TORTS DOCTRINES I. INTRODUCTION

A. Sources of obligations under Philippine law

- Civil Code o Articles 1156 to 1162, and 2176

§ Memorize: Articles 1157 and 2176

- Review: Causes of action (Rules of Court)

B. Quasi-delict distinguished from other sources of obligations

- Quasi-delict v. Breach of contract

o Cases Cangco v. Manila Railroad Co., 38 Phil. 768 (1918)

o From this article two things are apparent: (1) That when an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or employee there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him, after the selection, or both; and (2) that that presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure, and consequently, may be rebutted. It follows necessarily that if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in selection and supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family, the presumption is overcome and he is relieved from liability.

o On the other hand, the liability of masters and employers for the negligent acts or omissions of their servants or agents, when such acts or omissions cause damages which amount to the breach of a contract, is not based upon a mere presumption of the master's negligence in their selection or control, and proof of exercise of the utmost diligence and care in this regard does not relieve the master of his liability for the breach of his contract.

o As a general rule * * * it is logical that in case of extra- contractual culpa, a suing creditor should assume the burden of proof of its existence, as the only fact upon which his action is based; while on the contrary, in a case of negligence which presupposes the existence of a contractual obligation, if the creditor shows that it exists and that it has been broken, it is not necessary for him to prove the negligence.

o Not necessary for the plaintiff to prove the negligence of defendant in a breach of contract

o The fundamental distinction between obligations of this character and

those which arise from contract, rests upon the fact that in cases of non-contractual obligation it is the wrongful or negligent act or omission itself which creates the vinculum juris, whereas in contractual relations the vinculum exists independently of the breach of the voluntary duty assumed by the parties when entering into the contractual relation.

o These two fields, figuratively speaking, concentric; that is to say, the mere act that a person is bound to another by contract does not relieve him from extra-contractual liability to such person.

Air France v. Carrascoso, 18 SCRA 155 (1966)

o And this, because, although the relation of passenger and carrier is "contractual both in origin and nature" nevertheless "the act that breaks the contract may be also a tort".

o There must be bad faith in order to collect moral damage in a breach of contract action

Singson v. Bank of the Philippine Islands, G.R. No. L-24837; 23 SCRA 1117 (1968)

o No moral damages because there is no bad faith on the part of the bank.

o They tried to fix everything right away.

Philippine School of Business Administration v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 84698, February 4, 1992

o Using the test of Cangco, supra, the negligence of the school would not be relevant absent a contract. In fact, that negligence becomes material only because of the contractual relation between PSBA and Bautista. In other words, a contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to the school's liability. The negligence of the school cannot exist independently on the contract, unless the negligence occurs under the circumstances set out in Article 21 of the Civil Code.

Fabre v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111127, July 26, 1996 o A single act or omission may give rise to multiple causes of action

LRTA v. Navidad

o A single act may also have multiple defendants (LRTA Case) o Breach of K= LRT o QD= Security Agency o QD= Security Guard

o The premise for an employer’s liability is negligence or fault on the part of the employee. Once such fault is established, the employer can then be made liable on the basis of the presumption that the employer failed to exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees. The liability is primary and can only be negated by showing due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee.

o A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when the same act or omission causes the injury, one resulting in culpa contractual and the other in culpa aquillana.

o When an act which constitutes a breach of contract would have itself constituted the source of a quasi-delictual liability had no contract existed between the parties, the contract can be said to have been breach by tort, thereby allowing the rules on tort to apply.

o Duty of a common carrier to provide safety for its passengers so obligates it not only during the course of the trip but for so long as the passenger are within its premises and where they ought to be in pursuance to the contract of carriage.

- Quasi-delict v. Delicts

o Revised Penal Code § Articles 100 and 365

o Cases

Barredo v. Garcia

o Authorities support that the proposition that a quasi-delict or “culpa aquillana” is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code, with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime.

o The same negligent act causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, or create an action for cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual under articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. (old civ code yan)

Crime Quasi- delict Affect public interest Only private concern Penal code punishes or corrects the criminal act

Indemnify; repairs damage

Punished only if there is penal law Includes all acts in w/c “any kind of fault or negligence intervenes”

Elcano v. Hill

o Reiteration of Barredo case

o A separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary.

o …the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has been committed by the accused.

II. QUASI-DELICT

A. Elements

- Cases

Andamo v. IAC

o The nature of an action filed in court is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint as constituting the cause of action.

o Elements: (a) damage suffered by the plaintiff (b) fault or negligence of the defendant or some other person for whose acts he must respond (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff

Huang v. Philippine Hoteliers, Inc.

o In quasi- delict, negligence is direct, substantive and independent, while in breach of contract, negligence is merely incidental to the performance of the contract or obligation

o Burden of proof is on the plaintiff to prove the existence of the elements of QD.

Lucas v. Tuano

o Elements of quasi-delict in relation to medical malpractice (a) duty, (b) breach, (c) injury and (d) proximate causation

o A physician is under a duty to the patient to exercise the degree of care, skill, and diligence which physicians in the same general neighborhood and in the same general line of practice ordinarily possess and exercise in like cases.

o The physician has the duty to use at least the same level of care that any other reasonably competent physician would use to treat the condition under the similar cirmcumstances.

o This standard level of care, skill and diligence is a matter addressed by expert medical testimony

Casumpang v. Cortejo(dengue case)

o Medical Negligence: (1) duty, (2) breach, (3) inury (4) proximate causation

o Duty- standard behavior that imposes restrictions on one’s conduct; requires proof of professional relationship between the physician and the agent.

§ Physician-agent rel is create when a patient engages the services of a physician and the latter accepts or agrees to provide care to the patient.

o Breach- occurs when the doctor fails to comply with, or improperly performs his duties under professional standards

o Injury- resulted from the breach o Proximate causation- when it appears, based on the evidence

and the expert testimony, that the negligence played an integral part in causing the injury or damage, and that the injury or damage was either a direct result, or a reasonably probable consequence of the physician’s negligence.

o In our jurisdiction, the criterion remains to be the expert witness’ special knowledge experience and practical training that qualify him/her to explain highly technical medical matters to the Court.

o Standard of diligence must be proven on the factual and legal basis o Factual- provide the standard of diligence, which requires expert

witness o Legal- the court will still decide whether or not the defendant

met the required standard of diligence o Expert’s Testimony- does not need to be in the same specialization as

the tortfeasor; as long as he/she has a special knowledge o Standard of care of attending physician and resident physician

is the same.

B. No Double Recovery Rule

- Civil Code o Articles 1161, 2176 and 2177

§ Memorize Article 2177

- Cases

Joseph v. Bautista o A cause of action is understood to be the delict or wrongful act or

omission committed by the defendant in violation of the primary rights. It is true that a single act or omission can be violative of various rights at the same time, as when the act constitutes juridically a violation of several separate and distinct legal obligations. However,

where there is only one delict or wrong, there is but a single cause of action regardless of the number of rights that may have been violated belonging to one person. (better rule is that a single action can give rise to 1 or more cause of action)

Padau v. Robles (cab accident, killing a kid)

o Civil liability coexists with criminal responsibility. In negligence cases, the offended party has the option between an action for enforcement of civil liability based on culpa criminal and action for recovery of damages based on culpa aquiliana.

Atlantic Gulf v. CA o In this case, there were two causes of action arising from two different

acts. (ruination of the land and usage of the land as depot or parkin)

Lim v. Kou Co (cement o A single act or omission that causes damage to an offended party may

give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender- 1. Delict—arising from the criminal offense; 2. Independent civil liability that may be pursued independently of the criminal proceeding.

o Because of the distinct and independent nature of the two kinds of civil liabilities, jurisprudence holds that the offended party may pursue the two types if civil liabilities simultaneously or cumulatively, without offending the rules on forum shopping, litis pendentia, or res judicata. –subject to prohibition on double recovery

C. Person/s liable; nature of liability

- Civil Code

o Article 2194 (Memorize)

- Cases PNCC v. CA (sugarcane on the road)

o Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would do. It also refers to the conduct which create undue risk of harm to another, the failure to observe that degree of care, precaution and vigilance that the circumstances justly demand, whereby that other person suffers injury.

o Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the admonition born of this provision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist.

o It is sufficient that his negligence, concurring with one or more efficient causes other than plaintiff’s is the proximate cause of the injury. Accordingly, where several causes combine to produce injuries, a person is not relieved from liability because

he is responsible for only one of them, it being sufficient that the negligence of the person charged with injury is an efficient cause without which the injury would not have resulted to as great an extent, and that such cause is not attributable to the person injured.

o Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omissions of two or more persons, although acting independently, are in combination with the direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person, it is impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury and either of them is responsible for the whole injury.

Ruks Konsult v. Adworld (billboard battle)

o When several causes producing an injury are concurrent and each is an efficient cause without which the injury would not have happened, the injury may be attributed to all or any of the causes and recovery may be had against any or all of the responsible persons although under the circumstances of the case, it may appear that one of them was more culpable, and that he duty owed by them to the injured person was not same.

o No actor’s negligence ceases to be a proximate cause merely because it does not exceed the negligence of other actors. Each wrong doer is responsible for the entire result and is liable as though his act were the sole cause of the injury.

Chan, Jr. v. Iglesia ni Cristo (septic tank, hidden treasure)

o As a general rule, joint tortfeasors are all the persons who command, instigate, promote, encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a tort, or who approve of it after it is done, if done for their benefit.

Pereña v. Zarate (school bus hit by a train)

o Test for a common carrier: whether the undertaking is a part of the activity engaged in by the carrier that he has held out to the general public as his business or occupation.

o (a) engaged in transporting passengers generally as business, not just casual occupation; (b.) undertaking to carry passengers over established roads by the method which the business is conducted; (c.) transporting students for a fee

o Although the basis of the right to relief of the Zarates against the Parenas was distinct from the basis of the Zarates’s right to relief against the PNR, they nonetheless could be held jointly and severally by virtue of their respective negligence combining to cause the death of Aaron.

o They were considered tortfeasor Cerezo v. Tuazon

o The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary. Where the obligation of the parties is solidary, either of the parties is indispensable, and the other is not even a necessary party because complete relief is available from either.

III. Negligence

III. NEGLIGENCE

A. Concept

- Civil Code o Articles 2178, 1172, 1173, and 1733

§ Memorize: Articles 1172 to 1174

- Cases Picart v. Smith

o Test to determine the existence of negligence: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which and ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.

o The question as to what constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must of course be always determined in the light of human experience and in view of the facts involved in the particular case.

o Test of foreseeability: Could a prudent man in the case under consideration foresee harm as a result of the course actually pursued?

o To know what a reasonable prudent man would have done.

o Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing the conduct or guarding against its consequences.

o It will be noted that the negligent acts of two parties were not contemporaneous, since the negligence of the defendant succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval.

o Under these circumstances the law is that the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the other party.

§ While contributory negligence does not constitute a bar to recovery, it could be received in evidence to reduce the damages.

