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T H E NEW REPUBLICJournalofOpmion

vol.. n o NO.25 NEW YORK, MONDAY, JUNE 19 1944 NUMBER 154a

at eight-tenths of a billion annually. Other inflation-T h e B r i d g e h e a d Is Es tab l is he d ists madea general assault on allprices, in theinterestA t the end of the first week of the invasion, cau- of a selfishness which is blind to the general welfare,tious optimism regarding the outcome was pos^ble. As we go to press it looks as if a presidential veto isWe held about 600 square miles of the Normandy our only resource inholding the line against inflation,beach, withthe Germans, as anAllied military spokes-man grimly reminded us in possession of about two W h a t a b o ut de G a u l l e ?

million square miles of Euro pe. Russia s new dr ive The invasion begins with the relations between theinto Finland wasmarked by strong initial success. In French Provisional Government and the Allies veryNormandy,badweather had hampered our operations nearly at their worst point. It is true that eitherfor most of the first week, which raises the question Presid ent Roosevelt hasinvited deGaulle to Wasihing-whether our advance meteorological work hasbeen as ton or he hasaccepted de Gaulle s broad hint tha t hegood as it should have been. Neither side had yet would liketocome; but that has not prevented bittercommitted its full strength to the struggle on the criticism by the French of several actions. DeGaulle ,Cherbourg Peninsula. The Germans were still wait- it is reported, wanted to go to France when Generalin g to seew hether this wasonly a feint and themain Mon tgomery did; he was refused permission. H e ob-blow would come elsewhere; the Allies were putt ing jected to the Eisenhower broadcast, with its pointedashore men enough to cope with the immed iate situ- ignoring of the French Provisionarl Government. Heation but were not risking disaster by a tremend ous objects to the printing of French francs in Londonconcentration in an area too small for large numb ers which arebeing used inFrance by the invasion forces,to be vised effectively. The two great factors in our Wr i t ing in The NewYork He rald T ribune, Geoffrey,favor were clear dominancein the air andclear domi- Parsons Jr . says Mr. Churchill threatened bluntly tonance on the sea. It was these which gave us the send General deGaulle bade to Algiers. Surely noth-strongest hope of ultimate victory. ing in the whole history of deGaulle or the FrenchProvisional Government justifies this extraordinaryI n f l a t ion i s t s in Co ng res s t rea tment at the moment when we need more thanCongress used the week of the invasion for a ever before the utmost loyalty of every French patriot,commando raid of its own on the pocketbooks ofAmerican consumers. Various vena l special interests C ri si s in C i l i n abargained withone another for reciprocal votes toforce In our excitement about the new front in France,inflation. Th e cotton industry supported the Bank- we ought not to overlook the serious situation inhead plan to lay an extra burden of a quarter to a China. As General Stillwell has reported, there isthirdof a billion dolla rs onpurchasers ofcotton fabrics, dang er at this point of a victory by the JapaneseT he oil interests got together for a grab estimated which migh t prolon g the war in the East for years.

C O N T E N T S Washington Notes . . . . . . T. R. B. 815Andersen s Fairy Tale . . . Manny Farber 816The Week 799 The Bandwagon . 816Editorial Correspondence 817

The End of the German Myth 802 gooks in ReviewGeneral Articles The Might o^the President Walton Hamilton 819The Ail-Out Ofiensive . . . Max Werner 804 India Finds a Voice . . Robert Morss love tt 820The Shape of the War . . George Soule 805 Mrs. Fischer s Russia . . Granville Hicks 822In the Wake of Liberation . MaxLerner 807 The Malthusian Situation . Guy Irving Burch 824History of theSecond Front . Ralph Bates 809 Civil Liberty inAmerica . Heinz H. F.Eulau 824D-Day .Richard LeeStrout andMichael Young 811 A Rea der s List 825

PUBLISHED WEEKLY AND COPYRIGHT, 1 9 4 4 , IN THE U.S.A. BV EDITORIAL PUBLICATIONS, INC. , 4O EAST 49 ST., NEW YORK 1 7 , N . Y. SECOND-CIASS MATTER, NOVEMBER 6, 1 9 14 , AT THE POST OFFICE AT NEW YORK, N. Y. , UNDER THE ACT OF MARCH 3> ^

PR I N TE D I N TH E U . A .


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THE NEW R E P U L I CIf they capture Changsha, and go on to split northernChina from southern, our probable success in reopeningthe Burma Road will still not offer enough help tothe major Chinese forces.What is needed more than anything else is a majorport on the Chinese mainland. Continued Japaneseoccupation of this area would make the task of obtain-ing one an operation nearly as serious as the openingof the European second fron t itself In that caseany Allied armies advancing north from Burma orthe Malay Peninsula would find a formidable barrierin their way, and we might become dependent on alanding operation somewhat like that aimed at Cher-bourg. An equally difficult alternative would be simi-lar operations on the coast of Japan.

Delay in the Pacific war may thus carry a heavyprice. In so far as that delay was inevitable in viewof the need for taking the aggressive in Europe, wedo not regret it, but in so far as it may have beenthe result of any difliculty in reaching a basis of co-operation with the British in Asia, it is an expensiveerror indeed.T h e V i c e P r e s i d e n t ' s S e r v i c e s

The difliculties in China are not entirely military.They are also the result of internal splitsfor instance,that between th e so-called Commun ist armies and thoseof the Generalissimo, and that between the democraticand the dictatorial forces in the Kuomintang itselfThe government is heavily dependent on war lordsand la ndl ords w ho, if faced with th e choice,, mig ht bemore eager to save their property and power than todefeat the Japanese. It is thus fortunate for the Alliedcause that M r. W allace is now arriving in China, or isaibout to arrive there. So important an emissary for thecause of democrajcy may help in a ticklish situation ata critical moment. His sincerity, sobriety and convic-tions are such that he ought to be no mean advocate.If he does swing the balance, he will have performeda service for his country that might otherwise haverequired a large and well equipped army.

in The St. LouiPott-DispatehThe Face of War Hasn't Changed

Incidentally, why does the press pay so little atten-tion to Vke President Wallace's activities so far. * Wetmderstand that the speeches he has made in Siberia(in the Russian language) have created a very favor-able impression. It might be as well to hear of this asof E ric Johnston 's antics in Moscow. W e probablyshould, if the press were as keen to reelect Mr. Wai-lace as it is to push Mr. Johnston.S uc c e s s i n I t a ly

T h e dra ma of th e invasion overshad owed our fmarka ble v ictory in Ita ly, w hich neverthe less is o*great importance, not only in a military sense, butpolitically. The advance of our armies north of Roishas at some times reached a speed of 25 miles a day.Too often, in this war, our incorrigibly optimistic dailynewspapers have talked about a German retreatturning into a panic-stricketi rout, when subsequentevents proved it was nothing of the kind; but iTonce the term seems pretty well justified. The severedefeat above Rome unhinged the Germans' entire lin^iforcing a general withdrawal, across the peninsula.Th eir situation is grave and must be an adde d handicapto the already heavily burdened General StaffBerlin.Badaglio Is Out

Political events in Italy have moved in the rign*^direction since the fall of Rome. The King kept hispromise and, while he did not abdicate, he turned overauthority to his son. Prince Hu mb ert. Hum bert is apretty poor excuse for a monarch, and is certainly notanti-fascist, but he is a little better than Victor. Bado-glio has been forced out and replaced by IvanoeBonomi, a leading Italian liberal and head of theCommittee of National Liberation. We have no doiibtthat Bonomi represents the wishes of the majority orthe Italian people} and we have no doubt, either, thatthis majority would prefer a republic to any otherform of government. President Roosevelt has repeat-edly pledged that America will aid the Italians to getwhatever go vernmen t they want j we hope that pledgewill now be carried out.Doub tless we shall now seea renewal of the familiardebate between American liberals and such State De-par tme nt apologists as M r. A rth ur ICrock of T he Nev ^York Times. The liberals will say that since the Alliedgovernments have at last done what they have beenrecommending all the time, the action proves the lit 'erals were right and the governments were wrong'The State Department's friends will insist, on thecontrary, that the action had been impossible until thismoment, that it had always been intended, that theliberals never knew what they were talking about andthat they should suspend all future criticism and jtrust M r. H ul l. W e hereby cast one vote on the sidewhich says that the liberals were right.


