L-

-. CRIMINAL JUSTICE 273

THREE POLICIES TO REDUCE CRIME BY ONE-THIRD IN TWELVE MONTHS*

BY AMITAI ETZIONI~

General Conclusion

So called “liberal” crime-reduction policies, which have not been im- plemented so far, would reduce crime significantly and quickly. Our projec- tions show that if really given a chance we would see a decline of crime between 36 and 39 per cent within twelve months.

The three policies we have investigated are: the decriminalization of victimless crimes, which would result in a reduction of annual arrests of 31 per cent; a program of full employment - meaningful and decent paying- of young people that would result in a 9 per cent reduction of violent crime; and domestic disarmament that would result in a decrease in murder from 40 per cent to 45 per cent and an estimated decrease in armed robbery of 23 to 26 per cent.

We further calculated the secondary reduction in crime that would come with the freeing of police resources as a result of the above reductions; this amounted to another 3.3 per cent to 3.4 per cent annually.

In sum, we project a total reduction in all crime, as measured by , arrests, of from 35.9 per cent to 38.8 per cent annually. The three policies that would effect this reduction could be implemented within the next twelve months and they are vastly more effective than any reduction even advocates of the death penalty could hope for.

Methods of Computation

%

c

Our projections are based on 1970 data, the most complete currently

projection, as regarding the effects of the suggested policies, were made. Note that while the pessimistic projections are very cautious, the optimistic ones are not excessively so. The reasons we used such conservative projec- tions is that we wished to bend over backward, to be extra careful in our conclusions. Nevertheless, even the more pessimistic projection suggests that more than a third of the crime in the U.S.A. (35.9%) could be eliminated within the next twelve months, ifthe Congress, the Executive and the courts saw fit to implement, in conjuction, the following three policies often discus- sed but never implemented in this country.

I availabIe data on crime. When relevant, both a pessimistic and an optimistic

*This statement was submitted to the House Hearing for placement in the records on May 8, 1973.

tAmjtai Etzioni is professor of sociology and Chairman of the Sociology De- partment a t Columbia. The professor has been a consultant for government agencies a t the Federal, State and local levels and has written widely. Professor Etzioni was assisted in his research by Joshua Freeman.

274 The Forensic Quarter ly

The lzlrusure of Decriminalization of Victimless Crimes

Again and again the national debate about crime conjures up the image of the mugger, robber, rapist and assassin. Often overlooked is that a sizeabie pa:.’. irfthe crime wave is made up of crimes which have no harmful effect on anyone other than the perpetrator and even the harmful effects on him are not fully estahli5hed. A staggering 2,066,035 arrests, of the total of 6,570,473 reported in 1970‘, a full third, were for victimless crimes. (These victimless crimes include prostitution, gambling, drunkeness, runaways, and marijuana violations.)

Some of these victimless crimes, such as prostitution and gambling, involve moral issues. In effect then, our police are punishing people who misbehave by the code of established members of the community, or by a code of behavior that is no longer responsive to the community, rather than protecting body or property from violence. However, the most common arrest in the area ofvictimless crimes is for a “crime” which only a minority consider more than a breach of good manners, namely drunkenness. 1,512,672 arrests, or 23%, of the total arrests reported were for this charge. This does not include those arrested for drunken driving (432,522 arrests), liquor violations (222,464) or alcohol related crimes. (In line with our cau- tious approach, we included none of the 9% of all arrests which involved a simple “breach of the peace” at least some of which surely involve victimless crimes, e.g. boisterous drunk.) Computing only those arrests concerned with drunkenness alone locates this as the leading victimless crime; over twice as many arrests are reported on this charge as for the next largest cause for arrests, larcency.

Sex offenses, other than forcible rape, account for 1.5% of all arrests. There were about 49,000 arrests for prostitution and commercialized vice, and an equal number for other sex offenses,2 for a total of 98,722 arrests. Practically all of these “criminals” are consenting adults, who in other countries, for instance Britain, would not have been arrested. Police sources, who indicate that the policemen often are quite happy to get out of the social work and “moral” business, and focus on chasing criminals, occasionally suggest that prostitution should be controlled because it “leads” to other crimes, especially theft (or “rolling”). But the arrests re- ported here include only those in which charges no more serious than prostitution are also involved.

Gambling accounted for another 1.3% of all arrests, with 84,804 arrests made on this charge in 1970. The extent to which communities still view gatnbling as a sin varies, but this seems to be on the decline. Virtually nobody now seriously views it as a “crime,” other than in the tautological’ sense, i.e., “because the law says so.”

These crimes also raise a constitutional issue. Only a very small frac- tion of all gamblers, homosexuals, or prostitutes are arrested: when only a minute proportion of those committing a crime are punished, the punish- ment might legally be considered “arbitrary”, and as such be unconstitu- tional. On these grounds the Supreme Court might be able to relieve the

CRIMINAL JUSTICE 275

society from the obsolescent grip of laws prohibiting victimless crimes by striking them off the books.

As for drunkenness, expert after expert has testified, that drunks should be turned over to medical, rather than police authorities; the latter merely lock them up for the night, release them the next day, without the benefit of any long-term treatment, and then, simply rearrest them shortly thereafter.

If runaways as well as drunkards, were to be handled by authorities other than the police, in this case, social work agencies, the number of arrests would fall by another 179,073 a year.

