three faces of political marketing strategy

Journal of Public Affairs (2011)Published online in Wiley Online Library(www.wileyonlinelibrary.com) DOI: 10.1002/pa.434

■ Academic Paper

Three faces of political marketing strategy

Sigge Winther Nielsen*

Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen, Denmark

*CorPolitCopeE-ma

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The term strategy is appearing with great frequency in the political marketing literature. However, the concept ofpolitical marketing strategy has been criticized for being unidimensional, ill-defined and neglecting the contingenciesof strategy theories. This article argues that a minimal definition and a division of epistemological terms couldrespond to the outlined critique. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Keywords: political marketing, marketing strategy, strategy selection, epistemology, conceptual analysis

The term strategy is appearing with great frequencyin the political marketing literature. In fact, manydifferent entities and phenomena are analyzedthrough a strategy lens, from candidates andcampaigns to governments and parties. At the sametime, a host of new political marketing strategytheories is presented, related to, for example,positioning strategies (Baines and Worcester, 2006),military strategy (Marland, 2003; Smith, 2006) ormarket orientation (e.g. Lees-Marshment, 2009: 42).However, the concept of political marketing strategyhas been criticized for being ill-defined, because itsummarizes a broad body of literature (Barber,2005; Collins and Butler, 2002) where much focushas been dedicated to prescription instead of theessential concept analysis. Furthermore, critics haveargued that the concept of political marketingstrategy is applied in a unidimensional fashion,meaning it is underspecified in terms of the differentpostures embedded in the concept (Henneberg,2006; Fischer et al., 2007). It continues that the under-standing of ‘. . .the contingencies of strategic frameworkshave been largely neglected’ (Henneberg, 2006: 31).Indeed, less attention has been devoted to underwhat conditions, for instance, a political party selectsone marketing strategy over another relevant strategy(Strömbäck, 2007: 60).

If this premise is accepted, the overall lack ofclarity is problematic both for researchers andmarketers. For a researcher, it is worrying that

respondence to: Sigge Winther Nielsen, Department ofical Science, Copenhagen University, �ster Farimagsgade 5,nhagen, Denmark.il: [email protected]

yright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

the current status of theory building, only to alow extent, accounts for a way to predict why acertain political organization selects one strategyinstead of another. As such, it is a fundamentalfunction of a solid theory in that it can predictoutcomes under specific circumstances (Collierand Gerring, 2009). On the other hand, for politicalmarketers, it is currently troublesome to figure outwhich strategy theory is most prosperous tosubscribe to under altering circumstances in thepolitical market.Yet some of the confusing natures of political

marketing strategy can be dispelled. This articleargues for us to explicitly realize that the strategyconcept does not make up a unified framework ofthought. Thus, the aim is to identify unambiguousboundaries within the field. Accordingly, a minimaldefinition of political marketing strategy must bedeveloped to encompass the breadth of strategyliterature on the field. At the same time, it must beunderscored that the political marketing strategyconcept, by its minimal definition, has a variety ofdistinct faces. These are built upon differentepistemologies that apply and dominate underchanging conditions.The article is divided into four parts. First, we

construct a minimal definition of strategy in politicalmarketing. Second, three faces of political marketingstrategy are outlined—design, emergent and inter-pretive—to elucidate how the concept applies underaltering conditions. Third, we look at how some po-litical marketers implicitly use this categorizationin selecting a political marketing strategy, which isexemplified with historical cases from US politics.Fourth, suggestions to further research are delineated.

S. Winther Nielsen

A MINIMAL DEFINITION OF POLITICALMARKETING STRATEGY

Strategy in political marketing is considered bymany authors to be one of the most valuable assetsfor a candidate or party (Lynch et al., 2006; Barber,2005; Collins and Butler, 2002; Lees-Marshment,2009). However, the many and varied contributionscan make it difficult for scholars and practitioners tounderstand what strategy really is and when acertain strategy perspective is relevant. Hence,drawing on the concept formation literature, wecan seek to respond to the aforementioned critiquein order to develop a more rigorous politicalmarketing strategy concept (e.g. Collier and Gerring,2009; Goertz, 2006). In that light, the seminal workon concepts by Giovanni Sartori (1984) suggests thefollowing in broad terms: first, to develop a minimaldefinition with non-idiosyncratic attributes that canbe distinguished from other adjacent concepts andsecond, underneath the minimal definition, oneshould outline a body of subclassifications, broadlycapturing the diversity of approaches that inhibitthe concept. In this article the subclassifications aretermed the three faces of strategy.

How do we extract a minimal definition? Themarketing analogy of ‘companies as parties andcostumers as voters’ is now broadly acknowledgedin political marketing strategy, although importantdifferences between marketing and politics havebeen emphasized (e.g., Lock andHarris, 1996: 14–16).On this foundation, various authors propose differ-ent definitions. Newman (1994) posits that a politicalmarketing strategy concerns a plan to win an electioncampaign. Barber (2005: 9) states that ‘strategy is aboutforming objectives given resources available and carryingout a plan to achieve those objectives. . .’, a definition thatLees-Marshment echoes (Lees-Marshment, 2009: 40).Finally, Smith and Hirst (2001: 1059) assert that apolitical marketing strategy focuses on creating along-term advantage by segmenting and positioningthe offering.

