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A Preliminary Exploration of the Ideal of Compensatory Justice CHAPTER 1:
INTRODUCTION
This thesis aims to determine whether or not the ideal of compensatory justice
is an attractive way to determine wage rates. Currently in most societies, the
market largely dictates how much workers receive in exchange for their
labour. I believe that the market does not determine wage rates in a just
manner. As a replacement, I propose the ideal of compensatory justice.
Compensatory justice is an ideal of distributive justice that focuses on what
people get paid in exchange for performing their jobs. Compensatory justice is
compensation for the work a person performs in her chosen occupation.
Imagine if incomes were adjusted so that each individual was compensated
with money for the work they did: those who worked very hard at horrible
tasks would be paid very well to compensate for their great sacrifice, and
those who did little at their cushy jobs would be compensated with a smaller
amount to reflect how little they sacrifice. This would fulfil the requirements
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of the ideal of compensatory justice. Compensatory justice is egalitarian
because it seeks to equalise peoples package of workload -plus-income. It is
also liberal, as it takes into account how worthy workers are of compensation.
Defenders of the ideal of compensatory justice, either in part or in full,
include Joel Feinberg, James C. Dick, William Galston, Arthur DiQuattro,
Oskar Lange, Fred Taylor, H. D. Dickinson and George Bernard Shaw. The
main thrust of the ideal is also reflected in Ronald Dworkins theory of
equality.
Dworkin believes a system of distribution should be ambition sensitive and
not endowment sensitive.1 This means that what people receive should be
relative to their choices and the effort they put into those choices, rather than
influenced by factors that are beyond their control. This captures the
underlying principles of the ideal of compensatory justice. In compensating
for the work people do, the distribution of income is sensitive to the choices
people make and the effort they exert in their occupation. And because
compensation comes for the work a person actually does (lifting pianos,
trading currency, etc.), not what they are (doctor, model, etc.), how talented or
untalented someone is will not affect the amount they are paid.
1 Dworkin, What is Equality? Part 2 : Equality of Resources , Philosophy and Public Affairs ,v.10, no.4, 1981, p.311.
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Compensatory justice is an intuitively fair ideal. 2 Some people work under
dangerous or unhealthy conditions, and many people work in stressful or
boring jobs. It seems fair that these people be adequately compensated for the
burdensome aspects of their jobs. Compensatory justice, for example, might
support compensation for hard workers due to their greater effort, and gives
lower pay to lazier workers, because they do not have as much need for
compensation. Compensation means an individual gets paid relative to how
hard she works and how much she enjoys or dislikes her job. All other things
equal, if a person loves her job and works at an easy pace at convenient hoursfor a short time, she would struggle to convince others that she should receive
a higher income than someone who hates her job, and works very hard during
her long and awkward working hours.
Compensatory justice combines values from liberalism and egalitarianism. It
is liberal in the sense that individuals are personally responsible for their
income. Unlike straightforward equality of income, compensatory justice
rewards those who work hard and those who perform arduous tasks for a
living, while giving less to those who do not work hard or have undemanding
jobs. It is also egalitarian, however, in the sense that people are to end up
equally well off when both income and labour burden are combined as a
package. As Dick says,
2 Joseph H. Carens, Compensatory Justice and Social Institutions, Economics and Philosophy , v.1, 1985, p.41.
Comment [TD1]: Not sure I have thisintuition independently of the we needthe unpleasant job done consideration. Icould spend my days sorting though arubbish dump. It would be hard andunpleasant, but that surely doesnt entitleme to compensation of no one wants medo it. But if its the fact someone wants t job done, then it doesnt look like its theeffort or unpleasantness.One issue here is who is meant tocompensate on the hard and unpleasantview.
Comment [TD2]: Is this a subjectivemeasure? Suppose I hate teaching stage 1classes, while some of my colleagues donmind. The task is the same for all of us buthe subjective disutility varies dramaticallShouls I get higher compensation?
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the guidi ng principle should be that workers at all jobs be sorecompensed that when that nature of their work and theamount of their pay are considered together, all are treatedequally in the workplace. 3
Inequalities in income are only morally permissible under a system of
compensation if they reflect relative occupational disutility. Choices and
effort influence income; morally arbitrary factors do not. Egalitarian and
socialist proponents of compensatory justice view it as morally superior to the
neoclassical labour market where natural and social advantages (as well as
more general instances of luck) are allowed to influence income. Conversely,
liberals see compensatory justice as morally superior to the socialist model of
equality of income, as people are made responsible for the income they
receive.
One possible weakness of compensatory justice is that it does not reward
economic contribution. As Carens points out, under a compensation scheme,
lavatory attendants would probably get paid more than engineers. 4 This would
be fair according to the ideal of compensatory justice due to the relative
pleasantness of the two occupations. The problem may be however, that
without reliable material rewards for individuals who contribute more, society
may suffer from labour shortages in important areas. Without the appeal of a
high income, a would-be engineer might instead take a job as a lavatory
3 James C. Dick, How to Justify a Distribution of Earnings, Philosophy and Public Affairs ,v.4, 1975, p.272. 4 Carens, Compensatory Justice and Social Institutions, p.42.
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attendant simply because she would garner a greater income in the more
unpleasant job. Proponents of the neoclassical labour market value its natural
reactivity to labour shortages in highly valued industries. The same inherent
efficiency is not found in compensation schemes. This means that some of
those who support the ideal of compensatory justice make room for material
incentives out of a concern for productive efficiency and economic output. 5
However this is to be seen as an outside concern and not part of the ideal of
compensatory justice; within compensatory justice such incentives would not
be permissible. Incentives for highly productive or particularly valuable
occupations would have to come out of a desire for enhanced efficiency.
Efficiency should be seen as a competing value that might justify constraining
aspects of compensatory justice, not as part of it. So, since what I am
concerned with at present is the ideal of compensatory justice, I will not take
this version of distributive justice to include efficiency-enhancing material
incentives.
Another potential problem for the ideal of compensatory justice is
measurement: how should the relative unpleasantness of certain jobs be
measured? One option is to assign the government the task of deeming the
amount of compensation necessary for all the various occupations. This would
mean that the measure of how enjoyable a job is would be objective; it would
5 Ibid, pp.42-3.
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be decided outside of how particular individuals felt about it. For example, if
someone worked as a receptionist but greatly disliked interacting with people,
her greater burden would not be compensated; she would receive the same
amount of income as all the other people doing the same job as her. Another
option then would be to have a subjective measure of labour burden one
where how people felt personally about their work determined their level of
compensation. Both approaches have problems.
For example, the objective method of measuring labour burden, as in the case
of the misanthropic receptionist, does not take into account the fact that
people will certainly feel differently about performing the same job. 6 But the
subjective means of measurement, which avoids this problem, does not react
to cases where peoples preferences for work are malformed. 7 If, as a child,
Bertrand was brainwashed to think plastering was the most venerable and
desirable occupation by his plasterer father, we might think it unfair if he does
not get paid as much as Damien who did not receive such messages regarding
his chosen occupation. A way around these problems is suggested by James
Dick. According to Dick, the correct amount of compensation can be
determined by a persons transfer earnings.
Economists distinguish two different types of pay in an individuals income:
(1) transfer earnings and (2) economic rent. Dick defines transfer earnings as
6 Carens, Compensatory Justice and Social Institutions, pp.42 -3. 7 Ibid, pp.42-3.
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the amount necessary to keep [a person] from transferring to another job 8
and economic rent as the difference between what [a person] actually
receives and the amount that would be enough to prevent him from
transferring. 9 Take the case of Alec, a successful novelist, who is paid an
average of $100 000 a year. Alec loves writing novels, and would continue to
write them even if he was earning much less than $100 000 per year. Alec
would only stop writing novels for a living if his income dropped below $40
000, in which case he would take a job as an English tutor at a language
school. So Alecs transfer earnings are only 40% of his total income $40000. The rest of his salary, $60 000, is economic rent. An individuals transfer
earnings equal the amount required to compensate her for her labour burden.
