Geoforum 38 (2007) 558–575www.elsevier.com/locate/geoforum

Tigers, trees and Tharu: An analysis of community forestry in the buVerzone of the Royal Chitwan National Park, Nepal

Samantha Jones

Division of Geography and Environmental Management, Northumbria University, Ellison Building, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE1 8ST, UK

Received 26 January 2005; received in revised form 10 October 2006

Abstract

In the buVer zone of the Royal Chitwan National Park (RCNP), community forests represent a key land use to meet the objectives ofthe buVer zone concept. This article examines three diverse community forests surrounding the national park and explores how nationalpolicy has been mediated by emerging community forestry institutions to create diVerent levels of resource access and beneWt distributionboth within and between local user groups. Mindful of recent critiques of community-based conservation, the analysis gives considerableattention to the dynamics of power relations and inequality. The extent to which property rights have been transferred to the local level isevaluated and to whom power has been devolved in the process is assessed. The distribution of beneWts arising from community forestry iscritically examined. It seems that the current system for community forestry creates suYcient incentives for local cooperation due to thepotential for increased access to important resources and a high perception of ownership of community forests among the communities.However, emerging institutions vary in the extent to which they reproduce favourable resource access conditions for elites and beneWt dis-tribution does seem to be skewed in favour of the wealthy and higher castes, even where management practices on the surface appear fair.National policy creates suYcient but not necessary conditions for achieving downward accountability, transparency and fairness. Greaterattention to these issues is needed for buVer zone community forestry to better serve the poor and marginalised populations within usergroups.© 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Royal Chitwan National Park; Nepal; Heterogeneity; Power relations; BuVer zone; Community forestry; Decentralisation

1. Introduction National Park (RCNP) in the Terai region of Nepal (sub-

Following the emergence of a noisy critical voice in theacademic literature directed at community-based conserva-tion initiatives,1 this article examines three diverse commu-nity forests in the buVer zone of the Royal Chitwan

0016-7185/$ - see front matter © 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.doi:10.1016/j.geoforum.2006.10.010

E-mail address: samantha.jones@unn.ac.uk1 Terminology in this Weld is problematic. Campbell and Vainio-Mattila (20

to conserve wildlife or biodiversity via protected areas (also called communiHulme, 1998). It would be useful to reserve ‘community-based conservation’ amanagement, but this would generate a diYculty in Wnding appropriate terminity wildlife management is a somewhat misleading term as in many instanceMattila prefer the term community-based natural resource management (CBsoil or forest management. However, Jones (1999) uses CBNRM to refer to a(see footnote 4). As natural resources as well as wildlife can be conserved, in wildlife and natural resource management; community conservation to refer1998); and adopt the more speciWc ‘community forestry’ in favour of CBNRM

tropical plain covering about 14% of the country’s landmass, Chaudhary, 2000). The paper traces how nationalpolicy has played out at the local level, examining how usergroup committees have instituted policy in diverse ways.Particular attention is given to asymmetries of power and

03) note that community-based conservation is often the term given to eVortsty wildlife management or simply ‘community conservation’ by Adams ands a generic term to encompass both wildlife/biodiversity and natural resourcenology for community conservation in and around protected areas (commu-s communities are not involved in managing wildlife). Campbell and Vainio-NRM) to be applied only to participatory development in realms of water,

form of community conservation in protected areas, adding to the confusionthis paper I use the term community-based conservation to encompass both to wildlife and protected areas management (following Adams and Hulme,

.

S. Jones / Geoforum 38 (2007) 558–575 559

the inXuence of heterogeneous interests and inequality –factors that recent critiques have cited as oft ignored butcritical dimensions inXuencing the success of community-based conservation. The paper addresses three speciWc butinterrelated questions, the Wrst of which is tailored to thebroader policy context, the second to the intermediate com-mittee-level processes and the third to speciWc local usergroup impacts. First to what extent have property rightsbeen transferred from the state to the local level in the pro-cess of decentralisation and do local-level perceptions ofownership reXect these changes? Second, if decentralisationhas occurred, to whom have decision-making powers beendevolved and are the new institutions accountable and rep-resentative? Third, it considers the eVect of the decentralisa-tion of forest management at the local level – has itprovided beneWts and if so, for whom? These questions areclearly inter-related as, for example, it might be expectedthat if devolution has occurred and representation andaccountability have been facilitated then beneWts will befairly distributed among the population. The research isinformed by an exploration of committee membership andmanagement practices and a diVerentiated analysis of localattitudes towards the community forests.

The paper is split into Wve sections. First, a historicalbackground to the development of community-based con-servation in Nepal is presented in terms of both the shiftfrom state forestry to community forestry and from ‘for-tress’ conservation to ‘community conservation’. A briefintroduction to buVer zone community forests of theRCNP and the forest users is also provided here. The sec-ond section presents an overview of recent theoretical liter-ature and critiques of community-based conservation,focusing on property rights, devolution, accountability andbeneWt distribution. Following this, the third section high-lights the methodology for the more empirically-orientedcomponent of the research which compares the three com-munity forests. The fourth section explores the results andkey conclusions form the Wnal section.

1.1. A brief history of community forestry and protected areas management in Nepal

Nepal is regarded generally as one of the leaders amongdeveloping countries in setting conservation priorities(Agrawal and Ribot, 1999; Agrawal and Ostrom, 2001) andthe government is seen to support community-based con-servation approaches (Sah and Heinen, 2001). However,this has not always been the case. The drive for community-based conservation worldwide is frequently attributed tothe failure of states to sustainably manage naturalresources (Kellert et al., 2000) and Nepal is no exception inthis regard. Over the last decade or so, concern over naturalresource degradation and the negative impacts of protectedareas on local communities has mounted. There has been asimultaneous growth in awareness of the capacity of localpeople to develop rules and regulations for eVectiveresource management. In view of this, donor pressure has

increased to devolve power to local communities in naturalresource management. This section traces the shifts in gov-ernment policy from a more centralist and protectionistapproach towards community-based conservation in bothforestry and wildlife conservation and brieXy reXects uponsome conspicuous diVerences between the hills and theTerai.

In Nepal, all forest land was brought under governmentownership through the Nationalisation Act of 1957. Thecentral state asserted control over forests as part of mea-sures to ensure that commercial proWts from timber were amonopoly of the state (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999). In theabsence of eVective monitoring and enforcement systems,the nationalisation of forests undermined existing local sys-tems of management (particularly in the hills), leading towidespread deforestation (Agrawal and Ostrom, 2001).New steps were taken to decentralise forest control with thepassing of the National Forest Act of 1976. However, thisattempt at decentralisation was still formally linked toadministratively deWned government structures and wasunsuccessful (Nagendra, 2002, citing Thapa and Weber,1995 and Shrestha, 1998). Also, the conservation objectivesof this ‘social forestry’ were limited and deforestationreached epidemic proportions (Agrawal and Ostrom, 2001).In 1988, the Master Plan for Forestry Sector Nepal,endorsed by His Majesty’s Government in 1989, laid outthe strategy to enable all accessible (hill) forest to behanded over to forest user groups with the long term aimof: helping meet people’s basic needs for fuel, timber, fod-der and other products on a sustainable basis; contributingto food production; protecting against land degradation;conserving ecosystems and contributing to the growth oflocal/national economies (Chaudhary, 2000). By 1999 over620,000 ha had been allocated to 8500 forest user groups(Chaudhary, 2000) and these community forests have beenregarded widely as a success.

Despite the national scope of policies, policy implementa-tion in the hills and Terai diverge in important ways.Although 47% of Nepal’s population occupies the Terai(Chaudhary, 2000), only 17% of the area under communityforests in Nepal is in the Terai (Nagendra, 2002). There hasbeen a greater reluctance to relinquish control over forestsin the Terai (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999), as with better infra-structure and valuable timber, they are lucrative for the state(Agrawal and Ostrom, 2001). Chaudhary (2000) alsosuggests that many forest oYcials claim to be too busy inanti-smuggling activities to have time for community for-estry. Furthermore, following malaria eradication in the1960s, the once sparsely populated Terai was rapidly settledand most of the forest areas have been converted into farm-land (Chaudhary, 2000). It has tended to be degraded orpoor quality forests that have been given to local communi-ties and this has further limited success (Nagendra, 2002).The increase in inequality in the distribution of agrarianresources aVecting incentives to cooperate has also been pre-sented as a signiWcant obstacle to success in the Terai region(Chakraborty, 2001). Nagendra et al. (2005) note though

560 S. Jones / Geoforum 38 (2007) 558–575

that there have been relatively few studies exami-ning theimpact of decentralisation of the forests of the Terai.

