this paper summarizes the initial results of a household...
TRANSCRIPT
This paper summarizes the initial results of a household survey specially conducted to assess the effects the economic crisis
RELATION BETWEEN ENROLLMENT PER GRADE
AND POPULATION PER AGE
TOTAL COUNTRY - YEAR 2000
0
100,000
200,000
300,000
400,000
500,000
600,000
700,000
800,000
Año 1
6 años
Año 2
7 años
Año 3
8 años
Año 4
9 años
Año 5
10 años
Año 6
11 años
Año 7
12 años
Año 8
13 años
Año 9
14 años
Año 10
15 años
Año 11
16 años
Año 12
17 años
Children /Students
Matricula que está en el grado que corresponde
téoricamente a su edad
Población por edad
RETENTION ZONE
WITH OVERAGE
NON-SCHOOLING
ZONE
FULL AND TIMELY SCHOOLING
LINE
2
TRANSITION
ZONE
EVOLUTION OF ENROLLMENT FOR AGES 11 TO 17, BY REGULARITY
OR SCHOOL DELAY
Total Country, Data for Year 2000
0
100000
200000
300000
400000
500000
600000
700000
800000
11 años
12 años
13 años
14 años
15 años
16 años
17 años
Alumnos con tres y más años de rezago
Alumnos con dos años de rezago
Alumnos con rezago de 1 año
Alumnos en edad teórica
3
ENROLLMENT PER AGE
``
EVOLUTION OF ENROLLMENT FOR AGES 11 TO 17, BY REGULARITY
OR SCHOOL DELAY
Total Country, Data for Year 2000
0
100000
200000
300000
400000
500000
600000
700000
800000
11 años
12 años
13 años
14 años
15 años
16 años
17 años
Alumnos con tres y más años de rezago
Alumnos con dos años de rezago
Alumnos con rezago de 1 año
Alumnos en edad teórica
3
ENROLLMENT PER AGE
``
EGB 1 y 2
4,806,514
87.8
6.39
1.96
EGB 3
1,728,825
71.1
3.27
6.33
Polimodal
1,615,975
60.7
3.35
13.6
Source: Ministry of Education
Inter-annual
dropout
Educational
Level
Enrollment
Graduation
Rate
Average
Duration
Educational Level
1
2
3
4
5
Total
Preschool
23,27
27,38
21,16
14,38
13,81
100
Primary
34,25
25,57
19,88
12,03
8,27
100
Secondary
23,45
25,46
21,37
16,94
12,79
100
Higher Non Univ.
8,89
13,08
21,34
29,63
27,06
100
Higher University
5,12
8,65
16,85
28,37
41,01
100
Total
24,56
22,52
20,01
16,95
15,97
100
* Quintiles have the same number of individuals.
Source: Ministry of Economy- Directorate of Consolidated Social Expenditure based on EPH-INDEC
Households Quintiles per Cápita*
Marcelo Becerra
Sergio España
Ariel Fiszbein
June 2003
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction ...................................................................................................................2
I. The Context ..................................................................................................................2
II. Main Characteristics of Educational Financing and Expenditure .................................8
1. Consolidated Public Expenditure on Education.................................................8
2. Provincial Public Expenditure ...........................................................................9
III. The Efficiency of Public Expenditure Allocation to Basic Education in the
Provinces ....................................................................................................................14
1. Differences in per Student Expenditure among Provinces ..............................15
2. Per Student Expenditure and Outcomes ………..............................................15
3. Relative Efficiency among Provinces .............................................................17
III. Resource Allocation in School Organization ............................................................22
1. Analysis of School Organization Indicators ..................................................22
2. Normative Framework ...................................................................................23
Teacher Allocation Norms……..............................................................24
Labor Legislation ...................................................................................24
3. Application of Procedures in Reality ..............................................................24
4. A Concrete Case of Improved Efficiency…. ..................................................26
V. Other Factors that Influence Efficiency and Outcomes/Results ................................28
1. Repitency and Dropout ...................................................................................28
Conclusions …………………………………………………….…………………..29
Bibliography………...................................................................................................30
Annexes
Annex1. Schooling..............................................................................................31
Annex 2. Expenditure and Indicators..................................................................32
Annex 3. Student / Teacher Ratios by Province ................................................47
Annex 4. A Case Study: Catamarca Province....................................................48
Introduction
The Argentine educational system still faces important problems in terms of coverage and quality. A significant number of students fails to complete basic education, and the persistence of repitency is one of the main causes of dropouts. The schooling expansion of the past decade is over as a consequence of successive fiscal crises and the collapse of economy in 2002. Therefore, the actions to start growing again should necessarily foresee a different scenario from that of the nineties: the provinces will not be able to increase their expenditure level and the national government has a budget with limited capacity to finance special programs. Such situation demands extreme efforts to use the available resources in the most efficient way. The prevailing disparities among provinces in terms of resources allocated and outcomes achieved are clear evidence there is scope for a better use of resources, even in the context of current teacher allocation norms and labor regulations. The accumulated available capacity of human and physical resources lets us infer that the system has margins to increment the number of students without increasing the expenditure level. This paper will attempt to show the characteristics and the magnitude of these inefficiencies, and their possibilities for improvement.
I. The Context
During the 90's, Argentina launched a series of ambitious reforms of the educational system, aimed at improving the coverage, quality and equity of basic education. Such reform involved, among the most important aspects: (i) the completion of the decentralization process, through the transfer of secondary and tertiary non-university institutions to the provinces; (ii) a new definition of educational levels and cycles, and the organization of their curriculum; and (iii) the extension of mandatory school attendance from 7 to 10 years.
In terms of coverage, the main objective of this reform was to achieve total schooling for children aged 5, and for teenagers between 12 and 15 years old, an age range where the highest level of dropout occurred. In this respect, there were important achievements: between 1994 and 2000, enrollment grew 19 %, and almost reached universality for 5 year-olds. In several provinces this growth reflected a significant improvement in the number of youngsters who continue their studies. Nevertheless, the system still presents an important schooling gap: 12 out of 100 children that start EGB I and II will not finish 6th grade; and every 100 students that start 7th grade, 29 will not complete the 9 mandatory years of general basic education (EGB). Finally, 39% of the students who enter Polimodal may not graduate from that level (Graphs 1 and 2- Annex 1).
Table 1
Main Coverage and Schooling// Indicators
This schooling degrading process also stresses social inequity. The Argentine educational system is relatively progressive in primary EGB I and II levels - as schooling is almost universal, 34% of students belong to the lower income quintile. Nevertheless, the slant against lower income sectors becomes crudely evident in secondary school and, fundamentally, when the number of students who fail to graduate is taken into account. While over 75% of the students in the highest income quintile finishes secondary education, just 24% does in the low income quintile.
Table 2
Percentage Distribution of Students in the Educational System
By Quintile of Family per Capita Income, May 2002
(Total Urban Conglomerates)
Table 3
Basic Secondary Education Indicators by Income Level – 1998
Source: Siempro - Secretariat of Social Development. 1999
During the first years of the reform, the strong expansion of fiscal resources, together with a later national and provincial debt process, led to a period of sustained increase in education expenditure until 1999. The growth of enrollment was therefore accompanied by a larger budget for current expenditures as well as capital investments. Consequently, although there were sharp differences among provinces, higher demand was solved with higher resources: between 1996 (when the reform began to be implemented) and 2001 there are records of rises of 39% in provincial expenditure on education in real terms, and of 18.2% in teacher deployments - an increase that is higher than the rise of enrollment in that period. These percentages reflect a sustained growth in per student expenditure.
