RUSSIAN AND U.S. CONFLICT MANAGEMENT: THE ROAD

TOWARDS CHEMICAL DISARMAMENT IN SYRIA.

Martijn van Ballekom

May 2016

Master of Science in International Relations and Diplomacy

First Reader: Dr. Peter van Ham

Second Reader: Dr. Siniša Vuković

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Abstract

This study examines the process of conflict management that led to the chemical disarmament

of the Syrian regime. First, it attempts to define the intractable nature of Syria’s conflict. In

order to provide a concise examination, it uses five characteristics and four phases to define

the Syria’s conflict. Within the definitional limits of intractability, international efforts of

conflict management conducted by the Action Group for Syria are categorized as a phase of

failed peace-making efforts. Subsequently, the chemical attacks in the Ghouta suburb of

Damascus on August 21, 2013, are labelled as a vital tipping point within the conflict

management process of the Syrian civil war. It marks a period in which the Geneva peace

process was overshadowed by Russian and American attempts to find a short-term solution for

Syria. Through its theoretical framework of structural realism and methods of critical

discourse analysis, this study seeks to explain how the decision was made to disarm the Syrian

regime from its chemical weapons, and why it was made at this particular stage of the conflict.

This study will argue that a strategic interdependence defined by the American threat to use

military force and Russia’s successful efforts to manipulate the Syrian government into

accepting the formulated solution, resulted in the process of chemical disarmament.

Ultimately, this solution served the interests of both the United States and Russia, as the former

saw the agreement as an important step towards fulfilling the objectives as stipulated in the

Geneva peace process, whilst the latter regained a stronger geopolitical foothold in the Middle

East.

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Table of Contents

1.1 Introduction 4

1.2 Defining the Syrian Conflict 7

1.2.1 The Five Characteristics of Intractable Conflict 8

1.2.2 The Four Phases of Intractable Conflict 13

1.3 Placing Chemical Disarmament in the Context of the Geneva Peace Process 18

2.1 Theoretical Framework 22

2.1.1 Placing Structural Realism in Realist Thought 22

2.1.2 Strategic Interdependence between the United States and Russia 24

2.1.3 The Exercise of Power of Hegemonic States onto Weaker States 26

2.1.4 The Role of International Institutions 27

2.2 Research Design 28

3.1 United States Conflict Management in Syria 34

3.1.1 Deterrence and the United States’ Red Line 35

3.1.2 United States’ Credibility 37

3.2 The Ghouta Attacks as Tipping Point 39

3.3.1 Russian Formulation and Manipulation 42

3.3.2 Russia’s Renewed Geopolitical Influence in the Middle East 44

3.4 Discussion 45

4 Conclusion 47

List of Abbreviations 51

Bibliography 52

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1.1 Introduction

This study examines the conflict management processes that led to the chemical disarmament

of the Syrian Arab Republic in 2013. The Syrian conflict provides a unique case study within

conflict management, considering the fact that an agreement was established in a relatively

short time frame. Furthermore, the decision to remove and destroy Syria’s chemical weapons

was taken during a period of intense violent conflict. This analysis will scrutinize how this

decision was made, by whom, and why it was it was struck at that particular stage of the

conflict. This examination is conducted in three separate chapters.

First, it aims to define the conflict’s intractable nature. Since 2011, Syria has been engulfed in

a bloody and intractable civil war as insurgent forces attempt to overthrow the regime of

President Bashar al-Assad.1 For definitional purposes, it is important to keep in mind that this

study considers Syria to be a weak state. Following Thomas Ohlson and Mimmi Söderberg,

this means that Syria is characterized by:2

1. Lack of societal cohesion and consensus on what organising principles should

determine the contest for state power and how that power should be executed.

2. Low capacity and/or low political will of state institutions to provide all citizens with

minimum levels of security and well-being.

3. High vulnerability to external economic and political forces.

4. Low degree of popular legitimacy accorded to the holders of state power by portions of

the citizenry.

With these characteristics, societal and political disputes can rapidly evolve into full-fledged

conflict. This study refers to this process as conflict intractability. As Jacob Bercovitch

summarises, intractable conflicts are characterized by ever-present tension and violence and

continue over an extended period of time, often becoming the arena for many futile attempts at

management or resolution.3 In order to provide a concise examination, this analysis uses five

characteristics and four phases to define the intractable nature of Syria’s conflict. The purpose

of this is mainly to answer the question why the partial settlement to disarm the Syrian regime

1 J. Mitton, ‘Selling Schelling Short: Reputations and American Coercive Diplomacy after Syria’, Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 36, No. 3, 2015, p. 410. 2 T. Ohlson and M. Söderberg, ‘From Intra-State War to Democratic Peace in Weak States’, Uppsala Peace

Research Papers, No. 5, 2002, p. 6. 3 J. Bercovitch, ‘Mediation in the Most Resistant Cases’, in C. A. Crocker, A. Chester, F. O. Hampson and P.

Aall (Eds.), Grasping the Nettle: Analyzing Cases of Intractable Conflict, US Institute of Peace Press,

Washington DC, 2005, p. 101.

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from its chemical weapons was taken at this particular stage. Furthermore, defining the Syrian

conflict allows chemical disarmament to be placed within the context of the Geneva peace

process.

The Geneva peace process is marked by the diplomatic approaches to bring the conflict parties

to the negotiation table. The Action Group for Syria included state members of the European

Union, the Arab League, and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), who tried to initiate

processes of political transition and the cessation of violence as stipulated in the Geneva

Communiqué drafted on 30 June 2012. Up until August 2013, this study labels this process as

a failed peace-making effort. This brings the first chapter to its most important section; the

Ghouta attacks on 21 August 2013.

The atrocities that occurred on this particular day mark a tipping point and a transition in the

conflict management process. Mark Fitzpatrick notes that it eventually ‘took 1,400 deaths on

21 August 2013, including those of over 400 children, to shock the United States and its

partners into action.’4 As such, the Action Group’s progress in formulating a solution within

the terms of the Geneva Communiqué was severely overshadowed by intensified state rhetoric

of U.K. Prime Minister David Cameron, French President François Hollande, and U.S.

President Barack Obama in justifying punitive military strikes against Syrian military assets,

with or without Security Council approval.5 This segment of this study primarily answers the

question of who brokered the agreement to disarm Bashar al-Assad from his chemical weapons.

The second chapter mainly shapes the theoretical framework and explains the methodologies

of analysis. Regarding the transition of conflict management conducted by the Action Group

for Syria towards the intensified efforts of unitary state actors, this study adopts a structural

realist framework. It serves to justify the analysis of Russian and American conflict

management. Even though both state efforts are analysed separately, the theoretical framework

stresses the strategic interdependence that existed between both states. Kenneth Waltz argues

that ‘interdependence in some ways promotes peace by multiplying contacts among states and

contributing to mutual understanding.’6 Moreover, the structure of international politics

4 M. Fitzpatrick, ‘Destroying Syria’s Chemical Weapons, Survival’, Global Politics and Strategy, Vol. 55, No.

6, 2013, p. 107. 5 J-P. Zanders and R. Trapp, ‘Ridding Syria of Chemical Weapons: Next Steps’, Arms Control Today, Vol. 43,

No. 9, 2013, p. 2. 6 K. Waltz, ‘Structural Realism after the Cold War’, International Security, Vol. 25, No. 1, 2000, p. 14.

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mediates the outcomes that states produce, as internal and external circumstances change,

causing states to adapt according to the fluctuations within the international system.7

Structural realism also explains how powerful states exercise their influence onto weaker states.

In the case of the United States, their threat to intervene militarily constitutes their pressure on

the Syrian regime to consider the option of chemical disarmament. In the case of Russia, its

impact is defined within the confines of their alliance with Bashar al-Assad. Furthermore,

structural realism explains how international institutions serve as a tool of statecraft. For

example, to execute chemical disarmament, Syria had to become a state party to the Chemical

Weapons Convention (CWC). Their membership was in part due to the promotional political

efforts made by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)—the

international agency established under the Convention to supervise its implementation, conduct

international verification of compliance with its provisions, and act as a forum of consultation

and cooperation among its member states on all issues related to the implementation of the

Convention.8

After establishing structural realism as the theoretical framework, the second chapter continues

to explain the methodology of analysis. It emphasizes that it views chemical disarmament as a

partial settlement, and not as a fully mediated outcome. This operationalization is important in

distinguishing between what had been achieved in the short-term, and what is hoped to be

accomplished in the long-term. Clearly, chemical disarmament does not encompass a full

cessation of violence, nor does it constitute political transition. Nevertheless, limiting the

capabilities of unconventional warfare can arguably signify an important step towards the

desired mediated outcome as formulated in the Geneva peace process. Furthermore, the

methodology section highlights its two hypotheses.

First, the analysis aims to investigate if chemical disarmament was considered a sufficient

result by the U.S. government. A large focus is placed on the credibility of the U.S. red line,

which encapsulates the threat of military action in the case that chemical weapons were used

in the Syrian civil war. This study regards the threat to be perfectly credible. In fact, perfect

U.S. credibility is considered to be one of the main driving forces behind the agreement of

chemical disarmament. The second hypothesis aims to investigate how the disarmament

7 K. Waltz, ‘Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory’, Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 44, No. 1, 1990, p.

36. 8 R. Trapp, ‘Elimination of the Chemical Weapons Stockpile of Syria’, Journal of Conflict & Security Law,

2014, Vol. 19 No. 1, p. 8.

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process gave Russia a stronger foothold in the Middle East. In order to exercise more influence

on Middle Eastern geopolitics, much depended on Moscow’s ability to manipulate Assad into

accepting the formulated solution of chemical disarmament. In other words, chemical

disarmament had to be perceived as the best possible solution for the Syrian regime. Following

the conceptualization of the terms set in conflict management studies, such a process

constitutes the broadening of the Zone of Possible Solutions (ZOPS), and is operationalized

accordingly. Finally, the analysis is conducted through a critical analysis of state discourse

within a set timeline. The period surrounding the Ghouta attacks especially marks different

changes of state rhetoric, which will be examined thoroughly within this study’s third and final

chapter.

Here, the main arguments are brought forward. This chapter particularly aims to explain how

the disarmament process was agreed upon. First, the U.S. threat to use military action was

perceived to be perfectly credible by the Syrian regime, mainly because Moscow seriously

considered the possibility that Washington would enforce its red line. However, this changed

when U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry mentioned that military action could be averted if

Assad would place his chemical stockpile under international control. This was an opportunity

for Russian state representatives to initiate negotiations with the Syrian regime and convince

Assad that U.S. military action would impact his war efforts to such an extent that he would

eventually be unable to consolidate his executive power. If Assad was to remain in power,

Russia would also be able to support his military campaign in targeting resisting rebel forces.

In sum, the U.S. threat of military action combined with the positive incentives offered by

Russia, induced partial ripeness towards the successful negotiations of chemical disarmament.

1.2 Defining the Syrian Conflict

Since 2011, Syria has featured as a priority on the international political agenda, fostering the

reputation of a conflict that is intricately complex to manage and of which the outcome is

largely unclear. Michael Greig notes that ‘not only have third-party efforts to manage the

conflict been unsuccessful, but conditions have continued to deteriorate in Syria with the level

of violence mounting on both sides and civilian suffering deepening.’9 Although Greig wrote

this in April 2013, his observation is, to a great extent, still accurate today.

9 M. Greig, ‘Intractable Syria? Insights from the Scholarly Literature on the Failure of Mediation’, Penn State

Journal of Law & International Affairs, Vol. 2, No. 1, 2013, p. 49.

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Before this thesis enters its analysis of Russian and American attempts to manage the conflict,

it is important to define the exact severity and intractability of the Syrian civil war. Following

Oliver Ramsbotham and his colleagues, this study uses ‘the term “conflict” to refer to the

widest set of circumstances in which conflict parties perceive that they have mutually

incompatible goals.’10 Conflicts are thus not intractable per definition. For example, it can also

exist in times of negative peace in which tension and suspicion among parties run high but

violence is either absent or only sporadic.11 Furthermore, it has to be taken into consideration

that as a result of the idiosyncratic nature of intractable conflicts, it is difficult to generalize

knowledge across levels of analysis, including the identification of specific characteristics.12

With this in mind, at the hand of the five characteristics described by William Zartman and the

four phases noted by Louis Kriesberg, this thesis determines the intractable nature of the Syrian

civil war. Although these analyses are closely interlinked, the following sub-sections will treat

them separately in order to illustrate a clear account of the conflict.

1.2.1 The Five Characteristics of Intractable Conflict

Zartman identifies five internal characteristics: (1) protracted time, (2) identity denigration, (3)

conflict profitability, (4) the absence of ripeness, and (5) solution polarization.13 Before each

characteristic is examined separately it is important to consider some key features. Firstly,

intractable conflicts ‘are not static; they grow, in both degree and nature, extending and

defending themselves, so that efforts to overcome them must penetrate several layers and deal

with their protective dynamics.’14 Secondly, intractable conflict ‘is usually conducted through

destructive means and characterized by repeated acts of militarized activity and violence.’15

Throughout this study it will become evident that the Syrian conflict possesses these two

negative qualities. For example, although the exact numbers of casualties in conflict are

complex to verify, Greig relies on the claim that ‘from June 2012 to August 2012, the number

of Syrian casualties increased sharply, growing from 2204 deaths in June to 5037 killed in

10 O. Ramsbotham, T. Woodhouse, and H. Miall, Contemporary Conflict Resolution, Polity, Cambridge, 2011,

p. 9. 11 M. Lund, Preventing Violent Conflicts: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy, US Institute of Peace Press,

Washington DC, 1996, p. 39. 12 P. Coleman, ‘Characteristics of protracted, intractable conflict: Toward the development of a metaframework-I’, Peace and Conflict: Journal of peace psychology, Vol. 9, No. 1, 2003, p. 8. 13 W. Zartman, ‘Analyzing Intractability’, in C. A. Crocker, A. Chester, F. O. Hampson and P. Aall (Eds.),

Grasping the Nettle: Analyzing Cases of Intractable Conflict, US Institute of Peace Press, Washington DC,

2005, p. 48. 14 Ibid, p. 48. 15 J. Bercovitch, p. 100.

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August.’16 This does not only indicate extreme levels of violence but equally demonstrates a

vast escalation of conflict.

