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Toward the End of Force Projection?I. The Anti-Access Threat

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Corentin Brustlein

July 2011

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FFooccuuss ssttrraattéé ii uuee nn°° 2200 b b i i s s

Laboratoirede Recherchesur la Défense



The Institut français des relations internationales (Ifri) is a research center anda forum for debate on major international political and economic issues.Headed by Thierry de Montbrial since its founding in 1979, Ifri is a non-governmental, non-profit organization.

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“Focus stratégique”

Resolving today’s security problems requires an integrated approach.Analysis must be cross-cutting and consider the regional and globaldimensions of problems, their technological and military aspects, as well astheir media linkages and broader human consequences. It must also striveto understand the far reaching and complex dynamics of militarytransformation, international terrorism or post-conflict stabilization. Through

the “Focus stratégique” series Ifri’s Security Studies Center aims to do so,offering new perspectives on the major international security issues in theworld today.

Bringing together researchers from the Security Studies Center andoutside experts, the “Focus stratégique” alternates general works with themore specialized analysis carried out by the team of the Defense ResearchUnit (LRD or Laboratoire de Recherche sur la Défense ).

The author

Corentin Brustlein is a research fellow in Ifri’s Defense Research Unit. He isalso the deputy editor the Proliferation Papers , and blogs at Ultima Ratio.

Editorial Board

Editor: Etienne de Durand

Deputy-Editor: Marc Hecker

Translator: Alice Pannier

Editorial assistant: Marie-Charlotte Henrion

How to quote this article

Corentin Brustlein, “Toward the End of Force Projection? I. The Anti-Access Threat”, Focus stratégique , No. 20 bis , July 2011.

This text was previously published in French as “Vers la fin de la projectionde forces ? I. La menace du déni d'accès”, Focus stratégique , no. 20, April2010.

This article is the first of a two-volume study on the anti-access threat and

Western armed forces. The second part will be published in September 2011

in the Focus stratégique series.

http://ultimaratio-blog.org/






Table of Contents

Introduction _____________________________________________ 7 Force Projection and the Anti-Access Threat ________________ 11

Inherent Weaknesses ______________________________ 11 Access and Anti-Access: From Past to Present ________ 14 Lifecycle of the ‘Anti-Access’ Concept ________________ 15

Countering Force Projection Operations ____________________ 19 A Growing Diffusion of Advanced Technologies _______ 19

Iranian Anti-Access Strategy and Capabilities _________ 25



Abstract

Force projection has become a general posture and a fundamentaldimension of the influence Western powers intend to exert over the worldby means of their armed forces. However, for the last fifteen years,Western states’ adoption of expeditionary postures has encouraged theproliferation of certain technologies. The latter favor strategies based onnaval and air interdiction, and threaten to render foreign interventions too

costly. This article thus seeks to provide some clues for understanding andassessing the threat anti-access strategies pose to Western, and especiallyEuropean, force projection capabilities. In order to illustrate in a concreteway the potential problems regional adversaries can pose, this article willfocus on assessing the Iranian anti-access threat.



Introduction

orce projection capacity has historically been a criterion distinguishinggreat powers from other states. Most countries are able to use force to

maintain internal order or defend their borders, but very few have thepossibility to impose their will on their adversary by resorting to forceseveral thousand kilometers away from their national territory. Therefore,the “command of the commons” – oceans, air, and space – by certain

states used to be a unique feature in the confrontations between greatpowers.1

Once the long parenthesis of the two World Wars was closed, theWest became, again, the main beneficiary of the command of thecommons, and took advantage of this asset to carry out a number of armedinterventions. Due to the protection offered by nuclear deterrence since1945 and the absence of territorial threats after 1990, Western countrieshave moved from a logic of total war to one of limited war. As a

consequence, they have developed power-projection capabilities and theirarmed forces have focused on quality rather than quantity. Someoperations that occurred during and after the Cold War, such as the Suezcrisis, the takeover of the Falklands or the Gulf War, exemplify thisdevelopment. More than a specific type of military operation, forceprojection has become a general posture and a fundamental dimension ofthe influence that great powers, in this instance the West, intend to exertover the world by means of their armed forces.

As was proved by the two World Wars, securing and exploitingthe command of seas and air was likely to have a decisive impact on theoutcomes of land campaigns and wars in general.

Yet, this situation could experience a historical reversal. For the past15 years, a growing number of experts have observed that Western states’adoption of expeditionary postures has encouraged the proliferation of

certain technologies. The latter favor strategies based on naval and airinterdiction, and threaten to render foreign interventions too costly.2

1

Barry R. Posen, “Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S.Hegemony”, International Security , Vol. 28, No. 1, Summer 2003, pp. 5-46.

Thus,systems such as submarines, naval mines, cruise and ballistic missiles,and surface-to-air missiles (SAM) are at the heart of a complex problemposed to most Western military operations. The anti-access threat becamean issue in the United States following Operation Desert Storm and in themidst of a debate on the future of the US armed forces. However, this issue

2Anti-access strategies do not include piracy, which is less a strategy aimed at

weakening the enemy’s forces than a criminal practice targeted against trade andtourist activities.

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has seldom been studied in France, with a few exceptions.3

In the United States, the issue of anti-access emerged in the 1990s,but only after the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and DonaldRumsfeld’s military transformation plans did it get a tangible impact on USdefense policy. The topic was subsequently put on the back burner by theUS administration while it was grappling with insurgencies in Iraq andAfghanistan, but reappeared in American debates over the last few years.Obviously, this renewal is not fortuitous. It is rather a side effect of thestrategic debate initiated around two questions: defining the futureorientations of the American defense apparatus, and striking the rightbalance between preparing for future conflicts and supporting current

operations. The United States, as the dominating military player today andas an insular power, is the first to be concerned by the severe military andpolitical challenges facing force projection.

Unsurprisingly,the most far-reaching studies on this topic do not look at the threat facingFrance and Europe, nor do they assess those countries’ ability to counterthis threat. One of the aims of this study is thus to provide the first elementsof an assessment of the anti-access threat to Western forces as a whole.

4

Such an evolution looming over the world’s first military power isnecessarily problematic for France. Although it does not claim to be anenforcer of the international order, France has set ambitious targets foritself through its White Paper on Defense and National Security (Livre blanc sur la défense et la sécurité nationale , LBDSN), namely:

“France will possess the skills inherent in the critical phases of a major

operation, whether at the launch phase, i.e. for its forces to have“force entry” capability, or during the transition from a coerciveoperation to a stabilization operation, then to one of peaceconsolidation”.