State control over land use in the form of protected(conservation) areas was asserted somewhat later thanforest land. The Wrst National Park, the Royal ChitwanNational Park, was created in 1973 speciWcally to protectthe one horned rhinoceros considered to be at threat due tohabitat loss. Nepal’s protected areas now cover 15% of thecountry (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999). Initially a centralised-regulatory control model was adopted, which denied localpeople their rights to natural resources and deployed themilitary for law enforcement; people–park conXicts ensued(Mehta and Kellert, 1998). The negative consequences ofthe establishment of protected areas for local people werepronounced. They included: damage to crops and livestockby wildlife; restrictions on the consumptive use of naturalresources upon which people were often heavily dependent;and some forced resettlement. In the RCNP for example, in1962, 544 km2 were set aside for the park and by 1964, morethan 22,000 people had been removed from the area. Thepark was further enlarged to 894 km2 in 1976 (Stræde andHelles, 2000).

The introduction of community conservation in thenational parks of the Terai has been less progressive or rad-ical than in other countries (particularly in Africa) andother parts of Nepal. For example, in Nepal in 1989 theConservation Area Act was passed, which created a newcategory of protected area for the country. It allowedextractive natural resource use, encouraged communitydevelopment and participation (Mehta and Heinen, 2001)and aimed to develop sustainable alternatives to naturalresource use such as ecotourism (Mehta and Kellert, 1998).2

Such a progressive approach hardly typiWes the RCNPwhere the only consumptive use permitted is through the‘Grass Cutting Programme’ which allows local peopleaccess to speciWed resources in the park for a few days eachyear (although its duration has been shortened from 20 to15 days in 1978, to 10 in 1993 (Stræde and Helles, 2000) andin the last couple of years to Wve). Other protectionistelements that have been retained are resettlement, whichcontinued until 1999 (with an incomplete process of com-pensation, McLean and Stræde, 2003) and policing, whichis still enforced by the Royal Nepal Army.

However, eVorts to encourage more harmonious rela-tions between local people and the RCNP authorities wereinstituted through UNDP’s People and Parks Programmeand the establishment of a 750 km2 buVer zone around thepark in 1996 (Stræde and Helles, 2000). In the buVer zone,practices have been encouraged which are similar to thosepromoted in the Conservation Areas. The BuVer ZoneManagement Act of 1993 granted communities legal rightsto use and manage designated forest resources within the

2 The Annapurna Conservation Area was the Wrst to be created in 1986,the management of which has been handed over to a national NGO (TheKing Mahendra Trust for Nature Conservation). It has been widely re-garded as highly successful and other conservation areas have followed.

demarcated buVer zone. Such rights were granted in accor-dance with an operational plan prepared by local buVerzone community forestry user group committees and fol-lowed standard guidelines prepared by their ‘respectiveproject’ (Mehta and Heinen, 2001). In addition 30–50% offunds earned by the park are earmarked for local commu-nity development and managed by buVer zone user com-mittees (as distinct from the buVer zone community forestcommittees). The objectives of the People and ParksProgramme3 complement the aims of the buVer zone andare threefold: to develop alternatives to the use of thenational park for neighbouring households; to devise com-pensation mechanisms for local communities in exchangefor their exclusion from resources upon which they reliedprior to the formation of the protected area, and to createincentives for local populations to change their practices inthe protected areas (Agrawal and Ostrom, 2001).4 There issome debate about the extent to which such a policy con-stitutes successful decentralisation. While authors such asAgrawal and Ribot (1999) regard the most important stepsin crafting new legislation for local involvement inresource management to have been taken in the Terai,McLean and Stræde (2003) suggest that protected areas inthe Terai are managed with low community participationin decision-making. McLean and Stræde (2003) still con-sider the RCNP to follow a preservation-oriented manage-ment paradigm and one which has been particularlyrestrictive for the indigenous Tharu population (see Sec-tion 1.3 for an introduction to the Tharu population andSection 2.1. for a more in-depth discussion of decentralisa-tion).

1.2. BuVer zone community forests: An introduction

The decentralisation of forests in the protected areas ofNepal’s Terai then, has been a more recent provenancethan the establishment of community forestry in the hills.It arose from an amendment to the 1973 National Parksand Wildlife Conservation Act (the BuVer Zone Act of1993). Prior to this all forests outside the park belonged tothe Department of Forestry. Following the BuVer ZoneAct, the forests were handed over to the RCNP and thewhole area was mapped according to four forest types.First are privately owned forests and these remain asbefore. Second are state forests and these tend to be high

3 The more recent Participatory Conservation Programme is an exten-sion of this, aiming to disseminate ‘best practice’ throughout the buVerzone (Khatri, pers. comm. 2004).

4 Thus current practice falls under the type of community conservationlabelled by Jones (1999) as the ‘Park and Neighbour’ approach, which isdesigned to minimise conXict in protected areas through compensation,revenue sharing and community development. A more participatory anddevolved form of community conservation is sometimes known as ‘Com-munity Based Natural Resource Management’ (CBNRM) where sustain-able (consumptive) use of and local proprietorship over resources inprotected areas is encouraged (Jones, 1999).

S. Jones / Geoforum 38 (2007) 558–575 561

value sal forest.5 Third are the protected BuVer Zone For-ests such as the Barandabar Forest which are areas of highbiodiversity and conservation value. These buVer zone for-ests are subject to much the same rules as the national park(Grass Cutting Programme) where local consumptive useis restricted to a limited range of forest products for a fewdays a year. Fourth are the BuVer Zone Community For-ests (BZCF). The key objective of BZCF according to thechief warden of the RCNP is that they should reduce pres-sure on resources of the RCNP and BuVer Zone Forests,by facilitating consumptive use of the environment.6

After potential community forest areas had been estab-lished, it was left to the user groups to deWne the preciseboundaries of each forest within the mapped area. Oncedemarcated, the land for a community forest may be ver-bally handed over to the community, but it is not until thechief warden of RCNP ratiWes an operational plan that the‘management ownership’ oYcially lies with the community.The operational plan speciWes the rules of use for the com-munity forest and is valid for a period of Wve years. The

5 The Forest Department has been able to retain signiWcant control overhow commercial beneWts over the sale of timber will be realised and allo-cated (through the designation of areas of high value forest as state forestas opposed to buVer zone community forest).

6 However the chief warden was not unduly concerned about the level ofpressure on the park. As the RCNP has to be managed to maintain grass-land habitats as food sources for ungulates, tigers, rhinos and other endan-gered species, tree encroachment needs to be controlled and onemechanism for doing this is turning a blind eye to some illegal felling. Sim-ilarly the grass-cutting programme helps to prevent succession and main-tain an environment favoured by herbivores. The chief warden evenrevealed that the number of days in which people are allowed into the parkwas reduced less because of concern about pressure of population on re-sources and more in recognition that fewer people need thatch (due to therise in tin roofs) and fuelwood (due to the increased use of gas and avail-ability from the community forests) and people were abusing their rightsthrough gathering products for sale or using the park for (disruptive) rec-reational purposes. In line with recent academic thinking in other pro-tected areas (Fairhead and Leach, 1994), the chief warden argued that theRCNP is both a highly resilient environment and is neither ‘natural’ nor‘pristine’. Evidence to support his view may be gained from the ‘environ-mental recovery’ of the Baghmara community forest in particular (see Sec-tion 4.5) – an environment now supporting a diversity of wildlife.

operational plans are a combination of rules speciWedby the Department of National Parks and Wildlife Conser-vation (DNPWC), rules developed by the communitiesthemselves and a management plan developed with theassistance of the King Mahendra Trust for Nature Conser-vation (subsequently referred to as the King MahendraTrust), which is an inXuential national conservation NGO.The King Mahendra Trust conducts a household surveyamong the user group communities to assess their needs,and takes a forest inventory to ascertain the initial state ofthe forest, before the management plan is established. Someregulations speciWed by the DNPWC are common to allBZCF and diVer from the community forests in the hills(where communities are virtually free to manage forests asthey choose – see Table 1 and Section 2.1). These include;that no forest products should be sold outside the buVerzone; that no timber should be felled (or live trees be cut)without consultation with park rangers and that 40% ofrevenue should be reinvested into the forest, while 60%should be used for community development. Local popula-tions get few or no rights to revenues from the commercialexploitation of timber (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999). In thehills a controversial proposal to Wlter 40% of the commu-nity forest revenue back to the government has been vehe-mently opposed by the Federation of Forest User Groupsof Nepal but this policy has not been extended to buVerzone community forests.7

1.3. The Tharu and women: who are the forest users?

‘Tharu’ is the term given to a diverse group of peopleswho are considered to share a common identity throughtheir aboriginal inhabitance of the Terai, an area which hasbeen regarded historically as an inhospitable territory ofswamp, forest and malaria (Guneratne, 2002). They prac-ticed a form of shifting cultivation and preferred slightly

7 Although as one anonymous reviewer pointed out, as the BZCFs areowned by the government and 40% of the revenue must be reinvested inthe forest, this amounts to the same, although BZCF user groups would atleast beneWt from their reinvestment.

Table 1Decentralisation of property rights in community forest and around national parks in Nepal

a Source: Agrawal and Ostrom (2001).b Source: Nagendra et al. (2005).

