to the methodological frame of psychophysiology

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362 the present treatment he reverted only after two years. From the above group still another patient reverted also in two years. Thus the revertence attained stands only at 6.6%! The effects of treatment can be still consoli- dated by the planned short-term “repetition” treatment during which the individual behavioural therapy can be repeated. There has been carried out the catamnestic investiga- tion with the aim to find the sociosexual adaptation of our former patients. TO THE METHODOLOGICAL FRAME OF PSY- CHOPHYSIOLOGY T. Radil, Institute of Physiology, Czechoslovak Aca- demy of Sciences, Prague, Czechoslovakia The main object of contemporary psychophysiology - w@ (see also Radil-Weiss, 1973; Radil-Weiss and RadiIova, 1975; Radil, 1985) is the function of brain structures and systems responsible for human psychic phenomena; in other words the basic topic of w is represented by brain mechanisms of human psychic processes; the most important specific methodological problem of fl being that dealing with the interrela- tionships between psychic (both conscious and uncon- scious) processes and the underlying neural mecha- nisms (as well as the related peripheral vegetative and motor phenomena). The philosophical and general methodological concepts providing the basic frame for ~0 are those dealing with individual human conscious- ness (the “mind”) and brain and their relationships, and with the objective dialectics of complex hierarchical material systems composed of objectively existing and mutually interacting levels of organization of the “matter” and “motion” of the human brain, engaged in processing, information, regulating bodily functions and assuring survival, adaptation and development of the human organism in the actual social and natural environment (Radii, 1986). We have to limit ourselves to a few aspects of this extremely complex topic. The first one is almost selfevident. The basic way of gaining scientific infor- mation of v@ is that of designing and performing adequate experiments. Observation (as in clinical set- ting, when the task is to analyze the results of “experi- ments performed by nature”) is just of complementary importance. Thus w@ should be experimental when- ever that is possible. Experiments are not the aim per se naturally, they are just the indispensable means for discovering the psychophysiological principles under- lying complex brain functions. It is evident that experi- mental facts have to be validated by logical-ontological processing by which they are integrated into contempo- rary scientific theory. Another aspect which is far from being selfevident is that of the ontologic nature of psychophysiology as a science. It has to be realized that the levels of organization of the “matter” and “motion” (in the present context of the structure and function) of the brain are objective reality existing independently of the researcher. Two types of specific neuroscientific branches can be dissociated: those dealing with causal relationships taking place objectively within a particu- lar level of organization of the system and those dealing with causal relationships taking place objec- tively within a particular level of organization of the system and those dealing with relationships among different levels. A typical example for the former case is molecular neurophysiology analyzing physiological processes at their macromolecular level, whereas v@ is a typical example for the latter case. Its object is the relation (which is dialectic in nature), between the objectively existing psychological and complex phy- siological level. Any specific level of organization of the brain, which might be called “psychophysiological” is just a fiction apparently not existing in reality (which does not mean that v@ is unimportant, naturally). Assumptions on the specific psychophysiological level of organization of the brain do represent just one of the ontological errors frequent when hierarchical systems are being analyzed (Radii, 1988). Thus flowcharts and conceptual constructs depicting certain blocks as “psy- chophysiological” ones, which should represent a cer- tain level in the complex hierarchy of regulations usually and correspond to a definite level of organiza- tion of the brain matter (which is supposed to exist objectively, but does not in reality), are incorrect. Besides of that the explanative power of similar flow- charts and constructs is weak as they say basically nothing on the real brain mechanisms playing role either under normal or pathological conditions. The third aspect is related to what has been just stated. It is for sure that just the verbal use of the slogan “psycho- physiology”, “psychophysiological”, etc. is gnoseo-

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Page 1: To the methodological frame of psychophysiology

362

the present treatment he reverted only after two years. From the above group still another patient reverted also in two years. Thus the revertence attained stands only at 6.6%! The effects of treatment can be still consoli- dated by the planned short-term “repetition” treatment during which the individual behavioural therapy can be repeated.

There has been carried out the catamnestic investiga- tion with the aim to find the sociosexual adaptation of our former patients.

TO THE METHODOLOGICAL FRAME OF PSY- CHOPHYSIOLOGY

T. Radil, Institute of Physiology, Czechoslovak Aca- demy of Sciences, Prague, Czechoslovakia

The main object of contemporary psychophysiology - w@ (see also Radil-Weiss, 1973; Radil-Weiss and RadiIova, 1975; Radil, 1985) is the function of brain structures and systems responsible for human psychic phenomena; in other words the basic topic of w is represented by brain mechanisms of human psychic processes; the most important specific methodological problem of fl being that dealing with the interrela- tionships between psychic (both conscious and uncon- scious) processes and the underlying neural mecha- nisms (as well as the related peripheral vegetative and motor phenomena). The philosophical and general methodological concepts providing the basic frame for ~0 are those dealing with individual human conscious- ness (the “mind”) and brain and their relationships, and with the objective dialectics of complex hierarchical material systems composed of objectively existing and mutually interacting levels of organization of the “matter” and “motion” of the human brain, engaged in processing, information, regulating bodily functions and assuring survival, adaptation and development of the human organism in the actual social and natural environment (Radii, 1986).