5

French military power is thus directly concerned by the emergenceof anti-access capabilities. This is all the more true as the constraineddefense budgets of middle-sized powers require an even more carefulbalance between their capacity for build-up and the capabilities needed for

3 See for instance Etienne de Durand, L’Amérique et l’Alliance , Paris, Notes de

l’Ifri, No. 23, 2001, pp. 43-44; Bruno Gruselle, Missiles de croisière et stratégies d’anti-accès , Paris, Fondation pour la recherche stratégique, 2006; LaurentMurawiec, La guerre au XXI

e siècle , Paris, Odile Jacob, 2000, pp. 11-12. For a

history of the concept, see Roger Cliff et al ., Entering the Dragon’s Lair: Chinese Antiaccess Strategies and Their Implications for the United States , Santa Monica,RAND Corporation, 2007, pp. 3-11.4 Among most recent documents illustrating this American concern, see theQuadrennial Defense Review Report , 2010, pp. 31-34; John T. Bennett, “PentagonCrafting Anti-Access Concept”, Defense News , 25 January 2010, p. 3; Andrew F.Krepinevich, Why AirSea Battle? , Washington, Center for Strategic and BudgetaryAssessments, 2010; Abraham M. Denmark and James Mulvenon (eds.), Contested Commons: The Future of American Power in a Multipolar World , Washington,Center for a New American Security, 2010.5

The French White Paper on Defense and National Security , Paris, Odile Jacob – La documentation française, 2008, p. 202.




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irregular warfare. For this reason, it becomes particularly difficult tomaintain some specific know-how, for instance in the field of minecountermeasures.

This article thus seeks to provide some clues for understanding andassessing the threat anti-access strategies pose to Western, and especiallyEuropean, force projection capabilities. To that end, two weaknesses of theUS debate must be underlined and rectified: the first one is the recurringtendency to evaluate the threat only on the basis of the adversary’s anti-access capabilities, without taking into account forcible entry capabilities;the second is the fact that although it plays an essential part, the politicaldimension of this issue has more often than not been overlooked.

This study is comprised of two parts, published separately: the firstone – which is the focus of the present article – intends to present the

relationships between anti-access and force projection postures, and looksat the various existing anti-access capabilities and strategies. The secondpart, published in another issue of the Focus stratégique series, seeks toset the issue of anti-access back in its strategic dimension, by taking intoaccount potential responses to this threat (“forcible entry capabilities”), andby reasserting the paramount nature of the political dimension of theproblem.

Understanding and assessing the threat posed by anti-accessassets and postures first requires looking at force projection as a central but fragile element of Western states’ strategic postures . This fragility iscompounded by modus operandi and capabilities pertaining to anti-access

that seek to prevent or disrupt force projection operations throughharassment and interdiction. Even though anti-access is a fundamentallystrategic issue, understanding it requires being cognizant of its operational and technical dimensions , as this type of posture often relies on thediffusion of certain key technologies.

In order to illustrate in a concrete way the potential problems thatregional adversaries can pose to Western states, and especially to Europe,and whereas most analyses on this theme have been devoted to Chinesecapabilities and approaches, this article will focus on assessing the Iraniananti-access threat.



Force Projectionand the Anti-Access Threat

n anti-access strategy is first and foremost a defensive strategy. Usingmilitary and political means, it aims to disrupt or prevent – or even

discourage, when it entails a deterrent dimension – a force projectionoperation. As such, anti-access capabilities would not be, in themselves, a

threat to Western countries, were their strategic postures not depending onforeign interventions justified by overseas security interests. Such posturesare, by their very nature, complex and vulnerable. It would thus be wrong tothink that the issue of anti-access emerged as a result of post-Cold Wartrends. The issue burst into the strategic debate during this period, but theconcept conveys older operational and strategic realities.

Inherent Weaknesses

Force projection is the capacity of a state to employ land, air and navalunits in a distant theater of operations. To do this requires a range ofspecific equipment and know-how in order to gather, move over several

thousand kilometers and reorganize units representing hundreds ofthousands of tons of materiel and thousands of individuals – sometimes inemergency situations. The expeditionary posture adopted by presentWestern armies implies extremely complex missions of projection and, as aconsequence, suffers from a number of significant inherent weaknessesand vulnerabilities.

These weaknesses are twofold: on the one hand, there are physicalvulnerabilities within the logistical system of force projection missions and,on the other hand, the strategic vulnerabilities that characterize theseoperations and foreign interventions in general.

The physical characteristics of force projection operations tend tocreate a significant number of vulnerabilities. The required naval and airmaneuvers follow a course whose predictability, clumsiness and slownesshave been observed and criticized in the past. 6

6

For an overview of the logistical complexity of force projection operations, seeMichael E. O’Hanlon, The Science of War. Defense Budgeting, Military

Technology, Logistics, and Combat Outcomes , Princeton, Princeton UniversityPress, 2009, pp. 141-168.

Sea shipping is the onlyway to transport the volume of materiel necessary to carry out largeoperations, but it is vulnerable – to varying degrees – all along the journeytoward a distant area. Depending on the territory where the assembly

A




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points are located, they can be subjected to terrorist attacks,7

As far as the journey is concerned, there is a risk of harassment bysmall boats (potentially loaded with explosives and maneuvered byterrorists), submarines, aircraft and anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM), aswell as naval minefields. The convoy is even more vulnerable when itcrosses chokepoints (such as the Suez and Panama canals, or the straitsof Hormuz, Malacca, Gibraltar and Bab-el-Mandeb), the surroundings ofwhich cannot be perfectly controlled. The narrower the waterway, theshorter the range needed to strike the convoy, thus providing a widerchoice of possible hostile actions.

or meredemonstrations which could hamper planning and embarkation. Cyberattacks can also target logistical information management systemsessential to reduce the equipment’s deployment and employment time .

Finally, the debarkation and landing points and gathering areas,whence the forces are brought together into the theater of operations, areoften located in less controllable and more exposed environments, be itonly due to the adversary’s increased proximity. Facilities located in thesezones can be the target of acts of sabotage or terrorism, ballistic missilestrikes or long-range artillery firing, all kinds of means paving the way forblackmail attempts toward the host state.8

A ground intervention intended to defend or liberate an allied

country requires constituting a deployment base. To do so requires thatadequate seaports, airfields and land facilities are made available.

