to the: environment and natural resources committee · the inquiry. senior station officer tisbury...

1 | U F U A s u b m i s s i o n t o 2 0 1 5 F i s k v i l l e I n q u i r y

To the:

ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES COMMITTEE

UFUA SUBMISSION

TO THE INQUIRY INTO THE

CFA TRAINING COLLEGE AT FISKVILLE

ccastro

Typewritten Text

SUBMISSION NO. 449 RECEIVED06 MAY 2015


1. I am making this submission as the National Secretary of the United

Firefighters Union of Australia and the Victorian Branch Secretary.

2. United Firefighters Union of Australia Victorian Branch Committee of

Management Member Michael Tisbury has provided a submission to

the Inquiry. Senior Station Officer Tisbury is the primary UFU

representative for this Inquiry as he has undertaken much of the work

and research. Mr Tisbury’s submission deals with the water testing

and implications of contamination where as this submission primarily

outlines the UFU actions and attempts to access the testing results,

and to have the CFA, MFB and government agencies to take all

reasonable steps to prevent firefighters and employees working at

Fiskville from being exposed to contaminated water and soil.

3. The United Firefighters Union of Australia (“the UFUA”) is a registered

federal union of career firefighters and others employed by fire services

in Australia.

4. The UFUA has eight branches in Tasmania, South Australia, Victoria,

ACT, New South Wales, Western Australia, Queensland and an

Aviation sector branch. Each branch has very high level of union

membership with the majority of branches averaging around 95 percent

membership of the relevant workforce.

5. The UFUA represents firefighters employed on a permanent full time

basis, permanent part time basis and on a casual basis by fire services

including aviation and defence.

6. In addition, the UFUA also represents other employees of fire services

including, but not limited to, emergency call centres, fire safety officers,

mechanics, administrative support and technical support, and

hospitality.

Exposures to carcinogens

7. Firefighters put their health and lives at risk to protect and serve the

community. There are inherent risks in firefighting and therefore

firefighters put their quality and quantity of life on the line. The quality

and appropriateness of training, Personal Protective Clothing (PPC),

equipment, Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) can be the

difference between life and death of a member of the public and/or the

firefighter.


8. In addition to the obvious risks to firefighters there are insidious

hazards through the exposure to toxins and chemicals. The average

house fire is estimated to contain more than 70,000 chemicals and

carcinogens. Fabrics, furniture and construction materials give off a

range of gasses when burning. These toxins include Polycyclic

Aromatic Hydrocarbons (PAHs) acetic acid, phenol, formaldehyde,

benzene, styrene, ammonia, carbon monoxide and cyanide. In a fire

the combustion of these chemicals increases the toxicity significantly.

9. There is a wealth of accepted credible international research that has

demonstrated the link between firefighting and the increased risk and

incidence of specific cancers. The chance of a firefighter dying from

an occupational disease is far greater than the likelihood of a firefighter

dying at a fire scene.

10. In addition, the rate of incidence of cancer is even more disturbing

when the healthy worker effect is taken into account. Scientific

literature describes the protective effect that above-average health and

fitness has on mortality levels among groups (such as firefighters) who

are otherwise at a greater risk of illness. For firefighters it is estimated

that they are 20-30% less likely than the average person to contract

cancer so when it is recorded that firefighters are two times more likely

to contract cancer the actual risk is much higher than if that rate was

found in the general population.

11. The Australian Federal Government unanimously accepted the

international research and link between firefighting and the increased

incidence and risk of specific cancers when presumptive legislation

was enacted in 2011. Firefighters are denied assistance and access to

workers compensation because they cannot meet the required

threshold of proving which specific fires they were exposed to the

carcinogens that resulted in the contraction of cancer. The legislation

presumes specific cancers are occupational cancers for firefighters

enabling firefighters to access their entitlements as they would for any

other work-related injury or illness.

12. The enactment of the Federal "Fair Protection for Firefighters"

presumptive legislation resulted from a robust Senate Inquiry. The

UFUA made submissions to the Inquiry, and appeared at the Senate

Hearings. I attach in Tab 1:

i. a copy of the UFUA submission and supplementary submission

and attachments;

ii. The transcripts of the UFUA evidence at the Hearings;

iii. The final Senate Report


13. I include the UFUA submissions and attachments as part of this

submission for the Fiskville Inquiry as it contains the following

important information relevant to understanding the nature of

firefighting and the exposures to toxins and carcinogens including:

Nature of firefighting

Training

Emergency Response

Flashover

International research that demonstrates the link between

firefighting and the increased risk and incidence of specific

cancers

The toxic workplace

14. I respectfully urge this Committee to read the documentation attached

in Tab 1 and in particular the Senate Report as it succinctly canvasses

the very real inherent risk of cancer and firefighting. Of particular

relevance to this inquiry are the following findings:

"The committee understands that firefighters work in uncontrolled

environments which make it necessary for their protective gear to

breathe, therefore leaving them vulnerable to toxins and

carcinogens. On the weight of considerable evidence supplied to

the committee supporting a likely causal link between firefighting

and certain cancers, as well as the understanding that claims for

compensation would be legally contestable, this committee is

confident that rebuttable presumption is a solid - and fair -

foundation for workers' compensation policy for career firefighters."

