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MA Corporate Communication – Aarhus University, Business & Social Sciences, 2014 i

The Sparkling Launch of the Tesla Model S

A case study of Tesla Motors media communication during the crisis

period of the Model S car fire accidents in 2013

Master Thesis by Morten Bigum MA in Corporate Communication, Aarhus University

Department of Business & Social Sciences, 2014 Supervisor: Bo Laursen Student ID: 20095493 Characters: 135.235

MA Corporate Communication – Aarhus University, Business & Social Sciences, 2014 i

Abstract The purpose of this study was to evaluate Tesla Motors media communication during

the crisis period of the model S car fire accidents in 2013. The evaluation was based on

crisis communication theory where an examination of Tesla’s crisis response strategies

was initiated, followed by an examination of the media coverage and framing of the cri-‐

sis event. Finally, an evaluation of Tesla’s crisis communication with the media was ex-‐

amined in the study.

Qualitative methods were applied. First a discourse analysis of five press releases

presented by Tesla was conducted to identify crisis response strategies. Secondly, a con-‐

tent analysis of eighteen media articles from The New York Times, Los Angeles Times

and The Washington Post was examined to identify Tesla response strategies along with

the articles use of sources and tone of voice.

The results revealed that Tesla mainly used adjusting information and diminish strat-‐

egies as a start and as the crisis responsibility increased due to crisis history, strategies

of denial, bolstering and rebuild was increasingly applied. It was found that the media

used a majority of unfavorable sources to frame the articles coverage and that the arti-‐

cles tone of voice was primarily negative prior to a Tesla response, while being favora-‐

ble after. The principal conclusion was that Tesla successfully managed to place most of

its crisis communication strategies in the media coverage.

MA Corporate Communication – Aarhus University, Business & Social Sciences, 2014 ii

Table of Contents ABSTRACT ...................................................................................................................................... I

LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES ............................................................................................. III

LIST OF APPENDIXES ............................................................................................................... IV

INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................... 1 MOTIVATION AND GENERAL OBJECTIVE .................................................................................................. 1 PROBLEM STATEMENT ................................................................................................................................ 2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK – OVERVIEW .............................................................................................. 4 SOCIAL RESEARCH STRATEGY AND DESIGN ............................................................................................ 4

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK .................................................................................................. 8 CRISIS DEFINITION AND THEORY .............................................................................................................. 8 ORGANIZATIONAL REPUTATION AND CRISIS THREAT ....................................................................... 13 CRISIS RESPONSE STRATEGIES ............................................................................................................... 14 ROLE OF MEDIA AS STAKEHOLDER ........................................................................................................ 19

METHODOLOGY ........................................................................................................................ 23 QUALITATIVE RESEARCH ......................................................................................................................... 24 SUMMARY .................................................................................................................................................... 28

CASE STUDY: TESLA MOTORS .............................................................................................. 29 ABOUT TESLA MOTORS ............................................................................................................................ 29 CRISIS EVENT ............................................................................................................................................. 31 FINDINGS ..................................................................................................................................................... 44

DISCUSSION ............................................................................................................................... 60

CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................................. 64

BIBLIOGRAPHY ......................................................................................................................... 66

MA Corporate Communication – Aarhus University, Business & Social Sciences, 2014 iii

List of Figures and tables TABLE 1 – COMPARISON OF STAGED APPROACHED IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT ....... 10

TABLE 2 – SCCT CRISIS RESPONSE STRATEGIES ................................................................ 17

TABLE 3 – SCCT CRISIS RESPONSE RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................... 19

FIGURE 1 – TESLA STOCK DURING CRISIS EVENT ............................................................. 31

FIGURE 2 – TESLA CRISIS COMMUNICATION STRATEGIES ............................................. 50

TABLE 4 – USE OF SOURCES BY THE MEDIA ........................................................................ 53

FIGURE 3 – ARTICLES TONE OF VOICE .................................................................................. 55

TABLE 5 – TESLA RESPONSE STRATEGIES AND REPRESENTATION IN THE MEDIA

............................................................................................................................................................ 56

MA Corporate Communication – Aarhus University, Business & Social Sciences, 2014 iv

List of Appendixes APPENDIX 1 – TIMELINE ……………………………………………………………………………2 PAGES

APPENDIX 2 – PRESS RELEASES………………………………………………………………….7 PAGES

APPENDIX 3 – MEDIA COVERAGES……………………………………………………………41 PAGES

APPENDIX 4 – ANALYZED DATA – PRESS RELEASES…………………………………...5 PAGES

APPENDIX 5 – ANALYZED DATA – MEDIA COVERAGES……………………………..20 PAGES

MA Corporate Communication – Aarhus University, Business & Social Sciences, 2014 1

Introduction Motivation and General Objective In today’s world of corporate communication, there is a common belief that protect-‐

ing organizational reputation is one of the most important strategic objectives and that

an organization’s survival within an industry, depends on how it is viewed by key stake-‐

holders. Organizations have various groups who hold different types of stakes and in-‐

terest in the organization and maintaining corporate reputations is an important ele-‐

ment in managing relationships with stakeholders. Freeman defines stakeholders as

“any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organization’s pur-‐

pose and objectives”. Communication is an essential part of building, maintaining and es-‐

pecially protecting an organization’s reputation, which can be considered as the core

tasks of corporate communication (Cornelissen 2011; 3-‐5, 42, 59).

A crisis can be described as perceptual, unpredictable and can violate expectations of

stakeholders. Crisis is perceptual, meaning that it is the perception of stakeholders that

helps define whether an organizational crisis exists or not. Crises are unpredictable as

they strike suddenly and carry an element of surprise. It can threaten the relationship

between the organization and its stakeholders, as it disturbs stakeholders’ expectations.

A crisis can be seen as a threat to an organization and has the potential to do reputa-‐

tional damage. Reputational damage can lead to financial damage and threaten an or-‐

ganization’s survival. To prevent these circumstances, crisis response strategies can

help reduce reputational damage and eventually influence stakeholders’ interpretation

of the crisis. Coombs argue, “an organization’s reputation is cultivated by the information

stakeholders receive through various media outlets” (Bell 2010; 149), which naturally intro-‐

duces the next element – the media (Coombs 2012; 2-‐5, Coombs & Holladay 1996; 280).

Managing communication and relationships with the media defines the concept of

media relations and is an essential area of activity within corporate communication.

From a corporate viewpoint, the media as a stakeholder can be described as a channel

for reaching out and influence important stakeholders and generate publicity. The news

media is among communication professionals, therefore considered more of a channel

for reaching key stakeholders, rather than a stakeholder or audience itself. The news

media sets the public agenda by communicating a variety of information and conveys


feelings through its stance and tone. The news media practices an indirect power, which

can best be explained by a popular quote from Bernard C. Cohen: “The press may not be

successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but is stunningly successful in telling its

readers what to think about” (Mccombs & Shaw 1972; 177). The indirect power of media

coverage can have a strong influence and an amplifying effect on corporate reputations,

in which how stakeholders perceive an organization, both in positive or negative direc-‐

tions, depending on the medias coverage and framing. Organizations use media relation

techniques such as press releases to obtain news coverage for the general public and to

frame a particular issue, decision or event, in a way that is of interest for the organiza-‐

tion. Framing involves inclusion and exclusion of information in a message and the cor-‐

porate framing needs to be consistent with the outcome of the news framing, in order to

propagate an effect (Cornelissen 2011; 143-‐150, Merkelsen 2007; 236).

In 2013, these mentioned elements were seen highly relevant in the case concerning

the American electrical car brand -‐ Tesla. Tesla Motors, who designs, manufactures and

sells electric cars, has since its foundation in 2003 managed and successfully established

a strong corporate reputation as one of the leading automakers within electrical cars.

Unfortunately in 2013, the company faced public relations trouble during their launch of

the new Tesla Model S car. Despite a promising 5-‐star safety rating by the American Na-‐

tional Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), the car entered headline news,

as three Models S car fires occurred, within a timeframe of five weeks. The sequential

car fires and the negative media coverage evolved the localized incidents into a corpo-‐

rate crisis and a threat to Tesla’s organizational reputation.

The reasoning and argumentation of the problem statement will now be elaborated

and the overall problem statement including research questions will be presented.

Problem Statement As crisis situations have the potential to harm an organizations reputation and stake-‐

holder relations, proper crisis communication is designed to prevent or lessen the nega-‐

tive outcomes of a crisis. Organizations that find themselves within a crisis situation us-‐

es crisis response strategies to address a crisis with the intent to either change and in-‐

fluence stakeholders perceptions of a crisis or of the organization in crisis. Because the

media has great influence on stakeholder perceptions of a crisis and the question of

guilt, organizations try to influence the media coverage and framing of the crisis. The

influence refers to the response strategies, being words and actions derived by the or-‐

ganizations, which can be in the form of press releases and statements.


The case study presented focuses on Tesla’s effectiveness of using crisis response

strategies, in relation to the media as a stakeholder. The case study will end up with an

evaluation of Tesla’s media communication during the crisis period. To evaluate wheth-‐

er Tesla’s crisis communication has been successful or not, it makes sense to investigate

both Tesla’s own published material and the coverage presented by the media. If the

media’s coverage and framing of the crisis includes elements of crisis response strate-‐

gies presented by Tesla, an indication of successful crisis communication could be ar-‐

gued. The problem statement and the research questions are listed below, with an ex-‐

planation on the evaluation.

“Evaluation of Tesla Motors media communication during the crisis period of

the Model S car fire accidents in 2013”

RQ1. Which crisis response strategies have Tesla utilized during the crisis period?

RQ2. How is the coverage and framing of the Tesla Model S fires presented by the me-‐

dia?

RQ3. How has Tesla managed their crisis communication with the media?

An evaluation can include countless things and therefore needs to be narrowed down

to specific and tangible evaluation factors. As an overall consideration, the evaluation is

based on the researchers interpretation of text, based on published material. The speci-‐

fied research questions will function as the guiding elements for the overall problem

statement and evaluation.

The first research question contains the published material from Tesla, which include

five press releases. The text will be analyzed and interpreted, based on crisis communi-‐

cation strategy factors, presented by Coombs & Holladay.

The second research question includes the published material from the media and in-‐

cludes eighteen articles from three selected news media. The evaluation factors are

based on the use of sources and the articles tone of voice in relation to Tesla.

The third research question involves Tesla’s crisis communication with the media,

based on previous findings. It includes an overview and evaluation of Tesla’s successful-‐

ness in placing its crisis communication strategies in the media coverage. An elaboration


on how an organization should respond, according to theory will be compared to the

Tesla case, to create a more holistic view for the evaluation of the case.

Having defined the problem statement and the underlying research question, the fol-‐

lowing section includes a short overview of the theoretical framework. A more extensive

version of the theoretical framework is presented later on in the paper.

Theoretical Framework – Overview This section provides an overview of the fundamental theories that are covered with-‐

in this thesis. The theoretical framework will primarily consist of crisis communication

theory and subsequently stakeholder theory involving the media as the fundamental

elements. The theories and tables introduced in the crisis communication theory will be

used to analyze the communication strategy of Tesla Motors, during the sequential fire

accidents of the Model S car in 2013. The media related theory provides an understand-‐

ing of the media’s role and influence as stakeholder, which is relevant as the thesis in-‐

cludes a content analysis of different news media articles.

The theoretical framework starts with an introduction to crisis communication and an

exploration for a crisis definition, followed by crisis management and explanation to the

various crisis types. Secondly, the framework highlights the aspects and consequence of

a crisis on an organizations reputation including crisis history and prior reputation.

Thirdly, the framework will make an introduction to the various crisis response strate-‐

gies and elaborate on Coombs Situational Crisis Communication Theory. Fourth and fi-‐

nal, the features of media as a stakeholder, the media role and the facets of media rela-‐

tions, will be elaborated.

Social Research Strategy and Design

Research Strategy The thesis will follow the paradigmatic position of social constructionism, where social

entities are considered social constructions that are built up from the perceptions and

actions of social actors. This relates to the problem statement, as the organization’s cri-‐

sis communication is a factor that influences other social actors (stakeholders) percep-‐

tion of a crisis or the reasoning of guilt. More specifically, the focus is directed at Tesla

succeeding in influencing the social actor of the news media’s construction and framing

of the crisis. Constructionism includes that the researcher is presenting a specific ver-‐

sion of social reality, one that includes the researchers own accounts of the social world


as constructions and thereby excludes the notion of a definitive one. In general, this

means that the social world is regarded as something that people are in the process of

fashioning (Bryman 2012; 19, 32-‐33).

The epistemological considerations include the notion of what is regarded as appro-‐

priate knowledge about the social world. This thesis follows the epistemological choice

of interpretivism that respects the differences between people and the objects of the

natural sciences. Additionally, this acceptance requires the researcher to grasp the sub-‐

jective meaning of social action and thereby reflect on the distinctiveness of humans. As

the thesis includes a thorough analysis of various texts from the media and company

press releases, a hermeneutic approach is applicable and chosen. The hermeneutic ap-‐

proach helps the material to be ordered, explained and interpreted in order to make

sense of the situation and seeks to bring out the meaning of the texts from the different

authors perspective. This also means that the researcher continually revises the view of

the different parts, in order to understand and make sense of the whole (Bryman 2012;

28-‐30, 560).

The thesis follows the research strategy of qualitative research because of the empha-‐

sis of words and preference on the way in which individuals interpret their social world.

While qualitative research is typically associated with generating theories, this thesis is

predominantly using it for testing theory related to crisis communication (Bryman

2012; 36-‐37).

Considering the relationship between theory and research, the thesis follows an in-‐

ductive approach where the process involves generalizable inferences out of observa-‐

tions. The inductive process points out that theory is the outcome of research and that

observations/findings are incorporated back into existing knowledge to improve theo-‐

ries. Though, the inductive approach entails an element of deduction and vice versa, it is

seen more of a tendency, which works as a guiding element for the thesis and to support

the ontological and epistemological choices (Bryman 2012; 19,24-‐27, Ghauri &

Grønhaug 2010; 15).

In order to understand the structure and procedure, the methodological accounts will

be discussed in greater detail later on in the report.

Research Design The research design of the thesis encompasses the analysis method, selection of data

and case study design.


The analytical tools are based on two elements -‐ crisis response strategies and quali-‐

tative content analysis, which respectively include findings for the two first research

question.

The crisis response strategies will be based on Coombs & Holladay’s Situational Crisis

communication Theory (SCCT). It includes information giving strategies of instruct-‐

ing/adjusting and reputation repair strategies (response strategies) of denial, diminish-‐

ment, rebuild and reinforce (Coombs & Holladay 2012; 166). The strategies will be iden-‐

tified, based on Tesla’s press releases from their website, during the period. A more

comprehensive argumentation of Coombs crisis response strategies in the light of other

scholars will be discussed in the theoretical framework.

Qualitative research methods of content analysis are chosen as analytical tools in the

search for Coombs crisis response categories. This qualitative approach requires a close

reading of relatively small amount of texts and a re-‐articulation/interpretation of it.

These elements are important for the identification of underlying themes, which in this

case involves Tesla response strategies, use of sources and tone of voice (positive, neutral,

negative) based on data from the news articles. (Bryman 2012; 557, Krippendorf 2013;

23).

The selection of data for the case study is based on two segments:

1. Tesla press releases

2. Newspaper articles

The selection of data related to RQ1 is based on Tesla’s own communication. A total of

five press releases are collected from Tesla’s website and relates to the Tesla Model S

fire accidents.

The selection of data for the content analysis is based on eighteen articles from three

American newspaper publishers – The New York Times, Washington Post and The Los

Angeles Times. The selection of newspapers is chosen on behalf of the amount of rele-‐

vant articles related to Tesla Model S fires within the time period of Q4 ranging from

October – December in 2013.

The research of the thesis is built upon a case study research, which entails a detailed

and intensive analysis of a single case. This case study is directed toward the organiza-‐

tion of Tesla Motors and their particular product -‐ Tesla Model S car. By narrowing the

case study to a specific organization, a specific product and a definite incident or situa-‐

tion, provides the case study with the intensity to study an object with several dimen-‐


sions and thereby the opportunity to draw an integrative interpretation of the case

(Ghauri & Grønhaug 2010; 109). A more extensive elaboration on data selection and the

case study are explained in qualitative research.

Structure of the Report -‐ Overview The structure of the report is divided into three main sections. The sections include

theory, method and analysis.

The theory section refers to the theoretical framework and includes relevant theory

from crisis communication and stakeholder theory involving the media, as stated earli-‐

er. The method section refers to the methodology part, which includes the paradigmatic

considerations that relates to social constructionism. The accounts for qualitative re-‐

search and data gathering are elaborated, in relation to the case study. The analysis sec-‐

tion involves the case study findings based on the formulated research questions. The

analysis process follows the research questions in a logical order and is explained in

more detail in the following.