The aforementioned conceptions of a politicalmarketing strategy1 are important contributions,but they are not minimal definitions, as this articleattempts to find. Rather, they are ‘situation-specificstrategies’ that concentrate on a particular case(Henneberg, 2006: 30). A minimal definition, onthe other hand, does not exclude or contradict otherunderstandings of political marketing strategybecause it highlights a few, but universal attributes.In fact, some scholars have embarked on a minimaldefinition—implicitly. For instance, the definitionof strategy by Lynch and Baines (2005: 2) is ‘the

1It is important to underscore that this conceptualization relatesto political marketing strategy, not marketing strategy or politicalstrategy, but political marketing strategy. However, the chapterwill naturally cite and be inspired by literature on strategy inmarketing and political science.

Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

identification of the purpose of a political party and theactions to achieve that purpose’. Likewise do Collinsand Butler (2002: 2) outline a definition that ap-proaches the goal of a minimal definition: ‘Strategyis a scheme or principal idea through which an objectivewill be achieved’.This article draws on these two definitions, each

of which can be traced back to commercial market-ing literature. However, to create an even moreinclusive minimal definition, we first need torework the two definitions.Lynch and Baines (2005: 2) exclude entities that

are not political parties, such as the marketingstrategy of a nation or a candidate. Additionally, byreferring to actions in their definition, they restrictthe ground for creating strategy. A scheme, whichCollins and Butler (2002) write about, is broader inscope. Scheme, as a term, is therefore able to allowmore strategic perspectives. Yet, Collins and Butleralso have difficulties in complying with a fullminimal definition, because they do not explicitlystate that the objective of a political entity should befound, which Lynch and Baines surmise. As aconsequence, this article proposes this minimaldefinition: ‘Political marketing strategy is the identifica-tion of a political entity’s purpose and the scheme throughwhich that purpose will be achieved.’It is important to note that this minimal definition

seemingly includes the different strategy conceptsinvolved in political marketing. In other words,the definition does not exclude or contradict otherimportant defining attributes in the field (Gerring,1997: 966). There are three components in the min-imal definition that can be identified:

(i) Political entity: The strategy literature in politicalmarketing employs a wide range of actor figures.These can include nations, NGOs, parties, cam-paigns and candidates. The term political entitysummarizes all these caseswithout excludingany.

(ii) Purpose: In the literature, the different politicalentities identify—consciously or subconsciously—a purpose when embarking on a strategy. Forexample, a party could have the purpose oflong-term survival and maximization of influ-ence, although the purpose is subject to changeover time, from being office seeking to voteseeking, depending on the arena of focus at themoment.

(iii) Scheme: The diverse body of literature on polit-ical marketing strategy delineates suggestionson how the political entity accomplishes itspurpose. That is a mechanism, which in thedefinition is termed as scheme. A scheme isthe knowledge structures a political entity uti-lizes, whether simply a sketch of action points,a template for trial and error, an ideationalconstruction of symbols to alter the existinglogic or a precise long-term plan for gearingthe political entity to meet market demands.

J. Public Affairs (2011)DOI: 10.1002/pa.

On the concept of political marketing strategy

Following the recipe of Sartori (1984), the conceptof political marketing strategy shall be untangledfrom neighboring terms after settling on a minimaldefinition. Because of the limited space, we willonly focus on the two obvious terms: (i) tactic and(ii) plan. Essentially, a tactic concentrates on simpleshort-term operations relating to dealing with aconcrete problem for the political entity; on the otherhand, a strategy entails a more long-term perspective(e.g., Barber, 2005: 8). At the same time, a plan refersto a list of promotional initiatives, whereas a strategyconcerns a scheme for tackling challenges that cannotbe achieved by performing a set of activities. It is aworldview that directs action, not just to the battle athand, but for the one ahead (e.g., Harrop, 1990: 277).

After settling on a minimal definition of politicalmarketing strategy and relating it to adjacent terms,we will turn to the different subclassifications ofstrategy.

SUBCLASSIFICATIONS: THREE FACES OFPOLITICAL MARKETING STRATEGY

A strategy face is a certain way of doing strategy. Inthis article, it is understood as an ideal type in aWeberian (1949) sense. Thus, it is an abstraction

Design

Actor assumptions Foundational: Rational Focal

Political environment

Stable and unchangeable Un

Strategic politicalbehavior

Outline a precise long-term plan with means and ends

Tribeteve

Strategy objective Goal attainment Ma

Problems instrategy execution

The planning becomes too overwhelming. At the same time, there is no room foradaptive actions and responseto feedback from theenvironment