US v. Bonifacio (deaf mute hit by a train)

o This does not mean that in every case in which one accidentally injures or kills another he is criminally liable therfor, if at the moment he

happens to be guilty of a violation of some petty regulation. The injury or death must have resulted from some “imprudence or negligence” on his part. True it need only be slight negligence, if accompanied by the violation of the regulations, but the relation of cause and effect must exist between the negligence or imprudence of the accused and the injury inflicted. If it appears that the injury in no wise resulted from the violation of the regulations, or negligent conduct of the accused, he incurs no criminal liability under the provisions of this article.

Cusi v. PNR (Cusi cross the rail road and was hit by the train)

o Jurisprudence recognizes that if warning devices are installed in railroad crossings, the travelling public has the right to rely on such warning devices to put them on their guard and take the necessary precautions before crossing the tracks.

Wright v. Manila Electric (drunk calesa driving)

o It is the general rule that it is immaterial whether a man is drunk or sober if no want of ordinary care or prudence can be imputed to him, and no greater degree of care is required to be exercised by an intoxicated man for his own protection than by a sober one. If one’s conduct is characterized by a proper degree of care and prudence, it is immaterial whether he is drunk or sober.

People v. Delos Santos (a truck hit several PNP while jogging)

o Test for determining whether a person is negligent in doing an act whereby injury or damage results to the person or property of another is this: Could a prudent man in the position of the person to whom negligence, is attributed, foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course actually pursued? If so, the law imposes a duty on the actor to refrain from that course or to take precautions to guard against its mischievous results, and the failure to do so constitutes negligence. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the admonition born of this prevision is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist.

o Article 365 must consider the ff: (1) employment or occupation; (2) his degree of intelligence; (3) his physical condition and (4) other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.

Jarco Marketing v. CA (counter fell to a six year old child that caused her death)

o Accident and negligence are intrinsically contradictory; one cannot exist with the other. Accident occurs when the person concerned is exercising ordinary care, which is not caused by fault of any person and which could not have been prevented by any means suggested by common prudence.

o Below 9 years old, conclusively presumed to be incapable negligence (old law)

Hidalgo Enterprises v. Balandan (Petitioner owns 2 tanks that looks like a pool)

o Doctrine of attractive nuisance: One who maintains on his premises dangerous instrumentalities or appliances of a character likely to attract children in play, and who fails to exercise ordinary care to prevent children from playing therewith or resorting thereto, is liable to a child of tender years who is injured thereby, even if the child is technically a trespasser in the premises.

o Exception: If you put, attractive improvements in a pool or artificial bodies of water

Sarmiento v. Cabrido (precious diamonds got broken)

o Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages.

o GR: Moral damages not recoverable in an action for breach of contract o Exception: when there is bad faith or gross negligence

o The use of the wrong equipment of the goldsmith, who had 40 years of experience, amounted to gross negligence.= bad faith

Francisco v. Chemical Bulk (diesel bought from unauthorized person)

o One who is physically disabled is required to use the same degree of care that a reasonably careful person who has the same physical disability would use.

o They also considered the long experience of the blind person Pacis v. Morales (gun store incident)

o Firearms should be stored unloaded and separate from ammunition when the firearms are not needed for ready-access defensive use. With more reason, guns accepted by the store for repair should not be loaded precisely because they are defective and may cause an accidental discharge such as what happened in this case.

o Diligence is based on a PNP circular.

Makati Shangrila v. Harper (foreign engineer killed in the hotel in his room)

o The hotel business is imbued with public interest. Catering to the public, hotelkeepers are bound to provide not only lodging for their guests but also security to the persons and belongings of their guest. …we hold that there is much greater reason to apply the same if not greater degree of care and responsibility when the lives and personal safety of their guests are involved.

o Since 5 star hotel= 5 star security Consolidated Bank v. CA

o The law imposes on banks high standards in view of the fiduciary nature of banking. Sec 2 of RA 8791 declares that the State recognizes

the fiduciary nature of banking that requires high standards of integrity and performance.

o Fiduciary relationship means that the bank’s obligation to observe high standards of integrity and performance is deemed written into every deposit agreement between a bank and its depositor.

o The doctrine of last clear chance states that where both parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably later than that of the other, or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence caused the loss, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the loss but failed to do so, is chargeable with the loss.

PNB v. Santos

o Plaintiffs are not client of the bank= the more they have to be careful if not client

o The contractual relationship between banks and their depositors is governed by the Civil Code provisions on simple loan. Once a person makes a deposit of his or her money to the bank, he or she is considered to have lent the bank that money. The bank becomes his or her debtor, and he or she becomes the creditor of the bank, which is obligated to pay him or her on demand.

o The public reposes its faith and confidence upon banks, such that even the humble wage-earner has not hesitated to entrust his life’s savings to the bank of his choice, knowing that they will be safe in the custody and will even earn some interest for him. This is why we have recognized the fiduciary nature of the banks’ functions and attached a special standard of diligence for the exercise of their functions.

Dela Torre v. Imbuido

o The critical and clinching factor in a medical negligence case is proof of the causal connection between the negligence and the injuries. A verdict in a malpractice action cannot be based on speculation or conjecture. Causation must be proven within a reasonable medical probability based upon competent expert testimony.

Li v. Soliman

o Battery- unauthorized physical contact o Four essential elements to prove in a malpractice action based

upon the doctrine of informed consent: (1) The physician had a duty to disclose material risks; (2) S/he failed to disclose or inadequately disclosed those risks; (3) As a direct and proximate result of the failure to disclose, the

patient consented to treatment s/he otherwise would not have consented to and

(4) Plaintiff was injured by the proposed treatment o Exception to informed consent

1. Emergency 2. Incompetent patient

3. Minor treatment

Adarne v. Aldaba

o An attorney is not bound to exercise extraordinary diligence, but only a reasonable degree of care and skill, having reference to the character of the business he undertakes to do. He is not answerable for every error or mistake, and will be protected as long as he acts honestly and in good faith to the best of his skill and knowledge.

Issac v. A.L. Amnen

o Principles governing the liability of common carrier: (1) the liability of carrier is contractual and arises upon breach of its obligation. (2) a carrier is obliged to carry its passenger with the utmost diligence of a very cautious person, having due regard for all the circumstances; (3) a carrier is presumed to be at fault or to have acted negligently in case of death of, injury to, passengers, it being its duty to prove that it exercised extraordinary diligence; and (4) the carrier is not an insurer against all risk of travel

o Proximate cause of injury is the negligence the plaintiff so plaintiff cannot recover.

Calvo v. UPCB

o To prove the exercise of diligence required, it must prove that it used “all reasonable means to ascertain the nature and characteristic of goods tendered for transport and that it exercised due care in the handling thereof.

Rjdo Tape v. CA

o Standard care of public utility (utmost diligence)

B. Negligence as proximate cause

- Cases Bataclan v. Medina (bus accident; bus got burnt)

o This is a breach of contract case but proximate cause was used not to impute liability but to assess the extent of damages to be recovered.

o That cause which in natural and continuous sequence unbroken by any efficient intervening cause produces the injury and without which the result would have not occurred.

Urbano v. IAC(bolo hacking incident) o The rule is that the death of the victim must be direct, natural, and

logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the

accused. And since we are dealing with criminal conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victim’s death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt.

Phoenix Construction (car hit a improperly parked truck) o Foreseeable intervening Causes. If the intervening cause is one which

in ordinary human experience is reasonably to be anticipated, or one which the defendant has reason to anticipate under the particular circumstances, the defendant may be negligent, among other reasons, because of failure to guard against it; or the defendant may be negligent only for that reason.

o Of more importance are the nature of the negligent act or omission of each party and the character and gravity of the risks created by such act or omission for the rest of the community.

Austria v. CA (almost the same facts as Phoenix) o But the reckless driving of the accused was judged to be the proximate

cause of the collision. As the court said “ That he had no opportunity to avoid the collision is of his own making and this should not relieve him of liability.

Umali v. Bacani (a child got electrocuted by a live wire) o We cannot agree with petitioner’s theory that the parent’s negligence

constituted the proximate cause of the victim’s death because the real proximate cause was the fallen live wire which posed a threat to life and property on that morning due to the series of negligence adverted to above committed by the defendants’ employees ad which could have killed any other person who might be accident get into contact with it.

o Negligence of the employee is presumed to be the negligence of the employer because the employer is supposed to exercise supervision over the work of the employees. This liability is primary and direct.

Calalas v. CA (college student rode a jeepney and sat on an extension seat. Jeepney was hit by an Isuzu truck)

o The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions for quasi- delict, not in actions involving breach of contract. The doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a person where there is no relation between hi and another party. In such case, the obligation is created by law itself.

o But where the is a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, it is the parties themselves who create the obligation, and the function of the law is merely to regulate the relation thus created.

o Bad faith must be in the performance of the contract.

C. Proof of Negligence

- Rules of Court o Rule 131, Sections 1, 2 and 3(d)

- Case

Ong v. Metropolitan Water District (boyscout drowned in the pool; it is not established how he drowned or how he came to the big pool)

o The operator of swimming pools will not be held liable for the drowning or death of a patron, if said operator had exercised due diligence in the selection of, and supervision over, its employees and that it had observed the diligence required by law under the circumstances—in that it has taken all necessary precautions to avoid danger to the lives of its patrons or prevent accident which may cause their death.

D. Presumption of Negligence

(i) Res ipsa loquitur

- Cases Africa v. Caltex (gas station got burnt)

o Res ipsa loquitur (the transaction speaks for itself)- “where the thing which caused the injury, without fault of the injured person, is under the exclusive control of the defendant and the injury is such as in the ordinary course of things does not occur if he having such control use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of the explanation, that the injury arose from defendant’s want of care. And the burden of evidence is shifted to him to establish that he has observed due care and diligence.

o The intervention of an unforeseen and unexpected cause is not sufficient to relieve a wrongdoer from consequences of negligence, if such negligence directly and proximately cooperates with the independent cause in the resulting injury.

DM Consunji v. CA (worker fell from 14th floor)

o As a rule of evidence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence.

o Once the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of all the elements, the burden then shifts to defendant to explain. The presumption or inference may be rebutted or overcome by other evidence and, under appropriate circumstances a disputable presumption, such as that of due care or innocence, may outweigh the inference.

o The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which means, literally, the thing or transaction speaks for itself, or in one jurisdiction, that the thing or instrumentality speaks for itself, the facts or circumstances

accompanying an injury may be such as to raise a presumption, or at least permit an inference of negligence on the part of the defendant, or some other person who is charged with negligence.

o Where it is shown that the thing or instrumentality which caused the injury complained of was under the control or management of the defendant and that the occurrence resulting in the injury was such as in the ordinary course of things would not happen if those who had its control or management used proper care, there is sufficient evidence, or as sometimes stated, reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the injury arose from or was caused by the defendant’s want of care.

o Requisites of res ipsa loquitur: o The accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur

unless someone is negligent o The instrumentality or agency which cause the injury was under

the exclusive control of the person charged with negligence o The injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary

action or contribution on the part of the person injured National Power Corporation v. CA (inundation of fish ponds due to the dam)

o In the absence of any clear explanation on what other factors could have explained the flooding in the neighboring properties of the dam, it is fair to reasonably infer that the incident happened because of want of care on the part of NPC to maintain the water level of the dam within the benchmarks at the maximum normal elevation of 702 meters.