Initially, the case study considers the identification of crisis response strategies that

Tesla has used during the crisis period. Thereafter, the focus is directed towards the

content of the articles presented by the chosen media. At this stage, a qualitative content

analysis is conducted to indicate factors such as tone of voice, use of sources and recog-‐

nition of Tesla response strategies. Finally, a comparison of the crisis response strate-‐

gies initiated by Tesla and its presence in the media articles will be highlighted to de-‐

termine Tesla’s successfulness in placing its crisis communication in the media cover-‐

age. This section leads to the final conclusion of the overall evaluation of Tesla’s media

communication during the crisis period.


Theoretical Framework The theoretical framework outlines the relevant theory for the thesis. In an overall

perspective, it includes the fundamental theories within crisis communication and me-‐

dia relations. The theories and models included in this section will be the guiding ele-‐

ment for the analysis of the case study.

The theoretical framework is divided into four parts and it starts with an introduction

to crisis communication. Secondly, a closer look at crisis in relation to organizational

reputation is explained. Thirdly, crisis response strategies are introduced with an elabo-‐

ration on Coombs & Holladay’s Situational Crisis Communication Theory. Finally, the

role of media as stakeholder and media relations will be introduced and explained.

Crisis Definition and Theory Crisis communication has over the years addressed crisis related topics such as prod-‐

uct failure, natural disasters, terrorism, scandals and environmental crises. These differ-‐

ent types of crises happen every day and whether you represent an organization or not,

no one is immune from such crisis. A particular interest in organizational crisis has cre-‐

ated a variety of research findings and best practice observations within crisis commu-‐

nication and management. Public relation and corporate reputation experts dominate

the literature within this field (Coombs & Holladay 2012; 1, Olsson 2014; 2, Ulmer et al.

2007; 1).

Defining the term crisis can be challenging, as there is no common accepted definition

of a crisis (Coombs 2012; 2). Instead, a wide range of definitions has evolved over the

years. The understanding and complexity of the term relies not only in the theory, but

also in daily speaking where people use the word crisis on a daily basis to describe rou-‐

tine problems or bad experiences, even though it might not be a crisis (Ulmer et al.

2007; 5).

A clear definition of the crisis term is important, as it indicates how the thesis ap-‐

proaches the subject. One of the earliest and most classical definitions of crises is pre-‐

sented by Herman (1963) who describes it as “events characterized by threat, surprise, and

short response time”. This is a very broad definition, but these characteristics separate cri-‐

ses from other unpleasant events, as it involves an element of surprise, a serious level of

threat and a short response time. In addition, the level of threat highlights Coombs

(2012) distinction of incidents and crisis, where an incident is a minor, localized disrup-‐

tion, whereas, a crisis disrupts or affects the entire organization or has the potential to

do so (Coombs 2012; 3). Coombs definition of a crisis is based on common traits from


other definitions and is described as “the perception of an unpredictable event that threatens

important expectancies of stakeholders and can seriously impact an organization’s performance

and generate negative outcomes” (Coombs 2012; 2). This definition highlights that a crisis is

perceptual and that it is the perceptions of stakeholders that help define an event as a

crisis. This definition given by Coombs is preferred in this thesis, because it takes stake-‐

holders perception into account. This fits with Fishman’s (1999) reflection that a crisis

is field or context dependent as “one individual’s crisis may be another’s incident” (Heath &

O'Hair 2010; 42). Apart from stakeholder perception and expectations, it also highlights

that a crisis is unpredictable but not unexpected and has the potential to create negative

outcomes. Until now, crisis is referred to as bad experiences which this thesis tend to

follow, but other literature within crisis communication research support the idea that

crisis has the possibility to produce opportunities (Brock et al. 2001 in Heath & O’Hair

2010; 42) and relates crises to unique moments in the history of organizations (Ulmer et

al. 2007; 5). As a final remark to crisis definition, Robert L. Heath connects crises with

the importance of media relations. He points out that media reporting define and make

salient the conditions of crisis, by stating that “crisis is dramatic; it is newsworthy” (Coombs

& Holladay 2012; 1). By this, the media is an important stakeholder, when in a crisis sit-‐

uation.

Crisis Management is the term for common practice when dealing with crisis in or-‐

ganizations. As with the definition of a crisis, the term Crisis Management has been vari-‐

ously defined by different authors, as well as the approach. It can be seen as a strategic

plan for properly handling crises and as an ongoing process that eliminates uncertainty.

One thing that is consistent within the literature is the idea that a crisis has an identifia-‐

ble life cycle, where the life cycle has different phases that require different actions

(Coombs 2012; 6). An understandable definition is conducted by Gonzalez-‐Herrero

(1994) who defines crisis management as “the ability of an organization to plan for a turning

point in order to prevent negative consequences from occurring and to enable itself to deal quickly,

efficiently and effectively with contingency operations, if necessary” (Brønn & Berg 2011; 249).

Coombs (2012) introduces crisis management as four factors – prevention, prepara-‐

tion, response and revision, which seeks to prevent or lessen the crisis outcome and

thereby protect not only the organization, but also stakeholders and the industry from a

potential harm. In addition to stakeholders, it is worth mentioning that crises have the

potential to create a new category of stakeholders -‐ victims, who expect an organization

to express sympathy and concern for them. The crisis management factors correspond


to different stages in the crisis life cycle, which is also referred to as staged approaches

to crisis management (Coombs 2012; 5-‐6, 151).

Several approaches to crisis management have emerged over the years, but it is in

particular three approaches that have been influential and widely used. The models are

Fink’s (1986) four-‐stage model, Mitroff’s (1994) five-‐stage model, and a well-‐known

three-‐stage model with no identifiable author. All three approaches describe stages or

phases in the crisis life cycle and can be linked with each other, as illustrated below

(Coombs 2012; 7-‐10, Heath & O'Hair 2010; 43).

Table 1 Crisis Periods

Source: (Coombs 2012; 10)

The three-‐stage approach will be elaborated as it has been used as a meta-‐model by a

variety of crisis management experts (Meyers 1986; Birch 1994; Guth 1995; Seeger,

Sellnow, & Ulmer 2003; Coombs 2012). Each of the three stages has different sub-‐stages

or protocols of actions that should be covered, in order to perpetuate proper crisis

communication effectively.

The precrisis stage involves signal detection and the two first crisis management fac-‐

tors presented by Coombs – crisis prevention and preparation. This stage involves ac-‐

tions prior to a crisis, such as identification of warning signs, preventative measures

such as issues, risk and reputation management and finally preparation of creating crisis

teams and a crisis management plan.

The crisis stage involves crisis recognition and crisis containment, which includes the

third factor -‐ response, presented by Coombs. This stage involves actions during a crisis

and starts with a triggering event. At this stage the organizations must acknowledge that


a crisis exist and respond to the event by communicating with stakeholders with words

and actions. The crisis containment includes the crisis response strategies during the

actual crisis. Part of the response also includes recovery that symbolizes the organiza-‐

tions attempt to return to normal operations. At this stage communication relationships

and reputational management are important elements.

The postcrisis stage involves the last factor – revision, presented by Coombs and con-‐

tains the actions of when a crisis is resolved. At this stage, it is important to evaluate and

improve the effectiveness of the crisis management, to make the organization better

suited for potential future crises. This stage also includes ensuring that stakeholders’

hold a positive impression of the organization and their handling of the crisis, as well as

securing that the crisis is correctly dismissed (Coombs 2012; 5,11-‐12).

When dealing with organizational crisis, the list of potential crises is exceptionally

long and in most cases it is unique to the organization. Determining the type of crisis

that exists for an organization is an important element, as Coombs argue, “Different crises

can necessitate the use of different crisis team members, emphasize different stakeholders, and war-‐

rant different crisis response strategies” (Coombs 2012; 72). So instead of making an entire

list of potential crises, experts within crisis communication define crises, based on cate-‐

gories and identifiable types. Lee (2005) argues that the various types and categoriza-‐

tion is both a weakness and strength, as it shows the lack of coherence within the crisis

literature, whereas it has strength, due to greater potential breadth in the study (Bell

2010; 147).

Ulmer, Sellnow, & Seeger (2007) use a very simple categorization and distinct crisis

types, which fall into two categories – intentional and unintentional (Ulmer et al. 2007;

147). Another way of categorizing crisis types is based on Mitroff et al. (1987), who has

made a matrix. The matrix differentiates corporate crises between (1) internally and

externally to the organization and (2) caused by either technical/economical break-‐

downs or people/social/organizational breakdowns (Brønn & Berg 2011; 248-‐249).

Coombs has taken a different approach, by taking various crisis typologies within crisis

literature and synthesized it into a master list of ten identifiable crisis types. These ten

types of crises can then be arranged into three clusters based on the level of responsibil-‐

ity (Coombs 2012; 73, 158).

The first cluster of crisis types is named the victim cluster as it withholds very little at-‐

tribution of crisis responsibility of the organization, where the organization is also a vic-‐


tim in the crisis (Bell 2010; 150, Coombs 2012; 73,158). Four types of crises are present

in this cluster:

• Natural disasters – when an organization is damaged as a result of the weather

or “acts of God” such as earthquakes, storms etc.

• Rumors – when false or misleading information is purposefully circulated about

an organization or its product in order to harm the organization

• Workplace violence – when an employee commits violence against other em-‐

ployees at organizational property

• Malevolence – when outside actors or opponents employ extreme tactics to at-‐

tack the organization, such as product tampering, terrorism etc.

The second cluster of crisis types is the accidental cluster and it includes low attribu-‐

tion of crisis responsibility, because the organization’s actions were unintentional (ibid).

Three types of crises are present in this cluster:

• Challenges – when the organization is confronted by unhappy stakeholders with

claims that it is operating in an inappropriate way

• Technical-‐error accidents – when organizational technology fails and causes an

industrial accident

• Technical-‐error product harm – when organizational technology fails and results

in a defect or potentially harmful product

The third and final cluster is the preventable cluster, which includes strong attribu-‐

tions of crisis responsibility, as the organization knowingly placed people at risk (ibid).

Three types of crises are present in this cluster:

• Human-‐error accidents – when human error causes an accident

• Human-‐error product harm – when human error results in a defect or potentially

harmful product

• Organizational misdeeds – when management takes actions it knows may place

stakeholders at risk or knowingly violates the law


Organizational Reputation and Crisis Threat It is commonly accepted by authors and experts within crisis communication that a

crisis, no matter the type, can demolish trust and belief in an organization and impact its

reputation (Brønn & Berg 2011; 257). In the most basic form, reputation is an evalua-‐

tion of the organization and it refers to how stakeholders perceive the organization. It is

seen as an extremely valuable intangible resource, as it aids the organizations in a varie-‐

ty of ways. A positive organizational reputation helps attracting customers, investors,

top employee talent and generates more positive media coverage. Reputation is built

through organizational-‐stakeholder relationships and relates to the direct and indirect

(mediated) experiences that stakeholders have with the organization. Direct experience

includes for example buying a product, visiting a store, or using a service, while indirect

or mediated experience relates to messages from the organization, word-‐of-‐mouth,

online messages and media coverage about the organization. Fombrun & Van Riel

(2003) explains organizational reputation as either favorable or unfavorable depending

on the level of positive/negative interaction. Because crisis can be seen as a threat to

organizational reputation, proper crisis management is needed. Crisis response strate-‐

gies are argued as a mechanism for protecting the reputational resource, which will be

explained in the following heading (Coombs 2012; 14, Heath & O'Hair 2010; 107,

Coombs & Holladay 2012; 58).

An organization’s reputation before a crisis plays a significant role in crisis manage-‐

ment and for the evaluation of reputational threat. Coombs & Holladay (2002; 2004;

2006) have introduced two terms, each with different meanings that relates to prior

reputation – the Velcro effect and the Halo effect.

If an organization has experienced similar crises in the past or has a negative prior

reputation, the present crisis will be of much greater reputational threat. This means

that stakeholders change perception of the crisis and thereby attribution of crisis re-‐

sponsibility. Ultimately, this means that stakeholders treat victim crisis like an acci-‐

dental crisis and an accidental crisis like an intentional crisis. This is being termed as the

Velcro effect (Coombs 2012; 158, Heath & O'Hair 2010; 111, Coombs & Holladay 2012;

58-‐59).

In theory, the term halo effect claims that a positive reputation will shield an organi-‐

zation from reputational damage during a crisis. Unfortunately, the shield effect has not

yet been demonstrated by any research, as researchers has concluded that a crisis will

cause some reputational damage no matter if a positive prior reputation exist. The halo

effect is though described effectively by Alsop (2004), who argues “a positive prior reputa-‐


tion may allow for a quicker recovery of a reputation from crisis damage and may give an organiza-‐

tion the benefit of the doubt of stakeholders”. This means that the halo effect can perpetuate a

“benefit of the doubt” effect for organizations with a prior good reputation, if the crisis

communication effort is correctly executed (Coombs & Holladay 2012; 59, Johansen &

Frandsen 2008; 240-‐241).

Crisis Response Strategies The crisis response phase starts when a crisis hits an organization and involves the

management’s handling of the crisis and its attempts to return to normal operations.

The literature within crisis response communication is described as robust but disjoint-‐

ed by Coombs, as various researchers and practitioners have represented different per-‐

spectives. This has led to a categorization of the crisis research (Heath & O'Hair 2010;

103).

Johansen & Frandsen (2008) distinguish crisis communication research between text-‐

oriented and context-‐oriented traditions (Johansen & Frandsen 2008; 200-‐201).

The text-‐oriented research tradition deal with the rhetorical aspect of crisis commu-‐

nication where the focus is placed on the textual element of an organizations’ communi-‐

cation during a crisis situation. This tradition is mainly inspired by apologia research

that derives from genre theory in rhetoric, where the focus is on defensive strategies

and self-‐defense of one’s character following accusations of wrongdoing. Another inspi-‐

rational research within this tradition includes issues management where legitimacy

and social rules play an important part in the control of self-‐presentation and by the im-‐

pression that is formed by others. This tradition represents various researchers (Ice

1991; Allen & Caillouet 1994; Benoits 1995; Hearit 2006), where especially William Be-‐

noits’ (1995) theory of image restoration has been widely cited and used (Johansen &

Frandsen 2008; 200-‐201, Heath & O'Hair 2010; 107-‐108).

The context-‐oriented tradition focus on the strategical aspect and includes the crisis

situation in a broader perspective. To understand and effectively manage crisis commu-‐

nication factors of crisis type, crisis extent, decision-‐making processes and stakeholders

attribution of crisis responsibility, needs to be considered. Crisis management, reputa-‐

tion management and public relations mainly inspire this tradition. This tradition also

represent various researchers (Sturges 1994; Coombs 1999; Seeger, Sellnow & Ulmer

2003), where Timothy Coombs is one of the most cited and well-‐known authors within

the crisis field, due to his contribution of Situational Crisis Communication Theory (Jo-‐

hansen & Frandsen 2008; 201-‐202).


The elaboration of crisis communication research traditions provides an understand-‐

ing for the crisis response communication. Coombs divides crisis response communica-‐

tion into form and content, where form represents how an organization should respond

and content refers to what and organizations says and does (Heath & O'Hair 2010; 103-‐

5).

Form represents four key features that will be elaborated:

• Be quick

• Avoid “no comment”

• Be accurate

• Be consistent (speak with one voice)

First of all, organizations need to respond quickly to a crisis, because stakeholders

need to know the circumstances and what is happening about the crisis. It is especially

the stakeholder of news media that needs information and if the organization does not

provide a quick response, the media will find other sources of information to cover the

crisis. This lack of response can result in bad publicity for the organization, as the story

can be inaccurately framed by other sources and thereby harm the organization in a

negative way. The need for organizational crisis response has been intensified over the

years, as the Internet and the 24 hours news cycle has advanced. Secondly, Kempner

(1995) argues that a spokesperson at no point in the crisis response must say the word

“no comment”, because, in the minds of stakeholders, this means that you are guilty and

tries to hide something. Thirdly, organizations must not only deliver a quick response,

the information that is responded also needs to be accurate. Waiting for accurate in-‐

formation to respond to stakeholders with, is more important than delivering a quick

inaccurate response. Fourth and final, consistency in the organizations’ crisis response

messages is a critical factor. In a crisis situation, the news media require information

from experts and normally this require more than one spokesperson from the organiza-‐

tion. So for an organization to speak consistent and “with one voice”, members within

the organization needs to be kept well informed (ibid).

