DULAY vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS (G.R. No. 108017 April 3, 1995)Liability of company for criminal act done deliberately while on dutyFACTS: In 1988, an altercation between Benigno Torzuela and Atty. Napoleon Dulay occurred at the "Big Bang Sa Alabang," Alabang Village, Muntinlupa as a result of which Benigno Torzuela, the security guard on duty at the said carnival, shot and killed Atty. Napoleon Dulay.Maria Benita A. Dulay, widow of the deceased Napoleon Dulay, in her own behalf and in behalf of her minor children, filed an action for actual, compensatory, moral and exemplary damages against Benigno Torzuela and Safeguard Investigation and Security Co., Inc., and/or Superguard Security Corp., as employers, for negligence having failed to exercise diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision and control of its employee. SUPERGUARD alleged that the complaint for damages based on negligence under Article 2176 of the New Civil Code, such as the one filed by petitioners, cannot lie, since the civil liability under Article 2176 applies only to quasi-offenses under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. Also, it argued that Torzuelas act of shooting Dulay was beyond the scope of his duties and was committed with deliberate intent (dolo). It also filed a motion praying that it be excluded as defendant on the ground that defendant Torzuela is not one of its employees.However, petitioners opposed both motions, stating that their cause of action against the private respondents is based on their liability under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, which provides:Art. 2180 ..Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or an industry.RTC ruled in favour of Superguard. It held that the complaint did not state facts necessary or sufficient to constitute a quasi-delict since it does not mention any negligence on the part of Torzuela in shooting Napoleon Dulay or that the same was done in the performance of his duties. It also declared that the complaint was one for damages founded on crimes punishable under Articles 100 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code as distinguished from those arising from, quasi-delict. CA affirmed.Dulay insists that Torzuela' s act of shooting Napoleon Dulay constitutes a quasi-delict actionable under Article 2176 of the New Civil Code. Petitioners further contend that under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, private respondents are primarily liable for their negligence either in the selection or supervision of their employees. ISSUE: W/N Superguard and Safeguard can be held liable as employers for the criminal act of TorzuelaHELD: YES! It would show that petitioners are invoking their right to recover damages against the private respondents for their vicarious responsibility for the injury caused by Benigno Torzuela's act of shooting and killing Napoleon Dulay. Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.There is no justification for limiting the scope of Art. 2176 to acts or omissions resulting from negligence.Well-entrenched is the doctrine that article 2176 covers not only acts committed with negligence, but also acts which are voluntary and intentional.Since Article 2176 covers not only acts of negligence but also acts which are intentional and voluntary, it was therefore erroneous on the part of the trial court to dismiss petitioner's complaint simply because it failed to make allegations of attendant negligence attributable to private respondents. Under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code as aforequoted, when an injury is caused by the negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after selection or both. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the private respondents to prove that they exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employee.GARCIA, vs. THE HONORABLE MARIANO M. FLORIDO OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL (G.R. No. L-35095 August 31, 1973)FACTS:Petitioners, German C. Garcia, Chief of the Misamis Occidental Hospital, together with his wife, Luminosa L. Garcia, and Ester Francisco, bookkeeper of said hospital, hired and boarded a PU car owned and operated by respondent, Marcelino Inesin, and driven by respondent, Ricardo Vayson, for a round-trip from Oroquieta City to Zamboanga City, for the purpose of attending a conference of chiefs of government hospitals, hospital administrative officers, and bookkeepers of Regional Health Office No. 7 at Zamboanga City. At about 9:30 a.m., while the PU car was negotiating a slight curve on the national highway Zamboanga del Norte, said car collided with an oncoming passenger bus owned and operated by the Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and driven by defendant, Pedro Tumala. As a result, petitioners sustained various physical injuries which necessitated their medical treatment and hospitalization.Alleging that both drivers of the PU car and passenger bus were at the time of the accident driving their respective vehicles at a reckless, grossly negligent and and without due regard to the safety of the passengers aboard the PU car, petitioners filed with CFI Misamis Occidental an action for damages against the private respondents, owners and drivers of the PU car and the passenger bus.Marcelino Inesin and Ricardo Vayson admitted the contract of carriage with petitioners but alleged that the accident was due to the negligence and reckless imprudence of the bus driver, therefore, said private respondents could not be held liable for the damages caused on petitioners.It said that when the driver of the PU car, saw the oncoming passenger bus coming from the opposite direction he had to stop the PU car in order to give way to the passenger bus, but, in spite of such precaution, the passenger bus bumped the PU car, thus causing the accident.Respondents, Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and Pedro Tumala, filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the petitioners had no cause of action; and that the respondents, Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and its driver, accused Pedro Tumala, had operated said passenger bus with maximum care and prudence.Mactan: argued that the petitioners had no cause of action because respondent Pedro Tumala was already charged with "double serious and less serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence", and that, with the filing of the aforesaid criminal case, no civil action could be filed subsequent thereto unless the criminal case has been finally adjudicated; that Art. 33 of the New Civil Code, is not applicable because Art. 33 applied only to the crimes of physical injuries or homicide, not to the negligent act or imprudence of the driver.Petitioners: Action for damages was instituted not to enforce the civil liability of the respondents under Art. 100 of RPC but for their civil liability on quasi-delicts pursuant to Articles 2176-2194, as the same negligent act causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under the Revised Penal Code or create an action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code, and the party seeking recovery is free to choose which remedy to enforce. CFI ruled in favour of Mactan.ISSUE: W/N the action is based on quasi-delictHELD:YES! The essential averments for a quasi-delictual action under Articles 2176-2194 of the New Civil Code are present, namely:

