torts and damages cases
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Case Law for Torts and Damages for Finals....TRANSCRIPT
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PUBLIC HUMILIATION
1. G.R. Nos. L-51171-72 June 4, 1990
MARIA G. FORD, Substituted by PATRICK G. FORD, petitioner,** vs.COURT OF APPEALS and SULPICIA FABRIGAR, respondents.
G.R. No. L-51273 June 4, 1990
VICENTE F. UY, petitioner, vs.COURT OF APPEALS and SULPICIA FABRIGAR, respondents.
Quiason, Makalintal, Barot, Torres & Ibarra for petitioner in 51171-72.
Charlito F. Fantilanan for petitioner in 51273.
Ricardo C. Castro, Jr. and Teodulfo L.C. Castro for private respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
The generally accepted rule m our jurisprudence is that the findings of fact of a trial court carry great weight since it had the opportunity of observing the demeanor of the witnesses on the stand as a further aid in determining their credibility. The rule, however, admits of exceptions, both in the factual findings of the trial court and the conclusions drawn by it therefrom, and, as respondent court holds, the decision of the court a qou in these cases exemplifies a warranted departure from the aforesaid jurisprudential rule.
These consolidated petitions seek the review of the decision of respondent court
1 in CA-G.R. Nos.59402-03-R entitled "Sulpicia F. Fabrigar, Plaintiff-Appellant vs. Vicente F. Uy and Maria G. Ford, Defendants-Appellees," together with its resolution denying petitioners' motions for recondsideration, which reversed the decision of the trial court in Civil Cases Nos. M-282 and M-283 of the then the Court of First Instance of Capiz, Mambusao Branch, filed herein private respondent Sulpicia Fabrigar against spouses Vicente Uy and Paciencia Uy and spouses Thomas J. Ford and Maria G. Ford, respectively.
From the nature of the issues raised in the present appeals, we are constrained to set out and analyze the facts involved which we are told do not sustain the conclusions drawn by the court. below. The decision of respondent court presents the two sides of the incident as follows:
On July 27, 1973, at about 7:00 o'clock in the morning, Sulpicia Fabrigar, being a public school teacher of Barrio Sta. Cruz. Dumalag, Capiz reported to the precinct of her assignment particularly at the Elementary School of Sta. Cruz, Dumalag, Capiz, by reason of the deputization of all public school teachers to assist the COMELEC in the conduct of the National Referendum.
Between 3:00 and 3:30 P.M. of that day, while she was inside Precinct No. 11-a, she saw Elmo Uy, son of the barrio captain of Sta. Cruz, Vicente Uy, get the remark sheet of voter Regalado Firmalino and began to write on said remark sheet of the latter. She called the attention of the Referendum Committee composed of Leandra Fagtanac, Chairwoman; Concepcion Fale and Benito Facura, Members, to these acts of Elmo Uy but the Committee did not mind her. So, she took the initiative of going to and advising Elmo Uy not to write anything on the remark sheet of the voter Firmalino.
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Elmo Uy asked Sulpicia what business of hers (sic) in so doing to which she answered that she was merely advising him. Elmo Uy stood up, pulled out his appointment paper as an observer in the referendum and tore it to pieces saying that it was useless and not respected anyway. Thereafter, Elmo Uy went out of the precinct reported the matter to his father, Vicente Uy, the barrio captain of Sta. Cruz. A few minutes later, barrio captain Vicente Uy, father of Elmo, entered Precinct No. 11-A and shouted at Sulpicia Fabrigar, 'Hijo de puta, why do you interfere with what my son is doing? Why are you pretending to be somebody here in Sta. Cruz? You are a no good headteacher. I do not send my children to this school because of your enviousness.' Sulpicia Fabrigar answered that she was merely advising Elmo Uy not to write on the remark sheet of Regalado Firmalino and she did not pretend to be somebody. While Vicente Uy was leaving the precinct, he further said that he would report Sulpicia Fabrigar to Mrs. Maria Ford.
Thirty minutes after Vicente Uy had left the precinct, Maria Ford, owner of the Asturias Sugar Central, arrived very angry, saying, 'Where is Suping, where is Suping?' Sulpicia Fabrigar immediately presented herself to Maria Ford, and the latter said, 'Why did you campaign for 'No' according to the barrio captain?' Sulpicia Fabrigar answered, 'I did not campaign for 'No' I even wanted a zero 'No' because you promised to provide electricity in this barrio if nobody votes 'No'. 'Elmo Uy then interrupted their conversation and said that Sulpicia Fabrigar really campaigned for ''No' votes. Maria Ford said, 'Its true you campaigned for 'No' and why do you still insist on reasoning? and then, Maria Ford slapped Sulpicia Fabrigar on the left face. She wanted to retaliate but her sister, Fidelina Frias, held her back and pulled her away. Maria Ford further said, 'Ill have you transferred to a
far place. You are ungrateful to me. You are always rebelling against me. Get out and go home.' , Sulpicia Fabrigar reported this particular incident to the police authorities of Dumalag, Capiz (Exhibit 'A'/'1'). She also sent telegrams to the President (Exhibits 'I' and 'H'), to the COMELEC (Exhibit 'J') and to the Secretary of National Defense (Exhibit 'U') in connection with this incident. 2
Respondent court observes that, on his part, Vicente Uy presented his version of the incident thus:
At about 2 p.m. on referendum day, Benito Facura , upon the request o f the c h a i r wo m a n o f t h e R e f e re n d u m Committee, Leandra Fagtanac, went to the house of Vicente Uy to inform him that there was trouble in the barrio center. Vicente Uy went to said place and he had a talk with Leandra Fagtanac about what happened thereat. Leandra Fagtanac informed Vicente Uy that Sulpicia Fabrigar shouted at Elmo Uy; that she requested Sulpicia Fabrigar to keep quiet but the latter continued to shout at Elmo Uy that he should not teach the voters because they were more intelligent than him; that when Elmo Uy showed his appointment papers as referendum observer, Sulpicia Fabrigar tore it to pieces and threw it on the floor; and that as a result of the commotion created by the quarrel of Sulpicia Fabrigar and Elmo Uy, the people scattered away from the precinct.
Upon getting this information from Leandra Fagtanac, Vicente Uy asked her where was Sulpicia Fabrigar and he was told that she had just left the room. When Vicente Uy was about to leave the precinct, Sulpicia Fabrigar came in. Vicente Uy then addressed her, 'Mrs. Fabrigar, what happened here? Can you not settle this since this is our affair? Sulpicia Fabrigar answered, 'I told Elmo not to teach the
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voters because they also know what they're doing and why are you inquiring?' Vicente Uy said: 'Why did you humiliate Elmo when we have a chairwoman to refer this matter?' (sic) Sulpicia Fabrigar countered, 'You think you are still a barangay captain inside this precinct. It's the headteacher who is powerful in this building. 'Vicente Uy said, 'I'm not trying to be somebody here. If you won't believe me, I'd report this matter at the poblacion.' Sulpicia Fabrigar said, 'I don't care to whom you'd report, I'm not afraid, go ahead. 'So, Vicente Uy left with-his jeep. The people were no longer voting, and on the way to the poblacion Vicente Uy thought of asking Maria Ford to pacify Sulpicia Fabrigar, to stop her from molesting and disturbing the people so they could vote. Vicente Uy then believed that Maria Ford, being the godmother of Sulpicia Fabrigar, could pacify her.