Cebu Shipyard and Engineering Works v. William Lines Inc.

o For doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to apply to a given situation, the following conditions must concur:

o (1) the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent;

o (2) that the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person charged with negligence

Perla Compania de Seguros v. Spouses Sarangaya (car got burnt while in the parking)

o Requisites of res ipsa loquitur: o (1) The accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily

occurs unless someone is negligent o (2) The instrumentality or agency which cause the injury

was under the exclusive control of the person charged with negligence

o (3) The injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured

o (4) no direct evidence o The exempting circumstance of caso fortuito may be availed only

when: o (1) the cause of the unforeseen and enexpected occurrence was

independent of the human will o (2) it was impossible to foreseen the event which constituted

the caso fortuito, or if it could be foreseen, it is impossible to avoid

o (3) the occurences must be such as to render it impossible to perform an obligation in a normal manner

o (4) the person tasked to perform the obligation must not have participated in any course of conduct that aggravated the accident

Huang v. Philippine Hoteliers Inc.

o Res ipsa loquitur is Latin phrase which literally means “the thing or the transaction speaks for itself.” It relates to the fact of an injury that sets out an inference to the cause thereof or establishes the plaintiff’s prima facie case. The doctrine rests on inferences and not on presumption. The facts of the occurrence warrant the supposition of negligence and they furnish circumstantial evidence of negligence when direct evidence is lacking. Simply stated, this doctrine finds no application if there is direct proof of absence or presence of negligence. If there is sufficient proof showing the conditions and circumstances under which the injury occurred, then the creative reason for the said doctrine disappears.

Batiquin v. CA (rubber material was left in her womb)

• The doctrine of res ipsa liquitur as a rule of evidence is peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific negligence. It is merely a mode of proof.

o The rule is not intended to and does not dispense with the requirement of proof of culpable negligence on the party charged. It merely determines and regulates what shall be prima facie evidence thereof and facilities the burden of plaintiff of proving a breach of the duty of due care. The doctrine can be invoked when and only when under the circumstances involved, direct evidence is absent and not readily available.

Cantre v. Go (droplight; some placenta parts were left inside the womb)

o In case involving medical negligence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur allows the mere existence of an injury to justify a presumption of negligence on the part of the person who controls the instrument causing the injury provided that the requisites concur.

Professional Services, Inc. v. Agana

o Requisites of res ipsa loquitur

a) The occurrence of an injury b) The thing which caused the injury was under the control and

management of the defendant c) The occurrence was such that in the ordinary course of things,

would not have happened in those who had control or management used proper care

d) The absence of the explanation by the defendant o Res ipsa loquitur is not a rule of substantive law, hence does not per e

create or constitute an independent or separate ground of liability, being a mere evidentiary rule.

o In other words, mere invocation and application of the doctrine does not dispense with the requirement of proof of negligence.

Ramos v. CA (was supposed to undergo gallbladder stone operation then became comatose)

o …when the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is availed by the plaintiff, he need for expert medical testimony is dispensed with beause the injury itself provides the proof of negligence.

o Testimony as to the stetments and acts of physicians and surgeons, external appearances and manifest conditions which are observable by any one may be given by non-expert witness.

o Where common knowledge and experience teach that a resulting injury would not have occurred to the patient if due care had been exercised, an inference of negligence may be drawn giving rise to an application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitu without meical evidence…

o When the doctrine is appropriate, the patient must prove the nexus between the particular act and the injury sustained.

o Resort to res ipsa loquitur is allowed because there is no ther way, under usual and ordinary conditions, by which the patient can obtain redress for injury suffered by him.

o The real question, therefore, is WON in the process of the operation any extraordinary incident or unusual event outside of the routine performance occurred which is beyond the regular scope of customary professional activity in such operations, which, if unexplained would themselves reasonably speak to the average man as the negligent cause or causes of the untoward consequences.

Reyes v. Sisters of Mercy Hospital (typhoid patient died) o In this case, while it is true that the patient died just a few hours after

the professional medical assistance was rendered, there is really nothing unusual or extraordinary about his death.

o Prior to his admission, the patient already had recurring fevers and chills for five days unrelieved by the analgesic, antipyretic, and antibiotics given him by his wife.

o Hindi nag RIL kasi hind obvious na may negligence.

(ii) Violation of rules and statutes

a. Traffic rules (Memorize Articles 2184 and 2185) b. Republic Act No. 10586, Section 13, and

implementing rules and regulations

- Cases US v. Juanillo

o The operator of an automobile is bound to exercise care in proportion to the verying danger and risks of highway and commensurate with the danger naturally incident to the use of such vehicle.

o In determining the degree of care an operator of an automobile should use, when on the highway, it is proper to take into consideration the place, presence, or absence of other travelers, the speed of automobile, its size, appearance, manner of movement, and the amount of noise it makes, and anything that indicates unusual or peculiar danger.

o Under such conditions appellant being in charge of the powerful machine, capable of doing great damage if not skillfully manipulated, was bound to use a high degree of common right to the highway.

o A driver of an automobile, under such circumstances, is required to use a greater degree of care than drivers of animals, for the reason that the machine is capable of greater destruction, and further more, it is absolutely under the power and control of the driver; whereas a horse, or other animal can and does to some extent aid in averting an accident.

Chapman v. Underwood

o An owner who sits in his automobile, or other vehicle, and permits his driver to continue in a violation of the law by the performance of negligent acts, after he has had a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct that the driver cease therefrom, becomes himself responsible for such acts.

o If the driver, by a sudden act of negligence, and without the owner having a reasonable opportunity to prevent the act or its continuance, injures a person or violates the criminal law, the owner of the automobile, although present therein at the time the act was committed, is not responsible, either civilly or criminally, therefore.

Caedo v. Yu Khe Thai (accident in EDSA involving a caratella)

o The test of imputed negligence under Article 2184 of the Civil Code is, to a great degree, necessarily subjective. Car owners are not held to a uniform and inflexible standard of diligence, as are professional drivers.

o The test of his negligence, within the meaning of Article 2184, is his omission to do that which the evidence of his own senses tells him he should do in order to avoid the accident.

Serra v. Mumar(van, corolla, and motorcycle accident) o Under article 2180, employers are liable for the damages caused by

their employees acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. Whenever an employee’s negligence causes damage or injury to another, there instantly arises a presumption that the employer failed to exercise the due diligence of a good father of the family in th selection or supervision of its employees.

o …under article 2184, if the causative factor was the driver’s negligence, the owner of the vehicle who was present is likewise held liable if he could have prevented the mishap by the exercise of due diligence.

Mallari, Sr. v. CA (jeepney overtook a Ford fierry and hit a car in the opposite direction; this is an action for breach of contract)

o The rule is settled that a driver abandoning his proper lane for the purpose of overtaking another vehicle in an ordinary situation has the duty to see to it that the road is clear and not to proceed if he cannot do so in safety.

o When a motor vehicle is approaching or rounding a curve, there is special necessity for keeping to the right side of the road and the driver does not have the right to drive on the left hand side relying upon having time to turn to the right if a car approaching from the opposite direction comes into view.

FGU Insurance v. CA(foreigner, rented a car and figured in an accident)

o The liability imposed by art 2180 arises by virtue of a presumption juris tantum of negligence on the part of the persons made responsible thereunder, derived from their failure to exercise due care and vigilance over the acts of subordinates to prevent them from causing damage.

o Obviously, this provision of Art. 2184 is neither applicable because of the absence of master-driver relationship between respondent FILCAR and foreigner driver.

o RENT A CAR PCI Leasing and Finance Inc v. UCPB (contract of lease was not registered; 18 wheeler truck hit a lancer)

o In contemplation of the law, the registered owner of a motor vehicle is the employer of its driver, with the actual operator and employer, such as a lessee, being considered as merely the owner’s agent.

o This being the case, even if the a sale has been executed before a tortious incident, the sale, if unregistered, has no effect as to the right of the public and third persons to recover from the registered owner.

o A sale, lease, or financial lease, for that matter, that is not registered with the LTO, still odes not bing the third persons who are aggrieved in

tortious incidents, for the latter need only to rely on the public registration of a motor vehicle as conclusive evidence of ownership.

Anonuevo v. CA

o Art 2185 does not apply to non-motorized vehicle such as a bicycle. o The mere fact of violation is not sufficient basis for an inference that

such violation was the proximate cause of the injured complained. However, if the very injury has happened which was intended to be prevented by the statute, it has been held that violation of the statute will be deemed to be the proximate cause of the injury.

o Negligence per se- violation of a statutory duty o The petitioner has the burden of showing a causal connection between

the injury received and the violation of the LT and Traffic Code.

c. Statutes and ordinances/administrative rules

- Cases Marinduque Iron Mines Agents, Inc. v. WCC

o Violation of a rule promulgated by a Commission or board is not negligence per se.

o Evidence of negligence only F.F. Cruz and Co. Inc v. CA (furniture business did not put firewall)

o The failure to comply with an ordinance providing for safety regulations had been ruled by the Court as an act of negligence.

Cipriano v. CA (rust-proofing business did not comply with a law that requires it to insure its business)

o Petitioner’s negligence is the source of his obligation. He is not being held liable for breach of his contractual obligation due to negligence but for his negligence in not complying with the duty imposed on him by law.

o It is therefore immaterial that the loss occasioned to private respondent was due to a fortuitous event, since it was petitioner’s negligence in not insuring against the risk which was the proximate cause of the loss.

Sanitary Steam Laundry, Inc. v. CA

o Negligence, consisting in whole or in part, of violation of law, like any other negligence, is without legal consequence unless it is a contributing cause of injury.

PRIVATE RENTAL Owner/lessor liable together with driver

RENT-A-CAR Lessor/owner not liable (driver only is liable)

(iii) Dangerous weapons and substances

- Civil Code o Article 2188 (Memorize)

ccc - Case -

Araneta v. Arreglado o Father was negligent for allowing the child to have possession of the

firearm.

IV. DEFENSES

A. Plaintiff’s negligence is the proximate cause of injury

- Civil Code o Article 2179 (Memorize)

- Cases

Taylor v. Manila Electric (kid went to the premises of manila electric and got an explosive device)

o The test is simple. Distinction must be made between accident and the injury, between the event itself, without which there could have been no accident, and those acts of the victim not entering into it, independent of it, but contributing to his own proper hurt.

o related to attractive nuisance but not applicable because the court took in to account the mental capacity of Taylor.

o The explosive cups left by Meralco would have not exploded if Taylor did not get it and played with it.

Fernando v. CA (men cleaned the septic tank and died)

o The proximate cause of the victims was due to their negligence. There was no order to commence the cleaning of the septic tank. They should have known the risk in cleaning a septic tank that was not emptied for several years.

PLDT v. CA

o It is basic that private respondents cannot charge PLDT for their injuries where their own failure to exercise due and reasonable care was the cause thereof.

o Lack of warning is not the proximate cause because the defendant pass by the road almost everyday and knew of the existence of the excavation.

o He was also swerving and was driving fast.

Kim v. Philippine Aerial Taxi. Co. (passenger of the hydroplanes atat bumaba, got himself injured by the propeller)

o The plaintiff ought to know that a propeller, be it that of a ship or of an aeroplane, is dangerous while in motion and that to approach is to run the risk of being caught and injured thereby.

o Also, he did not wait for the instructions of the plane employees before going out of the plane.