Strategic airlift is, as a whole,less vulnerable to attacks perpetrated during the transfer, but the departureand arrival runways remain exposed to bomb attacks, special operationsforces, cyber attacks, MANPADS, etc.

9

More generally, many of the difficulties facing force projection

postures result directly from the offensive nature of this type of operation.Preparing or engaging in a distant conflict implies waging offensive warfareat the operational or strategic level. Offensive is the only way for thebelligerent to impose its will on an adversary, but it is, by nature, avulnerable posture. Defensive postures, on the contrary, enjoy a number ofsignificant advantages. The superiority of defense over offense, as

Thesefacilities should enable the unloading of equipment, the debarkation ofcombatant and noncombatant personnel, and the settling and organizationof the forces in one or several locations called gathering and waiting areas.The sea and aerial ports of debarkation (SPOD or APOD) should besuitable for the volume of materiel transported, which means that they mustbe big enough to contain the largest strategic airlift aircraft (C-5 type) or thecargoes and roll-on/roll-off ships transporting the heaviest equipment.

7 One can think, for instance, of the attack against the American destroyer USS Cole in 2000, while it was anchored in the port of Aden.8

Geoffrey Till, Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century , Abingdon,Routledge, 2009, pp. 237-238.9

In the US as well as in NATO, the terms Aerial Port of Debarkation (APOD) andSea Port of Debarkation (SEAPOD or SPOD) are used.




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underlined by Clausewitz and later by Mao, can be attributed to variousfactors. First, the defender has a better knowledge of the terrain, andusually has had time to prepare it so as to ward off enemy attacks. Second,it can rely on stronger support from the local population. Finally, it is closerto its supply bases and hence enjoys shorter communication and supplylines.

Conversely, the attacker progresses within an area it knows poorlyand moves away from its bases as it pulls ahead, thereby making itslogistics more complex and vulnerable.10 This disadvantage has an impactat the tactical and technological levels: the attacker is the one coming to thefore to strike the defenders, thus becoming more vulnerable to defensiveassets taking full benefit of concealment techniques and dispersion. Thesevery systems are all the more dangerous due to their low costs: whenprotecting the surroundings of a territory, very long range weapons are notindispensable, and cheaper capabilities with a shorter range can be

acquired in higher numbers.11

The unbalance between offense and defense shows clearly throughforce projection operations: Western armies suffer from their position ofattackers, while their adversaries take advantage of their defensivepostures. Such difficulties, inherent to these kinds of operations, exemplifythe “loss-of-strength gradient”, according to which a state’s military powerdeclines as its forces move away from the national territory.

12

One major political and strategic datum adds to the weaknesses ofthe offensive at the operational level: what is at stake in a conflict is morelikely to be given greater importance by the defender, who is by definitionlocal, than by the distant attacker. As its interests are greater, the defendercan sustain a more intense and enduring effort, while at the same timetolerating heavier human and financial costs than its adversary.

The sheervolume of vehicles, systems, and equipment to be deployed, along withammunition needs, constitute an increasing logistical burden.

13

Force projection, in that it consists in sending combat units intodistant theaters so as to influence an adversary’s policy or subdue it, is aninherently vulnerable and difficult posture. Despite its weaknesses, force

It shouldbe noted that armies do not adopt defensive postures to protect only astate’s vital interests, and have not always managed to benefit from such amoral advantage. Nonetheless, the asymmetry of stakes in a conflict tendsto favor the defender, especially in the case of force projection operationsbecause they take place very close to its territory, if not within it.

10 “Every attack loses impetus as it progresses”, Carl von Clausewitz, On War ,Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1976, p. 71. See also pp. 363-366, 527,566-573. For Mao’s writings, see for example Mao Tse-Toung, Ecrits militaires de Mao Tse-Toung , Pékin, Editions en langues étrangères, 1964, pp. 115-116 and265-269.11

Posen, “Command of the Commons”, op. cit., pp. 22-24.12

Kenneth Boulding, Conflict and Defense: A General Theory , New York, Harper &

Brothers, 1962, pp. 78-79.13Clausewitz, On War , op. cit., pp. 90-99.




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projection has always been closely linked to great power status andremains today one of the means by which great powers protect theirstrategic interests overseas and, more generally, help to maintain a certainform of international order.

Access and Anti-Access: From Past to Present

Force projection as a means to defend interests by the use of force indistant theaters of operations has always been a privilege of great powers.Athens’ naval domination during the Peloponnesian War, that of GreatBritain until the early twentieth century and America’s since the end of theCold War, enabled each of them to project their forces freely and to sustainenduring military interventions relying on their sea power 14

European states’ colonial conquests and rivalries during the 16 th and17th centuries drove them to build ships whose growing number and quality

offered an ever-greater reach.

15

“Greater competition between European powers in oceanic trade,maritime control and colonial acquisition outweighed any transoceanicstruggle with non-European powers […]. A shift in military capabilityheralded the decline of some non-European forces and the start of anew European-dominated power balance, remaining in part to thepresent day.”

Jeremy Black thus recalls that in the 17th century:

16

Supported by the technological and organizational progress driving

the “military revolution”, in particular by the increase in lethality resultingfrom the improvement of firearms of all calibers, great powers were able toconquer new continents with almost complete impunity – withconsequences still perceptible today.

Force projection has come back to the forefront of Western powers’strategic concerns since the end of the Cold War. Along with this tendency,the structures, doctrines and equipment of European and American armedforces have evolved, driving some of them to transition from conscription toprofessional armies. Although European and American armed forces nowboth consider force projection a key mission, the reasons why they do so,their capabilities and their field experience in this domain, clearly differ.

Europe’s transition toward armies that gave greater prominence tooverseas interventions is above all a consequence of the reorientation thatfollowed the disappearance of the Soviet threat. While Europe’s territory

14Williamson Murray, “Operational Issues of Sea Basing In the Twenty First

Century”, in Defense Science Board Task Force on Sea Basing , Washington, U.S.Department of Defense, 2003, pp. 138-140.15

Geoffrey Parker, The Military Revolution: Military innovation and the rise of the West, 1500-1800 , Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 103 andfollowing.16

Jeremy Black, War and the World: Military Power and the Fate of Continents,1450-2000 , New Haven, Yale University Press, 2000, p. 60.




