The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 8 | Issue 38 | Number 4 | Sep 20, 2010

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"The World is beginning to know Okinawa": Ota MasahideReflects on his Life from the Battle of Okinawa to the Strugglefor Okinawa

Ota Masahide, Satoko Oka Norimatsu

"The World is beginning to knowOkinawa": Ota Masahide Reflects onhis Life from the Battle of Okinawato the Struggle for Okinawa

Ota Masehide and Satoko Norimatsu

Ota Masahide interviewed on July 20, 2010at the Ota Peace Research Institute, Naha,Okinawa

Interview, translation, notes, andintroduction by Satoko Norimatsu

The Japanese original text is available(http://peacephilosophy.blogspot.ca/2017/06 / o r i g i n a l - j a p a n e s e - v e r s i o n - o f -interview.html).

Introduction

“Ota-san is the ‘Conscience of Okinawa’,” themanager of a small museum in Shuri said,when I told her I was going to interview formerGovernor of Okinawa Ota Masahide afterleaving the museum. The museum, run by thealumni association of Okinawa Prefectural FirstJunior High School (now Shuri High School),commemorates their students who perished inthe Battle of Okinawa. At the time of the U.S.invasion of Okinawa in late March of 1945, atleast 1,787 junior high school boys across theisland, mostly from age 14 to 18, were draftedby the Japanese Imperial Army as members ofthe “Tekketsu Kinnoutai (Blood and IronStudent Corps).” At least 921, more than half ofthose students, died in the Battle, the bloodiest

of the Pacific War, which took over 200,000lives, half of them local civilians.1

Ota Masahide (right ) as a student atOkinawa Teacher’s College

Ota, a native of Kumejima Island, about 100kilometres west of Okinawa Island, was a 19-year old student at the Okinawa Teacher’sCollege when he was mobilized as a member ofthe communication unit of the TekketsuKinnoutai. Almost daily, he saw his classmatesbombarded and “die the deaths not of humans,

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but of worms.” 226 of his 386 schoolmatesdied.2 He spent the last months of the Battlehiding amongst the rocks of Mabuni Beach,surviving the hunger, thirst, injury anddesperation.

The rocky shore of Mabuni, the lastbattlefield in the desperate war, on the

southern tip of Okinawa Island. Otasurvived the last few months of the war

hiding amongst the rocks there.

The experience of the Battle left incurablescars on Ota’s mind, as it did for manyOkinawans. When the Army left its ShuriHeadquarters to retreat towards the south ofthe island in May 1945, an injured soldierbegged Ota to take him along, saying “Gakusei-san! Gakusei-san! (student, student!).” Sixty-five years later, “I still hear the soldier’s cryevery day,” Ota said. “There is so muchunfinished business,” as there are stillthousands of bones yet to be discovered, andunexploded bombs across the island that areexpected to take 40 to 50 years to dispose of.Ota ponders, “The war is far from over inOkinawa. Then why prepare for more wars?”This sentiment is shared by many Okinawans.The islanders’ strong resistance against hostingU.S. military bases is inseparable from theirexperience of the indescribable horrors of awar that took more than one fourth of the livesof local people. They do not just want to seeanother war in Okinawa; many feel responsible

for indirectly participating in current U.S. warsin Iraq and Afghanistan, by providing land fortheir military bases, however reluctantly.

Corpses of Japanese soldiers in thecourtyard of Shuri Castle

The Battle also set foundations for Ota’s post-war endeavours. During his governorship(1990-1998), Ota set three goals as Okinawa’speace initiatives: commemoration of the wardead and promotion of education and researchfor peace. The first two were achieved: theexpansion and improvement of Okinawa PeaceMemorial Park and Museum; and the erectionof the “Cornerstone of Peace,” on which240,931 names (as of June 23, 2010)3 of thosewho died in the Battle of Okinawa areinscribed, regardless of nationality, and ofwhether military or civilian. The last of thethree-pillar project, the establishment of an“Okinawa International Peace ResearchInstitute,” was suspended when he left theGovernor’s office in 1998.

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From the top of the Okinawa PrefecturalPeace Memorial Museum, overlooking the

Mabuni Hill and the “Cornerstone forPeace (Heiwa no ishiji),” remembering all

who died in the Battle of Okinawa,regardless of nationality, and whether

military or civilian

Ota, the 85-year old sociologist and professoremeritus of the University of Ryukyus, nowruns his own peace research centre in Naha,with six staff members, and tirelessly writesand speaks on behalf of Okinawa and itspeople, long-oppressed by Japanese andAmerican colonialism and militarism. Hisinterview on July 20, 2010 covered theemerg ing movement fo r Ok inawa ’sindependence, the controversy over the forcedmass suicides during the Battle of Okinawa, the“Futenma relocation facility” and media bias onthe issue, growing worldwide interest inOkinawa research, and the importance of“making friends beyond the wall” to expand thenetwork of international allies for Okinawa.