We have to limit ourselves to a few aspects of this extremely complex topic. The first one is almost selfevident. The basic way of gaining scientific infor- mation of v@ is that of designing and performing adequate experiments. Observation (as in clinical set- ting, when the task is to analyze the results of “experi-

ments performed by nature”) is just of complementary importance. Thus w@ should be experimental when- ever that is possible. Experiments are not the aim per se naturally, they are just the indispensable means for discovering the psychophysiological principles under- lying complex brain functions. It is evident that experi- mental facts have to be validated by logical-ontological processing by which they are integrated into contempo- rary scientific theory. Another aspect which is far from being selfevident is that of the ontologic nature of psychophysiology as a science. It has to be realized that the levels of organization of the “matter” and “motion” (in the present context of the structure and function) of the brain are objective reality existing independently of the researcher. Two types of specific neuroscientific branches can be dissociated: those dealing with causal relationships taking place objectively within a particu- lar level of organization of the system and those dealing with causal relationships taking place objec- tively within a particular level of organization of the system and those dealing with relationships among different levels. A typical example for the former case is molecular neurophysiology analyzing physiological processes at their macromolecular level, whereas v@ is a typical example for the latter case. Its object is the relation (which is dialectic in nature), between the objectively existing psychological and complex phy- siological level. Any specific level of organization of the brain, which might be called “psychophysiological” is just a fiction apparently not existing in reality (which does not mean that v@ is unimportant, naturally). Assumptions on the specific psychophysiological level of organization of the brain do represent just one of the ontological errors frequent when hierarchical systems are being analyzed (Radii, 1988). Thus flowcharts and conceptual constructs depicting certain blocks as “psy- chophysiological” ones, which should represent a cer- tain level in the complex hierarchy of regulations usually and correspond to a definite level of organiza- tion of the brain matter (which is supposed to exist objectively, but does not in reality), are incorrect. Besides of that the explanative power of similar flow- charts and constructs is weak as they say basically nothing on the real brain mechanisms playing role either under normal or pathological conditions. The third aspect is related to what has been just stated. It is for sure that just the verbal use of the slogan “psycho- physiology”, “psychophysiological”, etc. is gnoseo-

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logically meaningless. We do not increase our knowl- edge a bit when renaming for instance psychosomatics for “psychophysiology” (and that did really happen when the term “psychophysiology” became, due to real experimental contributions gained in this field, respect- ful). That does not mean naturally that v is unrelated to psychosomatics. In contrary it provides powerful means for analyzing the pathogenic mechanisms of psychosomatic diseases. Different applied branches of do exist. Contemporary w, however, does represent a unique and unified science characterized by consider- able knowledge on the topic a common system of concepts, specific set of methods and common method- ology. It is worth mentioning that traditions of our v@ go back to J.E. Purkyne, who belongs to those who started to analyze in an objective way subjective psychic phenomena.

References Radil-Weiss, T. (1973) Psychophysiology - an inter- disciplinary branch (in Czech). Cs. Psychologie 17: 485-491 Radil, T. (1985) Psychophysiology and its methodol- ogy. Activ. Nerv. Super. 27:131-133 Radil, T. (1988) Ontological errors from the point of view of hierarchical organization of human brain. (In Czech). Filosoficky Easopis, (in press) Radil-Weiss, T., Radilova, J. (1975) Psychophysiology its object and methodology (in Czech)&. psychologie 19:230-234

A NEW TYPE OF HUMAN VISUAL MEMORY MECHANISM REFLECTED IN BLOCK IMAGE RECOGNITION HYSTERESIS

Radil, T.*, Nyman, G., Laurinen, P., Haikonen, S. Institute of Psychology, Helsinki University, Helsinki; *Institute of Physiology, Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, Prague

Block images (Harmon, Julesz 1973, Morrone et al. 1983), portraits and geometrical figures have been generated using two types of computer image process- ing systems.

Hysteresis in image recognition has been described (Radii et al. 1987, 1988) in the following experiments:

The subjects start to look at the image from a near position and then move away (increase spatial frequen- cy of the image) gradually until he/she can recognize its semantic meaning (in the present experiments a face or the ambiguous nature of the impossible triangle). This minimal distance has been recorded and converted into angular measures (B/deg., i.e. number of image blocks per angular degree). Then the subjects stepped slightly more away and started to move toward the display. The distance at which he/she could no longer recognize the portrait has been recorded and expressed again in B/deg. The stimulus was on during the whole experiment (with the exception of special measure- ments - see below), which has been performed in a dark room. The basic finding confirmed in two series of experiments was that the image is still seen at distances equalling approximately to the half of that being necessary for recognition before, when moving toward the display.

It is apparent that much less information is sufficient for maintaining the cognitive-semantic features of the image already recognized before. It seems to be prob- able that a specific visual memory mechanism is involved in the process of hysteresis of image recogni- tion described.

We have tried to analyze some of its features. The phenomenon is present when the subject moves away from the display with only one eye open and then approaches the image looking with the other eye. Thus the mechanism seems to be central. It is probably linked to cognitive processes underlying the semantics of the image. No similar hysteresis was found when using Snellen optotypes or sinusoidal gratings as sti- muli. The memory trace enabling to maintain recogni- tion of the semantic meaning of the image does contribute probably to the actual percept when the external stimulus becomes subthreshold. Experiments on subjects staying with covering image or replacing it by masking stimuli consisting of randomly distributed blocks of equal size proved that the trace does not disappear when not being supported by the specific sensory information represented by the image for 5 min. That also means that the mechanisms involved are different from those of iconic visual memory character- ized by a much shorter time course. Both eyes have been closed in other experiments for a part of trajectory when moving away from or approaching the display, without influencing the hysteresis markedly. It follows