Maria Ford asked Vicente Uy how the voting was going along, and the latter told her that Sulpicia Fabrigar was getting uncontrollable in the precinct, that she tore the appointment as observer of his son Elmo, and that the people were not voting anymore. Vicente Uy asked Maria Ford to stop Sulpicia Fabrigar from molesting and disturbing the people. Thereafter, Vicente Uy left to report the matter to the COMELEC Registrar but he did not meet him because he was out. On his way home, he met the Mayor and the Governor and to whom he narrated this incident. The following day, Vicente Uy reported this incident to the police authorities of Dumalag, Capiz and it was entered in the Police Blotter (Exhibit '3'-Uy). 3
Said decision continues with an account of the incident this time by Maria Ford:
At about 1:30 p.m. on referendum day, some people reported to Maria Ford that Sulpicia Fabrigar was screaming at the
polling place, and they asked her to stop Sulpicia Fabrigar as she is her (a)hijada and relative because people were going away and not voting anymore. Then came Vicente Uy, the barrio captain, who also asked Maria Ford to intercede with Sulpicia Fabrigar because she was creating trouble, fighting with his son, and many people were leaving the polling place.
Maria Ford went to the polling place to find out the truth of the report and also to make the people vote. Upon her arrival at the polling place, Sulpicia Fabrigar immediately shouted, 'Why did you come here, you're helping the barrio captain Maria Ford answered, 'I came here because the people and the barrio captain asked me to make you keep quiet and stop this trouble.' Then Sulpicia Fabrigar screamed, 'I'm the headteacher here!' Maria Ford told Sulpicia Fabrigar to keep quiet and go home and not to scream, but she answered that she was the headteacher and she was supposed to be there and she would not go home. Then Maria Ford started to inquire from the people around whether or not Sulpicia Fabrigar has some trouble with Elmo Uy and whether or not she tore his appointment paper as referendum observer. Suddenly, Sulpicia Fabrigar screamed again saying that Elmo Uy was insulting her. Maria Ford told Elmo Uy to go home, and when Elmo Uy passed between her and Sulpicia Fabrigar, the latter continued to scream insulting words at Elmo Uy. 'Sulpicia Fabrigar even wanted to beat Elmo Uy, and she was trembling. So, laboring under the belief that Sulpicia Fabrigar had already become hysterical, Maria Ford slapped her on the face to calm her down. After this, Sulpicia Fabrigar quieted down momentarily, and then she said to Maria Ford, 'If you're not only old, I'd beat you!' Maria Ford held out her face to Sulpicia Fabrigar and ordered her to hit it, but she did not. 4
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After trial in the Court of First Instance of Capiz, Mambusao Branch, presided over by Judge Tomas R. Leonidas, judgment was rendered dismissing Sulpicia Fabrigar's complaint and further ordering her to pay Maria Ford P2,000.00 as moral damages, P2,000.00 as exemplary damages, P1,000.00 for attorney's fees and P5,000.00 for expenses of litigation; and also to pay Vicente Uy P2,000.00 as moral damages, P2,000.00 as exemplary damages, P2,000.00 for attorney's fees and P1,000.00 for expenses of litigation, said amounts to bear interest from the date of judgment. 5
In dismissing said complaint for damages of herein private respondent, the lower court arrived at the following conclusions:
According Sulpicia Fabrigar, upon entering the precinct, Vicente Uy immediately shouted at her, 'Hijo de puta why do you interfere with what my son is doing here? Why are you pretending to be somebody here in Sta. Cruz? You are a no good headteacher. I do not send my children to this school because of your enviousness. ...
It clearly appears that from among the statements of Vicente Uy, only 'Why are you pretending to be somebody in Sta. Cruz' called for comment or action from Sulpicia Fabrigar which, to the mind of the court, is an innocuous expression or statement merely showing disgust, displeasure of, at its worst, anger, and not to slander. It is of a lesser degree and intensity than the words 'putang ina mo" Which the Supreme Court in Reyes v. People, L-21528, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 686, has stated to be a common expression in the dialect that is often employed not really to slander but rather to express anger or displeasure. With respect to the other statements of Vicente Uy which did not call for any comment from Sulpicia Fabrigar, her silence should be deemed to be an admission of their truth and truth
can not hurt or insult. Thus, an act or declaration made in the presence and within the observation of a party who does or says nothing when the act or declaration is such as naturally to call for action or comment if not true, may be given in evidence against him. (See. 23, Rule 130 Rules of Court). . . .
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Maria Ford admitted that she slapped Sulpicia Fabrigar because the latter became hysterical and the former was then laboring under the belief that the only way to stop a hysteric is to slap and jolt him There is speciousness in this assertion. Sulpicia Fabrigar even admitted on the witness stand that Maria Ford slapped her so that she would stop with Elmo Uy, but she failed to positively state that by this one slap she was, dishonored, defamed or shamed. She merely felt a deafening sensation, and nothing more. Sulpicia Fabrigar, by her ravings and rantings against Elmo Uy, was already disturbing the peace of mind of the people and scaring them from participating in the referendum process. There was then an emergency, absent any police officer, and as godmother and second cousin by affinity of Sulpicia Fabrigar, Maria Ford thought it her duty to do what she did which nobody would have dared done. In this setting, this court finds that Maria Ford acted within her legal and moral right and duty, for her own peace of mind, to arrest the shameful act of an (a)hijada and relative. To restore peace and order in the polling place and to prevent Sulpicia Fabrigar from further eroding and invading the right of suffrage of others. In so doing, Maria Ford could not have been actuated with malice aforethought of putting Sulpicia Fabrigar into disrepute, but rather to restore her to normal self and bring back order to the referendum process. . . 6
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Respondent court, however, rejected said conclusions on the following ratiocinations:
As we appreciate the facts of the case, We believe that Vicente Uy was very much offended by the action of Mrs. Fabrigar in admonishing former's son, Elmo, who has been shown to have interfered in the voting in Sta. Cruz, Dumalag, Capiz. Unable to swallow the fact that someone has questioned his 'power' as barrio captain, Vicente Uy immediately rushed to the barrio school and there began insulting the lowly school headteacher, Sulpicia Fabrigar.
We cannot clearly see Our way through when in disregarding other slanderous remarks of Vicente Uy, the lower court said that "her silence (to those facts) should be deemed an admission of their truth and truth cannot hurt or insult.' The trial court most certainly is in error in this regard. 7
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It further observed that-
. . . It is not for Maria Ford to say whether her acts did or-did not place the offended party Sulpicia Fabrigar in contempt of the spectators. The facts obtaining in this case indicate that appellee Ford in performing the act of slapping the school teacher in front of the people was motivated by personal animosity because Maria Ford has been misinformed that Sulpicia Fabrigar has been campaigning for 'No' votes in the National. Referendum of July 27, 1973 which was against the wishes of Maria Ford. And taking into account the position held by the victim and the circumstances surrounding the incidents in question, we believe that Maria Ford has by deed slandered plaintiff Sulpicia Fabrigar which would entitle the latter to damages. There can be no circumstance more humiliating for a headteacher of a barrio school than
to be seen by the barrio folks being slapped in her face. 8
Setting aside the decision of the trial court, respondent court ordered Vicente Uy to pay Sulpicia Fabrigar the sum of P5,000.00 as moral damages, P2,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P2,000.00, as attorney's fees; and also ordered Maria Ford to pay Sulpicia Fabrigar the sum of P10,000.00, as moral damages, P2,000.00 as exemplary damages and P2,000.00 as attorney's fees, with costs against both defendants-appellees.