Insdeepocompro

Points of critique(theoretical and

practical)

a) Super humans

b) Assumptions ofenvironmentalstatus quo

Empirical example

In Newman’s (1994)description, Clinton’s 1992campaign was plannedcarefully

Neprevo

Key inspirations inmarketing strategy

Kotler (1984) Hu

Design

Actor assumptions Foundational: Rational Focal

Political environment

Stable and unchangeable Un

Strategic politicalbehavior

Outline a precise long-term plan with means and ends

Tribeteve

Strategy objective Goal attainment Ma

Problems instrategy execution

The planning becomes too overwhelming. At the same time, there is no room foradaptive actions and responseto feedback from theenvironment

Insdeepocompro

Points of critique(theoretical and

practical)

a) Super humans

b) Assumptions ofenvironmentalstatus quo

Empirical example

In Newman’s (1994)description, Clinton’s 1992campaign was plannedcarefully

Neprevo

Key inspirations inmarketing strategy

Kotler (1984) Hu

Figure 1 Three faces of strate


not to be found in a pure version in the real world.The field of political marketing strategy can bedivided into three faces—design, emergent and in-terpretive (for an overview, see Figure 1). Theseare subclassifications to the mother concept ofpolitical marketing strategy and direct attention todifferent assumptions about actors, behavior andenvironment. Accordingly, within this logic ofconcept formation, as the field of political marketingstrategy grows, potentially new faces can be added(Collier and Gerring, 2009: 273; Goertz, 2006).But how does the article arrive at these three faces

of strategy? First of all, few scholars have categor-ized the field of political marketing strategy. Oneimportant contribution, however, makes the casefor dividing the field into three dimensions—content, context and process (Lynch and Baines,2005: 2). This categorization illuminates the fact thata strategy is more than the content of the marketingplan, but also involves the legal, cultural and insti-tutional context constraining actors and finally, thecomplexities of the process of managerial decisionmaking. However, this labeling does not grapplewith the presuppositions that underpin the differentactor figures on the field. Consequently, it does notaddress under what conditions different strategytheories apply. Instead, it is assumed that political

Emergent Interpretive

undational: Historicalculus – eclectic basis

Anti-foundational: Socio-psychology

stable and unchangeable Unstable and changeable

al and error. Create a fitween internal and externalnts

Develop norms, rituals, signs, and symbols

tch and learn Create legitimacy

titutional inertia and thep-rooted culture in

litical organizations plicates the “fitting

cess”

The cognitive and normative limitations of top managers hamper the ability to scan input, fabricate meaning, and change the environment

a) The unlearning of valuable procedures

b) Epistemological confusion

a) Lopsided focus on outside-in explanations

b) Install a social determinism

w Labour’s trial and error parations to fit policies to

ters (Gould, 1998)

The Obama campaign’s ability to transform the language, symbols, norms, and playing field of the 2008 presidential election (Plouffe, 2009)

tt et al. (1988) Firat et al. (1995)

Emergent Interpretive

undational: Historicalculus – eclectic basis

Anti-foundational: Socio-psychology

stable and unchangeable Unstable and changeable

al and error. Create a fitween internal and externalnts

Develop norms, rituals, signs, and symbols

tch and learn Create legitimacy

titutional inertia and thep-rooted culture in

litical organizations plicates the “fitting

cess”

The cognitive and normative limitations of top managers hamper the ability to scan input, fabricate meaning, and change the environment

a) The unlearning of valuable procedures

b) Epistemological confusion

a) Lopsided focus on outside-in explanations

b) Install a social determinism

w Labour’s trial and error parations to fit policies to

ters (Gould, 1998)

The Obama campaign’s ability to transform the language, symbols, norms, and playing field of the 2008 presidential election (Plouffe, 2009)

tt et al. (1988) Firat et al. (1995)

gy in political marketing.


S. Winther Nielsen

marketers subscribe to more or less the same ideaabout what is real (ontology) and to the status ofthe constitutive knowledge structures (epistemology)that circulate in connection to that reality (Ming andMoufahim, 2009; Savigny, 2007).

In contrast, the identification of the three politicalmarketing strategy faces follows a natural epistemo-logical trajectory. It entails that we can discover theembedded perception of actors within theories onthe field (Savigny, 2007: 34). For example, the roleof the marketer in political marketing strategytheories relies implicitly on the various ways ofdealing with strategy making, which in turn isinspired by disciplines such as economy, historyand sociology. Indeed, these disciplines have theirown epistemologies that undergird a certain wayof understanding the world. So, when perceivingthe political marketing strategy literature, threebroad perspectives stand out when we divide thefield in terms of the strategy conceptions’ constitu-tive truth claims. Put differently, when a researcherasks whether the political marketer is for exampleconsidered rational, cognitive or cultural in hisway of reasoning and perceiving the environment,it is argued that we can distill three faces. Thatis, the political marketing strategy faces—design,emergent and interpretive—respectively based oneconomy, history and socio-psychology.

This categorization is in line with widespreadmappings of the much broader field of businessstrategy, for example, the three models of strategyof Chafee (1985) and the four strategy schools ofWhittington (1993) that likewise employ actorassumptions as the dividing principle. Furthermore,other fields of study have successfully followed thesame basic idea of an epistemological division, forexample, neo-institutional theory (Hall and Taylor,1996) organizational theory (Allison, 1971) or for-eign policy theory (Carlsnaes, 2002).