American Express v. Cordero (credit card of Cordero was cut into half which caused embarrassment)

o Amex cut the card in half because they were not able to determine if it was really Cordero who was using the card. Cordero refused to talk to their representative when asked to in order to verify his identity. Because of his refusal to talk, the card was cut.

BJDC Construction v. Lanuzo (motorbicycle accident)

o BJDC was not negligent because there was proper lighting. Victim did not wear helmet, which could have saved his life.

o He should be familiar with the road and should have known that a construction was going on

Cagayan v. Rapanan (electric wire, motorcycle accident)

o Motorcycle was the proximate cause because the driver was driving really fast and lost control.

o Mishap already occurred before reaching the electric wire.

B. Contributory negligence

- Civil Code o Article 2179 (Memorize)

- Cases

Rakes v. Atlantic Gulf Bernal v. House

o Applied the rakes cas

National Power Corp v. Casionan o No contributory, the miners were doing ordinary routine.

Lambert v. Heirs (jeepney turning left without signal, trike hit the jeepney)

o Trike is contributory negligent kasi tailgaiting, overspeeding, drunk, and ….

Estacion V. Bernardo (sumabit sa jeepney) o Estacion sumabit, so contributory negligence.

Phil national Rail v. Brunty

o Benz was contributory negligent because it did not slow down

C. Assumption of Risk o ORDINARY RISK

Requisites: (1) You know (2) You understand (3) Nevertheless, you still voluntary and freely exposed

yourself to the risk Exception:

o However, a person is excused if an emergency is found to exist or

o if the life or property of another is in peril or o when he seeks to rescue his endangered property

- Cases Afialda v. Hisole

o Under article 1905 of the Civil Code, the owner of an animal is not liable for injury caused by it to its caretaker.

o The owner would be liable only if he had been negligent or at fault

Ilocos Norte v. CA o Exception to the assumption of risk

o However, a person is excused if an emergency is found to exist or

o if the life or property of another is in peril or o when he seeks to rescue his endangered property

Transporto v. Mijares(firecracker case) o full knowledge and extent of the risk

D. Last Clear Chance o Will not apply to breach of contract o Or when the defendant was put to a position to act

instantaneously

- Cases Picart v. Smith(pony got hit by a fast car)

o It will be noted that the negligent acts of the two parties were not contemporaneous since the negligence of the defendant succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. Under these circumstances the law is that the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without references to the prior negligence of the other party.

Philippine National Railways Corp. v. Vizcara (jeepney got hit by a train while on way to quezon wala daw “stop look and listen”)

o The doctrine of last clear chance is not applicable in the instant case. o The doctrine of last clear chance provides that where

both parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in point of time than that of the other, or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence brought about the occurrence of the incident, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm but failed to do so, is chargeable with the consequences arising therefrom.

§ The antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude recovery of damages caused by the supervening negligence of the latter, who had the last fair chance to prevent the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence.

Achevara v. Ramos(driver of the jeepney no longer had the opportunity to avoid collision)

o The doctrine of last clear chance does not apply where the party charged is required to act instantaneously, and the injury cannot be avoided by the application of all means at hand after the peril is or should have been discovered.

Bank of America v. Phil Racing Club

o In instances where both parties are at fault, this Court has consistently applied the doctrine of last clear chance in order to assign liability.

o In the case at bar, petitioner cannot evade responsibility for the loss by attributing negligence on the part of the respondent because even if we concur that the latter was indeed negligent in pre-signing blank checks, the former had the last clear chance to avoid the loss.

§ They could have called. Lapanday v. Angala(Uturn accident)

o We rule both parties are negligent so last clear chance is applicable. o De Ocampo, had the last clear chance to avoid the collision. DE

Ocampo was driving the rear vehicle, he had full control of the situation since he was in a position to observe the vehicle in front of him.

Tiu v. Arriesgado (truck parked because of exploded, bus bumped)

o Does not apply because it only applies in a suit between the owners and drivers of two colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations, for it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver and its owner on the ground that the other driver was guilty of negligence.

E. Prescription

- Civil Code

o Article 1146

- Cases Ferrer v. Ericta (kid joyride, pick-up overturned)

o It is true that the defense of prescription can only be considered if the same is invoked as such in the answer of the defendant and that in this particular instance no such defense was invoked because the defendants had been declared in default, but such rule does not obtain when the evidence shows that the cause of action upon which plaintiff’s complaint is based is already barred by the statute of limitations.

Kramer, Jr. v. CA (F/B and M/V, fb sinked because of mv. They waited for marine board resolution)

o Under article 1146, an action based upon quasi delct must be instituted within four (4) years. The prescriptive period begins rom the day the quasi-delict is committed.

Santos v. Pizardo (collision bet bus and lite ac; civil action was reserved and not instituted in the criminal case)

o The prescription of the action ex quiasi delicto deos not operate as a bar to an action to enforce the civil liability arising from crime especially as the latter action had been expressly reserved.

De Guzman v. Toyota Cubao( petitioner bought hilux, engine cracked, asked for replacement based on implied warranty)

o

F. Fortuitous Event

o (1) the cause of the unforeseen and enexpected occurrence was independent of the human will

o (2) it was impossible to foreseen the event which constituted the caso fortuito, or if it could be foreseen, it is impossible to avoid

o (3) the occurences must be such as to render it impossible to perform an obligation in a normal manner

o (4) the person tasked to perform the obligation must not have participated in any course of conduct that aggravated the accident

- Civil Code o Article 1174 (Memorize)

- Cases

Gotesco v. Chatto (Mother and child watched a movie, the cinema’s ceiling collapsed)

o That Mr. Ong could not offer any explanation does not imply force majeure.

o Such defects could have been easily discovered if only petitioner exercised due diligence.

Servando v. Phil Steam (cargoes of petitioner arrived and was discharged at BOC warehouse which got burned)

o There was no negligence on the part of the defendants. They did not incur delay

Edgar Cokaliong v. UCPB (ship with cargo got burnt w/c originated from unchecked crack in the engine)

o Fire was not a force majeure because it resulted from the negligence of the officers of the vessel to inspect their ship frequently.

G. Waiver

- Civil Code

o Articles 6 and 1170

- Cases

Gatchalian v. Delim (bus was in accident because it bumped a cement flowe pot)

o A waiver, to be valid and effective, must in first place be couched in clear and unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the intention of a person to give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to him.

o Jurisprudential basis o The circumstances under which the petitioner signed the waiver must

be considered.- vitiated consent o To uphold a supposed waiver of any right to claim damages by an

injured passenger, under the circumstances like those exhibited in this case, would be to dilute and weaken the standard of

extraordinary diligence exacted by the law from common carriers and hence render that standard unenforceable.

o Contrary to public policy Sabena v. CA (petitioner’s luggage gone missing; twice)

o It is a breach of contract o Extra ordinary diligence in taking care of the goods as well

o There is willful misconduct on the part of the carrier because there is gross negligence on the part of the carrier because it lost the luggage twice.

Valenzuela v. CA (carrier acted as a private carrier because it was chartered)

o In a contract of private carriage, the parties may freely stipulate their duties and obligation, which will be binding on them.

H. Emergency

- Cases

Gan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-44264, September 19, 1988 (old man)

o One who suddenly finds himself in the place of danger and is required to act without time to consider the best means that maybe adopted to avoid the impending danger is not guilty of negligence unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own negligence.

McKee v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 211 SCRA 517 (1992) o Kids suddenly cross the road, which gave the driver no time to

contemplate which is the means possible.

Valenzuela v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 115024 & 117944, February 7, 1996

o The conduct which is required of an individual in emergency cases is dictated not exclusively by the suddenness of the event which absolutely negate thoroughly care, but by the over-all nature of the nature of the circumstances.

Delsan Transport Lines, Inc., v. C&A Construction, Inc., G.R. No. 156034, October 1, 2003

o It is the ship captain’s fault the brought them to the emergency situation.

Orix Metro Leasing and Finance Corporation v. Mangalinao, G.R. Nos. 174089 & 174266, January 25, 2012

o

I. Damnum absque injuria

- Cases Farolan v. Solmac Marketing Corporation, G.R. No. 83589, March 13, 1991

o Presumption of regularity in the exercise of duty if a public officer or employee.

o There was no bad faith since they just exercised their duty.

BPI Express Card Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120639, September 25, 1998

o Applicable. Bank exercised its right to collect payment. Custodio v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 116100, February 9, 1996

o Amonoy v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 140420, February 15, 2001

o With bad faith. Despite receipt of TRO, the destruction of the building was still continued.

DOLE Philippines, Inc., v. Rodriguez, G.R. No. 174646, August 22, 2012

o With bad faith and injury because DOLE, destroyed the banana plantation.

V. VICARIOUS LIABILITY

- Civil Code

o Articles 2180 to 2182 (Memorize) A. Parents and Guardians

- Family Code (as amended by RA 6809) o Articles 219, 221, 236

- Cases

Exconde v. Capuno, 101 Phil. 843 (1957) (a 15 year old kid, was convicted of double homicide, his father argued that he should not be held liable with the kid because he was not present during the accident, but the law said that he is liable for his minor child.)

o The civil liability which the law imposes upon the father, and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, for any damages that may be caused by the minor children who live with them, is obvious.

o This is a necessary consequence of the parental authority they exercise over them.

o The only way by which they can relieve themselves of this liability is if they prove that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damages.

Tamargo v. Court of Appeals, 209 SCRA 518 (1992) (a kid shot another person with air rifle; the shooter kid was then adopted after the shooting)

o Imputed negligence- where a person is not only liable for torts committed by himself, but also for torts committed by others with whom he has a certain relationship and for whom he is responsible.

o The civil law assumes that when an unemancipated child living with its parents commits a tortious at, the parents were negligent in the performace of their legal and natural duty closely to supervise the child who is in their custody and control.

o The presumption of parental dereliction on the part of the adopting parents could have arising since Adelberto was not in fact subject to their control at the time the tort was committed.

Libi v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 214 SCRA 16 (1992) (ex boyfriend shot ex girlfriend)

o The civil liability of parents for quasi delicts of their minor children, as contemplated in Article 2180 of the Civil Code, is primary and not subsidiary.

o If we apply Article 2194 of said code which provides for solidary liability of joint tortfeasors, the person responsible for the act or omission, in this case the minor and the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are solidary liable.

o We are also persuaded that the liabilyt of the parents for felonies committed by their minor children is likewise primary, not subsidiary.

Cuadra v. Monfort, G.R. No. L-24101, September 30, 1970 (school girl was hit in the eye with an object by the classmate)

o “all diligence of a good father of the family to prevent damage”- it implies a consideration of the attendant circumstances in every individual case, to determine whether or ot by the exercise of such diligence the damage could have been prevented.

o His child was at school where it was his duty to send her and where she was, as he had right to expect her to be, under the care and supervision of the teacher.

o It was an innocent prank not unusual among the children at play and special reason to anticipate much less guard against. The plaintiffs were not able to collect.

St. Mary’s Academy v. Carpitanos, G.R. No. 143363, February 6, 2002 (accident during school activity. The jeepney driven by the minor has its steering wheel detached)

o For the petitioner to be liable, there must be a finding that the act or omission considered as negligent was the proximate cause of the injury caused because the negligence, must have a causal connection to the accident.

