As you read the attached documents, you will discover that the Florida judgment for nearly $10,000,000 was obtained as a result of extrinsic fraud, intrinsic fraud, fraud upon the court, violations of the United States Constitution, violations of federal laws, and many other assorted violations. And despite the judgment having been obtained by fraud, Lester Kalmanson Agency Inc., offered to settle the matter by asking the defendant, “Do you have insurance [to pay the $10,000,000 judgment]?” Most, if not all observers, would classify that question as attempted insurance fraud. This is an excellent example of the mastery and conspiracy of completely twisting a perfectly legal incident that is also protected by federal anti-trust laws into a crime and a $10,000,000 judgment. And people who don’t understand the laws and the facts have been misled to believe the Florida court documents should be relied upon. But after careful review, the fraud and/or conspiracy of fraud is unmistakable.

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VIRGINIA:

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE CITY OF FREDERICKSBURG

LESTER KALMANSON AGENCY, INC } Plaintiff, }

} v. } Case No.: } Judgment No.:110000869 } CHASE CARMEN HUNTER, et al., }

Defendant. }

AMENDED MOTION OF CHASE CARMEN HUNTER TO SET ASIDE JUDGMENT

COMES NOW Chase Carmen Hunter, pro se, pursuant to Virginia Supreme Court Rule 1:8, as amended, and in response to the Exemplification Certificate, Final Summary Judgment, Affidavit, and Notice of Filing in this case states in this amended motion as follows:

1. Defendant Chase Carmen Hunter, individually, appears before this Court for the

purpose of moving for relief from this court's docketing of a foreign judgment as

contemplated by Va. Code § 8.01-428(A), as amended.

2. This case arises under the Virginia Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments

Act, Va. Code § § 8.01- 465.1 et seq. The underlying original judgment was

issued on April 12, 2011, by the “Circuit Court for the Fifth Judicial Circuit in

and for Orange County, Florida”

3. This foreign judgment was filed in this Court on or about June 7, 2011.

COUNT I

4. Chase Carmen Hunter, individually, and D/B/A Chase Carmen Hunter

Insurance, and D/B/A Chase Financial Services, were not served with process

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in the underlying Florida state civil action, nor did they appear in the

Florida state action and an Order of Default was entered on December

7, 2010.

5. As a matter of Florida law; the Florida default judgment is void ab initio, as to

Chase Carmen Hunter, individually; D/B/A Chase Carmen Hunter Insurance;

and D/B/A Chase Financial Services, because none were served with process

in the case, as Florida law required.

6. Because the Florida state judgment is void ab initio, this court has no power to

docket it or enforce it under the Virginia Uniform Enforcement of Foreign

Judgments Act.

COUNT II

7. The documents in the underlying case are so fatally defective as to constitute

fraud.

8. Florida law states that any judgment obtained through fraud or duress is

void.

9. Because the Florida state judgment is void ab initio, this court has no power to

docket it or enforce it under the Virginia Uniform Enforcement of Foreign

Judgments Act.

COUNT III

10. To docket or enforce a foreign default judgment of nearly $10,000,000 raises

constitutional concerns of due process.

11. While the underlying Florida state court documents show that most of the

foreign judgment is for “compensatory damages”, there is no evidence of a trial

that was conducted to determine this amount.

12. Without such a trial, the amount is per se excessive and functionally punishing

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to Hunter. The United States Supreme Court has made clear that the due process

clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the state from imposing a grossly

excessive punishment.

COUNT IV

13. The court documents and the absence of court documents in the underlying

Florida state case are evidence of numerous significant violations of the

Fourteenth Amendment, Florida common law, Florida Statutes, and Florida

Rules of Civil Procedure.

14. Hunter was robbed of her Fourteenth Amendment right.

COUNT V

15. Hunter, if served, would have considered the option to move the matter to a

federal court.

16. She would have affirmatively asserted multiple defenses.

17. Hunter would have filed a countersuit.

18. But because Hunter was not served, she was robbed of her Fourteenth

Amendment right; and neither Hunter nor this Court will ever know if this

matter would have been non-suited, dismissed or otherwise disposed of in

Hunter’s favor.