This report emphasizes the “Futenmarelocation” issue, particularly elements thatprovide knowledge, background andperspectives that are not readily available inmainstream discourse. The Futenmacontroversy dates back to 1995, during Ota’sgovernorship. Ota, alarmed by the 1995 “NyeInitiative,” named for Assistant Defense

Secretary Joseph Nye and calling for astrengthened U.S.-Japan security relationship,refused to sign documents by proxy that wouldforce the landowners of U.S. military bases torenew leases. Okinawan rage erupted that yearover the rape of an Okinawan child by threeU.S. GIs, and talks started between Ota and theJapan/U.S. governments for return of the bases.Ota’s direct account on this issue gives specialsignificance to this interview, in the context ofthe contemporary Okinawan struggle to closethe dangerous base at Futenma while opposingthe US-Japan plan to build yet another U.S.military base at Henoko in the Oura Bay on thenorthern coast of the island.

Norimatsu Satoko

On the “Futenma Relocation” and plans tobuild a new base at Henoko, Oura Bay

Ota Masahide interviewed in his office

A large, dangerous, expensive, andunneeded base

There has been a lot of media coverage of the

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Henoko issue (the Japan-U.S. plan to build anew base to replace Futenma Air Station), butnone of those reports properly understand thehistorical background or the core issue. Wehave discovered some shocking facts frommaterial collected from the U.S. NationalArchives.

U.S. military bases in Okinawa – the bluedot is Henoko, where a controversial new

base is planned to replace the Futenma AirStation (in red)

Let me give you some background. As early as1965, the U.S. Government started behind-the-scenes talks about returning Okinawa to Japan.Many of the major U.S. military bases inOkinawa are situated in the mid-south region ofthe island, the most densely-populated area.

Before its 1972 reversion to Japan, neither theJapanese Constitution nor the Japan-U.S.Security Treaty applied to Okinawa. Thisenabled the U.S. military to bring nuclearweapons and biological/chemical weapons tothe island. On July 8, 1969, 24 U.S. militarystaff members were exposed to poison gasleaked from the Chibana ammunition depot.

The Wall Street Journal reported this incident,and it caused a huge uproar in Okinawa,igniting a movement to remove nuclear, andbiological/chemical weapons.4 The ammunitiondepot had some goats in their field. Goats aresusceptible to poison gases, so when dead orgroaning goats are found on the ground, itindicates that poison gas has leaked. The localresidents were not told about about theweapons or the incident.

The Wall Street Journal reported this becauseU.S. military personnel were affected. Thechemical warfare munitions were moved out ofOkinawa in 1971, in “Operation Red Hat,”5 butneither Japanese government representativesnor Okinawa’s Governor could enter the U.S.military bases without permission. No onechecked whether all the weapons wereremoved. Even now, polls indicate that 60% to70% of Okinawans believe that chemical as wellas nuclear weapons are still stored on theirisland.

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Map of US military bases in Okinawa. Red:Marine Corps; Dark Blue: Air Force

(Kadena); Green: Army; Bright Blue: Navy;Light Blue: Water Space and Airspace for

Training. 20% of Okinawa Island isoccupied by U.S. military bases, of which77% are managed by the Marines, but all

four services maintain bases.

After Okinawa was returned to Japan in 1972,the Japanese Constitution and Japan-U.S.Security Treaty were supposed to apply toOkinawa, so that there were supposed to berestrictions on how the U.S. military managedthose bases. Gene R. LaRoque, a retired Navyrear admiral who founded The Center forDefense Information in Washington, dropped abombshell in 1974 by stating that it wasimpossible for U.S. warships to unload nuclearweapons when they visited Japanese ports,because it would mean violation of Japan’s

three non-nuclear principles (non-production,non-possession of nuclear weapons and notallowing nuclear weapons into Japaneseterritory). In 1981, former U.S. ambassador toJapan Edwin Reischauer disclosed that the twogovernments had signed a secret pact to allowthe nuclear-armed U.S. vessels into theJapanese water and its ports.

Naha military port was under U.S. control aswell as the military bases. What is now knownas the National Route 58, which runs acrossOkinawa from the northern tip of the island allthe way south to Naha along the western shore,was built by the U.S. military and was formerlycalled “Military Route 1.” The U.S. militarywould load tanks and artillery at Naha Portonto long trucks and transport them on thisroute to the Northern Training Area. Angrylocal residents tried to block the road, bystanding in front of the trucks. The memory ofthe Battle of Okinawa was still fresh in theminds of those people, who did not want theisland being used for war and war preparationever again.