B. Owners and Managers of Enterprises/Employers

Requisites (Ordinary Employers) 1. Employee committed tortious act 2. There is an Employer-Employee Relationship 3. Employee is acting within the scope of his/her assigned tasks. Hospitals 1. Holding out

• Employer-Employee relationship • Doctrine of Apparent Authority • Corporate Negligence (2176)

2. Reliance

- Cases Dela Llana v. Biong, G.R. No. 182356, December 4, 2013 (whiplash injury)

o The petitioner failed to prove that the proximate cause of her whiplash injury was the accident.

Josefa v. MERALCO, G.R. No. 182705, July 18, 2014 (truck rammed a Meralco electric post)

o The finding that Bautista acted with negligence in driving the truck give rise to the application of paragraph 5, Article 2180 of the Civil Code which holds the employer vicariously liable for damages caused by his employees within the scope of their assigned tasks.

o In quasi- delict cases, the registered owner of a motor vehicle is the employer of its driver in contemplation of the law. The purpose of motor vehicle registration is precisely to identify the owner so that if any injury is caused by the vehicles, responsibility can be imputed to the registered owner.

Castilex Industrial Corporation v. Vasquez, 321 SCRA 393 (1999)(totyota hilux bumped a motorcycle;hilux did counterflowed)

o Distinction between par 4 and 5 of Article 2180 Par.4 Par. 5 Applies to owners and managers of establishment or enterprise

Applies to employers in general, won engaged in any business or industry

Covers negligent acts of employees committed either in the service of the branches or on occasion of their functions

Encompasses negligent acts of employees acting within the scope of their assigned task

o Under 5th par, an employer is liable for the torts committed by

employees within the scope of his assigned task. 1. It is necessary to establish the employer-employee relationship.. 2. The plaintiff must show, to hold the employer liable, that the

employee was acting within the scope of his assigned task when the tort complained of was committed.

o It is only that the employer may find it necessary to interpose the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee.

o To hold that acts done within the scope of the employee’s assigned task includes “any act done by an employee in furtherance of the interests of the employer or for the account of the employer at the time of the infliction of the injury or damages”

o Operation of Motor vehicle in going to or from meals/ going to or from work

§ Not ordinarily acting within the scope of his employment in the absence of evidence of some special business benefit. Evidence that by using MV, employee is enabled to reduce his time-off and so devote more time to the performance of his duty supports the finding that he is acting within the scope of his employment.

§ The employer may be liable if employer derives some special benefit from having the employee drive home in the employer’s MV as when the employer benefits from having the employee at work earlier.

§ “special errand” or “roving commission” rule- the employee continues in the service of his employer until he actually reaches home.

o The employer is not liable for the employee’s negligence where at the time of the accident, the employee has left the direct route to his work or back home and is pursuing a personal errand of his own.

Jose v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 118441-42, January 18, 2000(Ford escort bumped a Bus, ford driver and passenger came from party and a part of the car was broken)

o Therefore, before the presumption of the employer’s negligence in the selection and supervision of its employees can arise, the negligence of the employee must first be established.

o The failure to prove the employee’s negligence during the trial is fatal to proving the employer’s vicarious liability.

o The allegation that John Macarubo was “the authorized driver” of the Ford Escort is not equivalent to an allegation that he was an employee of Juanita Macarubo.

o That John Macarubo was the authorized driver of the car simply means that he drove the Ford Escort with the permission of Juanita Macarubo, the registered owner.

Bahia v. Litonjua, 30 Phil. 624 (1915) (newly purchased car’s steering gear malfunctioned and caused an accident)

o The action against Litonjua is dismissed. Although she purchased the automobile, she turned it over to the garage of her son for use therein.

The establishment belonged to his son and had the full management of control of such garage.

o When an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or employee there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the selection or supervision of the servant or employee.

o This is rebuttable. o This theory bases the responsibility of the master ultimately on

his own negligence and not on that of his servant. Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc., v. Phil-American Forwarders, Inc., G.R. No. L-25142, March 25, 1975 (manager of Phil-American was sued for the accident involving the driver of Phil-American)

o It may be gathered from the context of Article 2180 that the term “manager” is used in the sense of “employer”.

o Hence, Balingit as manager can not be held liable because he himself may be regarded as an employee of his employer, Phil- American Forwarders, Inc.

Martin v. Court of Appeals, 205 SCRA 591 (1992) (a private car, driven by someone else and not the owner, rammed a meralco post; Meralco sued the owner and not the driver)

o No evidence was adduced by the plaintiff to show that the defendant was the employer of the driver at the time of the accident.

o The ownership of the car and the circumstance of the accident, are not enough bases for the inference that the petitioner is the employer of Nestor Martin.

o The more plausible assumption is that Nestor (driver) is a close relative of the the petitioner and on the date in question borrowed the car for some private purpose. Nestor would probably not have been accommodated if he were a mere employee for employees do not usually enjoy the use of their employer’s car at two o’clock in the morning.

o “if the plaintiff, upon whom rests the burden of proving his cause of action, fails to show in a satisfactory manner the facts upon which he bases his claim, the defendant is under no obligation to prove his exception or defense.

St. Francis High School v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 82465, February 25, 1991 (student trying to rescue a female teacher from drowning drowned)

o It is clear that before an employer may be held liable for the negligence of his employee, the act or omission which caused the damage or prejudice must have occurred while an employee was in the performance of his assigned tasks.

o In the case at bar, the teachers were not in the actual performance of their assigned tasks. The incident happened

while the teachers and students were holding a purely private affair, a picnic.

o Mere knowledge of the principal does not in any way manner show acquiescence or consent to the holding of the picnic.

o If this is affirmed, employers will forever be exposed to the risks and danger of being hailed to Court to answer for the misdeeds or omissions of the employees even if such act or omission he committed while they are noe in the performance of their duties.

o Teachers exercised due diligence to revive the victim.

Mercury Drug Corporation v. Huang, G.R. No. 172122, June 22, 2007 (big truck of mercury figured in an accident with a car)

o Driver was found negligent o The liability of the employer under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code is direct

and immediate. It is not conditioned in a prior recourse against the negligent employee, or a prior showing of insolvency of such employee. It is also joint and solidary with the employee.

o Mercury was negligent in the SS of employee. § No NBI Clearance. § Car used in the training was a Gallant not a truck. § Last driving seminar was 12 years ago § No back up driver despite the accused driver was already

13 hours in the road.

Sanitary Steam Laundry v. Court of Appeals, 300 SCRA 20 (1998)( Sanitary’s panel truck figured in an accident with a Cimmaron; Sanitary did not require NBI Clearance and Psychological test because no law requires it)

o Sanitary was negligent in the SS of the driver. o It said that it is required of its all employees to have an NBI Clearance

but it was now able to show the NBI Clearance of the driver—it is not enough that requiring employees an NBI Clearance is an exercise of due diligence

o Although no law requires a psychological test, it is a reliable indicator that employer exercised due diligence in the SS.

o No test of skill, physical and mental and emotional were conducted.

o There was even failure on the part of defendant to present its concerned employee’s 204 file.

Carticiano v. Nuval, G.R. No. 138054, September 28, 2000(driver of Nuval swerved to the center isle and had a head on collision with Citriano)

o Nuval argued that the driver was not anymore his employee because he was not in the payroll.

o This is denied because a lot of employees of NUval was not in the payroll as well

o The driver had easy access to the keys and Nuval did not act as if the car was stolen or they did not look for it.

o Third parties are not bound to by the allegation that the driver was only authorized to operate the jeep only when the employer’s children were on board the vehicle.

o Giving credence to this outlandish theory would enable employers to escape their legal liabilities with impunity. Such loophole is easy and is simply unacceptable.

Universal Aquarius, Inc., v. Q.C. Human Resources Management Corporation, G.R. No. 155990, September 12, 2007 (Universal filed against Resources for breach of contract; Tan filed against Resources for the strike performed by its employees which caused damage to Tan’s business)

o The act of strike of Resources employees is beyond the range of employment. They were acting on their own, beyond the range of their employment.

Filamer Christian Institute v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 75112, October 16, 1990 and Filamer Christian Institute v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 75112, August 17, 1992 (Kapunan Sr, was struck by Pinoy jeep driven by Funtecha)

o First decision o Working scholars are not employee of the school o Assuming that Funtecha was an employee, still Filamer can not

be held liable for FUntecha’s acts because at the time of the accident, Funtecha was not acting within the scope of his supposed employment.

o Second Decision o The clause “within the scope of their assigned tasks” for

purposes of raising the presumption of liability of an employer, includes any act done by an employee, in furtherance of the interest of the employer or for the account of the employer at the time of the infliction of the injury or damage.

§ Futencha is an employee of Filamer. He need not have an official appointment for a driver’s position in order that the petitioner may be held responsible for his grossly negligent act, it being sufficient that the act of driving at the time of the incident was for the benefit of the petitioner.

o An employer is expecte to impose upon its employees the necessary discipline called for in the performance of any act indispensable to the business and beneficial to their employer.

§ Filamer failed to show that it has set some guidelines to prohibit its employee from using the vehicle if they are not the authorized driver.

Jayme v. Apostol, G.R. No. 163609, November 27, 2008 (the driver of the municipality figured in an accident while transporting the mayor to airport)

o To sustain claims against employers for the acts of their emloyees, the following requisites must be established:

1. That the employee was chosen by the employer personally or through another

2. That the service to be rendered in accordance with the orders which the mployer has the authority to give at all times

3. That the illicit act of employee was on the occasion or by reason of the functions entrusted to him

o It must be established that the injurious or tortious act was committed at the time the employee was performing his functions.

o Employer-employee relationship is not assumed. It is incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove the relationship by preponderant evidence.

o It was Municipality who was the employer of the driver based on the four-fold test. The driver was subsequently assigned to the Mayor

o An employer-employee relationship still exists even if the employee was loaned by the employer to another person because the control over the employee subsists.

o Assuming arguendo that the Mayor had authority to give intructions, he still is not liable.

o The mere giving of instructions to the driver does not establish that the passenger has control over the vehicle.

o Those instruction or directions are ordinarily no more than requests commonly envisaged in the contract for services entered into with the security agency.

o The law on the matter is clear: only the negligent driver, the driver’s employer, and the registered owner of the vehicle are liable.

Filcar Transport Services v. Espinas, G.R. No. 174156, June 20, 2012( driver of car registered under Filcar, met an accident in an intersection with Espinas)

o It is a well settled that in case of motor vehicle mishaps, the registered owner of the motor vehicle is considered as the employer of the tortfeasor-driver, and is made primarily liable for tort committed by the latter under Art 2176, in relation with Article 2180.

o The aim of motor vehicle registration is to identify the owner so that if any accident happens, or that any damage or injury is caused by the vehicle on the public highways, responsibility therefor can be fixed on a definite individual, the registered owner.

o Thus whether there is an employer-employee relationship between the registered owner and the driver is irrelevant in determining the liability of the registered owner who the law holds primarily and directly responsible for any accident, injury or death caused by the operation of the vehicle in the streets and highways.