In her petition at bar, the late Maria Ford contends that respondent court erred in holding that she acted with malice and ill will when she slapped private respondent, and in awarding damages and attorney's fees to the latter. 9 Along the same vein, petitioner Uy submits that the Court of Appeals should not have, reversed, the trial court's decision nor should it have awarded damages, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs to private respondent. 10
Petitioner Ford contends that the act of slapping, standing alone and unexplained, would not speak well of the intent of the actor and that to determine the intent, the surrounding stances, particularly those preceding the slapping, should be taken into consideration. It is submitted that this is so since malice, which is an essential element in this type of an offense, is a state of mind and can only be proven by extrinsic evidence. She declares that her act of slapping Sulpicia Fabrigar was not actuated by malice but engendered by a legitimate motive prompted by her desire to calm down a person who appeared to be hysterical and to stop a goddaughter and relative from further creating a scandal. She also assails as exorbitant the award of moral damages and, for alleged lack of legal basis, the awards of exemplary damages and attorney's fees. 11
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On the other hand, petitioner Uy maintains that he has not slandered Sulpicia Fabrigar; and that the contents of Exhibits "A"/"1" (police blotter of the incident in question), "I" and "K", (telegram of Fabrigar to the President), "J" (Telegram of Fabrigar to the Commission on Elections) and "L"(telegram Fabrigar to the Secretary of National Defense) constitute admissions against Fabrigar's interest under Section 22, Rule 130 and also judicial admissions under Section 2, Rule 129, both of the 1964 Rules of court, which would have barred respondent court from reversing the lower court's finding that he did not utter the words imputed to him and did not insult Fabrigar. 12
We find both appeals devoid of merit.
The decision of the trial court proceeds from misapprehensions and patently erroneous conclusions of fact. A slap on the face is an unlawful aggression. The face personifies one's dignity and slapping it is a serious personal affront. It is a physical assault coupled with a willful disregard of the integrity of one's person. This is especially true if the aggrieved party is a school teacher who, in penal law, is a person in authority. Respect for a teacher is required of all, if we are to uphold and enhance the dignity of the teaching profess ion. The demeaning act of respondent Ford is virtually inexpiable when done, as in this case, in the presence of the public inside a polling precinct during an electoral exercise. This certainly is one of the extreme circumstances under which ridicule, discredit and contempt could be cast upon the aggrieved party in the community where she performs her functions as a mentor of their children.
As discerningly observed by respondent court, considering the position of private respondent, nothing but shame, humiliation
and dishonor could have been heaped upon her by the indignities she had to suffer at the hands of petitioner Ford. Furthermore, there is ample reason to believe that said petitioner's displeasure over the rumor that private respondent was campaigning for "No" votes was sufficient motive for her to deliberately confront private respondent and maltreat the latter.
The act of petitioner Ford in slapping private respondent on the face in public is contrary to morals and good customs and under the circumstances, could not but have caused the latter mental anguish, moral shock, wounded feelings and social humiliation. 13 Full responsibility attached to said act of the late petitioner Ford and the corresponding sanctions should be imposed. Her excuse that she was prompted by her desire to calm down private respondent and prevent her from becoming hysterical is too lame a subterfuge upon which to premise a plea for exoneration. We are not persuaded by such pretense. Private respondent was in the performance of her duty when the incident took place and she had every right to stay in her post. On the other hand, petitioner Ford had no legitimate business inside the polling precinct. Definitely, she barged into the premises in response to the report and importuning of petitioner Uy.
The award of moral damages is allowed in cases specified or analogous to those provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code. 14 Under Article 21 of said Code, in relation to Paragraph (10), Article 2219 thereof, any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for moral damages. By way of example or correction for the public good, exemplary
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damages may also be awarded. 15 Attorney's fees are also recoverable. 16
With respect to petitioner Uy, the gravity of the defamatory words uttered by him depends not only upon their sense and grammatical meaning, judging them separately, but also upon the special circumstances of the case and the 'antecedents or relationship between the offended party and the offender which might tend to prove the intention of the offender at the time. 17
Suffice it to say that the imputations uttered by petitioner Uy against private respondent also cast further dishonor, discredit and contempt on the latter. Petitioner Uy was a barrio captain. His proven actuations do not speak well of a, public officer, especially when done in the presence of the public during said referendum.
Pet i t ioner Uy c la ims that pr ivate respondent should be bound by her statement appearing in the police blotter where, she made no mention that she was slandered by the former. This is fallacious reasoning. The entry in the police blotter, even if admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule, is not necessarily entitled to full credit as the, entrant did not have personal knowledge of the facts stated and the police agent who prepared the same did not testify in court. 18 Admissibility of evidence is one thing; the weight thereof is another. The court below also declared that an entry in the police blotter is an entry in an official record made in the performance of duty by a public officer and as such, its trustworthiness arises and its correctness cannot be impugned, there being a presumption of regularity in its execution. This is not entirely correct. Entries in official records are only prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. They are not conclusive.
We are satisfied with private respondent's explanation. Her initiative in promptly instituting her complaint clearly manifests her honest intention to vindicate the wrong committed against her. She explained that shortly after the incident between her and petitioner Uy, petitioner Ford came and slapped her. Thus, when the report was made by private respondent to the police authorities of Dumalag Capiz, the immediate hurt and humiliation being felt by her was not only the slander committed by petitioner Uy but, primarily and foremost, the slapping by petitioner Ford. Hence, the police report of private respondent which focused on her being slapped by petitioner Ford, although inadvertently omitting the incident with petitioner Uy in view of her emotional state then, should not be construed to mean that private respondent was not slandered by petitioner Uy.
Like an affidavit, a police blotter is taken ex parte hence, in the same manner, it could be just as incomplete and inaccurate, sometimes from either partial suggestions or for want of suggestion or inquiries, without the aid of which the witness may be unable to recall the connected collateral circumstances necessary for the correction of the first suggestion of his memory and for his accurate recollection of all that per ta ins to the subject . 19 I t i s understandable that the testimony during the trial would be more lengthy and detailed than the matters stated in the police blotter. Petitioner Uy's disquisition on the omission of his intemperate and slanderous outburst in the entries made in the police blotter, or in the telegrams sent by private respondent, cannot outweigh the evidence on -which respondent court based its factual findings and conclusions that he did commit said act. Further, the testimony thereon of private respondent in open court, in our view, has not been
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successfully rebutted and we have no reason to doubt the veracity thereof.
WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The decision of respondent court is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera (Chairman), Paras, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
UNJUST DISMISSAL
2. Singapore Airlines Limited vs. Pao, No. L-47739, 122 SCRA 671 , June 22, 1983G.R. No. L-47739 June 22, 1983S INGAPORE A IRL INES L IM ITED, petitioner, vs.HON. ERNANI CRUZ PAO as Presiding Judge of Branch XVIII, Court of First Instance of Rizal, CARLOS E. CRUZ and B. E. VILLANUEVA, respondents.Bengzon, Zarraga, Narciso, Cudala Pecson, Azucena & Bengzon Law Offices for petitioner.Celso P. Mariano Law Office for private respondent Carlos Cruz.Romeo Comia for private respondent B. E. Villanueva.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:On the basic issue of lack of jurisdiction, petitioner company has elevated to us for review the two Orders of respondent Judge dated October 28, 1977 and January 24, 1978 dismissing petitioner's complaint for damages in the first Order, and denying its Motion for Reconsideration in the second.On August 21, 1974, private respondent Carlos E. Cruz was offered employment by petitioner as Engineer Officer with the
opportunity to undergo a B-707 I conversion training course," which he accepted on August 30, 1974. An express stipulation in the letter-offer read:3. BONDING. As you win be provided with conversion training you are required to enter into a bond with SIA for a period of 5 years. For this purpose, please inform me of the names and addresses of your sureties as soon as possible.Twenty six days thereafter, or on October 26, 1974, Cruz entered into an "Agreement for a Course of Conversion Training at the Expense of Singapore Airlines Limited" wherein it was stipulated among others:4. The Engineer Officer shall agree to remain in the service of the Company for a period of five years from the date of commencement of such a foresa id conversion training if so required by the Company.5. In the event of the Engineer Officer:1. Leaving the service of the company during the period of five years referred to in Clause 4 above, or2. Being dismissed or having his services t e rm i n a t ed by t h e company fo r misconduct,the Engineer Officer and the Sureties hereby bind themselves jointly and severally to pay to the Company as liquidated damages such sums of money as are set out hereunder:(a) during the first year of the period of five years referred to in Clause 4 above ...................................................................................... $ 67,460/(b) during the second year of the period of five years referred to in Clause 4 above ................................................................................. $ 53,968/(c) during the third year of the period of five years referred to in Clause 4 above ...................................................................................... $ 40,476/(d) during the fourth year of the period of five years referred to in Clause 4
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above .................................................................................. $ 26,984/(e) during the fifth year of the period of five years referred to in Clause 4 above ....................................................................................... $ 13,492/6. The provisions of Clause 5 above shall not apply in a case where an Engineer Officer has his training terminated by the Company for reasons other than misconduct or where, subsequent to the completion of training, he -1. loses his license to operate as a Flight Engineer due to medical reasons which can in no way be attributable to any act or omission on his part;2. is unable to continue in employment w i t h t h e C o m p a ny b e c a u s e h i s employment pass or work permit, as the case may be, has been withdrawn or has not been renewed due to no act or omission on his part;3. has his services terminated by the Company as a result of being replaced by a national Flight Engineer;4. has to leave the service of the Company on valid compassionate grounds stated to and accepted by the Company in writing. 1Cruz signed the Agreement with his co-respondent, B. E. Villanueva, as surety.Claiming that Cruz had applied for "leave without pay" and had gone on leave without approval of the application during the second year of the Period of five years, petitioner filed suit for damages against Cruz and his surety, Villanueva, for violation of the terms and conditions of the aforesaid Agreement. Petitioner sought the payment of the following sums: liquidated damages of $53,968.00 or its equivalent of P161,904.00 (lst cause of action); $883.91 or about P2,651.73 as overpayment in salary (2nd clause of action); $61.00 or about P183.00 for cost of uniforms and accessories supplied by the company plus $230.00, or roughly P690.00, for the cost of a flight manual (3rd cause of action); and $1,533.71, or approximately P4,601.13
corresponding to the vacation leave he had availed of but to which he was no longer entitled (4th cause Of action); exemplary damages attorney's fees; and costs.In his Answer, Cruz denied any breach of contract contending that at no time had he been required by petitioner to agree to a straight service of five years under Clause 4 of the Agreement (supra) and that he left the service on "valid compassionate grounds stated to and accepted by the company so that no damages may be awarded against him. And because of petitioner-plaintiff's alleged ungrounded causes of action, Cruz counterclaimed for attorney's fees of P7,000.00.The surety, Villanueva, in his own Answer, contended that his undertaking was merely that of one of two guarantors not that of surety and claimed the benefit of excussion, if at an found liable. He then filed a cross-claim against Cruz for damages and for whatever amount he may be held liable to petitioner-plaintiff, and a counterclaim for actual, exemplary, moral and other damages plus attorney's fees and litigation expenses against petitioner-plaintiff.The issue of jurisdiction having been raised at the pre-trial conference, the parties were directed to submit their respective memoranda on that question, which they complied with in due time. On October 28, 1977, respondent Judge issued the assailed Order d i sm i s s i n g t he comp l a i n t , counterclaim and cross-claim for lack of jurisdiction stating.2. The present case therefore involves a money claim arising from an employer-employee relation or at the very least a case arising from employer-employee relations, which under Art. 216 of the Labor Code is vested exclusively with the Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission. 2Reconsideration thereof having been denied in the Order of January 24, 1978,
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petitioner availed of the present recourse. We gave due course.We are here confronted with the issue of whether or not this case is properly cognizable by Courts of justice or by the Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission.Upon the facts and issues involved, jurisdiction over the present controversy must be held to belong to the civil Courts. While seemingly petitioner's claim for damages arises from employer-employee relations, and the latest amendment to Article 217 of the Labor Code under PD No. 1691 and BP Blg. 130 provides that all other claims arising from employer-employee relationship are cognizable by Labor Arbiters, 3 in essence, petitioner's claim for damages is grounded on the "wanton failure and refusal" without just cause of private respondent Cruz to report for duty despite repeated notices served upon him of the disapproval of his application for leave of absence without pay. This, coupled with the further averment that Cruz "maliciously and with bad faith" violated the terms and conditions of the conversion training course agreement to the damage of p e t i t i o n e r re m ove s t h e p re s e n t controversy from the coverage of the Labor Code and brings it within the purview of Civil Law.Clearly, the complaint was anchored not on the abandonment per se by private respondent Cruz of his job as the latter was not required in the Complaint to report back to work but on the manner a nd con sequen t e f f e c t s o f s u ch abandonment of work translated in terms of the damages which petitioner had to suffer.Squarely in point is the ruling enunciated in the case of Quisaba vs. Sta. Ines Melale Veneer & Plywood, Inc.4 the pertinent portion of which reads:Although the acts complied of seemingly appear to constitute "matter involving
employee employer" relations as Quisaba's dismiss was the severance of a pre-existing employee-employer relations, his complaint is grounded not on his dismissal per se, as in fact he does not ask for reinstatement or backwages, but on the manner of his dismiss and the consequent effects of suchCivil law consists of that 'mass of precepts that determine or regulate the relations ... that exist between members of a society for the protection of private interest (1 Sanchez Roman 3).The "right" of the respondents to dismiss Quisaba should not be confused with the manner in which the right was exercised and the effects flowing therefrom. If the dismiss was done ant i-socia l ly or oppressively, as the complaint alleges, then the respondents violated article 1701 of the Civil Code which prohibits acts of oppression by either capital or labor against the other, and article 21, which makers a person liable for damages if he wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy, the sanction for which, by way of moral damages, is provided in article 2219, No. 10 (Cf, Philippine Refining Co. vs. Garcia, L-21962, Sept. 27, 1966, 18 SCRA 107).Stated differently, petitioner seeks protection under the civil laws and claims no benefits under the labor Code. The primary relief sought is for liquidated damages for breach of a contractual obligation. The other items demanded are not labor benefits demanded by workers generally taken cognizance of in labor disputes, such as payment of wages, overtime compensation or separation pay. The items claimed are the natural consequences flowing from breach of an obligation, intrinsically a civil dispute.Additionally, there is a secondary issue involved that is outside the pale of competence of Labor Arbiters. Is the liability of Villanueva one of suretyship or one of guaranty? Unquestionably, this
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que s t i on i s b eyond t he fie l d o f specialization of Labor Arbiters.WHEREFORE, the assailed Orders of respondent Judge are hereby set aside. The records are hereby ordered remanded to the proper Branch of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, to which this case belongs, for further proceedings. No costs.SO ORDERED.Teehankee (Chairman), Plana, Vasquez, Relova and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.