Table 4
Students, Teacher Allocations and Expenditure on Non-University Education
Comparison 1996 – 2001
Source: Ministry of Education
This situation shows that the need to make better use of resources was not properly addressed during the economic growth cycle. Later, successive fiscal crises, which have worsened since the end of the 90's soothed the transformational thrust in many parts of the country. Finally, those crises reached such a point that some provinces were not even able to continue providing the service, and improvement plans were postponed until the system started operating again.
The reforms were launched through a series of legal instruments. The main legal instruments are: (i) In 1991 the Transfer of the Educational Services Law for secondary and tertiary non-university education (the preschool and primary levels had been transferred to the provinces at the end of the 70's); (ii) In 1993, the Federal Education Law, which defined the competencies and responsibilities of the national government and the provinces; (iii) In 1994, the Federal Education Pact, by means of which the Federal Government committed resources and the provinces agreed to enforce this law; (iv) In 1995, the Higher Education Law, which consolidated the normative framework for national universities.
According to these instruments, the National Government is in charge of: (a) financing and regulating the national university system; (b) supervising and providing assistance to ensure the quality of basic education, by means of national evaluation systems, technical assistance for curriculum management and training; (c) financing compensatory programs to solve regional and social imbalances. Concerning the provinces, they are responsible for the provision of services and financing all non-university education levels: Preschool (1 mandatory year); General Basic Education – EGB - (9 mandatory years); Polimodal (3 years); and Higher Non-University level (3/4 years). This obviously includes teachers' salaries, school maintenance and infrastructure, managing staff assignments, supervising and the general administration and management of the system.
This process implied a new challenge to the coordination of roles between the national government and the provinces -a long-dated issue- as throughout most of its history, and in spite of the federal structure of the constitution, the Argentine State has been strongly centralized. Since the foundational stage and for more than a century, resource distribution and service provision were almost exclusively managed at national level. The federal structure has only been formal, and the national government has concentrated the management capacities that belong to the provinces. Therefore, the redistribution of faculties and competencies that took place in the last years has met with the inertia of power representations that were forged during this long centralistic period.
Following that organizational scheme, the initial implementation stage of the new structure got important resources for teacher training, curriculum management, compensatory actions (teaching equipment, books, school materials, scholarships, etc.), the organization of administrative systems, and school infrastructure from the national government. This financial support was executed by means of instruments that did not contemplate incentives to improve the efficiency of provincial systems. And, although it led to the schooling achievements we have mentioned, it failed to lay a sound basis for the reform to be sustainable and profound.
This situation changed as from 2000, when the National Teacher Incentive Fund (FONID) was included in the budget. This was an emergency measure to respond to the salary demands of the educational sector, and was intended to make up for the provincial delays in salary payments with national funds. The FONID was to be financed by a specific tax, to protect the resources that the national state had been allocating to the transfer of non-university educational levels to the provinces. But there were collection issues and the expected amount was never reached. In 2000, the fund was included in the national budget. The undesired consequence was that, in practice, the execution of the fund absorbed a large portion of the budget allocated to non-salary investments. Although it can be argued that FONID has relieved labor conflicts in some provinces, it has modified the division of responsibilities between the national government and the provinces. In this sense, in could be argued that the payment of part of the salaries by the national government has generated distortions in the allocation of resources at provincial level.
Likewise, the political changes in the national government and in some provinces due to the results of the 1999 elections opened a transition period which in some cases led to the temporary or permanent interruption of national programs and provincial reforms. Finally, in 2002 the social crisis worsened and led the national government to redirect resources to support school kitchens and increase the number of scholarship beneficiaries. As a result, at present, the national education budget includes two items (part of the salaries and food assistance) which were under the responsibility of provincial governments or other areas of the national government until a short time ago. Therefore, other components which supported the transformations in the initial scheme were lost.
Consequently, an initiative to resume the schooling effort should foresee a different scenario to of the 90's. The provinces will not be in a position to increase their teaching staff/teacher allocations on an annual basis and it may take some time for the national government to recover its capacity to finance special programs with the same intensity. This situation requires strong efforts to use existing resources in the most efficient way. As it was pointed out before, the accumulation of installed capacity leads us to suppose that the system has margins for a higher number of students. At the same time, most of them are children and youth who are in the system already, but are affected by repitency. Therefore, their first impact does not generate major costs, which may in fact be recorded when that progress implies a decrease in dropouts. For the system to be able to face this situation, it is necessary to organize educational management in provincial ministries, to adjust teacher allocations to real needs. To achieve this goal, it is essential for national instruments to include the appropriate incentives to reach these goals on the basis of objective criteria and outcomes, and with the current constitutional and legal framework.
To understand the situation better, the reader should be reminded that it is not appropriate to consider "the provinces" as a uniform whole. Their “size” –number of inhabitants, GDP, land area-, their human development –schooling rates, child mortality rates, literacy rates, etc.-; their available fiscal resources by internal tax capacity, by federal co-participation index, by royalties from renewable and non-renewable natural resources; their political and institutional stability; are all aspects that tend to be very different among provinces. At the most, some common factors can be identified and provinces can be grouped by regional characteristics linked to historical and geographical aspects. But even in those groups there are inevitable differences when policies and outcomes are reviewed.
What has been pointed out so far is the result of the analysis of the different expenditure components and their determinants; and of the effects of school organization, of the administration of the system and of repitency over costs and expenditure efficiency. This paper will attempt to show the structural characteristics of expenditure efficiency, the magnitude of some of its deficiencies and its possibilities for improvement.
The analysis that will be presented in the following sections focuses on these aspects: (i) efficiency in the allocation of human resources, the main component of the "educational production function," and its costs. On the one hand, the relation between the main variables that take part in determining the expenditure level and per student expenditure , and on the other hand, the processes of allocating and controlling teaching staffs; (ii) the relation between resource allocation and expenditure effort, and the outcomes of that investment in terms of quality and coverage, taking into account the prevailing differences among provinces, which are significant enough from the point of view of expenditure and of outcomes not to be taken as an object of analysis. Although this paper is not intended to discuss the particular situation of any province, in some sections the analysis will focus on those differences among jurisdictions, and within them, we will discuss specific cases that will help us understand aspects that should be studied in detail to improve the efficiency and equity of the system. Addressing these aspects of the system becomes relevant in the present context of severe fiscal restrictions, which reveals in nominal freezing goals for primary expenditure, and a strong fall in real terms.
II. Main Characteristics of Educational Financing and Expenditure.
II.1 Consolidated Public Expenditure on Education
In the context of the Argentine economic collapse of 2002, consolidated public expenditure on education suffered the most important fall in its history, as it decreased 38% in real terms and 28% over Gross Domestic Product (from 4.7% to 3.4%) with respect to 2001, even though GDP dropped 11% (Tables 1a, 1.b, 1.c and 1.d – Annex 2). This decrease has been similar both at national level and in the provinces and for all educational levels. It is also worth noting that although total consolidated public expenditure fell 39% in 2002, the reduction of expenditure on education in real terms has been greater than on health and social assistance, the areas which were given priority by the national government during the social emergency. However, it is important to point out that due to the salary freeze the impact on the educational system has special characteristics, as the capacity to provide the service was maintained since it was less affected by the increase of other inputs, as it happened in the health sector, for example, where the prices of hospital inputs increased significantly on account of devaluation.