[Paragraph 2,51 Senate Report]

"The committee holds a deep respect and gratitude for those who

serve to protect and assist. If we are honest, along with this respect

and gratitude comes with a generous dose of expectation. We

expect firefighters to come to our assistance when our homes,

schools, hospitals and businesses are ablaze.

We expect that a firefighter will enter a burning building when every

human instinct tells us to leave. We expect they will search for

those trapped inside and bring them out alive. We expect them to

do what they can to minimise loss of life and damage to property.

While everyone else is fleeing danger, it is the firefighter's duty to


tackle it head-on, to enter an extreme and dangerous environment,

armed with the best protective gear available."

[Paragraph 4.37, page 47 Senate Report]

"It is a duty firefighters take seriously, aware of the inherent risks to

their own health and safety. This awareness on their part does not

mitigate the community's responsibility towards them."

[Paragraph 4.38, page 47 Senate Report]

15. Since the 2011 Inquiry there has been a number of significant studies

that have reconfirmed the link between firefighting and the increased

incidence of specific cancers.

16. In addition, in April this year it was revealed that Royal Australian Air

Force (RAAF) who worked with jet fuel suffered cell damage. I

understand that in the past the aviation fuel was burned for training

purposes at Fiskville. A copy of a media story regarding this new study

released under a Freedom of Information request can be accessed via

http://mobile.abc.net.au/news/2015-04-30/raaf-personnel-exposed-to-

jet-fuel-suffered-cell-damage/6433360.\

17. Firefighters take every precaution made available to them to reduce the

level of exposure to these carcinogens and chemicals but firefighters

can never be fully protected because their PPC has to be able to

breathe otherwise the firefighter would perish from metabolic heat

build-up. Firefighters wearing the best PPC and using Breathing

Apparatus (BA) are still at risk as they absorb the carcinogens from the

smoke through their skin.

18. It is therefore imperative that firefighters when training and protecting

the community are provided with the most effective PPC, BA and

equipment, that training and firefighter Standard Operating Procedures

reduce the risk where possible and that there are strictly applied post-

fire processes to prevent the contamination of fire trucks, stations,

accommodation and office areas through exposure to dirty PPC and

equipment.

19. I refer the Committee to the submissions of Commanders Philip Taylor

and Brian Whittaker who are considered experts in the areas of

http://mobile.abc.net.au/news/2015-04-30/raaf-personnel-exposed-to-jet-fuel-suffered-cell-damage/6433360./

http://mobile.abc.net.au/news/2015-04-30/raaf-personnel-exposed-to-jet-fuel-suffered-cell-damage/6433360./


personal protective clothing and equipment, and the exposures to

toxins and carcinogens.

Contamination of Fiskville Training Ground

20. In December 2011 the late former CFA Chief Fire Officer Brian Potter

publicly exposed historical concerns about the contamination of the

Fiskville training ground and its hot fire training that had recklessly

exposed firefighters, employees and the Fiskville community to a toxic

soup of carcinogens over many years with the storing, burning and

burying of chemicals - some still unknown.

21. There was significant media coverage and as a result various reports

were made public including the use of toxic waste for hot fire training

and the subsequent burying of drums on the site of Fiskville.

22. The CFA response was ultimately to control an investigation into the

allegations by appointing Professor Rob Joy to investigate. This was

not an independent inquiry as the CFA was able to control the terms of

reference, the investigation and the report that was ultimately made

public. Despite this CFA investigation taking place in 2012 the report

was limited to the period 1971-1999 and therefore deliberately ensuring

any contemporary contamination would not be investigated enabling

CFA to try and relegate the issue as a historic matter.

23. It is of great concern that while the Joy investigation was being

conducted that it was brought to the UFU’s attention that the water

being used for firefighter training at Fiskville was not of a safe standard.

Despite the investigation into the contamination of the site and soil, the

CFA were denying that firefighters were being exposed to

contaminated water or training in water that was not fit for purpose.

Contaminated water

24. In June 2012 MFB Instructors training Station Officers at Fiskville

notified the UFU of their concern of the quality of water. The UFU

immediately determined that the use of the water should cease

immediately until assurances could be made that it was fit for use.

25. UFU Branch Committee of Management member and MFB Station

Officer Michael Tisbury was sent photos of the state of the water. Mr

Tisbury has provided a submission to this inquiry that details those

events and his subsequent research and findings of the status of the


water at Fiskville. Any queries regarding those matters should be

addressed to Mr Tisbury.

26. In addition Station Officer Michael (Tony) Martin who is a MFB Senior

Instructor has provided a submission to this Inquiry detailing his

personal knowledge of the poor water quality and attached a number of

photographs of the water.

27. Given the use, storage and burying of chemicals on site and the

possible continued contamination into the water supplies the CFA

should have been taking all reasonable steps to ensure the safety of

those working and training at Fiskville. The CFA should have been

regularly and appropriately testing the water to ensure it was fit for use

and free from contamination and notifying all those working and

training at Fiskville of any adverse testing results and taking immediate

action to prevent any exposure.