a) act or omission of the private respondents; b) presence of fault or negligence or the lack of due care in the operation of the passenger bus No. 25 by respondent Pedro Tumala resulting in the collision of the bus with the passenger car; c) physical injuries and other damages sustained by petitioners as a result of the collision; d) existence of direct causal connection between the damage or prejudice and the fault or negligence of private respondents; and e) the absence of pre-existing contractual relations between the parties. The violation of traffic rules that the driver drove the vehicle "at a fast clip in a reckless manner in violation of traffic rules and without due regard to the safety of the passengers aboard the PU car" does not detract from the nature and character of the action, as one based on culpa aquiliana. Certainly excessive speed in violation of traffic rules is a clear indication of negligence.Thus, the same negligent act (both in criminal and civil actions filed) causing damages may produce a civil liability arising from a crime under Art. 100 of the Revised Penal Code or create an action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual under Arts. 2176-2194 of the New Civil Code.Andamo vs IAC (G.R. No. 74761 November 6, 1990)Facts: Petitioner spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo are the owners of a parcel of land situated in Biga (Biluso) Silang, Cavite which is adjacent to that of private respondent, Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc., a religious corporation. Within the land of respondent corporation, waterpaths and contrivances, including an artificial lake, were constructed, which allegedly inundated and eroded petitioners' land, caused a young man to drown, damaged petitioners' crops and plants, washed away costly fences, endangered the lives of petitioners and their laborers during rainy and stormy seasons, and exposed plants and other improvements to destruction. As a result there was an institution of a criminal action against officers and directors of herein respondent corporation and subsequently a civil action for damages. Due to lack of jurisdiction, the civil case was dismissed due to the criminal case remaining unresolved following the provision of Section 3 (a), Rule III of the Rules of Court which provides that "criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may be instituted separately, but after the criminal action has been commenced the civil action cannot be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action." Issue: WON a corporation, which has built through its agents, waterpaths, water conductors and contrivances within its land, thereby causing inundation and damage to an adjacent land, can be held civilly liable for damages under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts such that the resulting civil case can proceed independently of the criminal case?Held: Yes. The civil action is one under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. All the elements of a quasi-delict are present, to wit: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff, (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff. The waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent corporation are alleged to have inundated the land of petitioners. There is therefore, an assertion of a causal connection between the act of building these waterpaths and the damage sustained by petitioners. Such action if proven constitutes fault or negligence which may be the basis for the recovery of damages.Article 2176, whenever it refers to "fault or negligence", covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, (if the tortfeasor is actually charged also criminally), to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. TAYLOR vs. THE MANILA ELECTRIC RAILROAD AND LIGHT COMPANY (G.R. No. L-4977 March 22, 1910)FACTS: The defendant is a foreign corporation engaged in the operation of a street railway and an electric light system in the city of Manila. Its power plant is situated at the eastern end of a small island in the Pasig River within the city of Manila, known as the Isla del Provisor.September 30, 1905 Sunday afternoon: David Taylor, 15 years of age, the son of a mechanical engineer, more mature than the average boy of his age, and having considerable aptitude and training in mechanics with a boy named Manuel Claparols, about 12 years of age, crossed the footbridge to the Isla del Provisor, for the purpose of visiting Murphy, an employee of the defendant, who and promised to make them a cylinder for a miniature engine.After leaving the power house where they had asked for Mr. Murphy, they walked across the open space in the neighborhood of the place where the company dumped in the cinders and ashes from its furnaces. They found some twenty or thirty brass fulminating caps scattered on the ground. These caps are approximately of the size and appearance of small pistol cartridges and each has attached to it 2 long thin wires by means of which it may be discharged by the use of electricity. They are intended for use in the explosion of blasting charges of dynamite, and have in themselves a considerable explosive power. The boys picked up all they could find, hung them on stick, of which each took end, and carried them home.After crossing the footbridge, they met Jessie Adrian, less than 9 years old, and they went to Manuel's home. The boys then made a series of experiments with the caps. They trust the ends of the wires into an electric light socket - no result. Break the cap with a stone failed. Opened one of the caps with a knife, and finding that it was filled with a yellowish substance and they got matches. David held the cap while Manuel applied a lighted match to the contents. An explosion followed, causing more or less serious injuries to all three. Jessie, who when the boys proposed putting a match to the contents of the cap, became frightened and started to run away, received a slight cut in the neck. Manuel had his hand burned and wounded. David was struck in the face by several particles of the metal capsule, one of which injured his right eye to such an extent as to the necessitate its removal by the surgeonsAn action to recover damages for the loss of an eye and other injuries, instituted by David Taylor, a minor, by his father, his nearest relative.Trial Court: held Manila Electric Railroad And Light Company liableISSUES: (1) Whether or not the elements of quasi-delict to make Manila Electric Railroad And Light Company liable; LAWS INVOLVED: ART. 1089 Obligations are created by law, by contracts, by quasi-contracts, and illicit acts and omissions or by those in which any kind of fault or negligence occurs.ART. 1902 A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when there is fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done.ART. 1903 The obligation imposed by the preceding article is demandable, not only for personal acts and omissions, but also for those of the persons for whom they should be responsible.The father, and on his death or incapacity the mother, is liable for the damages caused by the minors who live with them.xxx xxx xxxOwners or directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally liable for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter may be employed or on account of their duties.xxx xxx xxxThe liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage.ART. 1908 The owners shall also be liable for the damage caused 1 By the explosion of machines which may not have been cared for with due diligence, and for kindling of explosive substances which may not have been placed in a safe and proper place.RULING: Under the Civil Code, as under the generally accepted doctrine in the United States, the plaintiff in an action such as that under consideration, in order to establish his right to a recovery, must establish by competent evidence:(1) Damages to the plaintiff.(2) Negligence by act or omission of which defendant personally, or some person for whose acts it must respond, was guilty.(3) The connection of cause and effect between the negligence and the damage.The plaintiff in this case being a trespasser, the defendant company owed him no duty, and in no case could be held liable for injuries which would not have resulted but for the entry of plaintiff on defendant's premises.We adhere to the principles announced inRailroad Co. vs. Stout(supra). Applied to the case now before us, they require us to hold that the defendant was guilty of negligence in leaving unguarded the slack pile, made by it in the vicinity of its depot building. It could have forbidden all persons from coming to its coal mine for purposes merely of curiosity and pleasure. But it did not do so. On the contrary, it permitted all, without regard to age, to visit its mine, and witness its operation. It knew that the usual approach to the mine was by a narrow path skirting its slack pit, close to its depot building, at which the people of the village, old and young, would often assemble. It knew that children were in the habit of frequenting that locality and playing around the shaft house in the immediate vicinity of the slack pit. The slightest regard for the safety of these children would have suggested that they were in danger from being so near a pit, beneath the surface of which was concealed (except when snow, wind, or rain prevailed) a mass of burning coals into which a child might accidentally fall and be burned to death. Under all the circumstances, the railroad company ought not to be heard to say that the plaintiff, a mere lad, moved by curiosity to see the mine, in the vicinity of the slack pit, was a trespasser, to whom it owed no duty, or for whose protection it was under no obligation to make provisions.Loadmaster v. Glodel (GR No. 179446, January 10, 2011)

R&B Insurance issued Marine Policy in favor of Columbia to insure the shipment of bundles of electric copper cathodes against All Risks. The cargoes were shipped and arrived on the same date. Columbia engaged the services of Glodel for the release and withdrawal of the cargoes from the pier and the subsequent delivery to its warehouses/plants. Glodel, in turn, engaged the services of Loadmasters for the use of its delivery trucks to transport the cargoes to Columbias warehouses/plants in Bulacan and Valenzuela City.(Columbia Glodel Loadmaster)

The goods were loaded on board 12 trucks owned by Loadmasters. 6 truckloads of copper cathodes were to be delivered to Bulacan, while the other 6 were destined for Valenzuela City. Of the 6 trucks en route to Bulacan only 5 reached the destination. Later on, the said truck was recovered but without the copper cathodes. Columbia filed with R&B Insurance a claim for insurance indemnity. R&B Insurance paid Columbia. R&B Insurance, thereafter, filed a complaint for damages against both Loadmasters and Glodel. RTC rendered a decision holding Glodel liable for damages and dismissing Loadmasters counterclaim for damages and attorneys fees against R&B Insurance.

ISSUE: Who, between Glodel and Loadmasters, is liable to pay R&B Insurance for the amount of the indemnity it paid Columbia?Held: Premises considered, the Court is of the view that both Loadmasters and Glodel are jointly and severally liable to R & B Insurance for the loss of the subject cargo. Under Article 2194 of the New Civil Code, the responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary.Loadmasters claim that it was never privy to the contract entered into by Glodel with the consignee Columbia or R&B Insurance as subrogee, is not a valid defense. It may not have a direct contractual relation with Columbia, but it is liable for tort under the provisions of Article 2176 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts which expressly provide:ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

In connection therewith, Article 2180 provides: ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

It is not disputed that the subject cargo was lost while in the custody of Loadmasters whose employees (truck driver and helper) were instrumental in the hijacking or robbery of the shipment. As employer, Loadmasters should be made answerable for the damages caused by its employees who acted within the scope of their assigned task of delivering the goods safely to the warehouse.