1.2.1.1 Protracted Time

Edward Azar and his colleagues argue that protracted conflicts are hostile interactions which

extend over long periods of time with sporadic outbreaks of open warfare fluctuating in

frequency and intensity.17 Ronald Fischer adds that ‘protracted social conflict are often rooted

in the frustration of basic needs, such as denial of recognition, participation, or distributive

justice.’18 It is impossible to give a fixed-time threshold to protraction, however, its importance

lies not in its numerical duration but in that duration’s effect.19 Furthermore, protraction

exhibits a strong capacity to grow in terms of the involved actors and sub-actors and in terms

of goals, objectives, and types of grievances that sustain the conflict setting.20 For example, as

Greig notes, ‘a large number of groups, each with different goals and backgrounds complicates

the identification of all the actors needed in any potential peace process.’21 In other words,

protraction conditions the internal and external dynamics that are inherent to the intractable

nature of conflict.

The Syrian case exemplifies this social malignant process, in which the actors are enmeshed in

a web of threats and escalating manoeuvers that cannot be easily brought to an end.22 Such

degeneration turns old scars into new wounds reaffirming history with new proofs and

transforming momentary incidents into primordial hostility.23 In the case of Syria, Brian

Jenkins notes that ‘what began as a rebellion against the Assad regime has been transformed

into an existential sectarian war in which none believe they can survive in a Syria dominated

by their foes.’24 As such, parties ‘look for opportunities to escalate the conflict to possible

advantage (transitive escalation) and at the same time become vulnerable to internal and

external dynamics of the conflict to escalate on its own, by accident or incident (intransitive

16 M. Greig, p. 52. 17 E. Azar, P. Jureidini, and R. McLaurin, ‘Protracted Social Conflict; Theory and Practice in the Middle East’,

Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 8, No. 1, 1978, p. 50. 18 R. Fischer, ‘The Potential for Peace Building, Forging a Bridge from Peacekeeping to Peacemaking’, Peace

and Change, Vol. 18, No.3, 1993, p. 247-48. 19 W. Zartman, Analyzing Intractability, p. 48-49. 20 E. Azar et al., p. 50. 21 M. Greig, p. 51. 22 J. Bercovitch, p. 101. 23 W. Zartman, Analyzing Intractability, p. 49. 24 B. Jenkins, ‘The Dynamics of Syria’s Civil War’, Rand Corporation, 2014, p. 3.

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escalation)’.25 The continuance of looking for such opportunities eludes to an absence of

ripeness, which will be discussed in sub-section 1.2.1.4.

1.2.1.2 Identity Denigration

As it was implied in the previous sub-section, protracted conflict is often accompanied by a

widening of societal and cultural identity gaps. Zartman argues that ‘identities in intractable

conflicts not only are polarized but are actually dependent on the denigration of the Other.’26

This is formed through processes of selective perception, including prejudice and stereotyping,

malign perceptions of the ‘Other’, dehumanization and the formation of enemy images, and

the displacement of feelings of fear and hostility through suppression and projection.27 Such

structural victimization entails that people’s most basic human needs for dignity, safety, and

control over their life are jeopardized or denied.28 This catalyses the polarization of salient

identities.

Civil unrest in the Middle East is often characterized by the Sunni-Shia divide which also

features in the Syrian Civil War. Jenkins predicts that ‘atrocities against Sunni civilians ensure

loyalty of the Assad regime’s security forces – Assad’s soldiers and militiamen cannot expect

to survive under any other government and will continue to fight even if Assad falls.’29

Although the Syrian conflict transcends the Sunni-Shia divide exponentially, it is important to

note that the conflict took on existential dimensions: it became a fight for life, for the survival

of the party itself.30 These existential dimensions particularly juxtaposed the identity of the

people versus the government elite representative of the oppressive government institutions.

The zero-sum perception of identity fed the escalation of conflict in Syria. In the words of Ted

Gurr, it is important to note that ‘communal groups organize around their shared identity to

seek gains for members of their group.’31 Opposing parties of the Assad regime in Syria wanted

access to the political system, leading to conventional political action and protest campaigns,

most notably in the months of February and March, 2011.32 When the demands for democratic

25W. Zartman, Analyzing Intractability, p. 49. 26 Ibid. p. 50. 27 O. Ramsbotham et al., p. 47. 28 P. Coleman, Characteristics of Protracted, Intractable Conflict, p. 12. 29 B. Jenkins, p. 3. 30 W. Zartman, Analyzing Intractability, p. 50. 31 T. Gurr, ‘Minorities, Nationalists, and Islamists’, in C. A. Crocker, A. Chester, F. O. Hampson and P. Aall

(Eds.), Leasing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World, US Institute of Peace Press,

Washington DC, 2007, p. 131. 32 Ibid, p. 133.

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reforms and the release of political prisoners were supressed and ignored, the opposition chose

for strategies of violence, marking the beginning of an escalation of protracted communal

warfare.33 At this stage, resolution becomes impossible.

1.2.1.3 Conflict Profitability

As Zartman notes, profitability is a characteristic of conflict that is often forgotten, as attention

focuses much more on the costs and losses, the pain and suffering.34 Nevertheless, David

Malone and Jake Sherman argue that ‘in many conflicts, violence is a means to control trade,

appropriate land, exploit labour, extract benefits from humanitarian aid, and ensure continued

control of economic privileges and assets.’35 In other words, securing strategic financial hubs

and (re)sources plays a significant role in feeding the conflict’s intractability.

In the case of Syria, Russia and Iran openly came to Assad’s aid, providing him with financial

support at a critical juncture, when it appeared that the rebel forces had a chance of taking over

Damascus.36 Furthermore, the dimensions of profitability were severely impacted by the

increased role of the Islamic State (IS). Government forces were deployed to target or protect

revenue opportunities such as oil fields, key arterial road and centres of commerce, whilst IS

has used methods of taxation and trade, establishing a significant level of self-reliance and

financial autonomy.37

As such, while the ability to bear the costs of conflict is basic to its duration, that ability is

highly elastic, particularly under conditions of high commitment.38 This implies that

profitability fuels the protracted nature of conflict, as the disputant parties have the means to

sustain their violent efforts in an attempt to escalate the conflict and induce their opponents’

conflict fatigue. If conflict profitability is high for all belligerent parties, the perception of a

mutually hurting stalemate is unlikely, contributing to further escalation.

33 T. Gurr, p. 133. 34 W. Zartman, Analyzing Intractability, p. 51. 35 D. Malone and J. Sherman, ‘Economic Factors in Civil Wars’, in C. A. Crocker, A. Chester, F. O. Hampson and P. Aall (Eds.), Leasing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World, US Institute of Peace

Press, Washington DC, 2007, p. 639. 36 B. Jenkins, p. 7. 37 T. Keatinge, ‘The Importance of Financing in Enabling and Sustaining the Conflict in Syria (and Beyond)’,

Perspectives on Terrorism, Vol. 8, Issue. 4, 2014, p. 53-54. 38 W. Zartman, Analyzing Intractability, p. 51.

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1.2.1.4 Absence of Ripeness

Ripeness as a pressure toward negotiation is one of the central themes of this thesis and will be

referred to particularly within section 1.3. It also strongly alludes to sub-section 1.2.2.3 on the

stage of failed peace-making efforts as described by Kriesberg. The determination of whether

the conflict of Syria is “ripe” for negotiation towards a peaceful settlement is intrinsically

complicated since the conflict is still ongoing. This thesis argues that, after the Ghoutta attacks

of 21 August 2013, it reached a stage of partial ripeness, leading toward the disarmament of

chemical weapons. However, till this date, the stage of ripeness for negotiations on the

implementation of full political transition and cessation of violence as stipulated by the Geneva

Talks, has not been reached. Accordingly, the absence of ripeness constitutes a key

characteristic of intractable conflict.

Zartman notes that this absence illustrates a perception of a stable, soft, self-serving (4-S)

stalemate which is bearable to the parties both in the absolute and relative, leaving them in

control of some portion of the territory and population.39 In such a scenario, violence between

the parties increases, inducing a further escalation of hostility, the closing of communication

channels, thereby reinforcing the zero-sum identities. An absence of ripeness thus reinforces

other characteristics of intractable conflict. In contrast, ‘the concept of a ripe moment centres

on the parties’ perception of a Mutually Hurting Stalemate (MHS), optimally associated with

an impending, past or recently avoided catastrophe.’40 Furthermore, a hurting stalemate

emerges as costs grow for the belligerents, with neither perceiving the ability to overcome the

other whilst suffering increases for each.41 Peter Coleman identifies two other driving forces

that can induce ripeness: threats and the use of physical force and the offering of positive

incentives.42

At the outset of the uprising in Syria, the government possessed one of the most powerful

armed forces in the Middle East; its total strength numbered over 300,000, including 220,000

in the army and another 70,000 in the air force and air defence command.43 Such numbers are

just an example that indicate the extent to which military exhaustion is difficult to reach and

39 W. Zartman, ‘Analyzing Intractability, p. 52. 40 W. Zartman, ‘The Timing of Peace Initiatives’, Global Review of Ethnopolitics, Vol. 1, No. 1., 2001, p. 8. 41 M. Greig, p. 53. 42 P. Coleman, ‘Fostering Ripeness in Seemingly Intractable Conflict: An Experimental Study’, The

International Journal of Conflict Management, Vol. 11, No. 4, 2000, p. 304. 43 B Jenkins, p. 5.

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feeds the perception that outright military victory is still achievable. In sum, this constitutes the

absence of ripeness and the existence of a 4-S stalemate.

1.2.1.5 Solution Polarization

Intractable conflicts are generally characterized by the competing pulls of two salient solutions,

posing an extreme prisoner’s dilemma or collaboration problem, where non-cooperation,

though mutually hurtful, is the outcome logically preferred to unilateral attempts at

cooperation.44 One of the demands voiced by the parties opposed to the Syrian government at

the outset of civil unrest was democratic reforms. In contrast, the use of excessive force was a

clear sign of the regime’s determination to safeguard their claim to power by extension of their

command of the military and (secret) police (mukhabarat).45 Democratic reforms (or perhaps

more strongly; political transition) and the reinforcement of state control by the political elites

are the polarized solutions that define the basis of the Syrian Civil War. Within intractable

conflict, attempts of finding a middle ground or an agreed-on sense of justice through the

process of negotiation is absent.46

This solution polarization accompanied by the increasing levels of violence constitutes the fact

that the conflict reached the stage of institutionalization. Sub-Section 1.2.2.4 further elaborates

on this particular segment.

To conclude in the words of Zartman, ‘together, these five characteristics-protraction, identity,

profitability, ripeness, and solutions-are generally shared by intractable conflicts and go far to

explain the difficulty of bringing them under control. While the characteristics are independent

of one another, they also tend to reinforce one another, which in itself is an additional

characteristic of intractability, making it hard to pry them apart and deal with them one by

one.’47 The next sub-sections are designed to identify the exact stages of the Syrian conflict,

featuring the abovementioned characteristics.

1.2.2 The Four Phases of Intractable Conflict

Louis Kriesberg identifies six phases of intractable conflict: (1) the eruption of conflict with

high potentiality of generating intractability, (2) escalation marked by destructive qualities, (3)

44 W. Zartman, Analyzing Intractability, p. 53. 45 J. Landis, ‘The Syrian Uprising of 2011: Why the Asad Regime is Likely to Survive to 2013’, Middle East

Policy, Vol. 14, No. 1, 2012, p. 73. 46 W. Zartman, Analyzing Intractability, p. 53. 47 Ibid, p. 54.

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failed peace-making efforts, (4) institutionalization of destructive conflict, (5) de-escalation

leading to transformation, and (6) termination and recovery from the intractable conflict.48 It

is important to note that “true intractability” would mean perpetual conflict, a condition that

exists nowhere.49 As such, within the analysis of Kriesberg, conflicts are more or less

intractable, not wholly intractable.50 This explains the inclusion of the last two stages he

describes, phases Syria has not yet reached and which are therefore not included in the analysis

of this thesis. This sub-section will accordingly identify four stages of the Syrian conflict

separately in order to shape the extent of intractability and justify this thesis’ analysis of conflict

management. Additionally, it helps to consider the Geneva Communiqué drafted on 30 June

2012 merely as a stage of failed peace-making efforts (phase 3). Moreover, it reinforces the

definition of the five characteristics defined by Zartman, completing the eventual definition of

the intractable nature of the Syrian Civil War.

1.2.2.1 The Eruption Phase

Kriesberg describes the eruption phase as an episode that intensifies and prolongs a conflict

whilst oppression and injustices become starkly visible and unacceptable through new and

brutal encounters.51 Peter Coleman and his colleagues note that ‘most protracted conflicts do

not begin as intractable, but they become so as escalation, hostile interactions, sentiment, and

time change the quality of the conflict.’52 Within this particular phase, the salience of identities

tend to augment whilst long-standing grievances may be reshaped by new expectations and

threats.53 Ted Gurr analyses that the salience of ‘ethno cultural identity depends on how much

difference it makes in people’s lives; if a communal group is treated differently, by denial or

privilege, its members will become more self-conscious about their common bonds and

interests.’54

In Syria, the main political representative of the opposition is the Syrian National Council

(SNC) and is composed of three main factions: The Muslim Brotherhood, the National Bloc –

primarily secular, whose members tend to come from elite Syrian families – and members of

48 L. Kriesberg, ‘Nature, Dynamics, and Phases of Intractability’, in C. A. Crocker, A. Chester, F. O. Hampson

and P. Aall (Eds.), Grasping the Nettle: Analyzing Cases of Intractable Conflict, US Institute of Peace Press,

Washington DC, 2005, p. 68. 49 W. Zartman, Analyzing Intractability, p. 47. 50 L. Kriesberg, Nature, Dynamics, and Phases of Intractability, p. 66. 51 Ibid, p. 70. 52 P. Coleman et al., ‘Intractable Conflict as an Attractor: A Dynamical Systems Approach to Conflict

Escalation and Intractability’, American Behavioral Scientist, Vol. 50, No. 11, 2007, p. 1456. 53 L. Kriesberg, Nature, Dynamics, and Phases of Intractability, p. 70. 54 T. Gurr, p. 138.

