Table of contents

Introduction.....................................................................................................................4

Methodology.....................................................................................................................5

An historical outline of diplomacy.................................................................................8

The resident embassy..............................................................................................................8

The French system.................................................................................................................10

The ministry of foreign affairs................................................................................................11

Public diplomacy...........................................................................................................11

Goals of public diplomacy......................................................................................................13

Public diplomacy and propaganda.........................................................................................14

The established diplomacy and public diplomacy..................................................................14

Three dimensions of public diplomacy...................................................................................16

News management............................................................................................................16

Strategic communications..................................................................................................17

Relationship building..........................................................................................................18

Nation branding.............................................................................................................19

On branding...........................................................................................................................20

Limits to nation branding.......................................................................................................21

Planning branding campaigns.................................................................................................22

Cultural diplomacy........................................................................................................22

Theory.............................................................................................................................24

Soft Power..............................................................................................................................25

Power.................................................................................................................................25

The three chessboards of power........................................................................................28

Growing importance of soft power....................................................................................30

1

Soft power and public diplomacy.......................................................................................31

Neorealism.............................................................................................................................33

Human behavior.................................................................................................................34

State structure....................................................................................................................34

International anarchy.........................................................................................................35

The international political system......................................................................................36

On anarchy.........................................................................................................................38

On socialization..................................................................................................................38

Constructivism........................................................................................................................39

The Hobbesian culture.......................................................................................................40

The Lockean culture...........................................................................................................43

The Kantian culture............................................................................................................44

The socialization of international relations........................................................................48

Summary............................................................................................................................49

Analysis...........................................................................................................................50

Application of soft power.......................................................................................................50

New ways of conducting diplomacy...................................................................................51

More efficient in reaching foreign policy goals...................................................................52

Breakthrough in international relations.............................................................................52

Summary............................................................................................................................53

Application of neorealism......................................................................................................53

New ways of conducting diplomacy...................................................................................54

More efficient in reaching foreign policy goals...................................................................54

Summary............................................................................................................................55

Application of constructivism.................................................................................................55

New ways of conducting diplomacy...................................................................................56

2

More efficient in reaching foreign policy goals...................................................................56

Breakthrough in international relations.............................................................................57

Summary............................................................................................................................57

Conclusion......................................................................................................................58

Abstract of “The New Era of Diplomacy: The Effects of Public Diplomacy, Nation Branding and Cultural Diplomacy”............................................................................64

3

IntroductionDuring my internship at the Danish Embassy in Tokyo in 2007 I learned that public

diplomacy is one of the most important concepts in the Danish Ministry of Foreign

Affairs at the moment. This is underlined by the recent opening of the public diplomacy

division in the ministry, who orchestrates the total public diplomacy effort by the

foreign ministry in close cooperation with the representations abroad. (Ministry of

Foreign Affairs of Denmark)

At the embassy public diplomacy was mentioned on a daily basis, but when asked

directly nobody could really give a fulfilling answer for what it constituted and what

aspects it included. There I later found out it was often mixed up completely with nation

branding initiatives and advertisement in general. This lack of complete understanding

for a topic everybody talked about but nobody seemed to be able to define completely

sparked my interest to go deeper in the topic.

This tendency is not restricted to Denmark alone. Public diplomacy is increasingly

gaining importance in several ministries of foreign affairs especially in the more

economically developed countries – notably Canada, Norway and the United States all

have a very well developed public diplomacy. The United States has it for quite obvious

reasons as it has the biggest foreign service and because they are often engaged deeper

with several different areas around the world than many other states. Norway and

Canada on the other hand are more interesting in this relation as they both have

comparatively smaller foreign services yet they have chosen to become among the

leading trend setters in relation to public diplomacy. Furthermore France is noteworthy

as they have the world’s largest funding for cultural diplomacy – which is a close

relative of public diplomacy.

The reason for the increasingly central placement of this former niche area of the

diplomatic effort has been the recognition of the value of winning the hearts and minds

of the people and the growing importance of civil society in international relations. So

the ministries of foreign affairs have to widen their focus and not just concentrate their

efforts on foreign government offices and the multilateral diplomacy. (Melissen 2007:

xvii-xxii)

4

A concept linked to, yet very different from, public diplomacy is that of nation

branding. This is an approach where governments and the foreign services have been

inspired by modern marketing concepts such as brand creation. The thought is that it is

possible to mould people’s perception of a state or organization by using some of the

same tools as commercial enterprises use to sell their products. Even though the

approach seems increasingly popular amongst western states it is difficult to come by

solid proof that it is working or that it is beneficial to use commercial approaches like

this in politics.

It is quite symptomatic that focus to a higher extent Is moving away from the traditional

approaches of the ministry of foreign affairs. There is a wide tendency to ‘think outside

the box’ in conducting foreign relation policies – with very varying degrees of success.

Furthermore the ministries of foreign affairs in a wide range of countries are trying to

combat previous stigma of being closed, secretive and elitist and there seems to be an

increasing awareness of the importance of mass media and public opinion.

The thesis will try to uncover why these new approaches to conducting diplomacy and

maintaining or creating good foreign relations have emerged and how significant a role

they are and will be playing in international relations. Furthermore it will be explored

whether the importance of the ministries of foreign affairs can be deemed as increasing

or decreasing. The problem formulation of the thesis will be as follows:

“Why have several ministries of foreign affairs lately made moves to reinvent

themselves and have been introducing several new ways of conducting diplomacy? Is

the increased focus on mass media and public relations more successful in reaching

foreign policy goals compared to the traditional means of diplomatic practice and can

this constitute a breakthrough in international relations?”

Methodology

This chapter will describe in what way the main problem will be approached – including

which theories will be used and what role they play in the thesis, which data will be

used and the analytical approach. It is the hope that this chapter will help give a logical

5

framework for the thesis, will help clarify why the thesis is structured the way it is and

why this is a suitable way to reach a conclusion.

The theories which will be used to analyze the problem are all based in quite

conventional theories within international relations – neorealism, neoliberalism and

constructivism. The latter two theories have been chosen because they can both be

conducive to the analysis of the problem instead of dismissing the importance of public

diplomacy, nation branding and similar concepts right away – which a theory like

neorealism would have a tendency to do. Within neoliberalism the main concept used

will be Joseph S. Nye’s soft power, which stresses the existence and importance of other

power factors than military and economic might – which he terms hard power. The

acknowledgement of the power of attractiveness being just as military and economic

power and worth competing over will help justify the existence and growing importance

of public diplomacy, nation branding and other communicative strategies of conducting

foreign affairs and will ultimately – it is hoped – provide a path to understanding

whether these approaches signify a more effective way of achieving foreign policy goals

compared to traditional diplomatic tools.

Constructivism will be used as it can possibly attribute even more importance to the

increased focus on dialogue and communication in international relations than

neoliberalism and soft power can. The reason for this being that constructivism is more

open to the potential change of the most basic of mechanisms in international relations.

Therefore it will be explored whether the new approaches might be a tool of states to

change the most basic premises of the community of states in the world of today.

The final theory utilized in the thesis will be neorealism. The choice has fallen upon this

theory to maintain a critical view of the new communicative approaches to diplomacy

and international relations and question the importance of it altogether. Furthermore it

will pose counter arguments to the other two theories and thereby help driving forth the

analysis and discussion of the problem.

6

It is standing out that the choices of theories are all very state-centred which might be

considered as quite old-fashioned, but taking the problem formulation in to account this

is the most obvious way to approach the problem. As focus is on the traditional

diplomacy and its utilization of these new concepts the theoretical focus will therefore

also need to be centred on state agents. Even though international organizations, NGOs,

big business and civil society in general all can be involved in both public diplomacy,

nation branding or cultural diplomacy in one way or the other focus remains on state

institutions and their views on international relations.

After this chapter of methodology the empirical chapters will follow. These will include

a short outline of the development of traditional diplomacy and ministries of foreign

affairs which will set the setting from where the new concepts will have to be viewed in

relations to the scope of the thesis. The short outline will be followed by a presentation

of the three communicative aspects of the new way of conducting diplomacy, namely –

public diplomacy, nation branding and cultural diplomacy. The main focus will be on

the concept of public diplomacy as this must be deemed the most significant new

approach to diplomacy and foreign affairs. Cultural diplomacy is not a new concept in

international relations but will be presented together with public diplomacy and nation

branding nonetheless as it is so closely related to these and overlaps the two other

concepts in several areas.

After the empirical chapter the three theories mentioned above will be presented and

discussed after which the analysis will follow. In the analysis the explanatory models of

the three theories above will be applied to the empirical evidence and will be poised

against each other. The analysis will generally be quite heavy on the theoretical side as

the new public diplomacy in particular still is a fairly new phenomenon and difficult to

measure in general so undisputable empirical evidence is generally limited and difficult

to come by. Furthermore it is the theoretical discussion which is truly the most

interesting aspect of the possibilities of public diplomacy, nation branding and cultural

diplomacy, as this cannot be answered unless one has a clear understanding, or rather

belief, of how the dynamics of international relations truly work and whether the

mechanisms are static or not. As an extension to this, the data which will be used in the

thesis will be of a secondary character.

7

An historical outline of diplomacyAs the main premise of this thesis is involving the changed focus of the traditional

diplomatic institutions an outline of how diplomacy was established and evolved is

essential to maintain the relevance of the problem itself. Furthermore expanding this

historical outline to cover diplomacy in general is thought to provide a fundamental

basis of understanding for how public diplomacy, nation branding and cultural

diplomacy potentially might benefit from the diplomatic machinery already in place –

i.e. the contacts and reputation of the embassies and to a lesser extent the consulates

might have.

Diplomacy is as old as civilization itself, with the first signs of rudimentary diplomatic

activity taking place as long ago as possibly the fourth millennium BC in the near and

middle east. At this time the diplomatic activity was quite sporadic as communication

over long distances by traders and messengers was very slow and unpredictable. In

antiquity diplomatic practice began to evolve both in frequency and in mutually

accepted norms – such as diplomatic immunity. This can possibly be attributed to the

multitude of small – usually coastal – Greek city states compared to the large inland

empires of the ancient Near and Middle East. (Berridge 2005: 1-2)

The resident embassy

During the middle ages the diplomatic system had entrenched itself into two main types

of envoys – the nuncius and the plenipotentiary. The plenipotentiary was travelling as

the direct representative of his liege usually of high nobility and had full negotiation

powers whereas the nuncius was limited to delivering a message. Sending off an

embassy each time negotiations between states would take place became very expensive

and troublesome due to the pomp and often quarrels between the negotiators about

precedence and ceremony. Partly due to this the resident embassy was born in the

Italian city states in the late fifteenth century. It was also soon discovered that not only

was having a resident embassy within a state cost effective but also beneficial in the

creation of contacts, creating a better understanding of the state and thereby creating an

invaluable source of information. (Berridge 2005: 108-109)

8

Contemporary of the creation of the resident embassy was the infamous political

philosopher and career diplomat Niccolo Machiavelli and, although he didn’t spend

much time theorizing about diplomacy as such, he had some interesting opinions on

diplomatic practice which illustrate the crossroads of which Italy around 1500 can be

seen. Machiavelli believed in permanent diplomacy within all courts important to a

country – both with friends and foes, as you never could know when a friend turned into

a foe. Even though Machiavelli was in favor of the new modern resident diplomacy his

ideas were in many ways far from what would later become the widely accepted

diplomatic norms. For one he was in strong favor frequent use of deception and bribery

to achieve goals – which in later diplomatic practice would be advised against as it in

the long run would ruin the reputation and credibility of the embassy and in turn their

home government. Also, he didn’t see the diplomat as being part of an international

system but rather merely serving selfish interests for the diplomat himself and for the

state he served in what he saw as the almost continuous state of war between states.