U.S. military forces in Okinawa feared thatthose protests would increase once Okinawawas returned to Japan and basic human rights,which were guaranteed under the JapaneseConstitution, were applied to Okinawans. TheU.S. wanted to consolidate the bases away fromheavily populated areas – moving those basessouth of Kadena Air Force base – to Henoko,Oura Bay. Naha military port was too shallowto berth aircraft carriers so they wanted tobuild a military port with a gigantic pier inOura Bay, which had a depth of 30 meters,enough to accommodate aircraft carriers.

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Oura Bay, overlooking Cape of Henoko,with Camp Schwab buildings in sight

Futenma Air Station was also inconvenientlylocated for the U.S. military. Futenma has ahelicopter unit, which is a battle unit (thehelicopter that crashed into the adjacentcampus of Okinawa International University onAugust 13, 2004 belonged to this unit), andtheir helicopters have to go to Kadena to loadammunition, because Futenma is too close toresidential areas. A new airbase in Henokowould allow the helicopter unit to load weaponson land, and also at sea. The plan to build abase in Henoko was hatched as early as 1965,and blueprints were drawn up in 1966 and1967.

In 1966, the Navy and the Marine Corpscommissioned Daniel, Mann, Johnson andMendenhall, a U.S. engineering company, toassess the wind direction and they drew thisplan.

The 1966 U.S. plan to build a Marineairbase and a Navy military port at Henoko

Below is the plan made under the HashimotoAdministration, in 1997 (after SACO – theSpecial Action Committee on Okinawa report atthe end of 19966). It was called a “Sea BasedFaci l i ty .” The U.S. and the Japanesegovernments intended to build a base off thecoast of Camp Schwab, connected by bridgesand piers.

1997 “Sea Based Facility” plan

Below is the 2002 plan, which returned to theoriginal location where the U.S. military wishedto build the base in 1966. The sea-based,removable hel iport plan of 1997 wastransformed into a 2,000-meter runway onreclaimed land, two kilometers away from the

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coast of Henoko.

The 2002 plan for an off-shore runwaybuilt by reclamation

Now look at how this 2005 plan (below)resembles the original 1966 plan.

The 2005 L-shaped plan in the “U.S.-JapanAlliance: Transformation and Realignment

for the Future,” October 20057

But other voices were calling for a base furtheraway from the coastline, citing noise over theresidential area as the reason. So DefenseAgency Chief Nukaga Fukushiro came up witha V-shape plan as an alternative, claiming thatone of the runways would be used for landingand the other for take-off, to avoid flying over

residential areas. This is the plan in the 2006“Roadmap” agreement: the V-shaped runwayplan.8

The V-shaped runway plan in the RoadmapAgreement, 2006

Nukaga secretly met with former Nago MayorShimabukuro Yoshikazu, and worked out thisplan, supposedly to reduce noise by havingseparate runways for take-off and landing.Because a single runway (the 2005 L-shapeplan) would generate too much noise, therewere calls to move the new base further awayfrom the coastline. This led to the V-shape planin 2006. As of now (July 2010), the twogovernments are again talking about building asingle runway.

We (at the Ota Peace Institute) think that theplan will eventually be rolled back to the one of1966. But why was the U.S. unable to proceedwith this plan in 1966? The U.S.-Japan SecurityTreaty did not apply to Okinawa then, so theU.S. military would have had to pay for therelocation, construction, and maintenance ofthe new base. The Vietnam War was alreadybecoming very expensive, and the U.S. dollarwas depreciating. The U.S. simply could notafford this base and so put the plan on the backburner. Now, with the Japanese governmentready to shoulder all the expenses, it is aperfect opportunity for the U.S. to revive theplan.

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But I wonder how real is t ic a l l these“replacement” plans are. One recent idea wasto build a Futenma replacement base onIwojima Island. That made me laugh. Iwojimahas no residents; there is only a Self DefenseForce base. Supply of workers is essential forany military base, but Iwojima has no people.How could the U.S. accept this idea?

Futenma Air Station, the left dot on the map ofOkinawa, and Henoko, Nago, the right dot. The

“V-shape” plan and “I-shape” plan beingdiscussed in 2010 by the Japanese and U.S.

governments are diagrammed.

Although Nukaga managed to convince the U.S.to accept the V-shape runway, the soldiers inthe field found it ridiculous. Once war starts,how can pilots pick and choose this runway fortake-off and that runway for landing? It wouldbe impossible.

The Japanese and U.S. governments want tobuild a base by reclaiming land adjacent toCamp Schwab. The governments prefer a baseas close to Camp Schwab as possible, becauseit is off-limits to residents and construction canproceed without disturbance by protesters.Okinawa prefecture, however, wants the baseas far away from the coastline as possible.Their official rationale is noise reduction for theresidential area, but the truth is that thedecision is driven by construction interests.