Nonetheless, the three faces of political marketingstrategy, which will be illustrated later in the article,are not independent islands. In reality, they can andwill be combined. In the following, we will describethe three faces based on four tenets: (i) actorassumptions, (ii) political environment, (iii) strategicbehavior and objective and (iv) relevant critique.2

The first face of political marketing strategy:design

The first face of strategy is concerned with designinga game plan. The strategy-making process revolvesmainly around a controlled and planned platform

2It is pivotal to note that in the following, we will focus on polit-ical organizations, primarily parties (their top management) andvoters to exemplify the three outlined strategy faces. Yet it doesnot mean that the strategy faces exclusively relate to voters andparties; they should, indeed, be applicable to other actor figuresand political entities.


entrenched in the top management of the politicalorganization. The axiomatic ground is shaped byrational actors, which engage in a linear decision-making process with the capacity to plan ahead andimplement change (Kotler and Kotler, 1999; Maarek,1995; Niffenegger, 1989). Most actions are based onpolitical marketers’ ability to predict the moves ofcompetitors and voters in a relatively stable environ-ment. In this context, scholars agree that politicalmarketers will follow a carefully crafted strategyfostered by, for example, these phases: (i) identifyingsegments in the population, (ii) targeting segments ofvoters, (iii) positioning the party and (iv) implement-ing the strategy (Baines et al., 2002; Marland, 2003;Newman, 1994; Smith and Hirst, 2001: 1063–1069).Bruce Newman (1994), for instance, shows in his

classical contribution that the Clinton presidentialcampaign in 1992 followed an outlined game plan.A plan that tapped into the concerns of precise votersegments on the basis of huge data sources, leadingto an impressive victory. In addition, Faucheux(2002) exemplifies the notion of a design strategyby emphasizing the use of a SWOTanalysis in polit-ical campaigning to meticulously plan the course ofthe race. Finally, Baines et al. (2002) have formulatedone of the most thorough analyses that can beascribed to the design strategy face. This model alsoaccounts for the difficulties in working with the pol-itical marketing strategy design face. The authorsdirect attention to the essential steps of orchestrat-ing a strategy, just as the scholars mentioned previ-ously; but at the same time, they highlight thecomplexities in coordinating between the centerand the periphery of a national party organizationwhile a campaign unfolds. The overwhelming plan-ning activities can be time consuming, and moreimportantly, they leave no particular room for adap-tive actions and feedback from the environment(Baines et al., 2002: 9f).This strategy face is the most widespread in polit-

ical marketing, yet two points of critique arerelevant.First of all, this rational strategy face is premised

on the idea of a super human who is able tomanage, foresee and control most events. It is a per-son that can, roughly speaking, calculate utilityfunctions and absorb enormous amounts of data(Savigny, 2007). Scholars being critical of thispremise underscore that, in fact, the rationalassumptions about actors were initially formulatedas a way to capture how the perfectly rationalhuman would act and not how the real human acts.But over time, rational theories have evolved intoaccepting that people actually behave in a per-fectly rational way (Green and Shapiro, 1994: 12).Although many scholars within the design faceacknowledge that marketers do not have a brainthat functions similar to a calculator, they donot develop strategy theories based on the moremainstream political or marketing psychological



literature, considering people as cognitive misers(O’Cass and Nataraajan, 2003; Popkin, 1994). Thenit follows that even though a parsimonious groundcan be fertile, the assumption of a super humancan, in practice, sometimes dilute the usefulness ofthe design strategy face.

Second, the design face of strategy, as some argue,stipulates a conception of the organization’senvironment as if it was constituted by an almoststable configuration of elements that managers cananalytically break down. In contrast, many practi-tioners and theorists contend that the politicalenvironment often presents itself as an uninvitedand uneasy pressure to be reckoned with when,for instance, running a campaign (Farrell, 1996).Sometimes the environment can be an unpredict-able force,3 which is hard to interpret and respondto, because of ‘regular polling, strong media attentionand “events” outside the control of the political party’(Lynch and Baines, 2005: 10).

Despite its challenges, this design face of strategyis a constructive starting point—a temptingtemplate for creating strategy. Moreover, it fostersa language of political marketing strategy, which isindispensible when it comes to the components ofstrategic planning and implementation.

The second face of political marketing strategy:emergent

The idea behind the emergent political marketingstrategy face can be summarized in one sentence:It is marketing strategy carried out on the run. Theaxiomatic foundation of this perspective is eclectic,drawing on both rational and sociologicalunderstandings fashioned by a focus on historicalcontext. It means that actor assumptions are takenfrom various sources and do not exhibit a clean,parsimonious structure (Hall and Taylor, 1996),unlike rational propositions in the design perspective.