Table 5
Evolution of Consolidated Public Expenditure on Education by Government Level
In millions of Constant Pesos of 2001 and as a Percentage of GDP
Source: National Directorate of Consolidated Social Expenditure – Ministry of Economy
During the decade that preceded the 2002 crisis, consolidated public expenditure on education had increased significantly, rising 88% in real terms and 40% in product terms between 1991 and 2001. During this period, however, two different stages can be identified: (i) a strong expansion between 1991 and 1999, which coincides with the period of economic growth and of greater fiscal resources. In real terms, total public expenditure increased 86%, representing an 8% average annual growth rate, which was higher than the product growth rate, and implied a 3.4% rise over GDP in 1991, and a 4.6%, in 1999; (ii) during 2000-2001, expenditure remained constant, coinciding with economic recession and successive fiscal crises. As a percentage of total public expenditure, public expenditure on education rose from 10.5% in 1991 to 13.6%, in 2001.
Before the crisis, Argentina's fiscal effort on education (4.6% of GDP) had similar levels to the international average, it was slightly below the average for OECD countries (4.9% of GDP), and above Mexico's (4.4%) and Chile's (4.1%) and the average of other emerging Asian countries such as Korea, Turkey, Thailand and Philippines. However, in 2002 the 3.4% fall of GDP again pushed Argentina farther away from the OECD average and even below the average for Latin American and emerging countries.
Table 6
International Comparison
(Argentina, 2002 - Rest of the Countries, 1999)
Source: OECD – World Bank
II.2. Provincial Public Expenditure
In Argentine provinces, basic education (Preschool, EGB I-II / Primary and EGB III and Polimodal / Secondary) is provided through supply, meaning that provincial governments are responsible for organizing, financing and supervising schools' human resources and maintenance expenditures (recurrent expenditures), and for providing the necessary infrastructure (investment expenditure on school buildings and equipment). Thus, resources allocated to education are aimed at ensuring that demand is covered by the availability of school places. Supply is generally ensured by means of two mechanisms: (i) direct and total financing of public or state schools that provide free tuition; (ii) transfers to private institutions (or public school privately owned and managed) that partially or totally cover the cost of teaching staff with of subsidies. Private institutions cover 25% of total enrollment and receive 13% of total provincial expenditure on education.
Provincial funding of educational expenditure has two main sources: (i) "freely available" resources from provincial treasuries that finance 95% of provincial expenditure on education. On average, for all provinces, these resources comprise national resources from federal co- participation taxes and other co- participation sources (63%), and provincial resources derived from taxes and other sources (37%). This composition varies significantly among provinces, going from 98% of self-generated resources in Buenos Aires City to a range between 10% and 20% in medium size and small provinces; (ii) Contributions from the National Ministry of Education: they represent an average of 5% of provincial expenditure on education and consist of transfers specifically allocated to expenditure on different national programs (compensatory schemes, infrastructure, technical assistance) and FONID.
Since 1993, when the decentralization process finished, provinces have concentrated 80% of the execution of total expenditure on education (and 73% of its financing), while central government has contributed 17% of the execution (and 24% of its financing). The remaining 3% corresponds to municipalities. Between 1993 and 2001, expenditure on education increased 41% in real terms for provinces taken as a whole, although evolution by province varied widely (Table 2 – Annex 2). While in Buenos Aires Province, which represents 35% of total provincial expenditure on education, the expenditure in education increased by 80% in real terms, in the rest of the provinces it rose by 25%. An important aspect to highlight is that the resources that provinces allocated to the sector grew with time, and rose from an average of 26% of total provincial expenditure in 1993 to 30% in 2001, although there were significant differences among provinces (from 16% in Tierra Del Fuego to 35% in Buenos Aires Province).
In second place, it should be noted that provincial expenditure growth is much more important than the increase linked to the transfer of primary and secondary education services. During the period under discussion, the primary and secondary levels more than doubled the level of education expenditure executed by the provinces. The following list presents a brief classification of the circumstances that determined this increment: (i) salary rises: in order to recover part of the real salary fall, which had worsened by the end of the 80's on account of hyperinflation, during the 90's several jurisdictions proposed salary rises, as this decade was characterized by higher fiscal revenues and debt. Additionally, as from 1992 the decentralization of the Secondary and the Higher Non-University levels implied a salary increase for teachers who worked in schools and institutes that had belonged to the national government until then, in response to the need to make their salaries equal to those of provincial teachers, which were higher in general; (ii) an increase in “non-salary” investment categories (compensatory programs and infrastructure, equipment, training and scholarship investments); (iii) an increase in teacher allocations, which is discussed in detail in part IV of this paper.
The composition of expenditure by education levels represents coverage by levels and its corresponding costs to a large extent: 52% for basic education, 32% for secondary education, and 6.4% for higher education (Table 3- Annex 2). The remaining 9.5% is not discriminated by level, although it is estimated that in general it represents the above mentioned proportions. There is no accurate information on the percentage of expenditure that corresponds to the administration of the system, although it is estimated to be between 7% and 8% of total expenditure. Compared with OECD levels, Argentina puts more effort in basic education (72% of the total in Argentina against 65% in OECD) than in higher education (28% against 35% in OECD) even though expenditure on higher education grew in a significantly higher proportion than basic education did in the last ten years: in the 1991-2001 period expenditure on basic education grew 76% in real terms while expenditure on higher education increased 123%, fundamentally due to expenditure on universities, which represents 70% of the expenditure on higher education.
Concerning composition by category of expenditure, the payment of personnel salaries (including subsidies to the private sector) concentrates 91% of provincial expenditure on education, and the remaining percentage corresponds to maintenance and services (3%), different types of programs via transfers (3%) and capital expenditures (3%) (Table 4 – Annex 2). Most provinces, except the largest ones, allocate an almost null proportion to non-salary expenditures (for example, expenditures on maintenance, teaching equipment or books) and to improving and expanding school infrastructure. Most of the new capital investments (the Social Educational Plan and the Federal Educational Pact in the 90's, and the Infrastructure Program during 2001-2002) and other compensatory or pedagogical actions were made through federal programs. However, the case of Buenos Aires province has been an important exception. During the 1996-1998 period, Buenos Aires allocated self-generated resources to finance an infrastructure expansion to face higher enrollment, resulting from the mass implementation of the EGB III and Polimodal reform.
Another aspect to consider is that an important part of school expenditure on maintenance and supply of basic materials supply expenditures are covered by students’ families through parents' cooperadoras -- organizations run by parents to maintain schools and supply them with basic materials. Parents make contributions to cooperadoras to cover these costs, and many of them establish fixed contribution payments. In general, amounts contributed depend on the income level of students' parents, as in schools where students belong to poor or indigent families, contributions are very low or no contributions are made. Although there is no systematized data on contributions to cooperadoras, we can conclude that, as the distribution of public expenditure on maintenance is not adequately targeted, the previously described situation generates instances of inequity.
In Argentina, teachers' remunerations varies among teachers in EGB I-II/Primary schools and EGB III-Polimodal / Secondary schools, and it also differs among provinces, as each has its own remuneration structure, and normative and regulatory frameworks for the teaching career (Teachers’ Statutes, Leave Schemes, etc). Whereas primary school teachers, who work in the Preschool and EGB I and II levels, are paid according to their dedication - part-time (4 hours a day) or full time (7 or 8 hours a day), secondary school teachers are paid by their number of weekly teaching hours (45-minute teaching periods). Teachers are paid monthly during the academic calendar and also during annual vacations. In Argentina, teachers' remunerations comprise basically three factors: (a) the basic salary for each teaching position; (b) teaching seniority: in Argentina an average of 22 years of professional service are required to earn the highest salary for a teaching position; the difference in income between an inexperienced teacher and one who is at the top of the teaching career is, for the same position, 80%, with a rate between 20% and 30% over basic salary every five years on account of teaching experience, as the average among provinces; (c) bonus payments for specific tasks: teachers receive bonus payments for specific tasks or for working in specific zones/schools, such as those in remote or unfavorable locations, or accepting administrative duties as part of the same teaching job;
Promotion to these positions is determined by a competitive process and the performance record of the teacher, according to a score system. In summary, the composition of remunerative structures has very few incentives for individual teachers and schools to improve their "performance".