WHEREFORE, Chase Carmen Hunter, individually, prays that this honorable

Court order that the docketing of the filed foreign judgment be set aside as to Chase

Carmen Hunter, individually; D/B/A Chase Carmen Hunter Insurance; and D/B/A

Chase Financial Services; that any attempt of the enforcement in Virginia of the filed

foreign judgment be stayed; that Chase Carmen Hunter, individually, be awarded

all costs in defending this action; and that this Court grant such other relief as it

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VIRGINIA:

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE CITY OF FREDERICKSBURG

LESTER KALMANSON AGENCY, INC } Plaintiff, }

} v. } Case No.: CL11-0358 } Judgment No.: 110000869 } CHASE CARMEN HUNTER, et al., } Defendant. }

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION AND AMENDED MOTION OF CHASE CARMEN HUNTER TO SET ASIDE JUDGMENT

COMES NOW Chase Carmen Hunter, pro se, pursuant to Virginia Supreme Court Rule 4:15(c), as amended, and files her memorandum in support in this case and states as follows:

FACTUAL BACKGROUND :: GENERAL

1. Chase Carmen Hunter (“Hunter”) is a Virginia resident and has never been a resident of

Florida.

2. The plaintiff is a Florida corporation.

3. The matter comes before this Court under the Virginia Uniform Enforcement of Foreign

Judgments Act (“VUEFJA”), Va. Code § § 8.01- 465.1 et seq.

4. The underlying Order of Default was entered on December 7, 2010. (Exhibit A)

5. The underlying Final Judgment (default) was entered on March 14, 2011. (Exhibit B)

6. Defendant’s Exhibit B is fatally defective on its face for many reasons. For the sake of

brevity, a discussion on this will be reserved unless a memorandum is requested by this

Court.

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7. The Affidavit of Attorney Fees and Costs was entered on March 29, 2011. (Exhibit C)

8. The underlying Summary Judgment was entered on April 12, 2011, by the “Circuit Court

for the Fifth Judicial Circuit in and for Orange County, Florida”.

9. The Fifth Judicial Circuit in Florida does not serve Orange County, Florida.

10. This foreign judgment was filed in this Court on or about June 7, 2011.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT OBTAINED BY FRAUD

ARGUMENT :: INTRINSICALLY AND EXTRINSICALLY FRAUDULENT AND

A FRAUD UPON THE COURT

11. The Summary Judgment, by definition, implies jurisdicational findings.

12. But upon further review, this Court will discover that the Summary Judgment is void for

lack of jurisdiction and was obtained by fraud.

13. Black's Law Dictionary (2007) defines fraud as:

“all multifarious means which human ingenuity can devise, and which are resorted to by one individual to get an advantage over another by false suggestions or suppression of the truth. It includes all surprise, trick, cunning or dissembling, and any unfair way by which another is cheated.”

14. This Court may inquire into the Florida court’s jurisdiction without offending the Full

Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution. Bloodworth v. Ellis, 221 Va.

18, 21-22 (1980).

15. Indeed, when it is alleged that a judgment was obtained by fraud or is otherwise void, a

Virginia court should so inquire. “[O]therwise a foreign judgment would bear greater

protection than a judgment obtained and docketed by a citizen of the Commonwealth.”

Johnson v. Neimela, 19 Cir L199813, 58 Va. Cir. 199 ¶ 8 (2002) (Wooldridge, J.)

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(citing Bloodworth). Moreover, a Virginia court may make such inquiry even when a

foreign court’s order or judgment contains recitation of jurisdictional findings (such as

the validity of service of process).

16. The Order of Default in the underlying Florida state case states that the defendants

did not appear and did not file any papers. Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule

1.500 (a). (Exhibit D contains all relevant rules)

17. This Final Judgment in the underlying Florida state case states the following:

The “Court finding that a Default was due and entered against the Defendants…after notice and the Defendants have failed to file any pleading or paper as required by law, and the Plaintiff having filed an Affidavit in Support of a Motion for Entry of Final Default Judgment…”

18. Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 1.500 (e) states that “final judgments after

default may be entered by the court at any time.”

19. Once an Order of Default and a Final Judgment are entered, the matter is no longer

within the court’s jurisdiction after 10 days have passed and no party can seek to

recover again upon that same claim in that same court. (Florida Rules of Civil

Procedure, Rule 1.530)

20. An Affidavit of Attorney Fees and Costs was entered March 29, 2011 (Florida Rules

of Civil Procedure, Rule 1.525)

21. This Affidavit of Attorney Fees and Costs shows the fees and costs in the

underlying Florida state action terminated in March 2011, before the Summary

Judgment was entered in April 2011.

22. This Summary Judgment was entered in violation of Florida Rules of Civil

Procedure 1.530. (www.FloridaBar.org)

23. This Affidavit of Attorney Fees and Costs states that the fees and costs arise from

“unfair and deceptive trade practices” against Hunter. See paragraph seven (7) of this

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Affidavit of Attorney Fees and Costs.

24. Florida’s Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (“FDUTPA”), Florida Statute

§§501.201 et seq., (2010), is consumer protection law.