People and parks programmebuVer zone user groupsa

Community forestry in the hillsa Community forestry in the Teraib

Rights to National park resources Community forest resources Community forest resources

Withdrawal Limited rights (GrassCutting Programme)

Transferred, but forest clearance foragricultural use is not permitted

Transferred subject to guidelines that can be fairlyrelaxed subject to approval from the Forest Department

Management Retained by state Transferred – user groups play a directrole in the preparation and implementationof management plans, but 25% of cash incomemust be spent on development activity

Rights of user groups to modify management systemsdesigned by state bodies is somewhat limited

Exclusion Retained by state Transferred – user groups are involved in dayto day forest protection and allocation of beneWts

Largely retained by state – membership decided bydistrict forest oYcer

Alienation Retained by state Retained by state Retained by state

562 S. Jones / Geoforum 38 (2007) 558–575

elevated areas to protect against Xood and wild animaldamage (Nagendra et al., 2005, citing Guneratne, 1994 andMüller Böker, 1999). Dangol and Gurung (1991) note thatthe Tharu depend largely on natural resources for food,fodder and fuel and use 71 species of herbs, shrubs andtrees for medicinal purposes to treat common ailments inanimals and humans. Their forest needs are widelyregarded among external bodies to be greater than othergroups (Khatri, 2004; pers. comm.). A deWning attribute oftheir identity is malaria, to which they are thought immune(Guneratne, 2002) and this accounts for their historicaldominance of the region. However, due to migration downfrom the hills following the malaria eradication campaigncombined with the land reform process of the 1950s, theircontrol over land has been systematically eroded (Gun-eratne, 2002). They now constitute about half of the popu-lation of the Terai. The Tharus have shown a tendency toretreat into the forest to avoid contact with settlers andthere remains a movement of Tharus into the WesternTerai where there are still extensive tracts of forest (Gun-eratne, 2002). Internally they have been regarded to be lesshierarchical and stratiWed than Hindu caste society but theyhave gradually become assimilated into it over time. Hav-ing been marginal to the centres of state power which ruledthem, they have been accorded relatively low status withinthe caste hierarchy (Guneratne, 2002).

In the Royal Bardia National Park (in the WesternTerai), Brown (1998) found that the indigenous Tharu andthe poorest households were more dependent on grasslandproducts for a wide range of diVerent uses. Women too areseen to be more dependent on the forest than men – beingprimarily (but not exclusively) responsible for fuelwoodand grass collection. Yet in the Royal Chitwan NationalPark, Stræde and Helles (2000) found that during the grasscutting programme, gender and age did not have any sig-niWcant eVect on the quantity of products gathered, butthat ethnicity and place were signiWcant (the latter in termsof product availability, but also around wealthier touristareas the prevalence of tin roofs reduced the need forgrass). Women and the Tharu then are not the only forestusers. Chakraborty (2001) reports that wood is the mostimportant source of energy in both rural and urban areas(67% and 75% of energy consumption respectively) suggest-ing a dependence on forests, albeit some of which may beprivately owned, among the majority of the population.Forest product use is explored in more depth in thisresearch.

2. Theoretical review and research aims

Community-based conservation programmes, institutedworldwide over the last decade or so, have been heralded asrelatively successful, not least because they are regarded toconstitute a devolution of power from the state to the locallevel. However, there now exists a spectrum of critical writ-ings about ‘people-oriented approaches to conservation’,the more extreme versions of which advocate a renewed

emphasis on authoritarian protection to safeguard criti-cally threatened species (for a convincing critical review ofthe resurgent protectionist argument see Wilshusen et al.,2002).8 Most of the literature is broadly supportive of com-munity-based conservation although the processes and out-comes of decentralisation have been under considerablescrutiny. There are critical reXections upon whether powerhas in fact been devolved from the state to local communi-ties in community-based conservation initiatives (Agrawaland Ostrom, 2001) and to what extent accountability hasbeen achieved in the process (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999).Local communities have been regularly treated in commu-nity-based conservation programmes as homogenous withmembers having complementary interests, yet they aredynamic, characterised by asymmetries of power and inter-nally diVerentiated by gender, caste, wealth, ethnicity, ageand origin (see Li, 1996; Belsky, 1999; Brosius et al., 1998;Twyman, 1998; Sharpe, 1998; Leach et al., 1997 and Agra-wal and Gibson, 1999). As such, interests are diverse andsome (often elites) may beneWt from the process of devolu-tion at the expense of others. These critical themes are dis-cussed in more depth below and related where possible tocommunity forestry and buVer zone management in Nepal.

2.1. The decentralisation of property rights: theoretical issues and the case of Nepal

This section brieXy considers why decentralisation isregarded to be advantageous and the problems that may beassociated with it, before exploring the extent to whichdevolution has occurred in the community forests, pro-tected areas and buVer zone community forests of Nepal. Itprovides a comparative context to the Wrst research ques-tion on the extent to which property rights have beendevolved by exploring other community forest and pro-tected areas in Nepal. A more nuanced understanding ofthe process in buVer zone community forests emerges fromthe empirical research highlighted later in the paper.

The decentralisation of natural resource managementrequires the devolution of real powers over the disposition ofproductive resources and is frequently promoted on thegrounds of increased eYciency, more thoroughgoing equityand/or greater participation and responsiveness of govern-ment to citizens (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999). The critical liter-ature suggests however that in some cases, devolution ofstate responsibilities does not match the rhetoric in practice(Nagendra, 2002, citing; Chaudhary, 2000; Agrawal andOstrom, 2001). For example, buVer zones have sometimesbeen established as part of decentralisation initiatives, but ithas been argued that buVer zones: actually extend stateauthority over settlement and land use well beyond pro-tected area boundaries (Neumann, 1997); are still a top–down approach to development planning, and are something

8 They argue that the implementation of community conservation hasoften been problematic but defend the concept.

S. Jones / Geoforum 38 (2007) 558–575 563

of a ‘bribe’ to lessen local resistance to the establishment andexpansion of protected areas (Lynagh and Urich, 2002 citingGhimire, 1994).

Agrawal and Ostrom (2001) suggest that current studiesof decentralisation are relatively inattentive to the nature ofproperty rights that states devolve to local actors. Theyexplain that four types of property rights are important:

• withdrawal (the right to obtain resource units);• management (the right to regulate and transform use

patters);• exclusion (the right to determine who has withdrawal

rights and how that right may be transferred) and• alienation (the right to sell or lease withdrawal, manage-

ment or exclusion rights).

Table 1 shows the extent to which property rights havebeen devolved for: the People and Parks Programme in thebuVer zone of the national parks of the Terai; the commu-nity forests of (the hills of) Nepal and community forests ofthe Terai. It is evident from comparing the table with therules for buVer zone community forestry laid out in Section1.2, that buVer zone community forests are subjected to ahigher level of restriction than other community forests.Nagendra et al. (2005) believe that “decentralisationreforms tend to be louder in rhetoric and less developed onthe ground”. This paper, to reiterate, in addressing its Wrstresearch question, explores in greater depth the extent towhich devolution policy has been largely rhetorical byexamining the level of decision-making power aVorded toforest management committees through the devolution ofproperty rights. It also examines the extent to which localcommunities felt they owned the community forests asnone of the other published research in this Weld considerslocal views beyond the committee level.

2.2. The eVect of decentralisation: theoretical issues and the case of Nepal

The second research question asks, if the state has relin-quished some level of property rights to the local level, towhom have these decision-making powers been devolved?If those who have gained power in the processes of decen-tralisation are downwardly accountable, then beneWts tothe user group should accrue fairly. The third researchquestion explores the distribution of beneWts and the sec-tion below considers relevant literature to review these twointerrelated issues.

It has been noted that in some community-based conser-vation programmes, decentralisation has meant a greaterrole for powerful NGOs, whose (often conservation) agen-das may not be consistent with those of local people (Bryantand Bailey, 1997; Seeland, 2000; Sundberg, 1998). In othercases, where resource exploitation for market sales is pro-moted, proWts may Xow to the wealthy (local elite capture)who have capital, knowledge and status (Neumann, 1997).Local elites will rarely be willing to make way for local peo-

ple’s participation but rather manipulate projects toadvance their own political power (Neumann, 1997, citingColchester, 1994). As such, there is considerable potentialfor powerful actors in a diverse civil society to subvertrather than promote democratic processes and outcomes(Lane, 2003). This has led some to appeal for greater atten-tion to power relations (Kepe et al., 2001) as new institu-tional arrangements often reproduce the social relationshipsthat marginalise certain groups, such women (Martin andLemon, 2001). Conversely, as natural resources are oftenkey factors in maintaining rural livelihoods as well as signiW-cant sources of wealth, the distribution of control over natu-ral resources can play an important role in deWning localincome levels and power relations (Larson, 2003). Chakr-aborty (2001) examined community forestry in the Teraiand found that emerging institutions are built on establishedsystems of authority and that strong support from the ruralelite accounts for the success and stability of communityforestry, in spite of distributive conXict.9 This researchbuilds on Chakraborty’s Wndings, examining the extent towhich his conclusions hold for buVer zone community for-ests (where there has been a greater intervention of externalbodies such as the UNDP, the King Mahendra Trust andthe DNPWC). Procedures for committee membership areexplored and committee composition is analysed to examinethe extent to which women, lower castes and lower incomegroups are represented.