Under a scheme of compensatory justice, Alec would receive $40 000 per
year for writing novels.
Compensatory justice is a relatively unexplored concept in distributive justice.
However, the idea that incomes should reflect the relative disutility of an
occupation is common outside the realm of academia, although expressed
rather differently. For instance, it is not unusual for people to complain that
television celebrities salaries are exorbitant for the perceived amount of work
that they do. I believe cC ompensatory justice also has significant intuitive
8 Dick, How to Justify a Distribution of Earnings, p.268. 9 Ibid, p.268.
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appeal to those of an egalitarian ilk. Given the large amount of egalitarian
theories in the field of distributive justice, it makes sense to see whether
compensatory justice is any kind of match for the more well-known ideals that
dominate the current academic landscape.
This thesis takes the ideal of compensatory justice and puts it under a
microscope, albeit a somewhat weak one, the ultimate aim of which being to
find out how promising attractive compensatory justice is as a just a means of
determining wage leveldirective for just distributions . This thesis can be seen
as a launch pad for a more rigorous examination of compensatory justice
, not a complete study in and of itself.
I begin by addressing compensatory justices prima facie compatibility with
egalitarianism. The aim of this initial task is to see what kind of egalitarian
might favour compensatory justice . I think this is a valuable exercise because
the answer to the question of whether or not the ideal of compensatory justice
is an attractive way to determine wage rates will depend on whom we ask.,
This process willand also help to clarify the moral grounds on which it
compensatory justice rests by analysing how it relates to various accounts of
equality . Chapter 21 sets out the categories of egalitarianism. Chapter 32
begins with an overview of compensatory justice, and goes on to assess es its
the prima facie compatibility of compensatory justice with the previously
demarcated types of egalitarianism. In this chapter I also give my opinion of
Comment [TD3]: I think the beginningneeds to be reworked a bit. If your topic iabout income reflecting disutility, then Iwould be inclined to start with that, rathethan with the general example of compensatory vs . distributive justice. (Myimmediate thought was that it was an oddpair: why would compensatory justice b=an element of distributive (as opposed, foinstance to corrective) justice?
Comment [TD4]: Too apologetic I think.Describe the project you are doing and sayoure doing it, rather than apologise fordoing some other project.
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whether or not compensatory justice is likely to be complementary to, or to
conflict with, each incarnation of egalitarianism.
The following two chapters look at the underlying moral foundations of
compensatory justice. I believe these to be desert, and, equality of
opportunity. In order to know if compensatory justice is an attractive
ideal, we need to see what is at its heart. We need to know what moral
stuff it is made of (so to speak). I believe the concepts of desert and equality
of opportunity lie at compensatory justice s core. However, these ideals are
broad, and only a particular kind of each will lend their support to
compensatory justice. Chapter 43 takes the concept of desert and whittles it
down to the precise variation that underpins compensatory justice; chapter 54
does the same to equality of opportunity. The resulting principles are deontic,
non-radical, moral, pre-institutional desert, and substantive equality of
opportunity (also called responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism). Chapter 54
ends with my attempt to show that these two principles are really one and the
same.
At this point I turn my attention to a key objection to compensatory justice:
the self-ownership objection to redistributive taxation. If the self-ownership
objection holds, compensatory justice cannot even get off the ground because
taxation is its most vital practical component. The question of whether or not
the finer points of compensatory justice are just is moot if it is not morally
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acceptable to redistribute income in the first place. Therefore the strength of
the self-ownership objection is of importance to any study of compensatory
justice. Chapter 65 is my attempt to show that the thesis of self-ownership
does not preclude taxation, and that furthermore, self-ownership is yet to be
defended adequately.
My final point of interest is an elementary part of compensatory justice:
labour burden. Compensation suggests remuneration for a burden, but what
constitutes burden in occupations? A metric for labour burden is the first step
required to flesh out the concept of compensatory justice from an amorphous
principle to an articulated system of redistribution. This is why the nature of
labour burden is the subject of chapter 76. In this chapter I look at several
possible measures of labour burden, coming to the conclusion that it is best
defined as subjective disutility in the area of work. Subjective disutility is a
welfarist metric, so subsequently, and finally, I talk about the expensive tastes
objection to welfarism and what it means for compensatory justice. Finally,
chapter 8 sums up my thesis.
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CHAPTER ONE2 : EGALITARIANISMS - DIFFERENT VIEWS FROM
DIFFERENT WINDOWS
I. Introduction
This chapter will identify the different branches of egalitarianism and locate
what distinguishes them from one another. As we shall see, different types of
egalitarianism have different ramifications for how one might view the idealof compensatory justice. The purpose of this, and of the following chapter, is
to discover what kind of egalitarian might find compensatory justice
attractive. I think those of an egalitarian persuasion are the most likely to see
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Comment [TD5]: I think somewhere hereyou need to say clearly what you think compensatory justice is: The discussionseems a bit unmotivated. You might start with an example a case which you couldthen use to structure the discussion.
Also or perhaps instead, need to saysomething (more) about why youre talkiabout egalitarianism.
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the value of compensatory justice because it seeks to equalise how well-off
people are when both income and labour burden are combined as a package. I
think it is possible that other theories of justice can see something valuable in
compensatory justice, but I deal with only egalitarianism here. As we shall
see, different types of egalitarianism have different ramifications for how one
might view the ideal of compensatory justice. In order to move on to the
analysis in the next chapter, I need to explain how I have categorised the
many ways to be egalitarian. In this chapter I set out the distinctions between
variants of egalitarianism by focusing on how each one values equality.
Section II explains what I consider egalitarianism to be. Section III discusses
the first type of egalitarianism: intrinsic impersonal beneficial egalitarianism.
Section IV moves onto the second branch, which I define as intrinsic personal
beneficial egalitarianism. Section V outlines instrumental impersonal
beneficial egalitarianism as the third variant of the equality view. The next
branch of egalitarianism is instrumental personal beneficial egalitarianism and
it is explained in section VI. In section VII I talk about justice egalitarianism,
which differs from all the previous branches because it sees equality as just, as
opposed to good. Lastly, in section VIII, I note that procedural egalitarianism
is an also a kind of egalitarianism.
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II. The equality view
While prioritarians are generally considered egalitarians of a kind, myMy use
of the term egalitarian from now on refers to those who hold what Denis
McKerlie calls the equality view. 10 The equality view deems the relative
position of people to one another as morally important. Whether or not any
one person or group is badly off, the fact that any person or group is worse off
than another is a concern for egalitarians. Hence, egalitarianism is concerned
with relationships between individual lives, not the content of individual lives.
This poses a significant challenge for egalitarians because many philosophers
question the relevance of relative well-being in questions of distributive
justice. The core idea of their objection is that what egalitarians are really
concerned about, is the fact that some are badly off while others are well off,
not that there are different groups with different levels of well-being per se .
As Joseph Raz states:
What makes us care about various inequalities is not theinequality but the concern identified by the underlyingprinciple. It is the hunger of the hungry, the need of the needy,
the suffering of the ill, and so on. The fact that they are worseoff in the relevant respect than their neighbours is relevant. Butit is relevant not as an independent evil of inequality. Itsrelevance is in showing that their hunger is greater, their needmore pressing, their suffering more hurtful, and therefore our
10 Denis McKerlie, Equality and Priority, Utilitas , v.6, no.1, May 1994, p.25.
Comment [TD6]: Again explain what thimeans. Its hard to see where it comes fro
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concern for the hungry, the needy, the suffering, and not ourconcern for equality, makes us give them priority. 11
Views such as Razs are prioritarian. Prioritarians advocate giving priority to
the concerns of the worst off, which could conceivably conflict with the ideal
of equality. Despite the objections to the equality view inherent in
prioritarianism, it is still considered highly valuable by egalitarians.