Concerning the private sector, its size and importance in the Argentine educational sector became increasingly significant in recent years. From a 21 % share in total enrollment in all non-university levels, the private sector reached a 25% share in 2001. Public subsidies to private schools are an important part of public expenditure on basic education, and represent 13% of the total. However, the mechanism to distribute these subsidies does not include any incentive to improve efficiency and educational quality, and it also creates distortions in terms of inequity. Private education subsidy systems give priority to supply variables (for e.g., the number of teachers) against demand variables (for e.g., the number of students, based on efficient allocations in technical relations such as students per section, teacher allocations per section, etc) and equity variables (for e.g., students' social and economic condition). This situation has two important consequences: (i) there are great distortions in per student allocations and among schools in the same province, and (ii) subsidies fail to encourage the development of new capacity in the private sector within the system. Additionally, in most provinces the necessary information and supervision systems to determine the subsidy level to be granted to private schools are deficient, and in general, there is no per school information on students' monetary contributions. Some estimations indicate that the fees paid by the families that send their children to private primary and secondary schools represent approximately 17% of the public educational budget for these levels.
III. The Efficiency of Public Expenditure Allocation to Basic Education in the Provinces
III.1. Differences in Expenditure Per Student
One of the most salient aspects is that per student expenditure levels have significant differences among provinces, even among those with similar characteristics, both in terms of wealth, “coparticipation” transfers, and other factors (Table 5 – Annex 2). Graph 1 shows the relation between per capita GDP and per student public expenditure, which is positive between both variables and becomes more evident when it is observed by group of provinces: per student expenditure increases as we move from provinces with low per capita GDP level (all provinces in northern Argentina) to large / advanced provinces (Buenos Aires, Santa Fé, Córdoba and Mendoza) and finally to the Patagonia provinces (with per capita GDP levels above the average). However, within each of these groups there are significant differences: for example, although per capita GDP in Salta, Misiones, Corrientes, Tucumán, Jujuy and Chaco provinces is quite similar (between 3,000 and 3,500 pesos per capita), there is a 50% variation in per student expenditure levels (from $667 in Salta to $1015 in Chaco).
RELATION BETWEEN ENROLLMENT PER GRADE
AND POPULATION PER AGE
TOTAL COUNTRY - YEAR 2000
0
100,000
200,000
300,000
400,000
500,000
600,000
700,000
800,000
Año 1
6 años
Año 2
7 años
Año 3
8 años
Año 4
9 años
Año 5
10 años
Año 6
11 años
Año 7
12 años
Año 8
13 años
Año 9
14 años
Año 10
15 años
Año 11
16 años
Año 12
17 años
Children /Students
Matricula que está en el grado que corresponde
téoricamente a su edad
Población por edad
RETENTION ZONE
WITH OVERAGE
NON-SCHOOLING
ZONE
FULL AND TIMELY SCHOOLING
LINE
2
TRANSITION
ZONE
Source: Ministry of Education and Ministry of Economy
Graph 1 also shows that there are high levels of per student expenditure over GDP in La Rioja and Catamarca provinces. To a large extent, these levels are feasible because these provinces have high levels of per capita “coparticipation”. Per capita co participation transfers have a strong redistributional characteristic, which implies that the poorest provinces (more than half of the total) have fiscal resources that are much higher than their product capacity. In graph 2 we can see the positive relation between per student expenditure and per capita co participation transfers. However, once more there are important differences in per student expenditure between provinces with similar transfer levels (for example, La Rioja and Formosa or between Chubut and Rio Negro).
Source: Ministry of Education and Ministry of Economy
III.2. Expenditure Per Student and Outcomes
Another way of looking at efficiency is by relating the allocation of human resources and its costs to the outcomes achieved. Reality indicates that a higher level of per student expenditure is not related to better outcomes measured by performance test scores. In other words, higher costs -due to higher staff allocations or higher salaries- do not imply better outcomes (Tables 9 and 10 - Annex 2). Graph 2 shows the relation between per student expenditure in the basic education level and the results of the performance tests taken in 7th. Grade (Language – Average 1997-1999-2000).
In the graph it can be seen, for example, that the result of the test (57 points) in the province with the lowest per student expenditure (Salta, $419) is similar to the result of the province with the highest per student expenditure (Santa Cruz, $2.300). This conclusion becomes particularly relevant when we analyze groups of provinces with similar characteristics. For example, there is a group of five provinces in the north of the country that share similar characteristics (Misiones, Tucumán, Santiago del Estero, La Rioja and Catamarca) and have similar test results – 49 points- although they have great differences in their level of per student spending (from $524 in Misiones to $1,278 in Catamarca).
Source: Ministry of Education and Ministry of Economy
Likewise, neither is a positive relation observed between a lower number of students per teacher ("physical" or technical indicator of expenditure allocation) and performance test results (Tables 6, 7, and.10 – Annex 2). Graph 4 presents relations for the basic education level, where it can be observed, for example, that there is a group of six provinces with similar relative development (Santiago del Estero, Formosa, Tucumán, Formosa, La Rioja and Catamarca), and similar test results (between 49 and 50 points) but very disparate students per teacher ratios, which go from 13.5 students per teacher in Tucumán to 19.5 students per teacher in Misiones.
Graph 4
Relation between the Number of Students per Teacher (Primary Level)
and Performance in Language and Mathematics, 7th grade
(Average 1997-2000)
La Pampa
Santa Fe
Buenos Aires
Entre Ríos
Río Negro
San Luis
Mendoza
Córdoba
Salta
San Juan
Neuquen
Chubut
Corrientes
Chaco
Jujuy
Formosa
Misiones
Sgo. Del Estero
La Rioja
Tucumán
Catamarca
Santa Cruz
T.Del Fuego
45
47
49
51
53
55
57
59
61
63
65
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
Students per Teacher - Primary Level - (Corrected by Rurality)
Results of Assessment Tests
Language and Mathematics
(Average 1997-2000)
Source: Ministry of Education and Ministry of Economy
An important point to highlight about the previous efficiency relations is the influence of private education coverage in per student expenditure for the enrollment total used so far. In the case of the provinces with a significant percentage of their enrollments covered by subsidized private schools, the total amount of the per student subsidy in relation to average expenditure on public schools is an important factor to determine efficiency. This situation becomes particularly relevant in the case of larger provinces. The relation between subsidy to the private sector and expenditure per public school student is 20% in Buenos Aires City and 37% in Buenos Aires Province (Tables 5 and 8 - Annex 2). These two provinces cover 44% of the total enrollment of the country.
III.3. Relative Efficiency among Provinces
It is also possible to show the existence of inefficiencies by estimating an indicator that can show cost-efficiency degrees among provinces. In order to do so, two representative input variables in terms of quantities and prices were considered : (i) the quantity of students per teacher (adjusted by rurality), as a variable that is representative of the quantitative or physical allocation of teaching staff at school level; (ii) per student expenditure, adjusted by per capita GDP, as a variable that is representative of unitary expenditure or effort, although it has central weight in determining expenditure when the relative wealth effect is eliminated, as it was described before,. In this sense, efficiency levels were established on a scale from 0 to 1. In the case of students per teacher (adjusted by rurality), value 1 corresponds to the most "efficient" province, meaning that this value corresponds to the highest student per teacher ratio. In the case of per student expenditure, value 1 was assigned to the most "efficient" province, considered as the one with the lowest per student expenditure (adjusted by per capita GDP). The average between both indexes is called "input efficiency index." In all cases, values correspond to the basic education level. Finally, the combination of the input index with the outcome index, where 1 is the maximum level, renders an input-output efficiency index, also called "cost-efficiency" index.