25. The plaintiff was and is not a consumer of the defendant’s business.

26. Enforcement under FDUTPA is permitted only by an “enforcing authority”. Florida

Statute §§501.201 et seq. (2010)

27. The plaintiff had no enforcement authority over Hunter, a business competitor, under

the FDUTPA.

28. Section 501.202 et. seq. (“Purposes; rules of construction”) provides: The provisions of this part shall be construed liberally to promote the following policies:

(1) To simplify, clarify, and modernize the law governing consumer protection, unfair methods of competition, and unconscionable, deceptive, and unfair trade practices. (2)To protect the consuming public and legitimate business enterprises from those who engage in unfair methods of competition, or unconscionable, deceptive, or unfair acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce. (3)To make state consumer protection and enforcement consistent with established policies of federal law relating to consumer protection.

29. Section 501.211(2) (“Other individual remedies”) provides: “(2) In any action brought by a person who has suffered a loss as a result of a

violation of this part, such person may recover actual damages, plus attorneys’ fees . . . .”

30. Section 501.212 et. seq. (“Application”) provides: This part does not apply to:

“(3) A claim for personal injury or death or a claim for damage to property other than the property that is the subject of the consumer transaction.”

5

31. Clearly, damages under the FDUTPA require a business-to-consumer transaction and

are restricted to “actual damages” arising from a business-to-consumer transaction.

Florida Statute §§501.201 et seq. (2010)

32. The FDUTPA essentially adopts federal antitrust precedent, and it is relatively clear that

damages are measured by the amount of unlawful overcharge extracted from the

consumer. Florida Statute §§501.201 et seq. (2010)

33. Because there never existed a business-to-consumer transaction between the adverse

parties, no “actual damages” under FDUTPA can exist.

34. Section 501.212 et. seq. (“Application”) provides: This part does not apply to:

(4)Any person or activity regulated under laws administered by:

(a)The Office of Insurance Regulation of the Financial Services Commission;

Florida Statutes 2010 (http://www.leg.state.fl.us)

35. Section 501.212 et. seq. (“Application”) provides: This part does not apply to:

(1) An act or practice required or specifically permitted by federal or state law.

36. The adverse parties in this Florida state case are competitors in the insurance

industry and both are regulated under laws administered by The Office of Insurance

Regulation of the Financial Services Commission.

37. Florida Statute §§626.951 et. seq. sets forth the Florida insurance regulation regarding

unfair insurance trade practices.

38. The underlying dispute arose due to plaintiff’s objection to Hunter’s comparison

advertising which is permitted by the United States Constitution and federal law and

6

protected by federal anti-trust laws. (Exhibit E, part 1)

39. One real-life comparison was posted on the internet. It revealed that Hunter sold an

insurance policy to a Texas resident for about $300 and within the same week, the

plaintiff later sold the same consumer a policy with substantially less coverage for

about $2000. (The reason the consumer bought two policies within the same week

essentially arose from her inability to fully understand English and external duress.)

40. In fact, the plaintiff filed about ten (10) complaints against Hunter with various state

insurance regulators in 2009 and 2010. (Exhibit E, part 1)

41. These complaintes caused about twelve (12) investigations by insurance regulators into

Hunter’s insurance business in 2009 and 2010 and no investigation resulted in any

action, discipline, warning, penalty, or fine against Hunter.

42. But when the insurance regulators took no action against Hunter, the plaintiff had no

standing to pursue Hunter under FDUTPA.

43. This Summary Judgment entered for nearly $10,000,000 is instrinsically and

extrinsically fraudulent and a fraud upon the Florida court and this Court for these

foregoing reasons and as further stated below.

44. Florida Law is consistent with the United States Supreme Court which has made clear that

the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits any judgment for damages

being imposed without first conducting a trial so that the amount of damages can be

determined.

45. There was no trial in this underlying Florida state case.

46. A court document in the Florida state case was filed in the Lake County court on

February 26, 2010. (Plaintiff’s Exhibit B).

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47. A court document in this same Florida state case was filed in the Orange County court

on February 3, 2010. (Exhibit E, part 2)

48. Defendant’s Exhibit E, part 2, is fatally defective on its face for many reasons. For the

sake of brevity, a discussion on this will be reserved unless this Court requests a

memorandum.

49. It appears that the underlying Florida state case was ongoing simultaneously in two

separate Florida county courts.

50. Plaintiff’s Exhibit A reads as if the underlying Florida state matter is a divorce

proceeding.

51. Hunter has had no marital ties with the plaintiff.

ALL COURT ORDERS WERE OBTAINED BY FRAUD

ARGUMENT :: NO SERVICE OF PROCESS

IN REFERENCE TO CHASE CARMEN HUNTER ONLY

52. An Order of Default and Final Judgment of default were entered in the Florida state

case.