VIOLATION OF HUMAN DIGNITY AND PRIVACY
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 120706. January 31, 2000]
3. RODRIGO CONCEPCION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SPS. NESTOR NICOLAS and ALLEM NICOLAS, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Petitioner Rodrigo Concepcion assails in this petition for review on certiorari the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 12 December 1994 which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City ordering him to pay respondent spouses Nestor Nicolas and Allem Nicolas the sums of P50,000.00 for moral damages, P25,000.00 for exemplary damages and P10,000.00 for attorneys fees, plus the costs of suit.* Petitioner claims absence of factual and legal basis for the award of damages. h Y
The courts a quo found that sometime in 1985 the spouses Nestor Nicolas and
Allem Nicolas resided at No. 51 M. Concepcion St., San Joaquin, Pasig City, in an apartment leased to them by the owner thereof, Florence "Bing" Concepcion, who also resided in the same compound where the apartment was located. Nestor Nicolas was then engaged in the business of supplying government agencies and private entities with office equipment, appliances and other fixtures on a cash purchase or credit basis. Florence Concepcion joined this venture by contributing capital on condition that after her capital investment was returned to her, any profit earned would be divided equally between her and Nestor. Jksm
Sometime in the second week of July 1985 Rodrigo Concepcion, brother of the deceased husband of Florence, angrily accosted Nestor at the latters apartment and accused him of conducting an adulterous relationship with Florence. He shouted, "Hoy Nestor, kabit ka ni Bing! x x x Binigyan ka pa pala ni Bing Concepcion ng P100,000.00 para umakyat ng Baguio. Pagkaakyat mo at ng asawa mo doon ay bababa ka uli para magkasarilinan kayo ni Bing."[1]
To clarify matters, Nestor went with Rodrigo, upon the latters dare, to see some relatives of the Concepcion family who allegedly knew about the relationship. However, those whom they were able to see denied knowledge of the alleged affair. The same accusation was hurled by Rodrigo against Nestor when the two (2) confronted Florence at the terrace of her residence. Florence denied the imputations and Rodrigo backtracked saying that he just heard the rumor from a relative. Thereafter, however, Rodrigo called Florence over the telephone reiterating his accusation and threatening her that should something happen to his sick mother, in case the latter learned about the affair, he would kill Florence. Chief
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As a result of this incident, Nestor Nicolas felt extreme embarrassment and shame to the extent that he could no longer face his neighbors. Florence Concepcion also ceased to do business with him by not contributing capital anymore so much so that the business venture of the Nicolas spouses declined as they could no longer cope with their commitments to their clients and customers. To make matters worse, Allem Nicolas started to doubt Nestors fidelity resulting in frequent bickerings and quarrels during which Allem even expressed her desire to leave her husband. Consequently, Nestor was forced to write Rodrigo demanding public apology and payment of damages. Rodrigo pointedly ignored the demand, for which reason the Nicolas spouses filed a civil suit against him for damages.
In his defense, Rodrigo denied that he maligned Nestor by accusing him publicly of being Florence's lover. He reasoned out that he only desired to protect the name and reputation of the Concepcion family which was why he sought an appointment with Nestor through Florence's son Roncali to ventilate his feelings about the matter. Initially, he discussed with Nestor certain aspects of the joint venture in a friendly and amiable manner, and then only casually asked the latter about his rumored affair with his sister-in-law.
In contesting the decision of the appellate court, petitioner Rodrigo Concepcion raises the following issues: (a) whether there is basis in law for the award of damages to private respondents, the Nicolas spouses; and, (b) whether there is basis to review the facts which are of weight and influence but which were overlooked and misapplied by the respondent appellate court. Esm
Petitioner argues that in awarding damages to private respondents, the Court of Appeals was without legal basis to justify its verdict. The alleged act imputed to him by respondent spouses does not fall under Arts. 26[2] and 2219[3] of the Civil Code since it does not constitute libel, slander, or any other form of defamation. Neither does it involve prying into the privacy of anothers residence or meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relation of another. Petitioner also insists that certain facts and circumstances of the case w e r e m a n i f e s t l y o v e r l o o k e d , misunderstood or glossed over by respondent court which, if considered, would change the verdict. Impugning the credibility of the witnesses for private respondents and the manner by which the testimonial evidence was analyzed and evaluated by the trial court, petitioner criticized the appellate court for not taking into account the fact that the trial judge who penned the decision was in no position to observe first-hand the demeanor of the witnesses of respondent spouses as he was not the original judge who heard the case. Thus, his decision rendered was flawed. Esmsc
The Court has ruled often enough that its jurisdiction in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court is limited to reviewing only errors of law, not of fact, unless the factual findings complained of are devoid of support by the evidence on record or the a s s a i l e d j u d g m e n t i s b a s e d o n misapprehension of facts.[4] The reason behind this is that the Supreme Court respects the findings of the trial court on the issue of credibility of witnesses, considering that it is in a better position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial.[5] Thus it accords the highest respect, even finality, to the
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evaluation made by the lower court of the testimonies of the witnesses presented before it. Esmmis
The Court is also aware of the long settled rule that when the issue is on the credibility of witnesses, appellate courts will not generally disturb the findings of the trial court; however, its factual findings may nonetheless be reversed if by the evidence on record or lack of it, it appears that the trial court erred.[6] In this respect, the Court is not generally inclined to review the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals unless its findings are erroneous, absurd, speculative, conjectural, conflicting, tainted with grave abuse of discretion, or contrary to the findings culled by the trial court of origin.[7] This rule of course cannot be unqualifiedly applied to a case where the judge who penned the decision was not the one who heard the case, because not having heard the testimonies himself, the judge would not be in a better position than the appellate courts to make such determination.[8]
However, it is also axiomatic that the fact alone that the judge who heard the evidence was not the one who rendered the judgment but merely relied on the record of the case does not render his judgment erroneous or irregular. This is so even if the judge did not have the fullest opportunity to weigh the testimonies not having heard all the witnesses speak nor observed their deportment and manner of testifying. Thus the Court generally will not find any misapprehension of facts as it can be fairly assumed under the principle of regularity of performance of duties of public officers that the transcripts of stenographic notes were thoroughly scrutinized and evaluated by the judge himself.