Content represent three prioritized goals of crisis communication response, which

will be explained:

1. Preventing and minimizing damage

2. Maintaining the organization’s operations

3. Reputation repair


The first priority is to protect the people inflicted in the crisis, being the victim stake-‐

holder. At this stage, Sturges (1994) highlights the information giving strategies of in-‐

structing and adjusting, as appropriate of use. Instructing information focuses on telling

stakeholders what to do to protect them physically and financially from the crisis. Ad-‐

justing information focuses on the psychological aspects of informing stakeholder of

what happened by answering the what, when, where, why, and how questions of the cri-‐

sis. This is to avoid uncertainty and to reduce the stress element of the stakeholders. Ad-‐

justing information includes a summary of the crisis event, an outline of the organiza-‐

tion’s corrective actions to prevent future crises and acknowledgement to victims in

some way, by showing compassion, sympathy and regret. The second step is to organize

and maintain business operations, known as business continuity, since crises can dam-‐

age the financial aspects as well as harming people and reputation. At this stage, in-‐

structing information is applicable to inform employees on how work will be affected

and the plan for maintaining operations. The last step considers the reputational repair,

followed by a crisis (Heath & O'Hair 2010; 105-‐107, Coombs 2012; 146-‐152). The crisis

response strategies used to counter reputational threat will be elaborated in more de-‐

tail, in the following, as it is an important part of the theory for the thesis.

When it comes to crisis response strategies in relation to reputational threat, three

researchers work (Allen & Caillouet 1994; Benoit 1995; Coombs 1995, 2007a in Heath &

O'Hair 2010; 108-‐109) have influenced the crisis communication literature. A short in-‐

troduction of the two first researchers will be outlined, while a larger emphasis on

Coombs SCCT strategies is shown, as it is used in the case study.

Allen & Caillouet (1994) has provided a list of seven crisis response strategies, based

on impression literature. The response strategies are used to rebuild legitimacy, be-‐

cause it is argued that crises threatens legitimacy by violating the social rules. The re-‐

search from impression management has expanded the number of crisis response strat-‐

egies beyond those from corporate apologia theory (ibid).

Benoit (1995) has developed a list of five basic crisis response strategies, based on

image restoration/repair theory. He notes that organizations have reputations (images)

that are valuable to the organization and warrant protection when threatened (Coombs

et al. 2010; 340). The theory is based on a mix of rhetoric, apologia and account, which

relates to how people justify their actions. The image restoration theory is not designed

explicitly for crisis management, but has been used in a variety of crisis cases (Heath &

O'Hair 2010; 108-‐109).


Coombs has named his crisis communication research Situational Crisis Communica-‐

tion Theory (SCCT), which focuses on identifying the crisis response strategy that best

fits with the given crisis situation. The SCCT applies attribution theory, which Weiner

(1986) clarifies as being “based on the belief that people assign responsibility for negative, unex-‐

pected events” (Coombs 2012; 152). Because crises are negative and unexpected, this

means that stakeholders will make attributions about the crisis cause. This means that

the stronger the attributions of crisis responsibility, the greater the damage a crisis can

inflict on an organizations reputation. The SCCT is chosen because it is different from

the other reputation repair research highlighted. It takes point of departure in previous-‐

ly defined crisis response strategies, like for example Benoit (1995) and organizes it by

the help of attribution theory. Instead of focusing on apologia, impression management

and image restoration theory, SCCT focuses on experimental designs, to highlight the

most common strategies and to generate recommended guidelines. This makes the SCCT

more of a predictive approach, compared to other approaches (Coombs 2012; 152-‐154,

Heath & O'Hair 2010; 109-‐111). The crisis response strategies are illustrated below and

will be explained in more detail.

Table 2 -‐ SCCT Crisis Response Strategies

Source: Heath & O'Hair 2010; 111

TABLE5.4 SCCT Crisis Response Strategies by Posture

Deny Posture Attack the accuser. crisis manager confronts the person or group claiming somethidg is wrong with the organization. "The organization threatened to sue the people who claim a crisis occurred."

Denial: crisis manager asserts that there is no crisis. ''The organization said that no crisis event occurred."

Scapegoat: crisis manager blames some person or group outside of the organization for the crisis. ''The organization blamed the supplier for the crisis."

Diminish Posture '---"'

Excuse: crisis manager minimizes organizational responsibility by denying intent to do harm and/or claiming inability to control the events that triggered the crisis. ''The organization said it did not intend for the crisis to occur and that accidents happen as part of the operation of any organization." Justification: crisis manager minimizes the perceived damage caused by the crisis. ''The organization said the damage and injuries from the crisis were very minor."

Rebuild Posture Compensation: crisis manager offers money or other gifts to victims. 'The organization offered money and products as compensation."

Apol.ogy: crisis manager indicates the organization takes full responsibility for the crisis and asks stakeholders for forgiveness. ''The organization publicly accepted full responsibility for the crisis and asked stakeholders to forgive the mistake."

Bolstering Posture Reminder. tell stakeholders about the past good works of the organization. "The organization restated its recent work to improve K-12 education."

Ingratiation: crisis manager praises stakeholders and/or reminds them of past good works by the organization. 'The organization thanked stakeholders for their help and reminded stakeholders of the organization's past effort to help the community and to improve the environment."


The SCCT crisis response strategies are organized in four groups/postures, based on

whether they are used for altering the perception of the crisis or the organization in cri-‐

sis (ibid).

The first group is the deny posture and it involves removing any connection between

the organization and the crisis. Three crisis response strategies are included in this pos-‐

ture – attack the accuser, denial and scapegoat.

• Attack the accuser: confronts the person or group that claims that a crisis exists.

• Denial: asserts that no crisis exist

• Scapegoat: blames some person or group outside of the organization for turning

this into a crisis

The second group is the diminish posture and is connected with reducing the organi-‐

zation’s crisis responsibility or the negative impact of the crisis. Two crisis response

strategies are included in this posture – excuse and justification.

• Excuse: minimizes the organization’s responsibility for the crisis by denying in-‐

tent to do harm or claiming that the organization had no control of the events

• Justification: minimizes the perceived damage caused by the crisis (the crisis

isn’t that bad)

The third group is the rebuild posture, which represent the direct efforts to improve

the organizational reputation and includes positive actions toward stakeholders. Two

crisis response strategies are included in this posture – compensation and apology.

• Compensation: the organization provides money or other gifts to the victims

• Apology: indicates the organization takes full responsibility for the crisis and

asks for forgiveness

The last group is the bolstering posture, which is seen as a supplemental, secondary

strategy that should only be used in conjunction with the other three postures. Positive

stakeholder relationships can here be helpful to protect organizational reputation or to

improve relationships. Three crisis response strategies are included in this posture –

reminder, ingratiation and victimage. The last response strategy – victimage, is included

from Coombs (2012; 155).


• Reminding: the organization tells stakeholders of their past good works

• Ingratiation: the organization praises stakeholders

• Victimage: the organization explains how it too is a victim of the crisis

The crisis response strategies are one part of the SCCT that now has been covered.

Another part of SCCT is to evaluate the reputational threat during a crisis, which con-‐

sists of three parts. It is based on the crisis type, crisis history and prior reputation,

which have already been covered earlier. Once the reputational threat is assessed, the

organization can select the recommended crisis response strategy, based on a recom-‐

mendation list from SCCT. Followed by the recommendation list, it is argued that as the

reputational threat increases, the organization’s response should be more directed at

the victim(s) and should take more responsibility for the crisis. This form of response is

termed accommodative strategy; where the rebuild posture is the most accommodative

followed by diminish posture (Coombs 2012; 158, Heath & O’Hair 2010; 111-‐112). The

crisis response recommendations list is shown below.

Table 3 -‐ SCCT Crisis Response Recommendations

Source: Heath & O'Hair 2010; 112

Role of Media as Stakeholder Having highlighted the crisis communication literature in the previous parts, this sec-‐

tion focuses on the role of the media. In a crisis situation, the media plays a significant

role, as the general public and stakeholders tend to rely on media reports for infor-‐

mation. This means that organizations need to understand how media organizations and

the journalistic processes work, in order to develop effective crisis communication


strategies that influence the media news coverage. The section outlines the features of

media as a stakeholder, the media role, and the facets of media relations that involve

managing communication and relationships with the media (Cornelissen 2012; 143).

Media as Stakeholder Before elaborating on the features of media as stakeholder, a short clarification on the

stakeholder definition and its theory is provided. Freeman (1984) presents one of the

earliest and most standardized definitions of a stakeholder, which has been adopted by

various researchers in stakeholder theory. He argues, “A stakeholder is any group or individ-‐

ual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organization’s purpose and objectives”

(Friedman & Miles 2006; 5; Cornelissen 2012; 42). This broad definition highlights the

fact that an organization and its environment are populated by various groups of stake-‐

holders that have an interest in the organization. The importance of managing these

stakeholders is an essential part for any organization, in order to survive. Coombs

(2004) highlights stakeholder management in relation to reputation by stating; “organi-‐

zations build favorable relationship histories that create positive reputations, by meeting and ex-‐

ceeding stakeholder expectations” (Coombs 2012; 36). Clarkson (1991) assess stakeholders

into primary and secondary stakeholders, depending on whether they are economic or

moral in nature. Primary stakeholders are persons or groups that are important for fi-‐

nancial operations and necessary for a company to survive, being customers, employees,

investors and suppliers. These types of stakeholders are powerful, because they can

stop organizations’ operations. Secondary stakeholder groups are more moral in nature

and defined as influencers, who can affect or is affected by the organizations actions.

These types of stakeholders typically include the media, along with activist groups and

competitors. In short, they have the capacity to influence public opinion in favor of, or

against an organizations performance. The news media is therefore seen, by organiza-‐

tions, as a channel for reaching other stakeholders rather than as a stakeholder itself.

Both primary and secondary stakeholders are important, as they can create a crisis for

an organization and potentially damage an organizations reputation (Coombs 2012; 36-‐

39, Cornelissen 2012; 43).

The Media Role Having discussed the media in relation to stakeholder theory, it is now relevant to

elaborate on the media role. As a starting point, the media term refers to a broad range

of options with various kinds of media such as newspaper, magazines, television and

radio. These are referred to as mass media, because they target a large portion of the

general public and not necessarily specific stakeholder groups. The mass media is rep-‐


resented in all countries and can be segmented further into local, national and interna-‐

tional coverage, depending on which part of the world you live in. The media types can

also be referred to as specialized media, if it is directed at special interest groups or a

specific geographical basis (Brønn & Berg 2011; 261-‐262).

A closer look at the media role and powers will provide an understanding of how the

media and the journalistic process work. One of the most powerful effects of the media,

concerns public opinion and the media’s role of agenda setting. The media set the public

agenda by selecting the news stories and by making decisions about how to display the

stories. With the selection and placement of stories and the rejection of other, the media

provides the public with cues about the important issues of the day. The news media are

described by McCombs (1991) as the parents of public opinion on many issues, because;

“they give birth to issues, and they have some influence on the direction of their offspring”. This

essentially means that the media practices an indirect power, as they select the issues

that the public needs to think about (McCombs et al. 1991; 7-‐9, Merkelsen 2007; 236).

In relation to the role of agenda setting, the terms framing and gatekeeping are repre-‐

sented, when dealing with the media.

Framing refers to the processes of inclusion and exclusion of information in a mes-‐

sage and about the way in which news is selectively portrayed by the media. Each jour-‐

nalist has their own agenda and they frame news in accordance to the media organiza-‐

tions news routine and ideology. News routine highlights the media writing process,

which involves not only the journalist writing the story, but other influential people

such as copy-‐editor, layout specialist and newspaper-‐editor that can affect the outcome

of the story. Ideology refers to the media organization’s principles and values or political

orientation. Kosicki & Pan (1996) underlines the various journalists agendas but also

highlights the importance of sources in framing a story in claims, “Media can also affect the

way issues are framed through the choices of journalists who cover a story, and those who may be

chosen as sources” (Botan & Hazleton 2006; 283). This underlines the various journalists’

agendas but also highlights the importance of sources in framing a story. This media

way of framing is termed the news framing. On the other hand, organizations use fram-‐

ing as well, in their communication with the media and the general public. In a crisis sit-‐

uation, the organizations frame the crisis event in a way that is of interest for the organ-‐

ization, which is termed the corporate framing. This introduces the second term gate-‐

keeping, as the media has no obligation to pay attention to the corporate frame messag-‐

es. The media acts as gatekeepers and decides whether or not the corporate frame is to

be included in the news story or not. Media relations play a crucial role in the success of


placing the corporate framed message in the media story (Cornelissen 2012; 144-‐149,

Brønn & Berg 2011; 262).

As a conclusive element, the media possess the power of third party endorsement,

which can be rewarding for organizations in their efforts of getting favorable media cov-‐

erage. The media’s objectivity and gatekeeping role heightens the validity of the story

compared to an organization’s own published material. This power of the media is de-‐

scribed by Brønn & Berg as; “if an unbiased, objective third party reports it as fact, then it must

be true” (Brønn & Berg 2011; 262).

Media Relations From an organizational viewpoint, a professional working relationship with the me-‐

dia is important, as media coverage has a strong influence on the corporate reputation.

One of the main points in media relations is to establish good relations with journalists.

Research by Yankelovich Media viewpoint (1996) shows that the majority of journalists

with questions regarding a specific field, will contact an organization where they already

have good contacts. Being available and delivering quick response together with hones-‐

ty, openness and consistency are the main important factors for good relations with the

media (Brønn & Berg 2011; 265, 271, Coombs & Holladay 2012; 162).

Another central role in media relations is the role of the spokesperson. First of all, the

CEO of a company is the most important representative for an organization. Journalists

are always more interested in the CEO than to other spokespersons of the organization,

because he brings authority to the news story and that he is more likely to speak freely,

due to his independence. The CEO image is another important aspect in media relations,

because how the CEO is viewed becomes how the organization is viewed. This is a result

of an increasing person-‐orientation in business journalism (Brønn & Berg 2011;

266,269,271). Secondly, the media will seek alternative sources of information, if an or-‐

ganization and spokespersons fails to establish presence with journalists. In a crisis sit-‐

uation this can influence the perception that the organization is not in control of the sit-‐

uation or that it is hiding information. Lack of organizational response also means that

the media framing of the story will feature other sources such as first responders (fire-‐

men, policemen, emergency teams) or unofficial spokespersons (employees). The first

responders represent their own department and provide the factual information of a

crisis. The media can use this factual information to convey or frame the crisis in both

unfavorable and favorable manner, depending on the media relations and the effective-‐

ness of the organizations spokespersons (Coombs & Holladay 2012; 162-‐163).


Methodology As stated in the introduction, the thesis follows the interpretive paradigmatic position

of social constructionism. As the thesis involves Tesla’s media communication during a

crisis event, perspectives on public opinion are appropriate to highlight.

First of all, Ferguson (2000) argues that "Social constructionist believe that people create

their own realities through interacting with others and through co-‐constructing and living sto-‐

ries"(Ferguson 2000; 8). This fits with the interpretive acceptance of the researcher to

grasp subjective meaning of social actions and the exclusion of a definitive reality or

truth, as mentioned earlier. This also means that people can view an accident differently,

even though they are referring to the same accident. In addition to multiple truths, she

identifies social constructionist as "Curious about the world, they believe in participating ac-‐

tively in a quest for greater understanding" (ibid), which underlines the interpretive element

and the hermeneutic principle of the researcher to understand and make sense of the

whole. To evaluate Tesla’s media communication, the researcher needs to understand

the complex whole from the meaning of its parts, which form the principle of the her-‐

meneutic circle (Fuglsang et al. 2013; 292). So to identify crisis response strategies in

the empirical text material, an understanding of the text as a whole and an interpreta-‐

tion of its parts are essential.

Secondly, the social constructionist approach recognizes the media’s power and influ-‐

ence on public opinion, where Ferguson (2000) claims "The social constructionist approach

views public opinion as malleable and subject to manipulation by those in power" (Ferguson

2000; 8). This is an important element in crisis communication and for the definition of

a crisis, because it is the perception of stakeholders that help define an event as a crisis

(Coombs 2012; 2).

Finally, social constructionists acknowledge the salience of various stakeholders to an

organization, related to their degree of power, legitimacy and urgency. It also highlights

that stakeholders and public opinion are continuously influenced by social discourses,

like the news media. The pragmatic philosophers Machiavelli & Hegel note this by say-‐

ing, "Constructionists recognize the existence of many different publics with varying degrees of in-‐

fluence. These publics have distinct views that, although constantly changing and evolving through

the social and political discourse of the day, have the potential to impact on positions of leadership

at any given moment in time" (Ferguson 2000; 8-‐9). Alternatively, the media can be viewed

as a public or in a corporate term, a stakeholder and its distinct view can also be influ-‐

enced by the social discourses of others. This is a central element for the thesis, as it re-‐

lates to the evaluation and effectiveness of Tesla’s media communication.


Having described the social constructionism in relation to public opinion and stake-‐

holders, it is relevant to feature its influence during the analysis of the case study of Tes-‐

la. As previously mentioned, the analysis is characterized by the interpretation of the

author and the research findings are therefore based on qualitative research.