Table 7 shows results: Mendoza, Salta, Santa Fé and Misiones provinces are the most “cost-efficient." However, it is important to highlight that although these provinces hold the best indexes they have very different quality outcome levels. This situation is reflected in graph 4, where we can imagine a sort of “Cost-Efficiency Borderline” along which these four provinces are located. Similarly, the provinces that are farther away from this "frontier" are the most inefficient in cost-outcomes (La Rioja, Catamarca, San Juan, La Pampas, Santa Cruz, and Jujuy). Beyond the simplification proposed by this exercise, it becomes evident that there is a significant difference between the most efficient provinces and the most inefficient ones.
Table 7
Efficiency Indexes by Province (1) – Basic Education Level – Year 2001.
(1) Excluding Buenos Aires City.
Source: Ministry of Education and Ministry of Economy
Graph 5
Efficiency Ratios - Primary Level
Mendoza
Salta
Misiones
San Luis
Santa Fe
Santa Cruz
La Pampa
Sgo. del Estero
Tucumán
Catamarca
La Rioja
Formosa
Jujuy
San Juan
Chaco
Neuquen
Corrientes
Chubut
Córdoba
Río Negro
Buenos Aires
Entre Ríos
0.70
0.75
0.80
0.85
0.90
0.95
1.00
1.05
0.50
0.60
0.70
0.80
0.90
1.00
1.10
Input Efficiency Index (Inverse)
Outcomes Efficiency Index
Source: Ministry of Education and Ministry of Economy
Having discussed the relations between per student expenditure and the main economic and fiscal indicators and then, the relation between per student expenditure and outcomes, we will go on to analyze the factors that determine them. Taking into account that 90% of provincial public expenditure corresponds to expenditure on staff, the level of per student expenditure is basically determined by the level of teachers' salaries and the number of teacher allocations over the number of students. The factors that determine the assignment of physical quantities (technical relations) are discussed in the next chapter.
Concerning salary level, there is also a direct positive relationship with the income level in each province (per capita GDP), a result that is consistent with the relation between per student expenditure and per capita GDP, as salaries represent 90% of expenditure. Graph 6 shows that there is a group of provinces which have a per capita GDP that is below the average ($5.613), but nevertheless, their salary levels are above the average (La Rioja, Catamarca, Santiago del Estero) or, conversely, a group a provinces with GDP above the national average and salary levels below it (Santa Fe and Río Negro). These differences are determined not only by the levels of per capita co participation transfers but also by the effort that each province dedicates to the sector in terms of total public expenditure percentage.
Source: Ministry of Education and Ministry of Economy
IV. Resource Allocation in School Organization
IV.1. Analysis of School Organization Indicators
The indicator that is most usually applied to characterize efficiency is the students per teacher ratio. This indicator, by means of which relations and their links to outcomes can be easily read, shows great disparity among provinces. It is an abstraction, as no norm or concrete school situation can be referred to it. For that reason, the analysis also includes the factors over which the decisions that effectively determine the allocation of teaching staff are made. These factors, which we will call School Organization Indicators, are (i) the number of students per sections, and (ii) the number of teachers per section.
As it was explained in the previous section, the normative framework of each province establishes the coefficients for each case. A preliminary comparative analysis lets us observe that normative differences do not explain the different coefficients recorded in reality. The students per teacher indicator shows a national mean of 15.1 for the Basic Education level, with a 76% difference between extremes. In the Secondary Education level, the average is 9.2 students per teacher, with a difference of more than 100% between extremes (6.4 in Santa Cruz and 13.3 in Salta). Graphs 1 and 2 in Annex 3 show the magnitude of these ratios in each province and in comparison to the national mean.
To facilitate understanding, the incidence of contextual factors is analyzed, considering them exogenous or “previous” to school organization. Depending on demographic characteristics (dispersal of rural population, for example) or pedagogical characteristics (study plans or the duration of the school day), these factors condition the creation of new classrooms (sections) or the number of teachers that will be required for them, thus affecting the possibilities to optimize human resources. The general analysis of the relations of students, classrooms and teachers by province and by cycles of the system grouped by their common elements in school organization (Tables 11 and 12 – Annex 2) clearly reveals that (i) both school organization indicators are expenditure determinants; (ii) full day tuition is not associated to a higher proportion of teachers; (iii) rurality does not explain the lowest student per teacher ratios either; (iv) provinces with the highest numbers of teachers per section do not have a higher load of curriculum hours.
At the same time, the analysis of one province shows extremely high standard deviations in these indicators, even in homogeneous fields (urban, rural, private or public schools). In order to illustrate this point, Annex 4 presents a detailed analysis of Catamarca province.
IV.2. Normative Framework
The factors involved in the allocation of school staff can be classified into six components: five of them form the "permanent" teacher allocation structure called Organic Functional Plan (Planta Organica Funcional –POF-). The sixth component is related to teacher replacements, which imply that more than one salary is paid for each teaching position, and therefore are generally called "double-salary" positions.
Teacher Allocation Regulations.
The components of POF are regulated by a set of norms based on identifying demand to determine supply. In general, the normative framework of all provinces differs just in minimum coefficient variations, and in all cases, it regulates five organizational factors;(i) the number of classrooms, determined by the number of students per grade or year of study;(ii) the curriculum component (it determines the number of hours in each study plan); (iii) the school management component (principal, vice-principal, dean, etc.); (iv) the teaching support staff component (monitors, secretaries, etc.); (v) operational support staff (janitors, kitchen staff, etc.)
The number of classrooms directly depends on the number of students. It results from applying the coefficients or formulas established by provincial norms to create, split, close or merge classrooms, to the enrollment for each grade or year of study. It is the component that records “demand”, and consequently, it is a decisive factor for teacher allocations. This component requires enrollment to be thoroughly tracked every year, so that its evolution in each school is recorded, as the behavior of this component is decisive for the efficiency of the system in two aspects: (a) expenditure, and (b) outcomes.
In each province, curricular design establishes the hour load for each grade or year. The allocation of teaching staff to a course is determined by applying this hour load to the number of classrooms. This component is generally affected by overlapping study plans, successive curricular reforms, and unresolved existing situations.
The school management structure –principals, vice-principals, deans, cycle coordinators, etc.- is basically determined by: (i) the number of classrooms; (ii) the tuition “modalities” (half day or full day, with boarding); and (iii) the number of services offered by the same institution -more than one Polimodal orientation; more than one level (EGB III and Polimodal). On the basis of these aspects, regulations establish the "category" of each institution (in general there are 4), and hierarchical management positions are allocated according to this school category and to tuition modalities.
The teaching staff that supports school managers (secretaries) and lecturing teachers (prefects, students' counselors, etc.) is also determined by the number of classrooms. Counseling teams, on the other hand, are determined by less typified norms linked to specific modalities (special education schools, for example). Finally, general services staff is directly linked to the number of classrooms and modalities (half-boarding schools, school kitchens, agro-technical schools, etc.).
Labor Legislation
Another assumption is that staff surpluses are the result of the rigidity of teachers' statutes, which provide such stability that they do not allow staffing to be reorganized according to demand. This assumption should also be reviewed taking into account two aspects: (i) all normative frameworks in force -which are also very similar in all provinces as they are inspired by the National Law 14473- have an element that was expressly included for cases of staff surplus: availability for reallocation. Consultations revealed that this instrument is very seldom applied; (ii) stability is exclusively for regular teachers, while temporary and replacement teachers do not have this benefit, and therefore staffing adjustments can be made without legal constraints. However, the provinces with the lowest ratio have the highest share of temporary teachers on their staffs. In other words, they have enough margin to adjust their POF without having to apply the availability for reallocation instrument: according to the data reviewed, Catamarca had 59% of teaching positions covered by temporary teachers; San Luis, 45%; Santa Cruz and Neuquén 43%; Chubut and Río Negro 34%; La Pampa 33%; Buenos Aires 30%; Santa Fe 23%.