Egalitarians who are not prioritarian can be broken into several distinct groups
according to their defence of equality, which results in a number of different
types of egalitarianism. 12
The branches of egalitarianism I discuss in the next section are concerned
with outcomes. To be concerned with outcomes means to value equality in the
final distribution of things like resources or welfare. 13 In contrast to this view,
there is a kind of egalitarianism that is more concerned with what is often
called procedural equality, that is, the realisation of equal opportunities for
people to procure things like resources and welfare. For now though, I wish to
concentrate on types of egalitarianism that focus on outcomes .
11 Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom . Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1986, p.240.12 I have left out prioritarianism in this preliminary investigation into the value of compensatory justice.13 Egalitarians disagree about the correct metric for equality. Here I suggest resources andwelfare because they are well-known and suffice as examples of the kind of metricegalitarians use to measure equality. I am putting aside the debate about what equality shouldbe measured by.
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III. Intrinsically impersonally beneficial egalitarianism
Different egalitarians value equality for different reasons. These variations
reflect important differences in the various strands that sit under the umbrella
term of egalitarianism. These differences have significant ramifications
when each ideal is applied to a situation or issue. So, with the overall aim of
analysing the application of the different versions of egalitarianism to the
labour market, I shall now clarify how different forms of egalitarianism differ
from one another, drawing attention to the specific manner in which each
assigns value to equality.
These distinctions are somewhat artificial because it is possible to be an
egalitarian for a number of confluent reasons. So, while the two overlap at
times, these categories should be viewed as tools of clarification and
comprehension as opposed to actual strains of thought. There are five main
ways to value equality: (1) as intrinsically impersonally beneficial; (2) as
intrinsically personally beneficial; (3) as instrumentally impersonally
beneficial; (4) as instrumentally personally beneficial; and (5) as a
requirement of justice. Let us begin with (1), the view that equality is
intrinsically impersonally beneficial.
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This brand of egalitarianism values equality between persons as an end in
itself. Equality is then intrinsically valuable because it is considered a stand-
alone virtue. On this view, equality need not produce any positive effects
because equality itself is the aim. Through this strictly intrinsic account of the
value of equality, this view also commits itself to an impersonal view of the
good. 14
This means that the question of whether or not something is beneficial can be
answered autonomously independently of how it affects people. So an
impersonal view of equality that holds equality as valuable does so even when
equality affects people adversely. Indeed, whether people are favourably
affected, adversely affected or not affected at all, equality still has value
according to this particular view.
Finally, this branch of egalitarianism takes equality to be beneficial as
opposed to just. Equality is taken as an ideal alongside notions such as justice
and freedom; it is not defended by an appeal to fairness such as views about
equal shares of societys resources. Also, inequalities are taken to be bad
even when they are not caused by human activity or cannot be altered. 15 This
14 This idea of equality being defensible as an impersonal good is taken from Larry Temkinsarticle titled Equality, Priority, and the Levelling Down Objection in Matthew Clayton andAndrew Williams (eds.), The Ideal of Equality . New York, St. Martins Press, 2000.15 The view that inequalities are bad even when they are unalterable refers to a distinctionmade by Derek Parfit in his article Equality or Priority? in Clayton and Williams, The Idealof Equality , p.90. Here Parfit makes a dis tinction between Telic egalitarians and Deonticegalitarians by demonstrating that Telic egalitarians find equality to be bad even when noform of social activity brought it about, and even when social activity could not rectify it.
Comment [TD7]: I wouls sayindependently
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take on egalitarianism that I refer to as beneficial has been categorised by
different philosophers under such headings as non-instrumental
egalitarianism, 16 non-derivative intrinsic egalitarianism 17 and telic
egalitarianism (short for teleological) 18.
An intrinsic impersonal beneficial conception of equality can be said to be the
most pure and stringent version of egalitarianism. This is because it values
equality so highly and in so many cases. Imagine a society where there are
two groups, Rich and Richer. Both these groups are materially and
emotionally rich but Richer is slightly more so than Rich. This type of
egalitarianism would judge the inequality between Rich and Richer as bad,
even if making the two groups equal would affect the members of both groups
negatively. It should be noted that proponents of this view of equality can
value other ideals alongside equality utility and freedom being two
examples that would also play a part in advocating any change to a society.
So a concern for utility could conceivably override a move to equality for
Rich and Richer. However, this does not change the fact that this type of
egalitarianism still values equality irrespectively of how it affects people.
This is contrasted with the Deontic egalitarian view that nothing can be said about forms of
inequality that were not caused by social activity, or forms of inequality that cannot bealtered, because this view is only concerned with what should be done. If an inequality wasnot achieved through the actions of people then there has been no wrongdoing becausenothing has been done at all; and if an inequality is unalterable then nothing can be done, sonothing can be done wrongly.16 Temkin, Equality, Priority, and the Levelling Down Objection, p.1 30.17 Clayton and Williams, Some Questions for Egalitarians , in Clayton and Williams, The
Ideal of Equality , p.17.18 Parfit, Equality or Priority?, p.84.
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Many egalitarians see this as unjustifiable, if not incomprehensible if it is
irrelevant whether anyone is affected positively, why is equality even a
concern? Proponents of such a view value equality only if it is viewed as
beneficial to those who live under it. An example of this is intrinsically
personally beneficial egalitarianism.
IV. Intrinsically personally beneficial egalitarianism
This view differs from the previous one in that it values equality because it
has beneficial effects on people. This means that this brand of egalitarianism
has a personal view of the good, that is, that whether an outcome is good or
not depends on whether or not it is good for the people who live under the
conditions of that outcome. However, this view retains the idea that equality is
intrinsically valuable, which means that this view also contains the idea that
equality is beneficial to people in and of itself. To understand this conception
of equality, take T. M. Scanlons claim that equality is valuable because it rids
society of stigmatising differences in status. 19
19 T.M. Scanlon, The Diversity of Objections to Inequality in Clayton and Williams, The Ideal of Equality , p.46.
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Large differences in material well-being can be objectionableon the same ground: when the mode of life enjoyed by somepeople sets the norm for a society, those who are much worseoff will feel inferiority and shame at the way they must live.
The egalitarian character of this objection is shown by the factthat it provides a reason specifically for the elimination of thedifferences in question rather than an improvement of the lot of the worse off in some more general sense. This is obviously sowhere the differences are purely ones of status. But even wherethe basis of inferiority is a difference in material well-being,the aim of avoiding stigmatisation can in principle provide areason for eliminating the benefits of the better off (or forwishing that they had never been created) even if these cannotbe transferred to the worst off. 20
This illustrates the way in which equality can be seen simultaneously as
intrinsically valuable and good for people. The measure for equalitys
intrinsic worth is that it affects people in a favourable way. It is possible to
challenge my labelling and claim that stances like Scanlons are in fact
representative of an instrumental view of the value of equality. For example,
one could appeal to Derek Parfits position on the distinction between
instrumental egalitarians and intrinsic egalitarians:
Equality has many kinds of good effect, and inequality manykinds of bad effect. If people are unequal, for example, that canproduce conflict, envy, or put some people in the power of others. If we value equality because we are concerned withsuch effects, we believe that equality has instrumental value:we think it good as a means. 21
20 Ibid, p.43.21 Parfit, Equality or Priority? p.86.
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I believe however that while in many cases this would be true in the case of
conflict for example in a case like Scanlons (this may or may not be the
only one), even though equality of sense of status can be labelled an effect,
because it is extremely likely to be brought about by equality and only
equality can bring it about, save enlisting some kind of brainwashing
machine, it is reasonable to summarise that it is equality itself that is valued,
and not its role in bringing about some other ideal. So it makes sense to say
equality is intrinsically valuable to Scanlon and others, so long as they are
able to defend the position that equality and only equality bring about aparticular good effect on people.