28. We were therefore very concerned when the state of the water was

reported to the UFU as the CFA had not notified the UFU or those

working and training at Fiskville of any issue with the quality of the

water. The UFU immediately wrote on the 20th June 2012 (attached in

Tab 2) to the then CFA Chief Executive Officer Mick Bourke and MFB

Chief Executive Officer Nick Easy.

29. The UFU sought:

the immediate cessation of all training using water on the fire

pad

confirmation that the water used is classified as Class A

recycled water

information regarding the monitoring of the water including when

it was last monitored and the results of the testing

the commissioning of an agreed hygienist to provide sampling

and testing of the water

30. The MFB ceased training immediately and advised by letter of 21 June

2012 (attached in Tab 2) that discussions had occurred with the CFA

regarding the monitoring regime and further testing.

31. The CFA refused to cease training and in a letter dated 25 June 2012

(Attached in Tab 2) denied that the water was of the state as reported

to the UFU. Mr Bourke wrote:


"I can advise that this is not consistent with the current observations of

Management at Fiskville and give the sparse information in your letter

is not able to be substantiated. Further I note allegations of illness

form the water used in training at Fiskville and advise that no related

incidents have been reported to management at this site.”

"The regular monitoring of water quality at the site has seen it meet the

relevant health parameters, but it had exceeded the aesthetic

parameter for suspended solids due to a process to introduce

additional aeration in to Dam 2. This was an interim arrangement

preceding the investment and commissioning of a new aerator to that

dam. Advice was taken at that time to clarify that the suspended solids

levels did not pose any health risk."

"As a precaution Fiskville Management has bought forward its regular

testing by an independent laboratory (as is the practice) to confirm the

health and aesthetic aspects of the water used in the training process.

The full range of results are due in the next 48 hours and will be made

available when received"

"You have asked for confirmation that the water being used is 'Class A'

recycled water, You would be award that Class A water is derived from

the treatment of sewerage and conveyed through a separate

reticulation system all under the control of the relevant water authority;

there is however no Class A water supply to Fiskville."

32. The letter had two test results attached. UFU BCOM member Michael

Tisbury who has provided a submission is the UFU witness regarding

the water testing and reports. His evidence includes that that we later

learned that the CFA had changed its own water standard for E.Coli

after repeated failure to meet the standard. I also understand that from

the test results we have been able to access; there are inconsistencies

in the time of the testing, the areas tested and the organisms tested for.

There does not appear to be a consistent method or timing of testing

and monitoring which is greatly concerning.

33. I was in contact with members and shop stewards during this period

and concerns were broadening to all water used at Fiskville. We did

not want to interrupt training but we could not condone training

continuing if there was a risk to the health and safety of the trainees,

instructors and recruits. We were also concerned for the staff working

in other areas at Fiskville. The health and safety of firefighters and

staff is paramount.


34. The usual process to deal with health and safety concerns is to work

with the Health and Safety representative and delegates to determine

any risk and take the appropriate action to prevent any further harm or

risk to the members.

35. We sought meetings with the relevant CFA management at Fiskville

and UFU Industrial staff attended meetings at Fiskville but all attempts

to access information confirming the current status of the water were

unsuccessful.

36. Despite Mick Bourke's assurances in his letter dated 25 June that we

would be provided with testing results the CFA repeated refused or

ignored requests for the information.

37. We again wrote to Mick Bourke on the 26th June 2012 (attached in Tab

2) referring to his promise of providing test results that were to be

available within 48hours of his letter dated 25 June 2012 and the failure

to provide them to the UFU.

38. It was also brought to my attention that there were concerns that those

requesting information from the CFA on the quality of water and

seeking to cease training at Fiskville until the water quality had been

verified as suitable for training were at risk of being targeted by the

CFA and discriminated against. On the 26th June 2012 the UFU

wrote to the OIC at Fiskville (Justin Justin) and CFA CEO Mick Bourke

setting out the prohibition against discrimination under the

Occupational Health and Safety Act 2004. (A copy of that letter is

attached in Tab 3)

39. Also on the 26th June 2012 the HSR wrote to the OIC at Fiskville in

accordance with section 69(1) of the Occupational Health and Safety

Act 2004 requesting the following information. A copy of that letter is

attached in Tab 3.

A consultation meeting with the HR representatives at Fiskville inclusive with union representatives.

All documentation and material relating to injury, illness and exposure at Fiskville.

All information, documents, documentation and reports, whether they be draft, interim or final, regarding water testing and sampling at Fiskville.


The dates of which testing/sampling was conducted and who conducted such testing/sampling and the date of commencement of such testing/sampling.

Any procedure that has been implemented as a result of illness, injury or other i.e. Implementation of water fountains, the provision of drinking water via bottled water.

Any reports to the CFA board or management regarding potential contamination and/or threats as a result of exposure, either direct or indirect, as a result of activities at Fiskville.

Any risk management procedure that has been put in place or contemplated to avoid/minimise injury/illness to employees at Fiskville.

Any improvement, installation or equipment to minimise or eliminate contamination via the treatment of water whether it be for training purposes or drinking purposes.

The date of such installation of such equipment.

The procedures that are applicable for reporting any such incident, illness or injury for employees that undertake training or attend the Fiskville premises.

What awareness programs, if any, have been delivered or developed to any employees/volunteers or any person regarding potential threats and exposures at Fiskville.