Qualitative Research The case study focuses on Tesla’s use of crisis response strategies. The aim of the the-‐

sis is to determine Tesla’s successfulness of placing crisis response strategies in the me-‐

dia coverage and thereby evaluate on Tesla’s media communication during the crisis

period. In order to do so, qualitative approaches to content analysis is applicable, as the

data gathering involves readings and interpretation of textual material. The elements of

case study, data gathering and qualitative approach are explained in more detail.

The case study design is known to favor qualitative methods or mixed methods, as

they provide detailed and intensive examination of a particular case. Whether case stud-‐

ies are suitable or not depends on the research problem and the objective, but in general

it is useful for testing and developing theory. In this particular case of Tesla, the focus is

directed at testing theory within crisis communication, rather than developing theory.

Having chosen case study as research design, factors of reliability, validity and type of

case are relevant to highlight. First of all, case studies follow an idiographic approach,

meaning the researcher exposes the unique features of the case, which makes it difficult

to conclude Tesla findings that represent typical cases, in a broader perspective. Second-‐

ly, Yin (2009) distinguish between five different types of cases, where the case study of

this thesis can be viewed as a combination of two different case study types – repre-‐

sentative and longitudinal. The representative case underlines a broader category of

cases and a commonplace situation, which is conveyed in the Tesla case, where organi-‐

zations within a crisis situation are naturally observed under a microscopic lens, espe-‐

cially by the media. The longitudinal case element is present because the case is being

studied over a lengthy period of three months, in order to fully substantiate the crisis

extent (Bryman 2012; 66-‐71, Ghauri & Grønhaug 2010; 109-‐110).

The qualitative data is based on a gathering of news articles from a selection of media

articles and Tesla press releases.

As the mass media contains a variety of outputs like television, radio, newspaper and

interviews, the selection of data can be comprehensive and difficult to manage. The case

study focuses on the media output of newspaper articles both in printed and online for-‐


mat. The exclusion of other mass media types may reduce the scope and extent of the

study, but captures the essential elements, perceived in the written form of articles. This

fits with the requirements of qualitative approaches to content analysis, as “They require

a close reading of relatively small amounts of textual matter” (Krippendorff 2013; 23). As men-‐

tioned in the introduction, the selection of data is based on a total of eighteen articles

from three American newspaper publishers – The New York Times, Washington Post

and The Los Angeles Times. The selection of newspapers is chosen on behalf of the

amount of relevant articles related to Tesla Model S fires within the time period of Q4

ranging from October – December in 2013. The main source of information and articles

was gathered via the LexisNexis database, by searching for specific keywords like “Tes-‐

la” + “Model S” + “Fire”, within the specified timeframe. The database search indicated

the various newspapers coverage of the topic. In order to choose the relevant media, the

selection criterions about publish size, nationality, web ranking and amount of coverage

became relevant. As the three Tesla fire accidents respectively occurred in USA and

Mexico, the selection of data was limited to American newspapers, which naturally had

the vast amount of coverage. Additionally, all three newspapers are listed within the top

10 most visited and popular websites among 200 worldwide newspapers, based on a

web ranking algorithm that involves three different search engines, including Google

page rank (4imn 2014).

The additional part of the qualitative data concerns Tesla’s own press releases, which

is gathered from Tesla’s own corporate website – www.teslamotors.com. The website

includes a blog section, which works as an online newsroom for Tesla’s published mate-‐

rial. A thorough website screening within the specified timeframe, has resulted in a col-‐

lection of 5 press releases related to the Tesla Model S fire accidents.

The qualitative approach of the case study starts with a discourse analysis of Tesla’s

five press releases ranging from October 4th until December 23rd. The discourse analysis

is useful as it is concerned with text above the level of sentences and focuses on how

particular phenomena are represented in the text (Krippendorff 2013; 22). In this case,

the phenomena are directed at crisis response strategies and in order to identify Tesla’s

response strategies, an exploration of the whole text and not just words and a few sen-‐

tences, is needed.

As the crisis response strategies are based on Tesla’s argumentation, the qualitative

approach of Tesla’s press releases includes elements of rhetorical detail, as it focuses on

how messages and arguments are delivered and with what (intended and actual) effects.

The attention to rhetorical detail and how arguments are constructed will guide the re-‐


searchers interpretation of the text, to identify the response strategies (Bryman 2012;

535, Krippendorff 2013; 22). The analytical procedure for the discourse analysis is in

this case predefined, where the categorization is based on the crisis communication

strategies presented by Coombs. An example of a discourse analysis is shown in appen-‐

dix 4.1.

Having identified the communication strategies in the press releases with the help

from discourse analysis, the focus is directed upon the media coverage. A qualitative

content analysis will be conducted, to determine the media coverage and framing of the

crisis and to identify possible Tesla response strategies in the news articles. The media

coverage is based on eighteen articles ranging from October 2nd until December 26th.

First of all, qualitative content analysis is chosen as it is labeled interpretive and

acknowledges working within the hermeneutic circle, where social and cultural under-‐

standings constitutively participate (Krippendorff 2013; 23). This fits with the methodo-‐

logical considerations of social constructionism, as stated earlier.

Secondly, Bryman notes that qualitative content analysis is a strategy that involves a

searching-‐out for underlying themes in the materials being analyzed. In this case, the

content analysis is primarily used for the news articles to highlight underlying themes in

the form of response strategies and tone of voice (Bryman 2012; 557).

Finally, content analysis can be used for a variety of purposes and according to Weber

(1985), there is no simple right way to do content analysis and it is therefore up to the

researcher to find an appropriate method for the specific problem. He argues that con-‐

tent analysis is a research methodology that “utilizes a set of procedure to make valid infer-‐

ences from text” (Weber 1985; 9). In order to make valid inferences from the text, factors

of reliability and classification procedure are important. Krippendorff distinguishes be-‐

tween three types of reliability – stability, reproducibility and accuracy, where the two

first types are worth mentioning in relation to the case. Stability is achieved when the

same content is coded more than once by the same coder. In this case, the hermeneutic

circle principle helps to establish stability, as the content is re-‐analyzed and interpreted

until an understanding of the whole and its parts is consistent. Reproducibility is a

measure of the degree to which content classification produces the same result when

the text is coded by more than one coder. Because the content is analyzed and interpret-‐

ed by only one researcher, the content analysis will not be able to detect interobservable

differences and therefore not contain the reliability of reproducibility (Weber 1985; 16-‐

17, Krippendorff 2013; 270-‐271).


The classification procedure in this case refers to the coding scheme of the content

analysis. Despite that larger portions of text are more difficult to code as a unit, because

they contain more information, the recording unit for the content analysis is based on

sentence, paragraph and whole text. To identify response strategies, the recording unit

needs to include more than a specific word, to obtain proper understanding and inter-‐

pretation of the content. The whole text is used to define the tone of voice, in relation to

whether the text is favorable, neutral or unfavorable toward Tesla (Weber 1985; 16,40).

The recording unit of other sources helps define the tone of the article, as well as high-‐

lighting the media’s use of various sources, when writing a news article. The content

analysis is based on the following categories and an example of a content analysis is

shown in appendix 5.1.

• Number – The code for article reference.

• Date – The date the article was published.

• Media -‐ The media that published the article.

• Headline – The title of the article.

• Author(s) – The name of the author(s) of the text.

• Other sources – Does the article include other sources than tesla and how is the

source information presented toward Tesla?

o Favorable sources

o Neutral sources

o Negative sources

• Tone of voice – Is the article written in a favorable, neutral or unfavorable

manner toward Tesla?

• Information giving strategies – Does the article include Tesla information giv-‐

ing strategies?

o Instructing information

o Adjusting information

• Reputation repair strategies – Does the article include Tesla reputation repair

strategies?

o Deny

o Diminish

o Rebuild

o Bolstering


Summary The theoretical framework started with an elaboration on the crisis definition, which

highlighted that a crisis is perceptual and that it is the perception of stakeholders that

helps determine an event as a crisis. Secondly, crisis management and the three-‐stage

approach were introduced to understand the protocols and action for the different crisis

stages. Thirdly, ten identifiable crisis types were highlighted and divided into clusters,

based on stakeholders’ attribution of crisis responsibility. Fourthly, it was mentioned

that organizational reputation refers to how stakeholders perceive an organization,

based on direct and indirect experiences, where an organization’s reputation prior to a

crisis plays an important role in crisis management.

Coombs argued that crisis response communication could be divided into form and

content, where form represented the features of correct response and content refers to

the prioritized goals of crisis communication response. Coombs SCCT was introduced,

starting with an evaluation of reputational threat, based on crisis type, crisis history and

prior reputation. Secondly, the various crisis response strategies were introduced based

on crisis posture, followed by a list of recommendations.

The last part of the theoretical framework dealt with the media, who was introduced

as an influential secondary stakeholder. Secondly, the media’s role of setting the public

agenda was introduced, along with an elaboration on the terms of framing, gatekeeping

and third party endorsement. Lastly, the main points in media relations was introduced

and it involved the principles for good media relations along with a focus on spokesper-‐

sons including the CEO and the media focus on alternative sources.

The methodology chapter introduced the interpretive paradigmatic position of social

constructionism. This means that the case study is conducted from the researcher’s own

interpretation of the empirical data. The principle of the hermeneutic circle was includ-‐

ed in the methodology chapter, in order to gain an understanding of the complex whole,

from the meaning of its parts. The qualitative research methods applied in the case

study was a discourse analysis for the Tesla press releases and a content analysis for the

media articles. Both qualitative approaches were applied, because they acknowledge

working within the hermeneutic circle and involve a close reading/interpretation of rel-‐

atively small amount of text, which contributes to the complex whole.


Case Study: Tesla Motors The theoretical framework and methodology section have provided and elaborated

on the thesis structure, whereas this section focuses on the empirical and analytical part

of the thesis. The analysis is based on a case study concerning Tesla Motors and its me-‐

dia communication of the Model S car fire accidents in 2013. To provide a sufficient an-‐

swer to the problem statement and an analysis based on theory, the case study is divid-‐

ed into three main parts. The first part includes a short company introduction of Tesla

Motors and a more detailed description of the crisis event. The second part involves the

crisis event, where both press releases and media articles will be explained and ana-‐

lyzed in sequential order, according to date and publishing. The empirical data is ana-‐

lyzed with an outset in Coombs Situational Crisis Communication Theory, with particu-‐

lar emphasis on the crisis response strategies. To make the crisis event more under-‐

standable, the crisis event is divided into three phases – crisis/incident start, silent

phase and crisis outbreak. The last part includes the findings of the case study, in ac-‐

cordance with the research questions. The findings will elaborate Tesla’s use of crisis

response strategies and the media coverage of the crisis.

About Tesla Motors Tesla Motors, who designs, manufactures and sells electric cars, has since its founda-‐

tion in 2003 managed and successfully established a strong corporate identity as one of

the leading automakers within electrical cars. Tesla’s headquarter is situated in Palo Al-‐

to, California and globally the organization employs over six thousand people. Tesla has

a network of over hundred sales and service locations in North America, Europe and

Asia, along with a growing arrangement of public supercharger stations in the US and

Europe, for battery charging. In addition, Tesla also provides services and sells electrical

transmissions to other car manufacturers. The company is stock listed on NASDAQ with

recorded revenue of $2,013.5 million, during the financial year of 2013 (Tesla 2014a;

Marketline 2014, 3-‐4).

The management of Tesla includes several key executives, where Elon Musk is the

most prominent member of the board. In addition to owning the majority of the Tesla

stocks, he is titled as Chairman, CEO, and Product Architect of Tesla. As a successful en-‐

trepreneur and co-‐founder of both PayPal and Tesla, he started as CEO of Tesla in 2008.

The Tesla organization and managements’ vision of the company is “to accelerate the

world’s transition to electric mobility by bringing a full range of increasingly affordable electric

cars” (Tesla 2014b). To fulfill this goal, the organization has introduced three main


products – Tesla Roadster, Model S and Model X, as part of their strategic Tesla master

plan. Elon Musk summarizes the master plan into a three-‐step process, where the start-‐

ing point is to build an electrical sports car. This step was completed in 2008, where the

company introduced and launched their first luxury sports car, the Tesla Roadster. Se-‐

cond step in the master plan is to use the profit gained from the sports car, to build an

affordable car. This step was completed in January 2013, where the Model S was intro-‐

duced and available for the public. The Model S is a four-‐door sedan that comes in three

size variations of battery packs and a sale price starting from $70.000, which can still be

considered as an exclusive luxury car. The last step in the master plan is to use the profit

from the Model S cars, to build an even more affordable car, by introducing the Model X.

According to the Tesla plan, the Model X will start production in late 2014 and be vol-‐

ume produced in 2015 (Tesla 2014a; Musk, E. 2006; Marketline 2014: 4, 9).

The Tesla Model S Fires The Tesla Model S car has had a promising start since its launch in January 2013. In

May 2013, the Model S was titled as the best electrical car ever tested by the independ-‐

ent automotive magazine Consumer Reports, along with several other awards (Valdes-‐

Dapena, P. 2013). The car was tested and scored a 99 out of 100, with the only disad-‐

vantage being the recharging time compared to gasoline cars. In August 2013, The Mod-‐

el S received the best safety rating of any car ever tested, by the American National

Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA). The federal government’s test gained a

five star safety rating in all test categories and settled a new record for the lowest likeli-‐

hood of injury to passengers (Tesla 2013a).

In October 2013, the Tesla organization was facing its first major problem and con-‐

cern, regarding their Model S. The car entered massive headline news, as three Models S

car fires occurred, within a timeframe of 6 weeks. The car fires occurred respectively in

America and Mexico and were all caused by accidents and not spontaneous events. The

first fire accident occurred on October 1st in Kent, Washington, where the Tesla driver

hit a large metallic object on the freeway causing a hit on one of the car’s battery packs,

which started the fire. The second fire accident occurred on October 18th in Merida, Mex-‐

ico, but due to its location outside of America, the media coverage and the safety regula-‐

tors did not cover this event solely. The third fire occurred on November 6th in Smyrna,

Tennessee, where the driver hit a tow hitch on the interstate, causing damage to the un-‐

dercarriage of the car, which started the fire. As a consequence, the sequential car fires


have listed Tesla Motors on Bloomberg’s top 10-‐list of reputational crises in 2013 (Kai-‐

ser, T. 2013; Wooley & Steverman 2013).

In addition from a reputational crisis for Tesla, the sequential fire accidents has dam-‐

aged the organization financially as well. The Tesla stock (TSLA) on the American stock

exchange NASDAQ has been affected by the uncertainty of the cars’ safety and an inquiry

of a new federal safety investigation of the Model S has been demanded. An illustration

of the Tesla stock within the specified crisis timeframe (Sep 30 -‐ Dec 30, 2013) is shown

below and highlights the impact of the crisis financially (NASDAQ 2014).

Figure 1 -‐ Tesla Stock During Crisis Event

Source: nasdaq.com

Crisis Event Before starting the analysis, a few remarks on the crisis overview and data are pro-‐

vided. Appendix 1 provides a visual overview of the crisis timeline. It highlights the

three car fires, the media coverage and the Tesla press releases, in chronological order.

Secondly, the crisis event contains the empirical data, including relevant published ma-‐

terial from Tesla’s press releases and media articles that covers the crisis event. Tesla’s

published press releases are grouped in appendix 2, whereas the published media cov-‐

erage from The New York Times, Los Angeles Times and The Washington Post are

grouped in appendix 3. These are the raw empirical data collected from the Internet and

are in chronological order. The analyzed data is divided into press releases and media

articles and further grouped in chronological order, to follow the crisis course of the

event (appendix 4 & 5). During the analysis of the crisis event, the published material

will be referred to both the empirical and the analyzed data.


Phase 1 – Crisis/Incident Start The first phase includes the activities ranging from October 1st – October 5th, 2013. It

includes the first car fire, seven media articles and one Tesla press release.

October 1st

The first car fire accident takes place in America near Kent, Washington. The Tesla

driver named Rob Carlson hit a large curved metallic object on the freeway causing an

impact on the car battery packs and started the fire.

October 2nd

Both The New York Times (NYT) and Los Angeles Times (LAT) publish an article, the

day after the first Tesla fire accident. At this point, Tesla has not published any material

concerning the accident.

The first article (Appendix 3.1 & 5.1) published by NYT includes a general informative

and neutral description of the car fire, as it includes a variety of sources including

statements from Tesla. The article highlights neutral sources in the form of the police

description of the accident and a spectator’s video of the burning car. Other sources like

NASDAQ are used unfavorable toward Tesla, by featuring the incident’s negative effect

on the Tesla stock. In addition, the article uses the factual information from the official

firefighters to frame the accident in an unfavorable manner by stating “Capt. Kyle Ohashi,

said on Wednesday that the battery pack proved difficult to extinguish”. This tendency of unfa-‐

vorable framing by the first responders could indicate a lack of either organizational re-‐

sponse or ineffectiveness of the Tesla spokesperson to communicate with the media. In

contrast, the previous mentioned NHTSA safety rating and the Consumer Reports are

included as favorable sources in the article.