So, to those who I have convinced at least, this conception of the value of
equality is still intrinsic, and not instrumental, because equality itself is
viewed as a good. It is however different in the sense that it derives equalitys
intrinsic worth from its promotion of the personal good, and not from what
may be a more amorphous and potentially harder to defend impersonal
good. This can be seen as a slightly softer and more defensible version of
egalitarianism. Let us then apply this version of egalitarianism to the case of
Rich and Richer and see how it differs from the previous one.
In the case of Rich and Richer, this type of egalitarianism would still
recommend a move to equality, but this would be on the basis that the new
equality between people would affect those people favourably. As with the
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first brand of egalitarianism, it is possible for egalitarians that hold this view
of equality to be pluralistic about their approach to distributive justice. So, as
before, concerns sourced from other ideals like utility and freedom could
theoretically outweigh any benefits that equality is expected to produce.
However, equality is still considered an ideal; a concern that should be given
significant weight and consideration even when it is merely one of several
ideals that constitute a pluralistic moral outlook.
Finally, as with the first view of equality, this view takes equality to be
beneficial as opposed to just. Equality is attributed value as something which
is good. Equality is believed to make an outcome better than one that is
unequal, not more just. Equality is a good according to this view, not a
requirement of a theory of fairness.
So, the view that equality should be understood as intrinsically personally
beneficial values equality because it affects people positively in a morally
important way; it relieves feelings of inferiority for example. The next brand
of egalitarianism I will discuss values equality because it causes something
that is beneficial in a morally important way. This approach differs from the
view that equality is intrinsically personally beneficial in two respects: a) it
values equality only in so far as it brings about another ideal, and b) this end
goal ideal is thought to be good independently of its effects on people. This
type of egalitarianism is (3) instrumentally impersonally beneficial.
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V. Instrumental impersonal beneficial egalitarianism
Instrumental impersonal beneficial egalitarianism views equality as a means
rather than an end. This type of egalitarianism demonstrates an important shift
from valuing equality in itself to valuing equality for its effects. This
difference between intrinsic egalitarianism and instrumental egalitarianism
reflects a large discrepancy in their underlying principles. Parfit denies that
instrumental egalitarians are in fact r eal egalitarians: For true Egalitarians,
equality has intrinsic value. 22 Instrumental egalitarianism treats equality as a
mere means, which makes it far less devoted to equality in the theoretical
sensefor its own sake . So instrumental egalitarians tend to have greater
allegiance to whatever ideal they believe equality will promote than equality
itself while intrinsic egalitarians are committed to equality for its own sake.
Instrumental impersonal beneficial egalitarianism deems equality as
instrumentally valuable, it is also, however, characterised by the kind of ideal
it is ultimately concerned with. The end goal that equality between persons is
intended to promote is an impersonal good: an ideal that is valuable regardless
22 Parfit, Equality or Priority? p.86.
Comment [TD8]: I think you mean for itsown sake?
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of how people are affected. Take political equality as an example. A
proponent of the view that considers equality to be instrumentally
impersonally beneficial might be primarily concerned with achieving political
equality between persons. Realising equality in the distribution of well-being
could be seen as a way of achieving political equality. Equality of resources
for example would discourage the concentration of wealth, which can often
lead to the concentration of political power. Equality in distribution could in
this way be instrumentally valuable to a proponent of political equality.
Such a view would involve a commitment to an impersonal good. In the same
way as the first, this brand of egalitarianism encompasses (albeit indirectly)
the notion of impersonal goods. Political equality is typically defended not on
the basis of it being beneficial at an individual level, but beneficial to a
society. The realisation of political equality through the distribution of well-
being could be defended on the grounds that it has positive effects on people,
making it a personal good this kind of view is discussed next. But if the end
goal is defended as an impersonal good (a beneficial ideal that is beneficial
even when it does not benefit individuals) it would be classifiable as this
particular type of instrumental egalitarianism. Finally, this view also considers
the end goal ideal and its advance via equality as bettering a situation, as
opposed to making a situation more just or fairer.
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Let us now apply the instrumental impersonal benefit view of equality to the
case of Rich and Richer. Let us also use political equality as our first-order
objective. Imagine that in the society made up of Rich and Richer, the Richer
group is more politically influential. If they were not, that is, if both groups
were politically equal, this kind of egalitarianism would not support a move to
equality. But if we take the Richer group of people to be more powerful in
influencing policy (via lobbying, ownership of large corporations and so on)
an instrumental egalitarian with the primary goal of achieving political
equality would defend an equal distribution of resources. Naturally, the biggerthe gap between Rich and Richer, the more likely political equality will be
threatened. So if it was the case that a society had two groups, Rich and
Slightly Richer, equality of resources would not be so much of an urgent goal
because it is likely to be a reasonably politically equal society. Here
instrumental versions of egalitarianism gain an advantage because they tend to
sit better with peoples intuitions. In this case, it is a significantly large gap
that is required before inequality can be objected to. And we shall see that the
next branch of egalitarianism, which is also instrumental, draws a conclusion
about Rich and Richer which is probably intuitive to many people.
VI. Instrumental personal beneficial egalitarianism
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The fourth category of egalitarianism, the kind that values equality as
instrumentally personally beneficial, is similar to the previous one in that it
views equality as instrumental in achieving some other end, and because it
considers the attainment of its end goal as a good outcome (not primarily a
fair or just one). Indeed the only real difference is that the ideal that equality is
considered instrumental to achieving is a personal good rather than an
impersonal good. An example of a personal good is the relief of suffering
endured in conditions of poverty. The relief of suffering is normally deemed
to be beneficial because it is good for people themselves not for society to befree of people who are suffering. So taking this as an example, a proponent of
this egalitarian view would value equality on the grounds that it relieves
suffering. Now let us apply this view to the case of Rich and Richer.
Since no one is suffering under impoverished conditions in the society of Rich
and Richer, there is no support for a move to equality. For this brand of
egalitarianism to encourage equality between persons, equality must be
instrumental in bringing about a personal good. So, in this case where the
personal good is the relief of suffering a society of Poor and Rich for example
would be thought of as bad because the inequality in wealth and/or welfare
would affect the poor adversely in this way. As I mentioned earlier, this type
of judgement is more in line with peoples intuitions and makes it more
appealing than intrinsic accounts of equality. Comment [TD9]: Do you do anything wit this taxonomy?
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VII. Justice egalitarians
So far, all the views of equality have seen equality as beneficial. They have
taken equality to be either good for people, good in itself or instrumentally
good. The last category I specified earlier however does not view equality as
beneficial, but as a requirement of justice. This difference is important
because unlike goodness, justice is an artificial virtue, which means that it
applies to products of social interaction only.
To illustrate this, take the case of a baby that is born with only one arm,
purely through chance. It is not unjust that the baby only has one arm because
it could not have been born with two arms; no one is in charge of who gets
healthy limbs and who does not. It may however, be thought to be bad. The
first four categories of egalitarianism feel this way about inequality; inequality
is bad for whatever reason. But for justice egalitarians, inequality is
regrettable because it is unjust. Equality is taken as something social
institutions should promote in order to achieve justice in distribution, not
something which will make things better per se .
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An example of this justice-based view is egalitarianism that is based on a
social contract. According to one this contractarian position, if all people are
engaged in producing, all have a claim to an equal share of what is
collectively produced. All other things equal, equal members of a society who
partake in the production of goods and services should be equally well-off.
Another example takes equality to be the correct distribution by default. When
there is no justification for inequality, equality is then the just outcome. So let
us assume for a moment that in the society of Rich and Richer, Richers
superior wealth is not justified by any principle of justice. Given that this
inequality is unjustified, according to this default position, wealth should be
redistributed equally. Another example is the view that inequalities in natural
abilities should not affect peoples life prospects.