Agrawal and Ribot (1999) conclude that the presumedbeneWts of decentralisation become available to local actorsonly when empowered local actors become downwardlyaccountable. Thus if suYcient downward accountabilityexists, it is conceivable that positions on community forestcommittees could be held by local elites, who act in theinterests of the user group and ensure that the beneWts arestill distributed fairly among the population. Agrawal andRibot (1999) assess the level of accountability in the Parksand People Programme where supposedly there has been aprocess of decentralisation towards the buVer zone usergroups around the protected areas in Nepal. They note thatthere are almost no formal mechanisms in place to ensuredownward accountability of power holders to their constit-uents. Upward accountability has survived (army patrolunits to chief warden) but this has done little to alter exist-ing patterns of resource use, such that illegal harvest of fod-der and Wrewood in the protected area forests continueapace. They explain that informal authority and leadershipwithin settlements ensures the selection of particular indi-viduals to leadership positions. The Parks and PeopleProgramme documentation prescribes formal election pro-cedures for choosing leaders and it is suggested that overtime, formal electoral processes may lead to the formationof new leadership (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999). Nagendraet al. (2005) reXect on the level of accountability in the

9 He notes that the success of community forestry is ambiguous in termsof poverty alleviation but that the poor ease distributive injustice byresorting to exploiting forests managed under state property.

564 S. Jones / Geoforum 38 (2007) 558–575

buVer zone forests of the RCNP10 and note that there issimilarly limited downward accountability as local userslack the power to modify management guidelines and thatdecision-making authority rests with the chief warden. Thisresearch examines issues of representation in terms of com-mittee composition for buVer zone community forests andexplores the extent to which expressed local interests arecongruent with existing community forest managementpractices as an indicator of the level of accountability.

In Nepal, it has been demonstrated that community for-est user groups tend to reXect existing hierarchies and arebiased in favour of the wealthy and powerful (Chakr-aborty, 2001). Timsina (2003) attended a general assemblyof Forest User Groups and recorded that of 175 partici-pants only Wve made suggestions and these were from theelite and would be to the detriment of the poor. Kellertet al. (2000) convey similar Wndings in their evaluation ofcommunity-based natural resource management of twoprotected areas in the middle hills of Nepal. They foundthat beneWts were unevenly distributed such that certainindividuals, communities and interests beneWted materiallyand politically far more than others. They noted also thatwomen and people of low caste were highly under-repre-sented in executive committees. Agrawal (2001) highlightsthe many beneWts that may arise from women’s participa-tion in community forestry, but similarly concludes that

10 As far as it is possible to ascertain, Nagendra et al. (2005) concentrateon buVer zone forests rather than buVer zone community forests, but asthey do not name the buVer zone user committees with whom they heldinterviews this cannot be stated with certainty. As noted in Section 1.2.however, buVer zone forests are aVorded a level of protection due theirconservation value and are diVerent from buVer zone community forests,where devolution was meant to occur.

throughout Nepal women’s membership is extremely lowand female members are rarely active or eVective. However,in community-based protected areas management, Mehtaand Heinen (2001) found the most favourable attitudes toconservation to exist among the poorest and among Gur-ungs in the Annapurna Conservation Area and Sherpas inthe Makalu-Barun Conservation Area (both non-Hinducastes), which would be unlikely if they were persistentlydiscriminated against or did not experience substantial ben-eWts from community conservation. To address the thirdresearch question, perceptions of the fairness of beneWt dis-tribution are explored and an analysis of who has beneWteddirectly from community forestry is undertaken. Respon-dents’ views on the community forests are disaggregated bygender, ethnicity, age, and wealth, for each site to present adiVerentiated analysis.

3. Methodology

3.1. Locating the study: the tiger rhino conservation area and community forests

The Tiger Rhino Conservation Area (Fig. 1) was estab-lished following the initiative of the King Mahendra Trusttwo and a half years ago and it is funded by the GlobalEnvironment Facility and supported by United NationsDevelopment Programme. It forms part of a corridor in thenorthern central buVer zone between the national park andthe base of the Mahabharat hills, in recognition of themigratory patterns of tigers and rhinos. The central core ofthis area is Barandabar (BuVer Zone) Forest and encom-passes the Ramsar Site of Beeshazar and Associated Lakes.The periphery of this area is completely surrounded to thenorth, east and west by (eighteen) community forests and to

Fig. 1. Location of case study community forests.

S. Jones / Geoforum 38 (2007) 558–575 565

the south lies the national park. South of the East–WestHighway are the BuVer Zone Community Forests, whereasthose to the north lie outside the BuVer Zone and are Com-munity Forests oYcially owned by the Department of For-estry.11

3.2. The case study sites

Three case studies are explored in depth in this research.All three are located around the periphery of the Baranda-bar (BuVer Zone) Forest and all are BuVer Zone Commu-nity Forests. They were selected through key informantinterviewing12 to capture a diversity of institutionalarrangements and levels of ‘success’. The intention was notto select representative samples of community forests tomake observations about the success of buVer zone com-munity forestry generally, but rather to uncover some ofthe underlying reasons accounting for the diversity of com-munity forests and diVering levels of support from the usergroups. The Wrst area, Birandranagar, was cited as anunsuccessful example of community forestry. It actually liesjust outside the Tiger-Rhino Conservation Area alongsidethe river boundary to the north of the RCNP. The second,Banderi Barandabar, was cited as a success and lies in thenorth of the BuVer Zone on the western edge of theBarandabar Forest Corridor. Finally, Baghmara has beenheralded as a model in community forestry. It is locatednearest to the highest concentration of tourists visiting theRCNP and is also within the Tiger Rhino ConservationArea. It borders the national park and is on the south eastside of the Barandabar Forest (see Fig. 1).

3.3. Methods

Fieldwork took place from March to May 2004, by theauthor and a translator and Weld assistant. In each casestudy, at least three members of the community forest usergroup committee (including the chairperson) were inter-viewed in-depth to gain a thorough understanding of theoperation, history, management and general background ofthe community forest. To ascertain how representative thecommittee was of the user group, the gender and ethniccomposition of the committee was established. The process

11 There appear to be some contradictions apparent in the roles andinterests of the key government (DNPWC) and non-government organisa-tions (King Mahendra Trust). The King Mahendra Trust for example, seesan opportunity to manage community forests for maximum wildlife valueand extend the conservation area through the Tiger-Rhino Project. TheDNPWC, in contrast, aims to maximize the consumptive use of resourcesin the buVer zone to minimize pressure on the park. The overall aims ofboth however are congruent – to minimise local people’s impact on thepark. The King Mahendra Trust’s support for alternative income generat-ing projects and alternative fuelwood sources reduces people’s consump-tive needs in both the buVer zone and park.12 The park ranger of the DNPWC and the vice president of the King

Mahendra Trust held consistent opinions about the community forests inquestion.

of committee selection was sought as an indicator of(downward) accountability. Structured interviews werecarried out with community forest users in surroundingvillages, using a random walk technique (Lyon, 2000)throughout the user group area. The random walk tech-nique does not present a strict random sampling frame, butin aiming to survey the whole area (in this case of the usergroup population) and speaking to people who are avail-able and willing, it is an eYcient means of data collection(i.e. repeat visits are not undertaken if people are not in)more in line with participatory approaches. Unfortunatelycomparisons with census data to ascertain the representa-tiveness of the sample would not be useful as communityforest user groups do not follow the same administrativeboundaries. One of the buVer zone user committees how-ever, held data about their user group. They measured‘wealth’ on the basis of the amount of land and the incomesources of the 780 households surveyed. Their Wndings werevery similar to the self-reported levels of wealth amongthose surveyed during this research and a �2 test revealedno signiWcant diVerence between the sample and the popu-lation,13 which suggests that the data are representative, atleast for Baghmara. This is shown in Table 2.

Sample sizes varied according to size of user group. InBirandranagar, serving 300 households, 50 people wereinterviewed; in Baghmara, serving 800 households, 70 peo-ple were interviewed and in Banderi Barandabar, serving2000 households, 100 people were interviewed. Following apilot survey to ascertain the range of probable responses toquestions, people were asked to answer questions from arange of options. Questions sought to explore:

• a range of indicators of diVerentiation such as age, mainincome source, gender, whether respondents consideredthemselves to be poorer/wealthier or the same as othersin their village, resource ownership (land, cattle, goats)and caste;

• the extent to which respondents felt the community for-ests had been devolved to the community (e.g. did theyfeel that the community forest belonged to the wholecommunity, some members of the community or exter-nal bodies such as the Forestry Department or theDNPWC);

• a range of indicators suggesting changes in resourceavailability arising from community forestry and

13 (�2 D 0.409, pD 0.815).

