, and I have not wit enough todiscover, I shall therefore leave to th e reason of d n dt o find out.Your lordship ha..., in this part of your discourse,spoke very much of reason ;as,- is not this an ad&- able way to bring us to a certainty of reason?-And herefore it is a vain thing in any to pretend, that all( ( o u r . eason and certainty is founded on clear anddis tinc t ideas.-I appeal now to the reason of man-(( kind.-I am yet upon the certainty of our reason.-(The certainty is not placed in the idea, but in goodcar id sound reason.-Allowing th e argu m en t to begood, yet it is not taken from the idea, but fiom(( principles of true reason.What your lordship says at the beginning of thischapter, in these words, (( we must consider what weunderstand by reason, made me hope I shoukl herefind wh at your lordship unde rstands by reason explained,that so I might rectify my notion of it, and might beable to avoid the obscurity and confusion which verymuch perplex most of the discourses, wherein it is a ppealed to or from as judge. But notwithstanding theexplication I flattered myself with the hopes of, fromwhat I thought your lordship had promised, I find mother account of reason, bu t in quo tations a u t of othm,which you r lordship jus tly blames. H a d I been SOhappy as to have been enlightened in this p i n t by yourlordships learned pen, so as o have seen distinctly whatyour lardship understands by reason, I shouM possiblyhave excused myself from giving your lo rdsh ip the t rwbkof these papers, and been a& to have perceived, with-out applyiag myself any farther to your IcmWp, how80 much of my Esay came nta a chapter, whichww


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49 Mr. Lockes L e t i e r to t h edesigned to answer c objections against the Trinity, in6 point of reason.

Lc But I go yet farther : and as I have a lready showed$6 we can have no certainty of an immaterial substancewith in us, from these simple ideas; SO I shall now6 show, that there can be no sufficient evidence brought


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Bishop of Worcester, 48a large quotation out of th e tenth section of the tenthchapter of my fourth book ;of which your lordship says,(6 this is th e substance of th e argum ent used, t o provec an infinite spiritua l being, which I am far f rom6 weakening th e force of ; but th at which I design is( C to show, that the certainty of it is not placed upon 6 clear an d distinct ideas. Whoin now, I beseechyour lordship, can this be understood to be intendedagainst, but me ? For how can my using a n argument,whose certainty is not placed upon clear and distinctideas, prove an y th ing against another man, who says,( hat clear and distinct ideas are th e sole m atter an dki foundation of all our reasoning? T h is proves onlyagainst him th a t uses th e argument ;and therefore eitherI must be supposed here t o hold, th a t clear an d distinctideas are th e sole m atter and foundation of all our rea-soning, (which I do not remember th at I ever said) orelse th a t your lordship here proves against nobody.B ut though I do not remember that I have any wheresaid, th a t clear and distinct ideas ar e the sole m atter a n dfoundation of all our reasoning; yet I do own, thatsimple ideas are the foundations of all our knowledge,if th at be it which your lordship questions :and thereforeI must think myself concerned in what your lordshipsays in this very place, in these words, ( shall now(( show, th a t there can be no sufficient evidence brought f r o m these simple ideas, by their own confession,( oncerning the existence of God himself.Thi s being spoken in the plural number, cannot beunderstood to be meant of the author of Christiauitynot mysterious, and nohody else : and whom can a n yreader reasonably apply it to, but t he auth or of th e Essayof Human Understanding ; since, besides that it standsin t,he midst of a grea t many quotations out of t h a tbook, without any other person being named, or an yones words but mine quoted, my proof alone of a deityis brought out of th a t book, to m ake good w hat you rlordship here says ; and nobody else is an y where men-tioned or quoted concerning it ?The same way of speaking of the persons you arearguing against in the plural number, your lordship uses


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44in other places ; as, which they may call a complica- ion of simple ideas, if they please.(W e do not envy these pretenders to rea son ; but methinks they should not a t the same time assert thec absolute necessity of these ideas to our knowledge,cc and declare that we may have certain knowledgebc without them. And all along in th a t page, cc they.And in the very next page my words being quoted, yourlordship asks, cc how can that be, when th e same personst c say, that notwithstanding their ideas, it is impossible6 for matter to t h i n k ? So that I do not see how Ican exempt myself from being meant to be one of thosepretenders to reason ;wherewith we can be certain w ith-ou t any foundation of reason ; which your lordship, inth e immediate foregoing page, does not envy for thisnew sort of certainty. How can it be understood butthat I am one of those persons, that cc at the same timeassert the absolute necessity of these ideas to ourknowledge, and declare that we may have certainc knowledge without them ? Though your lordshipvery civilly says, c c that you must do that right to the ingenious author of the Essay of H um an Understand-(( ing, (from whence these notions are borrowed, to( erve other purposes than he intended them ) that, &c.yet, methinks, it is the author himself, and his use ofthese notions, th at is blamed and argued agains t; bu tstilI in the plural number, which he confesses himselfnot to understand.My lord, if your lordship can show me where I pre-tend to reason or certainty, without an y foundation ofreason ; or where it is I assert the absolute necessity ofany ideas to our knowledge, and declare that we mayhave certain knowledge without them, your lordshipwill do me a great favour: or this, I grant, is a FEWsort of certainty which I long to be rid of, m d to dis-own to the world. B u t truly, my lord, a s I pretendedto no new sort of certainty, but jil.st such 85 human undabndingwaspossessed of before I wasborn; aad s h w l dbe glad I could get more oat of the h k s a d writiwsthat come abroad n my days :so, my ord, if I have anywhere p&&d to any new mt of WHGQQ, I h h

