Title 在日米軍の削減可能性を探る研究( 資料編：9) )

Author(s) 我部, 政明

Citation

Issue Date 2001-02-08

URL http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12000/12988

Rights

Institute for National Strategic StudiesNational Defense University

The United States and Japan:Advancing Toward a MaturePartnership

The following report presents a consen-sus view of the members of a biparti-san study group on the U.S.-Japan

partnership. It is not a political document andreflects the views of the study group mem-bers only. This is solely an attempt by thegroup to inject consistency and stretegicdirection into what it believes is our essen-tial Asian relationship.

The study group consisted of Richard lAnnitage, Annitage and Associates; Dan E.Bob, Office of Senator William V. Roth. Jr.;Kurt M. Campbell. Center for Strategic andInternational Studies; Michael J. Green.Council on Foreign Relations; Kent M.Harrington. Harrington Group LLC; FrankJannuzi. Minority Staff. Senate ForeignRelations Committee; James A. Kelly. PacificForum. Center for Strategic and InternationalStudies; Edward J. Uncoln. BrookingsInstitution; Robert A. Manning. Council onForeign Relations; Kevin G. Nealer. ScowcroftGroup; Joseph S. Nye. Jr.• JFK School ofGovernment. Harvard University; Torkel lPatterson, GeolnSight James J. Przystup.Institute for National Strategic Studies.National Defense University; Robin H.Sakoda. Sakoda Associates; Barbara P.Wanner. French and Company; and Paul D.Wolfowitz. Paul H. Nitte School of AdvancedInternational Studies. The Johns HopkinsUniversity.

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Asia, in the throes of historic change,should carry major weight in the calculus ofAmerican political, security, economic, andother interests. Accounting for 53 percent of theworld's population, 25 percent of the globaleconomy, and nearly $600 billion annually intwo-way trade with the United States, Asia isvital to American prosperity. Politically, fromJapan and Australia, to the Philippines, SouthKorea, Taiwan, and Indonesia, countries acrossthe region are demonstrating the universalappeal of democratic values. China is facingmomentous social and economic changes, theconsequences of which are not yet clear.

Major war in Europe is inconceivable forat least a generation, but the prospects forconflict in Asia are far from remote. The region

hostilities that coulddirectly involve theUnited States in a majorconflict could occur at amoment's notice

features some of the world's largest and mostmodem armies, nuclear-anned major powers,and several nuclear-

build confidence through its proactive diplo-macy and economic involvement throughoutthe region.

Japan's participation in the United Na-tions peacekeeping mission in Cambodia in the

Tokyo has helped tofoster regional s.tabilityand build confidence

early 199Qs, its various defense exchanges andsecurity dialogues, and its participation in theAssociation of Southeast Asian Nations Re-gional Forum and the new "Plus Three"grouping are further testimony to Tokyo'Sincreasing activism. Most significantly, japan'salliance with the United States has served asthe foundation for regional order.

We have considered six key elementsof the U.S.-Japan relationship and put forth abipartisan action agenda aimed at creatingan enduring alliance foundation for the21" century.

Post-Cold War DriftAs partners in the broad Western alliance,

the United States and Japan worked together towin the Cold War and helped to usher in a newera of democracy and economic opportunity inAsia. In the aftermath of our shared victory,howeve~ the course of U.S.-Japan relations haswandered, looing its focus and coherence-notwithstanding the real threats and potentialrisks facing both partners.

this lack of focus andfollow-through has beenevident in both countries

Once freed from the strategic constraintsof containing the Soviet Union, both Washing-ton and Tokyo ignored the real, practical, andpressing needs of the bilateral alliance. Well-intentioned efforts to find substitutes for con-crete collaboration and clear goal-setting haveproduced a diffuse dialogue but no clear defini-tion of a common purpose. Efforts to experi-ment with new concepts of international secu-rity have proceeded fitfully, but withoutdiscemable results in redefining and reinvigo-rating bilateral security ties.

This lack of focus and follow-through hasbeen evident in both countries. Some in Japan

have been drawn to the notion of "Asianiza-tion" and the hope that economic interdepend-ence and multilateral institutions would putthe region on a path similar to that of Europe.Many in the United States regarded the end ofthe Cold War as an opportunity to return toeconomic priorities.