Table 2Comparisons of the sample and existing data about levels of wealthamong the Baghmara BZCF user group

Baghmara user group(Management Plan)

Sample of Baghmara’s user group(this research)

Wealthy 9.7% Wealthier than others 8.5%Middle 64.1% Same as others 62.9%Poor 25.6% Poorer than others 28.6%

566 S. Jones / Geoforum 38 (2007) 558–575

national park impacts more generally (e.g. whether therehas been a reduction in crop damage from wild animals,an increase in community forest resource availability,whether the costs or beneWts of living near a nationalpark were greater);

• what people’s interests in the community forests wereand whose interests were addressed by the managementcommittees (e.g. whether they thought the main objec-tive for the forest should be fuelwood provision/provi-sion of other forest products/wildlife conservation withtourism; whether the committee represented their inter-ests/the interests of the whole village/their own interests);

• how people considered beneWts to be distributed fromcommunity forests (e.g. whether respondents had bene-Wted directly from training or material resources fromcommunity forest funds; whether the beneWts were fairlydistributed/whether some people beneWted more thanothers).

Chi square tests were employed to ascertain whetherthere was a signiWcant diVerence among diVerent groups interms of yes/no; agree/disagree; more/less/same or othercategories of answers.

In addition, some of the preceding discussion and thatwhich follows has been informed by in-depth interviewsheld with a range of key informants. These included the sec-retary employed to manage Baghmara Community Forest,the ranger of the RCNP for the Sauraha area, the chiefwarden of the RCNP, and the president and vice presidentof the King Mahendra Trust, and the Director of UNDP/DNPWC’s Participatory Conservation Programme. Arange of secondary literature and the operational plans forthe two community forests within the Tiger-Rhino Conser-vation Area were made available for scrutiny by the KingMahendra Trust.

4. Results and discussion

4.1. Social variables and the three case study sites14

By way of introduction to the three case study sitesdiVerences in the key social variables in the surveyed sam-ples at the three community forests are brieXy discussed.Some divergences in social proWles are evident, with allvariables other than gender and primary incomes sourcesindicating signiWcant diVerences between samples for thethree forests (i.e. caste, wealth and age).15 In the three casestudy sites most people considered themselves to be of thesame level of wealth as others; but at Banderi 24% ofrespondents considered themselves wealthy, compared with

14 NB: These social factors may not be completely accurate as they werenot derived from population data but respondent samples, which were notselected randomly but using the random walk technique as noted in themethodology.15 Chi square values are not included here as this is only background

information.

8% at Baghmara and 8% at Birandranagar. Conversely, atBaghmara 29% of respondents considered themselvespoorer, while at Banderi only 6% and Birandranagar only8% did. The caste distribution shows some similarities withthis as the highest proportion of people sampled at Bagh-mara are of the lower castes (46% – mostly Tharu) and thehighest proportion of people sampled at Banderi are ofthe higher castes (45% – although the caste distributionin the sample is highly polarised and 41% of the populationare of the lower castes). The Birandranagar sample though,is also dominated by higher caste groups (72%) suggestingthat there may not be such as strong relationship betweenwealth and caste at Birandranagar. While those with andwithout land occur in fairly equal numbers at Baghmara,over twice as many people have land as are landless atBirandranagar and over four times as many people haveland at Banderi compared to the number of landless. Simi-larly a signiWcantly greater proportion of respondents atBanderi and Birandrangar own cattle compared with Bagh-mara. The sample at Baghmara also shows a larger numberof people in the younger age group.

In terms of preferred resource use in the community for-ests, Table 3 shows that there is relatively little variabilitybetween the community forests. Dead wood, thatch andfodder are the primary needs of the communities. TheBaghmara residents interviewed have a somewhat lowerdemand for grazing land, reXecting their lower level of cat-tle ownership and a higher demand for wild fruits and vege-tables, probably reXecting the higher level of poverty. Theoverall level of demand for forest products is very high,suggesting that there is potential for user groups to beneWtsubstantially from successful community forests, particu-larly where resource availability and access is enhanced.

The following sections explore the three community for-ests in turn to examine their policies and reasons for theirvarying levels of success. Tables 4–6 summarise the keybackground data for the three forests. Information for Sec-tions 4.2–4.4 are derived from interviews with committeemembers.

4.2. Case study 1: Birandranagar buVer zone community forest

Birandranagar Community Forest was cited as a primeexample of unsuccessful community forestry in the buVerzone.

Committee composition: The management committeeconsists of 9 members, all but one of whom is from the high-est Brahmin caste and the other being of the high Chhetricaste. All members are male, apart from the chairperson,who is female. This bias may be accounted for by a selectionprocess that potentially allows the wealthiest and most pow-erful person from every third household contribute to decid-ing upon community forest policies (see Table 5).

Management of the community forest: BirandranagarCommunity Forest is a much smaller area of forest thanmany other community forests (see Table 4) although its

S. Jones / Geoforum 38 (2007) 558–575 567

precise area was a matter of contestation (which may beaccounted for in part by severe riverbank erosion along itssouthern boundary). Being ‘barren land’ before it washanded over to the community it was used only for graz-ing.16 A central aspect of the management plan has

16 Essentially the Department of Forestry are handing over to the DNP-WC (to allow communities to manage) land which they consider to be of lit-tle value, but this does not represent an overall gain in the state apparatus.

involved tree planting to develop the area into forest, but,progress as been signiWcantly stalled by annual Xoods.Furthermore, while grazing has been prohibited, as the areahas not been fenced, cattle still wander into the area pre-venting vegetation regeneration (for this people are Wned 5Rs/cow).

The dominant vegetation is bush, from which twigs areallowed to be collected. Any larger branches are collectedby the committee for sale but they are insuYcient to meet

Table 3Current use of forest resources by sampled community forest user group members

Denotes signiWcant at 95%.

Proportion of people wanting to harvest (%)

Birandranagar Banderi BaghmaraForest product/activityDead wood 98 99 89Thatch 88 89 81Grasses for fodder 80 72 74Medicinal herbs 74 56 51Grazing 60 59 39Fertilizer 32 41 37Other (wild fruits and vegetables) 6 19 53Live wood 0 4 7

Table 4Background information about the community forests

Community forest Successful? Established/handedto community

Registered/OPratiWed

Size (ha) Households (hhs)served

Initial condition

Birandranagar No 1990 1995 22–32 300 Barren/grazing landBanderi Yes 1994/5 2000 167 2000 Established forestBaghmara Yes 1990/6 2000 215 800 Pasture with few silk cotton trees

Table 5Committee membership and community development

Communityforest

Number oncommittee

Length ofservice (years)

Committee selection process Community development fromforest funds

Birandranagar 9 2 One person from every 3 hhs chosen to make upthe forest user group and votes for committee members

Wells, Xood protection,erosion control

Banderi 17 3 Members of the 5 political parties choose 2 membersto stand. These 10 people choose an additional 6 andthe 16 members decide on a further ‘apolitical’ chairperson

Drinking water, local school, medicalexpenses of poorer hhs

Baghmara 13 3 Four wards are divided into 9 groups and each groupselects 5 people to represent it. One of the 5 stands onthe committee. An additional 4 women from each wardare selected

Income generation training activities,road maintenance, schools, biogas, toilets

Table 6Key management features

Communityforest

Fenced Vegetation Membershipfee

Key objective Grass-cuttingrights

Dead woodcollection

Numberemployed(guards)

Key managementproblems/plans

Birandranagar No Bush None Establish forest Auctioned Twigs only 0 (1) Flooding, riverbankerosion

Banderi Yes Forest 50 Rs 1st year10 Rs/yearthereafter

Maximise availabilityof resource forconsumptive use

240 Rs/year Twigs, brancheswith permission(esp. poorer hhs)

1 (5) Reducing fuelwoodneeds through biogas

Baghmara Yes Forest/zoned None Maximise revenuefrom tourismactivities

Between10am and 2pm

Not allowed(purchased from CF)

3 (4) Reconciling consumptiveuse with wildlife

568 S. Jones / Geoforum 38 (2007) 558–575

the community’s needs. Women in the vicinity admittedthat they collected some wood illegally from the RCNP andthe Barandabar Forest.

Grass cutting is prohibited in the community forest fornine months of the year. During the other three months, thearea is divided into 60–80 marked plots and the rights tocut grass in these plots are auctioned each year. This aimsto maximize the revenue generated by the community for-est (on average rights are sold at around 450 Rs per plot) tospend on community development projects (see Table 5).However, clearly this system denies access to fodder to allbut the wealthier households who fare the best in the auc-tion.17 Many poorer households are forced to purchasegrasses or hay from rice Welds from wealthier households ormeet their needs illegally. It was explained that many of thepeople voting for this system of community forest manage-ment were not actually dependent on the forest for grassesand they saw this as a mechanism to maximize beneWts tothe village as a whole. Clearly the Birandranagar Commu-nity Forest falls far short of meeting the needs of the com-munity and distributing forest products equitably.

4.3. Case study 2: Banderi barandabar buVer zone community forest

Banderi Barandabar was widely commended as a suc-cess in community forestry.