Del Carmen v. Bacoy, G.R. No. 173870, April 25, 2012

o The operator on record of a vehicle is primarily responsible to third persons for the deaths or injuries consequent to its operation, regardless of whether the employee drove, the registered owner’s vehicle in connection with his employment.

o The registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public service, woud primarily be responsible to the public or to third persons for inuries caused the latter while the vehicle was being driven on the highways or streets.

o Absent the circumstance of unauthorized use or that the subject vehicle was stolen which are valid defenses available to a registered owner, Oscar Jr. cannot escape liability for quasi-delict resulting from his jeep’s use.

Maranan v. Perez, G.R. No. L-22272, June 26, 1967 (taxi driver stabbed and killed its passenger)

o The new Civil Code of the Philippines expressly akes the common carrier liable for intentional assulats committed by its employees upon its passengers, by the wording of Art. 1759

o It is enough that the assult happens within the course of the employee’s duty. It is no defense for the carrier that the act was done in excess if authority or in disobedience of the carrier’s orders. The carrier’s liability here is absolute in the sense that it practically secures the passengers from assaults committed by its own employees.

o Three reasons for this rule: a. The special undertaking of the carrier requires that it furnish

its passenger that full measure of protection afforded by the exercise of the high degree of care prescribed by the law, inter alia from violence and insults at the hands of strangers and other passengers, but above all, from the acts of the carrier’s own servants charged with the passenger’s safety

b. Said liability of the carrier for the servant’s violation of duty to passengers, is the result of the former’s confiding in the servant’s hands the performance of his contract to safely transport the passenger with the utmost care prescribed by law

c. As between the carrier and the passenger, the former must bear the risk of wrongful acts or negligence of the carrier’s employees against passengers, since it, and not the passengers, has power to select and remove them.

o It is the carrier’s strict obligation to select its drivers and similar employees with due regard not to their technical competence and physical ability, but also, no less important, to their total personality, including their patterns of behavior, moral fibers, and social attitude.

Ramos v. Court of Appeals, 321 SCRA 584 (1999) and Ramos v. Court of Appeals, 380 SCRA 467 (2002) (patient died because of wrong or improper intubation) doctrines from Jason Arteche’s digest

o 1st decision o captain of the ship doctrine

§ it is the surgeon’s responsibility to see to it that those under him perform their task in the proper manner

§ Doctor Osaka failed to make sure that the anesthesiologist properly did her task

o In other words, private hospitals, hire, fire and exercise real control over their attending and visiting “consultant” staff.

o 2nd decision o Moreover, the contract between the consultant in respondent

hospital and his patient is separate and distinct from the contract between respondent hospital and said patient. The first has for its object the rendition of medical services by the consultant to the patient, while the second concerns the provision by the hospital of facilities and services by its staff such as nurses and laboratory personnel necessary for the proper treatment of the patient.

§ No evidence was adduced to show that the injury suffered by Erlinda was due to the failure of DLSMC to provide for hospital facilities and staff necessary for her treatment.

Nogales v. Capitol Medical Center, G.R. No. 142625, December 19, 2006 (the victim died after delivery because of the negligence of the attending physician)

o In general, a hospital is not liable for the negligence of an independent contractor-physician.

o Exception: The hospital may be held liable if the physician is the “ostensible” agent of the hospital. This exception is also known the “doctrine of apparent authority.

o The doctrine of apparent authority involves two factors to determine the liability of an independent- contractor physician.

a. Whether the hospital acted in a manner, which would lead a reasonable person to conclude that, the individual who was alleged to be negligent was an employee or agent of the hospital.

b. Whether the plaintiff acted in reliance upon the conduct of the hospital or its agent, consistent with ordinary care and prudence.

Professional Services, Inc., v. Agana, 513 SCRA 478 (2007) and Professional Services, Inc., v. Agana, G.R. Nos. 126297, 126467, 127590, February 2, 2010

Casumpang v. Cortejo, G.R. Nos. 171127, 171217 & 17122, March 11, 2015 Ramos v. COL Realty Corporation, G.R. No. 184905, August 28, 2009(accident in katipunan)

o If the master is injured by the negligence of a third person and by the concurring contributory negligence of his own servant or agent, the latter’s negligence is imputed to his superior and will defeat the superior’s action against the third person, assuming of course that the contributory negligence was the proximate cause of the injury of which the complaint is made.

C. The State

- Cases

Merritt v. Government of the Philippine Islands, G.R. No. 11154, March 21, 1916 (guy in a motorcycle had an accident with an ambulance of General Hospital)

o That the responsibility of the state is limited to case wherein it acts through a special agent (and a special agent is one who receives a definite and fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special official) so that in representation of the state and being bound to act as an agent thereof, he executes the thrust confided in him.

o This concept does not apply to any executive agent who is an employee of the active administration and who on his own responsibility performs the functions which are inherent in and naturally pertain to his office and which are regulated by law and the regulations.

TORTFEASOR FUNCTION STATE LIABLE? Public Officer Governmental

functions State not liable. PO liable under 2176

Public Officer Function foreign to office

Liable, PO is a special agent

Public Officer Proprietary Function

Liable, state is an ordinary employer

Private Individual Governmental function

Liable, special agent

Private Individual Proprietary function

Liable, state is an ordinary employer

Fontanilla v. Maliaman, G.R. No. 55963, December 1, 1989, and Fontanilla v. Maliaman, G.R. No. 55963 & 61045, February 27, 1991 (NIA pick-up hit a man riding a bicycle)

o The matter of due diligence on the part of respondent NIA becomes crucial issue in determining its liability since it has been established that respondent is a government agency performing propriety functions and as such, it assumes the posture of an ordinary employer which is responsible for the damages caused by its employees provided that it has failed to observe or exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of the driver.

o While it may be true that the NIA was essentially a service agency of the government aimed at promoting public interest and public welfare, such fact does not make the NIA essentially and purely a “government-function” corporation.

o Certainly, the state and the community as a while are largely benefited by the services the agency renders, but these functions are only incidental to the principal aim of the agency, which is the irrigation.

D. Teachers and Heads of Establishments

If student committed acts under 2176- teacher only liable and not school If teacher committed acts under 2176- school is also liable under 2180 Family Code Person VL For whom Requisites Defenses Liab Parents/ Sub PA

Children below 18 (Fam Code, 221)

1. Living in company 2. under their authority

Due diligence to prevent damage

Direct & Primary

Parents (pursuant deep pocket theory)

Children 18-21 (CC 2180, par 2, FC 236)

1. must be living in their company

Due diligence to prevent damage

Direct & Primary

Special PA (S,A,T,I)

Below 18 (FC 218-219)

Must be (SIC) 1. Supervision 2. Instruction 3. Custody

Due diligence to prevent damage

Direct & Primary

Guardians Minor/incapacitated 1. Living in company 2. under their authority

1. Living in company 2. under their authority

Direct & Primary

- Family Code

o Articles 218 and 219

- Cases

Mercado v. Court of Appeals, 108 Phil. 414 (1960) (students fight over pitogo)

o “Custody”- contemplates a situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher, such the control, direction, and onfluence on the pupil supersedes those of the parents.

o The control or influence over the conduct and actions of the pupil would pass from the father and mother to the teacher;and so would the responsibility for the torts of the pupil.

Palisoc v. Brillantes, 41 SCRA 557 (1971) (two students had a fist fight in the laboratory which caused the death of one of them)

o “custody”- means protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupil and students for as long as they are at attendance in school, including recess time.

o There is nothing in the law that student ust live and board in the school

Amadora v. Court of Appeals, 160 SCRA 315 (1988) (student shot by a gun another student)

o The provision in question should apply to all schools, academic as well as non-academic.

o In other words, teachers in general shall be liable for the acts of their students except where the school is technical in nature, in which case it is the head thereof who shall be answerable.

§ Following the canon of reddendo singular singulis, “teachers” should apply to the words “pupils and students” and “heads of establishment of arts and trades” to the word “apprentices”.

o The is really no substantial distinction between the academic and non-academic schools isofar as torts committed by their students are concerned. The same vigilance is expected from the teacher over the students under his control and supervision, ehatever the nature of the school where he is teaching.

o The student is in the custody of the school authorities as long as he is under the control and influence of the school and within its premises, whether the semester has not yet begun or has already ended.

§ As long as it can be shown that the student is in the school premises in pursuance of a legitimate student objective, in the exercise of his legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student

privilege, the responsibility of the school authorities over the student continues.

o Custody does not connote immediate and actual physical control but refers more to the influence exerted on the child and the discipline instilled in him as a result of such influence.

o If at all, the school, whatever its nature, may be held to answer fot the acts of its teachers or even of the head therof under the general principle of respondeat superior, but then it may exculpate itself from liability by proof that it had exercised the diligence of a bonus pater familias.

o Teachers or head are still liable even if the student is of age but the lesser accountability.

Ylarde v. Aquino, G.R. No. L-33722, July 29, 1988 (4 students dug a hole in order to burry a big stone)

o Applying the doctrine in amadora, the principal cannot be held liable for the reason that the school he heads is an academic school and not a school of arts and trades.

Salvosa v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 70458, October 5, 1988 (ROTC armorer and student at Baguio College Foundation shot someone)

o A student not at attendance in the school cannot be in recess thereat. A “recess” as the concept is embraced in the phrase “at attendance in the school” contemplates a situation of temporary adjournment of school activities where the student still remains within call of his mentor and is not permitted to leave the school premises, or the area within the school activity is conducted.

Aquinas School v. Inton, G.R. No. 184202, January 26, 2011 (student was kicked by a new teacher)

o Under the circumstances, it was quite evident that Aquinas did not have control over Yamyamin’s teaching methods.

o Aquinas still had the responsibility of taking steps to ensure that only qualified outside catechists are allowed to teach its young students.

o Aquinas took all the steps to avoid the occurrence of such injury. Therefore they are not liable.

St. Joseph's College v. Miranda, G.R. No. 182353, June 29, 2010 (student got his eyes injured by chemicals during experiments)

o The proximate cause was the concurrent failure of the petitioners to prevent foreseeable mishap that occurred during the conduct of the science experiment.

o Art. 218 of the Family Code

E. Right to Reimbursement

- Case

Mendoza v. Spouses Gomez, G.R. No. 160110, June 18, 2014 (truck bumped by a bus)

o Registered owner is liable. The defenses available under Article 2180 is no longer available because of motor vehicle registration law.

o However, under the civil law, the registered owner of the motor vehicle has a right to be indemnified by the actual employer of the driver.

o Under Article 2181, whoever pays for the damages caused by his dependents or employees may recover from the latter what he has paid or delivered in satisfaction of the claim.

Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 66102-04, August 30, 1990 (Bus hit jeepney who is in the improper lane because it rear wheel was detached)

o This is an action for breach of contract. The carrier can neither shift his liability on the contract to his driver nor share it with him, for his driver’s negligence is his.

o Secondly if we make the driver jointly and severally liable with the carrier, that would make the carrier’s liability personl instead of merely vicarious and consequently, entitled to reover only the share which corresponds to the driver, contradictory to the explicit provision of Article 2181.