While the treatment of marijuana is much more controversial, the evidence shows that this is not more but less harmful than alcohol. Moreover, it pacifies and does not cause aggressive behavior. A Presidential commission has recommended that it be decriminalized. This would reduce the annual number ofarrests by another 190,764 (by 1970 figures) or 2.9%.3

All said and done, if the categories of victimless crimes listed above were decriminalized, 31.4% of all arrests, or 2,066,035, would be eliminated.4

It may a t first seeni that this crime reduction is strictly semantic Le., some acts, which are not harmful to body or property of others or the community, were once called crimes, we cease to call them crimes, and - we report less crime. But there is a corollary, very real, crime reduction effect: a giant pool of police resources would be freed to focus on the crimes which do have victims5 And, hundreds of thousands of people, many quite young, who are legally labelled “criminals” and taught to see themselves as such, and are thus forced into contacts with criminal sub-cultures and organizations, would themselves no longer be so pushed by the society and its obsolescent laws.

Employment of the Young, and Crime Prevention

Crime is very much a youthful occupation. Many young offenders “re- tire” by the time they reach 25, even if they were not caught or arrested. More than half ofall arrests, 52.4%, are of persons under 25. (25.3%-under 18.) 77% of all robbers arrested are less than 25 years old.6

Second, unemployment which is itself disproportionately associated with crime, is disproportionately high among the young. Using 1970 as a base year, we find that while the unemployment rate for all males was 4.4%, the rate for males aged 16 and 17 was 16.9%, for males aged 18 and 19, 13.4% and for those 20-24 years old, 8.4%. Likewise, while the overall rate for women was 5.9%, for those 18 and 19, 14.4%, and for those 20-24 years old, 7.9%. For non-white persons the rates are even higher than the overall rates, reaching a peak of 36.9% unemployment for non-white females, age 16 and 17.’

Finally, i t should be noted that unemployment rates are still higher when we look specifically a t urban poverty neighborhoods. Thus, while the overall unemployment rate for the entire population was 4.9% in 1970, it was one and one half times as much (7.6%) in urban poverty neighborhoods.R

-.-

!

I 276 The Forensic Quarterly

TABLE 1. - AGE AND CRIMINALITY

Per cent of offenders arrested

Crime Per cent Per cent Per cent Per cent under 15 under 18 under 21 under 25

All crimes.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.2 25.3 Violent crime major:

Murder and nonnegligent manslaughter . . . . . . . 1.5 10.5 Forcible rape . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1 20.8 Robbery ..................................... 11.1 33.4 Aggravated aslault . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4 16.5

Total violent crime.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.1 22.6

Property crime major: Burglary, breaking and entering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Larceny-theft . . . . . ._. .. . . . ... . .. . . ....... . . . . Auto theft. .. . . . . . . . . ..... ..._...... . . . .. . .. .

Total p p e r t y crime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Other assaults (not aggravated). . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

22.9 52.0 25.1 50.7 15.1 56.1

23.3 51.7

.

Other selscted crimes: 7.3 18.2

59.5 72.0

Arson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Vandalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

39.0 45.3

39.1 52.4

25.2 43.4 42.4 64.5 56.6 77.0 29.8 58.6

40.1 58.5

70.4 80.7 66.5 77.4 74.9 86.3

68.6 80.1

30.7 47.0 69.5 77.4 81.0 87.3

Source: Fromm “Uniform Crime Reports,” FBI, 1970, pp. 12827 (52 per cent agencies, 1970 population: 15 1,604,000).

TABLE 2. - AGE AND CRIMINALITY

Per cent of offenders of age 0 to 17 18 to 25Total

fOto25)

Criminal homicide . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . 9.1 Aggravated assault . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17.7 Forcible rape . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20.9 Armed robbery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23.4 Unarmed robbery , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .87.1

33.5 42.6 24.6 42.3 45.0 68.9 52.0 75.4. 31.3 88.4

.

Source: From a survey of 17 cities, 1967, weighted cases conducted by National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, in their report, vol. 11, pp. 267, 271, 275,219, 283.

CRIMINAL JUSTICE 277

TABLE 3. - UNEMPLOVMENT BY SEX, RACE, AND AGE, 1970 Per cent

Total ............................................................ 4.9

Male ............................................................ .4.4 Age :

16 ! : I 17 ...................................................... 6.9 .'vhite ...................................................... 5.7

18 to 1 9 . . .................................................. .13.4 Nonwhite ...................................................... .27.8

White .................................................... .12.0 Nonwhite ...................................................... .23.1

20 to 24 ..................................................... .8.4 White ..................................................... .7.8 Nonwhite ................................................. .12.6

Female .......................................................... 5.9

16 to17 ...................................................... 7.4 White ...................................................... 5.3 Nonwhite . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.9

18 to 19 ....................................................... 4.4 White .....................................................l 1.9 Nonwhite . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2.9

20 to 24 ...................................................... 7.9

Age:

White ..................................................... .6.9 Nonwhite ................................................ .15.0

Source: "Manpower Report to the President" U.S. Department of Labor, March 1972 (U.S. Government Printing Office) p. 177-179.