Procedures that have been implemented to ensure that personal protective clothing is not inadvertently a vehicle for contamination of eating areas or other areas.

40. That day Justin Justin responded by email to the HSR stating it would

take some time to get the documentation requested. A copy of that

email is also attached in Tab 3).

41. On the 29th June 2014 the UFU again wrote to CFA CEO Mick Bourke

referring to his letter of 25 June where a full range of test results was

due in 48 hours but the CFA had yet to provide any such results to the

UFU. A copy of that correspondence is attached in Tab 4. A UFU

Bulletin was also sent out to inform members that the CFA was yet to

provide testing results despite the CEO previously stating results would

be provided. A copy of that UFU Bulletin is also attached in Tab 4.


42. On the 3rd July 2012 the UFU again wrote to CFA CEO Mick Bourke

and MFB CEO Nick Easy referring to our requests for information to

demonstrate the water was safe. A copy of that correspondence is also

attached in Tab 4. We also reported that UFU members working and

training at the Bangholme Campus were reporting the water had a

strong and pungent chlorine odour. As little information had been

received we now demanded the following to be provided within 24

hours:

All tests for all CFA training grounds since testing commenced;

Confirmation whether chlorine has been introduced into the water at SETG Bangholme?

If so, when?

Has the water been tested for chlorine

When are you going to test again?

43. MFB CEO Nick Easy responded in a letter dated 5 July 2012 (attached

in Tab 4) stating he had formally requested from the CFA information

on the current testing regimes at Sale, Bangholme and Fiskville training

facilities. To my knowledge MFB did not provide that information to the

UFU if the MFB received any such information from the CFA.

44. CFA CEO Mick Bourke responded in a letter dated 4 July 2012 but

received on the 10th July 2012 claiming a "sodium hypochlorite

treatment system" had been operating at Bangholme since 2007 and

that "with this type of system a chlorine type odour could possibly be

noticed from time to time," that there were water management plans at

each training ground with regular water testing but "training grounds do

not undergo tests of water supplies for sources that are supplied

directly from mains water". A copy of that letter is attached in Tab 4.

45. A 2009 report was then anonymously provided to the UFU which set

out the classification of sludge at Fiskville and estimates for remedial

work to address the extensive contamination. A copy of that report and

a UFU Bulletin to members are attached in Tab 5.

The leaked report states that the sludge was classified as

Category A level by EPA classifications as waters and as such

the contamination was so toxic it was banned being disposed to

landfill.

The report recommended the excavation of the sludge and

treating it on site so that it could reach the standard where it

could be transported offsite to be buried in a landfill. That

process was estimated to cost $750,000.


46. As the CFA was refusing to provide all testing results and testing

regime information we had little choice but to seek to close Fiskville

pending testing results that demonstrated the site was safe. Media

stories reported our call or the closure and a judicial inquiry into what

we believe is a cover-up of the contamination of the water. Attached

in Tab 6 is a copy of a Herald Sun story.

47. CFA CEO Mick Bourke published the following "blog" on the CFA

website on the 6th July 2012:

"As you may be aware the Herald Sun recently reported on the quality

of water being used for training purposes at Fiskville. We take very

seriously the health, safety and wellbeing of our members and indeed

all persons using the training facilities at Fiskville.

To provide certainty and comfort for all people doing live fire training at

Fiskville, we made a decision last week to only use mains water until

further notice.

We will keep using mains water for training while we receive further

expert advice about how we best manage our water systems in the

future.

Importantly, no-one from CFA has reported ill from the water used in

live fire fighting training and we have been unable to verify media

reports of brown and frothy water.

Independent water testing is in place and has been conducted in

accordance with a water management plan adopted for use in 2009.

While we don't believe recycled water used during live fire fighting

training at Fiskville has placed anyone at unacceptable risk, we

acknowledge that we may need to take medium and longer term

measures to ensure we have a water training system that provides

people with greater confidence and certainty.

The Herald Sun report today indicates that the UFU has inferred that

CFA treats volunteers poorly. These comments are offensive and

not based on fact. CFA only exists on the strength of our volunteers

and career staff.


As an organisation that prides itself on our volunteer backbone, we

greatly appreciate the work that our volunteers do - they provide

invaluable support and that is something that we, as an organisation,

do not take for granted.

I am focused on dealing with the issues raised over the past weeks and

months and do not want to be diverted by personal attacks raised by

the UFU.

Finally the CFA Board is in receipt of the independent Professor Joy

report into historical practices at Fiskville and is considering the report.

I do not wish to be drawn at this time on the contents of that report but

assure all members of CFA and those who have registered their

concerns, that a comprehensive and transparent action plan will be

developed to address the findings."

48. The CFA were maintaining that water met the standard and there were

no health and safety risks yet the CFA now decided to use only mains

water on the training pad. It is also astonishing that the CFA were

claiming that no one had been ill when submissions from firefighters

before this Inquiry show a wide-range suffered stomach, gastro,

rashes and infections and some firefighters refer to "the Fiskville virus".

49. The CFA already had the Joy Report but had not released it publicly.

The CFA therefore was fully aware of the extensive and shocking

contamination of the site and the probable impact that had on the water

table and water supplies yet was continuing to maintain the safety of

the site.