Finally, the article contains two statements presented by Tesla spokeswoman, Eliza-‐

beth Jarvis. She presents adjusting information to enlighten stakeholders of the fire

cause by stating “the fire was caused by the direct impact of a large metallic object to one of the

16 modules within the Model S battery pack”. In the second statement, she provides more

adjusting information, by saying, “because each module within the battery pack is, by design,

isolated by fire barriers to limit any potential damage, the fire in the battery pack was contained to

a small section in the front of the vehicle”. Besides from adjusting information, the technical

details about the fire barriers can be argued as an attempt to use the response strategy

of justification, to minimize the perceived damage.

The second article (appendix 3.2 & 5.2) presented by LAT is generally presented neg-‐

atively towards Tesla, by using unfavorable sources throughout the article. The article


extends the Tesla accident by referring to a different financial problem, issued by finan-‐

cial experts from Robert W. Baird & Co. In a report, they downgrade the Tesla stock, as

they predict Tesla troubles in expanding production and developing new models.

The article includes Tesla statements relating to adjusting information and justifica-‐

tion strategies. Tesla provides adjusting information by confirming the fire cause and

that no one was injured from the crash. This response shows that Tesla is actively in-‐

formed about the crisis and that the first priority of protecting the victims is secured.

The diminish posture of justification is another present factor in the article. Referring to

the statement in the article, “Tesla said that the design and construction of the vehicle and bat-‐

tery pack limited the spread of the fire”. This statement indicates that Tesla tries to reduce

the organization’s crisis responsibility and negative impact of the crisis.

October 3rd

Two more articles are published by NYT and LAT on the second day after the initial

fire. So far, Tesla has not published any material or press releases regarding the fire.

The NYT (appendix 3.3 & 5.3) publishes their second article relating to the car fire.

The article is generally negative towards Tesla with a predominant use of negative

sources, including analysts, battery experts and yet again firefighters. An emphasis on

the firefighters’ factual information is put on the fact that the fire was difficult to extin-‐

guish, as it reignites and that they had to cut a hole in the car, to apply water. Analyst

sources are used to increase the negativity of the car fire by quoting, “it’s a relatively in-‐

nocuous occurrence to hit something in the road, but in this case there’s a fire, and a fire that’s diffi-‐

cult to put out”. The NHTSA safety rating and Consumer Reports rating are mentioned in

favor of the Model S.

Two statements from Tesla are included in the article, both relating to adjusting in-‐

formation. The first statement is a recap from the previous NYT article, involving the fire

cause. The second statement includes the following “A Tesla spokeswoman, Elizabeth Jarvis-‐

Shean, did not comment on Thursday on whether Mr. Musk would publicly address the fire”. The

media uses the Tesla Spokesperson’s lack of response in the article, exposing the act of

not commenting, which can be used as a form of responding. This statement is framed

negatively towards Tesla, as the theory also indicates that “no comment” can be a sign of

guilt and that the organization is trying to hide something (Heath & O'Hair 2010; 103-‐5).

The LAT (appendix 3.4 & 5.4) also publishes their second article of the car fire, with a

focus on the declining Tesla stock, due to the fire event. The article uses financial expert

analyst (Wedbush Securities) to intensify the incident, by quoting “while car fires are typi-‐


cally not newsworthy, we expect this incident to gain heightened scrutiny as NHTSA and other

agencies look to understand how the safety of EVs can be ensured”. This source, along with pre-‐

vious battery incidents from federal regulators and competitors, highlights the articles

negativity of the Tesla incident and its industry.

Tesla statements are included in the article but are duplicated from LAT first press re-‐

lease (appendix 3.2 & 5.2). It includes adjusting and justification response strategies.

October 4th

At this point, Tesla sends out their first press release (appendix 2.1 & 4.1), concerning

the fire accident. Following the Tesla press release, two media articles (appendix 3.5 &

5.5; 3.6 & 5.6) are published, to cover the Tesla response.

The press release from Tesla is written by the CEO, Elon Musk and includes an email

correspondence between Tesla and the victim stakeholder. The press release contains

mainly adjusting information strategies and justification response strategies. Elon Musk

starts with a precise and detailed description of the accident, by providing adjusting in-‐

formation. The adjusting information is informative but also written with disguised el-‐

ements of justification, to minimize the perceived damage. As an example, Tesla high-‐

lights the car’s onboard alert system in their corporate framing of the incident, by stat-‐

ing “The Model S owner was nonetheless able to exit the highway as instructed by the onboard

alert system, bring the car to a stop and depart the vehicle without injury”.

The press release also features the media’s framing of the first responders, where

firefighters factual information was emphasized unfavorable toward Tesla. The press

release states “For the Model S lithium-‐ion battery, it was correct to apply water (vs. Dry chemical

extinguisher), but not to puncture the metal firewall, as the newly created holes allowed the flames

to then vent upwards into the front trunk section of the Model S”. This form of response points

at the denial posture of scapegoating, where Tesla blames the firefighters’ approach for

the extinguishing process.

The strategy of justification is present several times during the press release, where

two distinct types will be elaborated. The first justification response from Tesla states,

“At no point did fire enter the passenger compartment”, which relates to the minimization of

the perceived damage, at the fire accident. The second justification is different because it

minimizes the perceived damage of the fire accident by comparing it with gasoline cars.

Musk states, “Had a conventional gasoline car encountered the same object on the highway, the

result could have been far worse”. It is argued as a form of minimizing the perceived dam-‐

age, according to Coombs SCCT, but is in a higher degree related to the reinforcing strat-‐

egy of transcendence. Introduced from Benoit’s image restoration strategies, transcend-‐


ence is a form of placing crisis in a larger, more desirable context, which is evident in the

above-‐mentioned quote.

The attached email correspondence with the victim also highlights interesting strate-‐

gies. First of all, the rebuild strategy of compensation is present in the text, where the

victim states “Justin offered me a white loaner—thanks”. This shows Tesla’s direct efforts to

improve the organizational reputation, by offering the victim stakeholder a loaner-‐car in

compensation. In the email, Tesla also tries to improve the stakeholder relationship with

the victim by using the bolstering strategy of ingratiation by writing; “We very much ap-‐

preciate your support, patience and understanding while we proceed with the investigation”.

The LAT (appendix 3.5 & 5.5) issued their third article. It includes a series of state-‐

ments from the Tesla press release and six other sources both positive and negative to-‐

wards Tesla. Overall, the article is favorable, considering the amount of article coverage

provided by Tesla. The financial expert analyst (Wedbush Securities) who was unfavor-‐

able in the previous LAT article, now states, “most of the current Model S buyers are either

technology-‐savvy early adopters or environmentally conscious consumers with thick wallets, and we

believe both groups will already understand the risks of a lithium fire and likely calibrate this recent

as of relatively minor importance”. The expert source is now framed in favor towards Tesla.

Throughout the article, the statements refer to Elon Musk, Tesla CEO, rather than Tesla

as an organization and do not include any references from the email correspondence.

This indicates the person-‐orientation in business journalism and the fact that a CEO

brings authority to the news story (Brønn & Berg 2011; 266,269,271).

The article includes seven statements from the Tesla press release and is a combina-‐

tion of adjusting information and justification response strategies. In the article, the de-‐

scriptive and technical explanation from the press release serves as an accurate infor-‐

mation response, without alteration by the media.

The NYT (appendix 3.6 & 5.6) publishes a brief article regarding the Tesla press re-‐

lease. The article includes no other sources than the Tesla statements. It includes Tesla’s

adjusting information on the fire cause, explaining that a curved metallic component

was the culprit in causing the fire. The diminish strategy of justification with comparison

to gasoline cars is also present in the article.

October 5th

The Washington Post (WP) publishes their first article (appendix 3.7 & 5.7) concern-‐

ing the Tesla fire. The article includes four Tesla statements from the press release, in-‐


cluding two adjusting strategies regarding the fire cause and two justification strategies,

comparing electrical cars with gasoline cars and minimizing the perceived damage. De-‐

spite framing the Tesla stock in a negative perspective, the article is perceived favorable

towards Tesla, due to the coverage of Tesla statements.

Phase 2 – Silent Phase The second phase includes the activities ranging from October 6th – November 5th,

2013. This phase includes the second car fire and one media article.

October 18th

The second Tesla car fire occurs in Merida, Mexico, because the driver crashes into a

wall and a tree (appendix 3.10). The media has since October 5th not published any fur-‐

ther material upon the Tesla fire accident and the same goes for this second car fire, due

to its location outside of America.

November 5th

On November 5th, NYT publishes an article (appendix 3.8 & 5.8), primarily focused on

the financial aspect of Tesla, but also the Models S and the car fires are on the journal-‐

ist’s agenda. Both fires are mentioned as the article state, “the company suffered two promi-‐

nent fires last month when metal debris pierced one Model S’s battery pack and a high-‐speed crash

punctured another”. This shows that the second fire alone was not newsworthy, but in

connection with the first care fire, it became relevant on the journalist’s agenda. Three

Tesla statements are issued in the article, based on a letter to shareholders. The state-‐

ments naturally refers to bolstering strategy of reminding, as it focuses on telling share-‐

holders about the past good work. As an example, Tesla writes, “As more people see our car

on the road, take a test drive or talk with another Model S owner, more demand is created for our

product”.

Phase 3 – Crisis Outbreak The third phase includes the activities ranging from November 6th – December 31st,

2013. It includes the third car fire, ten media articles and four Tesla press releases.

November 6th

The third Tesla car fire occurs in Smyrna, Tennessee where the Tesla driver struck a

tow hitch on the interstate, causing damage to the undercarriage of the car and started

the fire.


November 7th

At this point, the media coverage is presenting new articles, following the third fire

event. LAT (appendix 3.9 & 5.9; 3.11 & 5.11) and NYT (appendix 3.10 & 5.10) publish

three articles, while Tesla has not yet published any material concerning the third car

fire. All three articles are generally unfavorable toward Tesla, according to the articles

content and use of sources.

The first article (appendix 3.9 & 5.9) from LAT highlights the dropping Tesla stock,

criticism of the Model S from Edmunds.com and Tesla’s response to the third fire. The

car shopping and car industry website Edmunds.com is sourced in the article, present-‐

ing a problem with the 2013 Tesla Model S, claiming that the car, “was making an ominous

noise under acceleration and deceleration”. The article is supporting this claim, by referenc-‐

ing to a similar discussion on Tesla’s owner forum and thereby extending and framing

the fire accident with another problem. Tesla spokeswoman, Elizabeth Jarvis Shean,

provides adjusting information with undertones of a denial response strategy to the

claim, by stating, “she was not familiar with the Edmunds complaint”.

Regarding the third car fire, Tesla has three other statements included in the article,

relating to adjusting information and a justification response strategy. Emphasizing that

no one was injured provides adjusting information and helps people cope psychological-‐

ly with the crisis. The same Tesla statement uses justification to minimize the perceived

damage, by claiming that the car saved the drivers life. In addition to adjusting infor-‐

mation, Tesla also states, “Our team is on its way to Tennessee to learn about what happened in

the accident”. This shows that the organization is taking action and explains what is being

done to prevent a similar recurrence.

NYT (appendix 3.10 & 5.10) presents the second published article. The article empha-‐

sizes that this is the third fire in six weeks, which brings the sequential fires and

timeframe into play, as a newsworthy focus. This shows that a crisis history partakes an

important role for the media. Safety experts comment on the sequential fires by stating,

“Wednesday’s incident showed that the first fire was not a fluke”. According to the article, they

suggest a safety shield, as a fix to the car fire problems, which Tesla did not respond to.

So in general, the article is unfavorable toward Tesla and the Model S fires. Another crit-‐

ical element in the article involves first responders. The first responder, being Tennes-‐

see Highway patrol provides the factual information of the fire and not Tesla. When the

media seeks alternative sources as featured spokespersons, it could involve lack of or-‐

ganizational response. Despite that, Tesla statements are covered in the article, provid-‐

ing adjusting information on the actions being done.


A second article (appendix 3.11 & 5.11) from LAT is published on the same day, con-‐

cerning the sequential fires and other negative aspects such as the Tesla stock and the

Edmunds complaint. Adjusting information statements and a justification response

strategy from Tesla are shown in the article, based on the previous article. The article

includes a confirmation from Tesla of the third fire by stating, “the automaker confirmed

Thursday that a fire burned up one of its $70.000-‐plus Model S hatchbacks”. The added price el-‐

ement reveals the exclusivity of the car and increases the newsworthiness of the story.

The justification response strategy that the car saved the victims life is also present in

this second article.

November 8th

LAT publishes their sixth article (appendix 3.12 & 5.12), concerning the Tesla fire ac-‐

cidents. The content of the article involves the financial aspect of the Tesla stock and is

written unfavorable towards Tesla. A Tesla statement, providing adjusting information

on the financial situation is stated as follows, “earlier this week Tesla said it lost $38,5 million,

or 32 cent a share, in the third quarter”. The financial loss is generally unfavorable, but is

supported in the article by a comparison from last year, where the loss was even higher.

November 9th

Tesla publishes their second press release (appendix 2.2 & 4.2), concerning the third

fire accident. Unlike the first press release, the text is strictly based on a letter from the

Tesla car owner in Tennessee – the victim stakeholder. The press release starts with ad-‐

justing information, where the victim in detail, explains the car fire accident in the first

two paragraphs. The following text is directed at justification response strategy of min-‐

imizing the perceived damage from the accident and defending the car. The victim

writes, “had I not been in a Tesla that object could have punched through the floor and caused me

serious damage”. The victim here defends the Model S, which correctly refers to the earli-‐

er statements from Tesla that the car saved his life. He minimizes the perceived damage

of the accident in several occasions, by stating, “I never felt that as though I was in any immi-‐

nent danger” adding “there was never a point at which I was anywhere even close to any flames”.

As a final statement the victim uses justification to reassure owners and other stake-‐

holders of the cars’ safety, by writing, “This experience does not in any way make me think that

the Tesla Model S is an unsafe car. I would buy another one in a heartbeat”.


November 18th

The CEO of Tesla, Elon Musk publishes the third press release (appendix 2.3 & 4.3),

concerning the mission of Tesla and the coverage of the fire accidents. The press release

uses a variety of different response strategies during the text, to address the perceived

crisis. He starts by confronting the media for its extensive coverage and claim that a cri-‐

sis exists, by using the denial posture of attacking the accuser. He writes, “However, the

three Model S fires, which only occurred after very high-‐speed collisions and caused no serious inju-‐

ries and deaths, received more national headlines than all 250.000+ gasoline fires combined”.

Again, he compares the Tesla with traditional gasoline cars, which has earlier been men-‐

tioned as a justification response strategy.

He continues his argumentation on the media coverage by writing, “The media coverage

of Model S fires vs. gasoline car fires is disproportionate by several orders of magnitude, despite the

latter being far more deadly”. This statement is referred to as a supportive bolstering strat-‐

egy of victimage, where the CEO tries to explain how Tesla is a victim of how the media

perceived crisis.

At the same time, the CEO also uses ingratiation as a response strategy to praise those

journalists who conduct correct and accurate articles. This is part of the supportive bol-‐

stering strategy in crisis literature, but it is also an essential factor in order to maintain

good media relations in the future. The ingratiation strategy of praising stakeholders is

also presented for another stakeholder group –customers. He writes, “Our primary con-‐

cern is not for the safety of the vehicle, which can easily be replaced, but for the safety of our cus-‐

tomers and the families they entrust to our cars”.

The diminishment strategy of justification has so far been widely used both in the

media articles, as well as in the previous press releases. This press release is not an ex-‐

ception, as the CEO compares electric vehicles with gasoline vehicles by stating, “you are

more than four and a half times more likely to experience a fire in a gasoline car than a Model S”.

Having already attacked the media, Elon Musk continues defending the Tesla Models

S, by using denial response strategy. Two denial strategies are identified in the press

release and the first statement involves the amount of casualties and deaths for gasoline

cars versus Tesla cars. He writes, “Since the Model S went into production mid last year, there

have been over 400 deaths and 1,200 serious injuries in the United States alone due to gasoline car

fires, compared to zero deaths and zero injuries due to Tesla fires anywhere in the world”. He con-‐

tinues to deny that a crisis exist, as there are no personal track list of injuries and

deaths, deriving from a Tesla car. The second denial strategy comes into play, as Tesla

apparently has requested a full investigation by NHTSA and that the CEO argues that a

larger issue is at stake. He writes, “if a false perception about the safety of electric cars is al-‐


lowed to linger, it will delay the advent of sustainable transport and increase the risk of global cli-‐

mate change, with potentially disastrous consequences worldwide”. The denial strategy is

shown as he presupposes that a false perception is present, while at the same time, plac-‐

ing the crisis in a more desirable context.