F

While there do not seem to be any recent national statistics on the socio-economic status of criminal offenders or their occupational status,* there are several studies which allow us to estimate the proportion and number of crimes committed by unemployed young persons, and the effect of full and meaningful employment of the young on crime. The most com- prehensive study of the occupational status of offenders was the study of major crime in 17 cities in 1967 conducted by the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence.'o

Using the data in that study, we can calculate the rate at which unemp- loyed and employed persons commit crimes.ll We calculated these rates in two ways, once using the unemployment rates for these cities presented by the US. Department of Labor, and once using rates one and a half times as great, in order to compensate for official unemployment rates undercount- ing the chronically unemployed, particularly among the young. (They in- clude only those who actively seek employment.)**

.'

278 The Forensic Quarterly

Assuming that those currently unemployed would, if employed, commit crimes not a t the rate they currently do so, but rather at the rate of those currrntly employed (ifonly because the hours spent at work, or resting from it, are not spent stalking the street in search of a “mark”), we can calculate the percentage decrease in crime that would result from conditions of full employment of all persons.’s

TABLE 4. - CRIME RATES: EMPLOYED VERSUS UNEMPLOYED; 17 CITIES, 1967’

Per cent Number committed by. committed by

employment employment statu3 status

Criminal homicide, total offenss=3274’ Unemployed . , , . , . . . . . . . . .

Employed , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

total offenses=75.198: Unemployed . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Employed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

12.7 415.8

59.9 1,961.1 Aggravated assault,

15.0 11,279.7

43.7 32,861.5 Forcible rape, total off+njes=7,908

Unemployed . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Employed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

15.7 1.241.6

59.4 4,697.4 Armed robbery. total offeenses=63.718:’

Unemployed . . . . . , . . . . . . . .

Employed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

29.8 18.988.0

42.1 26.825.3 Unarmed robbery, total offenses=42,479:’

Unemployed . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Employed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5.6 2,378.8

17.0 7,221.4

m I t

*

1 number of persons Rate of

in employ- (thousands) crimelthou- Ratio un-

sand persons employed vote/ ment status by employ- employed

category’ ment status’ votes‘

870.7 ’(1.306.1) 24,6 16 5

870.7 (1,306.1) 24,616.5

870.7 (1,306.1) 24,616.5

870.7 (1.306.1) 24,616.5

870.7 (1,386.1) 24,616.5

0.478 (.318) ,080

11.620 (.8636) 1.335

1.426 (.951) ,191

21.808 (14.538)

1.040

2.732 (1.821)

,293

5.975 (3.985)

8.714 (6.469)

7.466 (4.979)

20.007 (13.31

9.324 (6.215)

. ’ From 17 city survey, “Crimes of Violence,” op. cit., pp. 270, 274, 278, 282, 286.

* Column 2 divided by col. 3. ’ Unemployed rate from col. 4 divided by employed rate from col. 4.

From “Manpower Report to the President,” April 1971.

Total offenses for the 17 cities, fmm “Crimes of Violence,” p. 262, multiplied by col. 1. Parenthetical figures are second calculation, using higher unemployment rate estimate, as

discussed in footnote 11. ‘Estimate, based on total robberies: 106,197, and national figure of 60 percent robberies armed.

CRIMINAL JUSTICE 279

TABLE 5. - PROJECTED REDUCTION IN CRIME AFTER FULL EMPLOYMENT

Number Number of offenses

Per cent of offenses if commit- Projected Number of offenses

Offense 1970'

(1)

Criminal homicide . . . . . . .15,856 Excluding manslaught- er by negligence . . . . . . .12,836

Forcible rape . . . . . . . . . . . .15,411 Aggravated assault . . . . .125,971

Armed robbery4.. . . . . . . . .52,612

Unarmed robberyn . . . . . . .35,075

committed committed by unem- by unem- ployed2 ployment3

(2) 13)

12.7 2,014

12.7 1,630

15.7 2,420

15.0 18,896

29.8 15,678

5.6 1.964

ted at employed rate4

(4)

337

273 '(505) (409) 324 (486) 2,168 (2,921)

784 (1,175)

211 (316)

number of crimes Per cent less' decrease"

(5) (6)

1,677 10.6

1,357 ..... (1,509) (9.5) 1,221 ..... 2,096 13.6

(1,934) (12.5) 16,728 13.3

(15,975) (12.7) 14,894 28.3

(14,503) (27.6) 1,753 5.0

(1,648) (4.7)

'Number of arrested offenders, 1970. From UCR, 1970, p. 126. 'From table 4, col. 1. Yo1. 1 times col. 2. 'col. 3 divided by table 4, col. 5 (the ratio of unemployed crime rate to employed crime rate). Scol. 3 minus col. 4. T h e percentage decrease in total crime, ifunemployed committed crimes at employed rate.

The parenthetical figures are for a 2d calculation, using increased unemployment estimate,

'The UCKdoesnot directlygivearmed-unarmed statisticsforrobbery. However, it states that

Col. 5 divided by col. 1.

as discussed in footnote 11.