Pro-base construction interests in Okinawahave been sustained by the “gravel industry

association.” The farther away they build abase from the coastline, the more gravel theyneed, as the ocean gets deeper. The currentgovernor (Nakaima Hirokazu), the governorwho succeeded me (Inamine Keiichi), and theprevious Nago mayor (Shimabukuro Yoshikazu)were all elected with backing from the gravelindustry. But when they tried to build fartheraway from the coast, environmentalists andpeace activists dived into the ocean, pulled upthe piles and disrupted the construction. This iswhy the government is trying to build a basenear Camp Schwab.

85,000 Okinawans gathered in Ginowan, toprotest against US military bases and GI

crime on October 21, 1995, after the gangrape of a school girl by three US GIs.

The Japanese government is being called on topay for the relocation and construction, but ithas no idea what kind of base will be built. ADepartment of Defense report9 says theoperational life of the base will be 40 years andthe useful life of the base will be 200 years. TheU.S. GAO (Government Accountability Office),which checks the budgets, estimates the newbase will cost 1 to 1.5 trillion yen (approx. 10 to15 billion U.S. dollars), and will take 10 to 12years to build.10 On the other hand, the

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Japanese and U.S. government spokespersonsare estimating 300 to 500 billion yen (approx. 3to 5 billion dollars) and 5 to 7 years. There aregreat discrepancies between the GAO and thegovernments’ estimates.

Futenma Air Station, Ginowan, Okinawa,surrounded by residential areas, schools,and hospitals. Former U.S. Secretary ofDefense Donald Rumsfeld called it “the

most dangerous military base in theworld.”

Some young DPJ (Democratic Party of Japan)members of Parliament ask why billions ofdollars of taxpayers’ money should be spent forthe sake of Okinawa. I tell those people that weOkinawans don’t want any money, and they arewelcome to take the base themselves. Thesepeople, knowing nothing, keep saying that abase should be built at Henoko. They don’tknow what kind of base it will be or how muchit will cost.

The current U.S.-Japan agreement plans tomove 8,000 Marines and their 9,000 familymembers to Guam, with Japan paying 60% ofthe estimated cost of 10.2 billion dollars, thatis, over 6 billion dollars. Now it looks as if thiswill cost a lot more than 10 billion. Recently,U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gatesreques ted add i t iona l fund ing f romJapan,11 saying the whole transfer would cost as

much as 15 billion dollars. 60% of that wouldbe 9 billion. If the Henoko base costs 10 to 15billion, the total cost of the transfer to Guamand construction of a new base would be 30billion dollars.

A Marine helicopter that crashed into thecampus of Okinawa InternationalUniversity on August 13, 200412

The military base issue is not aboutsecurity; it is about profit

According to Colonel Thomas R. King, formervice commander of Futenma Air Station,13 thepurpose of a new base in Henoko is not just toreplace Futenma Air Station, but to build abase that has 20% more military power thanFutenma. A base in Henoko would enableloading of ammunition on land and from thesea. The new base would also host a dozen ormore MV-22 Ospreys. Ospreys, which havecaused frequent accidents in the U.S. andbeyond, are called “widow makers.”

King estimates that it would take two moreyears to make it possible for Ospreys to operatesafely on and around the new sea-based facility,so the construction of the base could take 12 to16 years in total. The cost of construction willbe10 to 15 billion dollars, and it will be as largeas Kansai International Airport; enough toaccommodate 35 aircraft. The annual

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maintenance cost of Futenma is 2.8 milliondollars, but that for the replacement base inHenoko would be exponentially higher – asmuch as 200 million dollars. The runway ofFutenma is 2,800 meters. The Japanesegovernment announced that the new runwaywould be shorter, but according to King, thenew base will be a lot larger.

Robert Hamilton, former company commanderof Okinawa Marine Corps has written articlesfor the Marine Corps Gazette. In one of these,he argued that the Futenma replacement issuehad nothing to do with security policies. TheJapanese steel industry has been in stagnation.The top steel manufacturer Nippon Steel hasbeen surpassed by a Korean firm. So theindustry needs stimulus. Then Prime MinisterHashimoto endorsed a plan to build a base byplacing tens of thousands of steel pilings on theocean bed, put steel boxes on top of them,connect those boxes, and put hot steel plates tobuild a runway. According to Hamilton, thiswas designed to boost the Japanese economy, itwas not based on the nation’s security needs.

Artist’s Conception of a Pile-SupportedSea-Based Facility (GAO, March 1998

(http://www.gao.gov/archive/1998/ns98066.pdf))

Hamilton is an engineer. He knows technicalrequirements. He says that specific kinds of

rings are necessary to connect those steelboxes, and that the technology has not yet beencompletely developed. The technology is mostadvanced in the Scandinavian countries, andthe U.S. Navy has invested 200 million dollarsthere in research and development of the rings.The kind of rings presently available are tooweak to withstand the strong winds ofOkinawa.