50. On the 6th July 2012 the UFU distributed a Bulletin to its members

(which is attached in Tab 8) informing members of the CFA’s

systematic failure in its duty of care.

51. Also on the 6th July 2012 through our Solicitors, the UFU wrote the

WorkSafe setting out the CFA's failure to provide information as

requested. A copy of that letter is attached in Tab 8 and requests:

That WorkSafe immediately and publicly disclose whether it had

been provided with any information regarding the quality of the

water any of the CFA Training Grounds and if so, whether the

water met the standard or otherwise; and


That WorkSafe conduct an immediate and thorough

investigation of the water quality at all CFA training grounds

including analysis of whether the water complied with all

statutory and regulatory obligations.

52. On the 11th July the UFU, through its solicitors, formally wrote to CFA

CEO Mick Bourke setting out its serious concerns and formally

requesting a specified list of information including the testing and

quality of all water at Fiskville, the results of such tests, any reports on

any water storage problems or remedial work, all water testing policies,

all information regarding any investigations, requests or exploration of

water/sludge, all documents regarding the introduction and testing of

pseudomonas aeruginosa. A copy of that letter is attached as Tab 9.

53. The CFA's lawyers responding on the 12th July stating the request was

being given consideration. But as no further information was

forthcoming the UFU, through its solicitors, again wrote the CFA on the

9th August. Copies of this correspondence are attached in Tab 9.

54. On the 12th July the CFA publicly released the Joy Report.

55. Having not received the information as he had previously requested, on

the 12th July 2012 the Fiskville HSR, issued three Provisional

Improvement Notices (PINs) under the Occupational Health and Safety

Act 2004. A copy of the PIN notices are attached in Tab 7.

Failing to maintain the work place in a condition without risks to

the health of employee by exposing them to contaminated water

and failing to implement adequate water testing regime at

training facility to eliminate the risk to the employees;

Failing to provide a system of work that is safe and without risk

by exposing employees at CFA Fiskville to high levels of

contaminated water;

Failing to provide information in relation to the exposure of

employees to contaminated water at CFA Fiskville, as requested

in the HRS's letter of 26 June 2012.

56. On the 13th July 2012 the HSR provided the UFU with a copy of test

results that the HSR had been provided. It is important to note that

these results had not been provided by the CFA to the UFU. Michael

Tisbury refers to these results and a table the UFU created and

released setting out an analysis of those results.


57. The UFU was told that the CFA was interfering with water testing as

the water from the pit had been drained, filled with mains water and

then the mains water was tested. Attached in Tab 10 is a copy of a

letter I sent to the who we were

informed was involved in organising the draining and filling of the pit

and that the CFA was advised that the pit would remain contaminated

as only the water was drained.

58. We were increasingly concerned that the CFA had and continued to

expose firefighters training and working at Fiskville to contaminated

water. The test results that we received via the HSR confirmed that the

water had not met water standards. We were also receiving anecdotal

reports that gastro and other illnesses were common among firefighters

training at Fiskville as were skin conditions.

59. In July 2012 the UFU commissioned the ACTU to undertake a survey

of members to ascertain the types of water members had been

exposed to and whether they had suffered any health issues during

and after training or working at Fiskville. Attached in Tab 11 is a copy

of the results of that survey.

60. The report shows of the 427 members completed the survey:

51 experienced nausea during their attendance at Fiskville

25 experienced suppressed appetite during their attendance at Fiskville

56 experienced digestive problems during their attendance at Fiskville

82 experienced headaches during their attendance at Fiskville

79 experienced gastro during their attendance at Fiskville

61. Of the 427 members completed the survey 102 reported skin

conditions:

30 experienced skin conditions during their attendance at Fiskville

36 experienced skin conditions following their attendance at Fiskville

36 experienced skin conditions during and following their attendance at

Fiskville.

62. On the 3rd August 2012 WorkSafe responded to the UFU's letter of 6

July 2012 seeking an investigation into the water standards at all CFA

training sites. A copy of that letter is included in Tab 8.


63. WorkSafe does not specifically address the request for an investigation

and refers to "restrictions" on the OHS Act 2004 on disclosure of

information stating "WorkSafe is unable to disclose any further

information relating to these matters".

64. WorkSafe wrote that CFA will only use mains water pending a

consultant’s review but does not make any comment as to the standard

of water being used prior to mains water being used or what steps

were being taken to ensure any water used was being appropriately

managed and tested.

65. On the 14th August 2012 the CFA's lawyers responded citing various

reasons for refusing to provide the information as requested – that the

request was too broad, claiming the UFU had not detailed the basis for

its concerns, the release of the Joy report etc. A copy of that letter is

included in Tab 9 attached to a letter from the CFA to UFU dated 17

August 2012.

66. By this stage the UFU had sought testing and information from the CFA

since 20 June 2012. The claims made by the CFA’s lawyers were just

excuses. We believed the CFA was deliberately refusing to provide the

information as such information was likely to be damning of the CFA’s

failure to comply with its obligations to provide a safe workplace.