See Cerezo v. Tuazon, G.R. No. 141538, March 23, 2004

F. Distinguished from subsidiary liability under the Revised Penal Code - Revised Penal Code

o Articles 102 and 103

- Cases

Carpio v. Doroja, 180 SCRA 1 (1989) (Jeepney bumped a pedestrian) (criminal action, civil aspect was appealed)

o In order to that an employer subs liable for employee’s civ liability arising from criminal action (execution only)

a. That the employer is engaged in any kind of industry b. That the employee committed the offense in the

discharge of his duties c. That he is insolvent

o The subsidiary liability of the employer, however, arises only after the conviction of the employee in criminal action.

Bantoto v. Bobis, 18 SCRA 690 (1966) (Jeepney driver bumped a 3 year old child)

o The master’s liability, under the Revised Penal Code, for the crimes committed by his servants and employees in the discharge of their duties is not predicated upon the insolvency of the latter.

o In this case, both employer and employee are charged in the criminal case.

Yonaha v. Court of Appeals, 255 SCRA 397 (1996) (driver of Tamaraw bumped someone and killed it)

o The execution against employer must not issue as just matter of course, and it behooves the court, as a measure of due process to the employer, to determine and resolve a priori, in a hearing set for the purpose the legal applicability and propriety of employer’s liability. The requirement is mandatory even when it appears prima facie that the execution against the convicted employee cannot be satisfied.

o The court must convince itself of the ff: o The convicted employee is in truth in the employ of the

employer o Latter is engaged in industry o The employee has committed the crime to which civil liability

attaches while in the performance of his duties as such o Employee is insolvent

VI. PRIMARY LIABILITY

- Civil Code

o Articles 2183 to 2193, and 1723 (Memorize)

A. Possessors/users of animals - Case

Vestil v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 179 SCRA 47 (1989) (dog bit a 3 year old girl)

o Vestil were the occupants of the house so they are in possession of the dog as well because they used the said house for business by renting it.

o Manresa: Article 2183 is not based on the negligence or on the presumed lack of vigilance of the possessor or use of the animal causing the damage. It is based on natural equity and on the principle of social interest that he who possesses animals for his utility, pleasure or service must answer for the damage which such animal may cause.

o Petitioner’s contention that they cannot exercise remote control over the dog is not acceptable. Art 2183 holds the possessor liable even if the animal should “escape or lost

B. Owners of Motor Vehicles

- See Section III(D)(ii)(a) above.

C. Manufacturers and Processors - Case

Coca-Cola Bottlers v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110295, October 18, 1993. (there is fiber like matter in the softdrinks offered by the canteen)

o Vendee’s remedies o Implied warranty o Annulment of contract upon proof of error or fraud o Quasi-delict

§ Quasi-delict may still exist despite the presence of contractual relations.

o Under these three remedies, the vendee can claim damages.

D. Municipal Corporations - Republic Act No. 7160, Section 24

- Cases

City of Manila v. Teotico, 22 SCRA 267 (1968) (a commuter, pumara ng jeep, while trying to ride the jeep, he fell on a man hole and incurred injuries)

o Under 2189, it is not necessary for the liability therein established to attach that the defective roads or streets belong to the province, city, or municipality from which responsibility ex exacted. What is required is that the province, city or municipality have either “control or supervision” over said street or road.

Jimenez v. City of Manila, 150 SCRA 510 (1987) (petitioner was buying “bagoong” in Sta. Ana Market. Due to the flood, he stepped on uncovered opening and a nail pierced his leg, market was managed by a private entity)

o Despite the management and operating contract, between manila city and Asiatic, Manila still retained the control of the market.

o It was admitted by the Mayor to a letter to the Sec of Finance o Manila employed a market master whose duty is to take direct

supervision and control of that particular market o Petitioner had the right to assume that there were no openings in the

middle of the passageways and if any, that they were adequately covered.

Guilatco v. City of Dagupan, 171 SCRA 382 (1989) (petitioner, while waiting for a tricycle in a sidewalk, fell on a manhole)

o The engineer exercise control or supervision over the public works in question.

o Although the engineers are employees of the National Government, they are detailed with the City of Dagupan and hence receive instruction and supervision from the city through the City Engineer.

E. Building Proprietors

- Cases

De Roy v. Court of Appeals, 157 SCRA 757 (1988) (building firewall collapsed and destroyed the house of the defendant)

o Petitioner is liable under Article 2190, which provides that “the proprietor of a building or structure is responsible for the damage resulting from its total or partial collapse, if it should be due to the lack of necessary repairs.

F. Engineers/Architects/Contractors

- Cases

Nakpil & Sons v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-47851, October 3, 1986, and Nakpil & Sons v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-47851, April 15, 1988 (PBA building was not able to withstand an earthquake because of the fault in the architectural design)

o 1st case o to be exempt from liability under Article 1174 due to an act of

God the ff must concur: a. the cause of the breach must be independent of the will

of the debtor b. the event must be either unforeseeable or unavoidable c. the event must be such as to render it impossible for the

debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner d. the debtor must be free from ay participation in, or

aggravation of the injury to the creditor. o 2nd Case

o citing Tucker v. Milan § One who negligently creates a dangerous condition

cannot escape liability for the natural and probable consequences thereof, although the act of a third person, or an act of God for which he is not responsible, intervenes to precipitate the loss.

o There is no need for PBA to provide full-time supervision because the construction involves highly technical matters

VII. SPECIAL TORTS (HUMAN RELATIONS)

A. Abuse of Rights and acts contra bonus mores

- Civil Code o Articles 19 to 21 (Memorize)

- Cases

Far East Bank and Trust Company v. Pacilan, G.R. No. 157314, July 29, 2005 ( Defendant issued checks, his account was insufficiently funded do the petitioner bank closed his account;defendant overdrawn a lot of times)

o Elements of abuse of rights a. The existence of a legal right or duty b. Which is exercised in bad faith c. For the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring

another o The law always presumes good faith and any person who seeks

to be awarded damages due to acts of another has the burden of proving that the latter acted in bad faith or with ill-motive.

o Defendant improperly handled his account o he overdrawn, used different signature s

Rellosa v. Pellosis, G.R. No. 138964, August 9, 2001(defendant, lessee of petitioner. Defendant’s house was demolished by petitioner after selling it and without letting def exercise their right to first refusal)

o A right is a power, privilege, or immunity guaranteed under a constitution, statute or decisional law, or recognized as a result of long usage, constructive of a legally enforceable claim of one person against another.

o When petitioners implemented the demolition, it was only after five days after the defendants received the notice. They still have time to appeal and the said decision is not yet final and executory.

Cebu Country Club, Inc., v. Elizagaque, G.R. No. 160273, January 18, 2008 (respondent wanted to join the club but he was rejected by the Board)

o The exercise of right, though legal by itself, must nonetheless be in accordance with the proper norm. When the right is exercised arbitrarily, unjustly or excessively and results in

damage to another, a legal wrong is committed for which the wrong doer must be held responsible.

o Damnum absque injuria will not apply when there is an abuse of a person’s right.

Nikko Hotel Manila Garden v. Reyes, G.R. No. 154259, February 28, 2005 (Reyes was not invited to the party of gen man of Nikko hotel)

o Volenti non fit injuria (“to which a person assents is not esteemed in law as injury”

o Refers to self-inflicted injury or to the consent to injury which precludes the recovery of damages by one who has knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even if he is not negligent in doing so.

o Calatagan Golf Club, Inc., v. Clemente, G.R. No. 165443, April 16, 2009 (Calatagan foreclosed Clemente’s share for delinquency in paying the monthly due;)

o A non-stock corporation like Calatagan is not exempt from that obligation in its treatment of its members. The obligation of a corporation to treat every person honestly and in good faith extends even to its shareholders or members, even if the latter find themselves contractually bound to perform certain obligations to the corporation. A certificate of stock cannot be a character of dehumanization.

o Clemente was not given due notice here. University of the East v. Jader, G.R. No. 132344, February 17, 2000(school made paasa the student that he is eligible to graduate)

o It is the contractual obligation of the school to timely inform and furnish sufficient notice and information to each and every student as to whether he or she had already complied with all the requirements for the conferment of a degree or whether they would be included among the those who will graduate.

o Graduation ceremony is the educational institution’s way of announcing to the whole world that the students included in the list of those who will be conferred a degree during the ceremony have satisfied all the requirements for such degree.

Albenson Enterprises Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 88694, January 11, 1993 (albenson filed a bp 22 but it was dismissed)

o Elements of Article 21 a. There is an act which is legal b. But which is contrary to morals, good custom,

public order, or public policy

c. Done with intent to injure o There is a common element under articles 19 and 21 and that

is, the act must be intentional. However, Article 20 does not distinguish: the act may be done either “willfully”, or “negligently”.

o In the absence of a wrongful act or omission or fraud or bad faith, moral damages cannot be awarded and the adverse result of an action does not per se make the action wrongful and subject the actor to the payment of damages, for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate.

o To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person, and that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that his charges were false and groundless.

o Requisites for malicious prosecution; a. The fact of the prosecution and the further fact that the

defendant was himself the prosecutor, and that the action was finally terminated with an acquittal

b. That in bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without probable cause

c. The prosecutor acted without probable cause

Martires v. Cokieng, G.R. No. 150192, February 17, 2005 (filed estafa case)

o To merit the award of damages in a case of malicious prosecution, the aggrieved party must prove: a. That he has been denounced or charged falsely on an offense

by the defendant b. That the latter knows that the charge was false or lack

probable cause c. That the said defendant actd with malice, and, of course d. The damage he has suffered

o The elements of want of probable cause and malice must simultaneously exist; otherwise, the presence of probable cause signifies, as a legal consequence, the absence of malice.

Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 81262, August 25, 1989 Ford v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 51171-72, June 4, 1990 Hermosisima v. Court of Appeals, 109 Phil. 628 (1960) Wassmer v. Velez, 12 SCRA 648 (1964) Baksh v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97336, February 19, 1993 Garciano v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 96126, August 10, 1992

B. Unjust Enrichment

- Civil Code o Articles 22 and 23 (Memorize)

- Cases

Security Bank & Trust Company v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117009, October 11, 1995 ( Uy v. Public Estates Authority, G.R. No. 147925-26, July 7, 2010 Car Cool Philippines, Inc., v. Ushio Realty and Development Corporation, G.R. No. 138088, January 23, 2006 Almario v. Philippine Airlines, Inc., G.R. No. 170928, September 11, 2007 Grandteq Industrial Steel Products, Inc., v. Margallo, G.R. No. 181393, July 28, 2009 C. Judicial Vigilance

- Civil Code

o Article 24 (Memorize)

- Case

1. Everett Steamship Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122494, October 8, 1998 (shipping; some of the shipment lost) o Greater vigilance is required of the court when dealing with

contracts of adhesion in that the said contracts must be carefully scrutinized “in order to shield the unwary from deceptive schemes contained in ready-made covenants.

o We assume that maruman trading has been extensively engaged in the trading business. It can not be said to be ignorant of the business transactions it entered into involcing the shipment of its goods to its customers.