60 per cent of robberies were armed and in total there were 87,687 robbery arrests. I

. This decrease, using the official unemployment rates, (which averaged 3.4% for the 17 cities) varies from 5% for unarmed robbery to 28.3% for armed robbery. Using the higher unemployment rate, the range is from a 4.7% to a 27.6% decrease. Since however, our figures are based only on the easier-to-achieve full and meaningful employment among those 25 and younger, we have to apply these decreases only to the percentage of each crime committed by persons in that age category. Projecting data for the percentage of crimes committed in the 17 cities by young offenders (which are very similar to national data from a separate source),14 we find that full employment for those 25 and younger would result in a decrease of from 4.3% - 4 . W of all murder (depending on the unemployment rate estimate used), from 5.4'70 - 5.6% in aggravated assault, from 8.6% - 9.4% in forcible rape, and from 20.8% - 21.3% in armed robbery.15 The decrease in unarmed robbery would be from 4.2% - 4.4%.

i

5 . . .

280 The Forensic Quarterly

Because the National Commission survey included only violent crimes, we cannot calculate a precise projection of the reduction in property crime, such as burglary, larceny, and auto-thefI.l6 However, given that the percen- tage of young property crime offenders is higher even than for robbery,'' we can assume that the reduction here would also be higher. However, to maintain our conservativeapproach, we estimate only that it will be in the r a n g of reduction of those crimes we were able to make precise projections for, that is between 4.4% and 21.3% or 4.2% - 20.8% using the higher unemployment estimate. (The large range is due to the lack of more precise data.)

In toto, while the relationships between unemployment and criminal behavior are rather complex and not well studied, we estimate that full decent-paying employment of young persons, would reduce violent crimes by 9% a year.lS The size of the effect on crimes against property is difficult to pin point but certainly will be considerable.

Domestic Disarmament

What effects on criminality would be achieved if most firearms would not merely have to be registered, but were removed from private hands, as in Canada, Britain, France, West Germany, Israel and practically all other democratic, economicallydeveloped societies. Drawing on the experience of other countries, we assume and this is our pessimistic estimate - that 85% of all arms could be removed; optimistically, this figure could reach 95%. W h a t would be the effect of such domestic disarmament, we ask, knowing full well that not all those deprived of arms will also drop their criminal intent?

Murders: The Most Serious Offense

In 1970,66% of the 13,649 murder victims were killed by the use of a firearm.Ig Firearm elimination would decrease this high rate of murder in two ways: in some cases faced with the lack of firearms, the potential murderer will abandon his intent altogether, and no crime will take place, for reasons soon to be explained. Secondly, in a greater number of cases, some less deadly weapon will be substituted for a firearm, and what other- wise would have been a lethal attack will be in many cases, a nonfatal one.

Certain murders by their very nature require a firearm.*O It is impossi- ble to climb a tower and murder persons a mile away without using a rifle. Similarly, i t is very difficult to attack a guarded bank without using some sort of firearm. Weak persons, children, cowardly assailants would all find attacks on others, particularly physically strong victims, difficult if not impossible without firearm availability. As Robert Coles puts it: "Every psychiatrist has treated patients who were thankful that guns were not around a t one time or another in their lives. Temper tantrums, fights, seizures, hysterical episodes all make the presence of guns an additional, and possible mortal danger"?'

CRIMINAL JUSTICE 281

An informal examination of actual cases indicates that in about 25% of all murders committed with firearms, the absence of the firearms would have resulted in no crime at all being committed.

What does this mean in terms of the overall murder rate? 66% of all murderers use firearms, and after domestic disarmament firearms would not be available in these cases. Our estimated reduction by 25% of murders in such cases would therefore mean a total decrease of 15.9% in all murders (ifdomestic disarmament is 95% effective), the reduction would be by 14.0%, if it is 85% enforced.“

However, the benefits of firearms elimination does not stop here. In the attacks that still do occur, the substitution of less deadly weapons for firearms will result in a large saving of lives, even if the number ofincidents as such remains the same.z3 It is well documented that murders fall into two categories: those characterized by a “single minded intent to kill,”“ and those which are “Slaying in the heat of passion, or killing as a Result of the intent to do harm, but without specific intent to kill.”25 We will assume pessimistically that all the remaining murders of the first type will be successfully carried out, even in the absence of firearms. However, in the latter cases this will not be true. These attacks, far more numerous, almost always grow out of quarrels or arguments, usually among family or friends.e6 The typical case involves someone grabbing the most potent weapon around - and using it. Ifit is a gun the effect is usually fatal. As the head of Chicago Homicide put it, describing one such case: “There was a domestic fight. A gun was there. And then somebody was dead. If you have described one you have described them all.’’z’ But what happens if a gun is not there? On the basis of the aforementioned survey we assume that in three out of four ofthe cases, an attack still will take place and the next most lethal weapon, a knife will be used. It has been shown that fewer fatalities in the case ofknife attack will result by a ratio of 4 out of 5, i.e. only one fatality where firearms would have left five dead.28 In other words, in such attacks,

course when other weapons are used, as they would be, whether fists, coke bottles, or baseball bats, the reduction will be still greater, but we will stick to our conservative estimations).