Whenever an employees negligence causes damage or injury to another, there instantly arises a presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection (culpa in eligiendo) or supervision (culpa in vigilando) of its employees.To avoid liability for a quasi-delict committed by its employee, an employer must overcome the presumption by presenting convincing proof that he exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee.n this regard, Loadmasters failed.Padilla vs CA(G.R. No. L-39999 May 31, 1984)FACTS:ROY PADILLA, FILOMENO GALDONES, PEPITO BEDENIA, YOLLY RICO, DAVID BERMUNDO, VILLANOAC, ROBERTO ROSALES, VILLANIA, ROMEO GARRIDO, JOSE ORTEGA, JR., RICARDO CELESTINO, REALINGO alias "KAMLON", JOHN DOE alias TATO, and FOURTEEN (14) RICARDO DOES were accused of the crime of GRAVE COERCION, committed as follows:On the morning of February 8th, Chief Galdones, complying with the instructions contained in said Memorandum No. 32 of MayorPadilla, and upon seeing that Antonio Vergara had not up to that time complied with the order to vacate, Chief of Police Galdones and some members of his police force, went to the market and, using ax, crowbars and hammers, demolished the stall of the Vergaras who were not present or around, and after having first inventoried the goods and merchandise found therein, they had them brought to the municipal building for safekeeping. Inspite of notice served upon the Vergaras to take possession of the goods and merchandise thus taken away, the latter refused to do so. It is not disputed that the accused demolished the grocery stall of the complainants Vergaras and carted away its contents. The defense that they did so in order to abate what they considered a nuisance per se is untenable, This finds no support in law and in fact. The couple (Vergaras) has been paying rentals for the premises to the government which allowed them to lease the stall. It is, therefore, farfetched to say that the stall was a nuisance per se which could be summarily abated.CFI DECISION: Roy Padilla, Filomeno Galdonez, Ismael Gonzalgo and Jose Parley Bedenia guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of grave coercion, and hereby imposes upon them to suffer an imprisonment of FIVE (5) months and One (1) day; to pay a fine of P500.00 each; to pay actual and compensatory damages in the amount of P10,000.00; moral damages in the amount of P30,000.00; and another P10,000.00 for exemplary damages, jointly and severally, and all the accessory penalties provided for by law; and to pay the proportionate costs of this proceedings. The others not included are hereby ordered acquitted on grounds of reasonable doubt for their criminal participation in the crime charged.Petitioners appealed the judgment of conviction to the Court of Appeals. Petitioners contention: trial court's finding of grave coercion was not supported by the evidence the town mayor had the power to order the clearance of market premises and the removal of the complainants' stall because the municipality had enacted municipal ordinances pursuant to which the market stall was a nuisance per se the lower court erred in finding that the demolition of the complainants' stall was a violation of the very directive of the petitioner Mayor which gave the stall owners seventy two (72) hours to vacate the market premises question the imposition of imprisonment and fineCA DECISION: appellants are acquitted on ground of reasonable doubt. but they are ordered to pay jointly and severally to complainants the amount of P9,600.00, as actual damages.Motion for reconsideration contending: acquittal of the defendants-appellants as to criminal liability results in the extinction of their civil liability. CA DENIED MOTION on the ground: appellants' acquittal was based on reasonable doubt whether the crime of coercion was committed, not on facts that no unlawful act was committed; as their taking the law into their hands, destroying complainants' properties is unlawful, and, as evidence on record established that complainants suffered actual damages, the imposition of actual damages is correct.ISSUE:Whether or not the respondent court committed a reversible error in requiring the petitioners to pay civil indemnity to the complainants after acquitting them from the criminal charge.HELD: GRAVE COERCION vs MALICIOUS MISCHIEFIn the case before us, the petitioners were acquitted not because they did not commit the acts stated in the charge against them. There is no dispute over the forcible opening of the market stall, its demolition with axes and other instruments, and the carting away of the merchandize. The petitioners were acquitted because these acts were denominated coercion when they properly constituted some other offense such as threat or malicious mischief. For a complaint to prosper under the foregoing provision, the violence must be employed against the person, not against property as what happened in the case at bar. The crime of grave coercion has not been proved in accordance with law. CRIMINAL PROCEDUREWhile appellants are entitled to acquittal they nevertheless are liable for the actual damages suffered by the complainants by reason of the demolition of the stall and loss of some of their properties. The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it that of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. (Rule 111, Sec. 3 Rules of Court). In the instant case, the fact from which the civil might arise, namely, the demolition of the stall and loss of the properties contained therein; exists, and this is not denied by the accused. And since there is no showing that the complainants have reserved or waived their right to institute a separate civil action, the civil aspect therein is deemed instituted with the criminal action. (Rule 111, Sec. 1, Rules of Court).The extinction of the civil action by reason of acquittal in the criminal case refers exclusively to civil liability ex delicto founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code. The civil liability which is also extinguished upon acquittal of the accused is the civil liability arising from the act as a crime. TORTS'There is the civil liability arising from the act as acrimeand the liability arising from the same act as aquasi-delict.Either one of these two types of civil liability may be enforced against the accused, However, the offended party cannot recover damages under both types of liability. For instance, in cases of criminal negligence or crimes due to reckless imprudence, Article 2177 of the Civil Code provides:Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.Section 3 (c) of Rule 111 specifically provides that: Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil might arise did not exist. Thus, the civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases; where the court expressly declares that the liability of the accused is not criminal but only civil in nature and, where the civil liability does not arise from or is not based upon the criminal act of which the accused was acquitted Article 29 of the Civil Code also provides that: When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence. It merely emphasizes that a civil action for damages is not precluded by an acquittal for the same criminal act or omission. The petitioners contention that it the claim for damages should be filed separately or in a separate civil action is not correct. The Civil Code provision does not state that the remedy can be availed of only in a separate civil action. A separate civil case may be filed but there is no statement that such separate filing is the only and exclusive permissible mode of recovering damages.A judgment of acquittal operates to extinguish the criminal liability. It does not, however, extinguish the civil liability unless there is clear showing that the act from which civil liability might arise did not exist.Decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.Cruz vs CA (G.R. No. 122445 November 18, 1997)Doctors are protected by a special rule of law. They are not guarantors of care. They do not even warrant a good result. They are not insurers against mishaps or unusual consequences. Furthermore they are not liable for honest mistakes of judgment.The present case against petitioner is in the nature of a medical malpractice suit, which in simplest terms is the type of claim which a victim has available to him or her to redress a wrong committed by a medical professional which has caused bodily harm.In this jurisdiction, however, such claims are most often brought as a civil action for damages under Article 2176 of the Civil Code,and in some instances, as a criminal case under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Codewith which the civil action for damages is impliedly instituted. FACTS:On March 22, 1991, Rowena Umali De Ocampo, accompanied her mother to the Perpetual Help Clinic and General Hospital situated in Balagtas Street, San Pablo, Laguna. They arrived at the said hospital at around 4:30 in the afternoon.Prior to March 22, Lydia was examined by the petitioner Dr. Niniveth Cruz who found a "myoma"in her uterus, and scheduled her for a hysterectomy operation on March 23, 1991.Rowena and her mother slept in the clinic on the evening of March 22 as the latter was to be operated on the next day at 1 in the afternoon.According to Rowena, she noticed that the clinic was untidy and the window and the floor were very dusty prompting her to ask the attendant for a rag to wipe the window and the floor with.Because of the untidy state of the clinic, Rowena tried to persuade her mother not to proceed with the operation.The following day, before her mother was wheeled into the operating room, Rowena asked the petitioner if the operation could be postponed. The petitioner called Lydia into her office and the two had a conversation. Lydia then informed Rowena that the petitioner told her that she must be operated on as scheduled.Rowena and her other relatives, namely her husband, her sister and two aunts waited outside the operating room while Lydia underwent operation. While they were waiting, Dr. Ercillo went out of the operating room and instructed them to buy tagamet ampules which Rowena's sister immediately bought. About one hour had passed when Dr. Ercillo came out again this time to ask them to buy blood for Lydia. They bought type "A" blood from the St. Gerald Blood Bank and the same was brought by the attendant into the operating room. After the lapse of a few hours, the petitioner informed them that the operation was finished. Thirty minutes after, Lydia was brought out of the operating room in a stretcher and the petitioner asked Rowena and the other relatives to buy additional blood for Lydia. Unfortunately, they were not able to comply with petitioner's order as there was no more type "A" blood available in the blood bank. Thereafter, a person arrived to donate blood which was later transfused to Lydia. Rowena then noticed her mother, who was attached to an oxygen tank, gasping for breath. Apparently the oxygen supply had run out and Rowena's husband together with the driver of the accused had to go to the San Pablo District Hospital to get oxygen. Lydia was given the fresh supply of oxygen as soon as it arrived.But at around 10 in the evening she went into shock and her blood pressure dropped to 60/50. Lydia's unstable condition necessitated her transfer to the San Pablo District Hospital so she could be connected to a respirator and further examined.The transfer to the San Pablo District Hospital was without the prior consent of Rowena nor of the other relatives present who found out about the intended transfer only when an ambulance arrived to take Lydia to the San Pablo District Hospital. Rowena and her other relatives then boarded a tricycle and followed the ambulance.Upon Lydia's arrival at the San Pablo District Hospital, she was wheeled into the operating room and the petitioner and Dr. Ercillo re-operated on her because there was blood oozing from the abdominal incision.The attending physicians summoned Dr. Bartolome Angeles, head of the Obstetrics and Gynecology Department of the San Pablo District Hospital. However, when Dr. Angeles arrived, Lydia was already in shock and possibly dead as her blood pressure was already 0/0. Dr. Angeles then informed petitioner and Dr. Ercillo that there was nothing he could do to help save the patient.While the petitioner was closing the abdominal wall, the patient died.Thus, on March 24, 1991, at 3 in the morning, Lydia Umali was pronounced dead. Her death certificate states "shock" as the immediate cause of death and "Disseminated Intravascular Coagulation (DIC)" as the antecedent cause.Heirs of the deceased sought redress for the petitioner's alleged imprudence and negligence in treating the deceased thereby causing her death. The petitioner and one Dr. Lina Ercillo who was the attending anaesthesiologist during the operation of the deceased were charged with "reckless imprudence and negligence resulting to homicide.Trial ensued after both the petitioner and Dr. Lina Ercillo pleaded not guilty. MTCC DECISION: The court finds the accused Dra. Lina Ercillo not guilty of the offense charged for insufficiency of evidence while her co-accused Dra. Ninevetch Cruz is hereby held responsible for the death of Lydia Umali on March 24, 1991, and therefore guilty under Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code, and she is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of 2 months and 1 day imprisonment of arresto mayor with costs.Basis of MTCC for conviction: the clinic was untidy lack of provision like blood and oxygen to prepare for any contingency that might happen during the operation the fact that the patient was brought tothe San Pablo District Hospital for reoperation indicates that there was something wrong in the manner in which Dra. Cruz conducted the