(Berridge 2001: 21-24)

A later but very important diplomatic thinker was the de facto ruler of France 1624-

1642 – Cardinal Richelieu. He was a strong proponent of diplomacy and preferred it

much to the use of brute force, particularly Richelieu is known for his concept of

continuous negotiation. By this he means that the state must have diplomatic

representations in all courts – even where it doesn’t seem worthwhile. Furthermore the

representations shall not be limited to gathering information but must conduct

negotiations at all times to reach objectives even where the objective seems difficult if

not impossible to reach or where no interesting objectives are to be found. Negotiations

doesn’t necessarily have to take place along the established channels either they can be

done in secrecy too if that is preferable. But the most important goal for Richelieu is the

reputation of the state and the sovereign – who is the embodiment of the state. Through

the vast network of diplomatic representations France in this case would have a large

amount of diplomatic agents speaking the case of their home country in all countries.

The continuous negotiation is therefore in many cases only secondarily intended to

achieve specific political or economic goals, but primarily a way of advocating the

viewpoints of the French state and increase awareness and perhaps in time support for

these causes. (Berridge 2001: 71-82)

9

Richelieu can in this regard be seen as much ahead of his time as much of his

continuous negotiation concept can be seen as a form of proto-nation branding or public

diplomacy centuries before these concepts were even coined.

The French system

As the diplomatic practice became more ingrown it began to be institutionalized. As

Richelieu had recommended diplomatic representations had become more widespread

and permanent and the role of the resident embassy gradually increased its status –

where it previously primarily was the occasional special envoys that had the highest

status it was now the ambassador. This institutionalization of diplomatic practice

created a sense of professionalism and collegiality between the diplomats in the

different capitals – the notion of the diplomatic corps was created. The diplomatic corps

became a valuable source of information for all involved diplomats as well as having

some similarities with a trade union as all the diplomats had some similar interests, such

as maintaining the diplomatic immunity. (Berridge 2005: 112)

Another development introduced with the French system of diplomacy was that of

secrecy. Negotiations generally began to be held in secrecy in order for both parties to

have a bit more leeway in the process without having too much interference from the

negotiators home governments or from public sentiment. This secret style of negotiation

was favored because usually both parties of a negotiation would need to give in on some

areas to reach a deal. This would be easier to present to their government and in turn the

public after the deal had been struck. Unfortunately this also stigmatized the diplomatic

corps as being closed and unapproachably, which is a reputation that might limit their

success in public diplomacy unless the image undergoes a change.

As the diplomatic practice had become institutionalized some dilemmas became visibly.

One of the main dilemmas was the tradeoff between experience and loyalty. The longer

time a diplomat was stationed at a location the larger chance he had of establishing an

invaluable network of contacts and gains a deeper understanding of the place he was

stationed. On the other hand, diplomats who were stationed at the same location for long

stretches of time ran the risk of going native. This means that the diplomat can begin to

10

have more sympathetic views of the policies and viewpoints of the place he is stationed

rather than his home government. To avoid this, ministries of foreign affairs generally

imposed a time limit for how long a diplomat could be allowed to be stationed at the

same location, which still is in effect to this day. (Berridge 2005: 110-114)

The ministry of foreign affairsThe ministry of foreign affairs is a fairly new invention in the world of diplomatic

practice. Even though the first ministry of foreign affairs was created by Cardinal

Richelieu in France it didn’t spread that much before the end of the eighteenth century,

when the ministries were opened in countries such as United Kingdom and the newly

independent United States. It wasn’t until the nineteenth century real importance can be

put on the ministry.

The reason for the creation of the ministries has primarily been to standardize

diplomatic procedures, create consistency in policies and provide analysis of reports

received from the diplomatic representations. In many countries there has been a sharp

distinction between the work of the ministry at home and the work of the

representations abroad – often separate career paths within each sector. Smaller

countries tend to have the areas mixed though. (Berridge 2005: 5-8)

Ministries of foreign affairs are usually the entity organizing and planning strategies of

public diplomacy though they will also include several other organizations, institutions

and other groupings. Below follows a more in depth presentation of public diplomacy

and how it is practiced.

Public diplomacyAs it has been made clear above, diplomatic practice has always been centered on

official bilateral or multilateral channels of communication between states and has

usually been shrouded in secrecy. While this traditional diplomacy will continue to be

essential for states to conduct their foreign relations, several governments have begun to

realize that it is necessary not only to target foreign governments in their efforts to reach

foreign policy goals. One of the most notable products of this realization has been the

11

growth of public diplomacy – i.e. diplomacy targeted not at foreign governments but

rather at selected segments of foreign publics. The practitioners of public diplomacy

will utilize several tools in their efforts to clarify the policies of their government to

avoid misunderstandings based on propaganda or lack of information in the hope of

eventually winning the hearts and minds of foreign publics. This chapter will go in

depth with the exploration of public diplomacy goals and tools. (Ross 2002: 75-77)

New public diplomacy is based on a number of principles which distinguishes it clearly

from other related topics. These principles can help to give a basic overview of the

concept and are as follows:

1. “dialogue, not monologue. To awaken understanding and wanting to understand

2. integration in the other diplomacy from the beginning

3. cooperation with non-state partners

4. work after the network method, not the hierarchical method

5. coherence between the public diplomacy work at home and abroad

6. tailored solutions for assignments: “There is no common definition or common

behavior which fits everyone.”

7. honest and reliable information, not propaganda

8. observer role, i.e. registration of other countries’ behavior in the area with later

reporting back to the home country.”1 (Andreasen 2007: 38-39)

This diverse concept occupying the crossroads between communication strategy,

propaganda, cultural diplomacy and traditional diplomatic practice will be presented

and explored in further detail in this chapter. The aim of the chapter is to provide a

thorough basis for a later analysis of this and related diplomatic/communicative

1 Translated from Danish: 1: dialog , ikke monolog. At vække til forståelse og at ville forstå 2: integration i det øvrige diplomati fra startfasen 3: samarbejde med ikke-statslige partnere 4: arbejde efter netværksmetoden, ikke den hierarkiske metode 5: sammenhæng mellem public diplomacy-arbejdet i hjemlandet og udland 6: skræddersyede opgaveløsninger: ”Der er ingen fælles definition eller fælles adfærd som passer alle.” 7: ærlige og pålidelige informationer, ikke propaganda 8: observatørrolle, dvs. registrering af andre landes adfærd på området med efterfølgende indberetning til den hjemlige instans.

12

practices in order to conclude whether it is a more effective means of reaching foreign

policy goals or not.

Goals of public diplomacy

Public diplomacy can make impacts on several levels depending on how successful the

public diplomacy initiatives are conducted, for how long they run and how many

resources are invested in them. The possible achievements for public diplomacy are

listed below in a hierarchical order:

“Increasing people’s familiarity with one’s country (making them think about it,

updating their images, turning around unfavourable opinions)

Increasing people’s appreciation of one’s country (creating positive

perceptions, getting others to see issues of global importance from the same

perspective)

Engaging people with one’s country (strengthening ties – from education reform

to scientific co-operation; encouraging people to see us as an attractive

destination for tourism, study, distance learning; getting them to buy our

products; getting to understand and subscribe to our values)

Influencing people (getting companies to invest, publics to back our positions or

politicians to turn to us as a favoured partner)” (Leonard 2002: 9-10)

So the goals of public diplomacy can span a vast area from basically introducing the

country to targeted audiences or dispelling any misperceptions they might have about it

to actively engaging people with the country by attracting people there for sightseeing,

studies or making investments or political deals. The hopes of what to expect of public

diplomacy initiatives relies on how the relations already are and in which areas mainly

are sought strengthened – be it political, economic or cultural relations.

Public diplomacy and propaganda

It can be tempting to see public diplomacy as a more easily digestible term for what has

always gone under the name of propaganda. Although the concepts are related in that

13

they both seek to affect the opinions of foreign publics they are, needless to say, very

different too. Generally speaking, propaganda seeks to narrow down the horizon of

people by trying to mould their minds through any means necessary while public

diplomacy strives to open the minds of people through information and education.

Public diplomacy of course has the motives to broaden the minds of people in what they

see as the right direction and has a specific agenda but it can be more helpful to see it as

counter-propaganda or the breaking down of prejudices the receiver has of the sender.

Public diplomacy has furthermore borrowed crucial experiences from the conventional

diplomacy – namely lies and disinformation is in the long run very counter-productive

and should never be done. As soon as diplomatic practitioners are caught in spreading

disinformation in any area it undermines all their work and the messages they have been

trying to send out. (Melissen 2007: 16-19)

A final distinction between propaganda and public diplomacy is, while propaganda

continuously spreads messages to its targeted audiences public diplomacy utilizes a

two-way communication strategy. Practitioners of public diplomacy has to listen to

what their audiences thinks and has to say about them and their governments, since this

will provide them more credibility and opportunity to continuously tailor the messages

they are sending out to have the biggest positive impact. The key is not the amount of

information sent out but rather finding out the most effective way to deliver the correct

message by the right means to achieve the best result. An understanding of the situation

and general viewpoints of different segments of the target population has to be

developed in order to achieve these results. (Leonard 2002: 46-49)

The established diplomacy and public diplomacy

The emergence of the new public diplomacy has created a vast array of conundrums for

the established diplomatic community and their ministries of foreign affairs. One of the

biggest challenges in this regard is how to integrate this new area in the diplomatic

organization. The very nature of public diplomacy is to seem open and outreaching

which historically has not been one of the strongest suits of the diplomatic corps – who

always has had an aura of secrecy and inapproachability about it. This is because as

14

mentioned earlier partly because it has previously been necessary for them to conduct

negotiations with counterparts and to investigate situations of the countries they are

stationed in – neither of which is an area conducive to a culture of openness. (Hocking

2007: 35-40)

The reason openness is a necessity for successful public diplomacy is not only that it

targets foreign publics but also that it is useful to include other organizations in parts of

the public diplomacy strategies. Cooperation with NGOs, the private sector (including

mass media) or other state organizations (i.e. ministries of education, trade/economy or

culture) are all obvious means of enhancing the impacts of the strategies as the

ministries of foreign affairs will inevitably have limited resources and connections. (van

Ham 2003: 432-433)

These groupings and organizations are necessary to include in any public diplomacy

strategy as they have expertise knowledge in areas the ministry of foreign affairs and

their staff lacks. Furthermore the incorporation of NGOs and civil society can give an

aura of credibility to public diplomacy initiatives which government officials would

never be able to do – especially towards potentially hostile population segments. The

involvement of non-governmental actors should both include people and organizations

in the sending and receiving countries and could include journalists, universities,

individual academics, businessmen or artists just to mention a few. The most interesting

for public diplomacy planners are to get people and organizations involved with the

strategy in the receiving country, but it will often be necessary to recruit people in the

sending country first to give the initiative credibility. One of the big challenges for the

traditional diplomacy will therefore be to include more actors and begin to show more

openness. (Riordan 2007: 90-91)

Three dimensions of public diplomacy

Public diplomacy activities can roughly be divided in to three dimensions depending on

the specific needs in different scenarios. These three dimensions are reactive, proactive

and relationship building – and can be directed towards the political/military, economic

or societal/cultural areas or any combination of these. The reactive variation of public

15

diplomacy practice centers on news management and is a very short term strategy to

spread the official opinion of the government about any news affecting it in any way.

The proactive approach is a medium term strategy to actively create positive news

regarding any messages governments want to send out – for example through the

organization of events and activities. Finally the relationship building approach is the

long term strategy to create, maintain and improve relations between foreign people and

the sending country. This takes years of funding of programs of for example scholarship

sponsoring. Below follows a more in depth presentation of the three dimensions.

