I72 Christian Ethics

view of the Bible and of Vatican II (GS 34, 57, 67), thenconscience appears object-oriented. Certainly the particular taskwhich falls to each one within this great work is only knownto him alone in his heart. But the contribution to be madein the realization of the common work must ultimately standin the service of *the fulfilment in history of the divine plan"and the unfolding of the creator's design (GS 34). This directsman to a task outside of himself and signifies for consciencean orientation toward the object and the actual world of being.

The moral law is inscribed in the hearts of men. Thisinner law is not simply identical with the moral laws andprecepts in the handbooks of ethics and moral theology. Nodoubt, the formulated norms are an essential help in theformation of conscience. Yet the norms of the manuals onlystake out a framework of moral obligations, as already explainedearlier. The moral good in is variety and richness is muchmore than what general laws can express. *Not everythingthat is morally gmd for the individual is already concretelyset forth in the general moral norm of an ethics derived frombeing and essence, even if it also cannot contradict this normand depart from the moral order in which God's will inprinciple is made known."l Precisely under this aspect menand women are called to self-reliant definition of the moraldemand, which can be called creative in a good sense.Moreover one has soberly to reckon with the possibility thatmoral norms formulated by men can be subject to imperfections,which perhaps personal conscience has to set off and tocorr@t. Not every judgment of conscience which departs froman external moral norm is an erroneous conscience, albeit aninvincibly erroneous one. Certainly dissent from a moral normcommonly, upheld requires a high degree of responsibility.The question will be given more attention below.

III. Conscience as practical moral judgment

l. Concept of the dictate of conscience

'The faculty of conscience goes into action when themorality of a concrete line of conduct, which a person wantsto follow or has followed, and the moral obligation in the

' R. S.h lund, Schdpferisches Gewissen (Freiburg: Herder,1990'), 77.

Conscience 173

concrete situation are to be judged. The moral faculty thenformulates a judgment, which is called the dictate of conscienceor also simply conscience (as in the expression ..antecedent

conscience").Conscience in this sense is defined as an ultimate, practical

judgment on the morality of a concrete action, commandingto do what is good and to avoid what is evil. It is called ipractical i\tdgment, because it is related to the ..praxis" ofthe moral activity. In most cases this judgment is not reflexivebut spontaneous. The judgment of bonscience is expresslyreflected upon especially in instances of doubt or of resistanceand disobedience to the dictates of conscience.

Conscience is called an ultimate, practical judgment incontradistinction to a practical judgment of speculativ-e nature.The first concerns a person's concrete action in a concretesituation; the second formulates general moral principles con-ceming the morality of human actions in the abstraci withoutrelation to the concrete activity of a person here and now.The principles and norms collected in moral handbooks orcatechisms are practical judgments of speculative nature.

The dictate of conscience contains a double element. Thefirst element is the judgment on the morality of a concreteaction-yhich .a person intends to'perform or- has performedor which he intends to omit or has omitted. This judgmenican be erroneous, because conscience may judge i line ofconduct to be right which is objectively wrong and vice versa.The second element is the command and obligation that whathas been recognized as good must be done br should havebeen donO, and what has been recognized as evil must beomitted or should have been omitted. This obligation iscategorical. It is not only always right to follow it, it isobligatory to do so.

Just as the faculty of conscience is not merely a collectionof pre-existent moral ncirms, so the concrete judgment ofconscience is not merely an act in which general

-moial norms

are applied to a concrete action here and now. True, such anapplication also takes place, but it is always accompanied andcompleted by a person's fundamental awareness of-his or herpersonal destiny and individual calling in the service of theintentions of God and the plan of creation. Even the generalmoral laws are formulated under the influence of this awirenesswhich men have of the purpose and meaning of their lives

'i,It

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1t:

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174 Chrktian Etlics

and ihe world at large. It is for that reason that the general

laws can appeal to the corsciences of men, because ultimatelythe laws have been formulated under their inspiration andcontrol.

2. Divkion of conscience

Conscience can be anlecedent or cotlsequqnr. It is calledantecedent if the judgment on the morality of an action and

the obligation to perform or omit it is passed before the actionis trans6ted into ieality. The antecedent conscience commandgexhorts, permits, or forbids. Conscience is called consequent

if it evaluates a deed already done or omitted. The consequent

conscience approves, excuses, reproves' or accuses.

Conscience canbe certain or doubtful: A certain consciencepasses judgment without fear of enor. For moral certainty itiufficei thit all reasonable fear be excluded. Thus a person

who is convinced that he has paid back the 200 dollars he

owed to his friend has a certain conscience. An absolutelycertain conscience howdver can still be erroneous. For example,if the debt is paid in instalments, it may still be true-thatthe person is misaken and that only 150 dollars have been

paid. The doubtful conscience on the other hand is uncertainionceming the morality of an action. Therefore it suspends

its judgmJnts; or it passes judgment but- with reasonable fear

of irriig. Thus a youth who doubts whether -it- is right for

him to &e a controversial movie has a doubtful conscience.