operation no showing that before the operation, accused Dra. Cruz had conducted a cardio pulmonary clearance or any typing of the blood of the patient it was said in medical parlance that the "the abdomen of the person is a temple of surprises" because you do not know the whole thing the moment it was open and surgeon must be prepared for any eventuality thereof the patient chart which is a public document was not presented because it is only there that we could determine the condition of the patient before the surgery the sister of the deceased wished to postpone the operation but the patient was prevailed upon by Dra. Cruz to proceed with the surgery the court finds that Lydia Umali died because of the negligence and carelessness of the surgeon Dra. Ninevetch Cruz because of loss of blood during the operation of the deceased for evident unpreparedness and for lack of skillAll these conclusively show that the petitioner had not prepared for any unforeseen circumstances before going into the first surgery, which was not emergency in nature, but was elective or pre-scheduled; she had no ready antibiotics, no prepared blood, properly typed and cross-matched, and no sufficient oxygen supply.Petitioner appealed her conviction to RTC.RTC DECISION: Affirmedin totothe decision of the MTCC.Petition for review with the Court of Appeals but was denied.Petition for review oncertiorariassailing the decision promulgated by the Court of Appeals affirming petitioner's conviction with modification that she is further directed to pay the heirs of Lydia Umali P50,000.00 as indemnity for her death.ISSUE:Whether or not petitioner's conviction of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, arising from an alleged medical malpractice, is supported by the evidence on record.HELD:The Court, however, holds differently and finds the foregoing circumstances insufficient to sustain a judgment of conviction against the petitioner for the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. The elements of reckless imprudence are: (1) that the offender does or fails to do an act; (2) that the doing or the failure to do that act is voluntary; (3) that it be without malice; (4) that material damage results from the reckless imprudence; and (5) that there is inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the offender, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition, and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.Whether or not a physician has committed an "inexcusable lack of precaution" in the treatment of his patient is to be determined according to the standard of care observed by other members of the profession in good standing under similar circumstances bearing in mind the advanced state of the profession at the time of treatment or the present state of medical science.In the case ofLeonila Garcia-Rueda v.Wilfred L.Pascasio, et al.,the Court stated that : in accepting a case, a doctor in effect represents that, he will employ such training, care and skill in the treatment of his patients. He therefore has a duty to use at least the same level of care that any other reasonably competent doctor would use to treat a condition under the same circumstances. It is in this aspect of medical malpractice that expert testimony is essential to establish not only the standard of care of the profession but also that the physician's conduct in the treatment and care falls below such standard.Immediately apparent from a review of the records of this case is the absence of any expert testimony on the matter of the standard of care employed by other physicians of good standing in the conduct of similar operations. The prosecution's expert witnesses, Dr. Floresto Arizala and Dr. Nieto Salvador, Jr. of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) only testified as to the possible cause of death but did not venture to illuminate the court on the matter of the standard of care that petitioner should have exercised.Whether a physician or surgeon has exercised the requisite degree of skill and care in the treatment of his patient is, in the generality of cases, a matter of expert opinion.The deference of courts to the expert opinion of qualified physicians stems from its realization that the latter possess unusual technical skills which laymen in most instances are incapable of intelligently evaluating.Expert testimony should have been offered to prove that the circumstances cited by the courts below are constitutive of conduct falling below the standard of care employed by other physicians in good standing when performing the same operation. It must be remembered that when the qualifications of a physician are admitted, as in the instant case, there is an inevitable presumption that in proper cases he takes the necessary precaution and employs the best of his knowledge and skill in attending to his clients, unless the contrary is sufficiently established.This presumption is rebuttable by expert opinion which is lacking in the case at bar.Granting the basis of the MTCC for conviction it does indicate, that petitioner was recklessly imprudent in the exercise of her duties as a surgeon, no cogent proof exists that any of these circumstances caused petitioner's death. Thus, the absence of the fourth element of reckless imprudence: that the injury to the person or property was a consequence of the reckless imprudence.In litigations involving medical negligence, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing appellant's negligence and for a reasonable conclusion of negligence, there must be proof of breach of duty on the part of the surgeonas well as a causal connection of such breach and the resulting death of his patient.InChan Lugay v.St.Luke's Hospital, Inc.,case:In order that there may be a recovery for an injury, however, it must be shown that the "injury for which recovery is sought must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong done; the connection between the negligence and the injury must be a direct and natural sequence of events, unbroken by intervening efficient causes."In other words, the negligence must be the proximate cause of the injury.For, "negligence, no matter in what it consists, cannot create a right of action unless it is the proximate cause of the injury complained of." And "the proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred."The findings of all three expert doctors do not preclude the probability that DIC caused the hemorrhage and consequently, Lydia's death. DIC which is a clotting defect creates a serious bleeding tendency and when massive DIC occurs as a complication of surgery leaving raw surface, major hemorrhage occurs.This Court has no recourse but to rely on the expert testimonies rendered by both prosecution and defense witnesses that substantiate rather than contradict petitioner's allegation that the cause of Lydia's death was DIC which, as attested to by an expert witness, cannot be attributed to the petitioner's fault or negligence. The probability that Lydia's death was caused by DIC was unrebutted during trial and has engendered in the mind of this Court a reasonable doubt as to the petitioner's guilt. Thus, her acquittal of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. While we condole with the family of Lydia Umali, our hands are bound by the dictates of justice and fair dealing which hold inviolable the right of an accused to be presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Nevertheless, this Court finds the petitioner civilly liable for the death of Lydia Umali, for while a conviction of a crime requires proof beyond reasonable doubt, only a preponderance of evidence is required to establish civil liability.For insufficiency of evidence this Court was not able to render a sentence of conviction but it is not blind to the reckless and imprudent manner in which the petitioner carried out her duties. DR. NINEVETCH CRUZ is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide but is ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased Lydia Umali the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as civil liability, ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00) as moral damages, and FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as exemplary damages.HEIRS OF EDUARDO SIMON,vs. ELVIN CHAN AND THE COURT OF APPEALS (G.R. No. 157547 February 23, 2011)On July 11, 1997, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila (MeTC) an information charging the late Eduardo Simon (Simon) with a violation of BP 22. More than three years later, or on August 3, 2000, respondent Elvin Chan commenced in the MeTC in Pasay City a civil action for the collection of the principal amount ofP336,000.00, coupled with an application for a writ of preliminary attachment. On August 9, 2000, the MeTC in Pasay City issued a writ of preliminary attachment, which was implemented on August 17, 2000 through the sheriff attaching a Nissan vehicle of Simon. On August 17, 2000, Simon filed an urgent motion to dismiss with application to charge plaintiffs attachment bond for damages,on the ground of litis pendentia.While the instant case is civil in nature and character as contradistinguished from the said Criminal Case in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, the basis of the instant civil action is the herein plaintiffs criminal complaint against defendant arising from a charge of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 as a consequence of the alleged dishonor in plaintiffs hands upon presentment for payment with drawee bank a Land Bank Check dated December 26, 1996 in the amount ofP336,000.On August 29, 2000, Chan opposed Simons urgent motion to dismiss with application to charge plaintiffs attachment bond for damages, stating that there is an effective implied waiver of his right to pursue this civil case owing to the fact that there was no allegation of damages in BP Blg. 22 case and that there was no private prosecutor during the presentation of prosecution evidence.On October 23, 2000, the MeTC in Pasay City granted Simons urgent motion to dismiss with application to charge plaintiffs attachment bond for damages, because in both civil and criminal cases, the rights asserted and relief prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts, are identical.Chans motion for reconsideration was denied. Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Pasay City upheld the dismissal of Chans complaint.Chan appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) by petition for review, challenging the propriety of the dismissal of his complaint on the ground of litis pendentia.Simon countered that Chan was guilty of bad faith and malice in prosecuting his alleged civil claim twice in a manner that caused him (Simon) utter embarrassment and emotional sufferings; and that the dismissal of the civil case because of the valid ground of litis pendentia based on Section 1 (e), Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure was warranted.On June 25, 2002, the CA overturning the RTC. On March 14, 2003, the CA denied Simons motion for reconsideration. Petitioners submit that the CA erroneously premised its decision on the assessment that the civil case was an independent civil action under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code; that the CAs reliance on the ruling in DMPI Employees Credit Cooperative Inc. v. Velez stretched the meaning and intent of the ruling, and was contrary to Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure; that this case was a simple collection suit for a sum of money, precluding the application of Section 3 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/feb2011/gr_157547_2011.html - fnt15In his comment,http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/feb2011/gr_157547_2011.html - fnt16Chan counters that the petition for review should be denied because the petitioners used the wrong mode of appeal; that his cause of action, being based on fraud, was an independent civil action; and that the appearance of a private prosecutor in the criminal case did not preclude the filing of his separate civil action.ISSUE: WoN Chans civil action to recover the amount of the unfunded check was an independent civil action.HELD: NO! There is no independent civil action to recover the civil liability arising from the issuance of an unfunded check prohibited and punished under Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22). Chans separate civil action to recover the amount of the check involved in the prosecution for the violation of BP 22 could not be independently maintained under both Supreme Court Circular 57-97 and the aforequoted provisions of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, notwithstanding the allegations of fraud and deceit.Regardless, therefore, of whether or not a special law so provides, indemnification of the offended party may be had on account of the damage, loss or injury directly suffered as a consequence of the wrongful act of another. The indemnity which a person is sentenced to pay forms an integral part of the penalty imposed by law for the commission of a crime. Every crime gives rise to a penal or criminal action for the punishment of the guilty party, and also to civil action for the restitution of the thing, repair of the damage, and indemnification for the losses.Civil liability to the offended party cannot thus be denied. The payee of the check is entitled to receive the payment of money for which the worthless check was issued. Having been caused the damage, she is entitled to recompense.Surely, it could not have been the intendment of the framers of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 to leave the offended private party defrauded and empty-handed by excluding the civil liability of the offender. However, there is no independent civil action to recover the value of a bouncing check issued in contravention of BP 22. This is clear from Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, effective December 1, 2000.The aforequoted provisions of the Rules of Court, even if not yet in effect when Chan commenced Civil Case No. 915-00 on August 3, 2000, are nonetheless applicable. It is axiomatic that the retroactive application of procedural laws does not violate any right of a person who may feel adversely affected, nor is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason is simply that, as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, or arise from, procedural laws. Circular No. 57-97 of this Court specifically states that the criminal action for violation of B.P. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. It also requires the complainant to pay in full the filing fees based on the amount of the check involved. Generally, no filing fees are required for criminal cases, but because of the inclusion of the civil action in complaints for violation of B.P. 22, the Rules require the payment of docket fees upon the filing of the complaint. This rule was enacted to help declog court dockets which are filled with B.P. 22 cases as creditors actually use the courts as collectors. Because ordinarily no filing fee is charged in criminal cases for actual damages, the payee uses the intimidating effect of a criminal charge to collect his credit gratis and sometimes, upon being paid, the trial court is not even informed thereof. The inclusion of the civil action in the criminal case is expected to significantly lower the number of cases filed before the courts for collection based on dishonored checks. It is also expected to expedite the disposition of these cases. Instead of instituting two separate cases, one for criminal and another for civil, only a single suit shall be filed and tried. It should be stressed that the policy laid down by the Rules is to discourage the separate filing of the civil action. The Rules even prohibit the reservation of a separate civil action, which means that one can no longer file a separate civil case after the criminal complaint is filed in court. The only instance when separate proceedings are allowed is when the civil action is filed ahead of the criminal case. Even then, the Rules encourage the consolidation of the civil and criminal cases. We have previously observed that a separate civil action for the purpose of recovering the amount of the dishonored checks would only prove to be costly, burdensome and time-consuming for both parties and would further delay the final disposition of the case. This multiplicity of suits must be avoided. Where petitioners rights may be fully adjudicated in the proceedings before the trial court, resort to a separate action to recover civil liability is clearly unwarranted. In view of this special rule governing actions for violation of B.P. 22, Article 31 of the Civil Code cited by the trial court will not apply to the case at bar. In prosecutions of estafa, the offended party may opt to reserve his right to file a separate civil action, or may institute an independent action based on fraud pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code,as DMPI Employees has allowed. In prosecutions of violations of BP 22, however, the Court has adopted a policy to prohibit the reservation or institution of a separate civil action to claim the civil liability arising from the issuance of the bouncing check upon the reasons delineated inHyatt Industrial Manufacturing Corporation, supra.JOSE CANGCO, vs. MANILA RAILROAD CO. (G.R. No. L-12191 October 14, 1918)Jose Cangco, was in the employment of Manila Railroad Company in the capacity of clerk, with a monthly wage of P25. He lived in the pueblo of San Mateo, in the province of Rizal, which is located upon the line of the defendant railroad company; and in coming daily by train to the company's office in the city of Manila where he worked, he used a pass, supplied by the company, which entitled him to ride upon the company's trains free of charge. As the train slowed down another passenger, named Emilio Zuiga, also an employee of the railroad company, got off the same car, alighting safely at the point where the platform begins to rise from the level of the ground. When the train had proceeded a little farther the plaintiff Jose Cangco stepped off also, but one or both of his feet came in contact with a sack of watermelons with the result that his feet slipped from under him and he fell violently on the platform. His body at once rolled from the platform and was drawn under the moving car, where his right arm was badly crushed and lacerated. It appears that after the plaintiff alighted from the train the car moved forward possibly six meters before it came to a full stop.The accident occurred between 7 and 8 o'clock on a dark night, and as the railroad station was lighted dimly by a single light located some distance away, objects on the platform where the accident occurred were difficult to discern especially to a person emerging from a lighted car.The explanation of the presence of a sack of melons on the platform was that it was customary season for harvesting these melons and a large lot had been brought to the station for the shipment to the market. They were contained in numerous sacks which has been piled on the platform in a row one upon another. The injuries which he had received were very serious. His arm was amputated. The result of this operation was unsatisfactory, and a second operation was performed and the member was again amputated higher up near the shoulder. He filed a case in Court of First Instance of the city of Manila to recover damages of the defendant company, founding his action upon the negligence of the servants and employees of the defendant in placing the sacks of melons upon the platform.CFI: although negligence was attributable to the defendant, nevertheless, the plaintiff himself had failed to use due caution in alighting from the coachISSUE: (1) WoN Cangco is guilty of contributory negligence(2) WoN the railroad company is liable for the damages incurred to CangcoHELD: (1) NO! Plaintiff was not guilty of contributory negligence. The test by which to determine whether the passenger has been guilty of negligence in attempting to alight from a moving railway train, is that of ordinary or reasonable care. It is to be considered whether an ordinarily prudent person, of the age, sex and condition of the passenger, would have acted as the passenger acted under the circumstances disclosed by the evidence. This care has been defined to be, not the care which may or should be used by the prudent man generally, but the care which a man of ordinary prudence would use under similar circumstances, to avoid injury." In determining the question of contributory negligence in performing such act that is to say, whether the passenger acted prudently or recklessly the age, sex, and physical condition of the passenger are circumstances necessarily affecting the safety of the passenger, and should be considered.As pertinent to the question of contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff in this case the following circumstances are to be noted: 1) The company's platform was constructed upon a level higher than that of the roadbed and the surrounding ground thereby decreasing the risk incident to stepping off. 2) the plaintiff was possessed of the vigor and agility of young manhood; and 3) The place was perfectly familiar to the plaintiff as it was his daily custom to get on and of the train at this station.(2) YES! It is important to note that the foundation of the legal liability of the defendant is the contract of carriage, and that the obligation to respond for the damage which plaintiff has suffered arises, if at all, from the breach of that contract by reason of the failure of defendant to exercise due care in its performance. That is to say, its liability is direct and immediate, differing essentially, in legal viewpoint from that presumptive responsibility for the negligence of its servants, imposed by article 1903 of the Civil Code, which can be rebutted by proof of the exercise of due care in their selection and supervision. Article 1903 of the Civil Code is not applicable to obligations arising ex contractu, but only to extra-contractual obligations or to use the technical form of expression, that article relates only toculpaaquiliana and not toculpa contractual.The negligence of the defendant's servants does not constitute a defense to an action for damages for breach of contract. The contract of defendant to transport plaintiff carried with it, by implication, the duty to carry him in safety and to provide safe means of entering and leaving its trains (civil code, article 1258). That duty, being contractual, was direct and immediate, and its non-performance could not be excused by proof that the fault was morally imputable to defendant's servants. As the defendant was bound by reason of its duty as a public carrier to afford to its passengers facilities for safe egress from its trains, the plaintiff had a right to assume, in the absence of some circumstance to warn him to the contrary, that the platform was clear. The liability arising from extra-contractualculpais always based upon a voluntary act or omission which, without willful intent, but by mere negligence or inattention, has caused damage to another. True it is that under article 1903 of the Civil Code the law creates apresumptionthat he has been negligent in the selection or direction of his servant, but the presumption is rebuttable and yield to proof of due care and diligence in this respect.In case of extra-contractualculpabased upon negligence, it is necessary that there shall have been some fault attributable to the defendant personally, and that the last paragraph of article 1903 merely establishes a rebuttable presumption.On the other hand, the liability of masters and employers for the negligent acts or omissions of their servants or agents, when such acts or omissions cause damages which amount to the breach of a contact, is not based upon a mere presumption of the master's negligence in their selection or control, and proof of exercise of the utmost diligence and care in this regard does not relieve the master of his liability for the breach of his contract.The fundamental distinction between obligations of this character and those which arise from contract, rests upon the fact that in cases of non-contractual obligation it is the wrongful or negligent act or omission itself which creates thevinculum juris, whereas in contractual relations thevinculumexists independently of the breach of the voluntary duty assumed by the parties when entering into the contractual relation.When the sources of the obligation upon which plaintiff's cause of action depends is a negligent act or omission, the burden of proof rests upon plaintiff to prove the negligence. But when the facts averred show a contractual undertaking by defendant for the benefit of plaintiff, and it is alleged that plaintiff has failed or refused to perform the contract, it is not necessary for plaintiff to specify in his pleadings whether the breach of the contract is due to willful fault or to negligence on the part of the defendant, or of his servants or agents. Proof of the contract and of its nonperformance is sufficient prima facieto warrant a recovery.Under the doctrine of comparative negligence, if the accident was caused by plaintiff's own negligence, no liability is imposed upon defendant's negligence and plaintiff's negligence merely contributed to his injury, the damages should be apportioned. It may be admitted that had plaintiff waited until the train had come to a full stop before alighting, the particular injury suffered by him could not have occurred. In this particular instance, that the train was barely moving when plaintiff alighted is shown conclusively by the fact that it came to stop within six meters from the place where he stepped from it. Thousands of person alight from trains under these conditions every day of the year, and sustain no injury where the company has kept its platform free from dangerous obstructions. PAZ FORES vs. IRENEO MIRANDA Facts:Respondent was one of the passengers on a jeepney driven by Eugenio Luga. While the vehicle was descending the Sta. Mesa bridge at an excessive rate of speed, the driver lost control causing it to swerve and to hit the bridge wall. Five of the passengers were injured, including the respondent who suffered a fracture of the upper right humerus (arm). He was taken to the National Orthopedic Hospital for treatment, and later was subjected to a series of operations. The driver was charged with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence, and upon interposing a plea of guilty was sentenced accordingly. The CFI awarded Petitioner filed an appeal contending that one day before the accident happened, she allegedly sold the passenger jeep that was involved therein to a certain Carmen Sackerman thus there is no breach of contract of carriage.Issue: WON there is a breach of contract.WON respondent is entitled to moral damages.Held: 1. Yes. A transfer contemplated by the law, if made without the requisite approval of the Public Service Commission, is not effective and binding in so far as the responsibility of the grantee under the franchise in relation to the public is concerned. The law was designed primarily for the protection of the public interest; and until the approval of the public Service Commission is obtained the vehicle is, in contemplation of law, still under the service of the owner or operator standing in the records of the Commission which the public has a right to rely upon. It appears that no such approval was given by the Commission before the accident occurred. Therefore, petitioner is still the owner of the vehicle.