IV.3. Application of Procedures in Reality.
If the educational system has express staffing regulations, ¿why are there such significant differences among school staffs in the same province? This question takes us directly to control mechanisms and the weight of the system's "inertia".
Controls inevitably comprise two instances: one is pedagogical and the other, administrative. In general, the former verifies enrollment, classrooms, and allocated teachers. The latter usually focuses on the budget support for the teaching positions that have been allocated. One of the most salient characteristics is the lack of contact between both sectors, and consequently, pedagogical supervision teams (generally closer to schools) or provincial directorates are usually not aware of how much budget is available, while staff directorates are unaware of the enrollment of each school. The consequence is a weakened control environment as each sector blames the other for the deviations.
Traditionally, the educational system has been characterized by a great difficulty to record changes in the situation of schools. Splitting classrooms and making new teacher allocations has always been a complicated process, even after verifying that demand justified it. Even in the cases reviewed we found schools where the staff had to be increased due to enrollment. But the reverse process seems to be even slower, that is to say, recording decreases in the number of students when classrooms are merged and teaching staff (POF) is reduced. In this case, there is a concrete lack of interest on the part of those who are directly involved in this task, which is therefore no taken care of and in general, no one perceives that rationalization directly contributes to improving the general situation in the province or the situation of education. On the contrary, the majority feels that "teaching jobs are lost", and this belief generates little motivation to comply with norms.
Consequently, teacher allocations tend to be the result of inertia rather than the enforcement of norms. But for some extraordinary cases, the previous year's POF is reproduced, without verification routines except for the new staff that is allocated as a result of insistent claims. Most cases consulted show that rules are followed when new positions are assigned, but later controls are discontinued and POF is overstaffed.
Considering the data from some provinces, this process seems to have acquired a special dynamics in the mid 90's when the system changed to a structure of levels and cycles. In general, and with the exceptions that would be worth studying in depth to learn from successful experiences, such reform and the context of low budget restrictions generated by the growth in provincial public expenditure previously discussed, led to a scenario where there was a strong expansion of teacher allocations that resulted from expected rises in enrollment and from new plans rather than from a real demand from schools.
Today, the development of statistical information systems provides better conditions to review current staff allocations than in the previous decade. And the administration systems that several provinces are developing -in some provinces these systems are fully deployed (Salta, Catamarca, Tucumán)- will enable more timely tracking of the evolution of demand in each school for teacher allocations to be the result of the enforcement of the current normative framework.
At the same time, the behavior of enrollment in the provinces where the reform has reached a more advanced stage helps us foresee certain phenomena that could have an incidence on staff allocations. An example is the phenomenon of students who had dropped out of the previous primary school scheme and have re-enrolled in the educational system. Many adolescents aged 14, 15 and 16 enrolled in the third cycle of EGB during the first years of its implementation, and enrollment in this cycle temporarily increased. One or two years later, the re-enrollment wave was over, and only "natural demand" -graduates from the second cycle- was left. But, the POFs kept the sizes they had during the enrollment peak.
IV.4. A Case of Improved Efficiency
During the last years, efficiency indicators improved in some provinces, as is the case of Salta, a province that experienced a significant increase in coverage jointly with quality outcomes that surpass those of other provinces with similar characteristics. To a great extent, these outcomes were achieved through a more efficient use of existing system resources. Between 1996 and 2001, enrollment increased 16.5%, but teacher allocations rose only 10%, while for the rest of the country the average enrollment rise was 12.7% and the average increase in teacher allocations was 18.4%. From the point of view of expenditure, while Salta grew 5.6% in real terms in this period, in the rest of the country expenditure rose 40%. The increase in the number of students is explained by the decrease in repitency cases, and a significant increase in the continuity of studies in EGB III and in Polimodal, where enrollment grew 40% in the last 7 years.
Table 8
The Growth of Enrollment, Equivalent Teacher Allocations and Expenditure
Comparison between Salta Province and the Rest of the Country 1996-2001
(All educational non-university levels - regular and special education)
(Expenditure in millions of pesos, 2001)
Source: Ministry of Education and Ministry of Economy
The factors involved in this process can be divided into two groups. The first group comprises a set of actions aimed at improving administrative management, and the second group of factors is related to actions meant to recover the normal operation of the educational system of the province. In the first case, improving the control environment led to a significant decrease in per student cost. Three actions contributed to achieving that goal: (i) more efficient staff allocations in POF, which were achieved by reallocating teachers, allowed schools to cover the rise in enrollment to a good extent by making better use of installed capacity; in fact, the enrollment increase was 65% higher than the rise in teacher allocations; (ii) the cost of replacements fell as a result of implementing medical controls for leaves; and (iii) a simplified and less bureaucratic administration of the system: the unification of structures when the Provincial Education Council was absorbed by the Ministry of Education was fundamentally important.
Concerning enrollment growth, one of the crucial factors was reestablishing the normal provision of the service provision after a very deficient period (1992-1995), which not only reverted negative trends but also implied one of the highest growth rates of the country in that period. From the point of view of quality, one of the most important factors was the increase in school days. Salta holds the highest number of school days in the country -187 days of classes per year.
V. Other Factors that Influence Efficiency and outcomes.
V.1. Repitency and Dropout
So far, the cost’s indicators of the system and their link to outcomes has been reviewed. This section will address another view of inefficiency: the unproductiveness caused by repitency and early dropout. The analysis of the behavior of enrollment reveals two effects of repitency: (i) the high over-aged student rate, which starts in the first half of EGB, continues into the other cycles and is an inefficiency factor as the age of students exceeds the proposed age for the curriculum, and; (ii) a very low graduation rate. Additionally, low attainment is considered not to guarantee the final acquisition of basic competences. Therefore, the effort of attending school for some years is rapidly lost. In fact, most functional illiterates have attended school for several years but the weakness of their learning and the lack of use of those skills lead them to that situation. Repitency rates and the consequent degrading of enrollment become a serious problem for human capital development and therefore, for social and economic development. And the investment of families and the state becomes quasi unproductive as their efforts fail to reach the desired goal as the years of schooling are not enough to configure a "product unit" that is sustainable in time. Consequently, the allocated resources fail to improve the human capital of the population.
If we focus on the first two EGB cycles, we can see the magnitude of this behavior: 6.25% of the students enrolled in the first 6 years of studies are repitency cases, while inter-annual dropout reaches 1.96%.
Repitency and dropout affect graduation rates and the average duration of studies until students graduate. The following table shows the figures that reflect the gravity of the situation in Argentina in terms of unused resources owing to desertion.
Table 9
Graduation Rate and Impact on Schooling
(The graduation rate expresses the number of graduates with up to three years of repitency)
(*) number of students who do not complete each level in the time expected, multiplied by the theoretical duration of each level in years: six for EGB I and II, three for EGB III and three for Polimodal.
Source: Ministry of Education and Ministry of Economy
At the same time, the number of resources that can be reused with greater efficiency and equity may be quantified by analyzing the indicators of the duration of studies of graduates and deserters.
Table 10
Mean Duration of the Studies of Graduates
(*) Number of students who fail to complete each level in the theoretical time, multiplied by
the theoretical duration of each level in years: six years for EGB I and II,
three for EGB III, and three for Polimodal.