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and vital interests no longer seemed to be at risk, the Persian Gulf Warserved as a reminder of the existence of security interests in distanttheaters. Hence, Operation Desert Storm illustrated the persistence ofregional threats, but also revealed to all coalition members the costs anddifficulties associated with force projection operations. European armiesare, however, far from equal in this regard: France and the UK gave foreigninterventions a specific importance even before the end of the Cold War.The 1990s only enshrined this position by decreasing the relativeimportance of border defense missions and putting the stress on the armedforces’ qualitative developments required for foreign interventions.17

Unlike many of its allies, the United States has always been anexpeditionary military power and will remain one so long as it chooses notto revert to an isolationist posture. The insular position the US enjoys andthe absence of territorial threats on the American continent have alwaysoffered Washington the privilege to opt either for isolation or for

involvement in global affairs – a freedom simply inaccessible to moststates. The US major and continuous involvement in foreign affairs startedwhen it entered the war in 1941 and has lasted up to the present day.

18 Asa consequence, the US has early on needed the ability to reach othercontinents, especially Eurasia. Although America has, since then,maintained an expeditionary posture, the constraints inherent to thisorientation and under which it has had to operate have evolved since thetime of East-West confrontation.19 During the Cold War, US armed forcesbenefited from a constant and massive physical presence on theirEuropean and Asian allies’ territories aimed at countering a clearlyidentified threat from the East. The current period is characterized by adiminution of military deployments and, above all, a shifting of threat towardother regions, especially the “arc of crisis” extending from Maghreb toCentral Asia.20

Lifecycle of the ‘Anti-Access’ Concept

Western armies’ shows of force in the past twenty to thirty years, from theFalklands to Iraqi Freedom , enshrined the reorientation of militaryapparatuses toward actions far from home territories. States seeking globalpower, regional powers and other states challenging the world order tooknote of the successes – sometimes more tactical and operational thanstrategic – of these interventions. They came to the realization that they

had to find ways of responding to practices they could face in the future.Hence, acquiring certain technologies seemed expedient to those stateswilling to keep interventionist powers at a distance.

17Tom Dyson, “Convergence and Divergence in Post-Cold War British, French,

and German Military Reforms: Between International Structure and ExecutiveAutonomy”, Security Studies , Vol. 17, No. 4, 2008, pp. 725-774.18

For an analysis of the US grand strategy since 1940, see Christopher Layne,The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present , Ithaca,Cornell University Press, 2006.19

See Nicole Vilboux, Les stratégies de puissance américaine , Paris, FRS -Ellipses, 2002, pp. 11-41.20

Williamson Murray, “Thoughts on Sea Basing in the Twenty First Century”, inDefense Science Board Task Force on Sea Basing , op. cit., pp. 121-122.




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Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA).23

The arrival of Donald Rumsfeld as head of the Pentagon turned theissue of access into a high potential threat, as illustrated in the QuadrennialDefense Review (QDR) of 2001.

Based on information technologies,the RMA was supposed to offer a clear advantage to those armed forcesthat took the full benefit from them.

24

When Western strategic postures are considered, anti-accessappears as an important challenge which cannot be seen as the soleproduct of a US inter-services bureaucratic rivalry. However, taking intoaccount this very specific organizational factor sheds light on an essentialcharacteristic of the debate on the anti-access threat: why it focused on themilitary dimension of the problem.

The anti-access threat is, by definition, afundamentally “naval” and “aerial” topic. Its occurrence in the QDR notablyillustrates how influential the US Navy and Air Force had been in provingtheir “usefulness” to the political power and justifying the budget necessaryto the development and procurement of “transformational” capabilities.Transformation and anti-access then strongly influenced American capacitychoices during the first mandate of the Bush administration. Although thewars in Afghanistan and Iraq somewhat put this issue on the back burner,the anti-access threat continues to affect the way the American defenseapparatus prepares for the future. Its recent reappearance in strategic

debates illustrates inter-services rivalries when it comes to fundingpriorities. In that context, this topic has again become the intellectual – andthus budgetary – “war-horse” of the Navy and Air Force, against the COIN-dominated defense and political decision-making circles.

23 On the first hours of Operation Desert Storm , see Williamson Murray et al ., Gulf War Air Power Survey: Volume 2, Part. I: Operations , Washington, U.S.Government Printing Office, 1993, pp. 120-124.24

Some analyses differentiate anti-access from area denial: “If [anti-access]strategies aim to prevent US forces entry into a theater of operations, then [area-denial] operations aim to prevent their freedom of action in the more narrowconfines of the area under an enemy’s direct control” i.e. its own territory. We shallnot use this distinction in the present article where the whole of the capabilitiesconcerned are gathered around the generic term “anti-access”. AndrewKrepinevich, Barry Watts et Robert Work, Meeting the Anti-Access and Area-Denial Challenge , Washington, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2003,

p. 5.



Countering ForceProjection Operations

efense experts’ analyses present the anti-access threat primarily as aconsequence of the diffusion of advanced technologies. Diffusion

benefits many actors – allies, neutral states, as well as potentialadversaries of Western countries. It goes without saying that anti-access

capabilities vary greatly depending on the states concerned: they rangefrom rudimentary capabilities, unable to cause harm unless used againstunprotected facilities or units, to conventional ballistic missiles with terminalguidance, like those currently being developed by the Chinese People’sLiberation Army.

In order to provide a concrete illustration of this tendency by lookingat a particular case, this study will analyze recent developments in Iraniandefense posture, especially in regards to its capacity to block the Strait ofHormuz and to strike neighboring countries in the Persian Gulf. Iran iscurrently trying to assert its power on the regional scale, in areas located

near present and future Western interests. Therefore it probably is the mostserious case of anti-access threat that the European and French armiescould someday confront.

A Growing Diffusion of Advanced Technologies

An anti-access posture can rely on various types of increasingly diffusedyet constantly improving technologies. In this regard, three categories ofweaponry stand out: strike capabilities (anti-ship and land-attack cruise andballistic missiles), air defense systems and purely naval means(submarines and naval mines).

Strike Capabilities: from Harassment to Interdiction?

On most occasions, Western defense communities saw war from adistance – typified by the aerial phase of Desert Storm – as a revelation ofthe decisive advantage that a modern “informational” army could mobilizeagainst an “industrial” adversary.25

25

Alvin and Heidi Toffler, War and Antiwar. Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century , New York, Little, Brown and Co., 1993.