2. No. Moral damages are not recoverable in damage actions predicted on a breach of the contract of transportation. Art. 2220 states that willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should find that, under circumstances, such damages are justify due. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. Mere carelessness of the carrier's driver does notper seconstitute of justify an inference of malice or bad faith on the part of the carrier; and in the case at bar there is no other evidence of such malice to support the award of moral damages by the Court of Appeals. To award moral damages for breach of contract, therefore, without proof of bad faith or malice on the part of the defendant would be to violate the clear provisions of the law, and constitute unwarranted judicial legislation.

FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, LUIS A. LUNA and CLARITA S. LUNA,Facts:Private respondent Luis A. Luna applied for, and was accorded, a FAREASTCARD issued by petitioner Far East Bank and Trust Company ("FEBTC") at . Upon his request, the bank also issued a supplemental card to his wife Clarita S. Luna. In August 1988, Clarita lost her credit card. FEBTC was forthwith informed. As a result of this, the lost card along with the principal card would appear as a Hot Card or Cancelled Card in the banks master file. On 06 October 1988, Luis tendered adespedidalunch for a close friend and another guest at the Bahia Rooftop Restaurant of the Hotel Intercontinental Manila. To pay for the lunch, Luis presented his FAREASTCARD to the attending waiter who promptly had it verified through a telephone call to the bank's Credit Card Department. Since the card was not honored, Luis was forced to pay in cash the bill amounting to P588.13. Feeling embarrassed about what happen, private respondent Luis Luna, through counsel, demanded from FEBTC the payment of damages. Adrian V. Festejo, a vice-president of the bank, expressed the bank's apologies to Luis. Still feeling aggrieved, private respondents filed a complaint for damages with the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Pasig against FEBTC which rendered a decision ordering FEBTC to pay private respondents (a) P300,000.00 moral damages; (b) P50,000.00 exemplary damages; and (c) P20,000.00 attorney's fees. On appeal, CA affirmed the decision of the trial court.