15

the National Coordinating Committees.55 This coalition is predominantly Sunni in character,

constituting their primary bond. Their common interest of political transition by removing

Assad from power is also aligned with other resistance groups such as the Kurdish Bloc and

the Free Syrian Army (FSA). However, the lack of leadership and internal power struggles

showcase the inherent weakness of the opposition when the conflict erupted in 2011. Therefore,

the eruption phase of the Syrian conflict was predominantly characterized by a lack of unity

and coordination within the opposition, and effective violent state repression of the Syrian

government.

In sum, due to the well-armed and disciplined government forces, the lack of opportunity to

mobilize, and the general unstable forms of organization,56 the opposition was unable to

effectively act upon their common interests and bonds. Nevertheless, the Syrian government’s

strategy of violent subordination invariably increased the collective grievances.57 The

increased hostile interactions thus reinforce the process of identity polarization in which groups

become starkly opposed to each other, leading to further escalation.

1.2.2.2 The Escalation Phase

Louis Kriesberg argues that ‘once a conflict is in the phase of escalation, identities, grievances,

goals, and methods often change in ways that perpetuate the conflict in increasingly destructive

fashion.’58 Whereas the phase of eruption constitutes the rising salience of identities and the

reshaping of threats and expectations, escalation encompasses the existence of zero-sum, “us

against them” perceptions.

Within these dynamics, Kriesberg argues that an important role is played by agents – political

leaders, intellectuals, and religious leaders – by formulating the grievances and identifying the

injustices suffered and those responsible for them.59 Leadership thus becomes an important

element within the escalation phase, particularly for the fragmented opposition. However, it

was exactly this element that was lacking within the opposition groups. Arguably, this is

exemplified by the short-termed leadership of Burhan Ghalioun. The SNC leader was criticized

55 J. Landis, p. 75. 56 C. King, ‘Power, Social Violence and Civil Wars’, in C. A. Crocker, A. Chester, F. O. Hampson and P. Aall

(Eds.), Leasing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World, US Institute of Peace Press, Washington DC, 2007, p. 117. 57 M. Ayoob, ‘State Making, State Breaking and State Failure’, in C. A. Crocker, A. Chester, F. O. Hampson

and P. Aall (Eds.), Leasing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World, US Institute of Peace

Press, Washington DC, 2007, p. 145. 58 L. Kriesberg, Nature, Dynamics, and Phases of Intractable Conflict, p.74. 59 Ibid, p. 72.

16

by the Muslim Brotherhood for trying to strike an agreement with the leftist National

Coordination Body (NCB), after which he quickly backed away from the tentative alliance.60

Both the internal fragmented nature of the SNC and the disunity of opposition parties, served

the existing 4-S stalemate during which the fighting lost its practical connection with the goals

of the resistance groups, as anger, hate, and revenge-seeking resulted in atrocities that further

inflamed the conflict.61

In the Syrian case, zero-sum perceptions between the Syrian government and the opposition

were clearly manifested. However, what reinforced the intractability of the conflict even further

was the increased polarization of identities within the opposition. In other words, the lack of a

common effort to combat the government led to a sub-level dispute between the opposition

groups, sustaining the existing 4-S stalemate.

1.2.2.3 The Phase of Failed Peace-Making Efforts

This sub-section merely refers to the definitional elements of this phase considering that the

contextual components are elaborately discussed in section 1.3. The reason for this approach

is to create a direct linkage between labelling the Geneva peace process as a failed peace-

making effort, and the structural realist framework which theoretically shapes and justifies the

analysis of Russian and American conflict management in the Syrian case. This phase is

marked by an international collective of third parties attempting to bring the conflicting parties

at the negotiation table.

What has to be taken into account is that in unstable regimes, leaders’ major concern is their

own political survival.62 Accepting an invitation to the negotiation table can be interpreted as

a sign of goodwill by observing parties. Kriesberg argues it can also be used as a tactic by a

disputant party to ‘mobilize constituency support or to demonstrate to allies and observers that

the other side is the obstacle to a peaceful resolution of the conflict.’63 This would imply an

anticipation of negotiation failure and high levels of mistrust. Michael Greig and Paul Diehl

argue that especially in times of armed conflict, leaders and domestic audiences become

habituated and psychologically committed, whilst some segments of the population profit

60 J. Landis, p. 76. 61 L. Kriesberg, Nature, Dynamics, and Phases of Intractability, p. 72. 62 K. Beardsley, The Mediation Dilemma, Cornell University Press, New York, 2011, p. 47. 63 L. Kriesberg, Nature, Dynamics, and Phases of Intractability, p. 72.

17

politically and economically from the fighting.64 Disrupting such patterns by peace-making

efforts becomes increasingly complicated when levels of violence augment.

From a third-party perspective, peace-making generally starts with the aim of facilitating

communication and building trust by trying to alter perceptions and influence the resolve of

belligerents by restructuring conflict issues.65 In other words, third parties attempt to frame the

conflict in order to raise awareness of similarities between the disputant parties. However,

Kriesberg notes that, ‘this can be severely strained by the multiplicity of the intermediaries as

it may interfere with effective assistance due to poorly coordinated interactions among the

intermediaries and the impact that has on the adversaries.’66 Such coordination becomes

particularly problematic when a civil conflict takes on international dimensions, thereby

affecting state power dynamics within the peace-making coalition.

To conclude in the words of Kriesberg, ‘the repeated failure of one adversary to impose an

ending, the failure of parties to negotiate an ending after trying to do so, and the failure of

external intervention to stop or transform the intractable, confirm the conflict’s intractability.’67

In other words, failed peace-making efforts marks a lack of readiness from the disputant parties

to explore alternative routes. It implies that the conflict has reached a stage of

institutionalization in which conflict is perceived to be a permanent element of everyday life.

1.2.2.4 The Phase of Institutionalization

The phase of institutionalization encompasses all the characteristics and phases analysed in the

preceding sub-sections and constitutes the stage in which conflict becomes the norm within the

state. It entails the self-perpetuating growth in nature and degree of the conflicts’ intractability.

Furthermore, it reaffirms identity polarization in which ‘members of each side increasingly

view members of the other side as enemies with many bad qualities, as cruel and

untrustworthy.’68 Salient solutions also become increasingly polarized as the political elite

holds onto power by means of force rather than peoples’ loyalty. Such developments could

64 M. Greig and P. Diehl, ‘The Peacekeeping-Peacemaking Dilemma’, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 49, Issue. 4, 2005, p. 625. 65 T. Ohlson, ‘Understanding Causes of War and Peace’, European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 14,

No. 1, 2008, p. 147. 66 L. Kriesberg, ‘Coordinating Intermediary Peace Efforts’, Negotiation Journal, Vol. 12, Issue 4, 1996, p. 343. 67 L. Kriesberg, Nature, Dynamics, and Phases of Intractability, p. 73. 68 Ibid, p. 74.

18

prove unsustainable for the Syrian regime as ‘sectarian entities with loyalties that transcend

Syria’s borders are replacing Syrian national institutions.’69

As such, there are two sides to the coin of conflict institutionalization. On one hand it marks

an absence of ripeness. On the other hand, the increase of destructive means by which the

conflict is fought could contribute to a perception of MHS. In sum, the phase

institutionalization represents a melting pot of the fundamental characteristics of intractable

conflict as described by William Zartman, whereby alternative courses of action become even

more difficult to undertake.70 It signifies that conflict has not matured sufficiently for conflict

management, something the international community underestimated whilst publishing the

ambitious final draft of the Geneva Communiqué on 30 June 2012.

1.3 Placing Chemical Disarmament in the Context of the Geneva Peace Process

In this section it is of essence to follow the chronological order of the Geneva peace process in

order to identify the key elements that make up its failure. It all started with the proposed six-

point plan drafted by Kofi Annan, the United Nations-League of Arab States Joint Special

Envoy for the Syrian Crisis. Although peace talks in Geneva regarding the cessation of

hostilities and a Syrian-led transition of government are still ongoing, this section limits its

scope no further than the Ghouta attacks of 21 August 2013. It does so in function of the

argument that the disarmament process of chemical weapons after Ghouta was an agreement

primarily brokered by the United States and the Russian Federation and not by an international

coalition. Following this section, this thesis will justify its theoretical approach of structural

realism, in which the utility of international institutions and the coalitions they represent is

recognised yet subjected to state behaviour.

The argument postulated in this section dictates that the multi-party mediation efforts of the

Action Group for Syria proved inefficient due to the group’s inability to resolve the severity of

elements inherent to the conflict’s intractable nature as described in the abovementioned

sections. Global state powers only explored “all means necessary” in their mediation efforts

when ‘pure’ mediation efforts such as reasoning, persuasion, control of information and the

69 B. Jenkins, p. 3. 70 L. Kriesberg, Nature, Dynamics, and Phases of Intractability, p. 74.

19

suggestion of alternatives seemed to fail in facilitating a negotiated settlement.71 There was

thus a need for a more assertive approach.

Michael Greig and Paul Diehl argue that ‘what separates mediation and negotiation from one

another is the inclusion of a third party in mediation efforts.’72 In the case of Syria, these efforts

were initially conducted by the Action Group for Syria, initiated by Kofi Annan and later

resumed by Lakhdar Brahimi, who replaced Annan as the Joint Special Envoy to Syria on 17

August 2012.

A notable and important first step was made by Annan when he outlined his six-point proposal

on 14 April 2012 as an annex to UNSC Resolution 2042 and 2043, becoming the foundation

on which the Geneva Communiqué was drafted on 30 April 2012. The essential objectives

stipulated in these documents are encompassed in point three of the Communiqué:

“They [the Action Group Members] are determined to work urgently and intensively to bring about an

end to the violence and human rights abuses and the launch of a Syrian-led political process leading to

a transition that meets the legitimate aspirations of the Syrian people and enables them independently

and democratically to determine their own future.”73

At the time, these were ambitious objectives. When in June 2012 activities by the U.N.

monitoring mission were suspended without renewal of the mandate following its expiration,

a lasting ceasefire had proven elusive.74 Although the mission merely suggests an investigation

on the possibilities of implementing a ceasefire, it exemplifies how initiatives of peace-keeping

during active combat fail to promote an effective peace process. In general terms, it confirms

the (rather pessimistic) conclusion drawn by Michael Greig and Paul Diehl who found

‘virtually no support for the optimistic view that peace-keeping promotes peace-making.’75

Although Annan introduced an important first step, the further escalation of Syria’s conflict

undermined the results of his tenure. On 2 August 2012 at the announcement of his resignation

he stated:

“Yet the bloodshed continues, most of all because of the Syrian government’s intransigence and

continuing refusal to implement the six-point plan, and also because of the escalating military

71 S. Vuković, ‘Soft Power, Bias and Manipulation of International Organizations in International Mediation’, International Negotiation, Vol. 20, No.3, 2015, p. 416. 72 M. Greig and P. Diehl, p. 623. 73 ‘Final Communiqué from the Action Group for Syria’, The United Nations, 30 April 2012,

http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/Syria/FinalCommuniqueActionGroupforSyria.pdf. 74 M. Greig, p. 49. 75 M. Greig and P. Diehl, p. 641.

20

campaign of the opposition – all of which is compounded by the disunity of the international

community.”76

Here Annan implicitly refers to the reality that both parties were still seeking to escalate the

conflict in order to obtain outright military victory, whilst indicating the fragmented nature of

the international community. Within this line of reasoning, we can extract the argument that

the conflict’s intractability caused a reluctance of Action Group members to further invest in

the peace process.

As the belligerent parties did not perceive the moment to be ripe for a ceasefire, neither did the

important members of the mediating coalition. The on 17 August 2012 newly appointed Special

Envoy Lakhdar Brahimi recognised this issue and attempted to approach the conflict from a

more diplomatic angle. Whilst upholding the aims stipulated in the Communiqué, he strived to

initiate negotiations by assembling the Syrian delegations alongside the United States and

Russia representatives in order to discuss how the conflict could be managed.

Although objective indicators such as the number of casualties, financial costs, material

damage, and the number of refugees suggested a hurting stalemate, it was Brahimi’s goal to

help the belligerent parties perceive and understand the unbearable nature of the conflict, and

more importantly, advocate for the benefits that can be obtained through means of

negotiation.77 In theory, Brahimi thus had to conceive the conflict parties’ perception of MHS

and consequently offer negotiation as a way out. According to Zartman, ‘a way out’ describes

a situation where ‘parties do not have to be able to identify a specific solution, only a sense that

a negotiated solution is possible for the searching and that the other party shares that sense and

the willingness to search too.’78 In the words of Kyle Beardsley, ‘they may simply desire a

breather during which negotiations can take place with some chance of success but with no

delusions about the prospects for full resolution.’79 Therefore, accepting negotiations as a way

out can be used as stalling-tactic through which the belligerents can save face.

Additionally, Brahimi would have to provide prospects for a more attractive future to pull them

out of their conflict, once a MHS has pushed them into negotiations.80 Such prospects are

76 ‘Kofi Annan resigns as UN-Arab League Joint Special Envoy for Syrian crisis’, UN News Centre, 2 August 2012, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=42609#.Vyn0m_l97IU. 77 S. Vuković, International Multiparty Mediation and Conflict Management: Challenges of Cooperation and

Coordination, Routledge, Oxford, 2015, p. 16. 78 W. Zartman, The Timing of Peace Initiatives, p. 9. 79 K. Beardsley, The Mediation Dilemma, p. 46. 80 W. Zartman, The Timing of Peace Initiatives, p. 14.

21

labelled as Mutually Enticing Opportunities (MEOs). In sum, a taxonomy of Brahimi’s tasks

can be created: (1) bring parties to the negotiating table, (2) create perception of MHS, (3) offer

negotiation as a way out of MHS and (4) provide MEOs.

However, Brahimi’s efforts were violently disrupted early in the morning of August 21 2013,

just a few days after the arrival of the U.N. Mission to Damascus, suggesting the use of

chemical weapons causing a large number of casualties in the opposition-controlled area of

Ghouta in the Damascus suburbs.81 This event marked a tipping point in which the United

States and the Russian Federation – on invitation of Brahimi – started to assume a more

prominent role within resolving the conflict.

Furthermore, the Ghouta attacks also indicated that the Syrian regime welcomed the process

towards the Geneva Talks II to create a perception of willingness towards negotiating peace.