Hamilton sent me another article, in which hewrites about the 1997 Nago plebiscite (onacceptance of a new base) and Japan’s DefenseAgency’s efforts to buy votes by visiting eachhousehold, going door to door, deliveringalcohol and money. He warned us in the lastNago mayoral election (January 2010) of suchactivities being repeated, and advised us tostop early-voting, as companies would mobilizetheir employees to go to the polls and pressurethem to vote for the base. I told him that ouranti-base side would also mobilize for early-voting.

Former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State RichardArmitage said that the 21st century would bethe century of “Mega-floats” (also known asVery Large Floating Structures, or VLFS), andendorsed the idea of a mobile base. RobertHamilton in the article mentioned above saysthe idea of “Mega-floats” originally came froma man called Watanabe, in the Japanese steelindustry, which works with U.S. military-industrial groups such as Bechtel. When I wentto the U.S., twenty board members of the U.S.Chamber of Commerce wanted to meet withme. Somebody from the military industryproposed a drawing of a new base to me, but Itold him I was in the U.S. to oppose baseconstruction. The Japanese steel industry justwants to make anything using steel. It is not amatter of national security; it is a matter ofcorporate interests.

No need for replacement base – U.S.experts

(Showing thick files), we have collected so

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many articles written by military and securityexperts in the U.S. that support our side thatare saying that there is no need for a Futenmareplacement base. The Cato Institute evensubmitted an advisory report to the U.S.Congress that recommended that the U.S.military withdraw from Japan and the twocountries sign a new peace and friendshiptreaty to replace the current Japan-U.S.Security Treaty. I invited Cato Institute’s seniorfellow Douglas Bandow and showed him thebases in Okinawa. He was surprised to see thelevel of military occupation still going on inOkinawa. Immediately after he went back tothe U.S., he wrote an article that tells how theU.S. has turned Okinawa into its militarycolony.14

Many Japanese Diet members are sympatheticto Okinawa, but even they tell me that theconcentration of bases in Okinawa is inevitablebecause of its “geopolitical” position. I talkedabout the “geopolitical issue” with GeneLaRoque, and that made him laugh. He said hehad just come back from Korea. Geopolitically,if North Korea were a real threat, it wouldmake a lot more sense to increase U.S. troopsin South Korea. We don’t need more U.S.troops in South Korea since it already hasmilitary power far surpassing that of the Northand national income many times greater thanthat of its rival. Furthermore, if North Koreawere really a threat, northern Kyushu would bemore advantageous, being closer to Korea.Knowing that, many in the Japanese Diet stillbring up this "geopolitical issue.” It is clear thattheir primary motive is refusal to contemplateadditional bases in the main Japanese islands,leaving Okinawa to bear the burden.

I am trying to let the Japanese people and itsmedia know about those in the U.S., whorationally and intellectually assess the situationin Okinawa and speak out against theunreasonable and unfair burden of the bases inOkinawa. The mainland media, however, refuseto heed these opinions, and only listen to the

so-called “ANPO Mafia,” or “Japan Handlers,”like Joseph Nye, Kurt Campbell, and MichaelGreen. The Japanese media, such as Kyodo,Asahi, and Mainichi, only listen to those people,and ignore the articles and opinions that Ibring to their attention. Or, if they do writeabout them, their bosses in Tokyo suppress theinformation. They say they need bases in Japanfor “deterrence,” but none of the articles that Imentioned or the U.S. experts whom I havespoken to refer to Marines in Okinawa as a“deterrent force.” The true situations ofOkinawa must be told in English, to the world.Then we would gain greater understanding andsupport.

Another issue is the U.S. plan to move OkinawaMar ines to Guam. In May 2006 , thegovernments of the U.S. and Japan issued the“United States-Japan Roadmap for RealignmentImplementation.” A few months later, the U.S.Pacific Command released the “GuamIntegrated Military Development Plan,”15 and inNovember 2009, the U.S. publicized an 11,000-page environmental impact statement on Guamand the Northern Mariana Islands.16 As IhaYoichi, Ginowan Mayor and a candidate in thegubernatorial election, points out, thestatement indicates that the Marine unitsstationed in Futenma Air Station are to betransferred to Guam, including their helicopterunit. This would make the construction of anew base in Henoko totally unnecessary. I keeptelling the Japanese media about thesedocuments, but they almost never take up theissue. It is deeply disappointing that evenKyodo ignores it. Mainichi and Asahi too. Theywrite a lot about Okinawan resistance, but saynothing about this.