To calculate the effect of this “substitution” effect, we first calculate the number of attacks that would still occur when firearms are eliminated. Since 66% of murders are by firearms and in 95% of these cases firearms would have been eliminated, and knowing that 75% of these previously firearm attacks will still occur, we find that 47% of all murders are attacks in which another weapon will be substituted for a With 85% elimination, our pessimistic projection, such cases are 42% of the total. A study ofChicago murders showed that 78% were ofthe type characterized as “deadly attacks,” not “single minded” murders.3o (It is among these attacks that the 80% reduction in fatalities will take place.) All told then, as a result of the substitution of other weapons for firearms, we will expect a reduction in the overall murder rate of from 26.3% to 29.3% (depending on the effec- tiveness of the elimination policy).31

I when knives instead ofguns are used, the death rate goes down by 80%. (Of

,

- _ _ . . . i

I

282 The Forensic Quarterly

Combining the two effects, i.e. the elimination of some firearm attacks altogether, and the use of less deadly weapons in others, we find that the overall reduction in murder would optimistically be 45.09 (at 95% elirnina- tion) and pessimintically 40.3% (at 85% elimination). In 1970 this would bare amounted to a saving of from 5501 to 6142 lives.

Firearm Accidents

In 1968 there were 2,394 deaths from firearms accident^.^" The rate of firearms accidents varies regionally in line with the rate of firearm owner- ship. In other words, the more firearms- the more firearms accident^.^^ We would therefore expect that the reduction in firearms would result in a parallel reduction in accidental deaths, or an annual saving of 2232 (or 2035) lives.34

It should be noted that the average life expectancy in the W.S. is about 72 years, the average age of death from all accidents is 41 years, and the average age of victims of firearms accidents only 24 years. 408 of the victims are children and teenagers (under 20).35 Disarmament would then save the most tragic victims, the young and the innocent.

Firearms elimination will also lead to the avoidance of some 19,000-95,000 at 95% elimination (or at 85% effectivenss, 17,000-85,000) nonfatal injuries annually, that result from firearm accident^.^^

Combining the reductions in murder and accidents, we find that 95% firearms elimination would result in an annual savings of 8,374 lives, or if 85% effective, a saving of 7,536 lives.

Robbery

In 1970 there were approximately 500,000 robberie~,~' 60% of which were armed, and 37%, or 185,000 of which involved firearms.38 (Several studies show that these robberies involving firearms caused a dispropor- tionate amount of harm both in property loss and fatalities, but we will not focus our attention on these.Y9

Evidence shows that the firearm is an essential element in many armed robberies. In its absence, many robberies would not be committed at all, both because of the increased difficulty 6.e. it is difficult to rob a bank protected by alarms and armed guards without a firearm),4o the increased risk to the robber (e.g., that the victim might fight back), and the psychological obsta- cles. On this last point Dr. Donald Newman, in a study of convicted robbers, commissioned by the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, noted:

Robbery appears to be a crime made infinitely more possible by having a gun. To rob without one requires a degree of strength, size and confidence which was lacking in many ofthe men with whom I spoke. . . , For the most part the men involved in robbery were not very aggressive. %me of these men could not possibly carry out a robbery without a gun.

CRIMINAL JUSTICE 283

In short, there was a clear reality element in the need for a gun once a man made the decision to rob. . . . Although the men needed a gun to rob, the converse was also true: they needed to rob in order to use a gun. . . it was the gun which provided the power and the opportunity for mastery.“

. A very cautious way to estimate the proportion of firearm robberies “saved’ in a disarmed America, lacking direct data on this, is to use the same proportion of murders avoided, namely under optimistic assumptions, 45%, pessimistically, 40%. There are some reasons that argue that it mig!it be lower (for instance, robbery is more often pre-meditated than murder and hence the “appropriate” tools can be related), and there are some reasons to think it might be higher (e.g. many robbers now armed would not dare climb into a house, let alone face a guard in a bank, without a weapon). Hence, we will take 5% off from o u r low estimate ofmurder depressent rate, making it a 38% reduction, and add 5% to our high one, making it 47%, to give us a reasonable range.

Thus, the reduction in firearm robbery would lead us to expect a decline of from 70,300 to 77,000 robberies annually, or 23.4% to 25.9% of all armed robberies4’

Cumulative and Secondary Effects, and Resource Allocation

To be able to judge thecombined effects of all threepolicies, we deal with arrest figures. We have already calculated the reduction in annual arrests that would result from the decriminalization of victimless crimes. For other crimes, by simply assuming that the number of arrests are proportional to the number of crimes, we can express their reductions in terms of the projected reductions in the number of arrests. We can then calculate the cumulative reduction from these three policies combined, modifying the individual reductions to take into account previous reductions from the other policies (e.g. if there are fewer younger offenders because they are a t work, this reduces the benefits one can expect to gain from gun elimination and vice versa). The cumulative results are shown in Table A [aRer Footnotes]. They are expressed in terms of a range, the lower figure based on the most pessimistic assumptions, the higher on more optimistic ones.

The table shows that we can project a reduction in the number of arrests, here used as an indicator of the number ofcrimes committed, using the most pessimistic assumptions, of from 4.28 for unarmed robbery, to 29.39 for armed robbery, and 24.9% for murder. The total reduction in arrests would be 32.6c7, a reduction of over 2 million arrests annually. Using more optimistic assumptions, the reductions would range from 4.4% for unarmed robbery, to 47.5% for murder, and 40.5% for armed robbery. The total reduction in annual arrests would be 35.4% or 2,322,758 arrests.

The large reduction in both crime and arrests will free a large amount of police resources presently devoted to the investigation of these crimes, the arrest ofthe offenders, and the post-arrest procedures ofdetention, trial, and

I.