Eventually would take place in the first few months of 2014. To a certain degree it could be

argued that the regime failed to perceive ripeness for negotiations and revived hopes of being

able to find a unilateral solution through escalation.82 Moreover, since conflict management

measures tend to carry with them the promise of conflict resolution at a later moment, the

conflict flares up again when that next step is not taken, heightening feelings of betrayal and

faithlessness, hardening the parties against sensitivity to ripeness and again contributing to the

conflict's intractability.’83 The Ghouta incidents indicated that, in the direct aftermath of the

events, the Syrian case required a more assertive approach.

This thesis argues that at this point, initiatives from the Action Group became overshadowed

by direct negotiations between U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Russian Foreign

Minister Sergey Lavrov and the belligerent parties, to find solutions for Syria. As power

mediators, both the United States and Russia sere able to use economic, military, and political

resources to pull or push the parties in their preferred direction, take measures in order to secure

their own interests in the country of the conflict, and exercise leverage over the parties in order

to make them comply.84 Syria was in desperate need of, at least, a partial settlement which

would limit, to a certain extent, the human suffering bared by the conflict. This thesis alludes

to the crux of its analysis; the methods of conflict management employed by the United States

and Russia resulting in the chemical weapon disarmament process. It will use the theoretical

81 R. Pita and J. Domingo, ‘The Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Conflict’, Toxics, Vol. 2, 2014, p. 393. 82 W. Zartman, Timing of Peace Initiatives, p. 14. 83 W. Zartman, Analyzing Intractability, p. 53. 84 I. Svensson, ‘Mediation with Muscles or Minds? Exploring Power Mediators and Pure Mediators in Civil

Wars’, International Negotiation, Vol. 12, 2007, p. 230.

22

framework of structural realism to justify its conclusions and its hypotheses will be tested

through critical discourse analysis.

2.1 Theoretical Framework

The purpose of adopting a structural realist framework is threefold. First, defining the relational

dynamics between Russia and the United States is important so to understand how strategic

interdependence was necessary in order to achieve full chemical disarmament of the Syrian

regime. Secondly, this theoretical framework examines how powerful hegemonic states as third

parties use threats to get other states to cooperate.85 This is particularly relevant to the role of

the United States and its deterrence policy. Thirdly, it is important to place the role of

international institutions within the theoretical approach of structural realism. Through the

examination of these three factors, a link between the structural realist framework and Russian

and American conflict management activities is established. However, before structural realism

is acknowledged as the most comprehensive approach, it should be differentiated from other

variants of realist thought.

2.1.1 Placing Structural Realism in Realist Thought

In order to justify the use of structural realism as a theoretical framework for this thesis, the

debate between different approaches of international relations, and more specifically, the

debate between different realist doctrines, should be understood. This can prove to be tricky,

as core assumptions are often shared and distinctions are subtle. For example, one of the most

shared notions across international relations theory is that the international arena is

characterized by the absence of an overarching authority and of reliable enforcement

mechanisms.86 Differentiating theories can thus prove to be complicated, certainly when strains

of theory are derived from each other. Therefore, the following sub-section will examine how

structural realism distinguishes itself from (neo)classical realism.

First, it has to be noted that structural realism is derived from classical realism. Although

disagreements galvanize contemporary debate within the realist approach itself, all classical

realists ultimately appear to agree that human activity occurs within transhistorically proscribed

85 K. Favretto, ‘Should Peacemakers Take Sides? Major Power Mediation, Coercion, and Bias’, American

Political Science Review, Vol. 103, No. 2, 2009, p. 249. 86 S. Vuković, Soft Power, Bias, and Manipulation of International Organizations in International Mediation, p.

419.

23

limits and that human beings do not control or determine the range of these limits.87 As such,

realism is founded on a Hobbesian pessimism regarding moral progress and human

possibilities.88 Departing from this Hobbesian stance, prominent realists such as Hans

Morgenthau draw the conclusion that war and conflict are deeply-rooted into human nature.

Second, as Robert Jervis notes, ‘realism is well known for arguing that power must be mustered

in order to reach the state’s possible goals; Morgenthau’s “interest defined in terms of power”

is its most familiar formulation.’89 In other words, classical realists seek to explain the foreign

policy strategies of individual states. On the other hand structural realism seeks to explain

international outcomes, such as the likelihood of major war, the prospects for international

cooperation, and aggregate alliance patterns among states.90 In this light, Kenneth Waltz argues

that structural realists view power simply as the combined capability of a state and as a possibly

useful means, whilst the ultimate concern of states is not for power but for security.91 In other

words, Waltz notes that states only seek to increase their security, with means which may

decrease the security of other states.92 However, states are often willing to settle for a status

quo which is driven primarily by fear rather than by the desire to make gains.93

This study shares Waltz’s argument in relation to the state behaviour of the United States and

Russia within the Syrian civil war. Their involvement was not to maximize their power per se,

but rather to guarantee their security and positions within the international system; specifically,

in the Middle East. Although an analysis of the role of terrorist organizations in Syria is

avoided, terrorism does justify the role of Russia and the United States in Syria. As René Pita

and Juan Domingo note, for both Russia and the United States, ‘the Syrian conflict has been

and still is of special concern, not only because the Syrian government had a chemical

capability, but also because there are many actors in the conflict apart from the FSA, including

terrorist organizations, such as Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham.’94

87 J. Sterling-Folker, ‘Realism and the Constructivist Challenge: Rejecting, Reconstructing, or Rereading’,

International Studies Review, Vol. 4, No. 1, 2002, p. 76. 88 R. Gilpin, ‘The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism’, International Organization, Vol. 38, No. 2,

1984, p. 290. 89 R. Jervis, ‘Realism in the Study of World Politics’, International Organization, Vol. 52, Issue 4, 1998, p. 986. 90 J. Taliaferro, ‘Security Seeking under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited’, International Security, Vol. 25, No. 3, 2001, p. 132. 91 K. Waltz, Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory, p. 36. 92 J. Taliaferro, p. 129. 93 R. Jervis, ‘Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate’, International Security, Vol.

24, No. 1, 1999, p. 49. 94 R. Pita and J. Domingo, p. 392.

24

In order to combat the dangers of terrorism and the threat of chemical warfare destabilizing the

Middle East, Russia and the United States thus had to establish a form of cooperation. The

temporary solution of disarmament essentially notes a struggle for both states to maximize their

security and solidify their status as an international power in the Middle East. However,

fostering cooperation was not evident seen the increased sentiment of mistrust and suspicion

surrounding the developments of the crisis of Ukraine.

2.1.2 The Strategic Interdependence between the United States and Russia in the

Middle East

Although the analysis of conflict management activities of both the United States and the

Russian Federation will be scrutinized separately, it is important to note that some degree of

cooperation was needed to coerce Bashar al-Assad into placing his chemical weapon arsenal

under the control of the international community. Robert Jervis argues that ‘the difficulty status

quo powers have in recognizing one another, in part because of deeply rooted political and

perceptual biases, is compounded by the high price to be paid for mistaking an expansionist

state for a partner that seeks mainly security.’95 However, from a defensive structural realist

perspective it can be noted that anarchy in the international system and the need for state

survival often force states to forgo mutually beneficial cooperation.96 As such, this section thus

rejects that aggression and expansionism are omnipresent, stressing the prevalence of extreme

conflict of interest.97 Instead, it argues that the collaboration between the United States and

Russia in the Syrian case seems to describe a situation entailing strategic interdependence, in

which one state’s optimal strategy depends on the other actors’ strategies.98

In 2009, the Obama Administration initiated a “reset” in U.S.-Russian relations. These were

overburdened by a legacy of disagreements and mutual mistrust from both the Cold War and

post-Cold War periods; yet, despite that, the Obama administration in its first term did manage

to improve both the atmospherics and the substance of the relationship.99 An example of this

improvement is the Geneva Communiqué and the general collaboration on disarming Bashar

al-Assad from his chemical weapons. Although relations were still frosty, both the United

States and Russia relied on their strategic interdependence to come to an agreement in Syria.

95 R. Jervis, Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate, p. 49. 96 J. Taliaferro, p. 138. 97 R. Jervis, Realism in the Study of World Politics, p. 986. 98 R. Powell, ‘Review: Anarchy in International Relations Theory: the neorealist-neoliberal debate’,

International Organization, Vol. 48, No. 2, 1994, p. 315. 99 A. Stent, The Limits of Partnership: US-Russian relations in the twenty-first century, Princeton University

Press, Princeton, 2015, p. 212.

25

On the one hand, it allowed Russia to reassert its position of power in the Middle East, on the

other, the United States was able to achieve a satisfactory result by limiting the military

capabilities of the Syrian regime.

Although the strategic interdependence surrounding the chemical disarmament in Syria proved

beneficial, U.S.-Russian relations severely deteriorated elsewhere. The Maidan civil protest in

Kiev, Ukraine, started out peacefully but turned into violent clashes, unchaining a sequence of

events including the ouster of President Viktor Yanukovych, the annexation of Crimea by

Russia, Russia-backed separatist mobilisation and war in the Donbas region, constituting the

most serious political standoff between Russia and the West since the end of the Cold War.100

At this stage, it is important to understand the neorealist notion that anarchy is not a general

condition of the international sphere, but rather a structure that mediates the outcomes that

states produce.101 Subsequently, neorealists like Waltz argue that interdependence, such as the

one that existed between Russia and the United States, is a relatively weak force that shapes

international politics.102

Therefore, the interdependence that existed between the United States and Russia in Syria

cannot be regarded as a prerequisite for the general improvement of their relations in other

regions. Instead, the deterioration of US-Russian relations also influenced the relational

dynamics between these hegemons in the Middle East. Ondrej Ditrych goes as far as to argue

‘that it became plain that no rapprochement was in place when the brutal civil conflict in Syria

was effectively turned into a ‘proxy war’ between Washington and its allies on one hand, and

Moscow, pursuing its geopolitical interest in the Levant, but also deliberately increasing the

costs of US hegemony globally, on the other.’103 The strategic interdependence that stood at

the basis of achieving the disarmament of Bashar al-Assad was quickly mitigated by the

escalation of conflict in Ukraine. Nevertheless, further examination of the causal relationship

between the crisis of Ukraine and the Syrian conflict after the disarmament deal was struck

escapes the scope of this analysis. Instead, the ultimate focus of this study remains with the

examination of how this disarmament deal was brokered. Therefore, the next section

scrutinizes how hegemonic power is exercised onto weaker states.

100 O. Onuch and G. Sasse, ‘The Maidan in Movement: Diversity and the Cycles of Protest’, Europe-Asia

Studies, 2016, p. 1. 101 K. Waltz, Realist though and Neorealist theory, p. 36. 102 K. Waltz, Structural Realism after the Cold War, p. 16. 103 O. Ditrych, ‘Bracing for Cold Peace. US-Russia Relations after Ukraine’, The International Spectator, Vol.

49, No. 4, 2014, p. 81.

26

2.1.3 The Exercise of Power of Hegemonic States onto Weaker States

Waltz notes that ‘relatively weak and divided states may find it impossible to concert their

efforts to counter a hegemonic state despite ample provocation.’104 In the case of the Syrian

regime, countering the influence of American power on the dynamics of its civil conflict,

especially after the Ghouta attacks, was indeed close to impossible. In fact, the Syrian civil war

instigated a renewed discussion about the extent of the United States’ hegemonic influence in

the Middle East. By using chemical warfare, Bashar al-Assad had crossed a red line,

constituting a ‘breach of international law so severe that it cannot be tolerated and warrants a

repressive response, including the legitimate threat of, or resource to, the use of force.’105

Enforcing this red line particularly crossed the minds of some of President Barack Obama’s

more conservative senior foreign policy staff. On the premise that chemical warfare severely

violates international law and the norms upheld by the constituency of the United States,

American military intervention can thus be defined as an international outcome as a result of

interactions at the unit [state] level.106 More detailed attention to this particular notion will be

paid in the eventual analysis of American conflict management.

The reasons behind the abandonment of using punitive military airstrikes in Syria in the direct

aftermath of the Ghouta incident is in part due to the alliance between Russia and the Syrian

regime. Alliances are a means to security against adversaries in which the decision to defend

another state that is threatened by an imminent attack may be motivated partly to prevent the

attacker from gaining power resources and partly to keep the victim’s resources available to

defend oneself.107 Within the context of the alliance between Russia and Syria, this statement

becomes a bit ambiguous but still remains valid. Although Assad’s chemical weapons were

taken away, his compliance with the disarmament process did safeguard his domestic political

power and ability to continue waging the conflict (somewhat) conventionally. Again, this

particular subject will be analysed more thoroughly in the section on Russian conflict

management.

104 K. Waltz, Structural Realism after the Cold War, p. 37. 105 C. Stahn, ‘Syria and the Semantics of Intervention, Aggression and Punishment’, Journal of International

Criminal Justice, Vol. 11, 2013, p. 957. 106 K. Waltz, ‘The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory’, The Journal of Interdisciplinary History, Vol. 18, No.

4, 1988, p. 618. 107 G. Snyder, ‘Alliance Theory: A Neorealist First Cut’, Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 44, No. 1, 1990,

p. 106.

27

2.1.4 The Role of International Institutions

The role of international organisations such as the U.N. and the OPCW also has to be placed

within this structural realist framework, keeping in mind that ‘so long as the major states are

the major actors, the structure of international politics is defined in terms of them.’108

Nevertheless, as Jervis notes ‘realists claim not that institutions lack utility, but that they are

not autonomous in the sense of being more than a tool of statecraft.’109 This particularly defines

the role of the U.N. and the OPCW in Syria.

As noted before, the utility of these two international organisations is explained by their role

of executing the agreement struck by the United States and the Russian Federation to disarm

the Syrian regime. This agrees with John Mearsheimer’s view that ‘institutions have minimal

influence on state behaviour’ but starkly opposes his argument that institutions ‘hold little

promise for promoting stability in the post-Cold War world.’110 This is where the analysis risks

to promote neoliberal tendencies. Alluding to the earlier discussed strategic interdependence,

Lakhdar Brahimi did facilitate (minimal) forms of cooperation between the United States and

Russia. Consequently, ‘neoliberalism does not see more cooperation than does realism; rather,

neoliberalism believes that there is much more unrealized or potential cooperation than does

realism.’111 Hence, a fine line divides neoliberalism and structural realism in their assessment

of the roles of international institutions, which is often misunderstood. In summary, albeit its

more pessimistic stance, structural realism still values the utility of international institutions in

the way that they can facilitate cooperation, on the condition that it serves the interests of both

states.