Precision-guided munitions (PGMs),

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employed in limited numbers in 1991, progressively came to make up anever-bigger share of the projectiles employed in air campaigns.26

However, although they still hold a clear advantage in this domain,

Western forces are not the only beneficiaries of the progress made in termsof precision of strikes, in particular in regards to land-attack (LACMs) oranti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs). The slowness of the fleets renders themparticularly vulnerable to ASCM strikes, as was proved by the cases of theIsraeli destroyer Eilat sunk by Egyptian Styx missiles in 1967, the Sheffield sunk by an Argentinean Exocet in 1982 or the Israeli corvette Hanit hit by aC-802 ASCM fired by Hezbollah during the war of summer 2006. Thenumber of states possessing anti-ship or LACMs of any ranges does notseem to have increased exponentially between 1992 and 2006.

27

Furthermore, the relative stability of the number of statespossessing cruise missiles of any kind should not overshadow the fact thatnew states – such as China, Taiwan, South Korea and India – startedLACM programs in the 1990s.

Nonetheless, this number remains significant and is increasing, whichseems all the more worrying considering the substantial improvement ofthese means of delivery (range, precision, speed, and even stealthiness) as

well as the growing share of force projection missions for Western armedforces.

28

The diffusion of strike capabilities provides its beneficiaries with theopportunity to aim for effects superior by far to the relatively limited damagethat Iraq inflicted upon the coalition by this means in 2003. On the onehand, the extended range of missiles means that one can threaten targetsthat were, until then, out of reach. On the other hand, the enhancedprecision of weapons now makes it possible to hit with the desired physicaleffect facilities such as command and communication centers, radars,

Certain potential theaters of intervention,like the Persian Gulf (for Europe and the US) or the China and Japan Seas(for the US) face an intensification of the threat posed by potentialadversaries such as Iran, North Korea or the PRC, who acquireincreasingly varied means of delivery.

26PGMs accounted for 9% of projectiles fired during Desert Storm , 29% during

Allied Force , 60% during Enduing Freedom and 68% during Iraqi Freedom . See

Benjamin Lambeth, Air Power Against Terror. America's Conduct of Operation Enduring Freedom , Santa Monica, RAND Corporation, 2006, p. 252; T. MichaelMoseley, “Operation Iraqi Freedom - By the Numbers”, USCENTAF, 30 April 2003,p. 11.27

Seth Carus listed around 60 states possessing cruise missiles in 1992 and DavidTanks 81 in 2000, a figure that was used in 2008 by the Congressional ResearchService. W. Seth Carus, Cruise Missile Proliferation in the 1990s , Westport,Praeger, 1992, pp. 126-140; Paul Kerr, Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons and Missiles: Status and Trends , Congressional Research Service, RL30699,February 2008, p. 19; David Tanks, Assessing the Cruise Missile Puzzle: How Great a Defense Challenge? , Washington, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis,2000, p. 3.28

Dennis M. Gormley, Missile Contagion. Cruise Missile Proliferation and the

Threat to International Security, Westport, Praeger Security International, 2009,p. 196.




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points of debarkation or ammunition dumps. The increasing precision ofcertain ballistic missiles and, above all, the deployment of supersonic cruisemissiles, also render the fleets more vulnerable. 29 The defense capabilitiesof fleets and land facilities against ballistic and, to a lesser extent, cruisemissiles may be growing steadily, as was proved by the 2003 Iraq War, butthe capacity to inflict saturation strikes, the diversity of the threat and thecombination of cruise and ballistic means of delivery render the task ofinterception infinitely more complex and expensive. 30

Hampering the Fleets’ Freedom of Action

Cruise and ballistic missiles are not the only means a state can employ inan attempt at regional blackmailing, or when defending the navalsurroundings of a theater of operations: submarines, naval mines or fastpatrol boats can slow, disrupt, or even impede force projection operationsfrom the sea. States like China can even adopt a posture of layered in-

depth naval defense.

The fact that they remain submerged for very long periods givesnuclear attack- and ballistic missile submarines formidable stealthiness.However, for now they remain the privilege of a very small number ofcountries. The same does not hold true for diesel submarines – such as theKilo -class ships built in Russia – which have been sold to the PRC, Iran,India and Algeria.31

The development of submarine-launched strike capabilities iscoupled with perceptible progress in terms of quietness: in this field, thecharacteristics of the Kilo -class submarines are nothing new but confirm anexisting trend, also illustrated by the improvement of Chinese Song -classsubmarines. One of them recently managed to surface in the midst of anAmerican carrier battle group without having been noticed beforehand.

In addition, the armament of these conventionallypowered submarines has substantially improved in the past years: moreand more often, they carry ASCMs whose range can reach 250 kilometers(SS-N-27 Clubs equipping certain Kilo -class ships).

32

29

Theodore Gaillard, “Cruise Missile Sector Facing Supersonic Challenge”,SpaceWar, 11 October 2007, available at: http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Cruise _Missile_Sector_Facing_Supersonic_Challenge_999.html. 30 “Ballistic and cruise missiles are liable to be the long-range weapons of choice,

given their capabilities to threaten land and sea targets from afar. The accuracyand lethality of such systems will increase significantly between now and 2025,even for the delivery of conventional ordnance. The competition between missiledevelopments and defensive systems will be a key operational challenge over thenext several decades. Large-scale missile attacks will be able to overwhelmdefensive systems, despite considerable improvements to them. American basesabroad will become vulnerable to these weapons”, The United States Commissionon National Security/21st Century, New World Coming: American Security in the 21

st Century – Supporting Research and Analysis , 15

thSeptember 1999, p. 52.

31James Clay Moltz, “Global Submarine Proliferation: Emerging Trends and

Problems”, Nuclear Threat Initiative , March 2006, available at:http://www.nti.org/e_research/e3_74.html. 32

On this incident, see for instance Bill Gertz, “China sub stalked U.S. fleet”, The

Washington Times , 13

th

November 2006, available at: http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2006/nov/13/20061113-121539-3317r/ .

http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Cruise_Missile_Sector_Facing_Supersonic_Challenge_999.html




http://www.nti.org/e_research/e3_74.html


http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2006/nov/13/20061113-121539-3317r/












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These evolutions are all the more worrying because in littoral combats theproperties of the environment (surrounding noises, water temperature andsalinity, etc.) make it even harder to carry out littoral anti-submarine warfare(ASW) missions.33 Besides, maintaining the know-how related to thesemissions has tended to become a lesser priority for Western fleets sincethe end of the Cold War.34

In addition, submarines also strengthen another disrupting factor forforce projection operations: mining. Naval mines have several advantagesfor those belligerents who pursue anti-access strategies: the most basicversions are cheap, and there is a great variety of models (moored ordrifting) and triggering systems (contact or influence mines – magnetic,acoustic, etc.).