Division at the 30th parallel: truths of themilitary colonization of Okinawa

I was interested to learn that only six monthsafter the onset of the Pacific War in December1941, the Departments of Defense and Statehad already started discussing dividing Japan

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at the 30th parallel north, with Amami andOkinawa islands south of the parallel, and therest of Japan north of it. Why did they want tochop off Okinawa and Amami? That was mybiggest question for a long time. Despite thejoint international research efforts, which I waspart of, none of us could find an answer. Amamiwas part of Kagoshima Prefecture, not ofOkinawa. Finally, after five years, we found it.

Then Assistant Secretary of State DeanAcheson testified in the U.S. Congress that theymade that decision because the 30th paralleln o r t h w a s t h e b o r d e r b e t w e e n t h e“Yamato(Japanese) race" and the "Ryukyu(Okinawa) race.” It was a racial distinction.They drew that line because the Ryukyuanpeople on those islands were not inherentlyJapanese, and they included Amami, which wastechnically part of Kagoshima Prefecture,because the islands had once been part of theRyukyu Kingdom. They also wanted tomaximize the occupied area to include morethan just Okinawa Prefecture.

Ryukyu Islands and 30th Parallel North

Linguists say that the 30th parallel is the borderbetween the Yamato (Japanese) language andOkinawa language. Biologist Watarase says theecological systems are different north andsouth of that parallel too. Similarly, the KoreanPeninsula was divided at the 38th parallel. Azainichi Korean author (Korean resident inJapan) says Japanese people are so blissfullyignorant, in thinking they are fortunate, asJapan was not divided after its defeat in thewar as Korea was. But it was the Japanesemilitary that first divided Korea. It decided thatthe elite Kwantung Army would defend north ofthe 38th parallel, and other armies dispatchedfrom Japan would defend south of the parallel.So, what did the 30th parallel mean militarilyfor the U.S.? South of it were the Nansei(Southwest) Islands, defended during the warby the Okinawa Defense Army. North of theparallel was “pure Japan,” which was defendedby the “Mainland Defense Army.”

So why was Okinawa cut off from Japan? Theidea goes back to the late 19th century. TheMeiji government abolished the feudal hansystem and established the centralized ken(prefecture) system in 1871. This was appliedto Okinawa in 1879, eight years later, makingOkinawa a prefecture of Japan. HistorianGeorge H. Kerr wrote a longtime seller “TheHistory of an Island People,” which wastranslated into Japanese and published in 1956under the title “Ryukyu no rekishi (History ofRyukyu).” Kerr renounced the Japanese editionbecause the commander of the U.S. militarygovernment took advantage of the book tojustify detaching Okinawa from Japan.

Kerr argues that the policy applied to Okinawawas completely different from that applied tothe mainland. Other prefectures were createdon the assumption of shared culture, language,and ethnicity, with the goal of creating amodern, centralized nation state. But theincorporation of Okinawa had a fundamentally

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different logic. The Meiji government wantedOkinawa to be a southern shield for the defenseof the mainland, with permanent presence ofmilitary forces there. They wanted theOkinawan lands; not the Okinawan people.Okinawans fiercely opposed government plansto station the Kumamoto 6th Division there. TheMeiji government eventually used force tomake Okinawa obey. This is why the process ofincorporation was called the “RyukyuDisposition,” something unheard of in thecreation of other prefectures.

U.S. post-war occupation policy focussed ondemilitarization and disarmament of Japan.Part of this demilitarization process involveddetaching Okinawa, because the southernmostislands had been used by Japan as a base forthe invasion of other Asian countries. The U.S.used Okinawa as collateral for Japan’sdisarmament.

When Japan surrendered, the Allied Powersentered a defeated nation that still had 4.4million troops with a force of only 300,000 to400,000. Fearing an uprising, DouglasMacArthur, the Supreme Commander of theAllied Powers, decided to reinforce U.S. troopsin Okinawa. Those U.S. forces in Okinawawould be “the cap in the bottle,” acting as adeterrent to prevent uprising of the remainingJapanese troops, or future military build-up ofJapan. MacArthur, with the understanding thatOkinawans were not Japanese, expected thatany form of l iberation from Japaneseoppression would please Okinawans, whether itwas militarization of the whole island ordetachment from the Japanese nation. He alsothought that Japan would have no use forresource-poor Okinawa.

Up until 1968, there was no democratic systemfor Okinawan people to choose their leader.Under U.S. occupation, Chief Executives of theRyukyu Government were appointed by USCAR(U.S. Civil Administration of the RyukyuIslands), with the influence of the U.S. military

commander. With Okinawan people’smovement, however, the first popular electionwas finally held in 1968, and the progressivecandidate Yara Chobyo won.