Conscience can be right or erroneous according as the

practical moral judgment agrees or disagrees with- the objectivenorms of morality. Tfre peison who jrgdges that it is not riglttto get a divorce dimply because his wife is no longer beautifulhas- a right conscienie. An erroneous conscience is eitherinvincibf or vincibly so. The invincibly erroneous conscience

is inculpabte, sinci the person has n9 awareness of thepossibiliiy of error. If Hindus believe they may nd eat the

meat of iows, their conscience is erroneous frorn a Christianpoint of view. But for the Hindus this error is invincible,5i*" tfr"ir retigion teaches them that cows are sacred- Thei

vincibly errondus conscience on the other han{ is culpable,

becausl with some good will its error could be correcte{e.s. if a white iudse is aware that he too uncritically accepted

thE testimony df iAouUtful witness against a black defendant'

.Ll

lt

,f

lii

Conscience 175

The perplexed conscience and the judgments of the tax andscrupulous conscience ire species of the erroneous conscience.

The perplex and lax conscience will be dealt with separate-ly -below. The scrupulous conscience is less an erroneous thana sick conscience. Scrupulosity is the persistent, gnawing,unreasonable fear that one has offended God or is about todo so. The scrupulous person is in constant dread of sinwhere there is none, or of grave sin where there is onlyveniil sin. The roots of this state of doubt and fear are notprimarily of rational character; they are above all to be soughtin disturbed emotions. Vaguely the afflicted person himselffeels that his doubts are futile and should be despised; buthe is unable to escape them. If need be, it may be advisableto refer the afflicted person to- a' psychiatrist. Frequentlyhowever psychiatric help is not available or feasible. In suchcases the priest can try the supportive kind of help whichthe more traditional methods have advocated. He then willendeavour to inform himself about them.l Fortunately theproblem has lost much of its urgency today. Together withthe elimination of legalism in moral and ascetic theology inrecent decades, the instances of scrupulosity have becomemuch rarer.

In ethical discussions today a strong stress is often laidon the distinction between moral goodness or badness andmoral rightness or wrongness. This distinction correspondswith the traditional distinction between a certain conscience(which judges something in firm conviction as morally goodor evil, whereby it can err) and a right conscience (whichcorrectly judges something as morally right or wrong). Whatis morally good must noi necessarily be mbrally right, andvice versa. If a daughter believes that she has to deny childabuse before the court because the accused is her father, thenshe does something which on account of her inner belief ismorally good; but objectively morally wrong.

IV. Stages in the development of conscience

A distinction.must be made between the evolving con-science in childhoo4 which is predominantly an authoritarian- l{.; very good and helpful treatment of scrupulosity in G.Hagmaier/R Gleason, Courcelling the Catlnlic (New York Sheed andWard, 1964), 145-173. For some basic moral principles in guidance seeH. Jone; MoralTheology, 1963, nr.9l.

176 Christian Ethics

conscience or a "must-conscience-, and the mature' adult form

;i"d;;;, *hi"h can G qualinia p an *ought-co11iep9"'

i; tr "f ;t*Li itpo.t"n"" ih"t on the- wav to adulthood the

authoritarian ru.u"Jnili""*i' "r,tt" "hild'd"uelops into the

frsonaf ought-conscience of the grown-up' matule person'

Some authors speak of superego instead of must-con-

s"i..[e.--Ho*"u",,6i. t"t.inof6gy. T" .mote readily- exposed

i"'*it".J"*tanding, since for FrJud, who introduced.the term

r"p"i"l", mis is eiientially an oppressive'. unauthentic-:Ifi:r,il"t""t"'"f the human psyche, whereas the musl-consclence

il;;;-;t il therefbrL genuine srage in the development

;? ;d;;.i. rt or"' *t o uOipt ttt" terni superego accordingly

il;;il;;;,ion that the sup'erego,..although basically. a prin;

;ili;;i censorship and cohtrol, *st!.11. has a oositive and

lli""ri"r"i'il;;it;' l; ;';;;ionutiti"'' In ihildren' the

lffi;*'3';; u'ptiti,iu" but necessary staee on the wav to

gen ui ne conscience. in' ua"G, iil: -1ry,

t^:qo finctions pmitivel y

when intelrated lnto a mature conscience to relieve us from

ilffis;;?;lA; ft"-thlvH;"e5r i.rptancc those matters which

;;; ;F*dr iegi ti ma;Iy' oeieimi'iea bv convention 9r cul1f i'^l

In thl v[w of many psychologiss' the musl-consqence

of ttie c-t itA euotuo oui o'i patentil commands' rTt-rylt-o:l:

;;d';;"hibiiions. Some form of punishment often accomparu€s

il;tJ'.";;;;;dt. Th;.itiiJ "r ioutt" does not know lvfr fe

must or must not aL l"*in thingg' tfe complies with the

oilltt-U"iu*. they are prescribed by his oarents' He spon-

taneously submits to theii competenc€.and knowledge'- 1nd h9

;;;i;" iuu, ttt.it"puniitt'nlnt if he disobevs' Although

i"i,i.rry't"umission'is'i"na"t"a.only as far as the parents'

;;ffii reaches, trt" "tirO

giadually.;interiorizes- the extemal

"oi.. .f u"thoiity and fol'iows their orders and norms even

when he is alone.