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J U N E 1 9 , 1 9 4 4The Mississippi Conspiracy

It would be more accurate to describe the Demo-cratic state convention held in Jackson, Mississippi, onJune 7, as a Republican meeting. The men Who areWorking to swing a Southwide bloc of convention dele-gates and presidential electors away from the Demo-cratic nominee unless he agrees to a set of undemocratic de ma nds as to white supremacy and the maintenanceof poll taxes were on hand in Mississippi with as muchstrength and preparation as they had shown at theTexas state convention a short time before. The topstrategy stemmed chiefly from the same Northern Re-publicans who master-minded the Texas putsch. Pewand Gannett and duPont found the Mississippi reportsas pleasing to them as the Texas ones had been. TheSouthern stooges of the Northern interests were onhand to play out the carefully planned game.Henchmen of the anti-Roosevelt Connor machine

had worked Mississippi thoroughly in a well financeddrive to line up convention delegates who would goalong with the plot to steal the state vote. Everybodyknew that the anti-Roosevelt forces wouldn't have achance if the voters were allowed to decide whichside Mississippi was on. The stooges did their workwell and the packed convention did their bidding.The Republocratic gang engineering the supposedSouthern revo lt against the New Deal appears wellsatisfied with the results of the Mississippi convention.But the New Dealers have legal remedies up theirsleeves which may yet upset these new carpetbaggers.

Not EnoughPresident Roosevelt has now adopted the idea offree ports for refugees, first put forward by SamuelGrafton in The New York Post. One thoiisand Euro-pean refugees will be admitted to the United Statesand maintained at Fort Ontario, Osiwego, New York.Just as goods enter a free port without paying duty,provided they are reexported at a later date, theserefugees will be permitted to stay for a time in thiscountry regardless of passport and visa restrictions.This is a good idea; but why in the world should itbe limited to one thousand, a tiny proportion of therefugees who are urge ntl y in need of assistance.'' W etake it for granted this is a trial balloon on the part ofthe President, to see what the public reaction is. Wehope the public will now react by saying that to takea thousand refugees is aibout as humanitarian as giv-ing a single drop of water to a man dying of thirst.Relief for Europe

On the Saturday afternoon before our invasion ofEurope, the reactionary Republicans in Congressbanded together to strike a serious blow at the UnitedNations' plans for bringing relief and rehabilitation tothe liberated peoples. Republican Representative

O'Hara of Minnesota rose before an almost emptyHouse to challenge, on a point of order, the Appro-priations Committee's report calling for a grant of$800,000,000 to the United Nations Relief and Re-habilitation Adm inistration. T he comm ittee's report wascertainly a conservative recomm endation in view of th efact that the Congress had previously approved aUnited States quota of $1,350,000,000 for UNRRA.Representative Cannon and other Democrats attemptedto defend the appropriation, pointing out how doublynecessary immediate action was now that tremendousEuropean requirements for food, clothing and otherthings are so imminent, but they were outshouted andoutvoted by Republicans like the lady Representativefrom Illinois, Jessie Sumner, who added this greatthought to the debate: If the UN R R A scheme is hu-manitarian, so is keeping a gigolo.

The House has now approved a grant of $450,000,-000 of the $1,350,000,000 this coimtry has solemnlypromised to UNRRA. The British have already ap-propriated their full pledge. So has the Republic of-Iceland. If U NR RA is to function properly, the U nitedStates must live up to its commitments at once.Ending the Insurance Racket

The New Republic has reported on several occa-sions plans of the insurance companies' lobbyoneof the strongest in Washington^to jam through legis-lation forbidding any federal control over their activi-ties. The lobby was working feverishly in expectationthat the Supreme Court would hand down a decisionadverse to their desires; and this the Court has nowdone. It has ruled that fire insurance is a commodityin interstate commerce and therefore subject to theSherman Act. Since this is the case, life insuranceough t to. and presumab ly will be in the same boat.In the past insurance has been subject to control by thestates only; and it would be more correct to say thatinsurance controlled the states than vice versa. Thedecision should save policy holders hundreds of mil-lions of dollars, and put an end to many undesirablepractices. It is hard to believe that the insurance lobbyand its friends in Congress will now have the brass-boimd nerve to seek new legislation restoring the oldracket of state control.How the Radio DidOne of the minor events of the first invasion weekwas the performance of the American radio. It wasprompt enough in bringing us the first news flashes,but after that it rapidly diminished the radio-hoursdevoted to listening by its eager audience.Those of us who were lucky enough to be tuned inat the right moments heard the news flashes as soon asthey came over. After that, the same brief dispatcheswould be repeated, ad nauseam, in the guise of bulle-tins just handed to the announcer. Between would come


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Otorrents of color material and comments. The best ofthese were very good indeed, but were repeated fartoo often for the conscientious listeiier to rival net-works, and most of them were a poor substitute fornews. After hours of frustration, we were hardly thank-ful to the commercial sponsors who, it was regularlyannounced, gave up their bought time for the sake ofthe invasion reports, first making sure that the namesof their products and their advertising slogans wereclearly repeated so that they might receive the essen-tial publicity after all. It was not the fault of the radioauthorities that more genuine news was not given outmore often. They correctly decided that the publicwas bent on hearing it. But the planning was chaotic, -and the return to something like the regular periodicnewscasts was a relief.im Farley Resigns

James Aloysius Farley has resigned his last ofScialoffice in the Democratic Party, the chairmanship ofthe New York State Democratic Committee. Thismarks the end of 3^ years of active party work forBig Jim, from town clerk of Stony Point, New York,to political chief of the Roosevelt administration.

Democrats who know Jim Farley and somethingof what he has been up to since his resignation aschairman of the Democratic National Committeebefore the 40 election take his resignation as an opendeclaration oif war against the President in the eventof a fourth-term contest. Jim Farley had to fight thethird term from undercover, since, according to thepoliticians code, a party man stands by the party schoice of nominees. This time, apparently, Farley doesnot intend to be bound by any such restrictions.

This magazine has maintained a more than casualinterest in Mr. Fariey s comings and goings since heleft the President to sell Coca-^Cola. We have re-ported his frequent business trips, as director of Coca-Cola s export division, to sudh foreign climes as Texas,Louisiana and Kansas. Some of Farley s most intimatefriends are letting it be known that Jim is willing tobecome the sacrificial lamb for the anti-Roosevelt forcesat the Democratic National Convention. We are gladthat the President s once close friend is now out inthe open as one of his greatest enemies today.TheNeutrals Get into Line

On the very eve of the invasion the Allies won asubstantial victory when Portugal agreed to suspendall shipment of wolfram, needed for high-grade steel,to Germany. Salazar, the Portuguese dictator, is smartenough to read the handwriting on the wall. He nowknows that an Allied victory is as certain as anythingcan be in an uncertain world and no doubt he has beentold that Portugal cannot now help our enemies andthen expect to enjoy our friendship after the war.Sweden,also, seems to be preparing to curtail her trade

T H E N E W R E P U B L I Cwith Germany. If she ships ballbearings in the future,apparently they are to be sizes that are not used inmilitary eqoiipment. Only Spain remains a real prob-lem, and that largely because of Churchill s amazingdesire to cater to Franco. In fact, it now seems probablethat the Franco regime would be overthrown in thenear future were it not for Churchill s support.erald P. Nye

Progressive Republicans in North Dakota have achance to l-emove from the Senate one of its least de-siraible members, in the primary election on June 27Gerald P. Nye is running for renomination, and re-ports from North Dakota say there is a real hope ordefeating him. It is hardly necessary at this late dateto tell our readers of Senator Nye s record, which hasconsistently been one of isolationism and appeasementabroad, and of dubious iprogressivism at home. In TheNew Repuiblic s most recent chart, he is shown to havevoted on the reactionary side on nine issues out xeighteen, and to ihave been absent once. He votedagainst appropriating funds for the National ResourcesPlanning Board, thus turning his back on constructivenational planning for America s future. He voted sev-eral times against subsidies and price controlthat is,in favor of inflation and against the interest of theoverwhelming majority of his own constituents. Hewas against the federal proposal for soldiers voting-He was against using cloture in the poll-tax fight m1942,which means that he stood with the Southernersin their battle to perpetuate the poll tax, which dis-franchises at least 80 percent of the electorate in thosestates. The Senate would be substantially improved bythe removal of Gerald P. Nye from its midst.