67. While refusing to provide any water testing results the letter confirms

the CFA had received results of water testing carried out at Fiskville

and "those results do not indicate any water quality issues that would

make the water unsuitable for use in firefighting training or otherwise

identify any matters that support the various assertions being made by

Mr Marshall to the effect that Fiskville is unsafe and should be closed".

68. The above timeline shows that CFA were obstructive of any attempt to

access the complete set of water testing results and to address the

serious concerns of the UFU.

69. There was significant media attention during this period and the UFU

repeatedly used all avenues to access the information necessary to

ascertain the standard of water. We were greatly concerned that the

CFA was being selective in when and where it tested.

70. The CFA's attitude and refusal to provide all the past testing and

current results to the UFU indicated that there were valid concerns;

otherwise the CFA would produce the information requested.


71. On the 8th October 2012 the MFB notified its staff of its intention to

recommence training at the Fiskville training ground. In doing so the

MFB relied upon advice from WorkSafe to the CFA. The

correspondence from WorkSafe to the CFA and CFA to the MFB as

well as the MFB’s email to staff are included in Tab 11.

72. In a letter dated 3 October 2012 WorkSafe to the CFA (Sherry Herman)

refers to visits to Fiskville on the 6th December 2011 and 10th July 2012

by WorkSafe Inspectors:

“WorkSafe was advised that control of risk to health and safety from

the use of recycled water is being achieved by the exclusive use of

mains/town water for fire fighting training at Fiskville. CFA also advised

that an environmental consultant has been retained to assist

management in reviewing and addressing health, safety and

environmental issues related to recycled water at Fiskville. An

Improvement Notice issued in relation the prevention of unauthorised

access to the water storage dams has been subsequently complied

with.

WorkSafe acknowledges the continued operation of the Fiskville

Training Facility in accordance with the risk controls associated with

dangerous goods and fire fighting water presented during inspector

visits conducted since 6 December 2011."

73. The UFU notified the MFB of a dispute in accordance with the MFB

UFU Operational Staff Agreement 2010. The MFB put the matter

before the Fair Work Commission to be conciliated and ultimately the

MFB withdrew its intention to recommence training at Fiskville. To my

knowledge the MFB has not trained at Fiskville since it withdrew on the

20th June 2012.

74. CFA continued to train at Fiskville on the basis only mains/town water

was used for firefighter training.

WORKSAFE INVESTIGATION

75. The UFU was very concerned that WorkSafe had not properly

investigated. On the 15th November 2012 the UFU, through its

solicitors, formally requested WorkSafe undertake a proper

investigation and sought prosecutions of the CFA pursuant to the OH &

S Act 2004. A copy of that letter and all correspondence between the

UFU and WorkSafe on this matter is attached in Tab 13.


76. Attached in Tab 14 are the documents provided to WorkSafe by the

UFU when UFU BCOM member Mick Tisbury met with WorkSafe

during this investigation. Mr Tisbury was the primary point of contact

for this investigation and he provides further information in his

statement to this Inquiry.

77. Under the Act such an investigation by WorkSafe is to be conducted

within 3 months. On the 20th February 2013 WorkSafe wrote to the

UFU Solicitors stating it had "commenced a comprehensive

investigation into these allegations, but due to the potential breadth and

complexity of the matter" would not be able to complete the

investigation within the required three month period.

78. The UFU requested that its letter of concerns and alleged breaches

also be forwarded to the EPA as some concerns were relevant to the

Environment Protection Act 1970 and the Pollution of Waters by Oils

and Noxious Substances Act 1986 which are not administered by

WorkSafe. By this stage we had become aware that the EPA had

issued clean-up notices to Fiskville. We had not been formally

notified of these notices but we became aware of them through

research conducted by Mr Tisbury.

79. The EPA subsequently responded to WorkSafe stating that the UFU

letter of concern did not raise "any new issues" and that the EPA

Notices required the CFA to conduct statutory audits to address water

and soil contamination." It appeared as far as the EPA was concerned

this was the end of the matter in regards to the UFU’s complaint.

80. In July 2013 WorkSafe wrote to the UFU through its solicitors advising

that due to the number of witnesses and "extensive range of

documentary evidence” relevant to the allegations, including

documentation from local water authorities, water testing agencies, and

the CFA and MFB and that " there was now some "30 volumes of

material", the investigation was now likely to be finalised at the end of

2013.

81. The UFU had first brought the matter seeking investigation to

WorkSafe in July 2012 and had formally sought prosecutions in

November 2012 and the delay to end of 2013 was deeply concerning.

However, as it appeared from the correspondence that WorkSafe were

interviewing relevant witnesses and had accessed significant

information we were hopeful that an appropriate and a thorough

investigation was taking place.


82. The UFU, through its solicitors repeatedly followed up with WorkSafe

as to the status of the investigation. WorkSafe would respond with

reasons for further delay including in May 2014 obtaining more

information which required expert analysis.

83. In October 2014 the UFU again wrote to WorkSafe who responded

stating the investigation was now the subject of legal review and

anticipated a decision within the next 4- 6 weeks.

84. On the 22st January 2015 Monash University released its study

"Fiskville Firefighters' Health Study" which confirmed that staff and

those trained at Fiskville had above average rates of skin, testicular

and brain cancers. The UFU issued a press release where Mick

Tisbury is quoted as stating:

“Now that the Monash study has been released, we would like to know

what has happened to the WorkSafe investigation which began more

than two years ago, in November 2012, and was supposed to have

been completed within three months."