Mor" ,o"ntly however greater attention is also given to*,ro nr imitntion ,"Jia?ntincation in the formation of

the rule of imitation and ion in the formation of

--t RM..cula, Reason Informed b-y $ith (NewYork P,alli:t^Pi:.:i

t e8 e), 1 2 8. I n t he. sa me i'i"v'p-;i{ rai'{-"-l -Y 1::^t: -*f:'1:*" ;*t:lH,lil'L'ii,il,}iif il"dii'Er-,I;,:*1*"::s:*':i':,f '3lHl;iiil';il..s; ii' neJos"'vi 1l'" :!9."i:n:,.1:

*f; J:t'ltiXl,ill:.iiii jff;f#:"GffiF;ilFi*m jl:ll'*without it.i n re lation to t he later o"i"r"p"**i ir. iot*itlg"'- tht.:: f:ig:::tl"Trn reralron to rrrc rdtsr "lttt"iiiii tilGhi;h ;p.ns at ttreiighi moment"a Dennanenl prison or the

ii;;" il b r, ;' ;i" rn *.' ul^don : d' c haiiman' te 6' rz L\'

';,1,lflff

,|

Conscience 177

the child's value patterns and ideals. Imitation and identifichtionplay a role in the development of conscience which is at leastequal to that of commands and prohibitions, and probablysuperior to them. I

Thus the early stage of conscience is formed, which isdue to the internalization of parental and social rules andideals.l Inasmuch as these rules are in harmony with thechild's true nature, they contribute substantially to the formationof an authentic conscience. But if they disregard the child'sreal constitution, they give rise to kinds of "superegds" and"personas" which do violence to and suppress. the true per-sonality. Furthermore the must-conscience is inclined to limitthe moral obligations to certain areas, i.e. to those areas whichare covered by the parental and social norms. The other areasappear to be morally indifferent and left to a person's freediscretion, which is a legalistic contraction of the moralobligation. The imitation of examples, though, can transcendthis framework, but can after all not fully compensate forthis inadequacy.'

As the child grows older and progresses towards adulthood,the must-conscience is to give way to the mature ought-con-science.2 The ought-conscience is no longer primarily sustainedby fear of punishment and extemal imitation. Rather it originatesfrom the conviction of the inner value of the moral obligation,from the inner law of a person's nature and the divine callingas spelled out in that centre of the human person which isa person's true self. Emphasis has shifted from, imitation andparental and social iontrol to personal responsibility. Thereremain many "musts" in adulthood, but they spring now froma sense of duty to build and not to tear down one's personalily

' A, ,lr"s the "superego' stage of conscience, which is primarilyformed in early childhood through the child's relation to the parents, isdistinguished from a more developed stage of conscience based on con-ventional morality, which is formed in interaction with the social group.This then is followed by the third stage of the ought-conscience. Thisthre€fold division is based on the theories of J. Piaget and L. Kohlberg

, (see G. Grisez, Tlie Way of the Lord Jesng vol. I. Chicago: FranciscanHerald, 1983, 89f). The superego stage of conscience and the conscienceguided by convention are however both forms of the authorilarian con-science, and their limits seem to be substantially of the same nature.

2 According to Jean Piaget the lransition from rhe "heteronomous'to the "autonomous" conscience occurs at about seven yean of age innormal children.

':l';

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'i{i'

r78 Christian Ethics

and from a sense of responsibility for the common good and

for the kingdom of the lord'Fundailentally there can be no opposition between an

''adult conscience and the "musts" of moral law' (Ihe qugt-

conscience to the g;;.i;; t*i"nt reflects the moral law of the

;;il;iri.i-n.t tfi. tit oi ttt" law is to exDress and clarifv

what one ought to ;U olit:tl'lqun abiliti& and the divine

."iri"J' ;g.ti." in pti#pte itre aautt person will acknowledge

Iil-'S"t"or" ln ttre-'tuni the imperativ.e of his own striving

;;.;dt'h;"n arrd-Ctrristian adulthood' even though he may

be clearly aware "f th;'-i*p"rfections in its formulation and

thus of the correctiont fl" 'must introduce into it' To be -inprinciple hostile unO- oppo*a. to evell law may safely be

i""rio'.r.a "n

inrattiuteilgn of immaruriiy."t At tirnes however

there will U" in.tui.", -*tt"r"

the deeper ought-conscience

,".t!niz.s the norms of the must-conscience as inadequate'

and that all the *o;;; tht mtre deficient v.iews "$ liT1ltl,gi;i;ril have influenced the formarion of the must-consqence.

The modifieA norm-muy simply be grounde4:" I clealgr

iniigtti-una tne transition to it may ensue without greater

conflicts. But the a.tu.fl*tnt from the old bonds can at times

;il;;;pi"o *itt "onsiderable

pain and euilt feelings' e'g'

if one is dealing ;ilh';;*pty- iU6t"a, unar;hentic ego-ideal.- - No, alwayJ the transition ftom the must-conscience to

the adult ougttt-.on'.tilnt" ii tutcessfully effected' Phfsi,gf'

i"iff".t""f uiA t*uf adulthood do not necessarily go together'

One person .u".".d, in forming a personal conscience' The

ir*.[[-."0-uufufi.-toai teariea irom others he is able to

incorporate u, purioittit own inner attitude and conviction'

Totheoutsider,upoton-*noseconscienceisthusself-reliantwill create ttre i#pression tttut his moral and religioris.life

comes straight ft"#il;;;;tt uno l'9t itt roots in a harmonized

;;;;;;;iily: sis retationship.s with his fellow-men are not

blocked by a mechl"i""i "ppti"ation

of principles and regula-

tions.But it is different with people whots consciences remain

autnoiitarian and do nor reach maturity' Their moral behaviour

;'iil;;;;;';'1il;d;; ;;i"r of principre with rittre warmth

"f ;;"li;!. For them the demands of .conscience remarn a

i;r;ig"-6dy, .*,"rnui o'-"u"n in opposition to the true' inner

- ' L."t. Monden, Sin, Liberry and law' l' c' 102'