D. Thoughtless Extravagance

- Civil Code

o Article 25 (Memorize)

E. Disrespect of Persons

- Civil Code o Article 26 (Memorize)

- Cases

Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 179799, September 11, 2009 (respondent was arrested in front of her husband and daughter)

o The complaint here is not of malicious prosecution but quasi-delist in relation with Article 26

Manaloto v. Veloso, G.R. No. 171365, October 6, 2010(petitioner filed an unlawful det case against def; petitioner gave copies of mtc decision to the neighborhood;def filed a case for humiliation)

o Requisite of cause of action a. There is a right in favor of petitioner b. There is an obligation on the part of the def to respect

such right c. Act or omission of def to violate such right

o Art. 26 is not limited to those it enumerated. o The philo behind art. 26 underscores th necessity for its

inclusion in our civil law. o Human personality must be exalted o The touchstone of every system of law is how far it

dignifies man. o While petitioners were free to copy and distribute such copies of

the MeTC judgment to the public, the question is whether they did so with the intent of humiliating respondent and destroying the latter’s good name and reputation in the community.

o However, in this case, there was no sufficient evidence presented by the petitioner.

o Good faith is presumed and he who alleges bad faith has the duty to prove the same.

o Bad faith imports dishonest purpose or moral obliquity due to some motive or interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud.

Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc., v. Verchez, G.R. No. 164349, January 31, 2006 (radio telegram did not reach the family)

o RCPI’s negligence in not promptly performing its obligation undoubtedly disturbed the peace of mind not only of Grace but also her co-respondents. As observed by the the appellate court, it disrupted the “filial tranquility” among them as they blamed each other “for failing to respond swiftly to an emergency.”

St. Louis Realty Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-46061, November 14, 1984(house of doctor was used in an ad)

o Prying into the privacy of another’s residence ad meddling with ou disturbing the private life or family relations of another and similar acts, “though they may not constitute a criminal offense,

shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief.”

Spouses Hing v. Choachuy, Sr., G.R. No. 179736, June 26, 2013( cctv case)

o Right to privacy (consti) o The right to be free from unwarranted exploitation of

one’s person or from intrusion into one’s private activities in such a way as to cause humiliation to a person’s ordinary sensibilities.

o Article 26 covers business offices where the public are excluded therefrom and only certain individuals are allowed to enter.

o Reasonble expectation of privacy test 1. Whether, by his conduct, the individual has exhibited an

expectation privacy 2. Expectation is one that society recognizes as reasonable

F. Dereliction of Duty

- Civil Code

o Article 27 (Memorize)

- Cases

Philippine Match Co., Ltd., v. City of Cebu, G.R. No. L-30745, January 18, 1978 (there was a tax ordinance; treasurer did not follow the advise of city fiscal)

o The fiscal’s opinion on the legality of the ordinance is merly advisory.

o The record clearly reveals that the city treasurer honestly believed that he was justified under the tax ordinance in collecting the sales tax.

o The city treasure acted within the scope of his authority and in consonance with his bonafide interpretation of the tax ordinance.

o A punlic officer is not personally liable to one inured in consequence of an act performed within the scope of his official authority, and in the line of his official duty.

Tuzon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 90107, August 21, 1992 (defendant was not issued business permit without signing the agreement of )

o The record discloses that the resolution was uniformly applied to all the threshers in in the municipality without discrimination.

Vital-Gozon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129132, July 8, 1998 ( doctor was demoted)

o A public official may be made to pay damages for performing a perfectly legal act, albeit with bad faith or in violation of the abuse of right doctirne embodied in the preliminary articles of the Civil Code under article 19 and 27.

Torio v. Fontanilla, G.R. No. L-29993, October 23, 1978 (fiesta;stage collapsed)

o Holding of fiesta is a proprietary function of the municipal o Macaraeg acted merely as an agent of the Municipality. Under

the doctrine of respondent superior mentioned earlier, petitioner is responsible or liable negligence of its agent acting within this assigned tasks.

G. Unfair Competition

- Civil Code

o Article 28 (Memorize)

- Cases

Willaware Products Corp. v. Jesichris Manufacturing Corp., G.R. No. 195549, September 3, 2014 (kinuha yung employee)

o Unfair competition o It must involve an injury to a competition or trade rival o It must involve acts which are characterized as “contrary

to good conscience” or shocking to judicial sensibilities or otherwise unlawful.

§ In the language of our law, it includes force, intimidation, deceit, machination

Calamba Medical Center, Inc., v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 176484, November 25, 2008

o The circulation of such list contatining names of alleged union members intended to prevent employment of workers for union activities similarly constitutes unfair labor practice, therby giving a right of action for damages by the employees prejudiced.

H. Violation of Civil/Political Rights

- Civil Code

o Article 32 (Memorize)

- Cases

Lim v. De Leon, 66 SCRA 299 (1975) (there wa a sale of motor launch)

o Valid search warrant 1. It must be issued upon probable cause

2. The probable cause tmust be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any other person

3. He judge must examine under oath or affirmation the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce

4. The warrant issued ust particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized

MHP Garments, Inc., v. Court of Appeals, 236 SCRA 227 (1994)

o Private persons who instigate an illegal warrantless search and seizure ay be held liable for damages.

Newsweek v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 142 SCRA 141 (1986) (sugar cane)

o Defamaroey remarks directed at a class or group of persons in general language only, are not actionable by individuals composing the class or group unless the statements are sweeping;and it is very probabe that even then no action would lie where the body is composed of so large a number of persons that common sense would tell those to whom the publication was made that there was room for persons connected with the body tp pursue…

MVRS Publications, Inc., v. Islamic Da’Wah Council of the Philippines, G.R. No. 135306, January 28, 2003 Silahis International Hotel v. Soluta, G.R. No. 163087, February 20, 2006

VIII. TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS

- Civil Code

o Article 1314 (Memorize)

- Cases

1. Gilchrist v. Cuddy, 29 Phil. 542 (1915) 2. Daywalt v. Corporacion de PP Agustinos Recoletos, 39 Phil. 587

(1919) 3. Tayag v. Lacson, 426 SCRA 282 (2004) 4. Yu v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 86683, January 21, 1993 5. So Ping Bun v. Court of Appeals, 314 SCRA 751 (1999) 6. Lagon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119107, March 18, 2005 7. Go v. Cordero, G.R. No. 164703, May 4, 2010

IX. CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM CRIMES

- Rules of Court

o Rule 111

- Civil Code o Articles 29 to 31, and 33 to 36 (Memorize)

- Cases

Banal v. Tadeo, G.R. No. L-78911-25, December 11, 1987 Simon v. Chan, G.R. No. 157547, February 23, 2011 Cancio v. Isip, G.R. No. 133978, November 12, 2002 Casupanan v. Laroya, G.R. No. 145391, August 26, 2002 Rodriguez v. Ponferrada, G.R. Nos. 155531-34, July 29, 2005 Padilla v. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 558 (1984) (grave coercion;aquitted because reasonable doubt)

• Petitioners were acquitted because these acts were denominated coercion when they properly constituted some other offense such as threat or malicious mischief

• The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil might arise did not exist. Thus, the civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases; where the court expressly declares that the liability of the accused is not criminal but only civil in nature.

• A separate civil action may be warranted where additional facts have to be established or move evidence must be adduced or where the criminal case has been fully terminated and a separate compalaint would be just as efficacious or even more expedient than a timely remand to the trial court where the criminal action was decided for further hearings on the civil aspects of the case.

• Romero v. People, G.R. No. 167546, July 17, 2009 People v. Bayotas, G.R. No. 102007, September 2, 1994 Cabugao v. People, G.R. No. 163879, G.R. No. 165805, July 30, 2014 Sanchez v. Far East Bank and Trust Company, G.R. No. 155309, November 15, 2005 Manliclic v. Calaunan, G.R. No. 150157, January 25, 2007 Cruz v. Court of Appeals, 282 SCRA 188 (1997) Lim v. Ping, G.R. No. 175256, August 23, 2012 Consing v. People, G.R. No. 161075, July 15, 2013

X. DAMAGES A. In General - Civil Code

o Articles 2195, 2197, and 2198 § Memorize: Article 2197

- Case

1. Ong v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117103, January 21, 1999 B. Actual Damages - Civil Code

o Articles 2199 to 2202, 2204 to 2213 o Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Circular No. 799, series of 2013

§ Memorize: Articles 2199, 2200, 2201, 2202, 2204, 2205, and 2208

- Cases

1. PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107518, October 8, 1998

2. Algarra v. Sandejas, 27 Phil. 284 (1914) 3. Cerrano v. Tan Chuco, G.R. No. 12907, August 1, 1918 4. Hicks v. Manila Hotel Company, G.R. No. 9973, November 6, 1914 5. Justiva v. Gustilo, 7 SCRA 72 (1963) 6. De Guia v. The Manila Electric Railroad & Light Company, G.R. No.

14335, January 28, 1920 7. Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 91852, August

15, 1995 8. Lim v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125817, January 16, 2002 9. Adrian Wilson International Associates, Inc., v. TMX Philippines,

Inc., G.R. No. 162608, July 26, 2010 10. People v. Mamaruncas, G.R. No. 179497, January 25, 2012 11. People v. Arellano, G.R. No. 122477, June 30, 2000 12. People v. Anticamara, G.R. No. 178771, June 8, 2011 13. Cariaga v. Laguna Tayabas Bus Company, G.R. No. L-11037,

December 29, 1960 14. Villa Rey Transit v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-25499, February

18, 1970 15. Cruz v. Sun Holidays, Inc., G.R. No. 186312, June 29, 2010 16. De Caliston v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-63135, June 24, 1983 17. Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.

116617, November 16, 1998 18. Tamayo v. Señora, G.R. No. 176946, November 15, 2010 19. Philippine Hawk Corporation v. Lee, G.R. No. 166869, February 16,

2010 20. OMC Carriers, Inc., v. Nabua, G.R. No. 148974, July 2, 2010 21. Spouses Pereña v. Spouses Zarate, G.R. No. 157917, August 29,

2012

22. Victory Liner, Inc. v. Gammad, G.R. No. 159636, November 25, 2004

23. Daywalt v. Corporacion de PP Agustinos Recoletos, 39 Phil. 587 (1919)

24. Consolidated Dairy Products Co. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 100401, August 24, 1992

25. Continental Cement Corporation v. ASEA Brown Boveri, Inc., G.R. No. 171660, October 17, 2011

26. Mendoza v. Philippine Air Lines, 90 Phil. 836 (1952) 27. Araneta v. Bank of America, G.R. No. L-25414, July 30, 1971 28. Simex International (Manila), Incorporated v. Court of Appeals,

G.R. No. 88013, March 19, 1990 29. National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-43814,

April 16, 1982 30. Padilla Machine Shop v. Javilgas, G.R. No. 175960, February 19,

2008 31. David v. Misamis Occidental II Electric Cooperative, Inc., G.R. No.

194785, July 11, 2012 32. Lacson v. Reyes, 182 SCRA 729 (1990). 33. Petron Corporation v. National College of Business and Arts, 516

SCRA 168 (2007) 34. Buan v. Camaganacan, 16 SCRA 321 (1966) 35. Villanueva v. Salvador, 480 SCRA 39 (2006) 36. Eastern Shipping v. Court of Appeals, 234 SCRA 78 (1994) 37. Nacar v. Gallery Frames, G.R. No. 189871, August 13, 2013 38. Rivera v. Spouses Chua, G.R. No. 184458, January 14, 2015