(Leonard 2002: 10-11)

News management

This dimension of public diplomacy includes a short term rapid response strategy. The

main idea behind this approach is that when something happens in the world which

might affect people’s perception of a government it is necessary to react fast and ensure

the government’s official positions are explained and clarified to the public. One major

obstacle for this approach is that it is very difficult to tailor a message to a certain group

of people as most people around the world will have access to more or less the same

information and will also hear what government officials has to say about an issue. This

can be illustrated very well with following quote of Colin Powell about his time in the

Gulf War where he told his staff:

“’Remember, when we are out there on television, communicating instantaneously

around the world, we’re talking to five audiences.’ One, the reporters who ask the

question – important audience. Second audience, the American people who are

watching. The third audience, 170 capitals who may have an interest in what the subject

is. Fourth, you are talking to your enemy. It was a unique situation to know that your

enemy was getting the clearest indication of your intentions by watching you on

television at the same time you were giving that message. And fifth, you were talking to

the troops. Their lives were on the line.” (Leonard 2002: 12-13)

This illustrates the dilemma practitioners of public diplomacy faces when confronted

with conventional mass media. It is problematic to convey a message in a rhetoric

16

which will not be misconstrued by some of the audience. The public diplomacy plans

can easily be scrapped in favor of pleasing domestic crowds.

A way to direct the correct communication to a chosen foreign public or grouping in

another country to the fullest effect is to increase support and potentially funding for

local media. By funneling the messages which is in correlation with the public

diplomacy strategy through local media with a limited audience, it is easier to tailor a

message which will provide a satisfactory result in relation to this local audience. This

approach can be enhanced further if one of the locals convey this message as the

audience will believe more in one of their own than in foreign government

representatives – especially in areas hostile towards the sending government. (Hoffman

2002: 91-93)

Strategic communications

This dimension of public diplomacy represents the medium-term strategy which lasts

for months at a time. This approach emphasizes on setting the news agenda instead of

just responding to what is happening and can be done through events or organizing

advertisement campaigns – where public diplomacy begins to overlap towards its

related concept of nation branding. The strategic communication strategy can be aimed

at improving relations in either political, economical and cultural areas or any

combination of these. Events could be anything from hosting the Olympics or a summit

on global warming depending on what image a country would like to promote.

The main difference from the first dimension here is thereby that it in the second

dimension is possible for the actor to put more planning and consideration in to the

messages they send out and can more easily target the people and organizations they

would like to affect with the message or image they send out. A problem within this

area in the meantime is that different state organizations will often have diverging

interests in what image they want to promote. An example here could be whether to

promote a country’s more traditional sides to promote tourism or the more modern sides

to promote investments. (Leonard 2002: 11, 14-17)

17

A first hand example of this was the dilemma the commercial section of the Danish

embassy in Japan was standing in when they had they were publishing the magazine

Hello Denmark to the Japanese public. As the two main interests for the Danish strategy

towards Japan was to attract investments and to increase tourism, they had to promote

an image of an idyllic country with small villages and a highly technologically modern

country well worthwhile investing in.

Relationship buildingThe third and last dimension of public diplomacy is relationship building – this is the

most long term strategy used and is potentially the most significant. The relationship

building programs stretches over years and is aimed at giving deep insight to a select

group of people of one’s country through various schemes such as scholarships and

network creation. A notable element to this approach is that the planning governmental

organization plays a secondary/facilitating role as the approach is mainly focused on

establishing networks between likeminded people across borders – be it politicians,

academics, artists or businessmen. A truly successful relationship building public

diplomacy effort will be very costly as it will have to administer, plan and sponsor the

exchange of a significant amount of people in order for it to have a decent impact.

(Leonard 2002: 18-20)

Probably the most important relationship building scheme is educational exchange. If

governments set up beneficial conditions for foreigners to come to their country to study

for months or years they are sure to get a nuanced picture of the country they are

staying. These will possibly then function as de facto ambassadors for the country they

had been towards their friends or families. An added bonus is that some of these people

who had been enjoying the benefits of such an exchange program might rise to

prominent positions within their own countries. It is estimated that 1500 cabinet-level

ministers and 200 current and former heads of state has been participating in the

American International Visitors Program. (Ross 2003: 27)

A potentially very important area to create ties and foster communication is between

political parties across borders. Facilitating meetings between members of similar

18

political parties and not just government officials and cabinet members will likely

provide increased understanding both between politicians but could secondarily affect

the message these politicians send out to their respective constituencies. An example of

this is Konrad Adenauer Stiftung which is a German organization which promotes

contact between Christian Democrat parties in different countries and is funded by the

state. (Leonard 2002b: 55)

Nation branding

Branding has for years been a buzzword in the business world and companies – big and

small alike – has channeled significant funds into the creation of their own brand and

increase brand-recognition. Before long this marketing approach has begun to spread to

the state sphere and the practice of location branding has arisen, with states hiring

branding consultants from the private sector. This new tendency has arisen at the

crossroads of public relations and international relations and for this reason ought to be

viewed together with the other communicative approaches of dealing with international

relations. (van Ham 2002: 249)

The increasing globalization has created a sharper competition between states as it has

become increasingly difficult to stand out from the others and governments have

therefore sought ways to increase their own relative competitive edge in relation with

their neighbors. Nation branding has here been a welcomed way to try to stand out from

other comparable countries. This chapter will go more in depth with how nation

branding originated and how it is practiced. (Cerny 2007: 272-273)

The idea of nation branding and the brand state is in a way not that new a concept. In a

way the creation of nations in itself is a kind of branding. When states began to be

transformed to nation-states primarily in the nineteenth century many strategies similar

to branding strategies were utilized. The creation of a national flag, a national anthem or

a constitution all helped setting the country apart from the others and created a kind of

national identity both for people viewing the state from the outside as well as its

citizens. (van Ham 2002: 259-260)

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One of the main differences between the creation of nations in the 19 th century and the

nation branding of the 21st century is that the creation of national ideas were primarily

planned to affect the inhabitants of the state whereas the nation branding initiatives are

directed towards foreign publics and corporations.

On brandingBefore moving on it is necessary to explore the concept of branding in itself before

putting it in a national and international context. Branding is in its origin a part of an

advertisement terminology. Advertisement tries to deliver a message that a certain

product has a certain quality or promotes awareness about the product. Branding is

taking this a step further by adding some emotional value to the product and making the

product tell a story. This does not necessarily have to have anything to do with the

primary product function as such and the quality does not necessarily have to be better

than similar products. People’s perception of the product is what counts and by adding

some sort of emotional value to it will make it stand out from the rest as it has its very

own story to tell the consumer. With successful branding strategies and increased brand-

recognition there will be an added value to it.

The idea behind nation or location branding is to give an added value to a country, to a

region or to an organization. The added value comes from the general perception people

around the world has about the country. They might see it as an environmentally

friendly country, technologically developed country or a very artistic country. Nation

branding is the conscious effort of state officials to define/redefine peoples’

understanding and view of their country. (van Ham 2004: 2-3)

It is suggested that there are four main reasons why it is a good idea to consider creating

a brand and they are as follows:

“…(1) products, services and locations have become so alike that they can no longer

differentiate themselves by their quality, reliability and other basic traits. Branding

adds emotion and trust to these ‘products’, thereby offering clues that make consumers’

choices somewhat easier; (2) this emotional relationship between brand and consumer

ensures loyalty to the brand; (3) by creating an aspiration lifestyle, branding offers a

20

kind of Ersatz for ideologies and political programmes that have lost their relevance;

and (4) the combination of emotions, relationships and lifestyle (values) allows a brand

to charge a price premium for their products, services and locations, which would

otherwise hardly be distinguishable from generics.” (van Ham 2002: 251)

So in short these reasons for embarking on brand creation campaigns are to set the

location apart from so many other similar locations and through this making people’s

perception of the location more favorable than to any other place and making sure they

will consider the place if they are planning a holiday, considering where to invest or any

other possible interaction with the place. By tying values to the locations the added

value will also come out of it and people will suddenly pay much more to go to one

holiday island instead of the neighboring one because of its brand recognition.

Limits to nation brandingIt is not possible for a state to completely freely decide on what image they want to

show to the outside world as people around the world will likely already have some

perceptions of the country. These perceptions cover both countries people might know a

lot about such as ideas of Germany being a strict and efficient country or United

Kingdom being a conservative and traditionalist country or countries people might just

have a faint idea about. Estonia has for example struggled with getting rid of the stigma

of being a post-Soviet state through trying to brand itself as a pre-EU or Scandinavian

state. These mainstream views of a country can either be good or bad for a country and

the state can therefore try to get rid of or enhance the image. The German brand for

example has been good economically for the automotive sector as the cars made in

Germany will have a higher perceived value than the car made in Ukraine – it matters

less if the German car really is better than the Ukrainian one. The United Kingdom on

the other hand has generally had a bad brand economically resulting in for example

British Airways and British Telecom changing their names to BA and BT in an effort to

hide their country of origin. (van Ham 2002: 261-263)

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Planning branding campaignsThe planning of nation branding campaigns poses several areas which are necessary to

consider. One main point is considering which interests a country and its inhabitants

have primarily. Even though nation branding campaigns could be designed to promote a

country’s art or cultural activities, three main areas tend to be in focus when considering

a nation branding campaign – namely the promotion of foreign direct investments,

exports or tourism. The strategy aimed primarily at increasing export usually promotes a

branding campaign which will increase the values of its major industries – be it cars,

agricultural products or the entertainment industry. A campaign focused on attracting

more foreign direct investments will likely be more state centered through advertizing

campaigns using relevant media. Finally a tourism centered brand creation campaign

will often have a very different approach than the export oriented campaign as it would

want to signal other values. When considering how to orchestrate a nation branding

campaign it will most likely be very unsuccessful if it is only based in state institution

but should rather be planned by both the public and private sector alike as well as

inclusion of any cultural venues/organizations will be of significant interest. (Olins

2007: 172-179)

Cultural diplomacy

The third and final communicative diplomatic approach to be explored is that of cultural

diplomacy. Cultural diplomacy stands out from the other two concepts – public

diplomacy and nation branding – in that it is not a fairly new concept like the others, but

it is just as old as traditional diplomacy itself. When relations were maintained between

states there would always have been an exchange of ideas, language, art and religion

taking place to mention but a few. (Arndt 2005: 1-2)

Cultural diplomacy is in short the official effort to facilitate exchange and spread of

culture around the world whether it is within music, art, philosophy or values. The effort

to spread one’s culture can have several different causes such as economic promotion or

the hope of transferring one’s values to people in other countries and thereby create

better relations. Of this reason cultural diplomacy can be seen as overlapping public

diplomacy significantly. (U.S. Department of State 2005: 1-7)

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Different governments attribute very different importance to cultural diplomacy but

often it has been a quite neglected niche area compared to the more traditional

diplomatic activities. In the United States for example it has since the end of the Cold

War been a much neglected area despite rhetoric stating otherwise – cultural diplomacy

saw several significant budget cuts throughout the 1990s and the cultural diplomacy

organization USIA was even closed down. Other countries have practiced a more

successful cultural diplomacy than the United States – amongst these United Kingdom,

Germany and the former Soviet Union. Most noteworthy though is France with an

annual spending on cultural diplomacy of more than one billion US dollars and postions

in the French cultural diplomacy is very prestigious. (Schneider 2007: 156-158)

An important note on cultural diplomacy and cultural exchange is that cultural exchange

does not necessarily constitute cultural diplomacy. The key word in this relation is

diplomacy – the cultural exchange has to take its basis in an official initiative for it to be

classified as cultural diplomacy. The reason for this being that non-official cultural

exchange might bring the same or better benefits than the officially planned and funded

exchanges, but they are too erratic and unpredictable to include in measuring the

success or failure of cultural rapprochement. (Andreasen 2007: 62-63)

Following quote finely describes the definition and importance of cultural diplomacy as

follows:

“Cultural diplomacy may be defined as the use of various elements of culture to

influence foreign publics, opinion makers, and even foreign leaders. These elements

comprehend the entire range of characteristics within a culture: including the arts,

education, ideas, history, science, medicine, technology, religion, customs, manners,

commerce, philanthropy, sports, language, professional vocations, hobbies, etc. and the

various media by which these elements may be communicated. Cultural diplomacy seeks

to harness these elements to influence foreigners in several ways: to have a positive

view of the United States, its people, its culture, and its policies…” (Lenczowski 2007:

196)

This signifies how very diverse the area of cultural diplomacy is and how vast an area it

is used to influence. Furthermore it gives a better idea of how closely related this area is

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with that of public diplomacy. They do clearly overlap in several areas even if they are

not the same.