The early 19905 was a period of height-ened bilateral tensions, primariJy over thequestion of aa:ess to Japanese markets. SomeAmericans saw economic competition fromJapan as a threat In the past five years, how-ever, trade tensions have diminished. Envy andconcern overJapanese economic prowess haveturned to dismay over the Japanese recessionand building financial crisis.

Neither country dealt with the need toredefme and reinvigorate the alliance. In fact,

neither country dealtwith the need to redefineand reinvigorate thealliance

both took it for granted. The drift in the al-liance was obvious until the mid-1990s whenthe crisis on the Korean peninsula:--punctu-ated by the horror of the Okinawa rape inci-dent-

same time, political and economic uncertain-ties in China and Russia, the fragile nature ofdetente on the Korean peninsula, and the

the time has arrived forrenewed attention toimproving, reinvigorating,and refocusing the U.S.-Japan alliance

prospect of protracted instability in Indone-sia-all pose shared challenges.

For those who argue that Japan is a"wasting asset" in irreversible decline, it mightbe useful to recall that it has been only adecade since it was taken as an article of faiththat American power was ebbing on the inter-national scene. It would be foolhardy to under-estimate the enduring dimensions ofJapanesepower, much as it was unwise for some Japan-ese to dismiss the latent and endUring qualitiesof American power in the I980s and I990s.

PoliticsOver the past decade, the ruling Liberal

Democratic Party (LDP), faced with internaldivisions, a clash of traditional interest groupagendas, and a growing split among key con-stituencies, has focused primarily on hangingon to its dwindling power. At the same time, thepolitical opposition has failed to produce credi-ble, well-conceived policy proposals. The neteffect is an LDP struggling to maintain its gripon the reins of government, an oppositionunable to provide a governing alternative, andaJapanese public, faced with a lack of crediblealternative leadership, reluctantly returning theLDP to office. The result has been a govern-

the Japanese politicalorder is experiencingprotracted change

ment stuck in neutral, incapable of more thanmuddling through.

Nevertheless, the necessity of economicreform and restructuring, driven by the pres-sures of a relentless globalization of the inter-national economy, are likely to lead to politicalchange. These economic forces are breaking

apart the monopoly power of the so-called IronTriangle-the heretofore collusive relation-ships among politicians, business, and thebureaucracies--and making power morediffuse. TheJapanese political order is experi-encing protracted change.

Political changes inJapan could lead tounprecedented opportunities to reinvigorate theU.S.-Japan relationship-as well as test itfurther. The end of bipolar ideological con-frontation in Japanese politics and the emer-gence of a new pragmatism about securityaffairs among a younger generation of electedofficials provide fertile soil for creative newapproaches to leadership.

It would be unrealistic to expect the cur-rent leadership suddenly to embrace reform orto assume a higher profile on the global stage.The demands ofJapan's parliamentary systemmake it difficult to implement policies, thatrequire short-term pain in exchange for long-term gain. The political system is risk-averse.But the successor generations of politicians andthe public-at-large also recognize that ec0-nomic power alone will no longer be enough tosecureJapan's future. Moreover, the Japanesepublic, by giving official standing to the na-tional flag and anthem, and in focusing onsuch territorial claims as the Senkaku islands,has evidenced a new respect for the sovereigntyand integrity of the nation state. The implica-tions for the U.S.-Japan relationship stemmingfrom these changes are profound.

Asimilar process is at work in the UnitedStates. TIle growing role of Congress as a forcein foreign policy, the rising influence of stateand local governments, and the dramatictransformation of the private sector as theinitiator of economic change-driven bytechnology and the empowerment of the indi-vidual-are altering the influence of once-central foreign policymaking institutions.

But, just as Japan's risk-averse politicalleadership has held back the nation's economictransformation, the lack of clear direction fromWashington also has taken a toll Episodicexecutive branch leadership has failed to pro-duce a well-conceived game plan for America'srelationship with Japan. This, in tum, hasaccelerated the erosion of political support andpopular understanding of the importance ofthe alliance. In short, the political, economic,and social changes undenvay in the UnitedStates put an even greater premium on execu-tive branch leadership in foreign affairs.