Nevertheless, much of the literature agrees thatthe environment of a political organization isunstable. Consequently, the political world isconstantly taking new shapes and forms, making ita necessity for a strategy to be reactive. As such, itbecomes pivotal for political marketers to realizethat they face a complex mix of information andintelligence, which they need to understand andaddress. Alniacik (2009: 227) bolsters this notionby examining the last three elections in Turkey. Eachtook an unexpected turn due to the sudden involve-ment of a terrorist, the military, an economic crisis

3Political marketing scholars grouped in the design face of strat-egy are not as dogmatic as their business strategy counter-parts—according to some authors, they virtually neglect theexistence of the environment (e.g., Mintzberg et al., 2005). Abroader group of political marketing scholars contend they areaware of the challenge from the surroundings. These include,for instance, Baines et al., (2002: 12) and Smith and Hirst (2001:1069–1070).


and the bad health of a political leader. In thesesituations, marketers seek to constantly try to adjustthe course.Under conditions of unpredictability, political

marketing strategy becomes an emergent process.The focal point is to adapt by means of ‘matchingand learning’ in order to have a competitive advan-tage in the market.First, organizations match new findings with old

knowledge. Essentially, marketers engage in anincremental process where they must deal with abureaucracy of fragmented decision-making struc-tures and a focus on solving day-to-day problems,rather than exploring opportunities in the environ-ment (Fischer et al., 2007: 191; Quinn, 1980). Strategythen becomes a science of ‘muddling through’ asLindblom (1959: 79) states this troubled process offinding a direction. As a consequence, one of thekey tenets in newer political marketing strategyliterature is that adjustments are paramount to apolitical organization because the media scrutinyand regular polling of opinions constantly trans-form the dynamics in the political marketplace(Lynch and Baines, 2005: 10). This idea of matchinginternal and external events is proposed in theorieson obtaining competitive resources and developingcapabilities. By constantly creating a fit with theexternal world, an organization can create assetsthat are hard to imitate by competitors and therebyinitiate a long-term advantage (Lynch et al., 2006;Barber, 2005).Second, political organizations try to learn. An

emergent strategy will develop feedbackmechanisms that factor in information from theenvironment. For instance, in a political campaignwhere the market testing of public opinion or focusgroups related to sudden ‘events’ takes place beforepresenting the policy offerings in a more detailedway during an election (Fischer et al., 2007; Sparrowand Turner, 2001). A political organization will thusembark on a mission of trial and error whendeveloping a marketing strategy by constantly moni-toring the surroundings (Gould, 1998). Althoughmost of the attention in the literature has been direc-ted toward top management (Lynch and Baines,2005), another important aspect is the art of collectivepuzzlement that comprises the totality of theorganization (Senge, 2006).In fact, people closest to the front line, it could be

party members or volunteers, are sometimes thosewho have the most valuable information, forinstance, people who canvass and note informationabout voters, they meet and send this knowledgeback to the strategy headquarters; this is a practiceused in campaigns in the USA (Melber, 2010).In sum, it must be underscored, that an emergent

strategy distinguishes itself from a product launchwhere the product stays the same over the wholecampaign. The emergent fine-tuning processes areseemingly a more difficult task, and even for the


S. Winther Nielsen

most dedicated organization, the constant adjust-ment can cause problems relating to organizationalinertia and deep-rooted cultural practices thatcomplicate the ‘fitting process’ between internaland external events (Vera and Crossan, 2004: 227f).

The emergent strategy face is a pragmatic tool kitavailable to scholars and marketers. Meanwhile,two challenging caveats can be discerned.

(1) A learning organization can be considered as afad that has attracted enormous attention—butthe more political managers try to learn, the moreoften it is possible that they unlearn existingpractices. Hence, the backside of learning is thatwell-functioning proceduresmight be eliminated.People simply start heralding new ideas becausethey are new. The desire to reevaluate becomesa trajectory in itself. But without a clear long-termdirection, the ability to absorb information can bedamaged because the organization becomes dis-tracted by minor changes in the environment(Mintzberg et al., 2005).

(2) A central theoretical critique concerns the epis-temological inconsistencies stemming from themultitude of different assumptions within thisperspective. It can be argued that actor assump-tions are at best eclectic and at worst confusing(Campbell, 2004). The historical calculus under-pinning the emergent strategy face is a mixtureof rational and sociological axioms, which makesit hard to stipulate clear empirical expectationsand attempts to falsify the theoretical propositions.

The third face of political marketing strategy:interpretive

The world outside the political organization is aconstruction. The interpretive political marketingstrategy face is built on this bold statement, and itdictates that the world is shaped by inter-subjectivethoughts and actions we all assemble. It represents acertain logic that is present in, for example,constructivist and postmodern marketing theories(Brown, 1993; Firat et al., 1995). From this departure,political marketers are condemned to interpret theenvironment, infuse meaning into the world andact upon it.4 These are the basic assumptions withinthe interpretive strategy face—reality is a socialconstruction (Berger and Luckmann, 1967). In short,the political sphere is what parties and voters makeof it, to paraphrase Alexander Wendt (1992).