Yara Chobyo, Okinawa’s first electedgovernor

We now know that Edwin O. Reischauer, whowas the U.S. Ambassador to Japan from 1961 to1966, tried to increase the number of pro-occupation representatives within Okinawa’sLegislature with CIA funding, intending tocrush the progressive forces. The U.S. andJapanese governments threw in 720,000 dollarsand 880,000 dollars respectively, into theirattempt to influence the election, but theyfailed with the victory of Yara Chobyo. This ishow Okinawa’s hard-earned democracy hasbeen manipulated. We got all this informationfrom declassified documents in the U.S.Archives. I cannot stress enough theimportance of these documents, and the needfor continued efforts to obtain more.

Making Friends beyond the Wall

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Why is it so hard to solve Okinawa’s problems?In democracy, the majority wins by definition.Among the 772 members of the JapaneseParliament, only 9 represent Okinawa.Mainland politicians don’t think aboutOkinawa’s military base issue as their ownproblem, because doing that would not helpthem gain votes in their constituency. Okinawahas always been discriminated against, becauseof this majoritarian principle. So how can weaddress this challenge?

I asked Danilo Dolci, who received the LeninPeace Prize for leadership in the non-violencemovement, what he would do if he wereOkinawa’s Governor to overcome that “thickwall” between Okinawa and the enormouspowers of the U.S. and Japanese governments.Dolci said, “Government power is hard toundermine. You can’t fight them head-on. If youfeel that you are stuck against the ‘thick wall,’make friends on the other side of the wall. Thatway , the ‘wal l ’ w i l l cease to ex is t . ”Understandably as a trade union leader, he alsosaid, “Trust common people.” Interestingly,Johan Galtung, founder of the InternationalPeace Research Institute in Norway, andRajmohan Gandhi, grandson of MahatmaGandhi, said the same thing when they came toOkinawa.

When I studied journalism in the U.S., I wastold that common people were like a flock ofbirds… just flying together wherever the windblows. But these three influential people –Galtung, Dolci, and Gandhi all said the samething: trust the common people. I wasimpressed. I met Dolci right before the BerlinWall collapsed. People in East and WestGermany still visited each other despite theWall. Then the wall became virtually non-existent. I was fascinated with Dolci’s foresight.This is why I make as many friends as possiblewhenever I am overseas. (Showing a file) Herewe have over 600 articles supportive ofOkinawa. We have also received about 220,000letters of support from the U.S., Japan, China,

Singapore, and beyond.

I also see that an increasing number of youngresearchers abroad are specializing inOkinawa. Here at our office, we have collectedmore than 300 MA and Ph.D. dissertations onOkinawa. I met one young British man who isstudying the 700 year history of Kin Town, anda British woman who is studying the life of thelast king of the Ryukyus, Sho Tai. Three PhD’shave been awarded in London for study of thesanshin, Okinawa’s “three-string” musicalinstrument. When a Georgian Ph.D. studentcame to see me, I asked her why she wasstudying Okinawa. She said it was becausethere were so many Okinawas in the world; inother words, because minority societies arealways oppressed. Learning about Okinawahelped her understand her own country,Georgia, also under constant pressure fromRussia.

The world is beginning to know what is goingon in Okinawa, and I hope such internationalexchange of friendship and scholarshipbetween Okinawa and the rest of the world willhelp dissolve the “wall.”

Ota Masahide, former Governor of Okinawa(1990-1998), former Member of the JapaneseHouse of Councillors (2001-2007), is aprofessor emeritus at the University of theRyukyus, Okinawa and Director of the OtaPeace Research Institute. He was born inOkinawa in 1925. While a student at OkinawaTeacher’s College, he was drafted into theJapanese Imperial Army as a member ofTekketsu Kinnoutai (Blood and Iron Corps),organized just before the invasion of Okinawaby U.S. forces on April 1, 1945. After the war,he went to Tokyo to attend Waseda University,graduating in 1954. He went to the UnitedStates as a scholarship student, receiving anMA degree in journalism from SyracuseUniversity in 1956. He has taught at the East-West Center, University of Hawaii (1973) and

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was a Fulbright visiting scholar at ArizonaState University (1978). He has written morethan eighty books on Okinawa, including TheBattle of Okinawa , Essays on OkinawaProblems, The Okinawan Mind (Okinawa noKokoro), Who Are the Okinawans? (Okinawajintowa Nanika), The Political Structure ofModern Okinawa (Okinawa no Seiji Kozo), andThe Consciousness of the Okinawan People(Okinawa no Minshu Ishiki), among others.

Satoko Norimatsu, an Asia-Pacific Journaleditor, is Director of the Peace PhilosophyCentre (http://peacephilosophy.blogspot.com/),a peace-education centre in Vancouver,Canada, and Director of Vancouver Save Article9 (http://vsa9.blogspot.com/). She leads youthand community members in promoting andlearning about Art ic le 9 , histor ica lr e c o n c i l i a t i o n i n A s i a(http://peacephilosophy.blogspot.com/2009/12/international-human-rights-day-student.html),Hiroshima/Nagasaki and nuclear disarmament(http://peacephilosophy.blogspot.com/2010/03/hiroshimanagasaki-peace-studies-tour.html),and issues surrounding U.S. military bases inOkinawa.