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If the United States can exercise leader-ship-that is to say, excellence without arr0-gance-in its relations withJapan, the twocountries will be better able to realize the fullpotential for cooperation nurtured dUring thepast 50 years. If the changes underway inJapan ultimately produce a stronger, moreresponsive political and economic system, thesynergy in U.S.-Japan relations will enl1anceour abilities to play an engaged, mutuallysupportive, and fundamentally constructiverole in regional and global arenas in the yearsto come.

the synergy in U.S.-Japanrelations will enhanceour abilities to play anengaged, mutuallysupportive, and funda-mentally constructive role

SecurityBecause the stakes are so high in Asia, it is

urgent that the United States andJapan developa common perception and approach regardingtheir relationship in the 21~ century. The po-tential for conflict in Asia is lowered dramati-cally by a visible and "real" U.S.-Japan defenserelationship. The use of bases granted byJapanallows the U.S. to affect the security environ-ment from the Pacific to the Persian Gulf. Therevised Guidelines for U.S.-Japan DefenseCooperation, the basis for joint defense plan-ning, should be regarded as the floor-not theceiling-for an expanded Japanese role in tiletranspacific alliance, and the uncertainties ofthe post-Cold War regional setting require amore dynamic approach to bilateral defenseplanning.

Japan's prohibition against collective self-defense is a constraint on alliance cooperation.Lifting this prohibition would allow for clooerand more efficient security cooperation. This isa decision that only the Japanese people canmake. The United States has respected thedomestic decisions that form the character ofJapanese security policies and should continueto do so. But Washington must make clear thatit welcomes aJapan that is willing to make agreater contribution and to become a moreequal alliance partner.

We see the special relationship betweenthe United States and Great Britain as a model

OKINAWA

Alarge concentration of U.S. forces in Japan-approximately 75 percent-are stationed on Okinawa. They are situated there because in matters ofsecurity, distance matters. Okinawa is positioned at the intersection of theEast China Sea and the Pacific Ocean-only about one hour's flying time from Ko-rea, Taiwan, and the South China Sea.

The U.S. Air Force base at Kadena provides a critical link to American powerprojection throughout the region. It is also crucial to the defense of Japan. TheIII Marine Expeditionary Force on Okinawa provides a self-sustaining, joint forwardechelon for rapid response to problems in the region, ranging from evacuation ofnoncombatant personnel to serving as cutting edge combat elements to enablelarge formations to defeat aggression.

But the heavy concentration of U.S. forces on Okinawa also creates an obviousburden for Japan and a less obvious one for the United States, arising, for example,from restrictions, such as those on training. Because of their intense operationaltempo and younger demographic profile, the Marines have drawn particularscrutiny from a Japanese public ready for some changes in the U.S. military pres-ence in the southernmost prefecture of the country.

For their part. the Marines have striven to be better neighbors, but readinessand training have suffered with the growing constraints imposed on them byen-croachment around the bases. And while statistics on incidents of misconduct byAmerican service personnel are sharply down, in the current political climate, atten-tion to episodes of deeply unfortunate behavior that do occur is sharply magnified.

In 1996, the U.S.-Japan Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) agree-ment called for a realignment, consolidation, and reduction of U.S. bases on Oki-nawa. The United States and Japan must complete implementation of that accord,which will reduce U.S. assets by about 5,000 hectares and 11 facilities, including theMarine Corps Air Station at Futenma.

We believe the SACO agreement should have had an important fourth goal-diversification throughout the Asia-Pacific region. From a military perspective, it isimportant for U.S. forces to have broad and flexible access across the region. Butfrom a political perspective, it is essential to ease the burden borne by theOkinawans so that our presence is sustainable and credible. American thinkingabout force structure in Japan must not stop with the SACO accord. The UnitedStates should consider broader and more flexible deployment and training optionsfor the Marines throughoutthe region.

for the alliance. This arrangement requires thefollowing elements:

• Reaffirming the defense commitment. TheUnited States should reaffinn its commitment to thedefense ofJapan and th~ areas under the admin-istrative control ofJapan, including the SenkakuIslands.

• Diligent implementation'of the revisedGuidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation,including passage of crisis management legislation.