Committee composition: Of the current seventeen com-mittee members, Wfteen are men and two are women. Thereare fourteen Brahmins (including the two women), oneChhetri, one Sarki and one Tharu. Thus there are only twomembers from the underprivileged castes and neither arewomen. Although the Banderi user group (sample) shows alarge proportion of higher castes (Section 4.1), this compo-sition does not reXect the social make up of the area as thecaste composition is quite polarised.

Management of the community forest: Unlike the othertwo case studies, the area allocated to the Banderi Baranda-bar community contained a signiWcant proportion of valu-able sal trees and was already an established forest. TheDNPWC permit 1375 m3 per year of valuable timber ortrees valued for their ayurvedic properties to be removedfrom the forest following the earmarking of dead or dis-eased standing trees and fallen trees by a park forester. Thiswood can be sold: at 300 Rs/m3 for timber and 100 Rs/m3

for medicinal purposes (and 100 m3 of this can be providedto the community to build temples or other public build-ings).

While cutting live wood is strictly prohibited, the ruleson the collection of fuelwood appear somewhat Xexible.Strictly speaking only the collection of small twigs isallowed, but permission can be sought from the committeeto collect fuelwood at no cost (granted speciWcally to

17 Although the wealthier have a tendency to own cattle and thus havehigher demand for grasses, poorer households may still need access tograsses for smaller livestock.

poorer households in recognition that they are heavilydependent on the forest and that meeting energy needs is akey function of the community forest). Once a year allmembers are allowed into the forest to collect thatch,though most people choose instead to make use of thenational park’s grass cutting programme as thatch qualityis superior. In terms of grass collection, only 150 house-holds exercise rights to collect grass, for which they have topay 240 Rs per year. Revenue for community developmentprojects (see Table 5) is also generated through a system ofWnes. This works on a sliding scale such that the wealthyand better educated violators are more heavily Wned.

The chairperson attributes some of the success of thecommunity forest to the sturdy fence erected around thecommunity forest (paid for by the municipality), whichforms an eVective barrier to wildlife to minimise crop dam-age and win local support.18 Although this community for-est can be regarded as an extension Barandabar Corridor, itaims to exclude mega-fauna and can hardly be regarded toprioritise conservation over consumptive use. Furthermore,despite the fact that the committee is not representative ofthe population in this area in terms of caste, gender andwealth, the regulations governing rights to forest useappear to enhance rather than exclude access to those mostneeding the community forest.

4.4. Case study 3: Baghmara buVer zone community forest

The Baghmara BuVer Zone Community Forest has beenheralded as a model in community forestry by the KingMahendra Trust.

Committee composition: This committee has membersfrom a much greater range of castes and ethnic groupscompared with the other committees due to the inXuenceand advice of the King Mahendra Trust. There are threeTamang (one of whom is female), one Newar, one Lama,three Brahmins and Wve Tharu (three of whom are women).The King Mahendra Trust recognised the importance ofhaving women, the main forest users, on the committee andrecommended their addition (see Table 5). One Tharufemale committee member was interviewed and she saidthat her views were explicitly sought and she felt that theneeds of the poorer castes and women were well embracedby the decisions made by the committee.

Management of the community forest: The establishmentof Baghmara Community Forest was initiated by the King

18 Fences have varying functions. At Banderi the whole forest is fenced,keeping wildlife out of the community forest on the Barandabar forestborder and livestock out of the forest at the border with the community. Afence at Birandranagar would likewise keep out wildlife at its southernborder with the RCNP and more critically keep livestock out of the com-munity forest to allow regeneration. Fences serve a somewhat diVerentfunction at Baghmara. The forest is not fenced at the park and Baranda-bar forest border to encourage wildlife into the forest, but its border withthe community helps to prevent wildlife from damaging crops outside thecommunity forest and livestock from competing for resources inside thecommunity forest.

S. Jones / Geoforum 38 (2007) 558–575 569

Mahendra Trust. They convinced people to allow regenera-tion of the area (initially only around 30 ha) and assisted inthe provision of fencing. When 45,000 Rs were earnedthough the sale of thatch following the fencing of the area,community support was won. Tree planting was encour-aged and initially diVerent zones were developed eachprioritising grass, thatch or tree planting (Table 6). In rec-ognition of its close proximity to Sauraha, the main desti-nation for tourists travelling to the RCNP, the communityforest committee decided to oVer ecotourism activities,including canoeing, elephant rides and overnight stays in awatchtower that was built in the centre of the forest. Fol-lowing this, revenue to the community forest has escalated.The community forest committee has been able to allocatefunding to a range of training workshops for the usergroup: cycle repairs; bee keeping; women’s embroidery forcrafts; chair making; sewing and tailoring. These aredesigned to provide alternative income generating opportu-nities to reduce reliance on the forest and provide incomefor alternative fuels and materials.19 Community forest rev-enue has also contributed towards road maintenance andschool buildings. It supports the establishment of biogasplants for individual households through providing a quar-ter of the cost as a grant and three quarters as a loan (topay back over three years at 8% interest). One hundred andtwenty two households so far have implemented biogasplants – reducing the dependence on fuelwood from theforest (but limited to households with cattle). It has alsobeen supporting householders’ construction of their owntoilets.

19 No evidence was sought to ascertain whether new activities transpiredfollowing training.

Wildlife is encouraged in the community forest as this isone of the main attractions for tourists. The area boastsregular sightings of rhinos and 192 species of bird. Peopleused to be allowed to collect dead wood from the forest tomeet their fuelwood needs but following reports that localpeople were frightened to enter the forest due to encounterswith wild animals the committee decided to employ peopleto collect the dead wood and sell it to users at cost price.Poor households with an abundance of labour and limitedcash will still be disadvantaged by such a policy, regardlessof the fact that no proWt is being made by the committee (asthey are no longer able to exploit their own labour).Besides, people still enter the community forest for grasscutting – for which there has been no ban and for which therisk of encountering wild animals is no diVerent. The usergroup is encouraged to harvest between 10am and 2pm,when the chances of encountering wildlife are reduced andtourists are not in the community forest. Thatch is nolonger available in the forest as grass cutting prevents itsgrowth. The manager argued that people only needed tore-thatch their houses once a year and for this they wereallowed access to the national park.

4.5. Local perspectives on community forest

This section discusses the questionnaire results.Responses to questions are highlighted in Table 7. Tables8–10 present a diVerentiated analysis for the three commu-nity forests (across gender, wealth and caste) and Table 11summarises these diVerences.

4.5.1. Control over resourcesOne of the most unexpected Wndings of this research

is that there is such a strong sense of local ownership of

Table 7A comparison of indicators of community forest success at the three case study sites based on questionnaire results

a Interviewees were given a choice of three options for their priority for the community forest (fuelwood provision, wildlife conservation with ecotour-ism, provision of other forest products). Most respondents chose the Wrst of these two options but where the two Wgures for any given location do not addup to 100%, the remaining percentage of respondents chose the latter option.

Question (phrased as positive statement) Birandranagar(% agreeing)

Banderi(% agreeing)

Baghmara(% agreeing)

Reduction of national park impactsThe beneWts of living near the NP are greater than the cost 48 57 77The CF has reduced crop damage from wild animals 6 93 27

Resource availabilityThe CF has increased the availability of important resources 2 28 76

Interest representationThe priority for the community forest should be

conservation with ecotourismElocal fuelwood provisiona32E68 27E73 47E51

The committee represents the interests of the whole village 66 64 86

BeneWt distributionThe beneWts of the CF are distributed fairly 46 56 64I beneWted directly from the CF 2 1 54

Control over resourcesThe CF belongs to the whole community 84 88 92

570 S. Jones / Geoforum 38 (2007) 558–575

community forests (Table 7), not least because oYciallyownership lies with the state. Most respondents in all threesites felt that their community forest belonged to the wholecommunity. There was relatively little variation in this fac-tor across the three sites (Table 7) and no signiWcant diVer-ences across social variables within sites. To the extent thatownership of BZCF has been transferred from one statebody (Department of Forests) to another (DNPWC), anoverall expansion of the state apparatus cannot be pur-ported (as proposed by Neumann, 1997). However, oneastute interviewee noted that the handing over of the com-munity forest area from the Department of Forests to theDNPWC ultimately amounted to an expansion of the pro-tected (conservation) area. The implication of this transfer-ence of power in terms of tenurial insecurity is evident. Oneperson was concerned that if the forests were managedbadly they would be appropriated by the RCNP and

Table 8SigniWcant diVerences in responses across social variables at Birandrana-gar

Do you think that the committee represents(a) your interests and the interests of the village or(b) their own interests

(a) (b) �2 D 3.85 p D 0.05All 28 22

High castes 26 18 8Middle and lower castes 24 10 14

another person noted that if they were managed well theywould be appropriated by the RCNP. Clearly the govern-ment’s proposal to siphon 40% of proWts from the commu-nity forests in the hills illustrates that user groups haveevery reason to be sceptical and cautious about the state’sfuture interests and interventions in BZCF. It is likelythough that the opportunity to utilise community forests tomeet the substantial demand for forest products (Table 3)overrides potential concerns about long-term ownershiprights for the majority of the population.