Has sufficient reason then been laid before us by petitioner to engender doubt as to
the factual findings of the court a quo? We find none. A painstaking review of the evidence on record convinces us not to disturb the judgment appealed from. The fact that the case was handled by different judges brooks no consideration at all, for preponderant evidence consistent with their claim for damages has been adduced by private respondents as to foreclose a reversal. Otherwise, everytime a Judge who heard a case, wholly or partially, dies or lives the service, the case cannot be decided and a new trial will have to be conducted. That would be absurb; inconceivable. Esmso
Accord i n g to pe t i t i one r, p r i v a t e respondents evidence is inconsistent as to time, place and persons who heard the alleged defamatory statement. We find this to be a gratuitous observation, for the testimonies of all the witnesses for the respondents are unanimous that the defamatory incident happened in the afternoon at the front door of the apartment of the Nicolas spouses in the presence of some friends and neighbors, and later on, with the accusation being repeated in the presence of Florence, at the terrace of her house. That this finding appears to be in conflict with the allegation in the complaint as to the time of the incident bears no momentous significance since an allegation in a pleading is not evidence; it is a declaration that has to be proved by evidence. If evidence contrary to the allegation is presented, such evidence controls, not the allegation in the pleading itself, although admittedly it may dent the credibility of the witnesses. But not in the instant case. Msesm
It is also argued by petitioner that private respondents failed to present as witnesses the persons they named as eyewitnesses to the incident and that they presented instead one Romeo Villaruel who was not named as a possible witness during the
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pre-trial proceedings. Charging that Villaruels testimony is not credible and should never have been accorded any weight at all, petitioner capitalizes on the fact that a great distance separates Villaruels residence and that of private respondents as reflected in their house numbers, the formers number being No. 223 M. Concepcion St., while that of the Nicolas spouses, No. 51 along the same street. This being so, petitioner concludes, Villaruel could not have witnessed the ugly confrontation between Rodrigo and Nestor. It appears however from Villaruels testimony that at the time of the incident complained of, he was staying in an apartment inside the compound adjacent to that of the Nicolas spouses. Whether his apartment was then numbered 223 is not stated. What is definite and clear is his statement that he and Nestor Nicolas were neighbors on 14 July 1985.
There are other inconsistencies pointed out by petitioner in the testimonial evidence of private respondents but these are not of such significance as to alter the finding of facts of the lower court. Minor inconsistencies even guarantee truthfulness and candor, for they erase any suspicion of a rehearsed testimony.[9] Inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses with on minor details and collateral matters do not affect the substance of their testimonies.[10]
All told, these factual findings provide enough basis in law for the award of damages by the Court of Appeals in favor of respondents. We reject petitioners posture that no legal provision supports such award, the incident complained of neither falling under Art. 2219 nor Art. 26 of the Civil Code. It does not need further elucidation that the incident charged of petitioner was no less than an invasion on the right of respondent Nestor as a person. The philosophy behind Art. 26
underscores the necessity for its inclusion in our civil law. The Code Commission stressed in no uncertain terms that the human personality must be exalted. The sacredness of human personality is a concomitant consideration of every plan for human amelioration. The touchstone of every system of law, of the culture and civilization of every country, is how far it dignifies man. If the statutes insufficiently protect a person from being unjustly humiliated, in short, if human personality is not exalted - then the laws are indeed defective.[11] Thus, under this article, the rights of persons are amply protected, and damages are provided for violations of a persons dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind. Exsm
It is petitioners position that the act imputed to him does not constitute any of those enumerated in Arts 26 and 2219. In this respect, the law is clear. The violations mentioned in the codal provisions are not exclusive but are merely examples and do not preclude other similar or analogous acts. Damages therefore are allowable for actions against a persons dignity, such as profane, insulting, humiliating, scandalous or abusive language.[12] Under Art. 2217 of the Civil Code, moral damages which include physical suffering, mental anguish, fr ight, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury, a l t hough i n c apab l e o f p e cun i a r y computation, may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendants wrongful act or omission.
There is no question that private respondent Nestor Nicolas suffered mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and social humiliation as a proximate result of petitioners abusive, scandalous and insult ing language . Petitioner attempted to exculpate himself by claiming that he made an appointment
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to see Nestor through a nephew, Roncali, the son of Florence, so he could talk with Nestor to find out the truth about his rumored illicit relationship with Florence. He said that he wanted to protect his nephews and nieces and the name of his late brother (Florences husband).[13] How he could be convinced by some way other than a denial by Nestor, and how he would protect his nephews and nieces and his familys name if the rumor were true, he did not say. Petitioner admitted that he had already talked with Florence herself over the telephone about the issue, with the latter vehemently denying the alleged immoral relationship. Yet, he could not let the matter rest on the strength of the denial of his sister-in-law. He had to go and confront Nestor, even in public, to the latter's humiliation. Kyle
Testifying that until that very afternoon of his meeting with Nestor he never knew respondent, had never seen him before, and was unaware of his business partnership with Florence, his subsequent declarations on the witness stand however belie this lack of knowledge about the business venture for in that alleged encounter he asked Nestor how the business was going, what were the collection problems, and how was the money being spent. He even knew that the name of the business, Floral Enterprises, was coined by combining the first syllables of the name Florence and Allem, the name of Nestors wife. He said that he casually asked Nestor about the rumor between him and Florence which Nestor denied. Not content with such denial, he dared Nestor to go with him to speak to his relatives who were the source of his information. Nestor went with him and those they were able to talk to denied the rumor. Kycalr
We cannot help noting this inordinate interest of petitioner to know the truth
about the rumor and why he was not satisfied with the separate denials made by Florence and Nestor. He had to confront Nestor face to face, invade the latters privacy and hurl defamatory words at him in the presence of his wife and children, neighbors and friends, accusing him - a married man - of having an adulterous relationship with Florence. This definitely caused private respondent much shame and embarrassment that he could no longer show himself in his neighborhood without feeling distraught and debased. This brought dissension and distrust in his family where before there was none. This is why a few days after the incident, he communicated with petitioner demanding public apology and payment of damages, which petitioner ignored. Calrky
If indeed the confrontation as described by private respondents did not actually happen, then there would have been no cause or motive at all for them to consult with their lawyer, immediately demand an apology, and not obtaining a response from petitioner, file an action for damages against the latter. That they decided to go to court to seek redress bespeaks of the validity of their claim. On the other hand, it is interesting to note that while explaining at great length why Florence Concepcion testified against him, petitioner never advanced any reason why the Nicolas spouses, persons he never knew and with whom he had no dealings in the past, would sue him for damages. It also has not escaped our attention that, faced with a lawsuit by private respondents, petitioner sent his lawyer, a certain Atty. Causapin, to talk not to the Nicolas spouses but to Florence, asking her not to be involved in the case, otherwise her name would be messily dragged into it. Quite succinctly, Florence told the lawyer that it was not for her to decide and that she could not do anything about it as she was not a party to the court case.
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WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing premises, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Br. 167, holding Rodrigo Concepcion liable to the spouses Nestor Nicolas and Allem Nicolas for P50,000.00 as moral damages, P25,000.00 for exemplary damages, P10,000.00 for attorney's fees, plus costs of suit, is AFFIRMED. Mesm
SO ORDERED.
Mendoza, Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
* Decision penned by Judge Alfredo C. Flores, RTC-Br. 167, Pasig City.[1] Translation: " Nestor, you are Bings paramour! So she gave you P100,000.00 which you, together with your wife, brought to Baguio and you came back leaving your wife behind so that you and Bing could spend all the time together for your immoral purposes."[2] Art. 26. - Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief: (1) Prying into the privacy of anothers residence; (2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another; (3) Intriguing or humiliating another on account of his religious beliefs, lowly station in life, place of birth, physical defect, or other personal condition.[3] Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases: (1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries; (2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries; (3) Seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts; (4) Adultery or concubinage; (5) Illegal or arbitrary
detention or arrest; (6) Illegal search; (7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation; (8) Malicious prosecution; (9) Acts mentioned in Art. 309 (referring to disrespect for the dead or wrongfully interfering in a funeral); (10) Acts or actions referred to in Arts. 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35 x x x x
DAMAGES + ARTICLES 2195, 2197
SECOND DIVISION[G.R. No. 116100. February 9, 1996]
4. SPOUSES CRISTINO and BRIGIDA CUSTODIO and SPOUSES LITO and MARIA CRISTINA SANTOS, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF PACIFICO C. MABASA and REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG, METRO MANILA, BRANCH 181, respondents.D E C I S I O NREGALADO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari assails the decision of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 29115, promulgated on November 10, 1993, which affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court, as well as its resolution dated July 8, 1994 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.[1]
On August 26, 1982, Civil Case No. 47466 for the grant of an easement of right of way was filed by Pacifico Mabasa against Cristino Custodio, Brigida R. Custodio, Rosalina R. Morato, Lito Santos and Maria Cristina C. Santos before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig and assigned to Branch 22 thereof.[2]
The generative facts of the case, as synthesized by the trial court and adopted by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
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Perusing the record, this Court finds that the original plaintiff Pacifico Mabasa died during the pendency of this case and was substituted by Ofelia Mabasa, his surviving spouse [and children].