The press release also include a bolstering strategy of reminding, by highlighting that

the Model S previously has achieved the lowest probability of injury of any car ever test-‐

ed, by the NHTSA.

The last response strategy included in the press release concerns the rebuilding strat-‐

egy of compensation. This form of strategy includes the positive actions toward stake-‐

holders and even though Tesla has rejected that a crisis exist and that the car has oper-‐

ated perfectly, they introduce three specific actions. The first compensation strategy is

introduced as a car software update for the air suspension, securing greater ground

clearance at highway speeds. The update is seen both as part of a compensation strate-‐

gy, but also as adjusting information, because it also explains the actions being done to

prevent a recurrence. The second compensation strategy includes the upcoming NHTSA

investigation report, where Tesla states “While we think it is highly unlikely, if something is

discovered that would result in a material improvement in occupant fire safety, we will immediately

apply that change to new cars and offer it as a free retrofit to all existing cars”. The last compen-‐

sation response strategy refers to the cars warranty. Tesla states, “to reinforce how strong-‐

ly we feel about the low risk of fire in our cars, we will be amending our warranty policy to cover

damage due to a fire, even if due to driver error”.

November 19th

The following day after Tesla issued their third press release the media publishes four

articles. Both the NYT, WP and LAT issues articles at this date and the content vary from

being unfavorable, neutral and favorable towards Tesla.

The first article (appendix 3.13 & 5.13) from NYT highlights the new investigation in-‐

quiry by NHTSA caused by the sequential Tesla car fires and is the sixth article issued by

this medium. The article refers to Tesla’s press release in several occasions throughout

the article. One paragraph refers to the adjusting information, where Tesla has request-‐

ed a full investigation of the Model S and the denial response strategy of a false percep-‐

tion. The article contradicts Tesla’s adjusting information, by using NHTSA as source,

which states, “The agency flatly denied on Tuesday that the inquiry was opened because of a Tesla

request”. This indicates that there are two sides of the story and that Tesla presumably

has tried to corporate frame the investigation into a proactive act in their favor. Other

strategies from the press release are also present in the article. It underlines Tesla’s re-‐


build strategy of compensation, by stating “Tesla said it would increase the ground clearance

of the Model S, and it also pledged to extend its current vehicle warranty to cover fire damage”. An-‐

other response strategy concerns the justification, where Tesla tries to minimize the

perceived damage from the accidents by comparing it with gasoline cars.

The second article (appendix 3.14 & 5.14) from WP involves a variety of adjusting in-‐

formation and response strategies from Tesla and a minimum of three other sources,

being NHTSA, NASDAQ and financial analyst expert from Deutsche Bank. Considering

Tesla’s contribution to the article in comparison to the other sources, the article is gen-‐

erally favorable toward Tesla.

This article also concerns the NHTSA investigation and the contradiction between

which party requested the investigation. In addition to the previous article, the WP arti-‐

cle refers to a twitter post from Tesla’s CEO, Elon Musk, by stating, “In a Twitter post, Musk

said that on Friday, Tesla’s vice president of regulatory affairs, Jim Chen, invited NHTSA senior staff

to conduct a review of Model S”. This shows Tesla’s argumentation on the requested inves-‐

tigation and that the CEO’s public statements are being taken into account, even though

it is send from a social media output.

The article is also the first to include information from the second press release (ap-‐

pendix 2.2 & 4.2), regarding the letter from the victim stakeholder in Tennessee. It in-‐

cludes the provided adjusting information of the third fire, whereas none of the re-‐

sponse strategies are being mentioned.

The article includes response strategies of denial, justification, compensation and re-‐

minding, based on the information from the third press release (appendix 2.3 & 4.3).

The denial strategy concerns the false perception of the safety in electrical vehicles. The

diminishment strategy of justification is shown in the article and concerns the letter

from the victim, the comparison of electrical cars versus gasoline cars and the safety fea-‐

tures of the Models S car. It includes the Tesla reference, stating, “You are more likely to be

struck by lightning in your lifetime than experience even a non-‐injurious fire in a Tesla”. This

shows a form of minimizing the perceived damage, by placing the accidents in a more

desirable context. The compensation response is visible, as the article refers to the ex-‐

tended warrant policy of the Model S that is set to cover any damages caused by fire. The

last supportive bolstering strategy of reminding is highlighted in the article by Elon

Musk, who states, “it is literally impossible for another car to have a better safety track record, as

it would have to possess mystical powers of healing”. This quote reminds stakeholders of Tes-‐

la’s safety record and that no people so far have been injured from a Tesla accident.


The third article (appendix 3.15 & 5.15) from this date is published by the LAT and

involves the investigation by the NHTSA. The article includes around ten Tesla state-‐

ments and numerous of other sources, mainly unfavorable towards Tesla. The Tesla

statements included, offset the negative source, so the article is generally neutral.

The statements include several adjusting information strategies and response strate-‐

gies involving denial, justification and compensation.

Like the two before mentioned articles, Tesla’s adjusting information regarding the

NHTSA request is highlighted, with the contradiction on who requested the investiga-‐

tion. This consistency, revels a similar way of framing the news, among the selected me-‐

dia. The article includes the adjusting information on the actions done to prevent a re-‐

currence accident, by stating, “The automaker is taking advantage of the car’s electronic capa-‐

bilities to execute a wireless update to the air suspension that will result in greater ground clear-‐

ance at highway speeds, Musk said”. This adjusting information is also argued as being part

of the rebuilding strategy of compensation. The statement is used in connection with

another quote from Tesla, relating to the diminishment strategy of justification. Here,

Tesla states, “This is about reducing the chances of underbody impact damage, not improving

safety,” Musk said. “The theoretical probability of a fire injury is already vanishingly small and the

actual number to date is zero”. Tesla’s notion that the compensation actions are improving

the likelihood of impact and not the safety is successfully placed in the article. The other

action of compensation, relating to the extended warrant is also present in the article

and explained. It states, “Either our belief in the safety of our car is correct and this is a minor

cost," Musk said, "or we are wrong, in which case the right thing is for Tesla to bear the cost rather

than the car buyer”. This statement of compensating customers can also be argued as a

supportive bolstering strategy of ingratiation, by praising stakeholders. The denial

strategy is present, relating to the Tesla argumentation that a false perception of the cri-‐

sis can influence the entire sustainable transport industry and affect global climate

change.

The fourth article (appendix 3.16 & 5.16) on this date is presented by LAT and in-‐

cludes Tesla’s CEO, Elon Musk’s attack on the media coverage from the three car fires.

The content of this article is based from an interview with Elon Musk, but relates to re-‐

sponse strategies from the Tesla press release (appendix 2.3 & 4.3), mentioned earlier.

The article is favorable toward Tesla, as it mainly highlights Tesla’s framing of the situa-‐

tion.

The first statement refers to the denial strategy of attacking the accuser, where Elon

Musk states, “Our car is basically the safest car you can possibly drive if you care about fires, he


said. “And that’s not the impression you would have if you read newspapers. In fact, you would have

the opposite impression”. This quote indicates Tesla’s attempt to directly confront the me-‐

dia coverage and framing of the car fires. In other words, Tesla accuses the medias role

for setting an incorrect agenda for the public, by framing the negative aspects. He ex-‐

plains the medias focus on negativity, by stating, “Newspapers seem to want to answer the

question: 'What was the worst thing that happened on Earth today?”

Another statement is directed at the increased attention toward the Tesla stock, espe-‐

cially in the media. The article states, “It kinda sucks running a public company,” Musk said.

The stock goes through “these huge gyrations for seemingly arbitrary reasons, and then you have to

explain why it changed.” Here, the CEO provides adjusting information mainly directed at

shareholders, by trying to explain the difficult circumstances that are connected with

being a public organization.

November 21st

On this date, LAT publishes a favorable article (appendix 3.17 & 5.17), concerning the

Tesla Model S. The Model S received top owner satisfaction ranking from a survey from

Consumer Reports. The article emphasizes the positive ranking from Consumer Reports,

while the contradiction of request for the NHTSA investigation is yet again summarized

as a negative point in the article. In relation to the car fires, no further response from

Tesla is included.

December 2nd

Tesla publishes their fourth press release (appendix 2.4 & 4.4) and it includes the in-‐

vestigation result from the German Federal Motor Transport Authority, regarding the

Model S. The press release is a response to the already ongoing investigation by the

NHTSA, which has not confirmed any results at this point. The press release states, “Ac-‐

cording to the documents, no manufacturer-‐related defects [herstellerseitiger Mangel] could be

found. Therefore, no further measures under the German Product Safety Act [Produktsicher-‐

heitsgesetz (ProdSG)] are deemed necessary”. This statement functions as a part of the denial

response strategy claiming that no crisis exists.

December 23rd

Tesla publishes their fifth press release (appendix 2.5 & 4.5), which include a NHTSA

reaffirmation on the five-‐star safety rating for the Tesla Model S year 2014. The press

release includes three response strategies – justification, denial and reminder. The justi-‐

fication response strategy of minimizing the perceived damage, is shown in the first sen-‐

tence, “The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) has reaffirmed the 5-‐star


safety rating of the Tesla Model S overall and in all subcategories for Model Year 2014, confirming

the highest safety rating in America”. This confirmation reduces the negative media impact

and shows that the cars safety rating is still the highest in America, despite the recent

fires.

The following sentence uses the previous results from press release (appendix 2.4 &

4.4) as a denial strategy, to remove any doubts and concerns regarding the Tesla Model

S. It states, “While Tesla is awaiting feedback from NHTSA regarding their investigation of recent

fire incidents, the German Federal Motor Transport Authority, Kraftfahrt-‐Bundesamt (KBA), recent-‐

ly concluded its review of the incidents, finding no manufacturer-‐related defects or need for further

action”.

The last paragraph in the press release includes the supportive bolstering strategy of

reminding, as a tool for protecting Tesla’s reputation and to present the positive sides of

the organization. As an example, it states, “Over the course of more than 100 million miles

driven in almost every possible terrain, weather and crash conditions, the Tesla Model S has consist-‐

ently protected its driver and passengers, achieving the best safety track record of any car on the

road”.

December 26th

On this date, WP publishes the last article (appendix 3.18 & 5.18) in the specified crisis

period. The article is favorable toward Tesla, as it includes the results from the recent

two Tesla press releases (appendix 2.4 & 4.4; 2.5 & 4.5). The article uses one statement

from Tesla, which is stated as follows, “In a blog post, the automaker states that NHTSA con-‐

firmed the Model S' high safety score, adding that a German agency says that the Model S is perfect-‐

ly fine”. This refers to the response strategy of denial and justification and more im-‐

portantly, it dominates the already ongoing investigation by NHTSA.

Findings

Tesla Crisis Response Strategies Tesla publishes five press releases during the crisis event ranging from October 1st

until December 31st, 2013. The press releases are published respectively in phase 1 and

phase 3, which signify the crisis start and the crisis outbreak. Both phases will be de-‐

scribed in more detail, to highlight Tesla’s use of crisis response strategies in relation to

theory from the theoretical framework.

Phase 1 – Crisis/Incident Start

Tesla publishes their first press release during this phase, in a response to the media

coverage concerning the first Tesla car fire. This phase highlights the evolving process,


which starts as an incident but turns into a crisis. As mentioned earlier in the theoretical

framework, an incident is a minor, localized disruption, whereas, a crisis disrupts or af-‐

fects the entire organization or has the potential to do so. The first Tesla car fire accident

in Washington can be described as an incident, because it is a minor localized disruption

occurring externally from Tesla and thereby does not affect the organizational routine.

To explain the development from incident to crisis, a reference to Coombs crisis defini-‐

tion is helpful. As stated earlier, crisis is defined as, “the perception of an unpredictable event

that threatens important expectancies of stakeholders and can seriously impact an organization’s

performance and generate negative outcomes” (Coombs 2012; 2). What turns it into a crisis

for Tesla is the involvement of the media. The media coverage of the localized incident

increases the awareness to a national as well as global scale, with its role of agenda set-‐

ting. The media uses its capacity to influence public opinion against Tesla with the nega-‐

tive news framing of the articles. In other words, the media helps shaping the negative

perception of the event by influencing stakeholders’ expectations towards Tesla. The

mediated perception and the uncertainty from the first car accident turns it into a crisis,

because it generates negative outcomes both financially on the Tesla stock and for Tes-‐

la’s reputation.

Having clarified how the fire accident is perceived as a crisis for Tesla, it is relevant to

highlight the crisis type and the level of crisis responsibility. The media articles concern-‐

ing the first fire accident highlight the falling Tesla stock as a general theme. More im-‐

portantly, the articles emphasize and frame the Tesla car accident into an industrial cri-‐

sis for electrical vehicles. As an example, NYT states in their second media article (ap-‐

pendix 3.3 & 5.3), “The fire, on a highway exit in Kent, Wash., poses a serious challenge for Tesla

and, at the same time, prompt new questions about the safety of lithium-‐ion batteries in electric

cars”. The uncertainty of the batteries in electrical vehicles places the crisis in the acci-‐

dental cluster of technical-‐error accidents. This type of crisis includes low attributions of

crisis responsibility of Tesla, due to a first time car fire accident and the uncertainty of

whether there is a flaw in the car design. The media frames the fire to be difficult to ex-‐

tinguish, but they also highlight the Model S’s prior positive features. Both the five-‐star

safety rating from NHTSA and the independent automotive report from Consumer Re-‐

ports are mentioned in the articles. This information functions as a halo-‐effect, high-‐

lighting the cars positive prior reputation, which also supports the crisis type of being in

the accidental cluster. The positive prior reputation combined with the uncertainty of

the car accident, provides Tesla with a “benefit of the doubt” effect for stakeholders. At

this point, the reputational threat is assed to be in the accidental cluster, because the


Tesla organization and the Model S have no previous crisis history and a positive prior

reputation.

Tesla’s first press release (appendix 2.1 & 4.1) is included in the first phase of the cri-‐

sis event. It is written by Tesla’s CEO, Elon Musk who starts the press release, by provid-‐

ing adjusting information to explain the car accident in specific detail. During the adjust-‐

ing information, he uses the denial strategy of scapegoating, to confront the medias’ em-‐

phasis on the firefighters difficulties with the extinguishing process of the car fire. The

following paragraphs in the press release from the CEO then uses the diminish strate-‐

gies of justification to minimize the perceived damage caused by the accident. According

to Coombs crisis response recommendations for SCCT, number five states, “For crises with

weak attributions of crisis responsibility, and no history of crisis or a negative prior reputation, add

diminish strategies to the instructing information” (Heath & O’Hair 2010; 112). This indicates

that Tesla is correctly using the response strategy of justification in combination with

adjusting information.

The press release also includes an email correspondence between Tesla and the vic-‐

tim stakeholder. The first recommendation from Coombs SCCT states, “all victims or po-‐

tential victims should receive instructing information” (ibid). Because the correspondence is

initiated two days after the car accident and the fact that no people were injured, there

is not provided any instructing information in the press release. Though, it can be ar-‐

gued that the statement “Justin offered me a loaner” represent an indicator of compensa-‐

tion as primary response action, as well as instructing information, by financially loan-‐

ing the victim a courtesy car. The second recommendation include, “all victims should be

provided adjusting information including an expression of sympathy” (ibid). This recommenda-‐

tion is also present in the mail correspondence, where Tesla’s vice president, Jerome

Guillen writes, “I am sorry to hear that you experienced a collision in your Model S 2 days ago. We

are happy to hear that the model S performed in such a way that you were not injured in the acci-‐

dent and that nobody else was hurt”.

Phase 3 – Crisis Outbreak

This third phase highlights the crisis expansion, as a result from the three Tesla fires.

In this phase, Tesla publishes the remaining four press releases, due to further media

scrutiny and coverage of the Model S.

The situation in this phase has increased the reputational threat for Tesla. The media

emphasizes the three sequential car fire accidents within a timeframe of six weeks as

the main issue. As an example on the situation, LAT (appendix 3.9 & 5.9) uses an expert


source in their article, stating, ””the problem is that we have three fires in six weeks” adding “for

a company with a stock price based as much or more on image than financials, those recurring

headlines are highly damaging”. Based on theory, the reputational threat is increased, be-‐

cause Tesla now has a crisis history. The situation of similar accidents and thereby a cri-‐

sis history refers to the Velcro effect, meaning that stakeholders change perception of

the crisis and thereby also the attribution of crisis responsibility (Coombs 2012; 158,

Heath & O'Hair 2010; 111, Coombs & Holladay 2012; 58-‐59). It is clear that the media as

a stakeholder has intensified the attribution of crisis responsibility towards Tesla, as the

articles are framed unfavorable and negative towards Tesla. The media continues to

doubt the cars design, especially the cars underbody protection and also refers to other

problems presented by other sources like Edmunds.com and Tesla’s owner forum. This

means that the crisis perception and type has increased from the accidental crises clus-‐

ter into the preventable crises cluster of human-‐error product harm. This cluster in-‐

cludes strong attributions of crisis responsibility and relates to a product being defec-‐

tive and potentially harmful because of human error from the Tesla organization (Bell

2010; 150, Coombs 2012; 73,158).