. 284 The Forensic Quurterly

punishment. Sirice the reductions are in all types of crimes, including both crimes demanding a great deal of resources, such as murder, and crimes involving few resources, such as drunkenness, we can assume that the average resources currently devoted to these reduced crimes is proportional to the resources used for all crimes in general. We can thus say that there will be a freeing ofbetween 32.6% and 35.4% ofthe police resources devoted directly to patrol, investigation and arrest as a result of the three measures outlined. These resources will now be free to deal with the prevention, and investigation, of the remaining criminal violations. Even assuming that crime declines proportionately only 15% as much as police resources will increase, this will mean an additional 4.9 - 5.3% reduction in crime rates, after the initial reductions. This would amount to a reduction in terms ofthe current crime rate of another 3.3 - 3.4%. The total reduction, including primary and secondary effects, would thus amount to 35.9 - 38.8% of the current arrests annually.

While throughout these projections we were as cautious as possible in estimating their benefits, we are the first to point out that any such projections are subject to a margin of error. But it must also be clear that even if the crime reduction achieved would be lower than expected, the benefits of the suggested policies would be very substantial.

’

FOOTNOTES

1 Unless noted, all arrest statistics are from the FBI, U S . Department of Justice Uniform Crime Reports-1970 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 19701, hereafter cited as UCA. 5,270 agencies, representing a 1970 population of 151,604,000 (or 75% of the country), reported the arrests under their jurisdiction according to standardized FBI procedures. If a person is arrested and charged with several offenses, this is counted as only one arrest (which is listed under the most serious charge involved). Ifan individual is arrested on several separate occasions, or several persons are arrested for the same offense, each arrest is counted separately. Traffic offenses are not included in these statistics. For a fuller discussion of the UCR see Marvin E. Wolfgang, “Uniform Crime Reports: A Critical Appraisal.” University of Pennsylvania Law Review, p. 721 (1963), and Crimes of VioZence. A staff report submitted to the National Commission of the Causes & hevention of Violence, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, December 1969, Part I chapter 2.

2 Included in “other sex offenses” are statutory rape, offenses against chastity, morals, common decency and 80 forth.

3 Marijuana: A Signal of Misunderstnnding. First Report of the National Commission on Marijuana and Drug Abuse, Washington: U.S. Gov’t Printing Office,

4 This is simply the summed total of arrests, for the above listed “victimless

5 This effect is discussed in the final section of this report. 6 Uniform Crime Reports, 1970, p. 126-27. Table I presents a summary of the

relevant data. An independent study of 17 cities, using 1967 data, supplied directly by the local

authorities came up with very similar findings, a s shown in Table 2. See Crimes of

i.

March 1972, p. 106-7.

crimes.”

CRIMINAL JUSTICE 285

Violence, Vol. 11. A Staff Report Submitted to the National Commission on thecauses and Prevention of Violence, Washington, D.C.: U S . Government Printing Office, December 1969, pp. 267, 271, 255,279, 283.

7 Manpower Report to the President, US. Department of Labor, March 1972, (U S Cmvernment Printing Ofice) p. 177-179. Table 3 gives a complete summary of the relevant data.

Tht. rates calculated by the Dept. of Labor are based on a monthly survey of households, in which the number of persons actively seeking work is ascertained. It has been widely stated that this method of calculation significantly underestimates the true unemployment rate, since those unable to find work, and so discouraged that they have ceased active search, are not counted as being unemployed, but rather as not being in the work force. Furthermore, those seeking full-time work, but presently employed invol1~ntarily on a part time basis only, are counted as fully employed. In a study of long-term Civilian Labor Participation Rates, and forced part-time employ- ment, Paul Sweezy has estimated that real unemployment is about 1.5 times the Dept. of Labor figure. (See Paul Sweezy, “Economic Stagnation and the Stagnation of Economics,” Monthly Review, 2211 (April, 19711.)

As will be seen later, we have therefore made projections based on both of the oficial rates and rates 1.5 times as high as the official ones.

8 “The poverty neighborhood classification used is based on a rarikingofcensus tracts according to 1960 data on income, education, skills, housing and proportion of broken families. The poorest one-fifth of these tracts in the Nation’s 100 largest metropolitan areas are considered poverty neighborhoods. As such some persons above the poverty level are probably included and some poor persons living in other urban neighborhoods excluded.” From: US. Dept. of Labor, Manpower Report to the President, March 1972, U S . Government Printing Office, p. 251.

9 A local study of the District of Columbia found that 44% of Black and 40% of White offenders in major violent crimes were unemployed. See Report of the President’s Commission on Crime in the District of Columbia, Washington, D.C., United States Government Printing Office, 1966, pp. 131-132.

10 This study, and the raw data collected for it, comprise Chapter 5 and Appen- dix 11 respectively, ofVolume 11, Crimes of Violence, ofthe Commission’s Report, op. cit.