53. Hunter relies upon Va. Code §§ 8.01-428(A)(i) and (ii), as amended, in her defense of this

default judgment.

54. As further detailed below, Chase Carmen Hunter, individually was not served with

process in the underlying Florida state action.

55. By Florida law, the underlying Florida Final Judgment of default is therefore void.

56. Va. Code § 8.01-428(A)(ii) provides that a void judgment may be set aside at any time, and

this provision comprises foreign judgments docketed under the UEFJA. See Lifestar

8

Response of Maryland v. Vogosen, 267 Va. 720, 725 (Va. 2004); Johnson v.

Neimela, 19. Cir. L199813, 58 Va. Cir. 199 ¶ 7 (2002) (Wooldridge, J.); Empire

Beauty School v. Bell, 13 Cir. CV54OI, 58 Va. Cir. 32 (2001).

57. Due process requires that proper service be effected upon a defendant in order for a court to

have personal jurisdiction over him. Moreover, under Florida law, strict compliance with

service of process procedures is required. Boatfloat, LLC v. Central Transport

International, Inc., 941 So.2d 1271, 1273 (Fla 4th DCA 2006).

58. The Florida courts have held that the requirements “that govern service of process are to

be strictly construed to insure that a defendant receives notice of the proceedings….[T]he

burden of proving the validity of the service of process is on the plaintiff.” Anthony v.

Gary J. Rotella & Associates, P.A., 906 So.2d 1205, 1207 (Fla. 4th Dist. App. 2005),

quoting Carter v. Lil’ Joe Records, 829 So.2d 953 (Fla. 4th Dist. App 2002). “Absent strict

compliance with the statutes governing service of process, the court lacks personal

jurisdiction over the defendant.” Anthony v. Gary J. Rotella & Associates, P.A., 906

So.2d 1205, 1207 (Fla. 4th Dist. App. 2005), quoting Sierra Holding v. Inn Keepers

Supply, 464 So.2d 652 (Fla 4th Dist. App. 1985).

59. Florida’s laws regarding service of process are well-established and the Affidavit of

Service, (plaintiff’s Exhibit A) on its face, is legally defective for several reasons.

60. The plaintiff committed a fraud upon the Florida court when it relied upon the legally

defective Affidavit of Service to pursue the underlying Florida state case against

defendants who had never been served with process.

FIRST LEGAL DEFECT

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61. The Affidavit of Service repeatedly uses the word “we”.

62. This affidavit is a statement about what the affiant believes to be someone else’s

knowledge of events and fails to contain key elements of first-hand knowledge.

63. This affidavit of service does not contain facts sufficient to meet the legal

definition of an affidavit as described above in State v. Johnson 553 So.2d 730,

733 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989) and Youngker v. State, 215 So.2d 318, 321.

SECOND LEGAL DEFECT

64. It is notarized by Theresa C. Abel on June 25, 2010. Her commission had

been expired for nearly five (5) months as of the date shown of this

affidavit which is “1/31/2010”

65. Florida law holds that if the return is defective on its face, it cannot be relied upon as

evidence that the service of process was valid. Re-employment Servs., Ltd. v. National

Loan Acquisitions Co., 969 So. 2d 467 (5th DCA 2007), citing Klosenski, 116 So. 2d at

769; and Gonzalez v. Totalbank, 472 So. 2d 861 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985). When there is an

error or omission in the return of service, personal jurisdiction is suspended and it “lies

dormant” until proper proof of valid service is submitted. Klosenski, 116 So. 2d at 769;

Schneiderman, 546 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989); Tetley v. Lett, 462 So. 2d 1126,

1127 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984).

THIRD LEGAL DEFECT

66. In Florida, one of the applicable statutory provisions that govern return of service are

found in section 48.21, which specifically provides:

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Each person who effects service of process shall note on a return-of-service form attached thereto, the date and time when it comes to hand, the date and time when it is served, the manner of service, the name of the person on whom it was served and, if the person is served in a representative capacity, the position occupied by the person. A failure to state the foregoing facts invalidates the service, but the return is amendable to state the truth at any time on application to the court from which the process issued. On amendment, service is as effective as if the return had originally stated the omitted facts. A failure to state all the facts in the return shall subject the person effecting service to a fine not exceeding $10, in the court’s discretion.

§ 48.21, Fla. Stat. (2010). (www.leg.state.fl.us/statutes, 2010).

67. The Affidavit of Service (plaintiff’s Exhibit A) does not comply with section 48.21 of

Florida Statutes because it failed to state the date and time when it came to hand.