After these presentations of public diplomacy, nation branding and cultural diplomacy

an in depth presentation of the three theories used in the analysis will be presented –

namely soft power, neorealism and constructivism.

TheoryIn this chapter the three theories which will be used as tools of the analysis will be

presented and discussed. The first neoliberalism will be presented and more specifically

the concept of soft power, which has been developed by the prominent neoliberal

theorist Joseph S. Nye. This section will explain how public diplomacy possibly can

work as a tool of the state to promote its soft power – the power of attractiveness – and

how this power is just as relevant as the hard power of military and economy.

The second theory which will be presented will be neorealism primarily on the basis of

Kenneth Waltz. The use of neorealism is primarily intended as a way to keep a critical

approach towards public diplomacy and maintain a counterargument towards the other

two theories which are more positive to public diplomacy. Neorealism will not attribute

much importance to public diplomacy – at best it will be a decent appendix to real

power politics.

The third and final theory presented will be constructivism as it has been developed by

Alexander Wendt. This theory will break away from both neoliberalism and neorealism

and be able to deliver the most positive approach to public diplomacy as constructivism

possibly is the most open theory of international relations towards potential change in

the most basic mechanisms of international affairs.

After the presentation of the three theories the analytical chapter will follow where each

theory will be attempted applied to the areas of public diplomacy, nation branding and

cultural diplomacy.

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Soft Power

One of the central concepts developed by Joseph S. Nye, who is amongst the most

prominent theorists within the Neoliberal theory, is soft power. This concept was for the

first time presented in 1990 in Bound to Lead and has since been developed into its final

form as presented in Soft Power – the means to success in world politics from 2004.

Soft power is best explained when contrasted against its counterpart – hard power.

Where hard power is signified by the utilization of sheer force and coercion to reach

certain objectives, the more indirect soft power is a way of reaching the goal through

persuasion and cooperation – soft power uses carrots rather than sticks so to speak. One

thing the two have in common though is the term power. (Nye 2004: xi, 5-6)

Joseph S. Nye is educated from Princeton, Oxford and Harvard Universities and has

been publishing works related to theory of international relations since the 1970s and is

to this day very productive with several published articles and chapters in books every

year – 45 in 2008 alone. Non-academic positions he has held include Assistant

Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Chair of the National

Intelligence Council, and Deputy Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance,

Science and Technology. (Harvard – Kennedy School)

Power

The central term power is very difficult to give a concrete definition of. An attempt to

make the term power seem more objectively measurable would be by looking at power

resources of a state – this could include military and economic strength, size of territory

and population or abundance of natural resources. This can be a useful approach when

power is defined as the ability to get what you want. This approach to try to understand

and measure power seems flawed though. Some countries which excel in many of these

measurable parameters don’t have the power which they ought to on the basis of their

resources – an example of this could be Japan since the 1960s. Japan having the second

largest economy in the world, a large population and advanced technology has

oftentimes been termed an economic giant but a political dwarf. On the other end of the

spectrum some countries seem to be more powerful than what their objectively

measurable resources would justify. Reasons for these discrepancies can explained by

different abilities of deception or by convincingly acting more powerful than what the

25

resources justify. Another factor which has to be taken into account is to see the

resources as potential power and this has to be mobilized into realized power. Before

resources are used specifically to increase the power of a state it does not really signify

power. (Nye 1991: 26-27)

Traditionally the real test of a country’s power would be its ability to wage war. The

basis of this ability has changed over time though. In the pre-industrialized society of

the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the ability to wage war was primarily based on

a large population which would provide manpower and a basis of taxation in order to

hire mercenaries – this is why France was the leading power in Europe in this period.

This is best illustrated during the reign of the Sun King Louis XIV and culminating with

Napoleon Bonaparte where the most important power resources started to change with

the dawning industrial revolution. As industrial production capacity and efficient

administration became more important than population size and sheer manpower as a

basis of power the centers of power changed to the British Empire and slightly later

Germany. In the middle of the twentieth century the industrial capacity of USA and

USSR had far outgrown the traditional powers of the old world and another power

factor was now nuclear weapons as well the delivery methods of these. Since then the

traditional understanding of power as the ability to wage war has been significantly

modified. The horrifying destructive capacities of nuclear weapons were one of the

reasons of this as it had become too costly and risky for great powers to sort their

disputes on the battlefield. Other reasons include that high casualties are much less

acceptable to domestic populations in the post-industrialized society, territorial

expansion is much more difficult in a more nationally awakened world and economic

growth is often depending on a state’s reputation and relations with others. (Nye 2002:

5-7)

This change in power resources are finely illustrated in the table below where the

leading states of each century are lined up and the different resources of power these

utilized to achieve this status. Joseph S. Nye has furthermore included his prediction for

the 21st century. An interesting detail in this table is the gradual entrance of different

forms of soft power as a major resource of power:

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Period State Major Resources

Sixteenth century Spain Gold bullion, colonial trade,

mercenary armies, dynastic

ties

Seventeenth century Netherlands Trade, capital markets, navy

Eighteenth century France Population, rural industry,

public administration, army,

culture (soft power)

Nineteenth century Britain Industry, political cohesion,

finance and credit, navy,

liberal norms (soft power),

island location (easy to

defend)

Twentieth century United States Economic scale, scientific

and technical leadership,

location, military forces and

alliances, universalistic

culture and liberal

international regimes (soft

power)

Twenty-first century United States Technological leadership,

military and economic

scale, soft power, hub of

transnational

communications

(Nye 2002: 13)

Understanding that merely resources will not necessarily determine whether a state is

powerful or not there ought to be other ways of viewing and determining power in

international relations. This can be to look at as a way of achieving one’s goals. The

most direct way of doing this is by forcing your will through by the use of military force

27

or the threat thereof. Another way to get what you want would be through utilizing a

state’s economic strength through threat of sanctions, bribery etc. The final and more

subtle way to get what you want and make other agents change their behavior is not to

coerce them but rather to convince them. Persuade them to think that your goal is

identical with their goal. This is the background of the division between hard power –

military and economy2 – and soft power which is the power of attraction so to speak.

(Mead 2004)

To see power as getting another agent to do what he/she/it otherwise would not have

done is a helpful way to explain both hard and soft power although it has one inherent

trapdoor. What if the target for this exercise of power – be it hard or soft – already

would have done what they are trying to be coerced or convinced to do? Then it is all of

a sudden very difficult to determine whether or not the attempt to wield the tools of hard

and soft power has been the deciding factor for reaching the result achieved and thereby

difficult to determine whether or not the wielder truly possess power over the other

agent. This is especially the case for soft power which in its nature is more subtle than

the tools of hard power. (Nye 2004: 2)

The three chessboards of power

Joseph S. Nye has made a model to understand the power relations of international

relations better while incorporating soft power. This model is to see the international

struggle of power as a game of chess – but played on three interrelated boards rather

than just one. The top board is the classical struggle between states for military

dominance and centers itself on security policy, alliance building, maintenance of a

balance of power etc. On the second board the game of economic growth is played

where issues can be anything within the financial and the economy policy realms – trade

agreements, anti-trust laws etc. The bottom board game of power is dedicated to a

multitude of international issues such as international crime, climate change or for

example the Olympics. It’s on this board soft power comes into play. Some political

actors fail to acknowledge other spheres than the classical power game of military 2 The two sides of hard power have later been sought divided between sharp (military) and sticky (economic) power by Walter Russell Mead in America’s Sticky Power – but this further distinction has limited relevance to the topic of the thesis, and will therefore not be developed further.

28

muscle though3 – a blunder that can have severe repercussions for the state’s standing in

the two other spheres. (Nye 2004: 4-5)

On table 1 seen below the tripartite division of the forms of power Joseph S. Nye

describes are illustrated keywords attached to each in relation to type of behavior,

primary currencies and government policies. Here it is seen how soft power really is

markedly different from the other two. Where military and economic power both utilize

very direct means to gain power, soft power uses more subtle and difficult to evaluate

means. Where the two types of hard power is signified by terms such as coercion,

deterrence, sanctions and threats the soft power keywords include attraction, values and

culture. The thing which is possibly most important to notice in the table the vast

amount of primary currencies soft power is spanning – values, culture, policies and

institutions – while the government policies are limited to diplomacy. This is an area

which will be explored more thoroughly later in this chapter.

Behaviors Primary Currencies Government

Policies

Military Power coercion

deterrence

protection

threats

force

coercive diplomacy

war

alliance

Economic Power inducement

coercion

payments

sanctions

aid

bribes

sanctions

Soft Power attraction

agenda setting

values

culture

policies

institutions

public diplomacy

bilateral and

multilateral

diplomacy

(Nye 2004: 31)

3 This point is illustrated well by the famous Joseph Stalin quote: “The Pope? How many divisions has he got?” Stalin apparently only recognized military power here and not the vast amount of soft power held by the papacy.

29

As mentioned above there is an interplay between the three chessboards of power.

Using hard power without analyzing possible impacts on its soft power can be very

counterproductive. Even if a state actor has significantly more military power than any

potential opponents, the unrestrictive use of force will possibly lead to mistrust,

alienation of allies and neutrals and in turn restrict the freedom of action for the state

actor in the long run to restore goodwill, avoid possible sanctions or boycotts and

ultimately avoid unfriendly alliance building to create a balance of power. The classic

illustration of some of these points is the American invasion of Iraq in 2003. Another of

the many examples of a time where a state actor ignored the importance of soft power

which in turn led to repercussions in other areas was China after the Tiananmen Square

massacre in 1989, through which event China destroyed its power of attraction and was

hit hard in the economic realm through trade embargoes and boycotts. (Nye 2004: 25-

29)

Growing importance of soft power

As mentioned above, soft power has gradually increased its importance to states

struggle for power. This tendency is like to increase exponentially in the dawning global

information age where access to the most and widest channels of information will be a

determining factor for who will experience the fastest growth in soft power. The access

to the most and widest channels of information will not be the sole determining factor in

relations to growth in soft power though – two other general factors are also very

important. The first of these is that a state with an ideological background of their

dominant culture which is closest to the general predominant global norms and values

of a certain time will command a vaster soft power than a state with a dominant culture

far away from the global standard norms. Key values in the world of today include

terms such as pluralism and liberalism – it is therefore unlikely to see a state far away

from these values being successful in the realm of soft power as it will not seem very

attractive to the broad global public. If a state is not a genuine supporter of these values

at least it will have to pretend to support these if it has any interest and

acknowledgement of the importance of soft power. The second factor important to a

state in order to be successful in the realm of soft power is enhancing one’s credibility –

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which can be done both through domestic as well as international actions. If a state

generally lives up to expectations and practice what it preaches its chances of gaining

soft power in the long run significantly increases. (Nye 2002: 69-73)

Soft power and public diplomacy

Now after having dealt with the presentation of the concept of soft power, its interplay

with the two forms of hard power and the growing importance of soft power in the

global age of information it has yet to be explored further from what sources soft power

actually stems and what direct tools can be conducive to the growth of soft power for a

state. It will be explored to what extent the state actually is able to directly control its

progress in soft power or lack thereof.