11 We calculated the rate at which unemployed and employed persons commit crime as follows:

The 17 city study gives the total number of offenses in 1967 in these cities for criminal homicide, forcible rape, aggravated assault, and armed and unarmed rob- bery. It also gives the percentage of offenses in each category committed by each occupational group, which can be subtotaled into offenses committed by unemployed persons, offenses committed by employed persons, and offenses committed by persons not in the work force (i.e. students, housewives, etc). Table 4 column 1 presents the percentages for unemployed and employed persons. Unless some occupation was stated, all persons 17 or under were listed as students, and therefore not in the work force. Thus a proportion of crimes committed by persons under 17 who were actually unemployed, that is neither students nor employed, were listed as being committed by students. (Presumably those minors with a job were listed under that occupational grouping as well). The effect of this bias is to decrease the amount of crime reported to have been committed by unemployed persons.

By multiplying the number of offenses in each category by thepercentuge com- mitted by employed and unemployed persons respectively, we calculated the actual number of crimes committed by each group in these cities in 1967. (For this and other

286 The Forensic Quarterly -

calculations see table 4). We used the 1967 employment data for these same 17 cities (from theManpower

Report to thePresident, April 1971) to determine the total number of individuals who were employed and who were unemployed. By dividing the number of offenses for each crime committed by unemployed and employed persons respectively, by the number of persons in each of these categories, we determined the number of offenses committed per thousand unemployed persons and per thousand employed persons, that I 5 the rates of crime for unemployed and employed persons. These rates are shown in T,tL!r 4. column 4.

12 8:nce it is widely asserted that many persons actually unemployed are categorized by the Department of Labor as being out of the work force (see footnote 6), we recalculated crime rates increasing by 50% the number of persons reported as unemployed in the 17 cities in 1967. (See Table 4).

13 First we estimated the number of offenses in each crime category committed nationally by unemployed persons by multiplying the total number of offenses na- tionally by the percentage of the specific offenses committed by unemployed persons, as determined in the 17 city study (see Table 5 for full data and calculations). We then projected the number of crimes that would be committed by those currently unemp- loyed if they committed crime at the employed person rate by dividing the number of crimes they currently commit by the ratio of the relevant unemployed crime rate to the employed crime rate (again as determined from the 17 city study). By subtracting the projected number of offenses that would be committed by those currently unemp- loyed if fully employed, from the number of offenses currently committed by the unemployed, we have the reduction in the number of offenses that we could expect to result from full employment. Dividing this figure by the total number of offenses for that crime category, we can express the reduction a s a percentage of current crime levels.

14 Although the 17 city and the national data are very similar, only the former is subdivided for robbery into armed and unarmed robbery. For this reason we chose to use this data. However, it should be noted that this data is for those25 andyounger, while the national data, previously discussed, is for those under25. See tables 1 and 2 for comparative data.

16 These figures are simply the decrease in crime expected from full employment of persons of all ages, multiplied by the percentage of crimes committed by persons 25 and younger (as shown in Table 2).

16 Other, more costly property crime, such as embezzlement, fraud, and false advertising, is usually committed by older, employed persons and would not likely be decreased by full youth employment.

17 80.1% of “major” property crime (larceny, burglary, auto-theft) is committed by persons under 25 compared to 77.0% of robberies. See Table 1.

18 Here we simply totaled up the expected reduction in the number of offenses for each of the five violent crimes (homicide, rape, assault, armed and unarmed robbery), and expressed the total reduction as a percentage of all offenses in these categories. Using the low unemployment estimate, we project a reduction of 9.1%; using the higher estimate, 8.8%

19 UCR, 1971, op. cit., p. 118. 20 This is particularly true for assassinations, which are almost always commit-

ted with firearms. 21 Robert Coles, “America Amok,”TheNew Republic, 155% (August 27,1966) p.

14, as cited in Marvin E. Wolfgang and Frances Ferracuti,TheSubcultureof Violence, New York: Travistock Publications, 1967, p. 189.

CRIMINAL JUSTICE 287

22 15.9c$ is 25Cr (murder reduction) of 95% (effectiveness of disarmament) of 66% (number of murders involving firearms). Similarly, 14.08 is 25% of 85% of 66%.

23 Tor this section, we based our general argument on that presented in Frank Zimiing's "Is Gun Control Likely to Reduceviolent Killings," a mimeograph report of the Center for Studies in Criminal Justice, University ofchicago, (republished in the University of Chicago Law Review, 35:721 (19681.)

24 Ibid., p. 3. 25 \Volfgang and Ferracuti, op. cit., p. 189. 26 See Zimring, op. cit., p. 23, also UCR, 1970, op. cit., p. 9. 27 Commander Francis Flanagin, in a television interview about Chicago's

600th homicide of 1968, quoted in George Newton and Frank Zimring,Firearms and Violence. A Staff Report submitted to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, Washington, United States Government Printing Office, 1969.

28 This ratio was determined by Frank Zimring, based on a study of 510 homicdes, reported to the Chicago police in 1966, and 480 serious assaults involving knives or guns reported in the 5th period of 1968. In Zimring, op. cit., pp. 4-5.

29 47% is 7 5 4 (murders still occur, without firearms) of 95% (effectiveness) of 66% (52 of murders using firearms).

30 Zimring, op. cit., pp. 2-3. Wolfgang and Ferracuti estimate that"F'robab1y less than 51% ofall known killingsare premeditated, planned, and intentional."op. cit., p. 189.