35 Existing procedures and equipment for mine warfare areconstantly improved, but as of today there is no quick way to clearminefields.36 Minefields combining several types of devices in a single zone – among which certain complex models possess several types of

detonators – compel mine clearance units to be prudent and in turn slowthe pace of the operations. Another element can further increase the timeand cost of such operations: because the defender has a good knowledgeof the seabed, it can maximize the mines’ effects or the difficulty ofminesweeping. Coastal defense units (ships, submarines, ASCMs, aircraft,artillery, etc.) can also protect the minefield and disrupt minesweepingoperations.37

Increasingly Sophisticated Surface-to-Air Threats

This whole posture can take the shape of a defense insuccessive and complementary layers, in which the efficiency of eachelement is reinforced by the others.

One last factor must be added that further complicates naval projectionoperations: enemy air defenses. Western armed forces have gotten used toenjoying air superiority above theaters of operations and taking fulladvantage of this asset by constantly observing the battlefield and theadversary’s defense posture. They could also take benefit of air superiorityto use airspace freely for tactical or strategic mobility or, of course, in order

On improvements in submarines’ stealth, see Office of Naval Intelligence, The People’s Liberation Army Navy: A Modern Navy with Chinese Characteristics ,August 2009, pp. 20-23.33 Till, Seapower , op. cit., p. 239.34

On the United States see, for instance, Owen R. Cote and Harvey Sapolsky,Antisubmarine Warfare After the Cold War , MIT Security Studies ConferenceSeries, June 1997, available at: http://web.mit.edu/ssp/Publications/confseries/ASW/ASW_Report.html; Keith W. Edmunds, “ASW – Current and Future Trends”,Defense & Security Analysis , Vol. 16, No.1, April 2000, pp. 73-87; see also MartinSieff, “ASW Dangers – Part I”, UPI.com, 12

thJune 2008, available at:

http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2008/06/12/Defense-Focus-ASW-dangers-Part-1/UPI-74581213308031/ . 35

According to Hoyt, the price of some basic mines is approximately $1,000.Timothy Hoyt, “The Next Strategic Threat: Advanced Conventional WeaponsProliferation”, in Henry Sokolski and James M. Ludes (eds.), Twenty-First Century Weapons Proliferation: Are We Ready? , London, Routledge, 2001, p. 40.36

James Dunnigan, How to Make War? A Comprehensive Guide to Modern

Warfare in the Twenty-first Century , New York, Harper, 2003, pp. 229-236.37Till, Seapower , op. cit., p. 239.

http://web.mit.edu/ssp/Publications/confseries/ASW/ASW_Report.html




http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2008/06/12/Defense-Focus-ASW-dangers-Part-1/UPI-74581213308031/










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to strike the adversary quickly and with increased precision. Today,opposing forces remain unable to contest Western air superiority. However,they do attempt to procure assets that would enable them to exploit thethird dimension for offensive purposes – using cruise or ballistic missiles, orunmanned air vehicles (UAVs) – and also for defensive purposes, bybuilding integrated and multi-layered air defense systems. Indeed, after theGulf War, American intelligence services observed a growing demand inSAM systems capable of intercepting stealth aircraft or cruise missiles.38

Whereas the coalition had achieved impressive successes againstIraqi defenses during Operation Desert Storm , NATO discovered eightyears later that neutralizing Serb SA-3/SA-6 systems’ missile batteries andradars was extremely difficult if these were employed using so-called “non-cooperative” tactics, and concealed by terrain and vegetation.

39 Thisincapacity of NATO’s air forces did weigh on the conduct of the operationsas it dissuaded their aircraft to fly below 15,000 feet, thus reducing their

tactical effectiveness and increasing the risk of collateral damage.40 But thissignificant capacity to cause harm – especially because the first versions ofsome of these SAM systems were deployed in the 1960s – was nothingcompared to the threat posed by the most recent models of long-rangeSAMs exported by Russia, in particular S-300 variants. Modern systemshave progressed in terms of the number of targets that the radars canfollow and engage simultaneously and also in terms of the interceptionrange and the nature of the targets that can be intercepted – among themcruise missiles, anti-radiation missiles, or even apparently stealth aircraft.41 Today, a dozen European and Asian states, among them China and India,own variants of the S-300, and many other countries possess systems thatare as recent but with a shorter range. Syria and Iran repeatedly displayedtheir willingness to buy S-300s, but no acquisition was ever confirmed, andcontradictory information is regularly issued about the Iranian attempts.42

38

Patrick J. Garrity, Why the Gulf War Still Matters: Foreign Perspectives on the War and the Future of International Security , Los Alamos National Laboratory – Center for National Security Studies, July 1993, p. 76.39

This surprising phrase – are tactics ever cooperative? – refers to certainpractices consisting in using search radars so as to provoke the launch of an anti-radiation missile that would be unable to reach its target. Operators turn the radaron so as to be targeted by the coalition’s HARM missiles and turn it off as soon as

the missile is launched. Once it lost its signal, the missile could no longer maintainits trajectory and went astray.40 Posen, “Command of the Commons”, op. cit., pp. 24-30.41

See “Operations in Kosovo: Problems Encountered, Lessons Learned andReconstitution”, Hearing before the Military Readiness Subcommittee of theCommittee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, 26 October 1999, pp. 42-43, available at: http://www.fas.org/man/congress/1999/has299030_0.htm; OwenR. Cote, Jr., Assuring Access and Projecting Power: The Navy in the New Security Environment , MIT Security Studies Conference Series, April 2002,Chapter 3, available at: http://web.mit.edu/ssp/Publications/navy_report/demands.pdf. 42

Christopher Bolkcom, “Military Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD):Assessing Future Needs”, Congressional Research Service, RS21141, 5

June

2006, p. 2; “S-300P (SA-10 Grumble)”, Missile Threat , available at:http://www.missilethreat.com/missiledefensesystems/id.50/system_detail.asp.

http://www.fas.org/man/congress/1999/has299030_0.htm



http://web.mit.edu/ssp/Publications/navy_report/demands.pdf




http://www.missilethreat.com/missiledefensesystems/id.50/system_detail.asp









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Unconventional Options

One final conceivable option for anti-access strategies is to resort toantisatellite (ASAT) weapons, WMDs, and offensive cyber warfare.