68. In Florida, the standard for personal service upon an individual defendant outside of the

State of Florida is set forth in Fla. Stats. § 48.194(1) which requires such service to be

made “in the same manner s service within this state by any officer authorized to

serve process in the state where the person is served.”

FOURTH LEGAL DEFECT

69. Further, Fla. Stats. § 48.031, which provides, in part:

Service of original process is made by delivering a copy of it to the person to be served with a copy of the complaint, petition, or other initial pleading or paper by leaving the copies at his or her usual place of abode….

Fla. Stats. § 48.031(1)(a) (www.leg.state.fl.us/statutes, 2010).

70. As is stated on the face of the Affidavit of Service (plaintiff’s Exhibit A), rather than

delivering service to “the person to be served”, the papers were put under a windshield

wiper blade of a motor vehicle at an unstated address known only as “McDonald’s parking

lot”. The affiant states that he did not believe that this “McDonald’s parking lot” was

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Hunter’s usual place of abode.

FIFTH LEGAL DEFECT

71. The Affidavit of Service appears to reflect an alleged service of process date that exceeds

the apparent 120-day time limit for returning service. (Florida Rule of Civil Procedure

1.070 (j), www.FloridaBar.org) (Exhibit D)

72. Plaintiff’s Exhibit B indicates that service of process was first attempted on December 11,

2009.

73. There is no evidence that the plaintiff in this Florida state action complied with Florida

Rule of Civil Procedure 1.070 (j)

74. As a matter of Florida law, the Florida default judgment is void ab initio as to all parties

named in that legally defective Affidavit of Service since none were served with process in

the case, as Florida law required. See Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b)(4) See

Dep’t of Transp. V Bailey, 603 So2d 1384, 1386-87 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) (“If it is

determined that the judgment entered is void, the trial court has no discretion, but is

obligated to vacate the judgment.”); Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC v Gonzelez No

3D06-1489 FastCase (Fla. 3d DCA 3/8/2007) (“Process left with defendant’s mother

quashed when defendant had not lived at service address for five years; not ‘usual place of

abode’; actual receipt of summons did not cure defect.”)

75. The Court’s attention is also directed to Boatfloat, LLC. V. Central Transport

International, Inc. 941 So.2d 1271 (Fla 4th DCA 2006), which contains extensive analyses

of various Fla. Stats. § 48.031 (1)(a) service-of-process cases. The District Court of

Appeals noted in Boatfloat, LLC that “[S]trict compliance with service of process

12

procedures is required.” 941 So. 2d at 1273 (citations omitted): and that the burden of

proof of valid services is on the party invoking the court’s jurisdiction. Id.

76. If the default judment is void, then all court orders, including the subsequent Summary

Judgment, must also be void.

77. The Florida default judgment is void ab initio and Virginia law permits this Court to set it

aside and to set aside the subsequent, fraudulently-obtained Summary Judgment.

ARGUMENT :: NO SERVICE OF PROCESS

IN REFERENCE TO THE THREE ADDITIONAL DEFENDANTS SHOWN ON THE

NOTICE OF FILING, ORDER OF DEFAULT, AND/OR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

78. As further detailed below D/B/A Chase Carmen Hunter Insurance, D/B/A Chase

Financial Services, and D/B/A Chase Financial Services, a Florida corporation, were

not served with process in the underlying Florida state action.

79. “D/B/A Chase Carmen Hunter Insurance” is non-existent.

80. “D/B/A Chase Financial Services” is not shown on the Order of Default, Final Judgment

of default, or the Summary Judgment. It is shown only on the Notice of Filing.

81. The underlying Florida state Order of Default, Final Judgment, and Summary Judgment

are against “D/B/A Chase Financial Services, a Florida corporation”

82. “D/B/A Chase Financial Services” is non-existent in Virginia and “D/B/A Chase

Financial Services, a Florida corporation” is non-existent. (Exhibits F & G)

83. By falsely naming a non-existent “Florida corporation” as one defendant, the plaintiff

fraudulently circumvented Florida’s Long Arm Statute § 48.193 which would have given

13

the Florida trial court good cause to short-circuit this underlying Florida state case.

84. The plaintiff admits that Hunter’s only tie to Florida is via a website and this website is

the sole focus of the plaintiff’s complaint against Hunter. (Exhibits B & E)

85. In determining whether personal jurisdiction over a non-resident of Florida is offensive to

due process as guaranteed by the United States Constitution, a "minimum contacts" test is

used. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).

86. Under International Shoe, personal jurisdiction may exist only if the court determines that

the defendant has "sufficient minimum contacts" with the forum state such that

"maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial

justice." Id.