Issue:WON private respondent is entitled to moral and exemplary damages.

Held:No. Inculpa contractual, moral damages may be recovered where the defendant is shown to have acted in bad faith or with malice in the breach of the contract.Art. 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should find that, under the circumstances, such damages are justly due.The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. (Emphasis supplied)Bad faith, in this context, includesgross, but not simple, negligence. Concededly, the bank was remiss in indeed neglecting to personally inform Luis of his own card's cancellation. Nothing in the findings of the trial court and the appellate court, however, can sufficiently indicate any deliberate intent on the part of FEBTC to cause harm to private respondents. Neither could FEBTC's negligence in failing to give personal notice to Luis be considered so gross as to amount to malice or bad faith. Malice or bad faith implies a conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or moral obliquity.Principles on tort as to that a quasi-delict can be the cause for breaching a contract that might thereby permit the application of applicable cannot be applied in this case. As it can only be applied where the act or omission complained of would constitute an actionable tort independently of the contract. Here, private respondents' damage claim is predicated solely on their contractual relationship; without such agreement, the act or omission complained of cannot by itself be held to stand as a separate cause of action or as an independent actionable tort.Incontracts and quasi-contracts, the court may award exemplary damages if the defendant is found to have acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner. Given the above premises and the factual circumstances here obtaining, it would also be just as onerous to sustain the exemplary damages granted by the courts below.Air France vs. Carrascoso, 18 SCRA 155

Plaintiff was a member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims that left Manila for Lourdes. The defendant, Air France, through its authorized agent, Philippine Air Lines, Inc., issued to plaintiff a "first class" round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok, plaintiff travelled in "first class", but at Bangkok, the defendants employee forced plaintiff to vacate the "first class" seat that he was occupying because here was a "white man", who had a "better right" to the seat. When asked to vacate his "first class" seat, the plaintiff, as was to be expected, refused. A commotion ensued, eventually, the plaintiff reluctantly gave his "first class" seat in the plane.The Court of First Instance of Manila 1 sentenced petitioner to pay respondent Rafael Carrascoso P25,000.00 by way of moral damages; P10,000.00 as exemplary damages; P393.20 representing the difference in fare between first class and tourist class for the portion of the trip Bangkok-Rome, these various amounts with interest at the legal rate; plus P3,000.00 for attorneys' fees; and the costs of suit.On appeal,2 the Court of Appeals slightly reduced the amount of refund on Carrascoso's plane ticket from P393.20 to P383.10

ISSUE: WON Defendant is entitled to damages?

HELD: 1. Moral damages. Petitioner claims that to authorize an award for moral damages there must be an averment of fraud or bad faith. Based on the facts, the court was in the opinion that there was bad faith when petitioner's employee compelled Carrascoso to leave his first class accommodation berth "after he was already, seated" and to take a seat in the tourist class, by reason of which he suffered inconvenience, embarrassments and humiliations, thereby causing him mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation, resulting in moral damages.The responsibility of an employer for the tortious act of its employees need not be essayed. It is well settled in law. 41 For the willful malevolent act of petitioner's employer, he must answer. Article 21 of the Civil Code says: Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.In parallel circumstances, we applied the foregoing legal precept; and, we held that upon the provisions of Article 2219 (10), Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable.

2. Exemplary damages - defendant should have "acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner. The manner of ejectment of respondent Carrascoso from his first class seat fits into this legal precept. And this, in addition to moral damages.3. Right to attorney's fees is fully established. The grant of exemplary damages justifies a similar judgment for attorneys' fees.4. Questioned as excessive are the amounts decreed by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals on damages - The task of fixing these amounts is primarily with the trial court.

PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS (G.R. No. 84698 February 4, 1992)FACTS: A stabbing incident on 30 August 1985 which caused the death of Carlitos Bautista while on the second-floor premises of the Philippine School of Business Administration (PSBA) prompted the parents of the deceased to file suit in the Regional Trial Court of Manila presided over by Judge Regina Ordoez-Benitez, for damages against the said PSBA and its corporate officers. At the time of his death, Carlitos was enrolled in the third year commerce course at the PSBA. It was established that his assailants were not members of the school's academic community but were elements from outside the school.Defendants a quo (now petitioners) sought to have the suit dismissed, alleging that since they are presumably sued under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the complaint states no cause of action against them, as jurisprudence on the subject is to the effect that academic institutions, such as the PSBA, are beyond the ambit of the rule in the afore-stated article.The respondent trial court, however, overruled petitioners' contention and denied their motion to dismiss.At the outset, it is to be observed that the respondent appellate court primarily anchored its decision on the law of quasi-delicts, as enunciated in Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code. That it should apply to all kinds of educational institutions, academic or vocational.At any rate, the law holds the teachers and heads of the school staff liable unless they relieve themselves of such liability pursuant to the last paragraph of Article 2180 by "proving that they observed all the diligence to prevent damage." This can only be done at a trial on the merits of the case.ISSUE: Whether the decision of the appellate court primarily anchored on the law of quasi-delicts is valid.RULING: agree with the respondent appellate court that the motion to dismiss the complaint was correctly denied and the complaint should be tried on the merits, we do not however agree with the premises of the appellate court's ruling.Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the Civil Code, establishes the rule of in loco parentis.The Supreme Court discussed this doctrine in the afore-cited cases of Exconde, Mendoza, Palisoc and, more recently, in Amadora vs.Court of Appeals. In all such cases, it had been stressed that the law (Article 2180) plainly provides that the damage should have been caused or inflicted by pupils or students of he educational institution sought to be held liable for the acts of its pupils or students while in its custody. However, this material situation does not exist in the present case for, as earlier indicated, the assailants of Carlitos were not students of the PSBA, for whose acts the school could be made liable.When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is established a contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligations which both parties are bound to comply with. 7 For its part, the school undertakes to provide the student with an education that would presumably suffice to equip him with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education or a profession. On the other hand, the student covenants to abide by the school's academic requirements and observe its rules and regulations.Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual relation between the PSBA and Carlitos Bautista, the rules on quasi-delict do not really govern. A perusal of Article 2176 shows that obligations arising from quasi-delicts or tort, also known as extra-contractual obligations, arise only between parties not otherwise bound by contract, whether express or implied. However, this impression has not prevented this Court from determining the existence of a tort even when there obtains a contract.As the proceedings a quo have yet to commence on the substance of the private respondents' complaint, the record is bereft of all the material facts. Obviously, at this stage, only the trial court can make such a determination from the evidence still to unfold.JUAN J. SYQUIA vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (G.R. No. 98695, January 27, 1993) FACTS:Juan Syquia, father of the deceased Vicente Syquia, entered in a contract of Deed of Sale and IntermentOrder with Manila Memorial Park Cemetery Inc (MMPCI). In the contract, there contained a provision which stated that the coffin would be placed in a sealed concrete vault to protect the remains of the deceased from the elements.During the preparation for the transfer of Vicentes remains in the newly bought lot in Manila Memorial, it was discovered that there was a hole in the concrete vault which caused total flooding inside, damaged the coffin as well as the body of the deceased and covered the same with filth. Syquia filed a complaint for recovery of damages arising from breach of contract and/or quasi-delict against the MMPCI for failure to deliver a defect-free concrete vault to protect the remains of the deceased. In its defense, MMPCI claimed that the boring of the hole was necessary in order to prevent the vault from floating when water fills the grave. The trial court dismissed the complaint holding that there was no quasi-delict because the defendant is not guilty of any fault or negligence and because there was a pre-existing contract between the parties. The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence, the present petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the private respondent is guilty of tort

HELD:Denied. Decision of the CA affirmed. We are more inclined to answer the foregoing questions in the negative. There is not enough ground, both in fact and in law, to justify a reversal of the decision of the respondent Court and to uphold the pleas of the petitioners. Although a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties does not preclude the existence of a culpa aquiliana, We find no reason to disregard therespondents Court finding that there was no negligence. Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict x x x.In this case, it has been established that the Syquias and the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., entered into a contract entitled Deed of Sale and Certificate of Perpetual Care on August 27, 1969. That agreement governed the relations of the parties and defined their respective rights and obligations. Hence, had there been actual negligence on the part of the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., it would be held liable not for a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana, but for culpa contractual as provided by Article 1170 of the Civil Code, to wit: Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages.