• Robust cooperation of all three U.S. armedservices with their Japanese counterparts. The U.S.and Japan should strive for greater jointness in theuse of facilities and for integration of trainingactivities and should review and update the rolesand missions of the Anned Forces agreed upon in1981. Both partners should invest in training thatreplicates reality, rather than follows old patterns.They also should define how to ~ist each otherwith emerging new challenges, such as interna-tional terrorism and transnational criminal activity,as well as longstanding potential threats, and howto collaborate in peacekeeping and peacemakingactivities.

• Full participation in peacekeeping andhumanitarian relief missions. Japan would need toremove its 1992 self-imposed restraints on theseactivities so as not to burden other peacekeepingnations.

• Development of a forre structure that hasthe characteristics of versatility, mobility, flexibility,diversity, and survivability. Any adjustments shouldnot be based on an artificial number, but shouldreflect the regional security environment As thisprocess unfolds, changes to forre structure shouldbe made through a process of consultation anddialogue, and be mutually agreeable. The UnitedStates should take advantage of technologicalchanges and regional developments to restructureits forre presence on the archipelago. We shouldstrive to reduce the American military footprtnt inJapan as long as our capabilities can be main-tained. This includes continued consolidation ofU.S. bases and rapid implementation of the terms ofthe 1996 U.S.-Japan Special Action Committee onOkinawa (SACO) agreement.

• Making priority availability of U.S. defensetechnology to Japan. Defense technology must beseen as an essential component of the overallalliance. We should encourage the American de-fense industry to make strategic alliances withJapanese companies to facilitate a greater two-wayflow of cutting-edge military and dual-use tech-nologies.

• Broadening the scope of U.S.-Japan missiledefense cooperation.

There will be a healthy debate in bothcountries arising from the larger role that weadvocate for Japan. And U.S. Government

officials and lawmakers will have to recognizethat Japanese policy will not be identical toAmerican policy in every instance. It is time forburdensharing to evolve into power-sharing

it is time for burden-sharing to evolve intopower-sharing

and this means that the next administrationwill have to devote the considerable time thatwill be necessary to bring this into being.

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IntelligenceThe changing nature of the potential

threats and the evident dangers for both theUnited States andJapan in East Asia requiregreater cooperation and integration of intelli-gence capabilities between the two allies. De-spite the importance of the bilateral alliance,intelligence sharing with Japan contrastssharply with the increasingly cl~ relation-ships we have enjoyed with our NATO partnersin this area. While global developments havedriven that trend, so, too, has the recognition

that declining resources and such new missionsas peacekeeping and peacemaking requiregreater cooperation and integration of alliedintelligence capabilities.

Ironically, with the end of the Cold War,the ambiguous nature of threats and the oftenmore complex policy choices have sharpened

new missions such aspeacekeeping andpeacemaking requiregreater cooperation andintegration of alliedintelligence capabilities

the need to cooperate in analyzing and collect-ing vital information on shared security threatsaround the world. Tokyo has made it clear thatexisting U.S.-Japan intelligence ties do notmeet its needs.

For the United States, the potential forgreater cooperation with Japan is obvious.Allies need to articulate their differences as wellas reach agreement on policy actions based oncomparative and competitive analysis. Sharedintelligence represents the road to that goal.Moreover, a division of labor-apportioninganalytical tasks according to the comparativeadvantages of each partner-offers gains for aresource-strapped intelligence community.Japan has the capacity to bring valuable infor-mation and insights to a strategic intelligencedialogue because of its global engagement.

Perhaps more important, a strategicvision of intelligence cooperation withJapan islong overdue. Failure to strengthen U.S.-Japanintelligence ties only raises the risks that ourperception-and possibly our policies-willdiverge when challenges demand commonunderstanding and action within the alliance.

Improved intelligence cooperation is noless important for Japan. The path to a greaterinternational contribution byJapan requiresboth astronger indigenous Japanese intelli-gence capability and greater cooperation withthe United States.

Strengthened intelligence cooperation willhelp Japan to improve its own policymaking,crisis management, and decisionmakingprocesses. In addition, both within and beyondAsia, Japan faces more diverse threats and morecomplex international responsibilities, whichcall for intelligence that provides a betterunderstanding of its national security needs.