Mr. Lockes Letter to the


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Bishop of Worcester. 4.5your lordship show me th e place, tha t I may correct thevanity of it, and unsay it to th e world.Again, YOUT ordship says thus, "I know not whether$6 it argues more stupidity or arrogance to expose a' 6 doctrine relating to the divine essence, because theF(6 cannot com prehend th e manner of it."Here , my lord, I find the same '' hey" again, which,Some pages back, evidently involved me : nd since th atyou have nam ed nobody besides me, nor alleged anybody's writings but mine ; give me leave, therefore, toask your lordship, whether I am one of these '' hey "here also, th a t I may know w hether I am conceped toanswer for myself? I am ashamed to importune yourlordship so often about th e same m atter ; but I meetwith so many places in your lordship% (I had almostsaid new) way of writ ing, that put me o a stand, notknowing whether I am meant or no, th at I am a t a bsswhether I should clear myself from what possibly yourlordship does not lay t o my charge : and yet the reader,thinking it meant of me, should conclude th a t to be inmy book which is no t there, and which I ut ter ly disown.Though I cannot be joined w ith those who expose adoctrine relating to th e divine essence, because they camnot comprehend th e manner of i t ; unless your lordshipcan show where I have so exposed it, which I deny tha tI have any where done : yet your lordship, before youcome to th e bottom of th e sam e page, has these words,'' I shall now show, that there can be no sufficient evi-cc dence brought from them, by the ir own confession," concerning the existence of the most spirituai and'' infinite substance, even God himself."If your lordship did mean me in th a t " hey" wGchis some lines backw ards, I must complain to your lor&ship, t ha t you have done me an injury, in imputing tha tto me which I have not done. And if ';their" herewere not meant by your lordship to relzlte to the samepersons, I ask by w ha t shall the reader distinguish them ?And how shall any body know who your lordship means?For tha t I am comprehended here is apparent, by yourquoting my essay in the very ne xt words, and argvingagainst it in th e following pages.


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4!6 Mr. Locke's Letter to theI en ter no t here into your lordship's argument ;' t ha twhich I am now considering is your lordship's peculiarway of writing in this pa rt ofyour treatise, which makes

m e often in doubt, whether th e reader will no t condemnmy book upon your lordship's authority, where he th inksme concerned, if I say nothing : and yet your lordshipm ay bok upon my defence as superfluous, when I didnot hold what your lordship argued against.Bu t to go on with your lordship's argum ent, your lord-ship says, "I shall now show th a t the re can be no suffi-4 cient evidence brought from simple ideas by their' own confession, concerning th e existence of the most" piritual and infinite substance, even God himself."Your lordship's way of proving it is this: your lord-ship says, we a re told, 11, iv. c. 10. \ 1. ('T h a t the evi-*' dence of it is equal to m atheinatical certain ty; and very6 good arguments are brought to prove it, in a chap-s ter on purpose: but th a t which I take notice of, is," hat t he argum ent from th e clear an d distinct idea of'( a God is passed over." Supposing all this to be so,your lordship, methinks, with submission, does notprove the proposition you undertook, which was this ;& 'th ere can be no sufficient evidence brought from" simple ideas, by their own confession concerning [i. e .'' o prove] th e existence of a God." F o r if I did inth a t chapter, as your lordship says, pass over th e prooffrom the clear and distinct idea of God, that, I pre-sume, is no confession th a t there can be no sufficientevidence brought from clear and distinct ideas, m uchless from simple ideas, concerning t he existence of aGod ; because th e using of one argum ent brought fromone foundation, is no conression th a t there is not anotherprinciple or foundation. But, m y lord, I shall notinsist upon this, whether it be a confession or no.Leaving confession out of th e proposition, I humblyconceive your lordship's argument does not prove.Your lordship's proposition to be proved, is, " there" can be sufficient evidence brought from simple ideas" o prove the existence of a God ;" and your lordship'sreason is, because the argument from the clear anddistinct idea of God is omitted in my proof of a God.


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Bishop of #'or cester. 47I will suppose, for th e streng thenin g your lordship's rea-soning in t he case, th a t I had said (which I am far enoughfrom saying) that there was no other argum ent to provethe existence of God, but what I had used in tha t c h a pte r; yet, my lord, w ith all this, your lordship's argum ent,1humbly conceive, would not hold ; for I might bringevidence from simple ideas, though I brought none fromthe idea of God ; for the idea we have of God is a com-plex, and no simple idea. So that the terms beingchanged from simple ideas to a clear and distinct com-plex idea of God, th e proposition which was undertakento be proved, seems to be unproved.P o u r lordship's ne xt words are, "h o w can this be*' consistent with deducing our certainty of knowledge'' from clear and simple ideas ? "H ere your lordship joins something th at is mine withsomething that is not mine. I do say, that all OUTknow ledge is founded in simple ideas ; but I do not say,it is all deduced from clear ide as; much leas th a t wecannot have any certain knowledge of the existence ofany thing , whereof we have no t a clear, distinct, com-plex id e a ; or, that the complex idea must be clearenough to be in itself the evidence of the existence of t ha tthing ; which seems to be your lordship's meaning here.O ur know ledge is all founded on simple ideas, as I havebefore explained, though not always about simple ideas,for we may know the t ru th of propositions which includecomplex ideas, and those complex ideas may not alw aysbe perfectly clear ideas.I n th e rem aining part of this page, i t follows : " I do" not go about to jus tify those who lay the whole stress'( pon that foundation, which I grant to be too weak'( o support so important a t ruth ; and th at those are" very much to blame, mho go about to invalidate other" arguments for the sake of th at : but I doubt all that" alk about clear and distinct ideas being made the" oundation of certainty, came originally from these'' discourses or meditations, which are aimed at. T h e" author of them was an ingenious thin kin g man, and" he endeavoured to lay the foundation of certainty, as" well as he c

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