As such, Syria thus provides a unique case in which, not only cooperation between two

hegemonic powers was (albeit temporarily) fostered, but also supported through the execution

of the disarmament process. As Jean Pascal Zanders and Ralf Trapp point out, ‘never before

had the international community attempted to secure and destroy a chemical weapons stockpile

in a war, let alone a civil war in which multiple factions are fighting each other for territorial

and ideological control.’112

108 K. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, Addison-Wesley, Reading, 1979, p. 93-94. 109 R. Jervis, Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate, p. 43. 110 J. Mearsheimer, ‘The False Promise of International Institutions’, International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3,

1995, p.24. 111 R. Jervis, Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate, p. 47. 112 J-P. Zanders and R. Trapp, p. 8.

28

The previous few sub-sections have demonstrated how structural realism can be applied to the

case of Syria. Structural realism supports explanations on how the disarmament process was

agreed upon, but proves insufficient in clarifying what the underlying state motives may have

been to agree on executing such a process. In order to do so, the main analysis of this thesis

will apply concepts of conflict management and critical discourse analysis to examine the

underlying reasons and interests of Russia and the United States in brokering the disarmament

process.

2.2 Research Design

Defining a set timeline for the examination of US-Russian negotiations leading up to the

process for the elimination of Syria’s chemical weapon arsenal can prove to be tricky, as it is

unsure when negotiations started. This thesis adopts the events of Ghouta on 21 August 2013

as a starting point. As noted before, the chemical attacks in Ghouta mark a period when

initiatives of the Action Group for Syria became overshadowed by the bilateral negotiations

between the United States and the Russian Federation. Additionally, it is important to note the

date of 27 September 2013 on which the UNSC adopts resolution 2118, endorsing Executive

Council decision EX-M-33/DEC.1, which stipulates that Syria will complete as soon as

possible, and in any case, not later than 1 November 2013, the destruction of chemical weapons

production and mixing/filling equipment and will complete the elimination of all chemical

weapons material and equipment in the first half of 2014.113 Between these two dates, state

representatives of both the United States and Russia reflected elaborately on the disarmament

process.

The end point of the timeline is marked by the completion of the UN-OPCW Joint Mission

activities on 30 September 2014, just after the final movement of chemicals out of Syria was

completed. For the purpose of this analysis, it seems futile to look beyond this particular

development as it primarily evolves around the negotiations leading up to the process.

Furthermore, the finalization of the UN-OPCW Joint Mission more or less marks the end of an

episode within the strategic interdependence between the the United States and Russia. Further

elimination of Syria’s chemical stockpile was completed by private entities, a process which is

unimportant for this study. Additionally, it is important to note that the conflict is still ongoing

113 For a complete overview of the disarmament process see: R. Trapp, ‘Lessons Learned from the OPCW

Mission in Syria’, Submitted to the Director-General of the Technical Secretariat of the OPCW, OPCW, 16

December 2015, Annex II,

https://www.opcw.org/fileadmin/OPCW/PDF/Lessons_learned_from_the_OPCW_Mission_in_Syria.pdf

29

and has experienced new developments that fall beyond the scope of this analysis. As such, the

justification for limiting the time period of this analysis is derived from the fact that the roles

of the United States and Russia underwent structural changes that might risk to undermine the

observations noted. Nevertheless, although these time parameters set a defined timeline for the

examination that follows, it is sometimes unavoidable for the analysis to detract discourse

outside it limits.

As suggested earlier in this thesis, the disarmament process will be operationalized as a partial

settlement and not as a fully mediated outcome. In doing so, it follows the methodology

composed by Zeev Maoz and Lesley Terris114:

MEDOUTCOME: {

0 𝑖𝑓 𝑁𝑜 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛, 𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑦, 𝑚𝑒𝑑. 𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒1 𝑖𝑓 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 2 𝑖𝑓 𝐹𝑢𝑙𝑙 𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡

A full settlement (2) in the case of Syria would suggest the accomplishment of the principal

objectives set out in the Geneva Communiqué; the launch of a Syrian-led political process

leading to transition and the end of violence and human rights abuses. Mediation failure (0)

would constitute no agreement whatsoever.

Within the timeframe of this case, the subsequent chapter will conduct critical discourse

analysis on discourse that is representative of both the United States and Russia. In order to

justify structural realism as the theoretical framework, the analysis will only be applied to

documents that entail discourse exclusively representative of the state, in the search for

indicators that help identify their behaviour. This primarily includes discourse transcribed in

official government and institutional documentation. As such, it avoids an analysis of discourse

voiced by media outlets, as they do not directly reflect the positions of the states in question.

Consequently, sources will be detracted from the online databases that represent or influence

executive branches of government. In the case of the United States, the databases of the

Department of State and the White House will be used. In the case of the Russian Federation,

this analysis will rely on sources retracted from the online site of the Kremlin and the Russian

Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

114 Z. Maoz and L. Terris, ‘Credibility and Strategy in International Mediation’, International Interactions, Vol.

32, No. 4, p. 428.

30

Critical discourse analysis is not just concerned with the semiotic element, but also works in

an interdisciplinary way to identify and understand the relations between semiotic and material

elements.115 It can only make a significant and specific contribution to critical social or political

analyses if it is able to provide an account of the role of language, and its public use, within

their geopolitical and/or historical contexts.116 This research method can be particularly useful

when analysing state interests, positions, and strategies. It allows the drawing of assumptions

from the language used and the behaviour shown by those involved within the mediation

process surrounding the agreement to disarm Syria from its chemical weapons.

However, there are some weaknesses in applying this methodology on the hypotheses the next

chapter will examine. First of all, the primary weakness of using critical discourse analysis in

the examination of Russian conflict management, is the language barrier. The scope of the

analysis is limited to English sources, thereby disregarding those written in Russian. Therefore,

it has to be taken into consideration that the possibility of misinterpretation exists. Secondly,

through discourse analysis, the next chapter looks for specific discourse that identifies

particular state interests, positions, and strategies. These risk to become subject to the bias of

perception. In other words, the author might look for particular vocabulary and choose to ignore

others. Thirdly, adding onto point two, this thesis cannot offer any concrete conclusions but

merely make assumptions in support of the theoretical examination of the context. Finally,

concrete information about the fundamental interests of all actors is, at times, unobtainable,

mainly because the conflict is still ongoing.

With this in mind, this analysis will scrutinize the following hypothesis in relation to the

conflict management methodology of the United States:

H1: Cancelling punitive strikes after the Ghouta attacks signals that the Obama administration

considered chemical disarmament as a “sufficient” settlement for Syria.

Within this hypothesis, the analysis aims to investigate if chemical disarmament was

considered a sufficient result by the US government. Of course, perceptions within the Obama

administration differed considerably, however, this study cannot control for these diverting

opinions. Therefore, this study only accounts for the rhetoric of the executive. Considering the

operationalization chemical disarmament as a partial settlement, this analysis rationalizes that,

115 I. Fairclough, and N. Fairclough, Political Discourse Analysis: A Method for Advanced Students, Routledge,

New York, 2012, p. 82. 116 T. van Dijk, ‘Critical Discourse Analysis’, Discourse and Society, Vol. 4, No. 2, 1993, p. 279.

31

within the timeframe described above, chemical disarmament was considered as a satisfactory

mediated outcome. This would imply that in the short-term aftermath of the Ghouta attacks,

the United States did not push to reach a full settlement of political transition and cessation of

violence.

The principal explanation for the outcome within this hypothesis is the cancellation of

launching punitive military airstrikes. As noted by Erik Sterner, ‘disarming Assad from his

chemical weapons was not considered an unwelcome outcome, however, it was not the result

of an effective deterrent strategy.’117 Sterner indirectly refers to the credibility of the threat

carried out by the Obama administration. Within this analysis, the credibility of the threat of

the United States is operationalized as follows:

USCRED: {0 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑛𝑜𝑛 − 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦1 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦

Since the partial settlement was reached, United States’ credibility is valued at 1. This, in part,

implies that American diligence and persistence in planning to launch airstrikes was the driving

factor behind the disarmament agreement. In support of this argument, John Mitton notes that

the bargaining position of the United States was strengthened via its threat to launch military

airstrikes. In a co-authored article with Frank Harvey, he argues that ‘despite these strong

criticisms, dire warnings and impassioned policy recommendations, the Obama administration

discarded critics’ advice and continued to bolster its coercive threat, openly moved forward

with operational plans to mount punitive airstrikes against the Assad regime, approached the

US Congress for authorization, and buttressed the threat by extending the deployments of

warships and aircraft carriers in the eastern Mediterranean.’118 As a result, ‘on the strength of

this threat, the United States was able to secure a disarmament deal in which the Assad regime

agreed to accede to the CWC and dismantle and destroy its chemical weapons stockpiles.’119

However, the numerical value of United States’ credibility in the Syrian case is also largely

dependent on the qualities of Russia as a mediating partner within their relation of strategic

interdependence. As an ally to the Syrian regime, Russia needed to render, or even perceive

117 E. Sterner, ‘Dictators and Deterence: Syria’s Assad, Chemical Weapons, and the Threat of U.S. Military

Action, Comparative Strategy, Vol. 33, No. 5, 2014, p. 416. 118 F. Harvey and J. Mitton, ‘Fighting for Credibility: US Reputation Building in Asymmetric Conflicts from the

Gulf War to Syria (1991-2013)’, Canadian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 48, No. 3, 2015, p. 506. 119 J. Mitton, Selling Schelling Short: Reputations and American Coercive Diplomacy after Syria, p. 411.

32

the American threat credible to establish the regime’s compliance in accepting the disarmament

process.

This brings us to the second hypothesis examined in this analysis:

H2: The disarmament process has given Russia a stronger foothold in the Middle East.

This hypothesis aims to investigate how the disarmament process gave Russia a stronger

foothold in the Middle East. Within the timeframe of the disarmament process, this is not

exponentially measurable by material indicators. However, Russia’s growing influence is

observable through discourse. Even though it is complicated to use critical discourse analysis

in this instance, there are some indicators that suggest Russia was assuming a more dominant

role in the Middle East. For example, after the process of chemical disarmament, the Iranian

Nuclear deal features predominantly within Moscow’s state discourse as a solution that was

brought to the negotiation table by Russian President Vladimir Putin.

However, before it could increasingly manifest its influence over Middle Eastern politics,

Russia had to contribute significantly into disarming Assad from his chemical weapons. In the

direct aftermath of the Ghouta incident, Russian discourse was changed as its alliance with

Syria was endangered by the imminent threat of US military action. Taking this into account,

the Kremlin was quickly on the defensive in order to protect its biggest ally in the Middle East.

At first, it is observable that Russia defends Assad by claiming that accusations on the use of

chemical weapons are based on inconclusive evidence. Secondly, there is also a continuance

in referrals to the successes achieved by the ‘international community’ and that any unilateral

forceful action bypassing the United Nations would disrupt these successes. This indirectly

reminds the public of past military endeavours of punitive warfare conducted by the United

States, which were not well received. Such defensive rhetoric clearly signalled to which extent

Moscow thought the American threat to be credible. However, when the United States

indicated that chemical disarmament as a partial settlement was negotiable, the Russians were

more than willing to collaborate and coerce their ally into compliance.

Russian coercion of the Syrian regime was mainly shaped through their strategies of

formulation and manipulation. Formulating chemical disarmament as the best possible solution

was predominantly based on creating the perception of an impending hurting stalemate as a

result of punitive military airstrikes. In a broad sense, ‘manipulation was used with the aim of

33

enlarging the spectrum of possible solutions.’120 To induce partial ripeness, Russia had to offer

positive incentives in order to convince Assad that surrendering his chemical weapons to the

international community would serve his efforts in escalating the civil war into victory.

Moscow’s promised efforts to support the legitimacy of Assad’s rule served to manipulate the

regime in surrendering its chemical weapons. Additionally, it could be assumed that Putin

promised Assad to support his military campaign against the rebellion forces. As such, through

formulation and manipulation, Assad’s zone of possible solution was thus expanded. This Zone

of Possible Solutions (ZOPS) is operationalized as follows:121

In the diagram above, chemical disarmament is defined by ZOPS2. It constitutes a broadening

of ZOPS1 which, in the case of Syria, signifies a continuance of violent conflict and chemical

warfare. The zones on the extreme ends of the diagram constitute the solutions as stipulated by

the Geneva Communiqué. In the case of Russia these zones are not desirable, nor is ZOPS1.

Instead, ZOPS2 offered the Russians a gateway to re-establish and strengthen their geopolitical

position in Syria, and to a certain extent, the Middle East. As Mark Fitzpatrick argues, ‘the

UN-approved chemical weapons deal effectively serves to legitimise and perpetuate Assad’s

regime.’122 In sum, manipulating the Syrian regime into accepting chemical disarmament did

not only constitute a perceived step towards political transition and cessation of violence, but

also served as a driving force for a stronger Russian foothold in the Middle East.

In conclusion, the two catalysts that induced ripeness for reaching the partial settlement of

chemical disarmament were a) the American threat to use military force, and b) the positive

120 S. Vuković, International Multiparty Mediation and Conflict Management: Challenges of Cooperation and

Coordination, p. 27. 121 Derived from model used in S. Vuković, Soft Power, Bias, and Manipulation of International Organizations

in International Mediation, on Zones of Possible Agreement (ZOPA). 122 M. Fitzpatrick, Destroying Syria’s Chemical Weapons, p. 107.

ZOPS1

Political Transition

Cessation of violence

ZOPS2

ZOPS2

34

incentives that were offered by Russia to Assad if he allowed his chemical weapons to be placed

under international control. This study now proceeds to its analysis of state rhetoric vis-à-vis

the discussed hypotheses.