4.5.2. Resource availability and park impact minimisationThere certainly has been an increase in the availability of

forest products. Baghmara community forest has under-gone rapid ecological succession to a forest from an initiallydegraded state showing dramatic environmental regenera-

Table 11A summary of Wndings from questionnaire responses showing communityforests where responses were signiWcantly diVerentiated by gender, casteor wealth

Key: Bg D Baghmara, Bd D Banderi and Br D Birandranagar.

Question topic Caste Wealth Gender

Costs versus beneWts BgFairness of beneWt distribution Bd BgRepresentativeness of committee Bd, Br Bd BdAvailability of resources BdPersonal beneWts Bg

Table 9SigniWcant diVerences in responses across social variables at Banderi

Do you think that the committee represents (a) your interests and the interests of the village or(b) their own interests

(a) (b) �2 D 8.69p D 0.001

(a) (b) �2 D 8.57pD 0.003

(a) (b) �2 D 6.87p D 0.008All 67 33 All 67 33 All 67 33

Wealthier 24 22 2 High castes 45 37 8 Male 48 26 22Poorer and the

same as others76 45 31 Middle and

lower castes55 30 25 Female 52 41 11

Are the beneWts of the c.f. distributed (a) fairly or(b) do some people beneWt more than others?

Has the availability of important resourcesincreased?

(a) (b) �2 D 7.58 p D 0.006 Yes No �2 D 8.21 p D 0.004All 56 44 All 28 72

High castes 45 32 13 High castes 45 19 26Middle and lower castes 55 24 31 Middle and lower castes 55 9 46

Table 10

SigniWcant diVerences in responses across social variables at Baghmara

NB Only the results that were signiWcant appear in these tables. Some of the categories were ‘collapsed’ as the sample sizes for some scenarios were toosmall.

Are the beneWts of the c.f. distributed (a) fairlyor (b) do some people beneWt more than others?

Have you beneWted from the c.f. in terms oftraining/materials/development?

Are the beneWts or costs of livingnear a national park greater?

(a) (b) �2 D 8.69p D 0.001

Yes No �2 D 8.42p D 0.004

BeneWts Costs �2 D 5.07 pD 0.024All 47 15 All 40 30 All 52 15

Wealthier andsame as others

49 40 9 Wealthier andsame as others

50 34 16 High castes 35 31 4

Poorer 13 7 6 Poorer 20 6 14 Middle andlower castes

32 21 1111

S. Jones / Geoforum 38 (2007) 558–575 571

tion (supported by Schweik et al.’s, 2003 and Nagendraet al.’s, 200520 Wndings) and as Table 7 indicates, the sampleof the Baghmara user group who were interviewed regardthe availability of useful resources to have grown consider-ably. Less dramatic success in enhancing resource availabil-ity has been achieved at Banderi, not least because anestablished forest already existed there. However, it isamong the sample at Banderi that higher castes were morelikely to consider that the availability of importantresources had increased (Table 9) suggesting that the avail-ability of resources has increased for some more than oth-ers (or that the higher castes had an interest in castingcommunity forestry in a more positive light). This Wndingcontradicts assertions of the forest committee that resourceaccess is better for the poor (assuming a link betweenwealth and caste exists).21 Birandranagar is clearly strug-gling to regenerate because without fencing, cattle continueto graze the area, preventing vegetation succession and itwas here that the perception of increased resource avail-ability was the lowest. These Wndings challenge Nagendra’s(2002) assertion that the initial condition of the foresthanded over to the community aVects the success of com-munity forestry – illustrated by Baghmara in particular.That people have unmet needs for forest products seems tooverride this factor as even in Birandrangar there was agreat deal of support for community forestry among thoseinterviewed.

Although Baghmara has been extremely successful inimproving resource availability, its fencing has done rela-tively little to protect agriculture from wildlife (Table 7),because the community forest is not located between thepark and the village and fencing surrounds only part of thecommunity forest. It is at Banderi where success has beengreatest in this regard (which eVectively provides two layersof fence between wildlife and Welds), thus while not dramat-ically increasing resource availability it has at least helpedreduce crop losses to wildlife. At none of the sites are theviews about changes in crop damage signiWcantly diVerenti-ated across social variables, suggesting relatively ubiqui-tous eVects for the user groups as might be expected. Theresults imply that eVective fencing of Birandranagar couldsigniWcantly improve the availability of resources andreduce animal attack thereby setting the community foreston a positive trajectory.

The most favourable attitudes towards living near thenational park can be found at Baghmara – although theproximity to Sauraha may mean that residents beneWt

20 In Nagendra et al.’s (2005) study, buVer zone groups showed a net in-crease in forest cover (unlike community forests outside the buVer zone)explained by the fact that they were wealthier as a result of tourism andwere thus able to use revenues from tourism to hire forest guards for forestprotection. This is a questionable conclusion for Nagendra et al. to arriveat however, given that their data show incomes from buVer zone commu-nity forests ranging from 7,500 to 2,400,000B and from community forests16,000–5,100,000B.21 Wealth and caste are positively associated across data amalgamated

for the three community forests (�2 D 15.88, pD 0.003).

through tourism also. The community forests may contrib-ute to the somewhat more positive attitudes among thesample at Banderi than Birandranagar although thisresearch has not explored other variables that may accountfor this diVerence (being closer to the national park,Birandranagar residents may suVer more wildlife encoun-ters for example). At Baghmara higher castes were morelikely to regard the beneWts of living near a national park tobe greater than the costs compared with middle and lowercastes (Table 10), suggesting that higher castes may beneWtto a greater extent. Across diVerent wealth categories,diVerences were not signiWcant though.

4.5.3. Interest representationAt Baghmara despite the chairman being from a higher

caste,22 the work of the King Mahendra Trust to encouragea better representation of the caste, ethnic and gender com-position has helped generate a sense among the vast major-ity of the population that the committee represented theinterests of the whole village (Table 7). Indeed at Bagh-mara, there were no signiWcant diVerences in this viewpointacross the various axes of social diVerentiation. At Birandr-anagar, the lack of a representative committee has led tosigniWcantly skewed access to natural resources among theuser group as only the wealthy are able to beneWt from theauction process. This policy clearly aVected user group per-ceptions among those interviewed as a third of respondentsfelt that the committee acted in their own interests. Again,surprising results were obtained from Banderi. While on thesurface the policy appears to be fair and even beneWt thepoor to a relatively greater extent (particularly in terms ofrights to fuelwood and Wnes for defection, but less so interms of grass cutting rights), a slightly higher proportionof respondents (35%) than at Birandranagar believed thatcommittee members acted in their own interest. Suspicionsof fraudulent behaviour could explain this anomaly.

As highlighted in Sections 4.2–4.5, higher castes dispro-portionately constitute committee membership in all threecase studies (if it can be assumed that the sample broadlyreXects the caste composition of the population). This wasmost extreme in the case of Banderi and Birandranagar(although at these sites, the sample suggests that highercastes also form a larger proportion of the population – seeSection 4.1.). At both Banderi and Birandranagar highercastes were more likely to consider that the committee rep-resents their interests and those of the village as a whole,23

whereas poorer and middle castes were more likely to feelthat the committee represents its own interests (Tables 8and 9). Furthermore at Banderi, males and those who con-sidered themselves wealthier, were also more likely to con-sider that the committee represented their interests and

22 Although he noted that he was not a wealthy man when he became in-volved in community forestry, he has now beneWted from tourism in Sau-raha by developing tourist accommodation.23 Categories had to be ‘collapsed’ to gain statistically valid data as some

of the categories were otherwise too small.

572 S. Jones / Geoforum 38 (2007) 558–575

those of the whole village, while women and those consider-ing themselves to be of the same level of wealth or poorerwere signiWcantly more likely to feel that the committeeacted in its own interests (Table 9).

At all three community forests the majority of intervie-wees favoured priority being given to local fuelwood provi-sion over conservation with ecotourism (Table 7) and in thissense, the policies adopted at Birandranagar and Banderiare broadly congruent with the interests of the user group(again, assuming that those interviewed represent the popu-lation). At Baghmara conservation with ecotourism clearlyfavours the King Mahendra Trust and they have inXuencedBaghmara’s committee in the development of this manage-ment policy. However, it is not thoroughly out of line withuser group preferences because the majority in favour offuelwood collection in the sample is only very slight.