87. Due to plaintiff’s fraudulent use of “a Florida corporation,” the Florida trial court was

misled to believe that there was no question of personal jurisdiction.

88. Florida public records show one active D/B/A registered for “Chase Financial Services”

a. Document ID G08077900259; owner named Colon, of Sunrise, Florida (Exhibit H)

89. The Affidavit of Service (Plaintiff’s Exhibit A) in the underlying Florida state case does

not reflect service of process having been made upon this D/B/A located in Sunrise,

Florida.

90. As further detailed above, because the Affidavit of Service is so fatally defective, any

defendant named on it, whether in existence or not, was not served with process in the

underlying Florida state action.

ARGUMENT :: FRAUD, DURESS, AND WRONGFUL ACTS IN ALLEGED

SERVICE OF PROCESS

14

91. Florida law states that any service of process, effected by fraud or duress is

defective and any judgment obtained through such fraud or duress is void.

Wyman v. Newhouse, 93 F.2d 313 (2d Cir. 1937).

FIRST ACT: FRAUD, DURESS, WRONGFUL

92. The Affidavit of Service depicts the affiant as one who fraudulently disguised

himself as a police officer conducting a traffic stop. He detained the occupants of

a motor vehicle without suspicion of criminal activity or violations of law.

93. This meets the definition of “fraud” and the definition of “duress”.

94. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “duress” as follows:

“duress. Any unlawful threat or coercion used by a person to induce another to act (or to refrain from acting) in a manner he or she otherwise would not (or would). Subjecting person to improper pressure which overcomes his will and coerces him to comply with the demand to which he would not yield if acting as free agent. Head v Gadsden Civil Service Bd., Ala.Civ.App., 389 So. 2d 516, 519. Application of such pressure or constraint as compels man to go against his will and takes away his free agency, destroying power of refusing to comply with unjust demands of another. Haumont v. Security State Bank, 220 Neb. 809, 374 N.W. 2d 2,6”

95. “Under the modern view, any wrongful threat which actually puts the

victim in such fear as to compel him to act against his will constitutes

duress.” Gallon v Lloyd-Thomas Co (CA8 Mo) 264 F2d 821, 2 FR Serv 2d

231, 77 ALR2d 417 (fear of deportation) Rizzi v Fanelli (Mun Ct App Dist

Col) 63 A2d 872; Fox v. Piercey, 119 Utah 367, 227 p2d 763. [American

Jurisprudence 2d, Duress and Undue Influence, Section 13]

15

SECOND ACT: DURESS AND WRONGFUL

96. The Affidavit of Service depicts the affiant as one who boldly violated the Fourth

Amendment and the Florida Constitution to allegedly effect service of process.

97. The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

98. Article I Section 12 of the Florida Constitution states the following:

“Searches and seizures.—The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, and against the unreasonable interception of private communications by any means, shall not be violated. No warrant shall be issued except upon probable cause, supported by affidavit, particularly describing the place or places to be searched, the person or persons, thing or things to be seized, the communication to be intercepted, and the nature of evidence to be obtained. This right shall be construed in conformity with the 4th Amendment to the United States Constitution, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court. Articles or information obtained in violation of this right shall not be admissible in evidence if such articles or information would be inadmissible under decisions of the United States Supreme Court construing the 4th Amendment to the United States Constitution. History.—Am. H.J.R. 31-H, 1982; adopted 1982.”

99. This affidavit of service contains statements outlining the unlawfully seizure

within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment in which “stopping an automobile and

detaining its occupants constitute a ‘seizure’ within the meaning of [the Fourth]

Amendment[].” Delaware v. Prouse 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979) “If a police officer has

16

reasonable, articulable suspicion that a person is engaging in, or is about to engage in,

criminal activity, the officer may detain the suspect to conduct a brief investigation

without violating the person’s Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable

searches and seizures.” McGee, 25 Va App. At 202, 487 S.E. 2d at 263.

100. The affiant made no statement that he suspected any criminal activity or

traffic or equipment regulation violations.

THIRD ACT: DURESS AND WRONGFUL

101. Further, given that this was a traffic stop in Virginia, Virginia Codes §§ 15.2-

1704 and 15.2–1726, as amended, apply and hold that this affiant had not

authority to conduct a traffic stop even if he had a reasonable suspicion of

criminal activity or a violation of law because he is not a police officer.

102. This Affidavit of Service contains no statement regarding probable

cause or a search warrant obtained.

103. This Affidavit of Service is legally defective on its face because it

boasts of allegedly effecting service of process as a result of violating these

constitutional protections and meets the definition of duress.