3. Analysis

Ralf Trapp notes that ‘in the Middle East, the question of chemical weapons disarmament has

been linked to nuclear weapons arms control and the wider concept of creating a zone free of

nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction.’123 In this regard, the disarmament process in

Syria can be seen a positive step. Additionally, within the dynamics of the Syrian conflict itself,

‘weapons destruction is one aspect, but losing the doctrinal capacity to deploy and employ

those weapons is by far the most important factor in preventing future rearmament with those

weapons.’124 Another example which indicates success is ‘Russia’s constructive involvement

in initiating the plan and bringing Assad on board, reversing what has been a growing

divergence between Moscow and the West.’125 Whether Syria showcases a stronger

relationship between Russia and the United States is debatable, however, it does signal that

strategic interdependence between these two global powers is possible. Such political

cooperation between the United States and Russia is relatively unique in the field of conflict

management. Therefore, this chapter will analyse the discourse of both states separately, in

order to establish how both efforts complemented each other in reaching the agreement to

disarm the Syrian regime from its chemical stockpile. Furthermore, it will investigate the events

surrounding the Ghouta attacks, defining it is as a tipping point which consolidated the

agreement.

3.1 The Conflict Management of the United States

The involvement of the United States in Syria is predominantly characterized by the setting of

its red line and the subsequent abandonment from its plan to launch punitive military airstrikes.

In the view of Erik Sterner, the events in 2013 serves as prima facie evidence that the Obama

administration failed to make its threat credible, thus implying that the President’s “bluff” to

act militarily was read by the Syrian regime.126 Since U.S. credibility within this study is valued

123 R. Trapp, Elimination of the Chemical Weapons Stockpile of Syria, p. 8. 124 J.P. Zanders and R. Trapp, p. 13. 125 M. Fitzpatrick, Destroying Syria’s Chemical Weapons, p. 113. 126 E. Sterner, p. 108

35

at 1, it does not adopt this argument. Contrarily, it is assessed that Washington threatened to

use military force only to create the perception that it might execute its threat, thereby creating

the perception of an impending catastrophe which would harm the regime’s claim to power.

As noted before, such developments are associated with the recognition of MHS and inducing

the perception of ripeness for (partial) conflict resolution. The following sub-sections will

identify, through discourse analysis, how a combination of the red line and U.S. credibility led

to the ripening of a partial settlement.

3.1.1 Deterrence and the United States’ Red Line

First, it is important to note that deterrence invokes threats to dissuade an adversary from

initiating an undesired action, while coercive diplomacy is a response to an action that has

already been taken.127 Building on the work of Alexander George, Jack Levy continues to argue

that ‘even more fundamentally, strategies of deterrence, coercive diplomacy, and crisis

management cannot be pursued in isolation, but must be subsumed within a coherent foreign

policy or grand strategy that includes crisis prevention as an important aim and that specifies

the conditions under which the limited use of force might be appropriate.’128 Ultimately the

goal is to create the opponent’s expectation of unacceptable costs, leading to erosion of

resistance to the coercing state’s demand.129

For this analysis, American coercive diplomacy started on 20 August 2012, when President

Obama declared his red line on the use of biological and chemical weapons:

“I have, at this point, not ordered military engagement in the situation. But the point that you made

about chemical and biological weapons is critical. That’s an issue that doesn’t just concern Syria; it

concerns our close allies in the region, including Israel. It concerns us. We cannot have a situation

where chemical or biological weapons are falling into the hands of the wrong people. We have been

very clear to the Assad regime, but also to other players on the ground, that a red line for us is we start

seeing a whole bunch of chemical weapons moving around or being utilized. That would change my

calculus.130”

127 J. Levy, ‘Deterrence and Coercive Diplomacy: The Contributions of Alexander George’, Political Psychology, Vol. 29, No. 4, 2008, p.539. 128 Ibid, p. 538. 129 S. Tarzi, ‘Hypotheses on the Use and Limitations of Coercive Diplomacy’, International Studies, Vol. 36,

No. 1, 1999, p. 65. 130 ‘Remarks by the President to the White House Press Corps’, The White House, 20 August 2012,

https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/08/20/remarks-president-white-house-press-corps.

36

There are a few important contextual elements that have to be noted. First, this declaration by

Obama was made not long after Syrian Foreign Minister spokesman Johad Makdissi officially

confirmed that Syria has chemical weapons, stating that these weapons would never be used

against the Syrian people, but only against “external aggression”.131 This proved to be an

inherently deceiving statement, especially after the Ghouta attacks. Furthermore, for the United

States “seeing a whole bunch of chemical weapons moving around or being utilized” shaped a

security dilemma. For example, Hezbollah fighters have played an important role in the Assad

regime’s effort by protecting arms supply routes, bringing with them years of combat

experience gained in Lebanon’s civil war and its two wars with Israel.132 If Hezbollah would

have potential access to Assad’s chemical stockpile, this would greatly threaten Israel,

Washington’s most important ally in the Middle East. As noted by Glenn Snyder, as an ally,

the United States has ‘an interest in maintaining their reputation for loyalty to their allies

[Israel] and their reputation for resolve vis-à-vis their adversaries.’133 As such, a decrease in

Israel’s security would constitute a decrease in American security.

Secondly, there is no question that this statement signalled the beginning of Obama’s

deterrence strategy vis-à-vis Bashar al-Assad. In the words of Erik Sterner, the exact purpose

of such a strategy is to make ‘a dictatorship such as Assad understand that the consequences of

committing an act will be worse for it than the consequences of not committing it.’134 As noted

before, loyalty to Israel and reputation towards the Assad regime could develop enough cause

to use coercive action. In light of the grand strategy to prompt political transition and cessation

of violence as stipulated in the Geneva Communiqué (which was signed just before Obama set

his red line), the first policy option was to apply financial pressure on the regime by “providing

non-lethal assistance…depriving Assad of the financial resources to continue waging his

war…by freezing assets of senior regime officials, restricting transactions with the commercial

and central banks and embargo Syrian oil.”135 Such power mediation was primarily aimed at

increasing the costs of non-compliance, thereby altering the cost-benefit calculations and

inducing the recognition of political transition as a viable alternative to the continuation of the

131 ‘Timeline of Syrian Chemical Weapons Activity, 2012-2015’, Arms Control, 19 August 2014, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Timeline-of-Syrian-Chemical-Weapons-Activity. 132 B. Jenkins, p. 1. 133 G. Snyder, p. 108. 134 E. Sterner, p. 407. 135 ‘Press Availability Hillary Rodham Clinton Following the Friends of he Syrian People Ministerial Meeting’,

U.S. Department of State, 6 July 2012,http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2012/07/194634.htm.

37

conflict.136 Such a strategy signals the intentions of the United States to render its threat of

military action credible. In other words, the United States applied sticks with few carrots as a

warning to Assad and reassuring Israel.

Thirdly, it has to be noted that President Obama does not explicitly clarify that the use of

chemical weapons will trigger military action. He merely mentions he has not yet ordered

military engagement, thereby creating the perception that he might if necessary. Consequently,

the causal nexus between military action and the red line remains relatively loose within

Obama’s discourse. It also implies that he relies on the United States known track-record of

military intervention to render his threat credible.

3.1.2 United States Credibility

The debate on U.S. credibility in Syria remains complex. On the one hand, scholars such as

Erik Sterner argue that Washington’s red line was received as a bluff, leading to the failure of

its deterrence policy and setting the precedence for other states to cross U.S. red lines.137 On

the other hand, authors such as John Mitton and Frank Harvey note that the credibility of

American threats are still viable because of its reputations and past actions from previous

cases.138 Within this thesis’ methodology, U.S. credibility is operationalized as perfect (1), thus

supporting the argument that the threat of military action was credible. However, there are

some indicators that suggest otherwise.

On both 23 March and 29 April, the Syrian regime allegedly defied the red line on chemical

weapons, resulting in several deaths near Damascus and the town of Saraqeb. In reaction to

these events, Deputy National Security Advisor Ben Rhodes stated the following:

“Following a deliberative review, our intelligence community assesses that the Assad regime has used

chemical weapons, including the nerve agent sarin, on a small scale against the opposition multiple

times in the last year … The President has been clear that the use of chemical weapons – or the

transfer of chemical weapons to terrorist groups – is a red line for the United States … Following on

the credible evidence that the regime has used chemical weapons against the Syrian people, the

President has augmented the provision of non-lethal assistance to the civilian opposition, and also

authorized the expansion of our assistance to the Supreme Military Council (SMC), and we will be

consulting with Congress on these matters in the coming weeks… The United States and the

136 S. Vuković, International Multiparty Mediation and Conflict Management: Challenges of Cooperation and

Coordination, p. 27. 137 E. Sterner, p. 418. 138 J. Mitton and F. Harvey, p. 520.

38

international community have a number of other legal, financial, diplomatic, and military responses

available.”139

With this statement, the White House clearly does not deviate from its foreign policy of

deterrence and coercive diplomacy but reinforces that it will not resort to military action,

despite the fact that the events in March and April clearly manifest a violation of the red line.

In other words, the United States did not develop its threat but continues the path of utilizing

non-lethal means to harm Assad’s war efforts. According to Sterner, ‘the Syrian Government

was willing to gamble on the [U.S.] president’s credibility, as the odds of getting away with

using chemical weapons looked to be in its favour.’140 However, as Mitton and Harvey note,

‘Obama may have issued a red-line warning, but it was never clear to Syrian leaders whether

he was committed to the deterrent threat, or what the red-line actually meant.’141 Moreover,

taking the domestic pressures into account, there were low interests and limited capabilities to

effect any significant change in Syria.142 The Syrian regime thus remained uncertain what

would trigger military action. Washington’s continued interest in the conflict was preserved by

keeping the implicit threat to intervene, upholding American presence in Syria.143 Therefore,

American credibility vis-à-vis future confrontations with the Assad regime was maintained,

although the red line was not a definitive or automatic deterrent.144

In conclusion, the statement of Ben Rhodes served to create the perception of non-credibility

(0) as part of a larger strategy of conflict management. Moreover, the moment for direct

military intervention was not ripe yet and would have bared little result. However, by

maintaining a vested interest through economic sanctions, the United States forced a certain

degree of uncertainty with the Syrian government. As it will be discussed later in this chapter,

the direct aftermath of the Ghouta attacks notes how the Obama administration reinforces its

credibility (1), triggering the negotiations of the disarmament process as partial settlement.

139 ‘Statement by Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communications Ben Rhodes on Syrian

Chemical Weapons Use’, White House, 13 June 2013, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-

office/2013/06/13/statement-deputy-national-security-advisor-strategic-communications-ben-. 140 E. Sterner, p. 408. 141 J. Mitton and F. Harvey, p. 518. 142 Ibid, p. 520. 143 K. Beardsley et al., ‘Mediation Style and Crisis Outcomes’, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 50, No.

1, 2006, p. 70. 144 J. Mitton, p. 411.

39

3.2 The Ghouta Attacks as Tipping Point

In the early morning of 21 August 2013 between 2:30 and 5am between fifteen to twenty

rockets containing sarin struck the East and Western Ghouta suburbs of Damascus, killing

thousands of civilians. In the letter of transmittal of the U.N. Report on the Alleged Use of

Chemical Weapons in the Ghouta Area of Damascus of 14 September, it is stated that:

“On the basis of the evidence obtained during our investigation of the Ghouta incident: the conclusion

is that chemical weapons have been used in the ongoing conflict between the parties in the Syrian

Arab Republic, also against civilians, including children, on a relatively large scale.”145

An atrocity of such magnitude was bound to trigger a reaction from both the United States and

the Russian Federation. This section will examine how the rhetoric of both states moved from

being greatly conflictual towards relatively harmonious. It also examines how, to a certain

extent, United States’ coercive diplomacy and threatened military action merged with Russia’s

manipulative relational power towards the Syrian regime, creating the partial settlement of

chemical disarmament.

On 31 August 2013, President Obama declared:

“This attack is an assault on human dignity. It also presents a serious danger to our national security.

It risks making a mockery of the global prohibition on the use of chemical weapons. It endangers our

friends and our partners along Syria’s borders, including Israel, Jordan, Turkey, Lebanon and Iraq …

after careful deliberation, I have decided that the United States should take military action against

Syrian regime targets. This would not be an open-ended intervention.”146

It is evident from this statement that the extensive use of chemical weapons poses a security

dilemma for the United States and its allies, especially when it was stated that these weapons

could also be used against external aggression. Although earlier cases did not trigger the

enforcement of military action, the magnitude of this event left President Obama with no choice

but to use clear-cut rhetoric stating that intervention would be pursued. Not only does, Obama

reaffirm the security dilemma, he also solidifies the causal nexus between military action and

his red line. With this statement, Obama sent clear signals showing his willingness to use force,

which was supported by observable indicators that evidenced the seriousness of his intents.147

145 Letter of Transmittal in, ‘Report on the Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons in the Ghouta Area of Damascus

on 21 August 2013’, The United Nations, 14 September 2013,

http://www.un.org/disarmament/content/slideshow/Secretary_General_Report_of_CW_Investigation.pdf. 146 ‘Statement by the President on Syria’, The White House, 31 August 2013, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-

press-office/2013/08/31/statement-president-syria. 147 K. Favretto, p. 250.

40

For example, on 3 September, the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee boosted the

credibility of Washington’s coercive threat by voting in favour of a draft resolution authorizing

the president to “use the Armed Forces of the United States as he determines to be necessary

and appropriate” in a limited and tailored manner against legitimate military targets in Syria.148

Furthermore, on 4 September 2013, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry stated that:

“Because we – as confidently as we know what happened in Damascus on August 21st, we know that

Assad will read our silence, our unwillingness to act, as a signal that he can use his weapons with

impunity … If we back down, if the world backs down, we have sent an unmistakable message of

permissiveness.”149

Strong discourse on the violations of human dignity, military action, the disallowance of using

chemical weapons with impunity, and the refusal to back down, was reinforced with tangible

evidence such as the aforementioned approval of the US Senate and the mobilization of

warships and aircraft carries in the eastern Mediterranean. In sum, the American threat became

perfectly credible and consequently was perceived as such, not only by the Syrian regime, but

also by its most important ally at this stage; Russia.

Russia’s initial reaction to Ghouta incidents is marked by suspicion of the evidence presented.

Through discourse, it reminded the audience that military action would violate the

fundamentals of international law. On 31 August 2013 President Vladimir Putin stated:

“I am convinced that [the chemical attack] is nothing more than a provocation by those who want to

drag other countries into the Syrian conflict, and who want the support of powerful members of the

international community, especially the United States … Is it in the interests of the United States to

once again flaunt the international security system, and violate the fundamentals of international law?