TheEnd of the German Myth o ONE CAN DOUBT that wheu the Allied soldierswent ashore on the coast of France on the morn-ing of June 6, the last phase of the war began. In allprobaibility it will still be long and bloody j indeed, thefirst days on the beaches were far more costly thanmost Americans, judging by the early complacency ofpress and radio, seemed to realize. Nevertheless, it isimpossible not to believe that the Alli^ will win inthe end, both over Germany and Japan. The English,quoted by Richard Lee Strout in this issue of TheNew Republic, are correct when they say that thequestion is not who will win the war, but how longit will last.

The invasion itself is of course only one in a seriesof operations under the grand strategy of the Allies,including the landings, in North Africa, the supplyingof Lend-Lease materials on a great scale to Russia, thebombing of Japanese-held islands and the operationsin Burma. Nevertheless, the first landings on the


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J U N E 1 9 1 9 4 4French coast had a psychological value greater, in allprobability, than anything ek ein thewhole war in-cluding even Stalingrad. For those landings werethefinal nail in the cofiin where lies buried themythofGerman invincibility.

Sensible people throughout theworld never for onemoment accepted the Nazi doctrine of Arya n supe-riority. Th ey were well aware that thescientistswhostudy anthropologyand allied subjects know thatin itspotentialities onerace isthesame as another. Yet allof ushave atendency tobelieve anystatement madeoften enough and in:a sufficient number of ingeniousforms; and atthe beginning the Nazis were extremelyskillful in spreading thenotion of th ei r efficiency,ingenuityandresourcefvdness. Before t he wa r, Ge rmanchemical science andelectrical and metallurgical tech-nology were known to behighly developed. In theearly days of thewar when they were picking offon eby one small nations which were without properdefenses, bu tcould no thave held out long evenifthey had hadthem, the Nazis gave a good imitationof practically irresistible power. It ishardl y surpris-ing, then, that weoverrated them for so long.Amajority of the professional milita ry e xperts of theUnited States gave theRussians only sixweeksor twomonths, after the German attack.And no matter hcnvmany times thestories were proved untru e, each addi-,tional German announcement ofterrifying newsecretweapons was likely in those days tosendachill dow nyour spine.

But now andfor the first time, the German mili-tary machinehas been deflated downto itsactual size.As th e fighting before Cagsino in Italy and on th eOhet'bourg Peninsula have demonstrated, the Germansare still tough andresoxirceful; butthat is allthatonecan sayforthem . On th e ground they appear no better,man for man than ou rown ground troops. In theair, th econsistent record proves t ha t ourfliersarebetter both aspilotsand asgunners. Butmost of allthe Nazi myth ofaninvulnerable W estwall hasbeenshattered. After theDiepp e raid. Hit ler boastedpub-licly that the military idiots who opposed him wouldnever again beableto setfooton the European conti-nent for aslong as nine hours. Well, Hitler hasbeenproved once agdn to be a liar. H isWestWallwasformidable in some places, much lesssoinothers.Butoverastretchoffifty miles, Americans, CanadiansandBritish have stormed all his 'bastions, the strong andtheweak alike, payingineach case whatever wastheneces-sary priceinblood. Lon g before th at,ofcourse, theyhad breached his fortress walls in Italy. Tosay th eWestwall wasa hoax w ouldbeacruel injustice to thegallant soldiersoftheUni ted Nations who have givenup their lives incrossing the sands, scaling the cliffsor dropping from thesidesbyparachute orglidertoeffect thebridgehead. The point isthat at long lastand afterall ourhopesandfears, we have gone ashore

8and stayed there. In spii:e ofthe precarious positionin whichwe still find ourselves,i tisimpossible to be-lieve that we shall loseourbridgehead,orshallbe un-able to establish otherspe rhaps many of them.The myth of German power which finally cametoan end onJune 6hadalready,of course, been badlydamaged atStalingrad and during last winter's longretreatof the supermen westward into RumaniaandPoland.T hemost industrialized nation inEuropehadbeen beaten at itsowngame of industrializationforwar pui-poses, partlyby British and American factories,but mainly, so far asthe Eastern front isconcerned,by thepower ofonce despised R\issia.The humorlessfanatics with blazing eyeswhogoosestepped sotrium-phantly across Eixrope winning victories against enemiesone-^tenth asstrong as themselves offer adifferentpic-ture when they fall back ignominiously before a foewho meets them on substantially even terms.

With thedeath ofthe Nazi myth of invincibility,fascism itself died in this world. I twasadoctrine thathad to be successfulor itwas nothing. Y ou cannot argu ethat theworld belongs to youbecauseyou arestrong,and then demonstrate publicly that those youassumedto be weak are stronger than you are. You cannot arguethat the lie isjustified becauseitworks,in thepresenceof overwhelming testimony that thetruth has worked,an d isworking, even better. You cannot continuetoprate a:bout soft and decadent democracy in the faceof atriump hant demonstration tha t democracy isableto fight atleast aswell asyou can. Th ewholemon-strous dream isnowended.To besure,we maystillhave many monthsofheavy loss aheadofusj indeed,itisprobable that mostofthe suffering, forour people,is still tocome.But thedanger,sogrimly real twoorthree years ago that th efascists wou ld win wouldcontrol the world, and that all the fundamental de-cencies of W estern civilization m ight be destroyed,perhaps for decades, perhaps forever^that dangerhasgone into limbo with theadvance of our soldiersacross thesands of Normandy.

THE NEW REPU LICA Journal of Opinion

Editors BRU CE BLIV EN , MA LCO LM COWLEY, CBOROE6OULE, MICHAEL STRAIGHT, STARK YOUNOTreasurer DANIEL MEBANEAssistant Editors ELIZA BETH H U LIN G , G EO RG E MA Y BERRYContributing Editors H . N . BRAILSFORD, VAN WYCKBROOKS, VARIAN FRY JULIAN HUXLEY, ALFRED KAZIN,MAX LERNER,E . C.LINDEMAN, THOMAS SANCTON, REXFORDGU Y T U GWE L l iAdvertising Manager E .G.WOODSINGLE COPIES, FIFTEEN CENTSJ YEARLY SUBSCRIPTION,FI V E D O L L A R S ; CANADIAN SUBSCRIPTION, SIX DOLLARS; FOR -E I GN , SIXDOLLARS; TH REE MONTHS TRIAL , ONEDOLLAR


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8O4 , -.. v: . -- ^ - - - - T H E N E W R E P U L I C

The AU-Out Offensive

HE LANDINGS on the N orm and y coast are still must be streng then ed and transf orme d into an armed