85. That public commented prompted a letter from WorkSafe. In a letter

dated 29 January 2015 WorkSafe Director, Enforcement Group wrote

to me noting "recent media references regarding the status of its

investigation into the Fiskville Training Facility" and enclosing a letter

dated 17 December 2014 which was for my records advising of the

outcome of the investigation. The letter dated 17 December 2014

advised that "there is insufficient evidence to establish any offences by

the CFA under the OHS Act".

86. A copy of the 29 January 2015 letter with the 17 December 2014 letter

attached is included in Tab 15.

87. The UFU had not received the 17th December 2014 letter prior to the

letter of 29 January 2015. We requested proof that the letter had been

sent previously and despite reference to "records" WorkSafe have

failed to produce any record or documentation that demonstrates the

letter was sent to the UFU. As the letter of 29 January 2015 does not

state the letter had been previously sent, and fudges that issue

altogether, it is my view that the letter had never been previously sent.

The UFU office has no record of receiving it any earlier. Despite

repeated requests WorkSafe have failed to provide any evidence to

support their claim it had been sent in December 2014.


88. We had no confidence in the finding that there was "insufficient

evidence" to establish any offences under the OH & S Act. For more

than two years WorkSafe had allegedly investigated the matter, had

repeatedly delayed a decision claiming copious amounts of material -

including 30 volumes of material as of July 2013 - which WorkSafe had

reported included matters that needed expert analysis. We did not

believe it credible that there was insufficient information to support a

prosecution.

89. The UFU was not satisfied that a proper and thorough investigation or

an independent analysis of that information had been undertaken.

90. On the 10th February 2015 the UFU wrote the WorkSafe requesting

WorkSafe forward its decision not to prosecute to the Director of Public

Prosecutions in accordance with the OH & S Act. WorkSafe have

recently confirmed it has done so. We are still waiting for an outcome

from the Director of Public Prosecutions.

91. In addition, the UFU wrote to the Coroner seeking an investigation. In

December 2011 the UFU wrote to the coroner requesting investigations

commence into the deaths of former firefighters and others in

connection with Fiskville. The Coroner's office responded stating it

would wait until Professor Joy's report before considering what action

to take.

92. In a letter dated 10 April 2012 the UFU through its solicitors again

wrote to the Coroner's office citing the Coroner not delay the decision

as to an investigation as there were a number of individuals diagnosed

with terminal illnesses that were exposed at Fiskville and evidence may

be lost or forgotten as time passed. In addition, as the Joy report was

commissioned and controlled by the CFA it was not an independent

inquiry and much narrower in scope to the Coroner's investigation

sought by the UFU

93. The Coroner's office responded citing section 7 of the Coroner's Act

which provides that Coroners should endeavour to avoid unnecessary

duplication of inquiries and investigation.

94. Given the UFU had then sought investigation and prosecution through

WorkSafe and now through the Director of Public Prosecutions, and

given this Parliamentary Inquiry, the UFU understands that it was likely

that the Coroner's office would be unwilling to investigate while these

inquiries were continuing.


CLOSURE OF FISKVILLE

95. On the 9th December 2014 this Parliamentary Inquiry into Fiskville was

announced.

96. On the 9th February 2015 CFA Chief Executive Officer Mick Bourke

resigned.

97. On the evening of the 3rd March we received news feared most– that

the mains water being used for firefighting and all other activity at

Fiskville was contaminated.

98. The CFA had immediately suspended all operations at Fiskville as

PFOS – believed to be from residue from firefighting foam that

supposedly was no longer in use at Fiskville – had seeped into mains

water pipes running under the training pad. As the mains water had

not been regularly tested it is not known whether the water was ever

safe or free from contaminants despite CFA and WorkSafe claiming

assurances that training could safely continue.

99. I had been at Fiskville meeting with members on the 2nd March and had

not been informed at the time that water testing results had shown

PFOS in the mains water that was being used on site.

100. On the 23rd March it was announced that Fiskville would be

closed. Media reported that 550 test results had been taken with 65

returning results well in excess of safe levels of chemicals such as

PFOS and PFOA.

101. At the time the closure of Fiskville was announced there was bi-

partisan support for proactive action finally being taken to protect

firefighters, trainees and staff from further exposure to contamination.

Attached in Tab 16 is an example of a media report where Emergency

Services Minister Jane Garrett declared the site shut and where

Opposition Emergency Services Spokesman Brad Battin said the

safety of firefighters and workers at Fiskville was a key priority.

PRIMARY ISSUES OF CONCERN

102. Taking into account the evidence of Michael Tisbury and the

submissions above, the UFU’s primary areas of concern are as follows:


i. The CFA has consistently failed to provide the UFU will all

testing results despite repeated requests. The Inquiry should

require the CFA to produce all test results.

ii. The CFA water testing regime was not comprehensive or

consistent. Testing took place at various intervals and did not

undertake the same tests or test for all contaminants every time.