4.5.4. BeneWt distributionRevenue generation from ecotourism activities in Bagh-

mara community forest has clearly generated considerabledirect beneWts to the population in terms of training andmaterials for individuals (Table 7) although those whoseidentiWed themselves as being wealthier or of ‘the same’level of wealth as others, were more likely to have beneWtedpersonally from training (Table 10). Furthermore, there isan evident conXict between consumptive and non-con-sumptive (ecotourism) uses of community forests as peoplefear encounters with rhinoceros and tigers during gatheringactivities. Baghmara’s attempt to overcome this problem byspecifying that grass cutting should take place during themiddle of the day and by employing people to collect deadwood disadvantages the poorest and may account partlyfor the fact that Baghmara does not fare that much higherthan the other two case studies in terms of perceived fair-ness in beneWt distribution according to those interviewed(Table 7), despite having a more socially representativecommittee. Indeed those who identiWed themselves as beingpoorer or of ‘the same’ level of wealth as others, were sig-niWcantly less likely than the wealthier to consider that thebeneWts had been distributed fairly at Baghmara (Table 10).The conXict between conservation and non-timber forestproduct harvesting could perhaps be more eVectivelyaddressed by a practice of exchanging fuelwood for labour(e.g. in casual maintenance or policing of the communityforest) so that the poorest are not disadvantaged.

At Banderi, that higher castes feel that the beneWts aredistributed more fairly than middle and poor castes lendsadditional weight to the suggestion that the higher castesbeneWt to a greater extent and contrary to the apparentfairness of the policies, the higher castes on the committeedo not represent the interests of the wider user group(Table 9). This was not signiWcant for wealth however. AtBirandranagar (Table 8), as a consequence of most peopleidentifying their level of wealth as being the same as others,the sample size too small for any statistical signiWcance indiVerences in perceptions of fairness to emerge, but there isno diVerence across caste which is somewhat surprising.

5. Conclusions

5.1. The extent and processes of devolution

Agrawal and Ostrom’s (2001) typology of propertyrights provides a useful framework to facilitate a morenuanced analysis of the extent of devolution in buVer zonecommunity forest management. Findings regarding theproperty rights in the buVer zone community forests arepresented in Table 12 and can be compared with the situa-tion of community forests elsewhere in Nepal (Table 1).Communities do actually make their own decisions aboutthe withdrawal of most forest products.24 A signiWcant vari-ety of management systems and resource extraction rulesexist among the three community forests. Not only werecommittees involved in the initial design of managementplans, but changes have been made over time as a result ofcommittee decisions (see Baghmara case study). In terms ofexclusion rights, communities are responsible for policingtheir own forests and deciding on the distribution of with-drawal rights. That the state had ultimate authority in thisregard is favoured by communities as they Wnd it diYculton occasions to penalise members of their own community.With regards to alienation rights, the government isunlikely to consider ceding constitutional level rights, andindeed as intimated from the results above, the beneWts tothe poorer and more marginalised population may not bevery signiWcant were it to do so.

24 The main exception is live trees and the commercial sale of timber: inBanderi a prescribed volume may be harvested with permission and atBaghmara the DNPWC prohibit the felling of any silk cotton trees.

Table 12Decentralisation of Property Rights in community forest and around national parks in Nepal

Rights Community forestry in the buVer zones of the RCNP

Withdrawal BZCF user group committees make their own decisions about the withdrawal of most non-timber forest products all year round (negotiated and agreed in Management Plan). Restrictions exist on selling produce outside the buVer zone

Management BZCF user group committees are involved in the initial design of the Management Plans and have considerable scope to modify management, in consultation with other stakeholders. Restrictions exist on how funds can be used

Exclusion BZCF user group committees police their own forests and decide on the forest and user group boundaries and distribution of withdrawal rights but the state has ultimate authority and enforcement responsibility for exclusion regulations

Alienation Retained by state

S. Jones / Geoforum 38 (2007) 558–575 573

This research indicates however that there may be littleto be gained from granting full blown ownership to thecommunity as there already exists a very high perception ofownership of community forests among the user groups.The key beneWt would be in removing tenurial insecurity(stemming from the fear that forests will be subsumed intothe national park if they are managed well or badly). This,combined with government proposals to siphon proWtsfrom the community forests of the hills, may well havesome negative impact on user group incentives to adhere tothe committees’ stated management regulations, althoughnecessity and increased access to useful resources seem togenerate a high level of support community forestry.

5.2. To whom is power devolved and how does this impact upon beneWt distribution?

The second research question of this paper asked towhom has power been transferred – to what extent are usergroup interests represented and how accountable are theemerging institutions? The third and related question con-siders the eVect of the decentralisation of forest manage-ment at the local level – has it provided beneWts and if so,for whom? These two questions are considered together asWndings from the three case studies are summarised below.

Community forestry user groups in Nepal are associatedwith considerable power and status. As Timsina (2003,p.238) conveys: “there are no other organisations at villagelevel that provide opportunities for discussions of issues ofconcern to all peopleƒFUG is a strong instrument of gov-ernance at the local levelƒ[and]ƒmay be more eVectivethan local government institutions (VDCs) in deliveringdevelopment at the local level”. Not only does this observa-tion support the argument that devolution has not merelybeen a rhetorical devise, but it also suggests that a consider-able level of decision-making power is retained by the usercommittee itself. If the committee is able to devise its ownmanagement policies then there exists the Xexibility todevelop downward accountability. All committees claimedto have annual general meetings with the wider user groupbut that does not necessarily mean that their views aretaken on board.

Birandranagar showed a much lower level of downwardaccountability as existing ‘election’ mechanisms ensure theselection of certain (more powerful) individuals to leader-ship positions. Committee membership is skewed towardshigher castes and indeed the lower castes tended to feel thatthe committee represents their interests to a lesser extentthan higher castes. Elite capture was particularly pro-nounced at Birandranagar, where the grass auction processfavours the wealthy. Here was the highest perception ofunfairness among those interviewed and the committee isclearly composed of members of higher castes (though so isthe user group if the sample is representative). As most peo-ple identiWed themselves as being of ‘the same’ level ofwealth as other people, opinions were not signiWcantlydiVerentiated by wealth among the user group.

At Banderi the committee was also composed of a rela-tively large proportion of higher caste members and mem-bers already have some status and power within thecommunity as a result of their involvement with local poli-tics. While the overall policy of prioritising access to forestproducts over conservation with tourism reXected the pref-erences of those interviewed, perceptions of fairness in thesample were not as high as would be expected from a policywhich on the surface appeared to favour the poor ratherthan reproducing favourable access for the wealthy andwas congruent with majority interests. Thus while the sys-tem at Banderi appeared fair, responses to questions weresigniWcantly diVerentiated by caste (which is quite polarizedin the sample), including; fairness of beneWt distribution,interest representation and resource availability. Greatertransparency may be needed in the activities of the commit-tee to improve user perceptions of fairness.

In the case of Baghmara, the active intervention of anNGO yielded a much more representative committee andthis was the only one of the three sites for which there wasno signiWcant tendency for certain groups in the popula-tion to feel that the committee acted in its own interests.The King Mahendra Trust clearly meet their own intereststhrough a policy which favours conservation (extendingthe area for megafauna) over local consumption.Although not quite the majority of those interviewed atBaghmara favoured conservation with tourism as a broadmanagement strategy, support was much higher than inthe samples at the other two case study locations and per-haps because of the inXuence of the King Mahendra Trust(in developing a more representative committee) the high-est perception of fairness of beneWt distribution existed.However in developing rules that disadvantage the poor(e.g. prohibiting fuelwood collection) the committee hasstill some way to go in terms of downward accountability.The poorer segment of the user group did consider thatsome people beneWted disproportionately from the com-munity forest, and those who were wealthier certainlyseemed to beneWt to a greater degree from training andmaterials.

Despite the signiWcantly diVerent management policiesin all three case studies, there is a consistent tendency forlower castes and poorer households to feel that their inter-ests are less well represented and that they receive fewerbeneWts.25 Overall however, it seems that the poor still sup-port community forestry even where policies are deemedunfair because it enables access to products which theywould not otherwise have. Platteau (2004, p. 226) providesa similar illustration of a case where poor people sup-ported an elite member of the community on the groundsthat they beneWted from his leadership eVorts. “That heappropriated to himself a disproportionate share of the

25 There was only one signiWcant result in terms of gendered responseswhich may imply that men and women responded in terms of the needs ofthe household, but further research would be required to make this claimwith any certainty.

574 S. Jones / Geoforum 38 (2007) 558–575

beneWts . . . is considered legitimate by most of them”(2004, p. 227). One advantage of such a system, as Chakr-aborty (2001) found, is that despite inequality, emerginginstitutions are built on existing systems of authority andconsequently they are stable. However, Platteau (2004)notes that this is a serious problem for the community-driven development approach where the poor are notempowered enough to withstand the pressures and inXu-ence of the local elite. This research clearly questions theview that decentralisation necessarily leads to greaterequity. SuYcient conditions may have been granted at anational policy level, but local level power structures andpolitics mediate national policy to create diverse outcomeson the ground. BuVer zone community forest user commit-tees may not always be downwardly accountable and deci-sion making at this level does not guarantee a moreequitable distribution of resources. This research corrobo-rates other research Wndings that decentralisation pro-grammes need to be more carefully designed so thatparticipation can be biased in favour of the poor and themarginal (Agrawal and Gupta, 2005).

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