To complicate or even deter force projection operations, ASAT andcybernetic weapons could be used to target contemporary armies’information systems and flows – extending the anti-access threat to theimmaterial domain. Because modern armies rely increasingly on theirC4ISR systems (for positioning, observation, target acquisition, datatransfer, strike precision, etc.), unconventional assets tend to become theoptions of choice for states willing to oppose Western projection forces.However, acquiring an ASAT capacity requires mature ballistic capabilitiesand advanced guidance systems. As a result, for now, only the mostmilitarily advanced potential adversaries can access these systems, suchas China, Russia, or potentially adversaries supported by these two

countries.

43

In the field of WMDs, psychological, disrupting or destructive effectscould be sought by using chemical, biological, radiological or even nuclearweapons (depending on the political and military contexts considered). Thenumber of courses of action available is, in theory, infinite; but the mostdestructive options, such as nuclear strikes, could not be opted for withoutincurring the risk of a devastating retaliation from interventionist powers, ofwhich the main three (United States, United Kingdom, France) possessmodern nuclear weapons and means of delivery. Nonetheless, should thethreat be indirect and targeted against a host-state protected by anextended deterrence posture, the situation would be more complex and

delicate. This raises the question of which options are available tointerventionist powers when it comes to limiting wars and avoidingescalation against an enemy proliferator.

44

Conversely, with the revival of the nuclear industry throughout theworld, the related risks of radioactive material being stolen, and the relativeavailability of chemical and biological agents, we can imagine variousscenarios of resorting to WMDs that would remain under the Westerndeterrence threshold.

45

43

Armies and societies’ reliance on satellites contributes to encourage thedevelopment of boost- and ascent-phase missile defenses and offers possibilitiesto fight against ASAT.

For instance, one could think of strikes or, above all,terrorist attacks, involving radioactive materials or persistent – but nothighly lethal – chemical or biological agents that could contaminate

44 For an analysis looking at this type of hypotheses, see for example Barry R.Posen, “U.S. Security Policy in a Nuclear-Armed World, or What If Iraq HadHad Nuclear Weapons?”, in Victor A. Utgoff (ed.), The Coming Crisis: Nuclear Proliferation, U.S. Interests, and World Order , Cambridge, MIT Press, 2000,pp. 157-190.45

Michael Moodie, “Dangerous Weapons in Dangerous Hands: Responding to theChallenges of Chemical and Biological Terrorism”, Proliferation Papers , No. 28,

Summer 2009, available at: http://www.ifri.org/downloads/PP28_Moodie_Summer2009.pdf.

http://www.ifri.org/downloads/PP28_Moodie_Summer2009.pdf









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potentially large areas (APOD and SEAPOD in particular) and durablyparalyze a significant part of the operation.46

Far from favoring only Western and interventionist powers,

technological progress also benefits potential or actual regional powersagainst which military interventions could have to be planned in the future.Iran holds, in this regard, a particular place, as it currently tries to assertitself as a regional power and attempts to build up military forces matchingthis status. The combination of its ambitions, capabilities and geographicallocation – close to current and future Western allies and interests – makeIran a particularly interesting case study of anti-access strategies forFrance and Europe.

Iranian Anti-Access Strategy and Capabilities

The threat that Iranian armed forces would pose in the event of a foreign

intervention in the Persian Gulf illustrates perfectly the diverse forms ananti-access strategy can take. The effectiveness of Iranian armed forces’anti-access capabilities would depend on the various elements considered.

Analysts studying Iranian defense usually consider that the strategyTehran would adopt in the face of a Western intervention in the Gulfcomprises of four main elements: (1) laying a minefield in the Gulf of Oman,and especially the Strait of Hormuz; (2) harassing the projection fleet ortransport ships (such as supertankers) that try to reach or leave the PersianGulf, using submarines, missile boats , and ASCM batteries on Iranianshores; (3) employing air defense means to protect Iranian naval bases,

ASCM batteries, and, more generally, Iranian military installations; andfinally (4) resorting to irregular, LACM and ballistic missile attacks in orderto strike seaport and airfield facilities, assembly areas, command andcontrol centers, supply bases, etc.

After the Gulf War, Iran identified several priorities for its militarydevelopment. Among these were: the reinforcement of ballistic capabilitiesemployed as a deterrent, and compensating for its inability to acquire airsuperiority; the possession of forces that control, or at least prevent, accessto the Strait of Hormuz; and finally, the improvement of its air defenses.47

Hence, Iran’s naval strategy against a Western intervention couldtake the shape of a multi-layered defense and anti-access systemcapitalizing on its knowledge of the area, on the proximity of its bases, as

46 Cliff et al ., Entering the Dragon’s Lair , op. cit., p. 8; for a detailed study of thethreat posed by chemical and biological agents to the US Air Force, see Brian G.Chow et al ., Air Force Operations in a Chemical and Biological Environment , SantaMonica, RAND Corporation, DB189-1, 1998, pp. 10-54. It is worth noting that, in ascenario where a logistical node would get paralyzed, the importance of othernodes would be increased. As a result, the whole system would be weaker and theincentive to disorganize or neutralize logistical nodes would be greater. Each

bottleneck would thus create a new vulnerability.47Garrity, Why the Gulf War Still Matters , op. cit., p. 99.




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well as on the assumed casualty aversion of Western forces.48 This navalstrategy forms part of a general posture aimed at providing the country withthe capacity to absorb the first adversary conventional strike. Indeed, thiscapacity appeared as a top priority following the Gulf War, and can onlyremain one so long as an attack scenario against Iranian nuclear facilitiescannot easily be ruled out. When applied to Tehran’s naval capabilities,resilience should be made possible by dispersing assets; avoiding directconfrontation with the adversary’s fleet; reinforcing coastal defenses; andexploiting opportunities offered by littoral zones to conceal them. 49 In orderto prevent its defenses from being neutralized too quickly, Iran also seemsto have engaged in the decentralization of its command structure, so thateach element can keep fighting despite coordination and command centershaving been neutralized by adversary air strikes.50

Mine warfare is also developing in the country. In 2010, the Iraniannaval forces supposedly possessed three to four thousand naval mines of

different kinds, ranging from moored contact mines to drifting influencemines.

51 Naval mines can be laid by specialized ships, civil ships and boats,midget submarines and Kilo -class submarines, which Iran bought fromRussia at the beginning of the 1990s.52 These submarines, famous forbeing among the quietest diesel vessels in the world and able to carry 24mines in place of their torpedoes, could easily constitute a minefieldunnoticed.53 According to a recent estimate, Iranian naval forces could,without much trouble, manage to lay a minefield of 700 units in the Strait ofHormuz before their mining assets were neutralized. 54 In view of theslowness of recent mine clearance operations, as well as the possibility thatIranian mines could mix several types of triggers, the minesweepingoperation that should allow the clearing of a relatively secure corridor alongthe strait would take some time.55

48

Office of Naval Intelligence, Iran’s Naval Forces: From Guerilla Warfare to a Modern Naval Strategy , Autumn 2009, p. 11.