It appears the CFA were selective in their testing.

iii. In 2009 the CFA changed its water testing management plan

water quality parameter for E.Coli from <10 orgs per 100 mls to

< 150 orgs per 100 ml due to failing to meet the lower standard.

The ability to change the standard due to failure to meet the

standard is abhorrent. An Agency should be required to meet

the required standard for water quality fit for purpose. Given the

exposure and inhalation of water during firefighting training the

standard must be to the level suitable for digestion i.e. drinking

water.

iv. At no time prior to June 2012 did the CFA notify the UFU or

members that water testing results had shown that the water

was not fit for purpose, cease training or take steps to prevent

exposure, and therefore continued the exposure to those

training and working at Fiskville.

v. Despite numerous reports over decades demonstrating serious

soil contamination the CFA did not notify the UFU or firefighters

and staff and therefore continued the exposure to those training

and working at Fiskville.

vi. Despite numerous reports over decades demonstrating serious

soil contamination the CFA did not undertake the remedial work

to clean up the site and therefore continued the exposure to

those training and working at Fiskville.

vii. WorkSafe failed in its obligations to investigate Fiskville and

require appropriate steps be taken to prevent firefighters and

those working at Fiskville from further exposure to contaminated

water.

viii. WorkSafe failed in its obligations to properly investigate the

UFU’s concerns.

ix. WorkSafe failed in its obligations to investigate Fiskville and to

take all reasonable steps to prevent firefighters and those

working at Fiskville from further exposure to contaminated

water.

x. The Environment Protection Agency failed in its obligations to

ensure that all reasonable steps were being taken to prevent

firefighters and those working at Fiskville from further exposure

to contaminated water.


RECOMMENDATIONS

103. The UFU recommends:

I. That the Committee require the following agencies to provide

all relevant information - without redaction - including all

water testing results, reports, investigations and

communications (internal and external) regarding the quality

of soil and water at Fiskville to the Inquiry forthwith:

CFA

MFB

WorkSafe Victoria

o Including the WorkSafe Investigation into the

UFU complaint which resulted in a decision that

there was insufficient evidence to prosecute

EPA

Department of Health and Human Services

II. That the current Board of the CFA be immediately removed

for failure to comply with its duties and responsibilities.

III. That the CFA management (including those that have since

left the CFA) be held accountable for the failure to notify

firefighters and employees of the contamination and failure to

take all reasonable steps to prevent further exposure and

therefore knowingly placing the health and safety of

firefighters and employees at risk. In order to hold the

appropriate management accountable, the investigation and

findings are to be forwarded to the appropriate agency for

prosecution.

IV. That the Committee recommends that the Minister take all

steps to bring the following before the appropriate authorities

for prosecution (criminal and/or civil) for the failure to take

reasonable steps to provide CFA employees, recruits and

members of the public safe from the foreseeable and

preventable contamination at Fiskville Training Ground and

the failure to notify said people of the contamination:

The members of the CFA Board from 2011 to present

All CFA CEO’s from 2011 to present


The management of Fiskville from 2011 to present

where it has been shown that they knowingly

continued to expose employees and the public to the

contamination.

The Board and Management of the MFB and those

responsible for firefighters training at Fiskville up until

June 2012 without undertaking all reasonable steps

including water testing and reporting.

Management of WorkSafe and those who were

responsible for overseeing the investigation of

Fiskville and to take all reasonable steps to protect

firefighters and employees from exposure to

contamination of soil and water.

Management of the Environment Protection Agency

and those who were responsible for failing to

undertake all necessary investigations as to the safety

of the Fiskville site.

V. That the appropriate Government agencies require

firefighting agencies to adhere to Government water quality

standards fit for purpose at all times and remove from

agencies any ability to change water management and

testing regimes.

VI. That the CFA ACT 1958 section 7 be amended to require

that of the five members of the Authority be appointed on the

recommendations of the Minister, including the Chairperson

that two members be volunteer members of brigades and to

be appointed from a panel of names nominated by the Board

of Volunteer Brigades Victoria, that two members shall not

be members of volunteer brigades but are to be appointed

from a panel of names nominated by the United Firefighters

Union of Australia and the fifth member be appointed from a

panel of names nominated by the Emergency Services

Commissioner.

VII. That the MFB Act 1958 be amended to require that of the

seven members of the Board be appointed on the

recommendations of the Minister and that each Board shall


include at least four members nominated by the United

Firefighters Union.

VIII. That a new training facility be built in Victoria. With the

closure of the Fiskville training ground Victoria will not have

sufficient firefighting training capacity or capability at

purpose-build facilities that include accommodation and

operate on the basis of best practice.

IX. That the OH & S Act is amended to insert a provision that

allows for certified enterprise agreements to include health

and safety provisions that allows the employee/s and their

union to elect a dispute process either through the Fair Work

Commission or through the OH & S ACT or both.

X. That the OH & S Act be amended to insert a provision that

allows for certified enterprise agreements that provides for

an employee/s and their union to be consulted on health and

safety matters in accordance with the consultation provisions

of that enterprise agreement without restriction of the OH & S

Act.

I respectfully request an opportunity to appear before the Committee.

Peter Marshall

UFUA National Secretary

Victoria Branch Secretary

to the: environment and natural resources committee · the inquiry. senior station officer tisbury...

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