In the two main forms of hard power – military and economic – the state has a very

large direct impact on the development of power resources through diverse economic

policies, beneficial trade agreement, subsidies to reach technological breakthroughs or

development of more efficient military doctrines to give but a few examples. Soft power

is not as straightforward though as this encompasses fairly uncontrollable terms such as

culture and values. Much of any country’s soft power resources have little or nothing to

do with the state, be it anything from famous writers, painters, architects or singers,

natural beauty, important mass media or well known brands. Many of the sources of

soft power are therefore not determined by direct actions of the state apparatus but

rather of the people and the land they inhabit. (Mead 2004: 51)

With this being said it seems as if the state has little to do with how much soft power it

has which of course is not the case. Soft power is more than just a matter of which states

got lucky to have the most sides that attracts people from around the world. Soft power

has more to it than just culture, and it is a mistake to think of soft power as a direct

result of culture although culture is conducive to the growth of it. The two other main

sources of soft power include foreign policy and general political values. (Nye 2004:

11)

General political values and foreign policy can both be linked to governmental policies.

These policies can, as mentioned earlier, diminish the soft power of a state – for

example through committing atrocities or displaying arrogance towards the opinions of

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others. The opposite can also be true though. Both domestic as well as foreign

government policies can help increase the country’s soft power if these policies help

increase its attractiveness to population segments. Examples of these could be

comparably generous contributions of development aid, a strong profile in peacekeeping

operations or a tolerant and fair treatment of domestic minorities. Also the more general

political values reflect on the growth or decline of soft power – a clean record of

democracy and rule of law will for example generally benefit a growth of soft power.

(Nye 2004: 13-15)

One of the seemingly most effective tools to increase soft power and which would

probably be a big mistake to overlook is public diplomacy. While public diplomacy is

not a primary source of soft power itself, it is one of the most direct tools a state has to

market itself for the foreign public. Even if a state tries to act in a way that would

increase its soft power the attempt might not be successful or there might be more

attention on negative actions the same state. Here the role of public diplomacy is to

attract focus on the positive sides of a country, not through mere propaganda which is

hopelessly obsolete but rather through dialogue. (Nye 2004: 105-107)

To sum up, the logic behind include the concept of soft power is that this exact concept

is vital to the success and in the end the very existence of public diplomacy. Soft power

is the raison d’être of public diplomacy because public diplomacy seeks to increase the

attractiveness of a country, signifying that attractiveness is important i.e. worth

competing over. If attractiveness is worth competing for it must contain a certain

amount of power – soft power.

NeorealismThe next theory to be presented and used in this thesis will be that of neorealism. In

theories of international relations, realism has the most longstanding tradition going

back to the likes of Thucydides and Machiavelli which first developed from the

observation of statecraft and diplomatic conduct. (Gilpin 1986: 307) The scope of this

presentation will be that of Neorealism though, which is – as the name implies – a

newer branch of realism which is more scientifically minded compared to its older

counterpart and has a wider scope than solely security policy as it also takes in aspects

such as economic factors or social theory. (Ashley 1986: 260-261)

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The theorist mainly used in this section will be Kenneth N. Waltz (1924-) who is the

founder and most prominent proponent of the Neorealist approach. His works primarily

centres around nuclear deterrence and the causes of conflict within the international

system – a field he has been occupied with for the past five decades. He has been active

in teaching in Columbia University, Berkeley, Brandeis and Swarthmore as well as

visiting positions at London School of Economics, Harvard and Peking University. He

has controversially maintained his realist standpoint during his career and has put forth

controversial remarks regarding the positive impacts of the gradual proliferation of

nuclear weaponry. (Columbia University News)

In his earlier work Man, the State and War – a theoretical analysis originally from 1959

he examines the causes of war between states which forms the foundation of his entire

theoretical structure. He divides the main explanatory models of the causes of war into

three so called images – (a) human behavior, (b) the internal structure of states and (c)

international anarchy. A short introduction of these three explanatory models will

follow here, before the wider implications of this fundamental view will be explored.

(Waltz 2001: 1-15)

Human behavior

The first image Waltz presents in his work is human behavior – that is the thought that

the reason for the existence of conflict and war lies within human nature itself. The

reason springs from the evil and sometimes irrational behavior of human beings. Among

the supporters of this strand there are pessimists and optimists. The optimists believe

that it is possible to create a peaceful world by changing human behavior. Depending on

which theorist or philosopher this could be through education, religious awakening or

political indoctrination. The pessimists on the other hand are more skeptical as to how

much it is possible to create a peaceful world as it can be impossible to change human

nature itself. (Waltz 2001: 39-41)

Both the pessimists and especially the optimists are quite incorrect according to Waltz –

as they focus too much on individual itself instead of its setting. They disregard the

arena in which the actors are found and how big a role this is playing – whether it can

33

be the structure of states or the entire system of international relations. Interestingly

enough by optimists it is generally suggested that to change the individuals in order to

create a more harmonious world it would take some changing of the setting the

individual acts within – this in itself proves the human behaviorists wrong as they

themselves partly suggests that the causal effects are to be found in the system and not

in the agent as such. (Waltz 2001: 75-79)

State structure

The second image Waltz presents as the explanation for how conflict and war come into

existence in international relations is the internal structure of states. This means the

thought that the cause of conflict for example lies in the form of government a state has.

Some believe if all countries were democracies the cause of armed conflict would

disappear, some think the same about communist countries and still others has thought

enlightened absolutism has been the right way to go. The list can go on in infinity but

all share the same fundamental thought that it’s the wrong kind of governance which

causes the misery in the world.

Waltz stresses in his presentation of the second image that conflict still has existed

between democracies or between communist states contrary to the ideas of the

supporters of the second image. Furthermore it is underlined that even if the internal

structure of the state will have a big say in how the state is acting, it cannot be assessed

as if it wasn’t part of the international environment of states. It is, so to speak, a matter

of looking at the international environment more than at the internal structure of the

state itself which is the important factor in the search for the causes of conflict – this

will therefore lead us on to the third image in Waltz’ analysis. (Waltz 2001: 120-123)

International anarchy

The third image Waltz presents as the cause of conflict in international relations is

international anarchy. The international anarchy of states exists because there is no

world government or supreme entity which can control the behavior of state actors. This

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entails states will do what’s in their power to ensure their interests such as survival and

increasing power – including the possible use of force. With the following decrease in

the common perception of security an anarchical environment will not end until a

superior power keep state actions in check. This is not too different from anarchy on the

national level which Waltz assumes will exist if there was no state to control the people.

In this view it is a common superior entity which will prevent the use of force between

actors. Where the actors are individuals it is the state where the actors are state it will be

a world government. (Waltz 2001: 159-161, 173)

As a concluding remark in Man, the State and War Waltz sums up his position as

follows:

“Each state pursues its own interests, however defined, in ways it judges

best. Force is a means of achieving the external ends of states because there exists no

consistent, reliable process of reconciling the conflicts of interest that inevitably arise

among similar units in a condition of anarchy. A foreign policy based on this image of

international relations is neither moral nor immoral, but embodies merely a reasoned

response to the world about us. The third image describes the framework of world

politics, but without the first and second images there can be no knowledge of the forces

that determine policy; the first and the second images describe the forces in world

politics, but without the third image it is impossible to assess their importance or

predict their results.” (Waltz 2001: 238)

So in this early work of Waltz he does not discard the first and second images

completely in favor of the third image. Rather the first and second images resemble the

contents which will require action and reaction among the states – whether this is the

nature of a head of state or the changes in the domestic political setup of a state. The

third image does constitute the machinery of the theory though and it is within this area

the real theoretical analysis comes into place. No matter what the ideas of a Napoleon or

a Bismarck are or what political party wins an election or brings about a revolution it is

the international context of anarchy and self-help which must be the real subject for

analysis.

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The international political systemTo clarify the neorealist view of international relations it will be helpful to use a few

graphs. The first one shows how most people view international relations/politics. Here

N1, 2, 3 represents what is happening in the states domestically which will create an

impact on its international behavior. The international behavior of the states is shown in

X1, 2, 3 which represents their external actions towards each other and how this

influence the other actors.

N1 X1

N2 X2

N3 X3

(Waltz 1986a: 95)

This graph is a good visualization of how a supporter of the above mentioned images 1

and 2 would view the world – seeing the main importance in for example either state

leaders or domestic structures.

N1

36

X1

X2

X3

X3

X3

N2

N3

(Waltz 1986a: 96)

The second graph shows how Neorealists see international relations and exemplifies the

third image. Here the main difference is the role of the international political system as

an entity in itself – shown in the graph as the big circle which affects the external

behavior of states as well as influencing the decision-making process domestically in

the states. It thereby gives the highest significance to the environment in which the

states act.

37

On anarchyAs the importance of the concept of anarchy in international relations has been

established, it is necessary to elaborate some further on this notion as well as its

opposite – hierarchy. Where anarchy is signified by the absence of government,

hierarchy is signified by the organized presence of government. Two points are

important to mention in relation to these concepts: (a) anarchy and hierarchy or the

outer points of a spectrum of organized order and there are a multitude of shades of gray

between the two extremes, and (b) anarchy does not necessarily entail complete chaos

and barbarism – just the absence of organized order.4

Since anarchy only means the absence of government and nothing more; claims stating

that international relations is signified by a modified anarchy due to the presence of

alliances, international organizations, civil society etc. will be rejected by the

neorealists. Even though these institutions are a reality, they will not alter the basic fact

that anarchy is the foundation of international relations – even if they seem to alter.

(Waltz 1986b: 113)

On socializationA question still left unanswered in relation to why it is the third image which is so

determining for how international relations play out is how this system of international

anarchy not only was created but also remains unchanged. According to Neorealists

such as Waltz, the system will not change because rule-breakers will be punished

automatically and forced to conform or perish in the process. Even if the anarchical

international environment is as old as the state system itself it would not be unthinkable

that this could possibly change in time as some actors vanish throughout history and

others appear newly on the stage. To this Neorealism would argue: as the international

anarchy signifies a kill or get killed system, states trying to reinvent their approach to

their neighbors would ultimately suffer as they would not be prepared to defend

themselves properly against the states still trying to survive and increase their power.

4 i.e. government

38

The exception to this automatic prevention of rule-breakers is states which are outside

the competitive struggle for survival or dominance. This could for example be states

that are quite isolated from the communications with other states – whatever the reason

might be. Examples of this could be the United States in the 19 th century or Japan in the

17th and 18th centuries. (Waltz 1986b: 128-129)

A way this unchanging anarchical system is explained further is through the tyranny of

small decisions. This means that the states will act to what is in their immediate best

interest in the short term even though the reality created through such action is not what

the state would prefer if it could choose. Waltz exemplifies this as follows:

“If one expects others to make a run on the bank, one’s prudent course is to run faster

than they do even while knowing that if few others run, the bank will remain solvent,

and if many run, it will fail. In such cases, pursuit of individual interest produces

collective results that nobody wants, yet individuals by behaving differently will hurt

themselves without altering outcomes.” (Waltz 1986b: 104)

The same thing is the case of the state acting in its environment amongst other states.