According to this justice-based view, inequalities in individual well-being
caused by natural abilities are unjust. A naturally high IQ for example, should
not ceteris paribus allow someone to end up with a bigger pay packet than
someone who has a naturally low IQ. People should be made equally well-off
because inequalities in ability are simply endowed upon people by nature;
they are not a result of actions or decisions employed by the people
themselves. Note that it is not natural differences in ability that are unjust on
this view, but allowing them to affect well-being through social institutions,
for example the labour market.
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So there are a range of theories within egalitarianism as a requirement of
justice that are all fairly different from one another in the way they attribute
justness to equality. What they have in common is the way in which they
value equality, that is, as a requirement of justice. This is the factor that
distinguishes this form of egalitarianism from the first four types of
egalitarianism. This branch is not concerned with forms of inequality that are
not caused by social activity, or forms of inequality that cannot be altered by
social processes, because it is interested in what should be done. According to
this view, if an inequality was not achieved through the actions of people then
there has been no injustice because nothing has been done at all; and if an
inequality is unalterable then nothing can be done, so nothing unjust can be
done. 23
VIII. Equality of opportunity
Before I move on to the task of comparing compensatory justice with various
types of egalitarianism, Now I would like to add another category of
egalitarianis m.m, Tthis kind of egalitarianism values equality in the procedure
for distributing well-being. This procedural kind of egalitarianism also views
23 Parfit, Equality or Priority? , p.90.
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equality as just, but the metric of equality is different. The equality required
by justice is procedural whereas the former type of egalitarianism required
substantive equality. So instead of favouring equality of outcomes, procedural
egalitarianism favours equality of opportunities. This claim is seen as a less
strong version of egalitarian justice because it allows for large inequalities in
well-being when everyone has an equal opportunity to access well-being. An
example of this type of egalitarian view is demonstrated by John Rawls
notion of fair equality of opportunity.
Fair equality of opportunity, according to Rawls, is the combination of formal
equality of opportunity and the equalisation of social contingencies. 24 Formal
equality of opportunity entails a lack of formal barriers. For example, a law
that prohibits women from enrolling in university would count as a formal
barrier to opportunities for women. The removal of inequalities in social
advantages means that things like education should be made equal. Expensive
private schools that give an advantage to children in wealthy families for
example, would not be permitted. The background idea being that everyone
should have an equal chance at achieving well-being. To use a common
analogy: everyone should start the race at the same place and be subject to the
same rules.
24 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1999, p.73.
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So procedural equality is essentially equality of opportunity, whereas
substantive equality (demonstrated by the previous five categories) is
essentially equality of outcomes. In the former, the rules of distribution are
supposed to be fair, and in the latter, the result of distribution is supposed to
be fair. Let us now review the various types of egalitarianism I have outlined.
IX. Conclusion
Firstly I discussed the egalitarian view that equality is intrinsically
impersonally beneficial. This variant of egalitarianism values equality as
intrinsically good irrespective of its effects on individuals. The second
category I outlined views equality as intrinsically personally beneficial. As
with the first, this branch of egalitarianism values equality as an intrinsic
good, but differs in that equality is taken to be beneficial to peoples lives.
The third version of egalitarianism I described views equality as
instrumentally impersonally beneficial. This position holds that equality is
valuable in so far as it promotes a particular impersonal good. The fourth kind
of egalitarianism is the same as the third except that the good it wishes to
advance is a personal good, so it values equality as instrumentally personally
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beneficial. The fifth category is different to all the previous ones because it
views equality as a requirement of justice. Equal outcomes are thought to be
valuable because they are a requirement of justice and not simply beneficial to
people or society. The last category I listed also values equality as a
requirement of justice, but in a different space. While the fifth brand of
egalitarianism took equality of outcomes to be just, the sixth took equality of
opportunity to be just.
These branches overlap in most real egalitarian theories, which is not a
problem for the present analysis because what is important are the underlying
principles that these theoretical categories rest upon. There are clear divisions
that cut across these categories. These divisions are: instrumental versus
intrinsic, impersonal goods versus personal goods, goodness versus justness
and outcomes versus opportunities.
I now have a means of sorting the many types of egalitarianism that will allow
me to find out which of these variants is compatible with the ideal of
compensatory justice. I want to find out whether or not compensatory justice
is an attractive way to set wage levels, especially in the eyes of egalitarians as
I think they are most in tune with it.
Comment [TD10]: I think this chapterneeds, at6 least, some set up work to sho
why it matters to your thesis. It might bethat a fuller introduction would do it, or areordering, or perhaps some motivatingexamples. As it reads its a bit hard to s eethe point of the taxonomy.
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CHAPTER 32: PRIMA FACIE COMPATIBILITY AND POTENTIAL
CONFLICT OF THE VARIOUS BRANCHES OF EGALITARIANISM
WITH THE IDEAL OF COMPENSATORY JUSTICE
I. Introduction
This chapter will examine the prima facie compatibility of the previously
outlined branches of egalitarianism with compensatory justice. Compensatory
justice is a type of labour market organisation that Joseph Carens calls a
liberal and egalitarian ideal 25. It involves restructuring the relationship
25 Carens, Compensatory Justice and Social InstitutionsJoseph H. Carens, CompensatoryJustice and Social Institutions, Economics and Philosophy , v.1, 1985 , p.41.
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Comment [TD11]: Some version of this hto come earlier. With a sketch of what youre talking about, you might be able toshow why you need a foray into thetaxonomy of egalitarianism.
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between the performance of labour and the distribution of income, with the
overall aim of equality. It is of interestimportant then to test whether the
presumed egalitarian principles underlying compensatory justice are
compatible with all or any versions of egalitarianism.
To begin with I shall explain the ideal of compensatory justice and mention
some of the issues it evokes. ThenIn this chapter I shall discuss the prima
facie compatibility of each branch of egalitarianism with compensatory
justice, focusing on the relationship between how each branch values equality
and the principles intrinsic to compensatory justice. I will also note any
potential areas of conflict.
Section III addresses the question: What is compensatory justice? In section
III begins my searchforay into into compensatory justices prima facie
compatibility by comparing it to intrinsic impersonal beneficial
egalitarianism. Section I IIV looks at how intrinsic personal beneficial
egalitarianism and compensatory justice seem to compare. In section IV,
compensatory justice is set up against instrumental personal beneficial
egalitarianism, and prima facie compatibility between the two is assessed.
Section V I does the same to instrumental personal beneficial egalitarianism,
while sections VI I and VII I compare compensatory justice to justice
egalitarianism and procedural egalitarianism respectively.
Comment [TD12]: Grammar/Typo Ibegin?
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II. What is compensatory justice?
Compensatory justice is an ideal of distributive justice that focuses on what
people get paid in exchange for performing their jobs. Compensatory justice is
compensation for the work a person performs in her chosen occupation.
Imagine if incomes were adjusted so that each individual was compensated
with money for the work they did: those who worked very hard at horrible
tasks would be paid very well to compensate for their great sacrifice, and
those who did little at their cushy jobs would be compensated with a smaller
amount to reflect how little they sacrifice. This would fulfil the requirements
of the ideal of compensatory justice. Compensatory justice is egalitarian
because it seeks to equalise peoples package of workload -plus-income. It is
also liberal, as it takes into account how worthy workers are of compensation.
Defenders of the ideal of compensatory justice, either in part or in full,
include Joel Feinberg, James C. Dick, William Galston, Arthur DiQuattro,
Oskar Lange, Fred Taylor, H. D. Dickinson and George Bernard Shaw. The
main thrust of the ideal is also reflected in Ronald Dworkins theory of
equality.