The plaintiff owns a parcel of land with a two-door apartment erected thereon situated at Interior P. Burgos St., Palingon, Tipas, Taguig, Metro Manila. The plaintiff was able to acquire said property through a contract of sale with spouses Mamerto Rayos and Teodora Quintero as vendors last September 1981. Said property may be described to be surrounded by other immovables pertaining to defendants herein. Taking P. Burgos Street as the point of reference, on the left side, going to plaintiff s property, the row of houses will be as follows: That of defendants Cristino and Brigido Custodio, then that of Lito and Maria Cristina Santos and then that of Ofelia Mabasa. On the right side (is) that of defendant Rosalina Morato and then a Septic Tank (Exhibit D). As an access to P. Burgos Street from plaintiffs property, there are two possible passageways. The first passageway is approximately one meter wide and is about 20 meters distan(t) from Mabasas residence to P. Burgos Street. Such path is passing in between the previously mentioned row of houses. The second passageway is about 3 meters in width and length from plaintiff Mabasas residence to P. Burgos Street; it is about 26 meters. In passing thru said passageway, a less than a meter wide path through the septic tank and with 5-6 meters in length has to be traversed.
When said property was purchased by Mabasa, there were tenants occupying the premises and who were acknowledged by plaintiff Mabasa as tenants. However, sometime in February, 1982. one of said tenants vacated the apartment and when plaintiff Mabasa went to see the premises,
he saw that there had been built an adobe fence in the first passageway making it narrower in width. Said adobe fence was first constructed by defendants Santoses along their property which is also along the first passageway. Defendant Morato constructed her adobe fence and even extended said fence in such a way that the entire passageway was enclosed (Exhibit 1-Santoses and Custodios, Exh. D for plaintiff, Exhs. 1-C, 1-D and I -E) And it was then that the remaining tenants of said apartment vacated the area. Defendant Ma. Cristina Santos testified that she constructed said fence because there was an incident when her daughter was dragged by a bicycle pedalled by a son of one of the tenants in said apartment along the first passageway. She also mentioned some other inconveniences of having (at) the front of her house a pathway such as when some of the tenants were drunk and would bang their doors and windows. Some of their footwear were even lost. x x x[3] (Italics in original text; corrections in parentheses supplied)
On February 27, 1990, a decision was rendered by the trial court, with this dispositive part:
Accordingly, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1) Ordering defendants Custodios and Santoses to give plaintiff permanent access - ingress and egress, to the public street;
2) Ordering the plaintiff to pay defendants Custodios and Santoses the sum of Eight Thousand Pesos (P8,000) as indemnity for the permanent use of the passageway.
The parties to shoulder their respective litigation expenses.[4]
Not satisfied therewith, therein plaintiff represented by his heirs, herein private
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respondents, went to the Court of Appeals raising the sole issue of whether or not the lower court erred in not awarding damages in their favor. On November 10, 1993, as earlier stated, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision affirming the judgment of the tr ia l cour t with modification, the decretal portion of which disposes as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the lower court is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION only insofar as the herein grant of damages to plaintiffs-appellants. The Court hereby orders defendants-appellees to pay plaintiffs-appellants the sum of Sixty Five Thousand (P65,000) Pesos as Actual Damages, Thirty Thousand (P30,000) Pesos as Moral Damages, and Ten Thousand (P10,000) Pesos as Exemplary Damages. The rest of the appealed decision is affirmed to all respects.[5]
On July 8, 1994, the Court of Appeals d e n i e d p e t i t i o n e r s m o t i o n f o r reconsideration.[6] Petitioners then took the present recourse to us, raising two issues, namely, whether or not the grant of right of way to herein private respondents is proper, and whether or not the award of damages is in order.
With respect to the first issue, herein petitioners are already barred from raising the same. Petitioners did not appeal from the decision of the court a quo granting private respondents the right of way, hence they are presumed to be satisfied with the adjudication therein. With the finality of the judgment of the trial court as to petitioners, the issue of propriety of the grant of right of way has already been laid to rest.
For failure to appeal the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals, petitioners cannot obtain any affirmative relief other than those granted in the
decision of the trial court. That decision of the court below has become final as against them and can no longer be reviewed, much less reversed, by this Court. The rule in this jurisdiction is that whenever an appeal is taken in a civil case, an appellee who has not himself appealed may not obtain from the appellate court any affirmative relief other than what was granted in the decision of the lower court. The appellee can only advance any argument that he may deem necessary to defeat the appellants claim or to uphold the decision that is being disputed, and he can assign errors in his brief if such is required to strengthen the views expressed by the court a quo. These assigned errors, in turn, may be considered by the appellate court solely to maintain the appealed decision on other grounds, but not for the purpose of reversing or modifying the judgment in the appellees favor and giving him other affirmative reliefs.[7]
However, with respect to the second issue, we agree with petitioners that the Court of Appeals erred in awarding damages in favor of private respondents. The award of damages has no substantial legal basis. A reading of the decision of the Court of Appeals will show that the award of damages was based solely on the fact that the original plaintiff, Pacifico Mabasa, incurred losses in the form of unrealized rentals when the tenants vacated the leased premises by reason of the closure of the passageway.
However, the mere fact that the plaintiff suffered losses does not give rise to a right to recover damages. To warrant the recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action for a legal wrong inflicted by the defendant, and damage resulting to the plaintiff therefrom. Wrong without damage, or damage without wrong, does not constitute a cause of action, since
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damages are merely part of the remedy allowed for the injury caused by a breach or wrong.[8]
There is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury; and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. These situations are often called damnum absque injuria.[9] in order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries of which he complains, he must establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant owed to the plaintiff - a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person causing it.[10] The underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the premise that an individual was injured in contemplation of law. Thus, there must first be the breach of some duty and the imposition of liability for that breach before damages may be awarded; it is not sufficient to state that there should be tort liability merely because the plaintiff suffered some pain and suffering)[11]
Many accidents occur and many injuries are inflicted by acts or omissions which cause damage or loss to another but which violate no legal duty to such other person, and consequently create no cause of action in his favor. In such cases, the consequences must be borne by the injured person alone. The law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not amount to a legal injury or wrong. [12]
In other words, in order that the law will give redress for an act causing damage, that act must be not only hurtful, but wrongful. There must be damnum et injuria.[13] If, as
may happen in many cases, a person sustains actual damage, that is, harm or loss to his person or property, without sustaining any legal injury, that is, an act or omission which the law does not deem an injury, the damage is regarded as damnum absque injuria.[14]
In the case at bar, although there was damage, there was no legal injury. Contrary to the claim of private respondents, petitioners could not be said to have violated the principle of abuse of right. In order that the principle of abuse of right provided in Article 21 of the Civil Code can be applied, it is essential that the following requisites concur: (1) The defendant should have acted in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy; (2) The acts should be willful; and (3) There was damage or injury to the plaintiff.[15]
The act of petitioners in constructing a fence within their lot is a valid exercise of their right as owners, hence not contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. The law recognizes in the owner the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those established by law.[16] It is within the right of petitioners, as owners, to enclose and fence their property. Article 430 of the Civil Code provides that (e)very owner may enclose or fence his land or tenements by means of walls, ditches, live or dead hedges, or by any other means without detriment to servitudes constituted thereon.