Intelligence cooperation also willstrengthenJapan's role in the bilateral alliance.Given the disparity in size between the U.S. andJapaneseintelligeocecommunities, morebalanced sharing inevitably will take time. Butthe long-term result-improved informationon potential threats, competitive analyticalproducts, and complementary perspectives-will enrich cooperation as well as better informboth allies.

As a national-level issue in both countriesU.S.-Japan intelligence cooperation needs 'national-level management. Cooperation needsto take new forms and to expand existingrelationships.

It is incumbent on Washington to do thefollowing:

• The National Security Advisor must makestrengthened intelligence cooperation apolley andintelligence priority.

• In coordination with U.S. policymakers, theDirector of Central Intelligence must work withJapan to brooden cooperation in away that fits with

transnational issues, suchas illegal immigration,international crime, andterrorism all requirecoordinated interagencyprograms in bothcountries

Japan's national security priorities. Thmsnationalissues, such as illegal immigration, internationalcrime, and terrorism all require coordinated intera-gency programs in both countries.

• The United States should support japan'sreasonable desire to develop an independent intelli-gence capability, including its own satellites. Im-proving the quality of sharing requires immediateattention.

• U.S. policy should give priority to jointstaffing of analytical centers, reciprocal educationalprograms, and similar elbow-to-eIbow initiatives toenrich the intelligence network.

An enhanced intelligence relationshipbetween the United States andJapan also needspolitical support in both countries. In thisregard, Tokyo needs to take severa! basic steps:

• Japanese leaders need to win public andpolitical support for anew law to protect classifiedinformation.

• While improved intelligence capabilities willoffer improved support toJapanese polieymaking,

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leaders in Thkyo need to address their own decision-making processes as well. Intelligence sharing mustoccur within the Japanese Government as well asbetween the United States andJapan.

experience argues strong-ly for a dialogue on howto include the Diet in theintelligence process

• Experience argues strongly for adialogueon how to include the Diet in the intelligenceprocess. Oversight of intelligence in democracies is acritically important component in sustainingpolitical support.

In short, as Japan addresses its futuredefense needs and reorganizes its government,the time has come to bring our intelligencecooperation out of the closet.

Economic RelationsAn economically healthyJapan is essen-

tial to a thriving bilateral partnership. Indeed,U.S. interests in all of Asia benefit from havinga prosperous, growing, and robust Japaneseeconomy. Japan remains the third-largestcustomer for U.S. goods, and its continuedfrailty has meant lost opportunities for Ameri-can workers and businesses. AweakJapancontributes to volatility and uncertainty inglobal capital flows. In addition, an inward-looking, frustrated, insecureJapanese populacewill be less willing or able to playa larger rolein the alliance.

an economically healthyJapan is essential to 8thriving bilateralpartnership

Unfortunately, Japan has experienced adisappointing decade of economic stagnationand recession. From 1992 through 1999,average annual real economic growth wasonly 1percent. The decade ended with a reces-sion in 1997 to 1998, and again in the secondhalf of 1999.

The restoration of sustained economicgrowth in Japan will depend in large measureon opening markets and recognizing that thekey to economic recovery rests in allowing the

private sector to respond to the forces of global-ization. This will involve continued deregula-tion and the reduction of trade barriers, as wellas the development of stronger rules and insti-tutions to support more open markets.

This is a fact understood by some Japan-ese policy elites and documented in a hCl'lt of

the key to economicrecovery rests in allowingthe private sector torespond to the forces ofglobalization

official connnentaries, beginning with theMaekawa Report of 1986. Since the mid-1970s,foreigners have attempted to encourageJapan-ese policymakers to take steps to increase thetransparency and openness of the economy.With mounting frustration, successive U.S.administrations have tried to prod Tokyo toadopt a range of invented and reinvented tradeand economic policy options.

Barriers to reform are significant. Matureworkers (including the 2(}-30 percent who stillenjoy the cozy sanctuary of lifetime employ-ment), protected industries, and bureaucratslong accustomed to calling the shots for vari-ous industries continue to protect the statusquo. Moreover, the Japanese tend to be averse toradical change, except in circumstances whereno other options exist And some inJapanargue that the nation's economic problemshave yet to reach crisis proportions. The lack ofasense of urgency, and a national characterresistant to abrupt shifts in established prac-tices, impede adoption of necessary restructur-ing measures that are politically and psycho-logically painful.