Comment [TD13]: As above, I thinktyouneed some reordering. This should be inintroduction or at least very early on.
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Dworkin believes a system of distribution should be ambition sensitive and
not endowment sensitive.26 This means that what people receive should be
relative to their choices and the effort they put into those choices, rather than
influenced by factors that are beyond their control. This captures the
underlying principles of the ideal of compensatory justice. In compensating
for the work people do, the distribution of income is sensitive to the choices
people make and the effort they exert in their occupation. And because
compensation comes for the work a person actually does (lifting pianos,
digging graves, etc.), not what they are (doctor, model, etc.), how talented oruntalented someone is will not affect the amount they are paid.
Compensatory justice is an intuitively fair ideal. 27 Some people work under
dangerous or unhealthy conditions, and many people work in stressful or
boring jobs. It seems fair that these people should be adequately compensated
for the burdensome aspects of their jobs. Compensatory justice also supports
compensation for hard workers due to their greater effort, and gives lower pay
to lazier workers, because they do not have as much need for compensation.
Compensation means an individual gets paid relative to how hard she works
and how much she enjoys or dislikes her job. All other things equal, if a
person loves her job and works at an easy pace at convenient hours for a short
time, she would struggle to convince others that she should receive a higher
26 Dworkin, What is Equality? Part 2, p.311. 27 Carens, Compensatory Justice and Social Institutions, p.41.
Comment [TD14]: Not sure I have thisintuition independently of the we needthe unpleasant job done consideration. Icould spend my days sorting though arubbish dump. It would be hard andunpleasant, but that surely doesnt entitleme to compensation of no one wants medo it. But if its the fact someone wants t job done, then it doesnt look like its theeffort or unpleasantness.One issue here is who is meant tocompensate on the hard and unpleasantview.
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income than someone who hates her job, and works very hard during her long
and awkward working hours.
Compensatory justice combines values from liberalism and egalitarianism. It
is liberal in the sense that individuals are personally responsible for their
income. Unlike straightforward equality of income, compensatory justice
rewards those who work hard and those who perform arduous tasks for a
living, while giving less to those who do not work hard or have undemanding
jobs. It is also egalitarian, however, in the sense that people are to end up
equally well off when both income and labour burden are combined as a
package. As Dick says,
the guiding principle should be that workers at all jobs be so recompensed
that when that nature of their work and the amount of their pay are considered
together, all are treated equally in the workplace. 28
Inequalities in income are only morally permissible under a system of
compensation if they reflect relative occupational disutility. Choices and
effort influence income; morally arbitrary factors do not. Egalitarian and
socialist proponents of compensatory justice view it as morally superior to the
neoclassical labour market where natural and social advantages (as well as
28 James C. Dick, How to Justify a Distribution of Earnings, Philosophy and Public Affairs ,v.4, 1975, p.272.
Comment [TD15]: Is this a subjectivemeasure? Suppose I hate teaching stage 1
classes, while some of my colleagues donmind. The task is the same for all of us buthe subjective disutility varies dramaticallShouls I get higher compensation?
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more general instances of luck) are allowed to influence income. Conversely,
liberals see compensatory justice as morally superior to the socialist model of
equality of income, as people are made responsible for the income they
receive.
One possible weakness of compensatory justice is that it does not reward
economic contribution. As Carens points out, under a compensation scheme,
lavatory attendants would probably get paid more than engineers. 29 This
would be fair according to the ideal of compensatory justice due to the
relative pleasantness of the two occupations. The problem may be however,
that without reliable material rewards for individuals who contribute more,
society may suffer from labour shortages in important areas. Without the
appeal of a high income, a would-be engineer might instead take a job as a
lavatory attendant simply because she would garner a greater income in the
more unpleasant job. Proponents of the neoclassical labour market value its
natural reactivity to labour shortages in highly valued industries. The same
inherent efficiency is not found in compensation schemes. This means that
some of those who support the ideal of compensatory justice make room for
material incentives out of a concern for productive efficiency and economic
output. 30
29 Carens, Compensatory Justice and Social Institutions, p.42. 30 Ibid, pp.42-3.
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However this is to be seen as an outside concern and not part of the ideal of
compensatory justice; within compensatory justice such incentives would not
be permissible. Incentives for highly productive or particularly valuable
occupations would have to come purely out of a desire for enhanced
efficiency. Efficiency should be seen as a competing value that might justify
constraining aspects of compensatory justice, not as part of it. So, since what I
am concerned with at present is the ideal of compensatory justice, I will not
take this version of distributive justice to include efficiency-enhancing
material incentives.
Another potential problem for the ideal of compensatory justice is
measurement: how should the relative unpleasantness of certain jobs be
measured? One option is to assign the government the task of deeming the
amount of compensation necessary for all the various occupations. This would
mean that the measure of how enjoyable a job is would be objective; it would
be decided outside of how particular individuals felt about it. For example, if
someone worked as a receptionist but greatly disliked interacting with people,
her greater burden would not be compensated; she would receive the same
amount of income as all the other people doing the same job as her. Another
option then would be to have a subjective measure of labour burden one
where how people felt personally about their work determined their level of
compensation. Both approaches have problems.
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For example, the objective method of measuring labour burden, as in the case
of the misanthropic receptionist, does not take into account the fact that
people will certainly feel differently about performing the same job. 31 But the
subjective means of measurement, which avoids this problem, does not react
to cases where peoples preferences for work are malformed. 32 If, as a child,
Bertrand was brainwashed to think plastering was the most venerable and
desirable occupation by his plasterer father, we might think it unfair if he does
not get paid as much as Damien who did not receive such messages regarding
his chosen occupation. A way around these problems is suggested by JamesDick. According to Dick, the correct amount of compensation can be
determined by a persons transfer earnings.
Economists distinguish two different types of pay in an individuals income:
(1) transfer earnings and (2) economic rent. Dick defines transfer earnings as
the amount necessary to keep [a person] from transferring to another job 33
and economic rent as the difference between what [a person] actually
receives and the amount that would be enough to prevent him from
transferring. 34 Take the case of Alec, a successful novelist, who is paid an
average of $100 000 a year. Alec loves writing novels, and would continue to
write them even if he was earning much less than $100 000 per year. Alec
would only stop writing novels for a living if his income dropped below $40
000, in which case he would take a job as an English tutor at a language
31 Carens, Compensatory Justice and Social Institutions, pp.42 -3. 32 Ibid, pp.42-3. 33 Dick, How to Justify a Distribution of Earnings, p.268. 34 Ibid, p.268.
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school. So Alecs transfer earnings are only 40% of his total income $40
000. The rest of his salary, $ 60 000, is economic rent. An individuals transfer
earnings equal the amount required to compensate her for her labour burden.
Under a scheme of compensatory justice, Alec would receive $40 000 per
year for writing novels.
Setting aside the feasibility of compensatory justice as a model of distribution,
and any potential problems the ideal may intrinsically have, it should be clear
by this point what the ideal of compensatory justice entails. So now I shall
examine if compensatory justice is prima facie compatible with various kinds
of egalitarianism. Comment [TD16]: So I think it is just cleathis material has to come first. It describean interesting puzzle. I think from here(though I havent see how this goes yet) yneed to describe why the puzzles aroundcompensatory justice lead to the discussiof egalitarianism (I don think thats clearyet).
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II I . Intrinsic impersonal beneficial egalitarianism and compensatory
justice
In the previous chapter I defined the branches of egalitarianism according to
why and how each values equality they are as follows: (1) intrinsic
impersonal beneficial egalitarianism; (2) intrinsic personal beneficial
egalitarianism; (3) instrumental impersonal beneficial egalitarianism; (4)
instrumental personal beneficial egalitarianism; (5) justice-based
egalitarianism; and (6) procedural egalitarianism. These distinctions are
theoretical and not taxonomical; this is because theoretical distinctions make
it easier to analyse the compatibility of different kinds of egalitarianism with
different modifications to labour market. These categories are defined by the
underlying principles of each brand of egalitarianism. It is these principles
that are important in discerning compatibility with compensatory justice
this is why I separate and compare them on this basis.