Conscience L79

self. It is by no means necessary that they should experiengeconscience as a foreign body, because from childhood on themclral demands of the social environment have been absorbedand interiorized. Yet ultimately these people do not live fromthe depth of their soul, but do what ofhers expect of them.l

There are many stages possible in the transition fromauthoritarian to mature conscience. Perfect ,maturity of con-science, such as realized by those saints who were only ruledby St. Augustine's principle "Love and do as you will", iscertainly rare. It makes part of authentic adulthood self-criticallyto acknowledge what has remained infantile in oneself andhow far short one's spiritual stature falls of the full adultstature of Christ..This will make a person all the more readyto listen to what the law can provide as a help and correctionof one's own views and unreliable leanings.2 Such acceptanceof the law is not immature submission proceeding from fearand external constraint, but is approval resulting from theinsight into one's limitations and from the knowledge that themoral laws are fruits of the experience and common work ofmany generations. However once a person has sufficientlyformed his conscience by attending to the law of nature andof grace, by purifying his intentions and gathering solidinformation, there comes a moment when he rhust be able torely on his own conscience, because no mere legality cansufficiently answer God's personal call and invitation.

B. The'binding force of conscience

I. The certain conscience

l. A certain conscience must always be obeyed when itcommands or forbids. It may always be followed when itpermits something. Paul states that "whatever does not proceedfrom faith is sin" (Rom 14:23). According to the context, he

'l F- th. characterization of rhe developed and undeveloped adultccrscicnce, cf. R. Egcnterand P. Matussek, Faith, Freedom and Conscience(Dublin: Gill and Son, 1967, ll8f; compare pp.9l and ll5).

2 The prohibition, existing in rnany states, of lhe sale of firb weapbnswithout spccial licensc is based on the cxpcriencc that private pcrsonsoflen do riot know how to handlc them prudcntly. The same is irue of theprohibition of the salc of narcotics.

180 Christian Ethics

means to say that every action which is not performed withthe certain conviction of its rightfulness is sin

The reason for the principle is that conscience is thatappropriate faculty of man which tells him what his moral,duties are. Conscience as the sense of right and wrong inman is the necessary cons€quence of a divine plan for theworld and of a purposeful world order. For neither the orderof nature nor the divine plan can be realized without a sensein man informing him about the place falling to his lot inthe world and the role he has to fulfil in it. Through themediation of conscience everybody gains the necesslry insightinto the laws he is to respect in the qrder of creation andthe tasks he is to fulfil in the service of God's plan for theworld. [t is the competent and indispelrsable guide given toman to discem his vocation and moral obligation. Thereforeto disobey this faculty is to disobey the moral order, is todisobey the will of Go4 and this is sin.

2. the certainty required for the judgments of consciencegenerally need not be a srict moral certainty, but a widemoral certainty is sufficient.

Strict moral certainty excludes any reasonable fear oferror. Strict moral certainties are the assumpions that pmplewill not kill arbitrarily, that Catholic priests or Anglicanministers baptize validly, that the apostles Peter and Paul metdeath in Rome; the opposites ivould contradict the normalbehaviour of rational beings and the assured rules of historicalverification. Wide moral certainty is accompanied by a slightyet negligible fear of error, because the possibility of erroris of linle probability. The assumptiors that physicians willact responsibly and with competence or that drivers willrespect the basic traffic rules are wide moral certainties. Widemoral certainty is equally the supposition that an action cannotbe pernicious and can therefore lawfully be performed ifseveral competent moral theologians regard it as licit, althoughothers are of a different opinion. The wide moral certaintycould also be characterized as a very high probability. It hasalso been termed *prudential certainty-.

Wide moral'certainty is sufficient for licit operation inthe general conditions of life, because frequently only thiscertainty can be obtained. Always to require strict moralcertainty for lawful actioll would burden life with many

anxieties and render it intolerable.the impmsible.

Conscience tgl

God does not command

Only in a few cases is wide moral certainty insufficient,namely, where a value is so importanl tnut noi-,";;;-;;]i'lr,risk can be taken to. damage it;'"j.'*n."-,-rti'r"""";";F "leading personality rs of gr-eat i*portun""'il';;J;&ft"

good (in which case one rirt ca' in not onry ong but threephysicians), or if at the visit of ;A;;g; head of state mulriDteprecaurions are taken to guard uguinst"any *pr."r#,'#l.l,.- 3. The invincibry erroneous conscience must ue

troilo*eajust the s:rme as a certain .oni"irn""';i;hl";igh,i-d#f.;"he who lies to heln a neighbour oui oi'u diffi;;lt),,

";;;;;that ro do so is an act :t ;l.rfur, iciually does perform alaudable act of fraternal - cfrariti;--lni,frouiO h" ;"i;;;;;;ryto. his erroneous conscience he;;i; ,t". G ii";;rl;dwhoever rhinks rhat it is a sin r. Jt'"rh h;li;;;"";;il;illtsays it sins, although, as a mattei oi. fu"t, ,f,l' ._p'r*.;;i;not sinful in itself.-

Paul's statement that ..whatever does not proceed fromfaith is sin- actuaty-refers to u"

"ironlous conscience. In theRoman communirv th;;; ;;;e-Lrl"c1'ri"ians who berievedthat the use of miat ano *in; ;;;;;"tt'was forbidden (Rom14:2-21)- paur asserrs that those-who judge ttut roictiili"",no food is "unclean".wele ,igfrt. nJl-t[" food;is-'unl#;for any one who thinks it un8i.un; G;, M:14), and sucha man "is condemned,^.if