The state will make the decision which secures itself and is in its short term interest,

even if they know that the culture developing from these actions will not be in the best

interest of any of the states. Several rational decisions will add up and create one

irrational culture of state behavior. (Waltz 1986b: 105)

A recent illustrative example of this idea could be the Kyoto Protocol or other summits

and agreements aiming at reducing emissions to decrease global warming. Even if the

states know that it is in everyone’s best interest to secure the environment, they will be

very watchful about not losing any relative competitive edge compared to their fellow

states – primarily in the economic/industrial realm.

Constructivism

The third and final theory used in this thesis to shed light on the potential, roots and

possible evolvement of public diplomacy will be constructivism. The theory will be

presented and developed primarily on the basis of Alexander Wendt’s version of

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constructivism as it was presented in his 1992 article Anarchy is what States Make of it:

The Social Construction of Power Politics and further developed in his book from 1999

titled Social Theory of International Politics.

Alexander Wendt is professor of international security at the Ohio State University and

specializes in social theory, theory of international relations and philosophy of social

science. He has published several books and articles on theory of international relations

during the 1990s and especially in the years after the turn of the century. His first

published article is Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of

Power Politics. (Mershon Center for International Security Studies)

The point of departure for the chapter will be the three different cultures which

according to Alexander Wendt’s constructivist approach can evolve in international

relations – these include the Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian cultures. After the

presentation of these three main cultures states can exist in in international relations the

chapter will move on to explaining how states are becoming socialized and through this

establish or help maintaining a specific culture in international relations. It is this final

mechanism which is at the core of the theory and why this theory is completely different

from neorealism because it is open to change.

The Hobbesian culture

The first of the three different kinds of cultures the world of international relations can

socialize itself into is the Hobbesian culture. This is named after the English philosopher

Thomas Hobbes, who lived between 1588 and 1679 and who’s most famous work

probably is the Leviathan published in 1651. It was written during the English Civil

War as Hobbes was a royalist by heart; he was promoting a strong state which should

toil the otherwise uncontrollable egoism of human nature. Without a strong government

he thought a war of all against all would evolve. What especially stands out is the

memorable front page resembling the sovereign (the embodiment of the state)

containing the individuals of the population. (Martinich 2005: xiv-18)

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The views of Hobbes on human nature and the devolvement of society during the lack

of presence of a centralized power can crudely be boiled down to the following quote

from Leviathan:

“… [I ]t is manifest that during the time men live without a common power to keep them

all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war, and such a war as is of every

man against every man.” (Hobbes 1994: 76)

Hobbes goes on to explain how this war of all against all can be ended through creating

a common power which can keep the peace:

“The only way to erect such a common power as may be able to defend them from

invasion of foreigners and the injuries of one another… is to confer all power and

strength upon one man, or upon one assembly of men, that may reduce all their wills, by

plurality of voices, unto one will” (Hobbes 1994: 109)

According to Hobbes this is done only when every man relinquishes his individual

rights and freedom in exchange of protection from the sovereign as well as peace of

mind through knowing all other men likewise have relinquished their rights and

ambitions. When this is done Hobbes does not accept any form of reversing the oaths

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people has pledged to the sovereign – with the sole exception of when the sovereign

does not prove able to provide safety and security from violence:

“…[T]hey that have already instituted a commonwealth, being thereby bound by

covenant to own the actions and judgments of one cannot lawfully make a new covenant

amongst themselves to be obedient to any other, in any thing whatsoever, without his

permission. And therefore, they that are subjects to a monarch cannot without his leave

cast off monarchy and return to the confusion of a disunited multitude, nor transfer

their person from him that beareth it to another man, or other assembly of men…”

(Hobbes 1994: 111)

When the ideas of Hobbes are taken from a domestic to an international level a quite

depressing world emerges which follows the lines of kill or get killed strategy in

international relations. This is the hardest case for constructivism to explain but has

nonetheless existed at several points in history. The main term to explain the

relationship between self and other would in this case be enemy. Alexander Wendt

explains the term enemy as follows:

“Enemies are constituted by representations of the Other as an actor who (1) does not

recognize the right of the Self to exist as an autonomous being, and therefore (2) will

not willingly limit its violence towards Self… this is a narrower definition than one

normally finds in IR, where “enemy” is often used to describe any violent antagonist”

(Wendt 2007: 260)

The reason Wendt utilizes a narrower definition of enemy than the norm is that it is

important not to confuse enemy with rival – which is the characteristic term of the

relationship between self and other in a Lockean culture. As the Hobbesian enemy does

not recognize their counterparts rights to exist and will therefore not limit itself. The

only things which can limit the aggression will be the eventual lack of capabilities to

destroy the other or the intervention of the Leviathan if there were a form of

international government in the world. Rivals of the Lockean culture on the other hand

recognize the right to exist of their counterparts but will at times seek to revise their

behavior or gain possession of their property – e.g. land, natural resources etc. The main

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difference between the two is therefore the non-existence of self-restraint in the

Hobbesian culture. (Wendt 2007: 259-261)

The Lockean culture

The second potential culture of international relations which Alexander Wendt describes

is based on the thoughts of the English philosopher and contemporary of Thomas

Hobbes - namely John Locke. Locke lived from 1632 to 1704 and was one of the major

British empiricists and thus worked a lot with human understanding and experience for

which he is most famous. He also delved into political philosophy with his Two

Treatises of Civil Government from 1689. (Locke 1980: vii)

Locke was strongly influenced by Hobbes but there were several areas where he

departed completely from the position of Hobbes. The two most striking examples are

the view of human nature and the right to revolution against an illegitimate government.

The Lockean culture as used by Alexander Wendt in his constructivist approach is

characterized by the live and let live approach instead of the Hobbesian kill or get killed.

The view of the other is in this culture as a rival and not as an enemy. There is in

general a mutual acknowledgement between states of their rights to exists. This can for

example be seen since the Westphalian system came into being in 1648, since when the

death rate of states has been very small compared to earlier times – this even goes for

the tiniest states. Even if a mutual recognition of states’ rights to exist and sovereignty

is in place, it doesn’t mean the use of violence has disappeared. There will still be

disputes over for example territory and resources – even to the extent of leading to war.

But as mentioned above, the wars will be limited wars mainly aimed at revising borders

or gaining concessions from the losing part and not as a struggle of life and death

between the states.

The effect of a Lockean culture is not limited to how and how often wars are waged.

Since the sovereignty of other states are generally respected and wars become less

frequent, states no longer have to focus solely on security and short term gains but can –

or have to, in order to keep up with their rivals – focus on longer term goals in a wider

range of areas. Furthermore the mutual recognition of sovereignty and the increased

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focus on longer term goals give way to a degree of trust between allies. (Wendt 2007:

279-282)

Since the Westphalian Peace in 1648 and partly since the Peace of Augsburg hundred

years before that, the Lockean culture has been the one signifying the international

relations at least at regional levels until the decolonization when the culture become

more entrenched and all-embracing.

The question is then how this culture came in to being and how it became so entrenched

that it persisted major ‘rule-breakers’ such as Napoleon or Hitler. The root of the culture

has to be found in coercion – after the protracted Thirty Years War which brought

nothing but misery and poverty in itself it became in the interest of the involved great

powers and the German principalities to respect each other’s sovereignty. As this was a

newly introduced norm it had to be effectuated by coercion in the beginning. An

example could be England and the Netherlands’ intervention in the conflicts between

Denmark-Norway and Sweden, where the latter was prevented in annexing the first.

(Wendt 2007: 286)

After this first phase of coerced Lockean culture the culture becomes more entrenched

as a norm. This means that the state-actors are beginning to get used to that it is

expected they respect other states’ sovereignty – or at least seemingly respect. By

recognizing other’s sovereignty can bring them benefits while not doing so can bring

them harm. In other words the states will respect each others’ sovereignty as long as

they believe it’s in their interest to do so.

The third and final step of an entrenched Lockean culture is when the recognition of

others’ sovereignty becomes such a habit and value in itself that the states will

automatically adhere to the norm even if it might not be in their direct interest to do so.

(Wendt 2007: 287-289)

The Kantian culture

The last of the three cultures of international relations Alexander Wendt outlines is that

of the Kantian culture which is based on the ideas of Prussian philosopher Immanuel

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Kant (1724-1804) in his treatise Perpetual Peace. Where the Hobbesian culture was

based on enmity and the Lockean culture based on rivalry – the Kantian culture operates

with the concept of friendship.

Perpetual Peace is a short pamphlet which contains six preliminary and three definitive

articles which would, if followed, transform international relations completely. It is one

of the most essential works of cosmopolitanism in history although it is quite utopian.

The six preliminary articles are:

“1: No Treaty of Peace Shall Be Held Valid in Which There Is Tacitly Reserved Matter

for a Future War…

2: No Independent States, Large or Small, Shall Come under the Dominion of Another

State by Inheritance, Exchange, Purchase, or Donation…

3: Standing Armies (miles perpetuus) Shall in Time Be Totally Abolished…

4: National Debts Shall Not Be Contracted with a View to the External Friction of

States…

5: No State Shall by Force Interfere with the Constitution or Government of Another

State…

6: No State Shall, during War, Permit Such Acts of Hostility Which Would Make

Mutual Confidence in the Subsequent Peace Impossible: Such Are the Employment of

Assassins (percussores), Poisoners (venefici), Breach of Capitulation, and Incitement to

Treason (perduellio) in the Opposing State” (Kant 2007: 7-11)

And the three definitive articles are:

“1: The Civil Constitution of Every State Should Be Republican

2: The Law of Nations Shall be Founded on a Federation of Free States

3: The Law of World Citizenship Shall Be Limited to Conditions of Universal

Hospitality” (Kant 2007: 13-21)

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In Kant’s vision of a peaceful world a few things stand out. Most importantly from the

theoretical point of view are the preliminary articles which try to prevent suspicion or

animosity between states such as article 1 or 6. This view in itself entails that there is a

possibility to change the way states interact and view each other – it doesn’t have to be

an anarchical society for eternity. This particular point also explains why Wendt has

found Kant’s thoughts intriguing enough to incorporate them into his theoretical

framework. Two other curious points in Kant’s Perpetual Peace is that he goes to great

lengths to explain the differences between a republican and a democratic form of

government as he is quite skeptical of democracy but supports the division of power and

meritocracy. Not surprisingly he strongly recommends that philosophers should be

taken in on counsel in any government decision. In his view of a peaceful future he

doesn’t envision a world government as he thinks it will be too lax and lose its

legislative dynamics. On the other hand he advocates a loose federation of states which

guarantees safety for all people traveling among them – as can be seen in the definitive

articles 2 and 3.

Turning to Wendt’s version of Kant’s ideas and the Kantian culture again - an example

which is difficult to explain within the logic of neither the Lockean nor the Hobbesian

cultures is the close cooperation seen between the NATO countries. In a Hobbesian

culture this would never have happened whereas in the Lockean culture it could have

been explainable as long as the Warsaw Pact and the USSR still existed. After the fall of

the USSR and the disappearance of a perceived common enemy of the NATO member

states, rivalry between the member states should have reignited and the alliance slowly

dissolved. Instead the alliance has persisted and there are still areas with close

cooperation between member states which in instances goes beyond national egoism.