So does it seem like the first branch of egalitarianism is compatible with
compensatory justice? Its underlying principles will show whether or not it is.
Intrinsic impersonal beneficial egalitarianism takes equality between persons
to be good in itself. This means that equality is intrinsically valuable, or, to
put it another way, equality need not produce any positive effects since
equality itself is believed to be good. How does valuing equality intrinsically
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as goods whose promotion is to the benefit of society. So how does this aspect
of intrinsic impersonal beneficial egalitarianism fit in with compensatory
justice? Are the two still prima facie compatible?
The last constituent principle of intrinsic impersonal beneficial egalitarianism
is not as obviously compatible with compensatory justice, but is not obviously
incompatible either. The beneficial value attached to equality does not suggest
straight out incompatibility, but more a potential source of tension and
conflict. Egalitarians of this sort are likely to be moral pluralists; as explained
by Larry Temkin, who advocates moral pluralism including valuing equality
as an intrinsic, impersonal good:
Equality is not all that matters, but it matters some. Advocatesof the Levelling Down Objection are mesmerised by pure
equalitys terrible implications. But equality is not the onlyideal that would, if exclusively pursued, have implausible oreven terrible implications. The same is true of justice, utility,freedom, and probably every other ideal. Recall Kants viewthat justice be done though the heavens should fall. Do wereally think, with Kant, that it would be wrong to falselyimprison an innocent man for even five minutes, if it werenecessary to save a million innocent lives? Or consider theprinciple of utility, which would require us to torture aninnocent person if only enough people had their lives improvedby the tiniest amounts because of our action. Or finally,consider the implications of unfettered freedom to act as onewants without government interference, as long as one doesntinterfere with the rights or liberties of others. Such a principlemight allow complete neglect of the least fortunate, evenregarding basic necessities such as food, clothing shelter, andhealthcare. Such considerations do not show that justice,
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utility, and freedom should be rejected moral ideals, onlythat we should be pluralists about morality. 35
Setting aside the strengths and weaknesses of moral pluralism, how does
adopting intrinsic impersonal beneficial egalitarianism within a pluralistic
moral view affect its compatibility with compensatory justice?
Because equality is conceived as a good, it takes on the character of
something that is thought of in terms of the more the better. Without other
ideals to balance equality with, that is, outside a pluralistic view of morality,
intrinsic impersonal beneficial egalitarianism would want as much equality as
possible. In a scheme based on the ideal of compensatory justice however,
there would be only limited equality. There would be no equality of income,
but furthermore there would be no equality of job status (doctors may be
respected more than drain layers, for example), no equality of effort exerted
during working hours, no equality of working hours, and no equality of work
experience, to name but a few. Achieving equality in areas such as these is
usually limited by concerns for freedom and efficiency, but if equality is
either a lone ideal or valued highly enough, this may push extensive equality
up the list and make intrinsic impersonal beneficial equality less
companionable with compensatory justice. So while incompatibility is not an
accurate description to give in this case, it seems that without other values to
limit equality, compensatory justice might not meet the standards of intrinsic
35 Temkin, Equality, Priority, and the Levelling Down Objection , p.155.
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impersonal beneficial egalitarianism, in that there may be an inadequate
amount of equality.
IIIV . Intrinsic personal beneficial egalitarianism and compensatory
justice
The second branch of egalitarianism I defined in the preceding chapter is
intrinsic personal beneficial egalitarianism. An intrinsic personal beneficial
egalitarian values equality because she believes equality is good for people.
This view differs from the previous one in that it values equality because it
has good effects on people. This means that intrinsic personal beneficial
egalitarianism has a personal view of the beneficial ability of equality:
equality is good because it is good for people. However this kind of
egalitarianism, like the previous one, also contains the notion that equality is
intrinsically valuable, meaning that it also takes equality to be good in and of
itself only this time equality is supposed to be good in and of itself for
people . So how compatible is this brand of egalitarianism with the ideal of
compensatory justice?
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Intrinsic personal beneficial egalitarianism values equality in itself. In this
respect, as with the first type of egalitarianism intrinsic impersonal
beneficial egalitarianism it appears compatible with compensatory justice.
As long as a system of distribution produces equality, a type of egalitarianism
that values equality in itself is able to approve of it and is hence compatible
with it. A scheme based on the ideal of compensatory justice must, in order
for it to be satisfactory to its blueprint, produce equality. This equality is in
the area of income-received-plus-labour-burden. Compensatory justice is
compensation for the effort a person exerts at work and the unpleasantness of her occupation. This compensation results in equality of the package of
income-received-plus-labour-burden. The presence of such equality is
compatible with valuing equality as an intrinsic good because equality per se
is deemed valuable; that is, it need not generate any particular good effects
distinct from equality itself. But what about the point of difference between
the first and the second brands of egalitarianism the kind of good each takes
equality to be? Is a personal view, as opposed to the impersonal view, of
equalitys beneficial character also compatible with compensatory justice?
The view of equality as a personal good is the idea that equality is good for
people. This notion is prima facie compatible with compensatory justice.
Taking equality to be good for people and believing that people should be
compensated for their labour burden do not appear to be incompatible ideas.
But while the two are not prima facie incompatible, holding the wider belief
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that all goods are personal goods is not so in tune with the ideal of
compensatory justice.
Believing equality to be a personal good does not in any obvious way commit
one to the belief that all goods are personal goods that is, that goods must be
good for someone to be classified as good. However, it is not unlikely that
someone who believes equality is good for people as opposed to believing
equality is good irrespective of whether or not it is good for people, would
also hold a personal view of the good. If someone takes equality to be a
personal good, as opposed to an impersonal good, this suggests that she finds
the concept of equality being impersonally good (good no matter how it
affects people) unconvincing in the space of equality. It is then easy to
imagine such a person finding other ideals such as justice, freedom, efficiency
and so on, just as unconvincing when thought of as impersonally good. The
core idea that anything could be good if it was not good for someone may be
unconvincing itself to such a person.
John Broome presents the principle of personal good as follows:
The principle of personal good . (a) Two alternatives areequally good if they are equally good for each person. And (b)if one alternative is at least as good as another for everyone anddefinitely better for someone, it is better. 36
36 John Broome, Weighing Goods . Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1991, p.165.
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A commitment to this view could potentially come into conflict with the ideal
of compensatory justice. Compensatory justice works on a premise of desert.
Individuals are compensated for what they deserve, hard workers are paid
high incomes, and lazy workers are paid low incomes; people with
burdensome jobs are paid a lot, and people with carefree jobs are paid a little.
The ideal of people getting what they deserve is a kind of justice, and is an
impersonal good. Under a scheme of compensation, it is possible that every
worker will receive a low income even though the pool of money that comes
in could allow them to be paid more. If every worker is lazy enough, or every
job is cushy enough, according to the principle of compensatory justice, pay
rates for everyone will be low. In an alternative scheme, everyone could work
as slowly as each other in similarly cushy jobs, but all the money would be
redistributed, even though the workers do not deserve it . People would receive
more than they deserved in absolute terms, while relative to one another, they
would fare the same as before. This second scheme would be better for
everyone. Compensatory justice in this case makes everyone worse off than
they could be. If one was open to the idea of impersonal goods, the scheme
based on the ideal of compensatory justice could still be preferable to the
second scheme, but if one believed the principle of personal good,
compensatory justice would be very hard to defend indeed. The principle of
personal good states that: if one alternative is at least as good as another for
everyone and definitely better for someone, it is better. 37 The second scheme
37 Ibid, p.165.
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is definitely better, not just for one person, but for everyone. Compensatory
justice has no inherent link to personal good it has no inner commitment to
having good effects on people. So while it is not intrinsically incompatible
with the principle of personal good, compensatory justice may not always
score highly on the personal good scale when compared to other systems of
distribution that are more connected to utility.