_he eats, because he does ;J;;;from fairh" (Rom l4:23y, rn r toriiiiriin, g, paur examinesa.similar problem. It concerns the meat f;*'pu;;; ;;;;ffi;which was offered for sare in tt" puuric markets. Arthoushj!1.lle-l, knowtedge is that tt.r" aie-n; ::rf,o'iIa#H;::rnar rnere rs norhins against eating meat froil .u"n raira.iJussacrifi-ces, nevertheiess-ttrose *ho"tiiinr,- .u"r, meat forbiddc.lwould sin if thev ate it. ..Their

"onr.i"n.., being weak, is!efi19$" (I Cor t:7). Tlre uftirrt" unJ decisive measure ofmorality is rherefore, according ro paul's.t*i t"u"ffi-;;Jtsubjective conscience, even if ifjudg;;;ongly. A .;fih;ii;;

I ^,

"9.lTI:,*ft",.h::t"-qy !.s nor a.tways hetd rhis principte withll!,"'L::-:].p-qf I-'^FF'"i.".";q;i#'.",';:;."ii""#illjfi .X,Tli::'#lf :119

,hi r,isrory ;iil,[ ;;;;;]; A.fr"ii;l;,dHJ^ T,:.Hi.H;Brti:!!s: r, Gewiss'en ,^a iui,iiii itiii,iiiffi i\i,i:::l fi;T;:::

182 Christian Ethics

of this doctrine can be found in the words of Chris' which

he addressed to the pit"tistot *If yoy were blind' you would

il;;;;,; tl" q,al).-ttrut i., iirhe Pharisees were unable

to detect their errors -i,on.i-ing

the person of Jesuq they

ili;-L -ei"ureO fior iin; bit as i matter of fact their

consciences *.r" noi-i'*in"ibry but.vincibly erroneous' and

ii'"lirrri-,lty *"t" responsible for their wrorrg-doing' .

, The inner reason foi the axiom is that a certain conscience'

even if it erroneoui;:'p6;i iomettrins as eood or bad'

proposes it as one's'rirolat bUtigation and is the-will of God'

iJ"Jitou"y this certain, ttrougfr erroneotrs iudsment of con-

science would |n"un io"oi*'#,i ;Fl is "urji"ci'iuely

believed

as one's moral duty ft Gff;*ill; therofori it would signify.

sin.Were man not entitled and bound to follow the certain

l*,!;:*I.';tm:"n::l.!:sffif.iili'i.."lsrt&F;h;;*ibility or uny itutttnotttty decision' on the other hand'

i;; frb;ilitie -io

h'is certain ionscience he acts in a wav

tirrr.t ""iiii"Jrtit, i"

"p*; "f occasional erors' to bqt realize

i,iili"lJ'g".c una'to-uioia *nat is evit. Although rhere is.a

;i.['"f Juiectiuety *-ng o*ryions, it is remote; while it is

"r*i.ul"'if theiudgments of conscience were simply dis-

i;;il;-;;;1d;;;;i of the wrong generalization that

co"nscience is unreliable'-- -il; possibility of erroneous judgments of conscience

should howevemul" *un caurious-in his decisions and open

;ih;;;ki or otneis- r"p""iotty in clse of fanatic convictions

irt"'i*."Aiate oangei.J blind'preposqession exists' Whoever

il;;;-;;"r" tt'ii't'" ii in tiltti u state of mln4 has th9

urgent duty to "*u*in"

hit *iudg'nents of conscience- with

;ril';;'Yet after having donJ what is in one's power to

:ffi;;" ;;;; decisiSn, one has the rigtt and.dutv.to

iliif;*";;;, "onr"i*e also in instances of invincible ig-

norance' f ottprs is conceme4As far as the eroneous consclence (

on" t,*'in piin"ipre'io iop."t their honest convictions. [t can

U"iJ"i*UfE to tol"rut. an erroneous gRinjon u$-t9-ry,?l:I'Iti,i'i]iit;; ;''-; not particularlv ^damagi*#o,tt,

t1;

lilllo'i'," iJ*'.i"ri ;;;rd'iuu* qYl:' i:J':p:*'j;* il'il,,"' d;";;i';;;';";fi. wourd i"":; .tg^i1* T":,,1isenousil';;J:A;i';;i;;;4, ui i' mostrv the case' it wilr

Conscience 183

certainly be a work of charity to find a way of removing it.And where the erroneous conscience even threatens fundamentalgoods and rights of others, one is obliged to oppose it firmly.and.to prevent the injustice within the scope of the possible.Thus if a religious fanatic believes that he ought to kill arepresentative of his religion pleading for tolerance, then thepolice can and must hinder the potential murderer, if theycome to know about his intentions, and take him into custody.l

Note that the unavoidable cannot be sinful, even thoughone falsely believes it to be a sin. Thus a gravely ill daughterdoes not sin if she cannot travel to the funeral of her father,even if she thinks she has by this gravely offended againstthe duty of filial love.