a limited operation. It is an operation limited , camp and a springb oard for furth er offensives. But bestfirst in space: as these lines are w ritten , the for the defensive in the Wes t are new offensives. The'Allied beachhead is hard ly m ore than fifty miles lon g, first week of the invasion has proved a military fact ofIt is also limited in the size of the forces participating treme ndo us im portance: We canland Pouring of al'on ly th e first echelon of the great invasion army has most unlimite d forces into the French theat re of war isbeen throw n into b attle. General E isenhower still has possible. Th is is not a problem of transport and supply;a tremendou s amount of power in the British Isles. T he only, but of the design of the ba ttle,operation is limited, too, in military objectives. Th e Th e beachhead in No rman dy must be relieved byUn ited . States-British blows now are aime d neithe r a t new offensive operat'ions, by new sectors of invasion. Inthe destruction of major Germ an forces nor at the seiz- the W est, too, there will be a war of many fronts,ure of decisive centers of Ge rma n defense on the Con- th at is to say, in th e space between th e Bay of Biscaytinen t. Our troop s are now fighting to conquer the and th e Danish coasts, many battle sectors must bemarshaling grou nd necessary for the deploym ent in combined, each suppo rting and strengthen ing thedep th of forces adequ ate for furth er attack. oth ers. It is necessary both to tie up and to disperseTh e new battle of France is still in its preliminary Germ an reserves in the Wesit by simultaneous blows,phas e. Yet even the first echelon of invasion is a leve r T he invasion can succeed only as an all-out offensive,destaned to overturn the whole strategic situation in In th e West, concentration of power is possibleor yEu rope . Th e starting of the invasion is already a defi- throu gh batitle, for there the deploym ent of forcesnite comm itm ent; it cannot be canceled or sus^pended. requires the extension of front lines and the establish'It opens a new dynamics of the war. ing of new sectors. ' ,W itho ut doubt, the situation on the W estern front T he war on many fronts in the We st may becomeis more critical for the anti-H itler coalition than on the a military reality in the sense that the Allied Hig hfronts elsewhere in Euro pe. In the East, the Red Army Comm and w ill have to coordinate many disconnectedhas clear superiority; in Italy the greater strength ol sectors into one major action. But the We stern frontBritis-h-American weapons has been proved by the will profit especially from t he great all-Europ eanvictories of the last five weeks. But on French soil it is strategy of war on many fronts . Tli e Italian campaignthe Wehrm acht tha t has numerical superiority against and ehe battle of Norma ndy are only a prdlude to thethe first wave of invading troops. It has the further Battle of Eu rop e which will develop this sum mer,advantage of supply bases on the Continent. In this At mid-June no more than perhaps io percent of thosephase of the b attle th e A nglo-American troops are forces which will enter into action in the East, Westattaching with weaker forces and must rely on local and South this sum mer h ave as yet participated insuperiority only, at chosen points. Moreo ver, they must actual fighting. Th e greatest relief and support to thecrush the powerful defensive installations of the enemy. W estern front will be brough t by th e coming R edOn th e Eastern front and in Italy the Red Army and Arm y offensive; and conversely the Russian offensivethe Anglo-American troops have only offensive tasks will now, for the first time, be furthered by the genuine,beifore th em ; there Germ an strategy is bound to the the big second front.defensive. In the We st, however, the Weh rmacht will Th e first week of the invasion has already refutedlaunch stro ng counter-offensives. In this phase of th e two main Germ an strategic ideas: that of protracte dcampaign here t he American and British forces w ill war and that of the impenetrability of Germ an defense,have to wag e combined ofEensive-defensive battles. W ith the start of total war against Germ any , with anIn th e W est the re will arise military emergencies offensive in the W est which can only be an all-outwhich must be m et by quick actions of complicated offensive, the pace of the war has changed . H it le r can-strategic design. It should not be hard to compensate not prolon g the war at his will. In this phase of theeffectively for Germ an nume rical superiority on Fren ch fighting, pi-otracted war is a Ge rman conception and asoil. T he Allies have in their main base in the British Germ an hope. O ur principles now are dynamic war.Isles power superior to the G erman forces in all of war of movement, quick victory. On the other hand .We stern Eu rope . Th e final preponderance of the Al- the breadhing of the Atlantic wall is the symbolic bloWlied weapons is unquestionable, but the tem porary G er- against the conception of th e Germ an absolute defense, man surplus of power must be neutralized. committed to hold at any price the outer border ofTh e general solution consists, of course, in bringing Eur ope. Th e German Hig h Comm and has no strategica maximum, of Allied power to the Continent in the variation in store to fight against deep Anglo-Amer-shortest possible time. Th e beachhead in Normandy; ican-Russian penetrations into Euro pe, MAX


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J U N E 1 9 , 1 9 4 4 805

The Shape of the War

N PAUSES between th e disp atches about the mo-mentous events in northern France, it may beinteresting to think of the war as a whole, in abroader perspective of time and space. What do weknow about its grand strategy that was not apparenta few months or even days ago? The layman in mili-tary affairs cannot pretend to understand it as an ex-pert, and even if he knew the inner details he couldnot reveal anything that would help the enemy. YetWe are all entitled to speculate about the main outlinesthat are taking form.

In the first place, the answers are becoming clearerto some of the major controversies which have ragedabout the planning of the war leaders.Jafan or Germany First?-Th. v was the argumentabout whether the United States should attempt todefeat first its Eastern or its Western enemy. An earlytheory was that we should throw all our resourcesagainst Hitler, and then when he was finished turnthe other way. For the moment it looks as if this werethe actual plan of campaign. Yet the bold strokes ofthe navy in the Pacific since last summer should makeUs suspicious of too long a quiet in tha t area. T he reftiay come a time even while th e E uropea n invasionis progressing when the headlines will again tell ofthe Asiatic war.The actual decision of this question appears fairlyclear. Apparently the answer was not either, but both.In both th eatres we have taken the aggressive for manymonths, driving the enemy back from his outlyingconquests. In both, this was a necessary preliminaryto striking at his heart. We could do both at once be-cause the Pacific war required a concentration of fight-ing ships and the European war a concentration ofground forces, while our resources were sufficient toprovide the necessary air power for each without rob-bing the other. Of course the navy has had much todo in the Atlantic and Mediterranean also, in combat-ing the submarine, convoying ships and covering land-ing operations. But this required for the most part a

different type of ship and operation. And we shall notbe able to use anything like as large concentration ofland forces in Asia, at least not until the navy has donethere the major part of its job.With good luck this summer, the Allied arms willprobably bring about German surrender before Japan3 brought to her knees. Then there will be greaterpower available to concentrate in Asia. But even if thispower were free now, we should be hard put to it toUse any m ore th an is at present active in the Eas terntheatre. It is probaible that even if we were not fight-

ing Germany at all, the defeat of Japan could notbe much hastened. The fact remains that we are fight-ing a two-front war with offensives on both at once.Air Power or Foot Soldiers'-Was the invasionnecessary? Could we have forced German capitulationwith bombing alone? The answer will now never besurely known, but as our armies adyance and Germanresistance develops we shall learn how grievously thebombing already do ne has injured th e enemy s power.This bombing has for months been carried on with ascope and inten sity which it woul d be difficult grea tlyto increase if we were relying on air warfare alone.The mere matter of obtaining enough suitable baseswould have set a limit to what could be done by this

means. Certainly, if the official reports have not beengross exaggerations, those in command of the bombinghave not overlooked much in the way of strategicmanufacturing plants, communications or defenses.Only those targets out of reach until the Russianshuttle bases were open seem to have remained un-touched.It may be that t he air-power advocates will win theirargument by a demonstration that about all there isleft for the infantry and armor to do is to roll in andtake over. But that possibility seems remote indeed.It now appears that in this argument too the rightanswer is not either, but both. There is little doubt

that through the most savage bombing campaign whichit was possible to wage, air supremacy itself has beenwon, and the Luftwaffe must before long be destroyedif it is not held o ut of battle., Imp ortan t dam age ofother kinds has been done. But every indication is thatartillery is also needed to do thitigs which bombs cannotdo , and that even when the artillery gets through,there is still plenty of work left for other weaiponsand even for personal combat.Was the '^Second Front Too Late?-Ever sinceHitler attacked Russia the advocates of a second fronthave been vocal. That their main contention was cor-^

rect few ever doubted, and if the invasion is successful,,it will, as they prophesied, end the war. But the realquestion was whether it should have been attempteda year or two ago, instead of four years after Hitlerstood on the shores of the English Channel.Some of those who urged earlier action feared thatwithout it, no matter how ill prepared we might bCyRussia would be knocked out of the war and so thechance ever to defeat Hitler would be lost. Their fearshave been proved wrong. The judgment that it wasbetter to wait until complete preparation had been