(Wendt 2007: 297)

The term friendship which this culture involves is signified by two rules – namely that

conflicts or disputes will be resolved without war or threat of war and they will both

engage in a conflict if one of the two is attacked – i.e. work as a team. This can

resemble an alliance but, in a friendship the notion of war between the friends are

unthinkable in an alliance the notion of war is only unthinkable as long as the alliance

exists – in other words a kind of friendship limited by time. Furthermore it is important

46

to note that the term friendship in the Kantian culture is regarding security areas only –

friends can still compete economically for example. Examples of friendships in

international relations in our contemporary world could be the special relationship

between USA and UK or between the Nordic states. The relations between these

countries are characterized by it being inconceivable for a state of war to evolve.

(Wendt 2007: 299)

Using the notion of friendship in international relations must also signify a degree of

selflessness since state A might help its friend state B with a problem even if this

doesn’t directly benefit state A. If a state is not necessarily egoistic and selfish and a

degree of trust can evolve between states it is a possibility to escape the international

anarchy characterizing Hobbesian and Lockean ideas – if not on a global level then on a

regional level. Alexander Wendt gives the example of the Unites States and Canada.

Even if these two neighboring countries have several disputes over for example fishing

rights and the United States is much more powerful than its northern neighbor it would

never consider using force to its own benefit towards Canada. The same situation could

be seen within for example the European Union. A culture has developed here which

has made military power obsolete within the sphere.

Furthermore it’s worth mentioning that the constructivism deviates from for example

neorealism in the approach to the difference between anarchy and hierarchy. Where the

neorealist sees anarchy as a result of the absence of a centralized authority – i.e. a

Hobbesian leviathan or world government – the constructivist doesn’t necessarily see

anarchy being the necessary product of the absence of a centralized authority. If the

Kantian culture develops sufficiently amongst a community of states on a global or

regional level, it is possible for anarchy to vanish in a decentralized arena. (Wendt 2007:

306-308)

An important aspect when looking at the contents of the Kantian culture in international

relations is looking at how this culture can develop and eventually become entrenched.

It is some conundrum how the former enemies of the Hobbesian world or rivals in the

Lockean world can become friendly towards each other. This will certainly not happen

from one day to the other but will be a long process which can be split up in three major

phases. The first phase would be an extension of what can be seen in a Lockean culture

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– if the prevention from killing other states in time increases to become a norm of not

attacking the foundation for the Kantian culture is in place – where coercion maintains

the nonviolence. From here it can develop with the norms becoming more entrenched

and cooperation increases. You will in this second phase see states cooperating and

seemingly act selflessly – this will not be genuine though. The norms are here to act

friendly, and as this is the expected way of communication the state is acting this way

because it knows this is how it achieves its goals and avoids becoming the victim of

sanctions. The idea behind the third and final phase is that the actions will eventually

become more genuine and less fundamentally based on egoism. (Wendt 2007: 303-306)

The socialization of international relations

After having explored the different cultures which can develop in international relations

and how they can become entrenched, it is time to discover the most important aspect of

the constructivist theory – the ability of states to learn and affect one another. The core

of constructivism is that interests and identities are created and are continuously

modified through interactions with others.

Wendt tries to explain this through his example of Alter and Ego meeting each other for

the first time. Both are focused on survival and have material force to try to back up that

interest – but apart from this they haven’t created any common interests or expectations.

At this first meeting every single gesture and movement is important to signal

peacefulness, animosity or outright threatening behavior. As soon as Alter decides to act

one way, Ego will begin to interpret that action and respond to this behavior. Ego might

misinterpret Alter’s intentions and act unaccordingly to this, causing Alter to change its

stance. In any event, a common history is starting to write itself for the two and each of

them will begin developing opinions of the other and also develop behavioral patterns in

relation to other entities in general based on its recent experiences. The understandings

and expectations of others will therefore be the major part of the formation of the

actor’s interests and identities. (Wendt 1992: 404-407)

Below is a figure showing the formation of states identities and interests through

interaction:

48

As seen in the figure the process of state socialization is seen in a limited arena of only

two states – the formation of state identities and interests are here visually explained. A

state encounters an issue and begins analyzing it from the perspective of its previous

experience (i.e. it’s previously created identities and interests) and decides on what it

deems to be an appropriate action. Other states will begin analyzing this action and will

try to figure out what reaction it might require and acts upon it – and so it continues.

These state actions all add up to the common history of the states and are the

fundamental building blocks of the mutual expectations of each other’s actions and in

turn formation of own identity and interest.

Summary

The constructivist theory is distinguished from the other theories presented and utilized

in this thesis as more dynamic and somewhat more unpredictable than the others.

State A with identities and interests

Intersubjective understandings and expectations possessed by and constitutive of A and B

State B with identities and interests

(1) Stimulus requring action

(2)State’s A definition of the situation

(3) State A’s action

(4) State’s B interpretation of A’s action and B’s own definition of the situation

(5) State’s B’s action

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Instead of explaining behavior in international relations as static – as in neorealism – or

following more predictable rules – such as in neoliberalism – constructivism is more

open-ended. What matters is the interaction between the actors and their shared history.

A history of violence and a high death rate among states will result in a justified

paranoia amongst them and a devolvement into a Hobbesian culture of kill or be killed,

while a history of cooperation and mutual respect of sovereignty can lead to a Lockean

or eventually even a Kantian culture. Wendt therefore see the anarchy of international

relations as a product of the state socialization and therefore possible to change – or as

his article is titled: “Anarchy is what states make of it” (Wendt 1993: 391)

AnalysisIn this chapter it will be attempted to provide an analysis of the topic of the thesis in

order to reach a conclusion and as clear an answer for the problem formulation as

possible. The analytical chapter will be divided in four main sections. The first section

will attempt to analyse the problem through the application of the soft power theory, the

second section from the perspective of neorealism and the third from the perspective of

constructivism. In the fourth section the findings of the three preceding sections will be

held up against each other and discussed. This final analytical discussion will in the end

provide a basis for the final conclusion of the thesis.

Application of soft powerThis chapter seeks to provide an explanatory model for the problem formulation

through the lens of soft power. As the problem formulation is divided in to three steps

so will this chapter. At first it will be explored why ministries of foreign affairs have

made moves to reinvent themselves through the introduction of rather new concepts

such as public diplomacy, nation branding and cultural diplomacy. After this it will be

explored whether or not these new approaches signify a more efficient way of reaching

foreign policy goals. Finally it will be explored whether this constitutes a breakthrough

in international relations from the viewpoint of soft power theory.

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New ways of conducting diplomacyWhen considering why these new communicative and open approaches to conducting

diplomacy towards a wider group than traditional diplomacy it is necessary to look at

the basic motivations of the states behind the diplomacy. Throughout time the areas of

competition between states have been moving from the core hard power areas of

economic and military affairs to increasingly include soft power areas as well – this has

to especially be seen in the light of wars generally has become too destructive.

If it is becoming more difficult to coerce other states in to doing what you want then it

is possible to utilize the more subtle approach to power mentioned in the theoretical

section – namely to persuade them to think that your goal is identical with their goal.

Public diplomacy and cultural diplomacy can then be seen as tools of increasing other

publics understanding and sympathy of one’s cause and thereby in turn make these

people pressure there governments to act favourable towards the sending state – or at

least not hostile. As mentioned in the theoretical presentation of soft power, it is

necessary for a government to increase its credibility to increase its soft power and that

is exactly the same case as with public diplomacy and how public diplomacy is

distinguishable from its cousin propaganda. The same goes for the necessity to listen to

what others has to say and be focused on the dialogue instead of just the monologue. All

these points suggest that the new approaches to conducting diplomacy have come in

place because of the recognition of the value of soft power.

A final note to this area is why the initiatives primarily have been introduced in Europe

and North America. It could likely be because there are directed more resources in to

trying out new approaches in these countries’ ministries of foreign affairs but there

could also be another cause of this. As mentioned in the theoretical presentation of soft

power that states which are closer to the predominant values and ideologies in the world

will command a vaster soft power than countries further away from the predominant

ideologies. Since the end of the Cold War these values has generally been dictated by

the United States – why it is namely this and fairly similar countries which focus on

these new approaches to conducting foreign relations.

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More efficient in reaching foreign policy goalsIn accordance with the theory of soft power the increased focus on public diplomacy

can signify a more efficient way of reaching foreign policy goals assuming that these

goals are fairly standard ones such as improving one’s economy, international standing

and political positioning. As mentioned in the theoretical chapter these initiatives cannot

stand alone as it is just one part of a bigger soft power picture and one could fear that

this is not always realized. Complementary areas to increase soft power could include

generous contributions of development aid, strong profile in peacekeeping operations or

a tolerant and fair treatment of domestic minorities. Areas such as these will more often

be guided by either domestic or hard power (economic) concerns rather than soft power

concerns – development aid will be cut due to budget concerns, domestic minorities will

experience high levels of intolerance in order to increase support amongst more

nationalist minded segments of the electorate etc. This can easily result in public

diplomacy not being able to achieve results to its fullest potential as it does not receive

the backing it needs in other areas.

Furthermore the concept of nation branding could pose a problem to the success of

public diplomacy. As nation branding is quite focused on commercial principles and has

the attention of the private sector its primary goal is to benefit the area of economic

power – i.e. the second chessboard. This can be unfortunate for the possibilities for

success in the area of public diplomacy. The reason for this is that nation branding in

itself does not have to follow the complete truth – rather it is about creating images and

artificially awaken emotional attachments to a location. In this way it diverges from one

of the basic principles of soft power and public diplomacy – namely to stick to the truth

and increase credibility. In this way the concept of nation branding is counter productive

to public diplomacy and thereby to increase soft power.

Breakthrough in international relationsAs it has been established that public diplomacy cannot reach its potential due to other

factors such as remaining hard power concerns, domestic concerns and the counter

productive element of nation branding, the introduction of public diplomacy does not

52

constitute a breakthrough in the basic principles in international relations – it rather

seems like an initiative taken with all the best intentions but to limited effect.

If it is assumed that public diplomacy did not have these current hindrances – would it

then plausibly signify a change in the basic principles of international relations? I.e. if

all the necessary support was in place for the public diplomacy efforts and the main

attention of foreign relations policy was on soft power. In a way it a change would be

plausible in that major armed conflict has grown increasingly rare and obsolete but then

again the focus on soft power is basically just taking the international competition to

another chessboard and states will remain as competitive as always. The introduction of

public diplomacy would therefore signify yet another tool of power rather than a way to

increase cooperation.

SummaryWhen viewing public diplomacy through the lens of the theory of soft power it explains

that public diplomacy has come to existence because the state actors see soft power as

real power and therefore worthwhile competing over. But as public diplomacy often

will stand alone without the necessary support of other policy areas, it does not at the

moment signify a more efficient means of reaching foreign policy goals or constitute a

fundamental breakthrough in international relations.

If public diplomacy at one time receives the necessary backing of other areas and focus

on soft power will rise to prominence alongside economic, domestic and military

concerns it can potentially be a very important competitive tool of power between

states. It is still unlikely though that there will be any significant change in the basic

principles of international relations.

Application of neorealismThis chapter will aim at analyzing the topic of interest from the perspective of

neorealism in order to reach an attempt of an answer for the problem formulation. The

structure of this chapter will be similar to that of the preceding one with one exception.

53

As the analysis at hand will reach a quite different conclusion than the one reached

previously the subchapters, of whether or not the new approaches to diplomacy are

more efficient at reaching foreign policy goals and whether the concepts signify a

fundamental change in international relations, will be merged. After the main analytical

sections of the chapter there will be a short summary of the conclusions reached through

the analysis from the neorealist perspective.

New ways of conducting diplomacyFrom the neorealist perspective the rise of concepts such as public diplomacy is quite

puzzling at best and utterly nonsense at worst. As the only entity which truly matters in

international relations is the state and the state will act rationally and not change its

basic behavioural patterns as long as there is no world government in place the rise of

public diplomacy is a mistake. The assumption that by creating close relations between

one’s own population and foreign populations or by seeming more open to dialogue will

change other states behaviour towards oneself is a miscalculation as state behaviour will

never change due to the anarchic conditions states exist under.