The interpretive strategy face can at first beconceived of as a radical view, and it is only slowly

4This strategy face entangles a wide range of diverse approaches,from constructivism, postmodernism, post-structuralism andcritical theory to certain variants of neo-institutional theory andsocial psychology (Ming and Moufahim, 2009). The frame ofreference is the unstable but changeable nature of the environ-ment, in addition to the assumption of fabrication of meaning:No political structures stay frozen; everything can be melted.


evolving in political marketing (e.g., Ming andMoufahim, 2009). However, ultimately this perspec-tive collects a wide range of prominent scholarswho acknowledge that the world is sociallyconstructed, and therefore, managers do not haveto respond to it simply as it unfolds. Instead, theworld is something we can give form to and frame.For example, while debating global warming, everypolitical organization is trying to invoke its versionof reality (Stone, 1989). Moreover, when George W.Bush enacted a doctrine for American foreign policyafter 9/11, he could have embarked on many differ-ent marketing strategies, but he decided to write thestory of what he called the ‘War on Terror’, the goodfighting the evil, the legal fighting the illegal. Thisstory has created a new narrative that has becomethe prevalent language in the Western world fromwhich to comprehend the international politicalsituation. This type of reasoning is at the core ofLakoff’s (2005) understanding of political marketingstrategy, when he writes about the importance of‘symbolic mechanisms of the political mind—theworldviews, frames, metaphors, cultural narratives,and stereotypes’ (Lakoff, 2008).However, in this context, the most important

question is how political organizations operatewithin this strategy perspective. The foundation ofthe interpretive strategy face is that a party, forinstance, builds strategies to manipulate and alterthe environment with the overall aim of gaininglegitimacy. By envisioning and enforcing new world-views, symbols, norms and metaphors, a party cantransform the general perception of a policy output,societal problem or even the political landscape(Patrón-Galindo, 2004; Nielsen 2011; Smircich andStubbart, 1985; Gamson and Modigliani, 1989).Instead of accepting the world as it is, and planningin accordance (design) or adapting to it by the pursuitof the acknowledged oceans of opportunities(emergent), there is empowering potential in theinterpretive political marketing strategy face.The interpretive political marketing strategy

perspective is not as developed as the other twodescribed faces. That is mainly because the adoptionof constructivist and postmodern theories, for somescholars, is still at the periphery of mainstreammarketing (e.g., Brown, 1993). Yet, an illustrativeframework of an interpretive strategy is outlinedby Patrón-Galindo (2004). He analyzes the politicalmarketing strategies in Peru by pointing to how pol-itical actors are ‘. . .struggling symbolically to obtaindiscursive hegemony’ (2004: 119). In this vein, thePeruvian president Toledo, tries to appeal to theelectorate for change processes in society by allud-ing ‘. . . to symbolical characters of Peruvian history, asa way to legitimize the process associatively in the publicimagination’.Another linked contribution by Nielsen (2011)

wrestles with how a party strategizes in the intersec-tion between pressure fromhistoricalmacrocleavages



and micropressure from voters. It is argued that aparty’s interpretation of macropressure and micro-pressure—either as a threat or a possibility—willdetermine their strategic path (Henneberg, 2006: 43);a path the party pursues in order to gain legitimacyby manipulating the agenda, fabricating newmeaning structures or developing cleavages anddiscourses through speech acts (Nielsen, 2011). Thistype of logic could be found in the 2008 Obama presi-dential campaign, according to the campaign man-ager (Plouffe, 2009: 69). It unfolded in this case byObama’s campaign trying to install a new interpret-ation of the political landscape, which diffused an al-ternative style of language and symbols (Harfoush,2009). Nevertheless, there are also limitations andcomplexities related to this strategy outlook. Indeed,the cognitive and normative constraints of top man-agers will hamper the ability to scan input, fabricatemeaning, and change the environment.

In general, two notable critiques of the interpretivepolitical marketing strategy face are worth outlining.First, the interpretive perspective mainly seeks tounderstand rather than to explain, because it is pre-mised on the great traditions of continental thinkersof constructivism and postmodernism. In this con-text, the observation point is a bit asymmetricalbecause it is more fashioned on an outside-in view(i.e., scholars searching for meaning) than on aninside-out view (i.e., scholars looking at how politicalmarketers search for meaning) of the organization.In contrast, the other strategy faces outline a morebalanced attitude toward the two extremes.

Second, it can be argued that the interpretivestrategy face entails a social determinism that replacesa material determinism associated with the designperspective. Roughly speaking, the interpretiveschool of thought to some extent downplays thebrute facts of physical power or material resourcesin the political struggle, thereby sometimes under-estimating the basic sources on which most humaninteraction is actually built.

ON SELECTING A POLITICAL MARKETINGSTRATEGY FACE

The three faces of strategy laid out previouslydemonstrates that what political marketers actuallydo in the real world, when they set out to strategize,is highly contingent on which kind of strategy out-look–implicitly or explicitly–they subscribe to. Apolitical marketer utilizing a design face of strategythus employs a scheme very different from a polit-ical marketer utilizing the emergent strategy face.With this argument, the article has achieved its firstand primary goal, namely to develop a frameworkfor the concept of political marketing strategy. How-ever, in the following, we will investigate moreconcretely how political marketers undertake theoutlined strategy categorization. Hence, the article


attempts to situate the three faces of strategy in theworking environment of the political marketer.Consequently, the article first describes a templateof three steps—diagnosis, analysis, and implemen-tation—that we suggest some political marketersimplicitly employ when, for instance, a party deci-des to select a particular marketing strategy. Second,the article exemplifies this template in connection tothe strategy faces by delineating three small casesfrom US politics.