II. The vincibly erroneous and lax conscience

(l) The vincibly erroneous conscience cannot be followedas a legitimate rule of action. Conscience is vincibly erroneousif it dawns on man that his moral outlook might not beentirely sound or if he is aware of being carelJss and ir-responsible in his decisions. Thus a physician may haveexamined a patient only hastily with the result that he is notable to make a responsible diagnosis. With such a state ofmind a person is not allowed to act or to appease himself,since he would voluntarily expose himself to the danger ofcommitting error and sin.' i

Before a pgrson with a vincibly eroneous conscience canact, he must first remove his doubtful state by searching afterthe truth. If he is not able to do so for the moment, he mustpostpone the action, or he must follow the safer line of action.If a motorist doubts, whether he may still drink another glassof wine, the safer altemative is not to drink another one.

(2) Akin to the vincibly erroneous conscience is thedulled or lax conscience. The lax conscience is inclined, oninsufficient grounds, to judge a thing to be lawful which issinful, or something to be a light sin which is actually a

. grave one. In a light-minded and sometimes frivolgus way.- \""1195 Premier Rabin was shot in Tel Aviv, "by order of God",

through the student Yigal Amir, who regarded Rabin's consent to Pales-tinian autonomy as treason. Had the police known about the intentions ofthe sludent, rhey would have had the right aird the duty to place him underdetention.

il184 Christian Ethics

the lax "o*.i"n""

does not face up to the gravity of thernoral obligation. A businessman, for examplg may regardthe defrauding of huge tax amounts as a light matter onlyand some cheating in the quality of his goods as normal,lawful business practice.

A person who is of lax conscierrce has the general andgrave obligation to reform this state of mind, since it exposeshim to the danger of sin and since it must, as a rule, beconsidered as vincibly erron@us. He must pay much moreattention to doubts that occur to him than others need do,and he may not readily disregard them as mere scruples. Butif such a person is unaware of his state of conscience anddoes not recognize, even in a general way, the malice of anaction or his duty to make further investigation, his consciencemust b regarded as invincibly erroneous and he would beexcused from sin in this particular case. Nevertheless thecausation of this state of mind may well have been accompaniedby guilt. It can result from the refusal to search for andrico 're the truth. This free refirsal which prevents the properknowledge is culpable. *The goodness or evil of the person

do therefore not begin with the moment in which consciencehas spoken and do not depend only on obedience or dis-obediince to its judgment; they extend to the very elaboationof its judgment and depend on its obedience or disobedienceto the truth."l

A lax conscienoe is usually the resuli of lukewarmnessin the service of Go4 as depiaed in the bmk of Revelation3:15-20. Christ counsels the lax members of his Church tobuy from him the remedies for their lukewarmness. Theseremedies are a re-vitalization of religious life and faith inGo{ the probing of corscience and repentance, and zeal indoing good workS. God himself announces his visitations as

a remedy. The antithesis to a lax conscience is the tenderconscience or the delicate conscience, which is characterizedby a clear and vigilant discernment of the good.

(3) A particular variety is the compensatory conscience.Through a bothersome preoccupation with small and quiteinnocentdetails of morality it attempts to conceal a fundamental

t G. c*i, L c. 136.

Conscience 185

1$ of generosity in the sp-iritual life.r Th_is compensarorysupersession is intended to'divert attention rrom th!-u"*iir-ingness to live up to one's t-" uo"uiion. A crient with these' "tepidity scrupres'- tries to outuin-iro* tt" spirituar guide theassurance that he has not reaily offended agaiil r,lr',r*rduties, which is true with regard t" itr" a"r""illonroi"a', u",not with regard to the deepJr lack of faithfulness. Th;;;i;in spite of possible approval uy tr," piiert

". .""^"ii;;;;;counselee's deener self will not be at peace. The treatmentof this type- of scrupulous un*i ,nli'Urlng to consciousnessthe secret lack of generosity by an'undeis;;i;g;^;;i;,sincere conversation, rrre tr6uuieJ penon must rearize thathis unrest is an invitation to " i*t'"irunge of heart and toa rnore faithful answer to the eall of divlne ;r;;;';il; ;;lL.^ :pi*t*lory conscience is the pharisaic

"o,i"i"n"", ;il;i,

l,_Tno great imrlortance to small things and makes light ofserious matters (cf. Is 5:20).

III. The perplexed conscience

. . trq perplexed conscience is a type of erroneous consciencewhich, in a conflict_ of duties, feir's sin in whativei*.-h;i;;it makes. A widowed.mother, *f,o tusllceiu"a muny'b;;;fii;llor,l friendly family whose fatheihus caused a car crashor wntcn she was a witness, will easily find herself in tfreconflict between the obrigation or gruiit,ioe to trei uen"f..;and the. obligation to te[ Ihe truth i; ;;un, where ste ii-c;t"oas a witness.

In such instances, if the decision can be delayed" onemgt.fi.pt postpone the action in order to obtain i#o;uti;and deliberate on it. But if the decision .unnot be postooned.one must choose what appears to be ttre ressei eiil-J.-l-iilT: ir impossibte. to settti - eittrei;i ;h" attematives. TheoDseryance of these loJm: presupposed, there is no questionof formal sin, since it is im'possibis f;;'ti," p"r.on ro es@pe

--l Adrl."=van Kaam speaks of .'rife-guirt". This guirt does not referto one or orher incidental tia_nsgression. It-resultrfro;; d.i;r;il;i';

Ti:.ryid,lg one's pe.rsonar catr. Accoroingit iiiiiifr';,"iiipi"[,-.,r::li:fi :iJ:'{:lti:!:;t:Eifil,t*xH#ff:f:;ll*o:olq_':lulr"', bur ii;;; ail .;f ;;.r r; ;#iillil'J:idis'action, e. g.- in resitesq aissi paii ng il""t,il;, ;#;f ilffi tffi:1"".;