Will it strengthen the country’s international prestige? Hardly.”150

Triggering a response by the United States by defining the Ghouta attacks as a provocation

signals to which extent Putin aims to protect Assad and their alliance. His reference to

international law is his most powerful tool of rhetoric. He is well aware that both the idea of

‘punitive war’ and the concept of punitive peace have lost public support in the West and in

148 F. Harvey and J. Mitton, p. 506-507. 149 ‘Opening Remarks Before the House Foreign Affairs Committee by Secretary of State John Kerry, Syria:

Weighing the Obama administration’s response’, US Department of State, 4 September 2013,

http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/09/213787.htm. 150 ‘President Vladimir Putin, answers to journalists’ questions’, The Kremlin, 31 August 2013,

http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/19113.

41

the development of modern international law.151 Through this discourse, he also directly refers

to past cases in which the United States intervened militarily, in order to build a strong case

against punitive warfare. This observation is supported by the statement of former Official

Representative of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Alexander Lukashevich: “This [the

alleged use of chemical weapons] makes us remember ten-year-old events, when using false

information about weapons of mass destruction in Iraq as a pretence, the United States started

a reckless action bypassing the U.N.”152

Not only do such statements signal a general aversion towards Western accusations, it also

indicates that Russia regarded the American threat to be credible. At this stage, Russia’s policy

options were limited until an opening presented itself in the shape of a statement made by US

Secretary of State, John Kerry. When reporter Margaret Brennan from Columbia Broadcasting

System asked “is there anything at this point that his government could do or offer that would

stop an attack?”, he replied:

“Sure. He could turn over every single bit of his chemical weapons to the international community in

the next week. Turn it over, all of it, without delay, and allow a full and total accounting for that. But

he isn’t about to do it, and it can’t be done, obviously.”153

Allegedly, private discussions between Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov and

John Kerry about the removal of Syria’s chemical weapons had already taken place previous

to this statement. Kerry’s scepticism however, notes that he did not consider it to be a realistic

outcome. Hereby, he also indirectly seems to suggest that he regards a strategic collaboration

between Washington and Moscow unlikely. Whether it was intentional or unintentional,

Kerry’s discourse clearly sent a signal that chemical disarmament as a partial settlement would

be considered a sufficient step towards political transition and the cessation of violence in the

short-term. Not long after, the agreement took tangible shape.

Beforehand, however, Russia would have to use conflict management strategies and its

relational power over the Syrian regime to coerce it into compliance. In other words, it would

151 C. Stahn, p. 959. 152 ‘Announcement by the official representative of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Alexander

Lukashevich regarding the statements of the US Secretary of Defense’, Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 25

August 2013, http://www.mid.ru/en/press_service/spokesman/official_statement/-

/asset_publisher/t2GCdmD8RNIr/content/id/98874. 153 ‘Remarks with United Kingdom Foreign Secretary Hague’, The Department of State, 9 September 2013,

http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/09/213956.htm.

42

have to broaden the ZOPS of the Syrian regime to such an extent that it encompasses chemical

disarmament as a viable solution.

3.3.1 Russian Formulation and Manipulation

Within the major power’s bargaining game of Syria, Russia’s position vis-à-vis the United

States affected the manner of potential intervention (military action) and the beliefs about

whether or not the Obama administration was actually willing to go to war.154 Meanwhile, as

a mediator Russia had to use its international position and its resources of power, influence,

and persuasion to manipulate the Syrian regime into agreement.155 Such persuasion and

manipulation was dependent on Assad’s perceptions and misperceptions of Moscow in terms

of power, direct and indirect resources, shaping an alliance characterized by the latter’s

dominance over the former.156 This sub-section examines how Moscow used its relational

power over Syria to shape and deliver the disarmament process as a potentially desirable

concession and agreement.157 It argues that the disarmament process was framed as the most

viable solution in which U.S. military intervention could be avoided. More importantly, this

sub-section demonstrates through an analysis of discourse how this agreement offered an

opportunity for the Syrian government to consolidate power in the short to medium-term.

When evidence clearly pointed to the fact that the Syrian regime used chemical weapons in

Ghouta, a shift in Putin’s discourse was clearly manifested. On 10 September he stated that:

“Not only do we think this is a viable option, but we really hope that our friends in Syria take this

responsible decision and agree not only to bring their chemical weapons under international control

but also to have them destroyed, and we hope Syria joins the international convention banning

chemical weapons … Of course, all of this will only mean anything if the United States and other

nations supporting it tell us that they're giving up their plan to use force against Syria.”158

This statement still demonstrates Russian loyalty within its alliance towards Assad, yet

formulates chemical disarmament as the best possible solution in order to avoid U.S. military

intervention. Formulation is a type of persuasion in which the mediator assumes an active role

154 K. Favretto, p. 251. 155 D. Quinn et al., ‘Power Play: Mediation in Symmetric and Asymmetric International Crises’, International

Interactions, Vol. 32, No. 4, 2006, p. 445. 156 O. Richmond, ‘Devious Objectives and the Disputants’ View of International Mediation’, Journal of Peace

Research, Vol. 35, No. 6, 1998, p.711. 157 P. Carnevale, ‘Mediating from Strength’, in J. Bercovitch (ed.), Studies in International Mediation, Palgrave,

New York, 2002, p. 30. 158 ‘Comments by President Vladimir Putin on the Chemical Weapons Situation in Syria’, The Kremlin, 10

September 2013, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/19194.

43

by formulating solutions that can reduce commitment problems whilst emphasizing that

unilateral and confrontational activities will not yield the expected results.159 This involves the

creation of the perception that military airstrikes would induce a hurting stalemate for the

Syrian regime. Essentially, this process indicates a movement from ZOPS1 to ZOPS2.

Yet formulation alone was not enough. The Syrian regime consecutively had to be manipulated

into compliance through positive inducements. It is not unthinkable that in 2013, the Russians

promised to support Assad militarily with his fight against certain opposition parties. Official

documentation of 2013 stating this commitment is unobtainable, however, there are some

indicators. A week before Syria officially became party to the CWC, Sergey Lavrov hails the

success of the agreement, yet slowly shifts the debate to another issue within the dynamics of

the Syrian civil war. In a joint press conference with John Kerry on Bali, Indonesia, he notes:

“We are worried by something else: there is sufficient reason to suspect that extremist groups within

the opposition will attempt to disrupt this process. I hope that the UNSC resolution adopted ten days

ago will be implemented by everybody, including Syria's neighbours, from whom the Security

Council requested the prevention of components of chemical weapons getting into the hands of non-

governmental players and the use of the territory of these countries for terrorist activities … In

general, the Secretary of State John Kerry and I confirmed our joint commitment to do everything to

assist in fighting terrorism and extremism in Syria. This is a common task for all those who think

about the future of this country as a laic, tolerant, multireligious and multi-ethnic country.”160

Within Lavrov’s discourse, it is clear that he initiates a shift of focus away from the Syrian

regime and towards “the extremist groups within the opposition” who “will attempt to disrupt

the process”. Knowing that terrorism has arguably positioned the United States in front of its

biggest security dilemma of the 21st century, this statement initiates the first steps of delaying

the process of political transition by prioritising the fight against terrorism. Indirectly, this

would consolidate Assad’s power in the short to medium-term. This analysis is supported by

concrete evidence, as in September 2014 an American led-coalition launched its first airstrikes

against targets of the IS, followed by Russian military intervention the following year.

In conclusion, Russia killed two birds with one stone. First, it provided the Syrian regime with

enough incentives by formulating that the threat of airstrikes could be avoided by chemical

159 S. Vuković, Soft Power, Bias and Manipulation of International Organizations in International Mediation, p.

421. 160 ‘Speech of the Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov with the US Secretary of State, John Kerry’, The

Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 7 October 2013, http://www.mid.ru/en/press_service/minister_speeches/-

/asset_publisher/7OvQR5KJWVmR/content/id/93466.

44

disarmament, thereby inducing a reassessment of the regime’s preferences and enhancing the

appeal of the negotiated solution.161 Secondly, Moscow used its strategic interdependence with

the United States tactfully to assume a bigger role in Syria and the Middle East, making it more

challenging for the United States to isolate Assad diplomatically.162 Russia’s diplomatic

investment in managing the Syrian conflict thus had the desired outcome it aimed to obtain:

the perception and realization of its large geopolitical influence in Syria and the Middle East.

3.3.2 Russia’s Renewed Geopolitical Influence in the Middle East

In light of the Cold War, Syria’s chemical stockpile started in 1973 and obtained chemical

artillery shells from Egypt, predominantly in order to establish a deterrent in case Israel resorted

to chemical warfare or in case that Syria’s defences collapsed completely.163 Weapons of Mass

Destruction (WMDs) had always been a regional issue that created severe tensions. As such,

Syria’s accession to the CWC marked a progress towards a proposal for a broader negotiation

for a zone free of WMDs, as Egypt and Israel remain the only two non-signatory parties within

the region.164 For Russia, this implicated that it could effectively demonstrate it had convinced

its ally to comply with the standards set within frameworks of international law, thereby

applying diplomatic pressure on, most notably, Israel and Iran. Furthermore, coercing Assad

to hand over his chemical weapons fed the perception of Russia’s global power status. This

section examines Russia’s renewed geopolitical influence in the Middle East by looking at

discourse specifically targeted at developments surrounding nuclear and WMD issues in Iran,

and how Putin perceived to influence the political processes in the region.

As noted above, Iran provides a clear-cut example of how Putin was able to impact Middle

Eastern issues which featured on the international agenda. Immediate political transition in

Syria would not only mean that Iran loses an important ally in the region, Iranian leaders also

feared the possibility that it could inspire a domestic movement aimed at bringing down the

Islamic Republic.165 However, through consolidating Assad’s power, Putin contributed in

avoiding social revolution in Iran. Not long after, a Joint Action Plan on Iran’s Nuclear Program

was signed on 24 November 2013. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated:

161 S. Vuković, Soft Power, Bias and Manipulation of International Organizations in International Mediation, p. 422. 162 E. Sterner, p. 416. 163 Z. Diab, ‘Syria’s chemical and biological weapons: Assessing capabilities and motivations, The

Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 5, No. 1, 1997, p. 104. 164 R. Trapp, Elimination of the Chemical Weapons Stockpile of Syria, p. 8. 165 B. Jenkins, p. 7.

45

“This agreement is based on the concept formulated by the President of the Russian Federation

Vladimir Putin. Its essence is the recognition of Iran's unconditional right to develop its peaceful

nuclear programme, including the right to enrich uranium, if this programme is put under strict

international control, and the lifting of all the sanctions in force against the Islamic Republic of Iran,

including unilateral ones, the legitimacy of which we have never and will never acknowledge.”166

Framing the agreement as a formulation initiated by Vladimir Putin establishes to which extent

its state discourse was designed to affirm its global power status. Furthermore, the

disacknowledgement of unilateral sanctions is a direct critique towards the United States.

Through the advancement of this framework and the lifting of economic sanctions, Russia

further strengthens its foothold in the Middle East by increasing bilateral trade with Iran, and

gaining incentive to invite Iran to the negotiation table of the Geneva II Peace Talks. Russia

had thus gained a more powerful ally in the Middle East in its attempt to balance the power of

the United States and its allies. For example, a nuclear deal would not be satisfactory for Iran

as it did not require Iran to stop all enrichment. The possibility that Iran would use its facilities

to produce nuclear weapons therefore still is a realistic security dilemma for Israel. On the other

hand, Saudi Arabia considers the deal as a huge loss since, in its zero-sum-game with Iran,

every win for the latter is a loss for the former.167 These developments seem to suggest that the

Middle East will, or is already experiencing a restructuring of its geopolitical power balance.

In conclusion, through the opportunity presented by the United States, Russia was able to use

its relational power by means of formulation and manipulation in order to expand its influence

and communicate the perception of its global power status. Through the ability to strengthen

its alliances, Russia marginalizes the role of the United States, giving a new dimension to the

WMD security dilemma of, most notably, Saudi Arabia and Israel. In other words, Russia was

able to realize its absolute gain in balancing the power of the United States, allowing for a more

structural control over its security dilemmas originating in the Middle East.

3.4 Discussion

This analysis has examined two principle hypotheses in light of the agreement that led to the

partial settlement of chemical disarmament. First, this thesis hypothesizes that the Obama

administration deemed the agreement to be sufficient in the period directly after the Ghouta

166 ‘Statement by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs’, Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 24 November

2013, http://www.mid.ru/en/web/guest/adernoe-nerasprostranenie/-

/asset_publisher/JrcRGi5UdnBO/content/id/86662. 167 M. Fitzpatrick, ‘Overwhelming Global Vote for the Iran Nuclear Deal, Survival, Vol. 56, no. 1, 2014, p. 72.

46

attacks of August 2013. Second, it examines how Russia gained a stronger political foothold

in the Middle East by coercing its ally to place its chemical weapons under international

control. Through methods of critical discourse analysis of state rhetoric, the processes through

which the partial settlement was reached were scrutinized.

One of the main challenges this methodology faces is one of selection bias. In light of its

theoretical framework of structural realism, official state discourse is used exclusively, thereby

applying only a narrow perspective of the topics at hand. The exclusion of discourse used

within societal frameworks and media outlets ignores other perceptions that are manifested

deeply within different types of societal culture. Furthermore, in relation to the first hypothesis,

this study does not control for the diverging opinions within the Obama administration.

Therefore, it only takes into account the perception of the executive. On the other hand, in

relation to the examination of Russian conflict management, analysis is limited to English

sources, which creates the possibility of misinterpretation.

Nevertheless, the analysis is strengthened by its operationalization. Firstly, the credibility of

the United States is defined as the extent to which Assad and Russia believe the statements that

postulate the ability of the Obama administration to carry out its threat.168 In its assessment,

this analysis operationalizes the degree of U.S. credibility as perfect. This starkly opposes the

arguments that suggest the United States’ attempt to deter chemical weapons use failed largely

due its lack of credibility.169 In spite of the fact that the threat of military action was perceived

to be perfectly non-credible in the spring of 2013, perception does not defeat key definitional

elements which constitute credibility. For example, the U.S. bargaining position after the

Ghouta attacks was strengthened by the plausibility of its commitment of reputation.170

Following the existential violation of the dignity of human rights as marked by the events of

Ghouta, it could be deemed highly probable that the U.S. would act based on humanitarian

justifications.