Diagnosis—collecting knowledge

Over the years, many new valuable strategytheories within political marketing have beenproposed (e.g., Newman, 1994; Marland, 2003;Smith, 2006). However, what is characteristic ofmany of those approaches is that the party or thecandidate has already decided on the handful ofstrategy options available to them, which areproposed in the particular author’s strategy theory(Henneberg, 2006: 30). Although this step of imple-mentation is a very important step, the distancebetween theory and practice is often longer (George,1993: 117). As a consequence, it is argued that thereis a step before going into one particular strategytheory’s epistemology and prescription for strategyimplementation—and that step is the diagnosis.A diagnosis is here understood as a process

wherein the political marketer seeks to uncover thecurrent political conditions by drawing on differentsources of knowledge, which could be

• media situation• voter opinions• competitors• stakeholders• political culture and history• institutional setup

In essence, a diagnosis activates the aboverelevant sources of information. The aim is todecipher whether these components of knowledgeare substantially changing or stay more or less thesame (Strömbäck, 2007). It entails that the politicalmarketer needs to figure out the current conditionsof the political market, for example, is the environ-ment stable or unstable? Can political actors changethe environment or is it unchangeable?

Analysis—settling on a particular strategy

After diagnosing the current political conditions, amatching treatment to these challenges will haveto be found, which implies an analysis to find theright political marketing strategy. However, creat-ing a strategy analysis requires that marketers ac-knowledge the contingent nature of theory. Theoriesare sometimes presented as if they are universal,applicable always and everywhere. In reality, asFigure 1 propels, the three strategy faces, and at


S. Winther Nielsen

times the subschools within, apply under differentconditions. So, a political marketer can make ananalysis that builds upon the diagnosis of thepresent situation in order to decide whether theevents he or she evaluates, correspond to a particulartheory corpus.

Oneway to grapplewith this selection process is tomake an analysis based on conditional reasoning. Assuch, we have to discover under what conditions onestrategy face is potentially more successful over an-other in the electoral market. Traditionally in socialscience, scholarswill seek to uncover causal inferencepatterns to solve this problem. In this case, this is apath that political marketers could also follow—and some tacitly do. In short, from this departurewe will seek to find a universal truth that comprisesthe logic; if we in the diagnosis stage have estab-lished that A (stable environment) is present, then B(a model within the logics of the design strategy face)will be a sensible strategic posture. However, thenotion that a relationship entailing that A is neces-sary and sufficient for the existence of B is not likely,as mentioned, when thinking about the dynamicnature of the political world (e.g., Lynch and Baines,2005). So, a more modest but feasible trajectory formarketers selecting a political marketing strategymight be to look at favoring conditions (George,1993). Therefore if we cannot generalize strictly fromA to B, then we might better detect when more epi-sodes of X and Y push for the success of C. Funda-mentally, the demanding hunt for necessary andsufficient conditions can to some extent obscure thelogic of probability as a useful tool.

With this reasoning about favoring condition inplace, for instance, a political party can diagnose—simply expressed—that if X and Y happen (X= theenvironment is unstable; Y= the environment ischangeable), then C will be a sensible marketingstrategy to pursue (C= a model within the logicsof the interpretive strategy face). In this fashion, pol-itical marketers have a systematic way of making ananalysis that informs political marketing strategy.

Implementation—strategy prescription

The last step of implementing the chosen politicalmarketing strategy is, broadly speaking, aboutexecuting it, making it work in the organizationand on the battlefield. Yet, this is probably the mostwell-known and well-researched area in politicalmarketing strategy (e.g., Kavanagh, 1995; Mauser,1983; Newman, 1994; Niffenegger, 1989), which wehave described in the outline of the three strategyfaces. Due to limited space and because the focusof this section is primarily on selecting a strategy,we will not investigate this step further.

Historical examples

One of the lessons of the three identified steps—diagnosis, analysis and implementation—is again


the contingent nature of theories. There are sometimes and places in which the design face of strategyhelps one to think rigorously about the political com-petition, others in which the emergent strategy face ismore prosperous, and others in which the interpre-tive strategy face is more relevant. The determinationof a political marketing strategy lens presupposes adispassionate diagnosis of the situation to analyzeand select a potentially successful strategy.To further explore the dynamics of this framework

we will look at three historical cases. These exam-ples illuminate how the three steps are implicitlyused in order to determine which strategy is chosen.