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S o T H E N E W R E P U B L I Cmade, meanwhile reinforcing the Soviet Union's power becomes a broad avenue for the full Allied strength'of resistance as much as possible and carrying on a With both the initiative and superior power in everyless ambitious preliminary campaiga in Africa and department, we apparently do not need to commit our-Italy, has been proved at least a saife one. selves and so allow the enemy the opportunity of asmashing counter-offensive. We can force him to com-What Kind of Invasion?-We come next to an ex- mit himself so that no matter what he does, he canamination of the kind of military action this invasion be caught off balance. It was probably for this reasonactually is. If invasion had been undertaken earlier, as that the Allied commanders did not completely syn-it might conceivably have been, it would necessarily chronize the offensive on all fronts. First Italy, thenhave had a different character. It would not have been. Normandy. Will it be Russia next? And if so, at whatso well prepared, or backed by such overwhelming point in the line? We have educated the enemyforce. In that case it would have been more in the to believe that we may strike at other places in thenature of a dashing adventure, relying for success more ^est. Aslongas weholdoff he has to be preparediovon strategic surprise, on the military genius of the ^ i possibilities. This means he can deal less effectivelycommanders, on still more bloody sacrifices and hero- with those fronts which are active. It means that oufism of those engaged, possibly on luck as well. Its choices of time and place can be calculated to exploitsuccess would not have been judged by the possibility ^^ weakness.of a relatively prompt series of decisive battle, but ^^ course we could have brougiht all our poweriorather by the possibility of injuring and embarrassing t)ear as soon as possible at every possible point, awithe enemy and of holding on like grim death while then relied on brute attrition to wear him down. But thisbehind the lines the preparation to deliver a crushing would have been to allow more scope for the extensiveblow went forward. possibilities of a clever defensive warfare. The timeActually, the Allied command has been thinking of ^ ^^^come when all our power will be concentratediocthe undertaking in entirely different terms. It has enor- a crushing blow. But it is apparent that if the plan*mous respect for the German army, its industria; sup- are successful, the enemy will have been weakened asport, its weapons, its human material, and above ail , much as possible by compelling him to noake an errorits officers. The first premise of the Allied strategy was at every turn, instead of allowmg him scope to exploitthat the United Nations possess an enormous suprem- such advantages of position as he has.acy of the material and human resources for war, and Our high command appears to have substituted thethat the proper course was to bring this supremacy to strategy of the impossible alternative for the strategybear. The risks involved in taking the time necessary of surprise. This is the most effective way to makeuseto do so were less than the risk of trying to defeat of its overwhelming power and thorough preparation.the Germans with inferior or even equal forces. We have advertised widely wha;t the enemy could notThe plan as it is developing appears to be to pre- help knowing, but we have made it impossible for himsent to the German high command, not a problem dif- to act in such a way as to prevent us from surprisingficult to solve, but a problem impossible to solve. Of him in detail. Since he had insufficient men to keep uscourse this does not mean that we cannot lose if im- from landing withsuperior force at each of a hundredportant mistakes are made or if everyone concerned possible beaches, we could land at any one we chose,does not do his job to the best of his ability. It does Since he cannot concentrate against one beachhead with-not mean that the highest courage and skill are not out leaving others thinly protected, we can exploitdemanded of the soldiers or that many need not give whichever ones he neglects. So we can either smash ortheir lives. Superiority in weapons, supplies and man.- filter into Europe until our armies are superior topower can never be a substitute for determined fight- anything he can throw against them,ing. But we are not relying on miracles. It is considerations such as these which give us hopeTake, for example, the judgment which Rommel that God will again be on the side of the biggestmust make about how far he should commit himself battalions. And wihen the wholeworldis in arms, thatin opposing the Normandy bridgehead. If he throws means that aggressive conquerors cannot win. Theirin his tactical reserves, the Allies can, given the ini- only hope is to subdue the peoples and the peacefultiative which their superior strength has assured them, nations before they can unite and gird for batde. Thisengage these reserves successfully while making' a time, as before in our history, democracy, thoughlanding at another point which they were supposed to caught unprepared and slow to anger, held off thecover. If he calls on his strategic reserves,hemay find threat until it could be countered. It was a narrowhimself outflanked by a wholly separate invasion in a escape, and it may not happen again. Yet it is betterdifferent sector, such as the low countries, the_ South to be on the side which eventually can mobilize theof France or Denmark. On the other hand, if he does greatest resistance, even though at first unarmed,not employ enough strength to contain the Normandy than to be armed to the teeth but an enemy of thebridgehead, it can be continuousJy developed until it world. GEORGE


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J U N E 1 9 , 1 9 4 4 807

In theW ake of LiberationA LL ARMIES have ideas tr ave ling with the m as aid, for tothemas to all menwho have waited longy \ camp-followers. W hat will be the political first thin gs come first,and imperatives admit no quali-

JL JL ideasand thestructure of civil power that will fication.come in the wake of our liberating armies, moving But if after the enemy is destroyed we do notinland into Franceandbeyond? I b iow thattheheavy recognize the continuing common cause-that the Al-fighting following the landings is still ahead, that the lied powers have with the democratic revolutionarybig casualtiesare to come,and that it is hard today to movements of Europe, they will be as unyielding inthink of anything other than the chances of victory their dema nds on us as they have been in their resis-and whenweshall achieve it. Yet if interms ofpolitical tance to the Germans.And if we try to set up govern-policywebungle France andnorthern Italy andwhat- ments that run counter to their deepest impulsesnow,ever follows them) as we bungled No rth Africa and they will fight them asstubbornly as they fought theSicilyand southern Italy, we shall store up a desolate puppet governm ents the Germansset up.harvest for Europe s generations. France will be the test, as she has all along beenOneof the Allied oflicers has said that the cracking some kind of test and symbol. It was France whoseof Hitl er s E uropea n fortress will have to be, to a outer and inner disintegration was the sign that Eu-larger degree than any of us understand, an inside ropean man hadcome to the end of thepassage.It wasjob.If thatis so,then a generous political policy in the the French people who added to the tragedy of beingwake of the invasion shouldquite apart from the conquered from without and betrayed from withinmoral questionsand thequestion of European freedom the pathos of believing^if only for a historical mo-and stabilitypayoff in immediate military dividends, mentthat a new government might be tolerableT h e men to do the inside job are ready. It is esti- which operated under the betrayers and collaboratedmated that there are a million of them , organized, with the conquerors. And it was the French peoplecohesive, active,in France alone. There areother mil- who roused themselves from this treacherous drea m,lions elsewhere in the fortress^Tito s arm ies, the and showed the regenerative powers that catastropheworkers in the northern Italian cities, the grim men can evoke. There is, as Adam Smith remarked, a vastand women in Belgium and Ho l land , in Greece and deal of ruin in a nation. But the French have alsoCzecho-Slovakia and Poland, and even among the shown that the ruin of a nation may uncover longtwelve million who form the foreign workers corps hidden layers of moral resources, as Prospero s storminside Germany itself. Call all these what you will stirred the sea to its lowest depths,the Underground, theResistance, partisans, gue rrillas. Th e three Allied powersor, as Mr. ChurchillTheir names are more diverse than the fires tha t -stir calls th em , the Grind Alliancehave not recognizedin. them. When their countries were first overrun they the provisional government of the French people,hid arms away toward a t ime of liberation like this, thoug h they have recognized governments in exileWe have dropped more armsto some of them . The ir with far less command over the ir peo ple s allegianceWork begins after the landings, as our armies move than the French government has, and with far lessinland. Their function is the same as that of the para- de jactopower.It is no great secret thatthe reluctancetroopers whomwe are dropping down behind enemy about France has centered in the American govern-linesto destroy enemy communications, to sabotage me nt: the Russians are anxious to extend recognition,enemy troop movements, to blow up or guard vital and theBritish would consent,butAmerica isunrelent-bridges, to take strategic points by surprise. Only in- ing thus far. I do not pretend to know the weight tostead of dropping down from the skies like the para- be given to the various factors here: how much musttroopers, they come up from underground where the be assigned to the State Department mentality; howdarknessand thelong wait have made them into coiled much to the diplomatic fear-of-communism tradition weengines of destruc tion. established in ourFrench missions und er Bullitt, Leah y,They will fight^bothfor themselves and for us M u r p h y ; how much to Adm iral L eahy s continuingfor they have long been waiting for this eve nt. Some influenceas the President s personal military Chief ofin Americaand in England have felt that theinvasion Staff; howmuch to thePresident s own impressions ofhas been long coming:but think how much longer it Frenc h policy and theFrench people, picked up aquar-has beenin thecoming for these others, whohave had ter-century before France s death and rebirth; howto eat the crumbs the conqueror-tyrant left them, sea- much to the composition and temper of the Frenchsonedby thegallof hisquisling lieutenants. Th ey will Com mittee, and the sway exercised over it by thefight if only out of hate and despair. Th ey will help resistance mov em ents; how much to de Gaulle s un-our armies.And they will make no stipulations intheir willingness to give up any of the former French cola-