31 Le. 7 8 4 of 42% to 78% of 47%. 32 U S . Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United Stutes 1972.

33 Kew-ton and Zimring, op. cit., pp. 27-28. 31 2232=.95 (effectiveness coefficient) X 2394. 2035=.85 X 2394. 35 Newton and Zimring, op. cit., pp. 27-28. 36 Estimates of non-fatal firearms accidents range from 20,000-100,000 annu-

ally. (See Ibid., p. 28). T h e "savings" is calculated as 954 (or 8 5 4 ) of the range. 37 The UCR indicates that in 1970 there were 348,000 robberies. (UCR, 1970, as

reported in Stat. Abst., 1972, op. cit., p. 143). This is probably considerably below the actual figure, since many robberies are not reported to the police, or by the police to the FBI. A national survey of 10,000 households conducted by the National Opinion Research Center for the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, indicated that the real numbers of robberies was probably about 1% times the reported figure. (Crimes of Violence, op. cit., p. 19). For 1970 this would indicate approximately 500,000 robberies.

38 6 out of 10 robberies, reported to the UCR were armed. In turn 63% of the armed robberies involved firearms. (UCR, 1970, op. cit.,p. 15). Thus3710 (63% of609) of all robberies involved firearms. This means that in 1970 there were roughly 129,000 reported robberies involving firearms. If unreported robberies followed simi- lar patterns, the actual number ofrobberies involving firearms was closer to 185,000.

39 The percentage of robberies involving firearms is far greater for indoor robberies (which are more dangerous and lucrative) than for outdoor robberies. See Newton and Zimring, op. cit., p. 47; also Crimes of Violence, op. cit., p. 302. Further- more, firearms are involved more often when a commercial establishment is the location of the robbery. See Crimes of Violence, op. cit., p. 302.

The fatality rate for robberies involving firearms is considerably higher than that for unarmed robberies, or robberies involving some other weapon. One study showed that in New York City the fatality rate for firearm robberies is nearly 4 times

(93rd edition!, Washington, D.C. 1972, p. 61.

288 The Forensic Quarterly e . -

th-it of other armed robberies. See Newton and Zimring, op. cit., p. 47. However, it should be noted that while the fatality is higher, the injury rate is lower in armed robhhery than in unarmed robbery. Presumably the presence of a weapon intimidates the vidim,and heorsheislesslikelytoresist. SeeCrimesofViolence, op. cit.,p. 370.

40 The National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence survey of 17 cittes -.rcluded in its weighted sample 649 armed andunarmed robberies. 3% of all armed robheries were bank robberies, but not a single case of unarmed bank robbery wai reported. See Crimes of Violence, p. 302.

41 Newton and Zimring, op. cit., p. 47. The complete report is Appendix E of the samr volume.

42 70,900 (reduction)=38% of 185,000 (number of firearms robberies). 77,000-47Ci: of 185,000. 23.4%=70,3001300,000 (number ofarmed robberies annu- ally). 25.9% - 77,000 l 300,000.

TABLE A

Murder and All criminal Armed robbery Aggravated Unarmed nonnegligent homicide assault robbery

manslaughter

1 5 0 arV2st.q Rrdu,twn from ending vict,T;,Iew crime

Re+A.:wn from full yob:h employment

V n . - : , . ~ ~ d d u c t i o n frnn d , itrnarnent

Adjosrrd reduction from disarmament

Y L F wnt

Pc: ,'e?;

Per irn:

Per cent Suhrotal

Primary etiects 'per cent)

12.836

552-578 4 3 4 5

5, I7 3-5.776 40 3-45 0

4.950-5.516 38 6-43 0

5.502-6.094 42 9-47 5

15.856 52.612 125.917 35.075

682-714 10.943-11.206 6.800-7.051 1,473-1.543 4.3-4.5 20.R-21.3 5 4-5 6 4 2-4.4

5.173-5.776 12.311-13.627 34.7-38.7 23.4-25.9

4.950-5.516 9.751-10.097 31.2-34.8 18 5-19.2

5.632-6.02n 20.694-21.303 6.800-7.051 1,473-1.543 35 5-39.3 39 3-40.5 5 4-5 5 4 2-4.4

Forcible Subtotal Property cnme Other Total. rape violenl Ilarceny. bur- crimes all crime.

crimes gtary. auto thefl,

.1970 arwsts RPduction from ending victBmles crime

Rdt.rtion from full youth'emplafment

Vnndjusted reduction from disarmament

AdjurLed reduction from disarmament

Per cent

Per cent

Per cent

Per cent

15.411 241,905 1.0B.858 5.541.615

2.066.035 37.3

1.325-1.449 21.223-21.963 43.212-219.147 86-9.4 88 -9 1 4.2-21 3

17.484- 19.403 1 4 - 8 2

14.701-15.6 13 6 1-6.5

6.570.473

2.066.035 31 4

64.435-241.1 IO 10-37

17.484-19.403 3- 3

14.701- 15.613 2 2

Subtotal 1.325-1.449 35.924-37.576 43,212-219.147 2.066.035 2,145.171-2.322.758 Primary efTectslper cent, 8 6-9 4 14 9-15 5 4 2-21 3 37 3 32 6-35 4

Unadjusted reduction from freed resources 'per Cent1 Adjusted reduction from freed PeSOUrCeS

Per cent

Total reduction Per cent

4 9-5 3 216.R40-225.129

3 3-3 4

2,362.01 1-2.547.887 35 9-38 8