FOURTH ACT: DURESS AND WRONGFUL

104. The Affidavit of Service describes a continuum of violations of

constitutional rights and false arrest of the passengers of this subject motor

vehicle by yelling, “DON’T MOVE THE CAR.” when there was no valid reason

to give this command. The operator of the motor vehicle quickly put the gear in

1

VIRGINIA:

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE CITY OF FREDERICKSBURG

LESTER KALMANSON AGENCY, INC } Plaintiff, }

} v. } Case No. CL11-0358 } Judgment No.:110000869 } CHASE CARMEN HUNTER, et al., } Defendant. }

DEFENDANT’S REPLY TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO STRIKE AND OPPOSITION

TO AMENDED MOTION TO SET ASIDE

COMES NOW Chase Carmen Hunter, pro se, pursuant to Virginia Supreme Court Rule 4:15(c), as amended, and in response to the plaintiff’s Memorandum of Motion To Strike and Opposition To Amended Motion of Chase Carmen Hunter to Set Aside Judgment (“Motion to Strike and Opposition”) in this case and states as follows:

1. Hunter opposes the Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike and Opposition in its entirely.

2. Hunter’s Motion and Amended Motion of Chase Carmen Hunter To Set Aside Judgment

constitute a collateral attack on the Foreign Judgment. Wyman v. Newhouse, 93 F.2d 313

(2d Cir. 1937).

3. This Virginia Court relies, in part, upon the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United

States Constitution in considering whether or not to set aside this Foreign Judgment.

4. If the first state did not have jurisdiction, well-established Virginia law and the Fourteenth

Amendment of the United States Constituion prohibit a sister state’s foreign judgment

from being enforced.

5. If a judgment is void at the place of rendition, it is also void where it is sought to be

enforced. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Vhaley, 173 Va. 11, 3 S.E. 3d 395 (1939) See also

Washington v. Anderson, 236 Va 316, 373 S.E. 2d 712 (1988).

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6. Jurisdiction can be disproved by extrinsic evidence or the record itself. Orchard

Management Co. v Soto, 250 Va. 343, 350-51, 463 S.E.2d 839, 843 (1995).

7. The jurisdictional question can be collaterally attacked when the original judgment

entered against the defendant was entered by a court that did not have personal

jurisdiction over the defendant. Wyman v. Newhouse, 93 F.2d 313 (2d Cir. 1937).

8. A much less doubtful case involving a Florida foreign judgment was recently decided in

Virginia in favor of the defendant. Jose Gosp, et. al. v. Joseph C. McAuliff, Jr. CL2008-

6665 in the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit of Virginia, Fairfax County. (Exhibit A)

9. In Gosp v. McAuliff Jr. service of process was alleged to have been effected when the

process server dropped the papers at McAuliff’s son’s feet.

10. Since this did not comply with Florida laws regarding service of process, the court found

in favor of McAuliff, Jr.

11. The overwhelming facts in the matter before this court prove that the underlying Florida

case is void ab initio.

12. Florida law makes no distinction in the setting aside of judgments; default, summary or

otherwise; when a judgment is obtained by fraud or is void as set forth in Florida Rule

of Civil Procedure 1.540 (b). (www.FloridaBar.org) (Exhibit B)

13. Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540 (d) (3) states that a court may relieve a party’s

legal representaive from a final judgment for the following reasons:

“fraud (whether heretofore denominted intrinsic or extrnisc),

misrepresentation, or other midconduct of an adverse party.”

This rule allows a motion for relief under this provision to be filed within one (1) year

after the judgment was entered. (www.FloridaBar.org) (Exhibit B)

14. This rule further states:

“[t]his rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent

action to relieve a party from a judgment, decree, order, or proceding to set

aside a judgment or decree for fraud upon the court.” (www.FloridaBar.org)

(Exhibit B)

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15. Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540 (d) (4) states that a court may relieve a party’s

legal representative from a final judgment for the following reasons: “that a judgment or

decree is void”. There is no time limit under this provision. (www.FloridaBar.org)

(Exhibit B)

16. Therefore, if the underlying Florida court allows for the setting aside of “a final

judgment” for fraud, fraud upon the court, and/or because the judgment is void, this

Virginia Court will not offend the Full Faith and Credit clause of the United States

Constitution if it inquires into allegations alleging the same.

17. Indeed, when it is alleged that a judgment was obtained by fraud or is otherwise void, a

Virginia court should so inquire into the allegation. “[O]therwise a foreign judgment

would bear greater protection than a judgment obtained and docketed by a citizen of the

Commonwealth,” Johnson v. Neimela, 19 Cir L199813, 58 Va. Cir. 199 ¶ 8 (2002)

(Wooldridge, J.) (citing Bloodworth), and otherwise, a defendant’s Fourteenth

Amendment right to due process would be foresaken.