186 Christian Ethics

both alternatives of the perplexing situation loge.ttter' Impos-

iiuiiiti ""a lack of freedoni however preclude sin'

A further guide for such instances is the rule that precepts

of natur"f -1"*

&din"rily precede precQPts of pcitive.ecclesias-

tical and civil law, supposing that the -moral gray1ry ot.lne

conflicting preceps rs approximately-the same' tlence lr a

;;i;;E &iie,il by praiep of the-church to sg.to,punglMass and bound by charity to stay with a crttlcally slcK

."ii*t. the obtieati6n of cliarity should be prefened to the

;bii;;ii." of the- ecclesiastical. precept' Iurthermore prelePF

*niEfr ur" certain prevail over thbse which are merely probable

or doubtful- -il; ferple*bO conscience is classified as a'type of

"r.onlou, conscience, because objectively only oqrg of the two

;;;fii"ht ourig"ti;' c1n-be. Sinaing' ft *9{9-"gil1g::iffi;;;;;e ,h" i,;J; gi o.* ir mai,wer" ""9{Y}tlYlli;;A;;lli'uinoing ouligations, of which after all he can

fulfil only one.Such conflicts more readily occur in individuals who are

for ""q".i"ted

with the moral-norms' However this qT,^Tliilri,oA--i-i'ri.-p.ttibiti,ithatevenlheelg:t131l-111-:.Ti::5.iiit""i,i'Ht-i; dme time be in a state of-perplgxi.tv.as.^ +!16 ^.o.,ailino nhliontion in a narticular conflict of duties6 th" prevailing obligation in a particular

"i iiif,[. The iommEntaries of ihe Catholic bishops' con-

i"r"#"t on the encyclical "Humanae Vitae' corrceming. the

l-riin.i"f ;;; of birth control can serve as an illusration.

IV. The doubtful conscience

' conscience is doubtful if it is in a state of unceftainty

as to ifri ta*futness or obligation of an action' whether

lonoien." Jr.p"nO, its judgmlen,'- or whether it inclines to

""" iia", Uut wittr the fear-that the contrary might equally

be true.The doubt may either concem the existence of a law and

tnorui'iri*ii\e (iubium iaris) or the- existence of a fact'i;;bir; factb. Tite question whether therapeutic -abortion

is

iawful ii a douh conceming a principle, whil$ the quesuon

whether the growth in the uterus of a sick woman ls a tumour

..'i-'lttilalJ. a"uut concarning the existence of a fact'

Another distinction is that beiween speculative q{ practical

OouUt.-.rn" former is concerned with the theoretical truth of

Cottscience

an ethical doctrine (e.g. whether the killing of a tyrant maysometimes tie lawful);

-the latter deals wirtithe lawfulness o?

an action to--be performed here and now (e.g. whether it islawful to kill this particular tyrant here and iow).

I

Nornts for action with doubtful conscience

. -The basic principle reads: In a practical doubt about thelawfulness of an action one may noi act. The reason is thatby actrlrg with a doubtful conscience, a person would

"*po*himse.lf to the danger of injustice and sin, and that irelfl isrnJustice and sin. Therefore a hunter who doubts whether whathe.is aiming at is an animal or a man, is guilty of homicideif he kills, even if it tums out that he slei an animal.

Action in insrances of a doubtful conscience is regulatedby the following rules: The action must be postponeE untilc.ertainty- can be reached. practical certainty-can be gained/iregtly py solving rhe doubt through refleciion on ttE casein the light of general principles,-through consultation of. expe$ and--pertinent books, through clarifilation of the facts,etc. The effort one is obliged to make in order to acquirecertainty ii to be measured-by the importance of the valueswhich are to be safeguarded. aprudencl forbids us to devote'excessive

attention and research to trivial matters because thii. would rob us of the spirit of joy in doing good and, mostof all, because it would'greatly iramper the Tulhlment oirnor"urgent and more important. duties.ri

If the doubt cannol be solved directly - but only then -one..may attempl to gail practical certainty indirectly by theapplication of rhe so-called reflex princijtes. fhes6 d6 notsglve the theoretical doubt about the'existence of a law, right,or fact (e.g- whether an accused person is guilty); but certaintyis obtained as to what one may or musi do here and noi(e.g. -in doubt presumption favours the accused). The reflexprinciples will be dealt with in detail in the next section.

If there is no time or possibility to solve the doubt" onemust opt for the safer alternative, lhat is, one must favourthe altemative which excludes the danger of sin and injusticim_ost cerrainly. Hence if somebody do-ubts whether thj drueLSD is allowed he may not rake-it. If no safer side can bE

-.

H*i ng, The'l-a' ofcfirisr, .vor. r, rgff-, r7z.

r88 Chrktian Ethics

disceme4 the situation amounts to a perplexed conscience'

and the person may choose whatever alternative seems best

to him.