Tesla’s second press release (appendix 2.2 & 4.2) is untraditional by nature, as the or-‐

ganization is not the direct sender of the message. It contains text presented by the vic-‐

tim stakeholder from the third Tesla accident. Even though, members of the Tesla organ-‐

ization do not directly write the press release, crisis communication strategies are pre-‐

sented in the text. Similar to the first press release, it starts with adjusting information

on the fire accident, but from the perspective of the victim. The second part of the press

release includes the diminish strategy of justification, where the victim tries to minimize

the perceived damage caused by the accident. This strategy is included several times by

the victim, stating as an example, “no flames ever reached the cabin, and nothing inside was

damaged”.

The overall purpose of using the victim in the crisis response is not mentioned in any

crisis communication theory, but it can be argued that it functions as an unbiased third

party endorser for Tesla. This means that if the victim reports the incident description

as a fact, then it must be true. It is similar to the media’s role of being an objective third

part, whereas the victim in contrast to the media is primarily focused on the positive

aspect and not the negative.

The crisis communication strategies in this press release do not correspond to the in-‐

creased reputational threat and the change in crisis type, as mentioned above. According

to Coombs’ recommendation, it is listed in number seven that “For crises with strong at-‐


tributions of crisis responsibility and a history of crises or a negative prior reputation, add rebuild

strategies to the instructing and adjusting information” (Heath & O’Hair 2010; 112). The strat-‐

egies used in the press release refers to accident crises cluster with low responsibility,

which signifies that Tesla either denies the increased crisis responsibility and reputa-‐

tional threat or that they have failed to understand how stakeholders like the media

perceive the crisis. As a concluding remark on the press release, it is noted that none of

the specified media and articles are published, in a response to this press release. This

indicates that Tesla was not successful in planting the victim press release in the media,

but it has suppressed the media from publishing more articles in the following days.

The third press release (appendix 2.3 & 4.3) is written by the CEO, Elon Musk, who

takes a more direct and defensive approach to the sequential car fires, by denying the

media perceived crisis. At this point, Tesla has not used the word crisis in any context,

but the increased reputational threat and crisis responsibility is becoming more appar-‐

ent in this press release. The press release shows a variety of crisis communication

strategies with dominance on strategies relating to denial and rebuild. It starts with a

denial strategy of attacking the accuser, where Tesla confronts the media and its cover-‐

age for turning it into a crisis, indicating that no crisis exists. The supporting bolstering

strategy of victimage is used to explain how Tesla is the victim in the media perceived

crisis. The CEO continues the denial, by comparing the number of serious injuries in

America with gasoline cars versus Tesla cars. Other factors of comparison between elec-‐

trical vehicles and gasoline cars are used as diminish strategy of justification to mini-‐

mize the perceived damage and to support the overall denial strategy.

Despite the defensive approach of denial strategies, the press release also presents fu-‐

ture actions, indicating the adjusting information to prevent a recurrence and the re-‐

build strategy of compensation. The first action is referred to as adjusting information

and involves a technical car update resulting in greater ground clearance. The second

action is adjusting information where Tesla states; “Second, we have requested that the Na-‐

tional Traffic Safety Administration conduct a full investigation as soon as possible into the fire ac-‐

cidents”. This statement regarding an investigation request will be of more interest later

in the report.

The compensation response is apparent, as Tesla will apply any material improve-‐

ments from the investigation, free of cost for Tesla car owners. The third action indi-‐

cates a compensation response strategy that includes an extended warrant policy to

cover damage due to a fire.


According to Coombs’ recommendation list number seven, the press release is now

correctly applying rebuild strategies to the adjusting information for crises with strong

attributions of crisis responsibility and a history of crisis. The recommendation list also

points out a negative aspect of the press release concerning consistency between the

crisis response strategies. The last recommendation on the list presented by Coombs,

states, “attempt to maintain consistency between post-‐crisis response strategies by not mixing deny

strategies with either rebuild or diminish strategies” (Heath & O’Hair 2010; 112). The lack of

consistency, which seems to be apparent, according to the recommendation list can be

difficult to elaborate on, as the crisis is unique and the list functions as general guide-‐

lines. The actions of compensation works in this case well in connection with the overall

denial strategy, but in general, the strategies will be contradicting responses.

The fourth press release (appendix 2.4 & 4.4) from Tesla is published after the NHTSA

has reopened an investigation inquiry of the Model S. Tesla’s initial statement saying

that they have requested NHTSA to conduct a full investigation, is being emphasized and

framed in the following media articles, because it deviates from the NHTSA version of

the request. This press release includes the investigation result performed by the Ger-‐

man Federal Motor Transport Authority. The result in the press release functions as part

of the denial strategy, by stating, “According to the documents, no manufacturer-‐related defects

[herstellerseitiger Mangel] could be found. Therefore, no further measures under the German Prod-‐

uct Safety Act [Produktsicherheitsgesetz (ProdSG)] are deemed necessary”. This investigation

result not only puts pressure on the ongoing investigation from NHTSA, it also repre-‐

sents Tesla’s commitment and proactivity in solving the perceived damage, created by

the media.

The last press release (appendix 2.5 & 4.5) includes a reaffirmation from NHTSA on

the five-‐star safety rating for the Tesla Model S year 2014. This confirmation is used as

justification, as it reduces the negative media impact and shows that the cars safety rat-‐

ing is still the highest in America, despite the recent fires. The press release also uses the

response strategy of denial, as it refers to the results from the previous press release, in

an attempt to remove any doubts and concerns regarding the Tesla Model S. Lastly, the

press release uses the supportive bolstering strategy of reminding to protect Tesla’s

reputation and to present the positive aspects.

Tesla Findings The previous phases explains Tesla’s crisis communication strategies during the crisis

event of the three Tesla Model S car fires. Phase one includes the first press release,


whereas the second phase includes the remaining four press releases from Tesla. The

figure below provides an overview of the crisis response strategies and the information

giving strategies used in the two phases.

Figure 2 -‐ Tesla Crisis Communication Strategies

Source: Press Release 1-‐5

In the first phase, which highlights the crisis start phase, the crisis is perceived in the

accident crisis cluster by the media. The phase involves low level of crisis responsibility

from Tesla, because of no crisis history and a positive prior reputation. The figure shows

that the phase is dominated by diminishment response strategies and adjusting infor-‐

mation. According to Coombs’ SCCT recommendation list, these are also the preferred

strategies of use, considering the reputational threat at this point (Heath & O’Hair 2010;

112). The denial strategy is used in connection to the media framing of car fire and the

car accident.

The third phase shows the crisis extension and outbreak stage, where the media high-‐

lights all three accidents. At this stage, the crisis is perceived as a preventable crisis by

the media, involving a strong level of crisis responsibility, due to similar sequential fires,

which generates a crisis history for Tesla. The figure highlights the four press releases in

this phase, which indicate a continuous use of diminish strategies, as the most dominant

response strategy. The diminish strategies are used in connection with the overall in-‐

creasing denial strategy, where the media and its coverage is confronted for the crisis

existence. The adjusting information is naturally decreased, as the fire accidents are at

an end, whereas bolstering strategies are increased as a supporting strategy used in

conjunction with the overall denial strategy. Lastly, the rebuild response has increased

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

40%

45%

Phase 1 Phase 3

Adjusting information

Deny posture

Diminish posture

Rebuild posture

Bolstering posture


in this phase, because Tesla is now offering actions of compensation, due to the fire ac-‐

cidents and is now using the correct response strategy considering the crisis type and

the level of reputational threat. Though, the use of contradicting response strategies

such as denial and rebuild indicates inconsistency, according to Coombs’ SCCT recom-‐

mendation list (Heath & O’Hair 2010; 112).

Media Coverage of the Crisis The media coverage includes three specified media, including The New York Times,

Los Angeles Times and The Washington Post. During the crisis event from October 1st

until December 31st, eighteen media articles were included. Relating to the amount of

articles published during the event, the NYT publishes six articles, LAT publishes nine

articles and the WP publishes three articles. This section about the media coverage

starts with a review on the three phases, highlighting the most interesting aspects of the

media in relation to theory from the theoretical framework. Secondly, an elaboration on

the overall findings will be provided to gain an understanding of how the coverage and

framing is presented by the media.

Phase 1 – Crisis/Incident Start

There are four interesting characteristics and actions from the media that are worth

mentioning in this first phase. First of all, two of the three media covers the first accident

before Tesla publishes any information regarding the case. Despite the quick response

from the media, the journalists still provide statements from a Tesla spokesperson, in

order to confirm the fire. This could indicate that the journalists have a good relation-‐

ship with Tesla or at least that Tesla is available and delivers a quick response, which is

some of the essential factors for good media relations (Brønn & Berg 2011; 265, 271,

Coombs & Holladay 2012; 162).

The second characteristic relates to a more critical aspect for Tesla, including the me-‐

dia emphasis and negative framing on the first responders’ factual information. The fire-‐

fighters’ description of the problematic extinguishing process is emphasized unfavora-‐

ble toward Tesla. According to theory, this negative framing indicates a lack of organiza-‐

tional response from Tesla, since they have not published any press release at this given

time (Coombs & Holladay 2012; 162-‐163).

Another critical characteristic, involves the media use of a passive response from Tes-‐

la concerning a “no comment” phrase. This statement is framed negatively towards Tes-‐

la, where theory indicates that “no comment” can be a sign of guilt and that the organi-‐

zation is trying to hide something (Heath & O'Hair 2010; 103-‐5)


The last characteristic from the first phase includes the media interest in the CEO. The

fifth media article (appendix 3.5 & 5.5) concerns the first press release from Tesla where

the headline as well as throughout the article, the CEO is mentioned rather than Tesla as

an organization. This person-‐orientation is recognized in some of the following articles

(appendix 3.14 & 5.14) as well, confirming the media theory stating that the CEO is an

important spokesperson for the media (Brønn & Berg 2011; 266,269,271)

Phase 2 –Silent Phase

The second phase includes one interesting media characteristic and it relates to

newsworthiness. The second car fire that happened on October 18th in Merida, Mexico

did not receive any media attention alone. The most logic explanation is that the car fire

occurred outside of America and the fact that the specified news media, mainly consid-‐

ers national coverage. Another point is that the car accident was a more direct car acci-‐

dent, by hitting a tree and a wall, and the fact that the NHTSA is not focusing on acci-‐

dents outside of America. Nonetheless, the second car fire becomes newsworthy for the

media in connection with the first fire, which is first mentioned in appendix 3.8.

Phase 3 -‐ Crisis Outbreak

The third phase starts with more elaboration on the newsworthiness. The third car

fire in Smyrna, Tennessee increases the media attention to the Tesla car accidents. The

sequential fire heightens the uncertainty of the first car fire and the focused media at-‐

tention highlights that a crisis history brings more newsworthiness. Another indicator

for Tesla’s increased media attention is shown in an article published by LAT (appendix

3.11 & 5.11), where an emphasis on the Model S exclusivity and price is mentioned.

Moreover, this third phase also demonstrates the media choice of excluding infor-‐

mation, which also refers the media role of gatekeeping. The second press release (ap-‐

pendix 2.2 & 4.2) from Tesla, which includes a letter from the victim, was published No-‐

vember 9th. The media did not cover this press release in the following days, indicating

that Tesla was not successful in placing this corporate message in the media story

(Brønn & Berg 2011; 262). Though, the press release message was successfully placed in

a media article (appendix 3.14 & 5.14) on November 19th, after Tesla published their

third press release.

After Tesla published their third press release, the media gained further interest on a

specific statement from Tesla concerning a request to NHTSA. The initial corporate

framing was placed on the fact that Tesla requested the NHTSA to conduct a full investi-‐

gation into the fire accidents. The media framed the NHTSA version in the articles (ap-‐

pendix 3.13, 3.14, 3.15), which contradicted to Tesla’s corporate framing and created


more negative media coverage for Tesla. From a media relation perspective, this chal-‐

lenges the professional working relationship between Tesla and the media, where hon-‐

esty is an important factor (Brønn & Berg 2011; 271).

Lastly, the negative media coverage obtained during the crisis event seems to be turn-‐

ing to the more positive side, for Tesla. The media coverage in the last three articles (ap-‐

pendix 5.16, 5.17, 5.18) is highly favorable towards Tesla, showing a positive tendency

among the media agenda. One article (appendix 3.16 & 5.16) from LAT highlights Tesla’s

denial strategy and attack on the media, showing that the media at this point fulfills its

role of an unbiased third party endorser, even though the claim is directed at the media

(Brønn & Berg 2011; 262).

Media Findings In an attempt to define the media coverage and framing of the crisis event of the Mod-‐

el S fires, it is relevant to look at the use of sources as a starting point. The table below

features all the sources used in the eighteen media articles from the three news medias.

They are listed in accordance to their contribution, based on whether the source is fa-‐

vorable, neutral or unfavorable toward Tesla.

Table 4 -‐ Use of Sources by the Media

Source: Media Article 1-‐18

The table indicates that more than half (66%) of the sources used in the media arti-‐

cles are emphasized or framed in an unfavorable way towards Tesla, by the media. It is

in particular the Tesla stock (NASDAQ) and the NHTSA, which has been used as a domi-‐

nant negative source and influence on the media articles agenda. As mentioned in the


theoretical framework, the media serves as a secondary stakeholder or influencer who

has the capacity to influence public opinion and other stakeholders (Coombs 2012; 36-‐

39, Cornelissen 2012; 43). In this case it means that the media has both framed the Tesla

stock decrease in an attempt to intensify the accidents and crisis scale, while at the same

time being a major contributor to the stock movement. Experts within different fields

are also used in a high degree, to emphasize the negative aspects of the Tesla fire acci-‐

dents.

In contrast to the negative sources, the favorable sources represent only a fraction

(15%) of the total use of other sources. It includes the five-‐star safety rating from

NHTSA and the top consumer satisfaction ranking from Consumer Reports, as the main

positive sources. Based on the use of other sources than Tesla, the media coverage and

framing of the crisis event is generally presented negatively towards Tesla.

A different aspect for determining the media coverage and framing of the crisis is to

look at the articles’ tone of voice. Tone of voice refers to whether the article is written in

a favorable, neutral or unfavorable manner towards Tesla and includes the researcher’s

own interpretation of articles overall tone. To include a reasonable level of objectivity,

the evaluation is created on the articles content of external information, based on the

use of other sources in contrast to the inclusion of Tesla statement. The figure below

includes the tone of voice from the eighteen media articles. The articles are classified

according to publishing time, meaning, that the article was published either before (pri-‐

or to response) a Tesla press release or after (after response).


Figure 3 – Articles’ Tone of Voice

Source: Media Article 1-‐18

The figure shows that the media articles published prior to a response are considera-‐

bly more unfavorable towards Tesla, in comparison to the media articles published after

a Tesla press release. The messages from Tesla seem to have excluded or at least domi-‐

nated the articles use of negative sources. Ultimately, this indicates that Tesla’s pub-‐

lished responses have gained a positive effect to the content of the media articles.

Tesla’s Crisis Communication with the Media The findings section has so far highlighted, Tesla’s use of crisis communication strate-‐

gies, in relation to the crisis phases. The media findings have provided information

about the published articles use of external sources and the tone of voice both prior and

after a Tesla response. A closer look at Tesla’s response strategies in connection with

the media coverage, will give a more precise indication on Tesla’s successfulness in plac-‐

ing its crisis communication strategies in the media coverage.

The table below shows an overview of the number of times Tesla’s crisis communica-‐

tion strategies has been used in the published press releases. It includes the information

giving strategies of instructing and adjusting and the crisis response strategies concern-‐

ing the reputation repair, divided by its posture. In addition, the table highlights the

number of times the strategies are represented in the various media.

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

Prior to response After response

Favorable

Neutral

Unfavorable


Table 5 -‐ Tesla Response Strategies and Representation in the Media

Source: Press Release 1-‐5, Media Article 1-‐18

The Individual Media

The New York Times

This medium has published six articles during the crisis event of the Model S and in-‐

cluded a total of eighteen Tesla statements with crisis communication strategies. This

adds up to a general of three Tesla statements per published article and is the least fa-‐

vorable media on this condition, compared to the others. The Tesla statements used in

the NYT articles includes a majority of adjusting information and exceeds the amount of

adjusting information provided by Tesla. This indicates that the media uses the same

information repeatedly in their articles, as a form of recount for the readers. The medi-‐

um is the most prominent in displaying Tesla’s response strategy of reminding stake-‐

holders of its past good works, while excluding the other supplemental bolstering strat-‐

egies. Furthermore, the vast amount of justification strategies used by Tesla to minimize

the perceived damage, are mentioned, but in a small degree, compared to the others.