Source: Ministry of Education and Ministry of Economy
Conclusions
The clearest conclusions from this study are the following: (i) the efficiency problems in resource allocation, which are revealed by the significant differences in per student expenditure among provinces, do not result from the enforcement of staff allocation norms; on the contrary, they are the consequences of applying norms deficiently; (ii) repitency and dropout, which make enrollments rates decrease progressively, generate a deficient use of expenditure and prevent a better use of existing resources; (iii) the poor “control environment” prevents an adequate verification of the enforcement of current pedagogical and administrative management norms; (iv) the lack of incentives to improve results at school level; (iv) the allocation of subsidies to private institutions is inequitable and does not promote efficiency; (v) financial and technical support from the national government has been scarce and not effective enough to encourage provinces to improve their efficiency.
Some successful experiences seem to indicate that it is possible to make important progress in efficiency if the application of management and control instruments and mechanisms improves, even in the current normative framework. All of these facts lead us to wonder why it is so hard to make progress. It is evident that decisions to enforce norms clash with the inertia of the system, and imply political costs for the reactions that are produced when existing situations are affected, at least in the short term. When that happens, education authorities are exposed to all kinds of pressures, public or discreet, and positive outcomes are verified a long time after measures were enforced. Consequently, apart from technical, pedagogical and administrative developments, it is necessary to contemplate the financial and political support that is necessary to consolidate the initiatives of the provinces that decide to improve the efficiency of their educational systems by overcoming repitency and early dropout trends, and reallocating installed capacity. In this context, the role of the national government is crucial to generate the instruments that will create the incentives to achieve these goals.
Bibliography
Clements, Benedict. “The Efficiency of Education Expenditure in Portugal”. IMF Working Paper. International Monetary Fund. Washington DC. 1999.
Experton, William. “Challenges for the Next Phase of the Education Reform in Argentina.” Washington D.C., World Bank, 1999.
Ministry of Culture and Education. Educational System Costs Project. “Public Expenditure on Education 1991 – 2000”. Buenos Aires. 2001
Ministry of Culture and Education (MCyE). Federal System of Educational Information. “Annual Survey 2000”. Buenos Aires 2000.
Morduchowicz, Alejandro. “Teachers Salary Structure in Argentina: Concepts, Issues and Empirical Evidence.” Educational System Costs Study Program. Argentina. Ministry of Culture and Education. Buenos Aires 1997.
Morduchowicz, Alejandro. “Educational Financing in Times of Crisis.” Buenos Aires. 2002.
Nicolini, Juan Pablo, Sanguinetti Pablo, Sanguinetti Juan. “Review of Financing Alternatives for Basic Education in Argentina in the Framework of Federal Fiscal Institutions." Sixth International Seminar on Fiscal Federalism. Buenos Aires, 2001
Parandekar, Suhas. “Análice da Eficiencia dos Municipios do Estado do Río de Janeiro”. (mímeo).2002.
ANNEX 1
Graph 1
Graph 2
ANNEX 2
The source of information presented in this Annex is the Directorate of Consolidated Social Expenditure of the Secretariat of Economic Policy, Ministry of Economy. All the data was updated in April 2003.
The 2001 data for provinces is provisional, and for municipalities, it is estimated.
The 2002 data for the national government is provisional and for the provinces and municipalities, it is estimated.
Table 1. (a) Consolidated Public Expenditure on Education 1991-2002. In millions of constant pesos, 2001.
Jurisdiction
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2002/1991
2001/1991
2002/2001
National Government
2,227
1,434
1,720
1,828
1,851
2,018
2,126
2,260
2,168
2,066
2,014
1,415
-36%
-10%
-30%
Basic Education
1,208
137
116
195
206
284
394
385
240
150
107
181
-85%
-91%
68%
Higher & Univ.
961
1,174
1,473
1,509
1,596
1,676
1,690
1,835
1,872
1,885
1,880
1,217
27%
96%
-35%
Not Discriminated
58
123
131
124
49
58
42
40
56
31
32
17
-71%
-44%
-47%
Provinces
4,588
6,725
7,570
8,043
7,883
7,664
8,668
9,165
10,388
10,620
10,675
6,401
40%
133%
-40%
Basic Education
4,026
5,665
6,500
6,909
6,581
6,412
7,229
7,688
8,641
8,838
9,000
5,366
33%
124%
-40%
Higher & Univ.
184
312
313
378
516
486
560
608
704
680
685
410
123%
272%
-40%
Not Discriminated
378
749
753
754
786
766
877
897
1,040
1,050
1,019
625
65%
169%
-39%
Municipalities
160
180
198
251
263
375
359
395
397
388
399
271
69%
149%
-32%
Basic Education
160
180
202
266
284
375
358
341
409
437
438
271
69%
173%
-38%
Total
6,975
8,339
9,488
10,122
9,997
10,057
11,153
11,820
12,953
13,074
13,088
8,087
16%
88%
-38%
Basic Education
5,394
5,982
6,818
7,370
7,070
7,071
7,981
8,414
9,290
9,426
9,545
5,818
8%
77%
-39%
Higher & Univ.
1,145
1,486
1,786
1,887
2,112
2,162
2,250
2,443
2,576
2,566
2,565
1,627
42%
124%
-37%
Not Discriminated
436
872
883
878
836
824
918
937
1,095
1,081
1,051
642
47%
141%
-39%
Source: Directorate of Consolidated Social Expenditure - Secretariat of Economic Policy
Table 1. (b)
Consolidated Public Expenditure on Education 1991-2002 over Gross Domestic Product
Jurisdiction
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2002/1991
National Government
1.05
0.61
0.69
0.69
0.73
0.77
0.75
0.77
0.76
0.73
0.75
0.60
-43%
Basic Education
0.57
0.06
0.05
0.07
0.08
0.11
0.14
0.13
0.08
0.05
0.04
0.08
-86%
Higher Ed. & Univ.
0.45
0.50
0.59
0.57
0.63
0.64
0.60
0.63
0.66
0.67
0.70
0.52
15%
Not Discriminated
0.03
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.02
0.02
0.01
0.01
0.02
0.01
0.01
0.01
-74%
Provinces
2.16
2.85
3.01
3.01
3.11
2.91
3.08
3.15
3.67
3.78
3.82
2.73
26%
Basic Education
1.89
2.40
2.59
2.59
2.59
2.44
2.57
2.64
3.05
3.16
3.35
2.28
21%
Higher Ed. & Univ.
0.09
0.13
0.12
0.14
0.20
0.18
0.20
0.21
0.25
0.24
0.26
0.17
102%
Not Discriminated
0.18
0.32
0.30
0.28
0.31
0.29
0.31
0.31
0.37
0.38
0.38
0.27
50%
Municipalities
0.18
0.08
0.08
0.09
0.10
0.14
0.13
0.14
0.14
0.14
0.15
0.12
-36%
Basic Education
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.10
0.11
0.14
0.13
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.16
0.12
53%
Total
3.39
3.54
3.78
3.79
3.94
3.82
3.96
4.06
4.57
4.65
4.72
3.44
2%
Basic Education
2.53
2.53
2.71
2.76
2.79
2.69
2.83
2.89
3.28
3.37
3.55
2.48
-2%
Higher Ed. & Univ.
0.54
0.63
0.71
0.71
0.83
0.82
0.80
0.84
0.91
0.92
0.95
0.69
29%
Not Discriminated
0.20
0.37
0.35
0.33
0.33
0.31
0.33
0.32
0.39
0.39
0.39
0.27
33%
Source: Directorate of Consolidated Social Expenditure - Secretariat of Economic Policy
Table 1. (c)
Consolidated Public Expenditure on Education 1991-2002
Evolution of Composition by Jurisdiction and Function (in percentages)
Jurisdiction
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2002/1991
National Government
31.9
17.2
18.1
18.1
18.5
20.1
19.1
19.1
16.7
15.8
15.4
17.5
-45%
Basic Education
17.3
1.6
1.2
1.9
2.1
2.8
3.5
3.3
1.9
1.2
0.8
2.2
-87%
Higher Ed. & Univ.