C. Formation of a certain conscience by means of

reflex principles

I. Nature and varieties of reflex principles

Reflex principles are rules of- prudence which do not

solve a dou'bt concerning the existence of a law, moral

oiinciole. or fact bv intriniic or extrinsic evidence, but only

inO"ui. ur to *h"r", in cases of insoluble doubt, the greater

;i"h; E usually to be found and the lesser evil to be feared'

",iJ-*fri"fr iide ttrerefore is to be favoured as long as- the

A""Ui p"itittt The principles-are gained by inference.fromtti .o.ron circumitances of such cases and the ordinary

iruoo"ninnt of life, from general experience and observation'

il'i;i;;l?-"i u"tuit evideice, the reflex principlts give sub-

,iaiury *r"tions, which will not in all instances do justice toilil;tG;oncemed, but which ?t l?ut gu1ante?.'h"t"ill!:maiority of cases injustice is avoided and the rights of those

""ri."tti"d are safeguarded best. If, e.g', in a court case two

;;;G-;I"i. ttre iame estate' the salest solution would be

frua if one side were able to procure intrirsic evidence of his

;;;;;tht; by submitting unequivocal.documents' But if no

p"ii-i, luid to do so, -the lawsuit will often be settled by

Ioot'ication of the rule'of prudence: in doubt, the condition

;f'th" p"..essor is the betier, i.e. of that possessor whg ,1

Dresent'lives on the land, cultivates it or actually uses lt rnanother way. This principle will not-always.$o justice toih:oarty which is not in possession; and the arbitration theretore

i.rliri-i"urioi"iy. But according to gomr-non experience, thesolution of the d6ubt thus gained is the right one more otten

than not.The most comprehensive of the reflex p-rinciples, to which

all ttre others can be reduced, is the rule: ln doubt we inust

.tunOton that side where preiumption stands, Presumption.is

understood as a conjectur" .s to where in cases of doubt the

sreater rieht commonly lies and the lesser injustice is to be

Feared. Tfis side is supposed to be within his rights untll the

truth of the contrary is Proved.

Corccience 189

The other reflex principles specify more in detail wherein doubt presumption stands. They are the following:

l. In doubt, the condition of the possessor is the better.(ln dubio melior est conditio possidentis.)In doubt, favour the accused; or: crime is not to bepresumed, but to be proved.In doubt, presumption stands on the side of thesupenor.In doubt, stand for the validity of the act (e.g. thevalidity of the matrimonial bond cf. CIC 1060, orthe validity of an examination or an appointment toan office; however doubtful contracts are usually notupheld by civil law.) '

In doubt, amplify the favourable, restrict the un-favourable. (Favorabilia sunt amplianda, . odiosarestringenda.)In doubt, presumption stands for the usual and theordinary; or: follow daily and ordinary experience.(8.g. in doubt whether an apparition is miraculousor a mere imagination, the latter is to be assumed.)In doubt, favour the custor4ary and hitherto approved. t

A doubtful law does not oblige (lex dubia nonobligat), i.e. presumption stands for liberty.

With regard to the last principle, "a doubtful law doesnot oblige', it must be noted that this principle can be appliedonly in instances of common doubt, i.e. when tho law isdoubtful among the very experts. If an undisputed law issolely doubtful to a particular person in a particular case,then such a doubt must be dealt with like a doubtful fact;e.g. if a man doubts whether it is lawful to help his ftiendin stealing some articles from a car repair shop. To instancesof doubtful facts the following rules apply:

(l) If there is a risk of serious spiritual or temporallnrm (be it to oneself, to anotlur person or to a cornmunity),which one is obliged to avoid by an indubitable law, the

I J. Crii"del arrives at this rule: *To depart from customary andhitherto moral action, without thc support of weighty reasons, is irrespon-sible- (J. Griindel, Normen in Wandel. Miinchen: Don Bosco Verlag, 1980,122); likewise B. Schiiller in Christlich glauben und handek, ed. by K.Demmer and B. Schiiller (Diisseldorf: Patmos, 1977r,282.

2.

3.

4.

5.

7.

8.

r90 Christian Ethics

safer alternative must be chosen. Therefore one may not enjoyeven the rare pleasure of the narcotic heroin because of thegreat and immediate peril of addiction with all its ruinouseffects. A hunter may not shoot in doubt whether the objectis an animal or a human being. In administering the sacramentgone must decide in favour of the opinion that safeguards thevalidity of the sacrament with certainty.

(Il) If there is only question of the honesty of an actio4where no risk of serious spiritual or temporal harm is involved,one is not bound to opt for the safer alternative. Tlrcreforeif one doubts whether one may cross a property, whetherthere is a sacred holy day with the obligation to go to Mass,whether a watch offered for sale is smuggled, one is notobliged to follow the safer way and to make a detour roundthe property, to attend a Mass or to decline the possiblysmuggled watch. The reason is that no serious damage isto be feared, even 'if the contrary should tum out to be true.

n. The systenrs of probability

The side where presumption stands is usually to befavoured, as long as the contrary is not proved. A man ispresumed to be innocent as long as it is not certainly provedthat he has committed a crime. The condition of the possessdis the better, as long as there is no certain proof for the rightof the contesting other side.

Yet especially conceming the principle "a doubtful lawdoes not oblige" a controversy exists whether liberty canalways be favoured as long as the law is not morally certain,or whether reservations are called for and liberty can onlybe favoured when its side is more probable or at least equallyprobable compared with the case for the obligation of thelaw. This controversy led to the systems of probability, intradition less felicitously called *moral systems-, i.e. thesystems of rigorism, probabiliorism, aequiprobabilism, prob-abilism and laxism, which caused many passionate altercationsamong moral theologians in the past, especially during thelTth and lSth centuries. It has cost the moral theologiansmuch effort and thinking. The dispute does indeed concemnot a merely peripheral problem, but the significant questionafter the greater right of the law or of liberty. ln the.coune

I