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8 o 8 . T H E N E W R E P U B L - I Cnial hold ings; and how much, finaily, to the contrast diplomacy in the direction of the strong Europeanbetween de Gau lle's stiffness and Joan of Arc sense of currents, or seek to imprison them , and become Eu-mission and the Presiden t's wholly American mistrust rope's jaile rs. Our governmen t's acceptance of lastof heroics. week's change in the Italian cabinet, with the oustingI do not know how to evaluate these factors, but I of Badoglio, may argue either that the President anddo know that the whole parcel of them is a precarious Secretary Hu ll had a ll along intended to move in thisfreight to be carrying to France , and afterward to the direction, and were only waiting for the rig ht time,rest of Euro{>e, in the wake of the invasion. On Gen- or that (as with the surrender of the Giraud adventureeral de Gaulle's currenit visit to London he and General in North Africa) they had to face the granite factoiEisenhower came to an understanding about military popular feeling in Euro pe. I hope the former is true,coilaiboration, and announced th at they had separated but the morall for the future is a clear one either way-military from political matters. The la tter process is. Secretary H ull has said that fascism and democracyof course, possible as it is possible to separate the head cannotco existin the same wor'id. And President Roose-froon th e body: but the consequences are bound to velt has again s hown his saving flexibil ity of min' prove unfruitful. It is still true on the record that after a long and stubborn battle with de Gaulle, in in-while the Allied command has signed agreements with viting him to Washington for talks durin g the next fewthe governments-in-exile of Belgium, Ho lland, Nor- weeks.way and Czecho-Sipvakia, recognizing their civil au- There a re, of course, real difficulties in Europethority in the areas to be liberated, it has not yet done which w ill not easily be surmounted. Th ere will beso with the provisional French governm ent, but has peoples so dazed and weakened by years of occupationreserved the power to deal w ith the civil authority of that they will have lost the moral resilience of a demo-any French group it may choose. cratic come-back. Th ere will be the tough question ofW e shall find the French very difficult about this, how to handle the German surrender, and what to doas weshouldfin he Partisans of Yugoslavia difficult if in breaking the cartel-Nazi nexus in Germany. Therewe should make accommodations with those who have will be the question of the timing of a genuine Unitedcollaborated with the fascists, and as we should find Nations Council, and the place of the small nations andthe starved Greeks and the forgotten men in Spain the Great Powers on it. And there will be the everdifficult. W e shall without doubt talk of civil order pi esent fear that the prestige and power of Russia raiseand of anarchy, of military necessity, of liberation. W e in the hearts of the British and American ruling groups,shall inveigh against the folly of ideologies and and the jealousy lest too many of the small nations beshall talk of the blood we are spilling for liberation, swept into Russia's sphere of influence. Our attitudeand the answer may well come back from those who seems to be that we know better than these small na-have fought the Germans for five years and fascism tions what is to their interest. In Housm an's lines:for a decade and two decades that they too have spilled _ ^ .blood, and tha t the concem of the Grund Alliance ^h e Gnzzly Bear is huge and wM ;, , , , , c ' r J He has devoured the lniant dhiLd.should be the common cause or rootmg tascismidea T-U f ,v,-ij . .^ 1 hamiant c'hild is not awareaad fact -o ut of all Europe He has been eaten by the bear.W e sha ll be very angry w ith these stiff-necked men,yes: but mainly for the reason that made Oliver Crom- But, whatever may be our shrinking from the imagewell explode into fits of passionate anger whenever he of the democratic revolutions in Euro pe, we shall notwanted to do something that his conscience would not be able permanently to stop them . W e can thwartjustify. To be sure, many of these thin, half-starved, them for a while, and thus mes3 th in p up both forstubborn men have been turned into neurotics by their them and for us. But in the ead neither we nor theexperiences, but all war is a neurosis, and anti-fascism British are of the institutional stuff tha t can play Met-if pursued passionatelybecomes in the end obses- ternich successfully with the future, nor maintain asive. Things have moved far in the Europe whose condomiiiium over the worid in which we are thedemocratic will the Germans set out to break a decade grandees of a new Anglo-Saxony,ago by gunfire and starvation and depopulation. Things And in the end we know deep in o ur hearts tliathave moved so far that if a man has not the stomach fascism will not be overcome by force of arms only-to be a traitor, he must end with rather less of the If it is to be kept from ever again raising itself to makesaint in him than of the terrorist. another thrus t at world power, it must be because thereI have a strong sense tha t Am erican foreign policy is a unified moral force of mankind against it. Th e seatmay yet swing into the clear. It has, to be sure, been of that moral force will be Europe and not America.bad wherever it has had a choicein Spain, No rth Just as de Tocqueviile a hundred years ago saw theAfrica and Italy . Yet a few bats do not make.a nigh t, revolutionary democracy of his age rising in America,And we may learn before it is too late that there is no sowemayseeit reborn inEurope.T he wheel has comeeal choice open to us: that we must either move in our fuU turn. MAX LERNER


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J U N E 1 9 , 1 9 4 4 8 0 9

History of the Second Front

N STUDYING THE VICISSITUDES which t he ho pe an d In the British pote ntia ls of pro duc tion were inclu ded

idea of the invasion of Eu rope have und ergone, the products of the American aviation industry, whileone mig ht well begin with a glance at the so-called the Germ an disability was held to be a shortage of oil. phony -war period previous to the Germ an assault on Powerful as these argum ents were, they failed.France . Mo st of the fruits of such a study, however. In Mr . Churchill's thou ght, the absolutely essentialcan be obtained from the m ore relevant period which condition for a British invasion of Europ e was alwaysfollowed the British withdraw al from Euro pe. to have been tha t Russia and the Un ited States mustAfter Dun kirk, Britain could not ha ve pu t much join with Eng land . As the He ss incident revealed, the remore than 100,000 adequately armed and reasonably were many in Germany who though t British fear oftrained meir in the field. Mo reove r, the British leaders extinction and of revolution was so great tha t Lo ndonwho set about the task of rebuilding an army knew that could be tricked into, a prem ature peace. This was notthis was the last army Britain could raise. If it were so, thoug h it migh t have been true had C hamberlainlost, Britain would be lost with it. In these circum- still ruled Eng land . (So tha t the Labor Pa rty, whichstances, M r. C hurchill's prom ise of an invasion of rejected Com munist advice and helpe d Chu rchill intoEuro pe in 1943 was a matte r of rhetoric. Alone, Britain office, probably saved Russia.) In a certain sense Brit-could never have set foot upon French soil without ain, by her fortitude and by her success in building upappalling risk. T he only thing to do was to await de- an army with American aid, had compelled Hi tle r tovelopme nts. T he importa nt point to grasp is that attack Russia. Once Britain had become impreg nable,all major political parties agreed on the absolute neces- H itl er could obtain a solution in no ot'her way. This issity of reducing risk to the minim um. Mo st of the to argue that by 1941 British strength was once more offuture v icissitudes which the second-front idea was to a statu re to influence major eve nts. In th e large st his-und ergo dep end upon this conception oif nationa l sur- torical view, Anglo-Am erican coop eration had forcedvival far more than upon the fears of revolution, pre- Hi tle r into the disastrous adve nture of the Russianpondera nt as they were in certain exalted quarters. war. Th at was what the Soviet leaders all along hadAnd a nother essential conception is that a British feared and that was why they and the ir party hadinvasion of Europe could only be conceived and carried urged a negotiated peace after t he division of P oland ,out as part of a grand strategy. On e does not invade After the Soviet involvement it was inevitable thatEurop e as an isolated or u nprem editated act. T he the Comm unists should dem and an imm ediate secondpriority amo ng the competing grand strategies lay front. And now there was a great change in the termsnecessarily with the British, whose strateg y was always of the d ebate co ncerning the invasion. In circles far Chxirchillian. Th at is, it was built upon the idea remov ed from the Com munist Pa rty, the same specu-of preserving the Em pire link, Eg ypt , the Suez and the lations were entertained and, as time w ent on, thereMe diterrane an. Doubtless M r. Church ill's imperial- were many consciences, firmly opposed to all radical-ism had much to do with this, yet there was nothing ism, which labored in the shadow of apparently Com-sinister about it as a military plan. It is hard to believe munist conceptions. Despite th e Anglo-Soviet treaty ofnow that it was not the wisest and indeed the only 1941, the fear became widespread that anti-revolu-course. Th at the plan was British in origin was later tiona ry calculations would coincide with counter-revo-made the basis of much anti-war and anti-second-front lutionary desires, and that the invasion would bepropaganda. delayed or abandoned in the interest of capitalist im-Thr oug hou t the latter half of 1940 and the first perialism. Mo st of the formulations mad e at thathalf of 1941 , ther e was m uch honest speculation in date were wildly exaggerated. Yet one coiild not openBritain concerning th e best way to continue the w ar. a newspaper or listen to a public speech without beingIt was during this time that the air-power school rose aware tha t th e Comm unists, even if they w ere no tto some eminence. Within the councils of th e British talking about effective realities, were drawing attentionH igh Com mand , it had been said, these believers in to some extraordinarily grizzly ghosts,air power were strong enough to influence the whole In retrospect, with confirmed statistics before one,structure of the war economy. Be that as it may, inde- it is certain that the second-front dem and at tha t earlypendent thinkers, such as Lieutenant-Colonel W . C. date was not founded upon possibility. W ritin g early inGarsia and others, published theoretical treatises at- 1942 and aifter two mo nths' study of all the publiclytemp ting to dissuade Mr . Chvu-chill's governm ent from and privately available estimates, I came to the conclu-the invasion. Th e argum ent was that B ritain, a power sion that Britain was then in a position to undertake awithout unlimited reserves, should oppose her charac- limited offensive. Its field would have to be one interistic stren gth to Germ any 's characteristic weakness, which a decision could be quickly reached an d where