At the same time, it is important to recog-nize that Japan has made some progress inaddressing its economic problems. For example,many Western economists have given highmarks to Tokyo's so-called Big Bang financialsector deregulation package and the bankingbailout of 1998. Foreign direct investment hasincreased dramatically (though it remainslower than in any other major industrializedeconomy). These developments have introducedgreater competition and new business models.Businesses have begun to place greater empha-sis on profitability over relationships, a shiftthat has weakened the increasingly archaiC

keiretsu system. Entrepreneurship is on the rise,and the venture capital market is growing.

The information technology (IT) sector isgrowing rapidly. New firms are starting up, andthe potential benefits acm;s many sectors of theeconomy are substantial. Yet economists re-main divided as to whether IT sector growthwill be sufficient to rescue the economy fromthe stagnation of the past decade. Regulatorybarriers have constrained growth and slowOOthe adoption of IT technologies in other indus-tries. The potential importance of this sector furthe economy, therefore, reinforces the need foradditional reform and deregulation of theeconomic system as part of ensuring a pCl'iitivefuture for the economy. Perhaps the mostimportant contribution IT can make is toprovide the thin wedge to encourage deregula-tion and greater flexibility of business modelsin the broaderJapanese economy.

Yet obstacles to recovery continue to exist,In particular, bankingproblems have yet to beaddressed adequately, and fiscal stimulus hasrelied too heavily on pork-barrel public worksprojects with little if any potential for fosteringlong-term growth. This flawed fiscal approach

banking problems haveyet to be addressedadequately

has produced a ratio of debt to gT

the search for an inde-pendent Japaneseidentity in foreign affairsis not in conflict withAmerican diplomacy

Tokyo. Washington must recognize that multi-lateral efforts are important to Tokyo. 'IbeJapanese Government regards such initiativesas expressions of national identity, not asattempts to undermine U.S. leadership. Quiet,behind-the-scenes coordination of strategiesoften is more effective than theatrical pro-nouncements of partnership thrown together atthe last moment as an outcome of bilateralsummits.

'Ibe search for an independentJapaneseidentity in foreign affairs is not in conflict withAmerican diplomacy. Indeed, the United States

CondusionSince the arrival of Commodore Perry's

Black Ships in Tokyo Bay nearly 150 years ago,U.S.-Japan relations have shaped the history ofJapan and Asia-for better or for worse. At thedawn of the new millennium, the inescapableforces of globalization and the dynamics of thepost-Cold War Asian security setting pose newand complex challenges to the United StatesandJapan. How the two countries respond,indiVidually and as alliance partners, willdefine significantly the security and stability ofthe Asia-Pacific as well as the possibilities ofthe new century-much as their interactionhas affected the economic, political, and strate-gic contours of the past

• Supporting Ru&Sian stability in the Far Eastand facilitating the development of the vast Russianstore of natural resources. The United States andJapan should more effecti~ly coordinate theirpolicies toward Russia.

• Encouraging an activist, independent,democratic, and prosperous Association of SoutheastAsian Nations even as the United States and Japanha~ divergent policies toward individual ASEANmembers.

• Coordinating our efforts to support territo-rial integrity and revival of Indonesia.

Japan, with the world's second-largesteconomy, should not allow its economic prob-lems to become an excuse to reverse the evolu-tion of its foreign aid policy away from onethat focuses on benefitting the recipient ratherthan the donor. Japan's policies should furthereconomic growth and openness in Asia. Tokyo'sproposals for internationalization of the yenwill only suca:ro ifJapanese financial marketsare transparent

flMipWilftall R. Bode George C. Maetz

General Editor SupervisoJy Editor

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andJapan largely share the same overall diplo-matic goals. 'Ibe two countries have manycommon interests.

• Maintaining an engaged, forward-deployedAmerican presence in Asia.

• Reforming the United Nations as an institu-tion to deal more effectively with conflict preven-tion, pearekeeping, and pearemaking activities. TheU.S. should continue to support Japan's quest for apennanent seat on the Security Council. Howe~r,there are obvious obligations of collective securitywith which Japan must come to grips.

• Encouraging the People's Republic of Chinato become ap