At the time of the construction of the fence, the lot was not subject to any servitudes. There was no easement of way existing in favor of private respondents, either by law or by contract. The fact that private respondents had no existing right over the said passageway is confirmed by the very decision of the trial court granting a compulsory right of way in their favor
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after payment of just compensation. It was only that decision which gave private respondents the right to use the said passageway a f ter payment of the c o m p e n s a t i o n a n d i m p o s e d a corresponding duty on petitioners not to interfere in the exercise of said right.
Hence, prior to said decision, petitioners had an absolute right over their property and their act of fencing and enclosing the same was an act which they may lawfully perform in the employment and exercise of said right. To repeat, whatever injury or damage may have been sustained by private respondents by reason of the rightful use of the said land by petitioners is damnum absque injuria.[17]
A person has a right to the natural use and enjoyment of his own property, according to his pleasure, for all the purposes to which such property is usually applied. As a general rule, therefore, there is no cause of action for acts done by one person upon his own property in a lawful and proper manner, although such acts i nc identa l l y cause damage or an unavoidable loss to another, as such damage or loss is damnum absque injuria.[18] When the owner of property makes use thereof in the general and ordinary manner in which the property is used, such as fencing or enclosing the same as in this case, nobody can complain of having been injured, because the inconvenience arising from said use can be considered as a mere consequence of community life.[19]
The proper exercise of a lawful right cannot constitute a legal wrong for which an action will lie,[20] although the act may result in damage to another, for no legal right has been invaded[21] One may use any lawful means to accomplish a lawful purpose and though the means adopted may cause damage to another, no cause of action arises in the latters favor. Any injury
or damage occasioned thereby is damnum absque injuria. The courts can give no redress for hardship to an individual resulting from action reasonably calculated to achieve a lawful end by lawful means.[22]
WHEREFORE, under the compulsion of the foregoing premises, the appealed decision of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the j u d g m e n t o f t h e t r i a l c o u r t i s correspondingly REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Romero and Puno, JJ., concur.Mendoza, J., took no part.
FIRST DIVISION[G.R. No. 114118. August 28, 2001]
5. HEIRS OF SIMEON BORLADO, namely, A D E L A I DA B O R L A D O, L O R E TO BORLADO, REYNALDO BORLADO, RICARDO BORLADO, FRANCISCO BORLADO and ALADINO DORADO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and S A LVA C I O N V DA . D E B U L A N , BIENVENIDO BULAN, JR., NORMA B. CLARITO and THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF CAPIZ, respondents.D E C I S I O NPARDO, J.:
The case is an appeal via certiorari from a decision[1] of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the trial court, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered dismissing plaintiffs complaint for lack of cause of action and ordering as vacated the restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction issued in this case; and
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1. Plaintiffs to be jointly and solidarily liable to defendants the quantity of one hundred (100) cavans of palay every year from 1972 until plaintiffs vacate the premises of the land in question;
2. Declaring defendants as owner of the land and entitled to possession;
3. Ordering plaintiffs to pay defendants the sum of P5,000.00 as attorneys fees and the sum of P5,000.00 as litigation expenses; and
4. To pay the costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.
Roxas City, Philippines, March 18, 1988.
(Sgd.) JONAS A. ABELLAR J u d g e[2]
The Facts
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
The records show that plaintiffs-appellants[3] (petitioners) are the heirs of Simeon Borlado whose parents were Serapio Borlado and Balbina Bulan. The original owner of the lot in question, Lot No. 2097 of the Pontevedra Cadastre, Maayon, Capiz, was Serapio Borlado, grandfather of petitioners.
On 15 April 1942, Serapio sold the lot to Francisco Bacero (Exh. C, p. 247, MTC Record) for Three Hundred Pesos (P300.00). After the death of Francsico on 26 February 1948, his widow Amparo Dionisio Vda. de Bacero, in her capacity as legal guardian of her minor children, namely: Nicolas, Valentin and Luzviminda, all
surnamed Bacero and forced heirs of Francisco Bacero sold it (the lot) to the Spouses Bienvenido Bulan and Salvacion Borbon, through a Deed of Absolute Sale dated 27 August 1954 (Exh. 65, pp. 243-245, id.).
Upon the execution of the Deed of Sale and even prior thereto, actual possession of Lot No. 2057 was with the vendees-spouses Bulans in view of a loan obtained by Francisco Bacero from them in December 1947 (Exh. 65, supra). Exercising their right of ownership under the Deed of Sale, Salvacion Borbon Vda. de Bulan declared the lot in her name in 1900 for taxat ion purposes under Tax Declaration No. 2232 (Exh. F, p. 254, Record [MTC] ) . S he p a i d t he corresponding taxes as evidenced by the Tax Receipts marked as Exhibits K, J, I, G, F and H (pp. 248-253, Record, id.). Sa lvac ion and her co-defendants-appellees[4] possession of the lot was continuous, peaceful, uninterrupted, adverse and exclusive until November 4, 1972, when petitioners forcibly entered and wrested physical possession thereof from them.
On 23 November 1972, respondents filed with the Municipal Court of Maayon, Capiz a complaint for ejectment docketed as Civil Case No. A-1, against petitioners (p. 1, id.). The ejectment case was decided in favor of the respondents whereby the petitioners, their agents, tenants, privies and members of their families were ordered to vacate Lot No. 2079 and deliver possession to the respondents together with all improvements and standing crops; to pay said respondents One Hundred (100) cavans of palay annually from 1972 to the present or in the total amount of One Thousand One Hundred (1,100) cavans of palay; and to pay the sum of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos as reimbursement for the amount
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respondents had paid their lawyer to protect their rights; and, the costs of suit (Exh. 57, pp. 256-261, id.). Instead of appealing the adverse decision to the Court of First Instance (now RTC), on 8 November 1983, petitioners filed the present case with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Roxas City, docketed as Civil Case No. V-4887. This case was dismissed for lack of cause of action in a decision, the decretal portion of which was quoted earlier.[5]
On 24 November 1993, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision affirming in toto the appealed decision.[6]
Hence, this appeal.[7]
The Issue
The issue raised is whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that respondents were the owners of the lot in question.
The Courts Ruling
We deny the petition. The issue is factual. In an appeal via certiorari, we may not review the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals.[8] When supported by substantial evidence, the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding on the parties and are not reviewable by this Court,[9] unless the case falls under any of the exceptions to the rule.[10]
Petitioner failed to prove that the case falls within the exceptions.[11] The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts.[12] It is not our function to review, examine and evaluate or weigh the probative value of the evidence presented.[13] A question of fact would arise in such event.[14] Questions of fact cannot be raised in an appeal via certiorari before the Supreme Court and are not proper for its consideration.[15]
Nevertheless, as a matter of law, the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in ho ld i