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810 T H E N E W R E P U B L I Cthe enemy could not bring his mass forces to bear. In big gun. The General was known to have similar, if1941, however, the assertion that Britain wascapable not identical, views. Senators Vandenberg and TaftofaEurop ean invasion alone was merely irresponsible, and all those who have since tried to persuadeMac-And before Pearl Harbor itw asthepoorest ofadvice. Arth ur to accept nomination for the presidency, inH a d theattempt failed,orsucceeded on lyinholdinga greater or less degree aided the Japan Firsters.Thefew desperate bridgeheads, it migh t have been disas- real intention of their proposal was made clear bytrous in hardening Anterican sentiment against par- maladroit Senator Wh eeler in Th e NewYork Times,ticipationand infavor of anegotiated peace. Fear oif the Soviet and of European revolution andBu tit is notfair onlytopointout therisks involved not the desire to punish Japan was his real motive,in those second-'front campaigns.Allwasnotdisservice. W hat is interesting hereis theconjunction ofdates.T h e old Munich appeasement and the abandonment The Japan Firsters timed their effort to theexactmo-of Spainhadbeen caused by precisely those fears whose me nt when certain ve ry real differences were beingexistencethe Communists recognized. That thosemat- thrashed out. It is now known that previous to theters should be openly discussedwas a good thing on invasionof North Africa there hadbeen sharp differ-the wholeand in anyevent,theentireset andpatte rn ences of opinion between th e British and Americanof Anglo-American foreign policy was later to lend Gen eral Staffsas to the next Stagesof the Eixropeanfresh substance to those o lddisputes. It is apersonal war. Ithas been said publidly thatth eAmerican Hig hopinion, but,I think,awell grounded one, that neither Command wasfor an invasion,of thecontinental landthe British nor the American General Staff has ever massandthat Mr.Churchillwas in favor of oompU-delayed or changed its plans because of the fear of cated proiposals dep ende nt in part on Russian agrec-revolution, thoughourState Departm ents have been so men t.InMarch, 1943, whenitwas already certain thatinfluencedand nodoubt willbeagain and againin the the Germans were facing defeat and at the criticalfuture.It ishard nowtorealizehowmorbid thefears momentofAnglo-American n egotiations,thedefeatistsand extravagant the imputations became. It w spub- of Japan First made their reckless effort. Frustratediicly suggestedin myhearing t hat Mr.Churchill had then, they continued throughout the whole of thatdeliberately betrayedtheDieppe raidofAugust, 1942, spring and made a sipecial effort when at last weby failing to grant sufficient air protection. This in were about to invade Sicily.Of the twoconjunctionsorder to fool the Russians and becalm the second- I t?hink the latter is the more interesting and thefronters This was not the only sort of unreasoning onewhidhismore importantfor future guidance.It isreactiontothe still unsolved problemofEurope. Many at the very moment when a decisive stage has beenwho called themselves liberals quite as evidently re- reached andcombat has been temporarily broken off,fused to support the second-front campaign because tha t the pro-Fascists make their deceptive proposals,they were afraid of Soviet predominance in Europe. It willbe so again. Their defeat in 1943 was a signalPearl Harbor again changed the terms of the de- political event, for it made clear to theRussiangov-bate, though much more slowly.If Britain could hold ernmen tourunalterable will. Hencefo rth,thereal taskou tand if wecould w orkout a joint strategy, victory wastobring Russia together with B ritainandAmerica,was nowcertain.The old anxiety about political dis- Tha twas not easyand it sitill seems to me that thecordances continued, and waseven increased by the fault was largely on our side. Again public opinionincomprdhensible poiliciesol Mr.H u ll toward Fra nce , showed itse lf extremely sensitive to every eventcon-an dby the British surrenderto theState Dep artmen t nected with the Soviet Union. One time it was sug-after Eden'sandChurchill's visit to theUn ited States gested thattheUSSR wason thepointof withdrawingin March, 1943. In reality, however, thedebate was from the war.This in particular was an idea verynow governedby the differences inherent in working much entertainedincertain liberal circles. W ithdraw alou ta common strategy among three major powers of ofRussian Amte sado rs, Mr.Sta'lin's failure to attendsuch strikingly different needs, tempersandpoten tials, conferences towhichhe had notbeen invited, the set-In America, 1942 saw the riseofthe air-power theoreti- tingup of the Free Germany Committee in Moscow,cians exactly asinEnglandin1939and1940,but1943 even the very resolution of the Yugoslav Par t isan s-produced a far more dangerous movement, manned all were held to be proof that the Soviet wasgoinglargelyby the oldAmerica F irsters. O pposition to the its own way with utter disregardfor itsallies,invasion of Europenowtook antw nd sinister form. One of the most curious reactionswas thebehavior"American strategy isbeing made subservient to Brit- of certain journals which hitherto had shownno en-ish imperial needs," it was said. No t Europe but thusiasm for the second front. Fear of Russianpre-Asiais ournatural battleground.Let usdefeat Japan dominanceinEurope now moved themtosupportthefirst." Senator "H ap py " Chan dler and Senator W hee ler administration's evident deterxnination to invade Eu-were the big trench mortars (1918pattern) in this rope.We heard much offehe"racetoBerlin." Itcase,with Th e New York Daily News and other papers after the Quebec Conference in August,1943,trying to drag General MacArthur into pjositian as a ever, that the American public became convincedof the


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J U N E 1 9 , 1 9 4 4necessity of a forthright approach to the Soviet gov-ernment, and at Moscow in October the initial stepswere taken.The general opinion was that the Moscow Confer-ence solved very few political differences but thatStalin was reassured concerning the second front. Inthe light of an official statement in London made onSunday, June 4, that was probably not so, for it wasnot until Teiheran that the Russian leader was ac-quainted with the date of the major invasion. And ob-viously the Russians did not regard the s5mewhatlagging Italian campaign as a true second front.