DEFENDANT’S REPLY TO PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSTION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION

TO SET ASIDE JUDGMENT

18. Relitigation of the merits of the underlying case is precluded by the Full Faith and

Credit Clause, res judicata and estoppel. United States Constitution Article IV, Section

19. An erroneous judgment may be attacked collaterally. Wyman v. Newhouse, 93 F.2d

313 (2d Cir. 1937).

20. Regarding plaintiff’s argument related to an appeal of the Florida action: since a

judgment entered by a court without jurisdiction is not entitled to Full Faith and Credit

under the Constitution, a defendant may elect to disregard the first litigation and save

the attack for the time of enforcement. Pennoyer v. Neff 95 U.S. 714 (1877)

21. Hunter is not required to appeal the Florida state case as a prerequisite to asserting her

rights afforded by the United States Constitution and the Commonwealth of Virginia.

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22. Paragraph seven (7) of plaintiff’s Opposition To Motion To Set Aside Judgment and all

content related to “evasion of service” are irrelevant since establishing whether or not a

person tried to evade service and “a waiver has occurred in any give situation is

generally a question of fact.” Hill v. Ray Carter Auto Sales, 745 So.2d 1136, 1138 (Fla.

1st DCA 1999).

23. “Res judicata prohibits relitigation of the same cause of action, or any part thereof

which could have been litigated between the same parties and their privies.” Bill

Greever Corp. v. Tazewell Nat’l Bank, 256 Va. 250, 504 S.E. 2d 854 (1998); See also

Scales v. Lewis, 261 Va. 379, 541 S.E. 2d 899 (2001).

24. No facts regarding “evasion of service” were established in the underlying Florida state

case.

25. No facts in the underlying Florida state case established that Hunter waived her right to

service of process.

26. Plaintiff’s exhibit A contradicts plaintiff’s assertion that it believed that Hunter

waived her right to service.

27. The plaintiff uses Anthony v. Rotella to fake support for its position that Hunter waived

her right to personal service as a result of her alleged attempt to evade service. Anthony

v. Gary J. Rotella & Associates, P.A. 906 So.2d 1205, 1208 (2005).

28. The only question before the court in Anthony v. Rotella was whether or not the

defendant had waived his right to be served personally only because an employee

accepted service on behalf of the defendant. Id.

29. The court held that the defendant had not waived his right to be served personally.

30. Any reference the plaintiff makes to Virginia laws regarding personal service is

irrelevant to this Florida Foreign Judgment. The matter before this Court is a question of

Florida jurisdiction only.

31. Paragraphs ten (10) and twelve (12) are false and constitute a fraud upon this court.

32. Plaintiff’s exhibit C is not a pleading, as is evident on its face.

33. The Order of Default and Final Judgment in the underlying Florida state case are dated

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after the date shown on plaintiff’s exhibit C and they state that Hunter filed no papers in

the case. (Exhibits C & D)

34. Paragraph thirteen (13) states, in part, that “the underlying judgment was not a default

judgment but rather a summary judgment”. This is a false statement and Virginia Code

§ 8.01 – 428(A), et. seq., as amended, applies.

35. But if paragraph thirteen (13) contained only true statements, Florida law states that “a

final judgment” for fraud, fraud upon the court, and/or because the judgment is void,

shall be set aside. Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540 et. seq. (www.FloridaBar.org)

(Exhibit B)

36. Therefore, this Virginia Court may apply this Florida law to this underlying Florida

Foreign Judgment without offending the Full Faith and Credit Clause.

37. While Virginia Code § 8.01 – 428(A), et. seq., as amended, applies to “default

judgments,” it specifically permits a Virginia Court to set aside a judgment that is void

and/or obtained by fraud.

38. It is reasonable to assert that when the general assembly drafted Virginia Code § 8.01 –

428(A), et. seq., as amended, it had not contemplated the possibility that a foreign

“summary judgment” could be collaterally attacked for jurisdicational findings only

because, by definition, a summary judgment, if not obtained by fraud, is possible only

when a defendant is under the jurisdiction of the foreign court.

39. Virginia Code § 8.01 – 428(A), et. seq., as amended, is unequivocal in its intent which

is that foreign judgments that are void or obtained by fraud shall be set aside.

40. Virginia Code § 8.01 – 271.1, as amended, states: every pleading, written motion, and other paper of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in his individual name……. The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by him that (i) he has read the pleading, motion, or other paper, (ii) to the best of his knowledge, information and belief, formed after reasonable inquiry, it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and (iii) it is not interposed for any