threat and error management · 2020-01-16 · –lks riteas • both pilots “cross-verify”...
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Threat and Error Management Threat and Error Management Society of Experimental Test PilotsApril 28, 2009
Robert Sumwalt, Board MemberNTSB
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Threat and Error Management:Threat and Error Management:
A Practical PerspectiveA Practical Perspective
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Building a wallBuilding a wall
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How do we How do we improve safety? improve safety?
• Train crews/teams how to better manage Threats and Errors
Threat and Error Management is 6th
Generation of CRM
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““ThreatsThreats””
• Those things that can increase the operational complexity, and if not handled correctly, can decrease the safety margins
- Time pressure- Distractions- ? ?
- Weather - Delays- Mechanical Malfunctions - Stress
- Maintenance shift carry-over
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• Threats – Threats can increase error potential – Threats “put holes in” or weaken our barriers
against error
• Threats = Red Flags
ThreatsThreats
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Be aware of threats! Be aware of threats! • “Snakes in the grass”
– What are the things that can bite you on this flight?• We want employees to identify, talk about and think
about threats, and • those things that are different about this operation or
flight – Unfamiliar airport – Flying with new pilot– New procedures
• This puts the threats in the employees “mental RAM”and makes it readily available for retrieval– Example: mentally rehearse CFIT escape maneuver
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““To err is humanTo err is human””
Marcus Tullius Cicero106-43 B.C.
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Why error management?Why error management?
• Traditional thinking focused on eliminating human error in aviation
• Contemporary thinking acknowledges that error is a way of life– given the acceptance that human error may occur, the
focus has become “How do you effectively manage error?”
– proper error management greatly enhances safety
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Errors will occurErrors will occur
“So we must create an error management system in which the crew recognizes and corrects errors before
negative consequences occur.”
- Captain Frank J. Tullo“Aviation Week and Space Technology”
May 21, 2001
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Threat and Error ManagementThreat and Error Management
Helps us avoid and trap errors.
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Avoiding ErrorsAvoiding Errors
• Good training • High levels of proficiency• Following SOPs• Minimizing distractions• Planning ahead• Maintaining situational awareness• CRM – the effective use of all available
resources
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Trapping Errors Trapping Errors
• Once an error is committed, it is difficult to catch (trap) your own error
• Other people are often more likely to catch your error
• Therefore, redundancyis one strong defense against error
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Pilot Flying
PNF/PM
Onboard Alerting Equipment
External Alerting, i.e., ATC
Layers of Defense (barriers)Layers of Defense (barriers)to trap crew errorsto trap crew errors
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Threats and errors put Threats and errors put ““holesholes”” in our barriers in our barriers
We can attempt to build barriers against error to trap errors
Even good barriershave weaknesses
Threat and Error Management helpsreduce the size of these holes
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Examples of how Examples of how ““holes in holes in defensesdefenses”” can be formed can be formed
• Increasing workload• Procedural non-
compliance
• Poor crew coordination• Undue time pressure
• Fatigue • Interruptions / Distractions
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Potential Hazard
Potential Potential HazardHazard
Layers of defense help deflect Layers of defense help deflect errors from becoming hazards errors from becoming hazards
ErrorError
Error Trapped.Error Trapped.Hazard AvertedHazard Averted
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Captain calls for checklist
F/O reminds Captain if checklist is not done
Takeoff Warning Horn activates if flaps not configured
Designed system redundancies Designed system redundancies
External Alerting -does not exist
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Captain has developed personal style of allowing FO to initiate checklist
F/O gets busy and forgets to remind Captain that checklist is not done
Takeoff Warning Horn does not activate as designed
Holes in defensesHoles in defenses Accident
External Alerting -does not exist
AccidentAccident
Error – flaps not set from flow
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ABCDABCD’’SS of SS of Threat and Error Threat and Error
ManagementManagement
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Threat and Error Threat and Error ManagementManagement AABCDBCD’’SS SS
AcknowledgeAcknowledge that we that we are error prone are error prone
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Threat and Error Threat and Error Management Management AABCDBCD’’SS SS
• This does not mean that errors are okay– Naturally we would prefer not to make them– However, the reality is that we will make
mistakes, so acceptance and awareness are vital• Acknowledge that threats can affect
performance
Acknowledge Acknowledge errorserrors
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Threat and Error Threat and Error ManagementManagement AABBCDCD’’SSSS
Maximize BarriersBarriers
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Realize the importance of Realize the importance of redundanciesredundancies
• Keep as much redundancy in the operation, for as long as possible
• Plan best time for being “out of the loop” (split cockpit)– lowest workload– least risk