Secondly, this analysis demonstrates how methods of formulation and manipulation broaden

the perceived spectrum of possible solutions of the Syrian regime. The assumption that

unconventional war methods could benefit the quest of escalating conflict to victory were

severely limited by the dynamics of relational power of Moscow on the Syrian regime. Through

the strength of its alliance with Assad, Russia portrayed itself to be untainted by any affinity

168 Z. Maoz and L. Terris, p. 409. 169 E. Sterner, p. 407. 170 J. Mitton, p. 409.

47

with the opposition forces or the United States, thereby effectively eliciting information that

suggested the credibility of Washington’s threat, reinforcing the consideration that chemical

disarmament would be a viable option.171 In other words, by transferring the perception that

U.S. military intervention would be detrimental for the regime’s efforts in defeating the

opposition forces, Russia convinced Assad that his chances of winning the war were best served

by temporary compliance, avoiding the risk of finding oneself in a hurting stalemate.

Additionally, Moscow arguably offered the Syrian government the promise of supporting

government forces in their battles against terrorist groups. This positive incentive was designed

to further manipulate the Syrian regime into conformity. Although this cannot be completely

verified by a critical analysis of Russian state discourse, military action in the subsequent seem

to suggest this promise was made. By consolidating power for the Assad regime, Russia

automatically increased its manifested influence over Middle Eastern geopolitics.

In sum, the combination of Obama’s credible red line on the use of chemical weapons and

Russia’s ability to coerce Assad into compliance, effectuated the possibility of a strategic

relation of interdependence between the United States and the Russian Federation. With the

Ghouta attacks serving as the main catalyst, reaching the partial settlement of chemical

disarmament served the objectives of both parties, despite the fact that their positions and

motivations vis-à-vis the Syrian civil war were starkly opposed.

4. Conclusion

This study has aimed to answer three questions: it examines who made the decision to disarm

the Syrian regime from its chemical weapons, why the agreement was struck at that particular

stage of the conflict, and how it was made.

In its first chapter the Syrian conflict is defined at the hand of five characteristics and four

phases that indicate intractability. The elaborate examination of the conflict’s intractability sets

the stage to answer the question why the partial settlement of chemical disarmament was

reached at that particular stage of the conflict. It is important to note that before the Ghouta

attacks of 2013, the conflict was still marked by an absence of ripeness for conflict resolution.

Hence, the peace-making efforts of the Action Group for Syria up until that moment are

labelled as a failure. In other words, the Geneva peace process prior to chemical disarmament

171 P. Carnevale, p. 30.

48

is regarded as a phase within Syria’s intractable conflict. The first chapter continues to argue

that the Ghouta attacks of August 21, 2013 mark a tipping point in which the efforts within the

confines of Geneva were overshadowed by stronger state rhetoric from the United States and

its allies.

The second chapter elaborates on its theoretical framework and methodology. At the hand of

structural realism, this thesis continues its examination for three separate purposes. First, and

most importantly, it aims to understand how strategic interdependence between the United

States and Russia was necessary in order to achieve full chemical disarmament of the Syrian

regime. Both states were offered an opportunity to effectively soften their security dilemmas

that were rooted deeply into the geopolitics of the Middle East. Secondly, it uses structural

realism to understand how strong states can use threats as a driving factor in order to coerce

weaker states into compliance. Thirdly, it situates international institutions as vehicles of state

power, thereby defining the roles of the UN and the OPCW. Here it is argued that international

institutions have minimal influence on state behaviour, however, they can still facilitate a

certain degree of cooperation between states, if it serves the interests of all state parties.

Structural realism serves to justify the analysis of American and Russian conflict management,

moving away from a more elaborate examination of the efforts determined within the Geneva

peace process. By doing so, the second chapter thus explains who agreed to disarm the Syrian

regime by identifying the United States and Russia as the principal actors.

Moreover, the second chapter serves to explain the methods of analysis that will be conducted

in the third chapter. The chemical disarmament deal is operationalized as a partial settlement,

since it does not constitute a full mediated outcome. The principal objective as stipulated by

the Geneva Communiqué (which was approved by Russia and the United States) constitutes a

full political transition and cessation of violence. This objective was not reached at any

particular time within the scope of this study, nor has been achieved until this day.

Nevertheless, chemical disarmament does represent an important step towards achieving as the

desired mediated outcome. The section on the methodology of analysis then proceeds on to

describe the two hypotheses it will examine.

The first hypothesis investigates if the Obama administration considered chemical

disarmament as a sufficient result within the short-term aftermath of the Ghouta attacks. A

large segment of the analysis is devoted to U.S. credibility. Through critical discourse analysis

of American state rhetoric, this study comes to the conclusion that the credibility of President

49

Obama’s threat to intervene militarily was perceived to be perfect. The first sections of the

third chapter note that after the Ghouta attacks, American state rhetoric was strengthened,

implying that it would actually proceed into carrying out its threats. This change in discourse

was also supported by objective indicators. The main examples that are highlighted in this

study are the U.S. Senate’s approval to use military force, and the structural mobilization of

military forces at strategic infrastructure. As such, the Syrian regime and Russia were seriously

considering the possibility that U.S. intervention was imminent. This development induced

partial ripeness, as it created a perception of an impending hurting stalemate for the Syrian

government.

The third chapter continues its analysis by examining the direct aftermath of the Ghouta attacks,

marking a critical juncture within the conflict management process surrounding chemical

disarmament. At a joint press conference with United Kingdom Foreign Secretary William

Hague, US Secretary of State John Kerry stated that military intervention could be avoided if

Assad surrendered his chemical weapons. This sent a clear signal to Russian Foreign Minister

Sergey Lavrov that an alternative solution to military intervention was deemed possible by his

American counterparts.

Subsequently, the analysis investigates how Russian state representatives formulated chemical

disarmament as a possible solution by manipulating them by offering positive incentives. In

light of this study’s methodological section, this procedure is operationalized by a movement

from ZOPS1 to ZOPS2. Moscow convinced Assad to place his chemical stockpile under

international control, as it would offer him a better chance to consolidate power. Furthermore,

this development would allow continued Russian support in assisting the regime with their war

efforts against the opposition. The study was not able to verify whether a promise was made

by the Russian delegation to support the Syrian government’s war efforts in the medium to

long-term. However, developments in 2015 seem to strongly suggest that the mobilization of

Russian military forces into Syria had been agreed upon at an earlier stage of the conflict.

Furthermore, this thesis assesses that the consolidation of Assad’s power served as a gateway

to an increase of Russian influence on Middle Eastern geopolitics. It highlights the Iran nuclear

deal which followed not long after the agreement on chemical disarmament, and examines how

the Iranian nuclear deal was framed as a product of Vladimir Putin’s statesmanship. More

importantly, by strengthening the Assad regime and the Iranian government, Russia gained two

stable allies through which it could exercise it influence in the Middle East to balance the power

50

of the United States, Israel, and Saudi Arabia. Chemical disarmament in Syria thus served the

state interests of Russia.

In conclusion, partial ripeness in the Syrian conflict was induced through a combination of the

American credible threat of using military force and the successful manipulation techniques of

Russia. Through an examination of the altercations in the state discourse of both the United

States and Russia in the direct aftermath of the Ghouta attacks, this thesis concludes that both

recognised the opportunity to achieve a partial settlement which satisfied their momentary state

interests. Both used the nature of their strategic interdependence to obtain short-term results,

in the aspiration that it would further strengthen their state objectives in the long-term. Whether

the result of this agreement contributes to a perpetuation of the Assad regime, or whether it

constitutes an important step within the larger process of conflict management is

underdetermined within the scope of this thesis. Nevertheless, the author undeniably hopes that

future history books will describe the chemical disarmament process in Syria to be an important

milestone towards peaceful resolution in the Syrian Arab Republic.

51

List of Abbreviations

UNSC – United Nations Security Council

CWC – Chemical Weapons Convention

OPCW – Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

ZOPS – Zone of Possible Solutions

IS – Islamic State

MHS – Mutually Hurting Stalemate

4-S – Stable, Soft, Self-Serving Stalemate

SNC – Syrian National Council

FSA – Free Syrian Army

NCB – National Coordinating Body

MEOs – Mutually Enticing Opportunities

WMDs – Weapons of Mass Destruction

52

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Chapters in Edited Books

Ayoob, Mohammed, ‘State Making, State Breaking and State Failure’, in C. A.

Crocker, A. Chester, F. O. Hampson and P. Aall (Eds.), Leashing the Dogs of War:

Conflict Management in a Divided World, US Institute of Peace Press, Washington

DC, 2007, pp. 95-114.

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F. O. Hampson and P. Aall (Eds.), Grasping the Nettle: Analyzing Cases of

Intractable Conflict, US Institute of Peace Press, Washington DC, 2005, pp. 99-122.

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Gurr, Ted, ‘Minorities, Nationalists, and Islamists’, in C. A. Crocker, A. Chester, F.

O. Hampson and P. Aall (Eds.), Leasing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a

Divided World, US Institute of Peace Press, Washington DC, 2007, pp. 131-160.

King, Charles, ‘Power, Social Violence and Civil Wars’, in C. A. Crocker, A. Chester,

F. O. Hampson and P. Aall (Eds.), Leasing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in

a Divided World, US Institute of Peace Press, Washington DC, 2007, p. 115-130.

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A. Chester, F. O. Hampson and P. Aall (Eds.), Grasping the Nettle: Analyzing Cases

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Malone, David, and Sherman, Jake, ‘Economic Factors in Civil Wars’, in C. A.

Crocker, A. Chester, F. O. Hampson and P. Aall (Eds.), Leasing the Dogs of War:

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Conflict Management in a Divided World, US Institute of Peace Press, Washington

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Hampson and P. Aall (Eds.), Grasping the Nettle: Analyzing Cases of Intractable

Conflict, US Institute of Peace Press, Washington DC, 2005, pp. 47-64.

Books

Beardsley, Kyle, The Mediation Dilemma, Cornell University Press, New York, 2011.

Lund, Michael, Preventing Violent Conflicts: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy,

US Institute of Peace Press, Washington DC, 1996.

Ramsbotham, Oliver, Woodhouse, Tom, and Miall, Hugh, Contemporary Conflict

Resolution, Polity, Cambridge, 2011.

Stent, Angela, The Limits of Partnership: US-Russian relations in the twenty-first

century, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2015.

Vuković, Siniša, International Multiparty Mediation and Conflict Management:

Challenges of Cooperation and Coordination, Routledge, Oxford, 2015.

Waltz, Kenneth, Theory of International Politics, Addison-Wesley, Reading, 1979.

Fairclough, Isabella, and Fairclough, Norman, Political Discourse Analysis: A

Method for Advanced Students, Routledge, New York, 2012.

Reports

Jenkins, Brain, ‘The Dynamics of Syria’s Civil War’, Rand Corporation, 2014.

Trapp, Ralf, ‘Lessons Learned from the OPCW Mission in Syria’, Submitted to the

Director-General of the Technical Secretariat of the OPCW, OPCW, 16 December

2015, Annex II,

https://www.opcw.org/fileadmin/OPCW/PDF/Lessons_learned_from_the_OPCW_Mi

ssion_in_Syria.pdf.

‘Timeline of Syrian Chemical Weapons Activity, 2012-2015’, Arms Control, 19

August 2014, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Timeline-of-Syrian-Chemical-

Weapons-Activity.

Official Government and Institution Documents

‘Final Communiqué from the Action Group for Syria’, The United Nations, 30 April

2012,

57

http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/Syria/FinalCommuniqueActionGroupforSyria.pd

f.

‘Kofi Annan resigns as UN-Arab League Joint Special Envoy for Syrian crisis’, UN

News Centre, 2 August 2012,

http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=42609#.Vyn0m_l97IU.

‘Remarks by the President to the White House Press Corps’, The White House, 20

August 2012, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/08/20/remarks-

president-white-house-press-corps.

‘Press Availability Hillary Rodham Clinton Following the Friends of the Syrian

People Ministerial Meeting’, U.S. Department of State, 6 July

2012,http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2012/07/194634.htm.

‘Statement by Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communications Ben

Rhodes on Syrian Chemical Weapons Use’, White House, 13 June 2013,

https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/13/statement-deputy-national-

security-advisor-strategic-communications-ben-.

Letter of Transmittal in, ‘Report on the Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons in the

Ghouta Area of Damascus on 21 August 2013’, The United Nations, 14 September

2013,

http://www.un.org/disarmament/content/slideshow/Secretary_General_Report_of_C

W_Investigation.pdf

‘Statement by the President on Syria’, The White House, 31 August 2013,

https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/08/31/statement-president-syria.

‘Opening Remarks Before the House Foreign Affairs Committee by Secretary of State

John Kerry, Syria: Weighing the Obama administration’s response’, US Department

of State, 4 September 2013,

http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/09/213787.htm.

‘President Vladimir Putin, answers to journalists’ questions’, The Kremlin, 31 August

2013, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/19113.

‘Announcement by the official representative of the Russian Ministry of Foreign

Affairs Alexander Lukashevich regarding the statements of the US Secretary of

Defense’, Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 25 August 2013,

http://www.mid.ru/en/press_service/spokesman/official_statement/-

/asset_publisher/t2GCdmD8RNIr/content/id/98874.

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‘Remarks with United Kingdom Foreign Secretary Hague’, US Department of State, 9

September 2013, http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/09/213956.htm.

‘Comments by President Vladimir Putin on the Chemical Weapons Situation in

Syria’, The Kremlin, 10 September 2013,

http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/19194.

‘Speech of the Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov with the US Secretary of

State, John Kerry’, The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 7 October 2013,

http://www.mid.ru/en/press_service/minister_speeches/-

/asset_publisher/7OvQR5KJWVmR/content/id/93466.

‘Statement by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs’, Russian Ministry of Foreign

Affairs, 24 November 2013, http://www.mid.ru/en/web/guest/adernoe-

nerasprostranenie/-/asset_publisher/JrcRGi5UdnBO/content/id/86662.