Calalas vs CA, 332 SCRA 356, 2000Facts: Calalas jeep was improperly parked with its rear portion protruding from the board shoulder of the road (violation of LTTC). Passenger Sunga who was sited on a wooden stool as an extended seat moved to give way to another passenger alighting from the inside and in the process he was bumped by an overtaking truck owned by Salinas. Sunga sued Calalas for breach of carriage. Calalas sued Salvas for Tort. Held: While moral damages are not recoverable in actions for breach of contract for it is not one of the items enumerated in Art 2219, NCC, however, the exception is in the cases of mishap resulting to the death or injury of passenger under Art 1764 in relation to Art 2206 (3) NCC and in cases in which the carrier is guilty of fraud or in bad faith. In this case the ruling in Calamas vs Salvas is not binding in the case of Sunga vs Calalas. Res Judicata does not apply because Sunga is not a party to the tort case where Salva was found at fault and liable to Calalas. Thought both cases has the same issue of negligence, however, each is distinct and separate from the other. (Breach of contract and tort)Defense of proximate cause is not available in breach of contract of carriage: only in tort cases. Neither is the defense of caso fortuitous where it is attended to by negligence which in Calalas case were overloading and parking improrely which are vioation of tle LTTC.Moral damages cannot be award in the absence of any injury or factual basis. There must be pleading and proof of moral suffering, mental anguish, fright, wounded feelings ad similar injury. (Brent Hospital Inc vs NLRC, 292 SCRA 304, 98; People vs Aguilar, 349 SCRA 292, 98)

PNB VS. FF CRUZFacts: F.F. Cruz & Co., Inc.] (hereinafter FFCCI) opened savings/current or so-called combo account No. 0219-830-146 and dollar savings account No. 0219-0502-458-6 with Philippine National Bank] (hereinafter PNB) at its Timog Avenue Branch. Its President Felipe Cruz (or Felipe) and Secretary-Treasurer Angelita A. Cruz (or Angelita) were the named signatories for the said accounts. The said signatories on separate but coeval dates left for and returned from the United States of America, Felipe on March 18, 1995 until June 10, 1995 while Angelita followed him on March 29, 1995 and returned ahead on May 9, 1995. While they were out of the country, applications for cashiers and managers checks bearing Felipes signature were presented to and both approved by the PNB. The first was on March 27, 1995 for P9,950,000.00 payable to a certain Gene B. Sangalang and the other one was on April 24, 1995 for P3,260,500.31 payable to one Paul Bautista. The amounts of these checks were then debited by the PNB against the combo account of [FFCCI]. When Angelita returned to the country, she had occasion to examine the PNB statements of account of [FFCCI] for the months of February to August 1995 and she noticed the deductions ofP9,950,000.00 and P3,260,500.31. Claiming that these were unauthorized and fraudulently made, [FFCCI] requested PNB to credit back and restore to its account the value of the checks. PNB refused, and thus constrained [FFCCI] filed the instant suit for damages against the PNB and its own accountant Aurea Caparas (or Caparas). In its traverse, PNB averred lack of cause of action. It alleged that it exercised due diligence in handling the account of [FFCCI]. The applications for managers check have passed through the standard bank procedures and it was only after finding no infirmity that these were given due course. In fact, it was no less than Caparas, the accountant of [FFCCI], who confirmed the regularity of the transaction. The delay of [FFCCI] in picking up and going over the bank statements was the proximate cause of its self-proclaimed injury. Had [FFCCI] been conscientious in this regard, the alleged chicanery would have been detected early on and Caparas effectively prevented from absconding with its millions. It prayed for the dismissal of the complaint.Regional Trial Courts Ruling The trial court ruled that F.F. Cruz and Company, Inc. ( FFCCI) was guilty of negligence in clothing Aurea Caparas (Caparas) with authority to make decisions on and dispositions of its account which paved the way for the fraudulent transactions perpetrated by Caparas; that, in practice, FFCCI waived the two-signature requirement in transactions involving the subject combo account so much so that Philippine National Bank (PNB) could not be faulted for honoring the applications for managers check even if only the signature of Felipe Cruz appeared thereon; and that FFCCI was negligent in not immediately informing PNB of the fraud. On the other hand, the trial court found that PNB was, likewise, negligent in not calling or personally verifying from the authorized signatories the legitimacy of the subject withdrawals considering that they were in huge amounts. For this reason, PNB had the last clear chance to prevent the unauthorized debits from FFCCIs combo account. Thus, PNB should bear the whole loss.Court of Appeals Ruling On January 31, 2006, the CA rendered the assailed Decision affirming with modification the Decision of the trial court, The appellate court ruled that PNB was negligent in not properly verifying the genuineness of the signatures appearing on the two applications for managers check as evidenced by the lack of the signature of the bank verifier thereon. Had this procedure been followed, the forgery would have been detected. Nonetheless, the appellate court found FFCCI guilty of contributory negligence because it clothed its accountant/bookkeeper Caparas with apparent authority to transact business with PNB. In addition, FFCCI failed to timely examine its monthly statement of account and report the discrepancy to PNB within a reasonable period of time to prevent or recover the loss. FFCCIs contributory negligence, thus, mitigated the banks liability. Pursuant to the rulings in Philippine Bank of Commerce v. Court of Appeals and The Consolidated Bank & Trust Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the appellate court allocated the damages on a 60-40 ratio with the bigger share to be borne by PNB. On August 17, 2006, FFCCI filed its petition for review on certiorari which was docketed as G.R. No. 173278 On March 7, 2007, the Court issued a Resolution denying said petition. On June 13, 2007, the Court issued another Resolution denying FFCCIs motion for reconsideration. In denying the aforesaid petition, the Court ruled that FFCCI essentially raises questions of fact which are, as a rule, not reviewable under a Rule 45 petition; that FFCCI failed to show that its case fell within the established exceptions to this rule; and that FFCCI was guilty of contributory negligence. Thus, the appellate court correctly mitigated PNBs liability. On July 13, 2006, PNB filed its petition for review on certiorari which is the subject matter of this case. Issue: Whether the Court of Appeals seriously erred when it found PNB guilty of negligence?

HELD: PNB is guilty of negligence. Preliminarily, in G.R. No. 173278, we resolved with finality that FFCCI is guilty of contributory negligence, thus, making it partly liable for the loss (i.e., as to 40% thereof) arising from the unauthorized withdrawal of P13,210,500.31 from its combo account. The case before us is, thus, limited to PNBs alleged negligence in the subject transactions which the appellate court found to be the proximate cause of the loss, thus, making it liable for the greater part of the loss (i.e., as to 60% thereof) pursuant to our rulings in Philippine Bank of Commerce v. Court of Appeals and The Consolidated Bank & Trust Corporation v. Court of Appeals.[ PNB contends that it was not negligent in verifying the genuineness of the signatures appearing on the subject applications for managers check. It claims that it followed the standard operating procedure in the verification process and that four bank officers examined the signatures and found the same to be similar with those found in the signature cards of FFCCIs authorized signatories on file with the bank. PNB raises factual issues which are generally not proper for review under a Rule 45 petition. While there are exceptions to this rule, we find none applicable to the present case. As correctly found by the appellate court, PNB failed to make the proper verification because the applications for the managers check do not bear the signature of the bank verifier. It posits that the testimonies of Geronimo Gallego, then the branch manager of PNB Timog Branch, and Stella San Diego (San Diego), then branch cashier, suffice to establish that the signature verification process was duly followed. First, oral testimony is not as reliable as documentary evidence. Second, PNBs own witness, San Diego, testified that in the verification process, the principal duty to determine the genuineness of the signature devolved upon the account analyst.[ However, PNB did not present the account analyst to explain his or her failure to sign the box for signature and balance verification of the subject applications for managers check, thus, casting doubt as to whether he or she did indeed verify the signatures thereon. Third, we cannot fault the appellate court for not giving weight to the testimonies of Gallego and San Diego considering that the latter are naturally interested in exculpating themselves from any liability arising from the failure to detect the forgeries in the subject transactions. Fourth, Gallego admitted that PNBs employees received training on detecting forgeries from the National Bureau of Investigation. However, Emmanuel Guzman, then NBI senior document examiner, testified, as an expert witness, that the forged signatures in the subject applications for managers check contained noticeable and significant differences from the genuine signatures of FFCCIs authorized signatories and that the forgeries should have been detected or observed by a trained signature verifier of any bank. The court found no reversible error in the findings of the appellate court that PNB was negligent in the handling of FFCCIs combo account, specifically, with respect to PNBs failure to detect the forgeries in the subject applications for managers check which could have prevented the loss. As we have often ruled, the banking business is impressed with public trust. A higher degree of diligence is imposed on banks relative to the handling of their affairs than that of an ordinary business enterprise. Thus, the degree of responsibility, care and trustworthiness expected of their officials and employees is far greater than those of ordinary officers and employees in other enterprises. In the case at bar, PNB failed to meet the high standard of diligence required by the circumstances to prevent the fraud. In Philippine Bank of Commerce v. Court of Appeals and The Consolidated Bank & Trust Corporation v. Court of Appeals, where the banks negligence is the proximate cause of the loss and the depositor is guilty of contributory negligence, we allocated the damages b