• Both pilots “cross-verify” critical checklist items (“killer items”) and ATC clearances
• Maintenance: RII – back up each other– Continental Express at Eagle Lake
Maximize Maximize BarriersBarriers
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Flight Crew Example:Flight Crew Example:
• Climbing out of 10,000 feet, with clearance to 12,000– Timing of “10,000
foot announcement”
Maximize Maximize BarriersBarriers
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Planing and awareness are Planing and awareness are the keysthe keys
• We’re not saying don’t do these things -obviously you must do them
• The point is to PLAN them (when able) to conduct them during lowest workload, least risk periods
• We realize that not everything can be planned, so when one pilot is out of loop, be very aware of reduced redundancy
Maximize Maximize BarriersBarriers
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Threat and Error Threat and Error ManagementManagement ABABCCDD’’SSSS
CommunicateCommunicateThreats and Intentions Threats and Intentions
Effectively Effectively
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CommunicateCommunicate
Anything that can:• Reduce your ability
to detect errors• Anything that can
increase your chance of making errors
CommunicateCommunicate
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Communicate threats Communicate threats
• “Snakes in the grass”– What are the things that can bite you on
this flight or operation? – Identify, discuss and think about these
things (threats) and those that are different about this operation
CommunicateCommunicate
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Effective communications Effective communications
• Effective communication– Makes sure that everyone is “on the same
page”– Raises crew’s situational awareness – Helps avoid and trap the consequences of
errors
CommunicateCommunicate
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Ways communications Ways communications can be improved can be improved
• Research shows that the way a crew communicates can be a predictor of the way that the crew performs. – In short, crews who communicated better were
those crews who made fewer errors
CommunicateCommunicate
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Improving Improving communications communications
• Improved performance (i.e., fewer errors) was associated with crews who showed increased number of :– commands – inquiries – acknowledgements – verbal observations about flight status
- Foushee & Manos (1981) - Foushe, Lauber, et al (1986)
CommunicateCommunicate
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Threat and Error Threat and Error Management ABCManagement ABCDD’’SSSS
DDistractions and istractions and Interruptions Interruptions
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Distractions & Interruptions Distractions & Interruptions can form can form ““holes in defensesholes in defenses””
ManageManage Distractions Distractions
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Distractions & InterruptionsDistractions & Interruptionsare Red Flagsare Red Flags
• Treat Distractions and Interruptions as Red Flags
ManageManage Distractions Distractions
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Distractions & Distractions & InterruptionsInterruptions
NASA Ames is researching distractions and interruptions in air carrier operations
http://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/
ManageManage Distractions Distractions
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““IInterruptions nterruptions AAlways lways DDistractistract””
Identify – the interruption
Ask – what was I doing before being interrupted?
Decide – what action to take to get back on track
I A D
ManageManage Distractions Distractions
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Threat and Error Threat and Error Management ABCDManagement ABCD’’SSSS
Follow Follow SOPsSOPs
Standard Operating Procedures
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Flying pilot nonFlying pilot non--adherence to procedureadherence to procedureOther operational procedural
considerationsNonNon--flying pilot nonflying pilot non--adherence toadherence to
procedureprocedureEmbedded piloting skills
Design improvementCaptain or instructor pilot exercise
of authorityMaintenance or inspection action
Approach path stabilityATC system performanceFirst officer’s cross-check
performance as non-flying pilot
Go-around decision
Runway hazards eliminated
Percentage of AccidentsPercentage of Accidents20201010 3030 4040Primary FactorPrimary Factor 5050 6060
Each bar represents the percentage of hull-loss accidents that contained at least one instance of the listed prevention strategy.
138 Accidents 5,686 Fatalities
Accident Cause Factors (1982Accident Cause Factors (1982--1991)1991)
Importance of SOPsImportance of SOPsImportance of SOPsSource: Boeing
FollowFollow SOPsSOPs
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How SOPs relate to error How SOPs relate to error
• University of Texas LOSA data show that crews who intentionally erred by not following SOPs were 3 times more likely to commit another error with consequential results
• “Normalization of Deviance”
FollowFollow SOPsSOPs
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Standard Operating Standard Operating ProceduresProcedures
• SOPs establish a consistent baseline for performance
• Because the baseline is established, deviations from it can be identified easier– “Hmm, I don’t usually miss things like that.”
• Allows crewmembers to concentrate on issues not covered by SOPs
FollowFollow SOPsSOPs
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Threat and Error Threat and Error Management ABCDManagement ABCD’’SSSS
Sensible?Sensible?
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Sensible?Sensible?
• Ask yourself and make sure that what you are doing (and are about to do) is sensible
Sensible? Sensible?
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Threat and Error Threat and Error Management Management ABCDABCD’’SSSS
AA AcknowledgeBB BarriersCC CommunicateD D DistractionsSS SOPs SS Sensible
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