Recommended citation: Satoko Norimatsu,"'The World is beginning to know Okinawa': OtaMasahide Reflects on his Life from the Battle ofOkinawa to the Struggle for Okinawa," TheAsia-Pacific Journal, 38-4-10, September 20,2010.

Articles on related themes:

G a v a n M c C o r m a c k(http://peacephilosophy.blogspot.com/2010/03/hiroshimanagasaki-peace-studies-tour.html),The US-Japan ‘Alliance’, Okinawa, and ThreeLooming Elections

Ryukyu Asahi Broadcasting and NorimatsuS a t o k o(https://apjjf.org/-Norimatsu-Satoko/3381),Assault on the Sea: A 50-Year U.S. Plan to Builda Military Port on Oura Bay, Okinawa

K e n s e i Y o s h i d a(https://apjjf .org/-Yoshida-Kensei/3378),Okinawa and Guam: In the Shadow of U.S. andJapanese “Global Defense Posture”

M a k i s h i Y o s h i k a z u(http://www.japanfocus.org/-Makishi-Yoshikazu/1819), US Dream Come True? The New HenokoSea Base and Okinawan Resistance

Ahagon Shoko and C. Douglas Lummis(https://apjjf.org/-C__Douglas-Lummis/3369), ILost My Only Son in the War: Prelude to theOkinawan Anti-Base Movement

Y o s h i o S h i m o j i(https://apjjf.org/-Yoshio-SHIMOJI/3354), TheFutenma Base and the U.S.-Japan Controversy:an Okinawan perspective

Iha Yoichi (https://apjjf.org/-Iha-Yoichi/3287),Why Build a New Base on Okinawa When theMarines are Relocating to Guam?: OkinawaMayor Challenges Japan and the US

Notes

1 Ota Peace Research Institute, Okinawa kanrenshiryo – Okinawa sen oyobi kichi mondai, 2010,p.2

2 ibid.

3 ibid.

4 The morning edition of Ryukyu Shimpo on July19, 1969 reported that The Wall Street Journalreported the incident in its July 18, 1969edition. “11 Beigun no dokugasu haibi hakkaku1969 nen 7 gatsu 19 nichi chokan,” RyukyuS h i m p o , J u l y 2 4 , 2 0 0 9 . L i n k(http://ryukyushimpo.jp/news/storyid-147533-storytopic-189.html).

5 Some details of “Operation Red Hat” areavailable at “Dokugasu iso hajimaru,” January13, 2009 entry of the blog of OkinawaP r e f e c t u r a l A r c h i v e s . L i n k

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(http://www.archives.pref.okinawa.jp/publication/2009/01/post-149.html).

6 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, TheSACO (Special Action Committee on Okinawa)Final Report , December 2, 1996. Link(http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/96saco1.html).

7 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, SecurityConsultative Committee Document, U.S.-JapanAlliance: Transformation and Realignment forthe Future , October 29 , 2005 . L ink(http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/doc0510.html).

8 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, UnitedStates – Japan Roadmap for RealignmentImplementat ion , May 1 , 2006 . L ink(http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/doc0605.html).

9 Department of Defense, OperationalRequirements and Concept of Operations forMCAS Futenma Relocation, Okinawa, Japan,Final Draft, September 29,1997

10 United States General Accounting Office,Overseas Presence, Issues Involved InReducing the Impact of U.S. Military Presenceo n O k i n a w a , M a r c h 2 , 1 9 9 8 . L i n k

(http://www.gao.gov/archive/1998/ns98066.pdf).

11 “Marines’ move to Guam to cost more,” TheJ a p a n T i m e s , J u l y 4 , 2 0 1 0 . L i n k(http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20100704a1.html).

12 Photo courtesy Ginowan City website.Accessed September 24, 2010. L ink(http://www.city.ginowan.okinawa.jp/2556/2568/2596/2662/4254.html).

13 NHK News, broadcast on April 10, 1998

14 Douglas Bandow, "Okinawa: LiberatingWashington's East Asian Military Colony."S e p t e m b e r 1 , 1 9 9 8 . L i n k(http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=1173).

15 U.S. Pacific Command, Guam IntegratedMilitary Development Plan, July 11, 2006 (Thed o c u m e n t i s d o w n l o a d a b l e h e r e(http://www.docstoc.com/docs/5646080/Guam-Integrated-Military-Development-Plan)).

16 U.S. Department of the Navy, Guam andCNMI Military Relocation – EnvironmentalImpact Statement, November 2009. Link(http://www.guambuildupeis.us/final_documents).