So valuing equality intrinsically is not prima facie incompatible with
compensatory justice, nor is taking equality to be a personal good. However, a
further commitment to the principle of personal good may make for a less
happy pairing. So far, as with the first branch of egalitarianism, intrinsic
personal beneficial egalitarianism is prima facie compatible with
compensatory justice. I have discussed the intrinsic value this view gives to
equality and its treatment of equality as a personal good. Finally I will discuss
the beneficial character this branch confers on equality.
As with the first branch of egalitarianism, the fact that intrinsic personal
beneficial egalitarianism sees equality as a good does not suggest prima facie
incompatibility. There is no innate conflict between the ideal of compensating
for work and believing equality to be beneficial. The view that equality is
beneficial may however potentially make compensatory justice less attractive.
This is because, when equality is seen as a good, the more equality there is,
the better the system of distribution becomes. As I mentioned earlier,
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egalitarians that value equality as beneficial are likely to be moral pluralists,
which will limit the reach of equality. However, equality may easily be valued
highly enough so that compensatory justice becomes inadequate and other
systems of distribution become more attractive. So, while the beneficial
character assigned to equality by intrinsic personal beneficial egalitarians is
not prima facie incompatible with the ideal of compensatory justice, it is not
completely in tune with it either.
IV. Instrumental impersonal beneficial egalitarianism and compensatory
justice
I now move on to my third category of egalitarianism: instrumental
impersonal beneficial egalitarianism. This category sees equality as a means
rather than an end, signalling a key shift away from valuing equality in of
itself to valuing equality for its ability to produce some other ideal. A
significant divergence in underlying principles is reflected in the move from
intrinsic egalitarianism to instrumental egalitarianism. As I have mentioned in
other places, Derek Parfit has made the claim that instrumental egalitarians
are not real egalitarians: For true Egalitarians, equality has intrinsic value. 38
38 Parfit, Equality or Priority? p.86.
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Instrumental egalitarians value equality in so far as it promotes some other
aim. They do not see value in equality itself.
So how does this difference affect this brand of egalitarianisms compatibility
with the ideal of compensatory justice? Instrumental egalitarians, while
valuing equality for different reasons than intrinsic egalitarians, still value
equality as a good. This means that as with intrinsic egalitarians, instrumental
egalitarians are concerned with the presence of equality. Equality is still good
it is just good for a different reason. So because compensatory justice aims
for equality (in the area of labour burden and income, taken together as a
package), instrumental egalitarianism is prima facie compatible with the ideal
of compensatory justice.
There is room for conflict, however. The kind of equality present in a scheme
of compensation for labour burden is a specific type of equality that may or
may not engender the ideal that equality is supposed to be instrumental in
bringing about. Take for example the end goal ideal of political equality.
Someone who wants political equality might be an instrumental egalitarian
because she sees equality of resources as instrumental to achieving political
equality. However, schemes built on the ideal of compensatory justice will not
necessarily have equality of any degree in the area of resources. People who
choose to work hard in unpleasant occupations will receive high incomes
under a compensation scheme, making these people more resource-rich than
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those who enjoy their jobs and work at a comfortable pace. Compensatory
justice is compatible with great inequalities of income, and an instrumental
type of egalitarianism with an end-goal of political equality is likely to be
incompatible with large gaps in income across society. So in order for
instrumental egalitarianism to be compatible with compensatory justice, its
specific breed of equality equality of labour burden must satisfactorily
bring about the particular end-goal ideal that equality is supposed to be
instrumental to. In saying this however, at the primary stage of examination,
there is nothing incompatible about instrumental egalitarianism andcompensatory justice.
Instrumental impersonal beneficial egalitarianism is unique in the sense that
the end-goal ideal is an impersonal good. So the ideal in which equality is
supposed to bring about is taken to be good, regardless of how people are
affected. Political equality is such an ideal. So how does this impact
instrumental impersonal beneficial egalitarianism and compensatory justices
compatibility? The fact that this brand of egalitarianism values equality
because it brings about an impersonal good is prima facie compatible with
compensatory justice. Valuing something as an impersonal good is not
counter to the ideal of compensatory justice. Compensatory justice is an
impersonal ideal; as such, there is no salient suggestion of incompatibility or
potential for conflict in this area.
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With all the branches of egalitarianism discussed so far, equality has been
seen by instrumental impersonal beneficial egalitarians as a good. Therefore,
as with the other two branches, the beneficial facet of instrumental impersonal
beneficial egalitarianism is prima facie compatible with compensatory justice.
However, as with these other two branches of egalitarianism, this aspect also
suggests possible tension with compensatory justice due to the potential extent
to which equality may dominate a moral view. If equality is given
significantly more weight than other values, it could find the amount of
equality present in a compensation scheme unsatisfactory.
VI. Instrumental personal beneficial egalitarianism and compensatory
justice
The fourth branch of egalitarianism to examine is instrumental personal
beneficial egalitarianism. This kind of egalitarianism values equality in a very
similar way to the previous kind, in that it values equality as an instrument in
achieving some other good. The two differ only in that one is primarily
concerned with an end-goal ideal that is taken to be an impersonal good, while
the other takes this end-goal ideal to be a personal good. So in terms of prima
facie compatibility instrumental personal beneficial egalitarianism does seem
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compatible with compensatory justice on two counts. Instrumental
egalitarianism is prima facie compatible with compensatory justice (although,
as I have discussed, there is potential for conflict on this count) and beneficial
egalitarianism is prima facie compatible with compensatory justice (although
there is also room for tension in this aspect). The third aspect appears
compatible also.
There are no clear irreconcilable principles between the ideal of compensation
for labour burden and valuing equality because it is instrumental to a personal
good. Compensatory justice aims to equalise the income-plus-labour-burden
package and instrumental personal beneficial egalitarianism aims for equality.
Unlike the last branch however whose end goal ideal was an impersonal
good this branch suggests a possible area where further tension may arise.
This tension is the same as that which I discussed with reference to intrinsic
personal beneficial egalitarianism. If, in addition to valuing the end-goal ideal
as a personal good, an instrumental personal beneficial egalitarian maintained
the principle of personal good, then compensatory justice may not be
defensible in her eyes since it is an impersonal ideal. But the principle of
personal good that all goods are personal goods is not in any way
inextricably bound to the idea that one good is a personal good. So in total,
instrumental personal beneficial egalitarianism is prima facie compatible with
compensatory justice.
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VII. Justice egalitarianism and compensatory justice
The fifth category I defined was justice-based egalitarianism. The first four
categories take equality to be something which makes things good, either for
people, or just good full stop. But this view values equality in the sense that is
required by a theory of justice. Equality is taken as something social
institutions should promote in order to achieve justice in distribution, and not
as a good-producing phenomenon. This kind of egalitarianism does not
attribute a more the better character to equality; instead it sees equality as a
fair distribution given a particular line of argument. So, is this justice-based
kind of egalitarianism compatible with the ideal of compensatory justice?
The abstract exercise of taking equality to be a requirement of justice is
compatible with the ideal of compensatory justice. This is because
compensation for labour burden defends equality on the basis of justice.
Compensatory justice is a theory of justice that views compensation for work
as a requirement of fairness. But a level down from pure abstraction, we find
that a justice-based egalitarian holds a particular theory of justice that has
equality as its aim. In this sense, without knowing the ins and outs of this
particular theory of justice, talk of compatibility is purely speculative (though,
there may well be incompatibilities once this information gap is filled). At the
same time, a theory of justice that recommends equality may well be
compatible with compensatory justice. Compatibility with