8 i rOn first thought it may seem that all this history is ama tter of mere academic interest. It is not so. For sth ecosts mount and as the chances of war go this way andthat, all the old proposals will be made in new formsand a section of public opinion will react to them inways not wholly dissimilar. Hitler has put out peace-

feelers in the past and more than once, and to morethan one power. H e w ill do so again. It will be easierto be on our guard this time. The spirit of a nationjoined in grim battle and aware of its immense strengthis proof against the pettiness and the itching suggestibil-ity of irresolute and half-hearted men. RALP H BATES

D-DayI. In the ChannelB RITAIN'S REACTION to the invasion has been one ofelation mixed with anxiety. Britain has been inthe war and subject to war nerves two years longerthan the United States. She is taking the new crisisphilosophically. Hope is the dominant emotion, thoughthe leaders warnand the facts are too evident to deny^that the outcome is still touch and go, with the wholevast issue wavering in th e balance. Now it's a race as tosupplies between Montgomery and Rommel, with cer-tain advantages to each. Rommel has interior lines ofcommunication, flat terrain for his automotive equip-ment, good roads. The grove-dotted landscape makessuperb camouflage for transport, whose value only amilitary man understands. Also, Rommel has troopsand fortifications which were already there on D-Day.

The Allies have mastery of the air, and the newtechnique of pinpoint shelling by navail guns as long asthe battle remans near the coast. I was on one of theseships, the cruiser Quincy, during the assault, and I cantestify to the superb accuracy of the fire. The Allieshave the advantage of the American genius for organi-zation. They have the world's best equipmentif theycan get it ashore. Finally, and always subject to weatiherconditions, the Allies have greater over-all mobilitythan Rommel in control of the sea lanes. This may bethe decisive factor if the umlbrella of Allied planes isable to break up Rommel's supply lines.The real test will come in the great counter-attackwhich is undoubtedly preparing and will decide thelength of the war. Rommel had apparently reinforcedthe Germans on the Cherboui-g peninsula some timebefore our th rust was made. W e knew of this, how-ever, and made allowances for it in the final timetableof the campaign. The general picture at the end of thefirst week was therefore one of restrained optimism.The war is not close enough to its end so that the NewYork stock market should gO into a peace-panic nose-dive. On the other hand, Portugal's willingness to

stop future wolfram shipments to Germany indicatesa canny neutral's view of the situation. The Britishare undoubtedly right when they say the question isno longer who will win the war but how long it willlast.

I missed the scenes in London because I was off theNorman coast on shipboard, where dajvvn found us onHitler's doorstep like a milk bottle. Our task forcetook up the methodical off-shore bombardment as soonas it was light. The navy fights a gentlenian's warof long-distance killing. W e relaxe d, save when theshore batteries got too close, and luckily for us theGermans were apparently so jolted by previous aerialbombardment that their aim seemed to suffer. In anycase, we outranged them.My own eye-witness account was written under farmore comfortable circumstances than, for example,Kenneth Crawford's story in Newsweek of landing inthe first wave, and others like it. I was on the upperbridge of a great new battle cruiser where the chiefdiscomfort was the jolting from our own eight-inchguns. I had a panoramic view of thirty miles of thebeachhead, where I could see the orderly, methodicallanding, handicapped by the stiff breeze which cap-sized some small boats and inconvenienced all of them .It would be hard to exaggerate the effectiveness ofthe support by the capital ships. Radio spotters con-stantly reported on the targets and gave us the ranges.I listened to the drama of this in the fire-control room.Over the radio came the code identification of thespotter. Then he would ask for shells to be laid downin such and such a place, as casually as somebody buy-ing cigarettes. The men on the cruiser would fire, andwould O.K. the request, simultaneously, telling theunseen spotter miles distant that the shells were .onthe way. Forty or fifty seconds later we would radiothe message, "Fl ash " which meant the shells weretimed to hit then. A second or two later the spotterwould tell us, "U p 100," or "Dow n 100," for the nextshot. This went on until the target was demolished.


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'814 T H E N E W R E P U B L I CIn another part of the ship our radio picked up dreaded the hour. Once before, when the Commandoswalkie-talkie reports of fighting at shorter range. I went ashore at Dieppe, the country had thrilled withheard one commander demand to know peremptorily the news of the second front, only to be shocked bywhy the walkie-talkie was not answering him louder the high losses incurred.and clearer. We heard the meek answer, just audible Now the country and every man and woman in ithrough the static, that the speaker was pinned down were irrevocably committed to the decisive canipaigii

in the crossfire between a pillbox and machine guns, of the war. The news spread like wildfire. PassengersThe greatest thrill was the arrival of a vast sweep on suburban trains passed the word to one another.of glider-borne troops towed by transport planes, in Factory managers, in excited voices, told their eni'the late afternoon and evening of the first day of the ployees about it over the shop public-address systeni.assault. It was a wholly unexpected and soul-stirring Government officials, with startled faces, told theirsight, and I cannot tell you what a tremendous impres- typists that this is it. School teachers spread thesionit made. Even hard-boiled veterans on deck could word in their classrooms and the children, in truehardly speak, as the great roaring wave went over. It British fashion, rose and Cheered. At midday, crowdswas so long from end to end that the first transports thronging the streets in the central part of Londonwere returning without gliders on one side of the ship waited in long lines to buy extras. Everyone had tfee;While on the other the gliders were still going by. It same thought: the comradeship of the blitz had beenwas a scene out of the future and certainly the greatest revived. Everyone had a friend or relative imrne-sight of my whole life. First there was a distant mutter diately involved. People from the occupied countries^which rose quickly to thunder. Then they were above with perhaps even more at stake, complained of thus in perfect formation, the twinkling spiderweb phlegmatic British for their stolid demeanor,filament visibly connecting transport with glider. I Nobody wanted to talk of anything else, yet nobodycould not see them land and don' t know what were ^^^ anything to say. There was enough news to scot i^the casualties among them on the fields where they the rumors, but not enough to satisfy the omnivorousheroically crash-dived. But there is no question that appetite. Even the amateur strategists were nearlythis is one of the great developments of the war. silenced by the vastness of the operation, althoughMy chief impression was the crowded condition of ^ ^ explained to all hearers that the landings at thethe English Channel as we returned to Britain on louth of the Seine were only a flanking operation andWednesday evening. It was absolutely choked with *^ * Denmark would be the scene of the real landing-traffic of every kind, including craft big and little, new ^ ^ ^ ^^ interested in such speculations,or old. Suddenly I realized what it meant. This was I *h House of Commons Mr. Churchill's appeal-Dunkirk in reverse. Now we were going back. ^ ^^ ^^s greeted with cheers. William Galladier, thLondon (by cable) RICHARD LEE STROUT ^^ Communist in Parliament, followed M r. ChurchiHwith two sentences of his own: I would like to expressmy own feelings and what I am sure are the feeling*

II In ondon ' ^ ^very member of this House. Our heartsandthoughts are with those lads and with their mothersARLY on the morning of D-Day, millions of Lon- at home.don's citizens lay in their beds listening to the There were 800 volunteers for blood donations at amighty drone of planes heading over the city toward single London factory. In another, the women workersFrance. Many of them wondered whether the pilots of offered to go from their day's work to serve as nurses'the Fortresses and Lancasters were finally bound for helpers in the hospitals. Production spurted in all w -ithe invasion beaches. The war workers got up wearily plants; everybody wanted to do more. In the eveningas usual, dressed and waited on the corner for the early the Home Guards who were on duty cleaned theirbus,with the question still unanswered. The later-rising Bren guns and wondered whether the Nazis would afl'office workers switched on the radio for the 8 o'clock swer the invasion by dropping paratroops pn England-news and heard the announcer report naval engage- In the city, only a few minutes by air from the actualments in the Channel. They sat before their radios as front lines, the people listened to the planes overhead)long as they could, with mounting excitement. Finally waited and worked. They realized the Nazis wouldcame Eisenhower's sihort and shattering communique, soon counter-attack in Normandy, if they hadn't alreadyThis was it. Since Dunkirk, since the Germans went begun to do so. The Americans, the Russians and theinto Russia, since Toheran, since the fall of Rome, the French seemed more than ever brothers in a comro.o people of London had been awaiting this moment, enterprise. When one remembers Dunkirkand mil'Some of them had succeeded in making the delay lions of Englishmen did remember it on D-Daythin the second front a political issue; they had attended military recovery of this country seems a miracle. Thedemonstrations in Trafalgar Square at which it was people who worked that miracle are now determinedcharged that we were sabotaging our gallant ally,^ Rus- both to win this war and not to lose the peace,sia. Mothers and wives of servicemen, of course, had London (by cable) MICHAEL

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