Since it is a fact that public diplomacy initiatives has been established in a wide range of

countries the reason must lie in the wrong perception that the reason for conflict lies in

the evilness of man and the unpredictable behaviour of the individuals in power – i.e.

the first image. In other words the public diplomacy initiatives has been started because

it is hoped that one can directly or indirectly affect the future leaders of a country to

have a good impression of one’s own country and thereby increasing the security of that

country because it will have postponed possible conflict with this state.

More efficient in reaching foreign policy goalsFollowing the argument of the preceding paragraph the rise of public diplomacy does

not signify a more efficient way of reaching foreign policy goals as the basic interests of

a state is static and communication with foreign publics will not to any significant

extent result in increased security for the sending state rather it will likely be a waste of

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resources giving a competitive edge to the states not wasting funds on these ill-

conceived concepts.

Regarding nation branding though, this can be a good initiative as such from the

viewpoint of neorealism in that it can affect a state’s economic strength positively and

thereby increasing its power and security. Nation branding as such does not really have

anything significant to do with international relations as such though since it only is of

importance as an export-enhancing initiative and won’t change the approach towards

other states fundamentally.

Since the concepts are not really of any significant use in the competition between states

or affecting the relationship between states in any real way, the rise of public diplomacy

does not constitute any fundamental change in the way international relations are taking

place.

SummarySince neorealism view state behaviour as rational and the international environment as

anarchical and static, the new concepts of public diplomacy does not have any relevance

to international relations at all and has probably arisen to prominence lately by the

mistake of seeing human behaviour as the source of conflict and therefore the way to

limit direct conflict is to create beneficial views of one’s state among foreign publics.

Even though nation branding can be seen as beneficial indirectly to a state’s security by

proposing a way to increase the economic strength of a state it does not have anything to

do with international relations as such but is merely an advanced advertisement

campaign.

Application of constructivismLike the two previous chapters, this chapter will aim at providing an explanatory model

in order to give some answers in relation to the problem formulation. It will do this

through the application of constructivism as it was presented in the corresponding

theoretical chapter. This current chapter will generally be structured in the same way as

the preceding two chapters by exploring the three levels of the problem formulation one

at a time. First it will look in to why the communicative approaches to diplomacy has

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arisen to prominence the last years followed by an investigation on whether it can

signify a more efficient way of reaching foreign policy goals from a theoretical

approach. Finally it will be explored whether or not this can be deemed as constituting a

significant breakthrough in the way international relations generally are conducted.

After this chapter the final analysis and conclusion of the thesis will follow.

New ways of conducting diplomacyFrom the constructivist point of view the reason why public diplomacy and other

communicative approaches to conducting diplomacy has arisen can be manifold as it is

a quite flexible theory so to speak – international relations is what states make of it after

all. One interpretation can be developed by looking at the general world history since

World War II. In World War two the dominant culture must be deemed to have been a

Hobbesian culture – a kill or be killed culture. This was reverted back to a Lockean

culture as the Allies or the status quo powers won the war. During the post-war period

and the Cold War the Lockean culture became increasingly entrenched – this was partly

due to coercion, as the theory proscribes, since it became too costly to engage in war

partly due to the nuclear bomb. Major wars were rare, borders hardly moved and a quite

significant amount of respect for sovereignty of states – at least for the most part. Even

as the major rivalry in the world between the United States and the Soviet Union ended

with the Cold War alliances persisted and grew closer even though an increased

competition should have been expected. As this did not happen the Lockean culture

must be deemed to have reached one of its most entrenched phases. Since the culture is

that entrenched there is no serious fear that the status quo should not be maintained and

it is becoming increasingly desirable to increase dialogue and understanding between

countries.

More efficient in reaching foreign policy goalsAs the Lockean culture can be deemed to have reached its most entrenched phase it

gives room to sew the seeds of friendship between peoples and states among the world.

So when seeing whether a state becomes more efficient at reaching its foreign policy

goals through the use of public diplomacy or not, this might not be the right question to

ask in this relation. If the Lockean culture has reached its final stages and has begun to

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approach other countries through increased dialogue, openness and honesty, this can

signify the move from a Lockean to a Kantian culture. If the culture of international

relations are changing from a Lockean to a Kantian it would entail a change of foreign

policy goals which in turn makes the question obsolete in itself.

The emergence of public diplomacy can therefore more be seen as a tool to increase

socialization between states with foreign publics as the medium. By affecting foreign

publics through openness, sincerity and dialogue these will in turn affect their

governments increasing the prospects of possible friendship between the two states in

question.

Breakthrough in international relationsIf the culture of international relations are changing from Lockean to Kantian partly due

to the effects of public diplomacy this signifies an enormous potential change in the

fundamental ways international relations are taking place. The reason for this is that it

changes how states are socialized – from seeing each other as rivals they will begin to

see each other as friends instead. This can in turn make room for a previously unheard

of degree of cooperation in international relations. In the early stages after a new culture

has been introduced in international relations, it will be severely fragile though. The

slightest break of trust between the former rivals turned friends could potentially revert

the culture back – at least until it has become more entrenched. In short, the rise to

prominence of public diplomacy does not in itself signify a big fundamental change in

the conduct of international relations but rather plays an important part in this potential

change.

SummarySince constructivism is a very flexible theory, several different scenarios could be

plausible according to the theory. The explanation mentioned here have been chosen as

it resonates well with the theory as presented in the theoretical chapter as well as

providing a distinct third way – meaning that it is quite different from the explanatory

model used both in the chapter of soft power and of neorealism. Throughout the past

57

sixty years the Lockean culture has grown increasingly entrenched as the primary

culture of international relations. There have been few wars due to the costly nature of it

after the invention of the nuclear bomb, a high degree of respect for sovereignty and

maintenance of the status quo. This has especially been true for the post-Cold War era

and can be deemed as signifying a highly entrenched Lockean culture.

The rise of public diplomacy can therefore be interpreted as a sign that the culture of

international relations are on the verge of a change from the Lockean to the Kantian

culture with an increased focus on communication, openness and dialogue – key tools to

socialize the states into seeing each other as friends rather than rivals.

ConclusionIn this chapter the final conclusion for the problem formulation will be sought. This will

be done through a critique of the previous three analytical chapters which took their

basis in soft power, neorealism and constructivism.

In relation to the theory and analytical chapter of neorealism, this theory is in its very

nature quite conservative and static. Because of its firm view that the basic ways states

are relating to one another never changes – there will always be anarchy and states will

always secure themselves, even if it means attacking others. This leaves no room for

analysis of concepts like public diplomacy or nation branding, but it rather dismisses

these outright. Furthermore a puzzling aspect to this theory is that if the state is a

rational actor and public diplomacy initiatives equals nonsense – how can a state then

rationally choose to organize and fund significant public diplomacy strategies.

As for the analytical approach of constructivism – this theoretical approach leaves

plenty of room to speculate about the causes and effects of public diplomacy strategies.

As it potentially attributes quite a significant amount of importance to public diplomacy

initiatives, it thereby also makes it more understandable why so much time, effort and

resources are channelled into public diplomacy, nation branding and cultural diplomacy

initiatives. Furthermore it leaves open room for the most positive explanation of why

these public diplomacy initiatives have been initialized around the world. This is

58

explained in the analytical chapter as because there is a change of culture taking place

or about to change place in the international environment which will affect how states

are reacting towards one another.

One of the more problematic areas of the explanatory model this theory offers is also

why it is ultimately rejected as usable in achieving a satisfactory answer to the problem

formulation is that the theory is too open-ended. Basically the theory leaves room to

explain any and all state behaviour towards other states. Some firm standpoints of the

theory would make it easier to utilize efficiently. As the theory stands now, the only

firm standpoint it has is that international relations is what states make of it. As it

stands, state actions and behaviour is completely dependable on how states are

socialized towards one another in the international environment. If the international

environment does not see armed conflict for a significant amount of time the states

inhabiting this environment will ultimately stop even considering armed conflict in the

future.

With regards to the theory of soft power and its analytical approach to the present

problems it occupies a middle-ground between the stance taken by the constructivist

approach and the stance taken by the neorealist approach. The explanatory model used

with this theory attributes a certain amount of potential towards the public diplomacy

initiatives seen around the world. Even though attributes much significance to what the

initiatives are aimed at achieving it promotes some scepticism towards whether it will

succeed or not. The reason for this scepticism is that presently it seems like most states

are prioritizing other areas before considering soft power – namely economic, military

or domestic issues. As the theory of soft power estimates that it is necessary to act on a

large front in order for soft power to rise to any significance – even if it means taking

unwise decisions in relation to economic growth or domestic support. A point of interest

is especially with regards to nation branding. As nation branding is a close cousin of

public diplomacy one would assume that they would complement each other but that is

not the case as it was discovered. Rather the false or idealized images promoted through

nation branding campaigns diverts quite a bit from several of the basic principles of

public diplomacy – namely to promote openness, dialogue and most importantly

increase credibility and honesty.

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Finally, to address the problem formulation with some concluding remarks – the reasons

why public diplomacy initiatives has gained prominence in the last years can be

attributed to an increased recognition of soft power. It is currently not deemed to be of

much importance though, as the area still has a secondary priority despite praising

words from ministries of foreign affairs around the world. Since it is only a secondary

priority and does not receive the kind of all round support it needs, it is not likely to

foreign policy goals more easily attainable. In relation to the last part of the problem

formulation – whether or not the focus on public diplomacy constitutes a breakthrough

in international relations – the answer must be no. It might one time play a primary role

of international relations but it will not change the basic principles states are operating

under internationally.

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Abstract of “The New Era of Diplomacy: The Effects of Public Diplomacy, Nation Branding and Cultural Diplomacy”

The topic on which the thesis is centered is on concepts of public diplomacy, nation branding

and cultural diplomacy – especially public diplomacy is in focus. The aim of the thesis is why

these concepts has rised in prominence amongst several ministries of foreign affairs in Europe

and North America lately and has become an integrated part of their diplomatic strategy.

Furthermore it seeks to explore whether these concepts will contribute to an increased

efficiency in reaching foreign policy goals and if they signify a fundamental change in the way

international relations are viewed. The first parts of the thesis gives a short outline of the

history of traditional diplomacy, followed by a presentation of public diplomacy, nation

branding and cultural diplomacy. The biggest significance is given to the presentation of public

diplomacy as it is the most analytically interesting concept in relation to the problem

formulation.

These questions are explored from the viewpoint of three theories namely Joseph S. Nye’s

theory of soft power, Kenneth Waltz’ view of neorealism and Alexander Wendt’s version of

constructivism. Where the analysis from the neorealist perspective dismisses the importance

of public diplomacy and partly nation branding the constructivist are more enthusiastic in its

approach – accepting the possibility of fundamental change in international relations, partly

due to the significance of public diplomacy. The theory of soft power occupies a middle-ground

between the other two theories and is cautiously optimistic of public diplomacy but very

sceptical towards nation branding. Regretably the analysis from the soft power approach

deems public diplomacy to have limited relevance in international relations at the moment as

most state initiatives to increase their soft power are at best half-hearted. In the conclusion

the analytical results of the soft power approach are deemed more realistic than both

constructivism and neorealism.

The methodological approach of the thesis is very theoretically centered and a significant

effort has been put in presenting the three theories thoroughly with use of both the works of

the theorists themselves as well as several works of philosophers often cited by them –

including Immanuel Kant, Thomas Hobbes and John Locke.

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