Tesla’s denial and compensation strategy are both mentioned once by the NYT.

Los Angeles Times

This medium is the most active publisher during the event with a total of nine articles

including thirty-‐seven statements with crisis communication strategies. The increased

focus from this medium could be because of the fact that LAT and the Tesla headquarter


are geographically situated in California. In general, the medium publishes four Tesla

statements per published article and the majority of the statements are also related to

adjusting information. Tesla’s denial response posture of attacking the accuser, which in

this case is directed at the media, is published solely by this medium. It is clear that LAT

as medium emphasizes Tesla’s diminish strategies of justification to a higher degree in

their media coverage, compared to NYT. This medium also mentions Tesla’s rebuild

strategy of compensation. Lastly, the LAT highlights as the only medium, the supplemen-‐

tary strategy of victimage, where Tesla frames their role of being a victim of the media

perceived crisis.

The Washington Post

This medium is the least active publisher during the event with only three published

articles. Despite the low volume of articles, the medium includes seventeen Tesla state-‐

ments with crisis communication strategies, which add up to a general of nearly six Tes-‐

la statements per published article. This is seen as favorable toward Tesla and it also

shows the significant variation between the different media and its use of content. The

WP features the diminish strategy of justification to a higher degree than adjusting in-‐

formation, although they both function as the main factors in the media coverage. Tes-‐

la’s denial strategy as well as compensation and reminding are also mentioned in this

medium.

General Tesla Findings To correctly evaluate how Tesla has managed its crisis communication with the me-‐

dia, it is logical to divide the findings and argumentation into content and form, as intro-‐

duced by Coombs (Heath & O'Hair 2010; 103-‐5). As mentioned in the theoretical

framework, content refers to what an organization says and does and form represents

how an organization should respond. The first part includes the content and includes

Tesla’s successfulness in placing the crisis communication in the media coverage.

Based on the results from table 5, Tesla has successfully managed to place its adjust-‐

ing information in the media coverage. The adjusting information involves Tesla’s sum-‐

mary of the accidents and its corrective actions, which appears to be accepted by the

media. Because, Tesla is using the victim stakeholder actively in the forming of the ad-‐

justing information, the media interprets it more objectively. This means that that me-‐

dia’s role of gatekeeping is more willingly to include this form of message, because the

victim stakeholder provides validity and content to the corporate framing.


The deny posture has been used by Tesla both in the form of attacking the accuser,

denial and scapegoating. Generally, this strategy of removing any connection between

Tesla and the crisis has been more difficult to plant in the media coverage. Only one me-‐

dium has covered Tesla’s response strategy of attacking the accuser, whereas none of

the media have referred to the scapegoat strategy involving the victim’s media exagger-‐

ation claim and the firefighters extinguishing process. The media have covered Tesla’s

denial strategy, in the final stage of phase three, as investigation evidence becomes more

favorable towards Tesla.

The diminish posture of justification has been widely used by Tesla, to reduce the cri-‐

sis responsibility and negative impact of the crisis situation. As a result, it is predomi-‐

nantly being used in the media coverage, meaning that Tesla has successfully planted

the message in the media coverage. A dominant factor in the success of planting these

messages relies on the technical details and the multiple comparisons to gasoline cars,

provided by Tesla’s CEO.

The rebuild posture of compensation represents Tesla’s direct efforts and actions to-‐

ward stakeholders. The three actions of compensation involving a car update, a poten-‐

tial retrofit and an extended fire warranty are all successfully placed in the media cover-‐

age.

Finally, the bolstering posture has been used both in the form of reminder, ingratia-‐

tion and victimage to improve stakeholder relationships and Tesla’s reputation. Gener-‐

ally, these strategies have been difficult for Tesla to include in the media coverage. How-‐

ever, the reminding strategy including the five-‐star safety rating from NHTSA has been

successfully placed in the media coverage. The media have not covered Tesla’s ingratia-‐

tion strategy of praising stakeholders including victims and investigative journalists,

while the victimage strategy is only covered at a single occurrence, by one medium.

Form represents the second part of the evaluation and includes four key features,

which will be discussed.

Be Quick

Theory states that organizations need to respond quickly to a crisis, because stake-‐

holders like the media need information of the crisis circumstances (ibid). Based on the

press releases from Tesla, they have not been quick to respond to the crisis. Tesla’s

press releases regarding the first and third fire was both published three days after the

accidents occurred. Nonetheless, Tesla did manage to inform the various media and

thereby influence the media coverage and framing of the accident, to some degree.


Avoid “no comment”

Kempner (1995) argues that a spokesperson at no point in the crisis response must

say the words “no comment”, because, in the minds of stakeholders, this means that you

are guilty and try to hide something (ibid).

In a media article from NYT, a Tesla spokesperson is quoted for using the “no com-‐

ment” phrase and its regard to whether the Tesla CEO would publicly address the fire.

The following day, Tesla and the CEO did publish a press release regarding the fire and

thereby reduced the risk of guilt among the stakeholders.

Be Accurate

According to theory, an accurate response is more important than delivering a quick

inaccurate response (ibid).

As mentioned in the above, Tesla has not been quick to respond, but instead they have

responded accurately. The press releases related to the first and the third car fire in-‐

cludes a detailed description and explanation of the accident from the victims point of

view and from Tesla’s CEO. The fact that Tesla sends out an investigation team to the

crash sites indicates a high level of accuracy.

Be Consistent (Speak with One Voice)

According to theory, members within the organization need to be kept well informed

to deliver a consistent message and speak with one voice (ibid).

During the crisis event, only two spokespersons from the Tesla organization are men-‐

tioned and it includes the CEO, Elon Musk and spokeswoman Elizabeth Jarvis-‐Shean.

Normally, the media require information from several experts within the organization,

but in this case, the CEO provides enough influence and knowledge to withhold this re-‐

quirement. This indicates that Tesla has managed to speak consistent during the case.


Discussion This discussion section will be divided into a content discussion, a method discussion

and a reflection to related and future research. The content discussion will elaborate on

the case study and some of its practical examples and implications towards the theory.

The method discussion focuses on the applied method in the case study and its general

applicability for this type of study.

Content

The Tesla case study shows an interesting point of discussion in relation to crisis the-‐

ory and especially crisis response strategies. In two out the five published press releas-‐

es, Tesla uses the victim stakeholder actively in a response to the car accidents. The first

press release includes the Tesla CEO’s response to the first accident including an email

correspondence between the victim and a Tesla spokesperson, whereas the second

press release is information solely from the victim stakeholder. The text represented

from the victim stakeholder has been analyzed as part of Tesla’s own crisis response

strategy, even though the organization is not the direct sender of the message. The case

study has used the crisis response strategies presented by Coombs SCCT, where the vic-‐

tim responses are mainly used to provide adjusting information of the crisis event and

to minimize the perceived damage with the use of justification. These strategies involve

the textual elements, while the overall strategy of using the victim is not taken into ac-‐

count. In the context of media related theory, the case study suggests that the victim

functions as an unbiased third party endorser for Tesla.

This untraditional way of presenting press releases, not only confuses the research-‐

er’s way of interpreting the text, but also opened the discussion on the implications or

absence of a suitable crisis response strategy. Considering the prominent researchers

within the field of crisis response strategies (Allen & Caillouet 1994; Benoit 1995;

Coombs 1995, 2007a), it is unclear to define a suitable or matching strategy, because

most strategies involve the organizations own words and actions. The most prominent

and related strategy is argued to be the ingratiation strategy presented by both Allen &

Caillouet and Coombs (Heath & O’Hair 2010; 109,111). The ingratiation strategy is de-‐

scribed by Allen & Caillouet as “try to gain approval of stakeholders”, whereas Coombs de-‐

scribes it as “crisis manager praises stakeholders” (ibid). Both versions consider the stake-‐

holder perspective as a strategy, but in a broad and imprecise way. The case study ex-‐

ample represents a reverse form of ingratiation strategy, because it is the victims who

praise the organization and its product and not the other way around. This leads to the


overall discussion question. Could it be argued that the case study highlights a new type

of crisis response strategy that involves the victim stakeholder or an unbiased third par-‐

ty endorser?

The second part of the content discussion refers to the media role. The case study

findings showed a general tendency of negative media coverage during the crisis event.

The articles used a majority of unfavorable sources towards Tesla and it was especially

the articles published prior to a Tesla press release that was covered in a negative way.

This opens the discussion on whether this case study was a singular example of an in-‐

creased media focus on negativity. Theory provided by Argenti highlights that this is not

a singular event, stating, “most people realize that the media get more excited about the bad

things that organizations do, rather than the good” (Brønn & Berg 2011; 263). To understand

the reasons for this claim, a closer look at the media role of gatekeeping is relevant. Ac-‐

cording to Chibnall (1977) “news is constructed from a variety of raw materials, the most im-‐

portant of which is information from sources” (Shoemaker & Vos 2009; 19). This shows the

importance and dependence for journalists to use sources in comparison to their own

direct experiences in their coverage of an event. How the journalists tend to frame the

different sources is another question, but the case study indicates that negative framing

is preferred. Another essential subject relating to the media is the term inter-‐media

agenda setting effect, which involves with the media marketplace and competition for

audiences. The term highlights that the media is monitoring as well as collaborating

with each other for stories. All three media used in the case study are described as some

of the most influential in guiding other media coverage (Shoemaker & Vos 2009; 92).

This inter-‐media agenda setting effect explains the publishing timing and consistency in

use of sources by the various mediums in the case study example. Despite of explaining

the case study, the elements mentioned above also raises questions and concerns about

the media power of being a third party objective endorser. If the media is critical by na-‐

ture, dependent on sources and borrows and reframes news stories from other influen-‐

tial media, then where is the objectivity and reliability of the news stories?

Method

The case study has focused on qualitative approaches to content analysis based on

empirical data from press releases and media articles. The qualitative approach is fun-‐

damental for this type of case study, as it involves a high level of interpretation of the

textual data to identify the crisis response strategies. Content analysis is used because

the case study is solely focusing on published text material and not material from inter-‐


views and conversations. The findings from the discourse analysis of the press releases

and the content analysis of the media articles are gathered and presented into numerical

figures and tables to gain an overview, while still being qualitative. This is argued by

Krippendorff, who states, “ultimately, all readings of texts is qualitative, even when certain

characteristics of a text are later converted into numbers” (Krippendorff 2013; 23).

A discussion on the case study’s reliability and validity are relevant to take into ac-‐

count in the discussion of its general applicability. In the methodology section it is ar-‐

gued that the study possess the reliability type of stability, due to the researchers use of

the hermeneutic circle principle. The reliability type of reproducibility is not present in

the case study, because the content is analyzed and interpreted by only one researcher.

This means that the categorization factors such as Coombs’ crisis response strategies,

categorization of other sources and tone of voice can differ if other researchers tries to

replicate the same case, with the possibility of ending up with different findings. The

case study findings of the media coverage show a general focus on the negative aspects,

which correspond to theory within the field. This shows that the research findings pos-‐

sess face-‐validity and social-‐validity, because it makes sense that the media coverage is

negative toward Tesla, especially in a crisis situation, while being an important issue for

the general public. On the other hand, the case study extend features only three different

news media and a total of eighteen articles which can be argued to possess a lack of con-‐

tent-‐validity, in order to capture the crisis event in a broader and more holistic perspec-‐

tive (Krippendorff 2013; 329-‐331).

Related and Future Research

A related research study presented by Sherry J. Holladay published in 2009 focus on

crisis communication strategies in the media coverage of chemical accidents (Holladay

2009). Two studies are highlighted in this research.

The first study examines to what extend organizational spokespersons inclusion of

crisis communication strategies are used in the media coverage, in comparison to other

sources. The research findings show that reputation repair strategies (Crisis response

strategies) are rarely shown in the media, whereas information-‐giving strategies from

organizational spokespersons are more included in the media. Moreover, other sources

like first responders are more frequently used in comparison to organizational spokes-‐

persons, in the media.

The second study, examine to what extend the crisis communication strategies from

organizational spokespersons are included in the follow-‐up media coverage. The find-‐

ings from this study reveals that the crisis communication strategies appeared more


frequently in the media coverage, but still at a low level. As an overall finding, the organ-‐

izational spokespersons are not featured to a high degree in then media coverage.

These findings from Holladay contribute to the Tesla case study findings in several

ways. First of all, it supports the notion that the media are more willingly to include in-‐

formation giving strategies than crisis response strategies from organizational spokes-‐

persons. Secondly, it highlights the media preference in using first responders in the

coverage, which was also evident in the Tesla case. Thirdly, it confirms that follow-‐up

media coverage after a crisis response is more favorable and includes more crisis re-‐

sponse strategies, as also illustrated in the Tesla case. Fourth and final, the Holladay

study reveals that organizational spokespersons are generally not featured in a high de-‐

gree in the media coverage, which is the opposite for the Tesla case. Tesla’s CEO is highly

featured in the media, which could denote that some types of spokespersons are more

profiled and relevant for the media than others.

The Holladay research did also make use of content analysis and it consisted of sixty-‐

one newspaper articles and thirty television reports in electronic form, while four peo-‐

ple functioned as coders for the interpretation of the text. The media reports were re-‐

read and discussed to obtain reliability and avoid discrepancies. As mentioned earlier,

this last part of obtaining reproducibility was not optional for the Tesla case, as only one

person coded it.

Having discussed the Holladay research study in relation to the Tesla case, the results

show both similarities and differences. It could be relevant for future research to inves-‐

tigate the effects of different types of organizational spokespersons towards the media.

This type of investigation could test the hypothesis claimed from theory and showed in

the Tesla case, that especially the CEO as spokesperson is more effective than other

spokespersons within an organization.


Conclusion The subject of the thesis involved crisis communication and media related theory. The

influential stakeholder of the media and crisis communication literature based the the-‐

sis on a case study of Tesla Motors, who faced a reputational crisis when three Model S

car accidents occurred. The case study involved an overall evaluation of the organiza-‐

tion’s media communications during the crisis event in 2013, which functioned as the

overall problem statement. Qualitative methods for the empirical data were applied. To

provide an answer to the thesis problem statement, three research questions were de-‐

veloped and answered in the following.

The first part of the analytical procedure included a discourse analysis of Tesla’s five

published press releases during the crisis event, with the outcome of outlining the ap-‐

plied crisis communication strategies, presented by Coombs SCCT.

The crisis event ranging from October 1st – December 31st 2013 involved three Tesla

car fire accidents and was divided into three different phases, where each accident rep-‐

resented a different phase. The first phase represented a low level of organizational cri-‐

sis responsibility, where Tesla mainly used diminish strategies and adjusting infor-‐

mation strategies. The second phase involved a second fire occurring outside of USA and

became relevant in connection with the third phase. The third phase represented a

strong level of organizational crisis responsibility due to a Velcro effect involving a crisis

history, where Tesla reduced its use on information giving strategies and involved more

response strategies. Diminish strategies was mainly used to minimize the perceived

damage and to support the increased use of denial strategies directed at the media for

the claim of a crisis existence. Supportive bolstering strategies were also used as a rein-‐

forcing part to support the denial, whereas the rebuild strategy was used to offer actions

of compensation.

The second part of the analysis included a content analysis of eighteen media articles,

in an attempt to highlight the media coverage and framing of the crisis event. The cate-‐

gorization of the analysis included the crisis communication strategies presented by

Coombs to identify Tesla’s strategies in the media, but more importantly also the me-‐

dia’s use of external sources and the articles tone of voice.

The external sources were primarily used to frame the articles in an unfavorable way

towards Tesla, where especially the Tesla stock and the federal regulators of NHTSA had

been emphasized. First responders and passive responses from Tesla were some of the


elements used to increase the negative coverage from the media. Throughout the crisis

phases, the media coverage increased and examples of published material from Tesla

was either excluded or reframed in an undesirable way by the media. In contrast to the

negative presentation, the researcher’s interpretation of the content showed that the

media article’s tone of voice was primarily negative prior to a Tesla press release, while

being favorable after a Tesla press release.

The last part of the case study analysis included an overall assessment of Tesla’s han-‐

dling of its crisis communication with the media, based on the previous qualitative find-‐

ings. Through a review of Tesla’s crisis communication strategies representation in the

media coverage, an indication of success could be evaluated, along with dictation of cor-‐

rect response from crisis theory.

Despite general negative media coverage, Tesla did successfully manage to place most

of its crisis communication strategies in the media. Tesla’s use of adjusting information

and the crisis response strategies of justification, compensation and reminding had been

successfully placed in the media coverage. On the other hand, the denial strategies and

the bolstering strategies of ingratiation and victimage, had been more difficult to place

in the media. Generally, Tesla had been very specific and consistent in their crisis com-‐

munication and provided the media with information, despite late published press re-‐

leases.


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