• At the beginning of the 1990s, the Bill Clintoncampaign for the 1992 presidential electioncrafted a heavy plan. The strategists Begala andCarville (2002) diagnosed the political environ-ment as stable and unchangeable: It was all aboutthe economy and only the economy. ‘It’s the econ-omy stupid’ as it was epitomized in the Clintonwar room. In that light, the campaign had towin the media agenda and portray Clinton as anefficient leader. The strategy memos analyzedthat what was needed was a careful plan thatgrappled with the economic issue in terms ofvoter attitudes, target groups and message devel-opment. It was about ‘staying on message’, theeconomic message, and sticking to the masterplan (Begala and Carville, 2002; Newman, 1994).At its core, the strategy memos were about thestable configuration of issues on the agenda thatClinton needed to address. The diagnosis impli-citly depicted the strategy design face’s typicalemphasis on a stable and unchangeable environ-ment, leading to the creation of a clearly designedmarketing plan that could be executed from theheadquarters.

• In February 2005, Howard Dean became chair-man of the Democratic National Committee(DNC) and conducted a thorough diagnosis ofthe political landscape. The Democrats were introuble. They had lost seats in Congress and atthe same time badly trailed George W. Bush, theincumbent president, in the 2004 election. Theidea that something had to happen to regainmomentum was pervasive among the Democrats.The DNC’s strategy memo concluded in a potentanalysis that they had to constantly match andlearn their resources according to their diagnosisof an unstable political environment—but stillwith an unchangeable dominance of Republicanattitudes. The answer was a ‘50-State Strategy.’Every state on the map could be valuable, similarto a chess game where you bring the opponent onthe defense from every angle. A line of thinkingthat has resulted is a focus on nurturing long-term resources and efficient allocation. Thisnew focus implied hiring full-time staff in all50 states, training candidates, campaign staff



and organizers, developing precise voter data tomicrotarget and finally, investing heavily in newtechnology to build a unified communicationplatform (Gilgoff, 2006). The goal was to con-stantly adapt and spread resources around thecountry. Once again, we can identify the diagno-sis relating to a strategy face, this time the emer-gent political marketing strategy, highlighting anunstable but unchangeable environment one hadto adapt to through the creation of long-term cap-abilities and learning feedbacks.

• Barack Obama declared in Chicago in February of2007 that he would run for president. Around thesame time, David Plouffe (2009) became Obama’scampaign manager and started crafting a newbold strategy. In his strategy memos, he perceivedthe political environment differently than whatHoward Dean and the DNC did only 2 yearsearlier. It was now possible for the world tochange. People could be swayed after the BushAdministration because of economic meltdownand fighting two difficult wars at the same time.From this diagnosis, Obama, Plouffe and the restof the campaign analyzed that they shouldengage in setting up the strategy ‘Obama forAmerica’. This catapulted the idea of altering thelanguage, norms and metaphors in the Americanpolitical discourse (Melber, 2010: 4). It happenedamong other things through the initiation ofObama as an empty blackboard that everybodycould paint their vision on. This type of strategy,playing to voters’ imaginations, offered people anew worldview in which to see politics from, atleast that was the intention. Therefore, the strat-egy was not directly about designing a concretemarketing plan to guide every step and was notprimarily about emergent adjustments of resourcesand issues; rather it was about installing a newinterpretation of the political debate (Plouffe,2009: 69f). In essence, lessons taken from the inter-pretive strategy face.

In summary, strategy making is often an iterativeprocess. The marketer has to work back and forthbetween the three outlined steps to encompass thepolitical reality, because, whenever new informationis obtained, it might change the strategy outlook.Moreover, even though we focused on threecampaign cases and their affiliations with each ofthe three political marketing strategy faces, in reality,the three campaigns combined elements from allthree faces over the course of time. As an example,the Obama campaign did not only subscribe to theinterpretive strategy face. At times, it also concen-trated on ‘match and learn’ from the emergentstrategy face. This reasoning was visible when pollssuggested that a more protectionist trade policywould be beneficial in a swing state such asOhio. Then Obama apparently adapted a differentopinion.


CONCLUSION

This article has attempted to outline an alternativecategorization of the theoretical world withinthe field of political marketing strategy. This is a cat-egorization wherein the underlying epistemologicaldifferences of how actors perceive the world areuncovered and unpacked. This new categorization ofthe three faces of political marketing strategy, asshown in the article, underlines that different strategytheories apply under diverse conditions. This logichas a dual implication. For practitioners, the threefaces of strategy can be employed to select a politicalmarketing strategy. For scholars, it can be an instru-ment to explicate the pre-supposition within themarketing strategy concept—and potentially help topredict the strategic choice of political entities.Nonetheless, further research is required. Despite

the numerous fruitful conceptualizations of modelson how to plan and implement a political marketingstrategy, relatively few empirical studies have docu-mented the conditions favoring the use of one strat-egy over another (Henneberg, 2006). As such,researchers have little predictive knowledge aboutunder what conditions a party will choose apolitical marketing strategy that highlights plan-ning (design), adapting (emergent) or enacting(interpretive). These three faces of political market-ing strategy outlined in this article can be a solidstarting point for investigating how politicalmarketers actually arrive at a particular strategy.An endeavour which is crucial if the research fieldnot only will outline strategy models—but also ac-cumulate knowledge.

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