13.8
14.1
15.5
14.9
16.0
16.7
15.2
15.5
14.5
14.4
14.4
15.1
9%
Not Discriminated
0.8
1.5
1.4
1.2
0.5
0.6
0.4
0.3
0.4
0.2
0.2
0.2
-75%
Provinces
65.8
80.6
79.8
79.5
78.9
76.2
77.7
77.5
80.2
81.2
81.6
79.1
20%
Basic Education
57.7
67.9
68.5
68.3
65.8
63.8
64.8
65.0
66.7
67.6
68.8
66.4
15%
Higher Ed. & Univ.
2.6
3.7
3.3
3.7
5.2
4.8
5.0
5.1
5.4
5.2
5.2
5.1
92%
Not Discriminated
5.4
9.0
7.9
7.4
7.9
7.6
7.9
7.6
8.0
8.0
7.8
7.7
43%
Municipalities
2.3
2.2
2.1
2.5
2.6
3.7
3.2
3.3
3.1
3.0
3.0
3.4
46%
Basic Education
2.3
2.2
2.1
2.6
2.8
3.7
3.2
2.9
3.2
3.3
3.3
3.4
46%
Total
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
0%
Basic Education
77.3
71.7
71.9
72.8
70.7
70.3
71.6
71.2
71.7
72.1
72.9
71.9
-7%
Higher Ed. & Univ.
16.4
17.8
18.8
18.6
21.1
21.5
20.2
20.7
19.9
19.6
19.6
20.1
23%
Not Discriminated
6.3
10.5
9.3
8.7
8.4
8.2
8.2
7.9
8.5
8.3
8.0
7.9
27%
Source: Directorate of Consolidated Social Expenditure - Secretariat of Economic Policy
Table 1. (d)
Consolidated Public Expenditure on Education 1991-2002
Evolution 1991-2002 base 1991=100
Jurisdiction
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
National Government
100
64
77
82
83
91
95
101
97
93
90
64
Basic Education
100
11
10
16
17
24
33
32
20
12
9
15
Higher Ed. & Univ.
100
122
153
157
166
175
176
191
195
196
196
127
Not Discriminated
100
213
226
214
85
99
72
69
96
53
56
29
Provinces
100
147
165
175
172
167
189
200
226
231
233
140
Basic Education
100
141
161
172
163
159
180
191
215
220
224
133
Higher Ed. & Univ.
100
169
170
205
280
264
304
330
382
369
372
223
Not Discriminated
100
198
199
199
208
203
232
237
275
278
269
165
Municipalities
100
113
124
157
164
234
224
247
248
243
249
169
Basic Education
100
112
126
166
177
234
223
213
255
272
273
169
Total
100
120
136
145
143
144
160
169
186
187
188
116
Basic Education
100
111
126
137
131
131
148
156
172
175
177
108
Higher Ed. & Univ.
100
130
156
165
185
189
197
213
225
224
224
142
Not Discriminated
100
200
203
201
192
189
211
215
251
248
241
147
Source: National Directorate of Consolidated Social Expenditure – Ministry of Economy
Table 2. Evolution of Provincial Expenditure on Education 1993-2001 (In constant pesos of 2001)
Province
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2001/ 1993
%
Prov./ Total
Buenos Aires
2,119
2,328
2,187
2,403
3,071
3,252
3,711
3,786
3,816
80.1%
35.7%
Buenos Aires City
757
715
730
733
753
782
862
906
873
15.4%
8.2%
Catamarca
138
147
132
124
129
141
145
138
139
0.1%
1.3%
Chaco
230
224
227
217
231
250
296
287
287
24.5%
2.7%
Chubut
133
134
140
127
137
150
155
154
160
20.6%
1.5%
Córdoba
630
650
615
539
639
661
714
823
986
56.5%
9.2%
Corrientes
181
174
164
167
203
216
225
245
238
31.5%
2.2%
Entre Ríos
290
303
300
265
284
285
370
343
329
13.3%
3.1%
Formosa
112
136
131
124
133
158
169
165
162
45.2%
1.5%
Jujuy
128
159
161
157
159
171
208
198
201
56.6%
1.9%
La Pampa
119
115
105
100
109
117
128
127
127
6.7%
1.2%
La Rioja
103
107
128
120
108
118
140
145
138
35.0%
1.3%
Mendoza
324
347
350
328
339
361
444
442
434
33.8%
4.1%
Misiones
178
181
180
176
184
195
240
229
215
20.7%
2.0%
Neuquen
254
266
263
212
236
247
301
289
295
16.0%
2.8%
Rio Negro
176
209
213
178
172
176
187
208
200
13.6%
1.9%
Salta
179
201
194
177
200
194
218
216
187
4.8%
1.8%
San Juan
168
104
178
130
153
155
183
203
193
15.1%
1.8%
San Luis
74
112
102
81
78
79
104
116
147
98.7%
1.4%
Santa Cruz
106
685
132
126
138
157
159
171
151
42.4%
1.4%
Santa Fé
685
208
711
675
688
754
834
850
802
17.1%
7.5%
Santiago Del Estero
188
208
179
174
194
204
220
230
228
21.6%
2.1%
Tierra Del Fuego
79
76
76
65
72
83
83
73
72
-9.1%
0.7%
Tucumán
219
256
285
266
258
259
288
277
294
34.0%
2.7%
Total
7,570
8,043
7,883
7,664
8,668
9,165
10,388
10,620
10,675
41.0%
100.0%
Total Public Exp.
28,984
30,663
29,435
29,210
31,491
34,083
36,203
35,318
36,382
25.5%
Ed. Exp. / Total Exp.
26.1%
26.2%
26.8%
26.2%
27.5%
26.9%
28.7%
30.1%
29.3%
25.5%
Source: Directorate of Consolidated Social Expenditure - Secretariat of Economic Policy
Table 3
Composition of Expenditure on Education by Educational Level - Year 2001
(In millions of current pesos)
Province
Basic
Secondary
Higher
N/Disc.
Total
Basic
Secondary
Higher
N/Disc.
Total
Buenos Aires
1,793.5
1,141.2
329.2
553.5
3,817.4
47.0%
29.9%
8.6%
14.5%
100%
Buenos Aires City
509.8
255.1
64.5
43.8
873.2
58.4%
29.2%
7.4%
5.0%
100%
Catamarca
80.2
34.7
7.3
16.4
138.6
57.9%
25.0%
5.3%
11.8%
100%
Chaco
153.7
81.9
14.3
37.2
287.0
53.5%
28.5%
5.0%
13.0%
100%
Chubut
92.1
47.7
6.8
13.2
159.8
57.6%
29.8%
4.3%
8.3%
100%
Cordoba
514.5
372.5
49.5
49.6
986.1
52.2%
37.8%
5.0%
5.0%
100%
Corrientes
131.4
87.2
4.5
14.4
237.5
55.3%
36.7%
1.9%
6.1%
100%
Entre Rios
182.9
123.9
22.5
329.2
55.5%
37.6%
6.8%
0.0%
100%
Formosa
84.7
48.0
14.6
14.9
162.3
52.2%
29.6%
9.0%
9.2%
100%
Jujuy
102.7
79.3
0.9
18.1
201.0
51.1%
39.4%
0.4%
9.0%
100%
La Pampa
91.9
29.2
2.7
3.1
126.8
72.5%
23.0%
2.1%
2.4%
100%
La Rioja
72.7
63.1