This is all the more likely as the minefieldwould probably be protected by harassing anti-ship missiles andcommandos.

49Office of Naval Intelligence, Iran’s Naval Forces , op. cit., p. 9, pp. 21-22; Steven

R. Ward, Immortal: A Military History of Iran and its Armed Forces , Washington,Georgetown University Press, 2009, pp. 314-316.50

Office of Naval Intelligence, Iran’s Naval Forces , op. cit., pp. 7-9.51 Frank Hoffman, “The Maritime Commons In a Neo-Mahanian Era”, in Denmark

et al., Contested Commons , op. cit., p. 59. A recent Pentagon memo estimated thenumber of Iran’s naval mines at 3,500: Unclassified Report on the Military Power of Iran , April 2010, p. 5, available at: http://www.fas.org/man/eprint/dod_iran_2010.pdf. 52

Fariborz Haghshenass, Iran’s Asymmetric Naval Warfare , Washington Institutefor Near-East Policy, Policy Focus, No. 87, September 2008, pp. 13 and 16.53 Anthony Cordesman and Martin Kleiber, Iran’s Military Forces and Warfighting Capabilities: The Threat in The Northern Gulf , Westport, Praeger SecurityInternational, 2007, p. 114; Hoyt, “The Next Strategic Threat”, op. cit., pp. 39-40;Office of Naval Intelligence, Iran’s Naval Forces , op. cit., p. 16; Caitlin Talmadge,“Closing Time. Assessing the Iranian Threat to the Strait of Hormuz”, International Security , Vol. 33, No. 1, Summer 2008, p. 89.54

Talmadge, “Closing Time”, op. cit., p. 93.55

Caitlin Talmadge considers that such operations would take approximately onemonth. Ibid., p. 97.

http://www.fas.org/man/eprint/dod_iran_2010.pdf









- 27 -

Map 1. The Strait of Hormuz 56

The Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps Navy (IRGCN), inparticular, adopted this indirect style based on “naval guerilla”. The Iranianfleet is split between the IRGCN and the Islamic Republic of Iran Navy(IRIN), the former being responsible for the Persian Gulf and the Strait ofHormuz, and the latter being in charge of the Gulf of Oman.

57 Iran seems tobe preparing itself for a naval asymmetric war with the help of fast patrolboats equipped with torpedoes or anti-ship missiles, and aimed to harasscivil or military traffic near the Strait of Hormuz.58 Harassment can also beundertaken from the islands of Abu Musa and the Greater Tunb, where Iran

recently reinforced its military installations. The islands are respectivelylocated on the southern flank of the channels used by supertankers, andbetween those two channels (see map 1).59

56

Credit: University of Texas Libraries:http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/hormuz_80.jpg. 57

Office of Naval Intelligence, Iran’s Naval Forces , op. cit., p. 11.58

Ibid., pp. 13-14; Ward, Immortal , op. cit., pp. 314-6.59

David Hartwell and Allison Puccioni, “Island Fortresses: Abu Musa and the

Greater Tunb”, Jane’s Intelligence Review , Vol. 21, No. 9, 14

August 2009, pp. 33-35.

http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/hormuz_80.jpg






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To back up these tactics, anti-ship missiles can be launched fromthe batteries positioned on the northern bank of the strait. As of today, theremust be around thirty ASCM batteries capable of striking across the wholebreadth of the strait, deployed over a part of Iranian territory equivalent tothree times the size of Kosovo. 60 The missiles likely to be used for suchattacks are increasingly sophisticated and make interception ever moredifficult. Indeed, HY-2/C-201 Silkworm missiles are progressively replacedby more recent systems of Chinese conception – C-801s and C-802s – which, although they cruise at subsonic speeds, are characterized byshorter delays of employment, extended range, enhanced precision, andlower flight paths, making interception more difficult.61 Consistently with itsneed for cover and concealment, Iran seems to favor small and mobilelaunch platforms. Allegedly, it has also planned to deploy fake ASCM fireunits along the shore.62 Iran also seems to have managed to acquire asmall number (a dozen at most) of KH-55s – Russian missiles illegally soldby Ukraine in the early 2000s. With its 2,500-kilometer range, this cruise

missile could potentially be a major qualitative leap for Iran, compared tothe systems currently deployed in its arsenal. However, the missile isunlikely to have been integrated into Iranian units, but might rather beanalyzed for the purpose of reverse engineering.63 Finally, Iran could, withina few years, possess Kilo -class submarines capable of launching ASCMswith a 200-kilometer range: the first of its three vessels is currently beingmodernized to that aim.64

An Iranian strategy aimed at impeding access to the Persian Gulf orincreasing sharply its cost should then logically be supported by defensesagainst its adversaries’ air superiority (especially the US and Israel). As oftoday, Iranian capabilities in this field still appear to be relatively weak; itcan defend specific points, or maybe zones, against air strikes but lacks acomplete cover of its territory.

65 Iran is supposed to possess a greatdiversity of surface-to-air assets to defend against Western forces’ airstrikes, but they remain overall rather inefficient. The only long-range SAMsdeployed in Iran are SA-2s and SA-5s, both old and fixed systems of limitedpotential. These systems currently seem to concentrate around Tehran,seaports and nuclear facilities.66

60

Talmadge, “Closing Time”, op. cit., p. 104.

Besides, Iran also possesses a greatnumber of short- and medium-range SAM systems of Western origin (suchas Hawks procured under the Shah) or built by the Soviet Union or Russia,

61Office of Naval Intelligence, Iran’s Naval Forces , op. cit., p. 17.

62 Talmadge, “Closing Time”, op. cit., p. 101; Ward, Immortal , op. cit., p. 315.63

Cordesman and Kleiber, Iran’s Military Forces and Warfighting Capabilities , op.cit., pp. 154-155; Gormley, Missile Contagion , op. cit., p. 100.64

Modernization should enable Kilo submarines to launch YJ-1 or Novator Alfa ASCMs. However, it seems that Iran is experiencing difficulties to pursue this, as itis reluctant to send its submarines to Russia. Cordesman and Kleiber, Iran’s Military Forces and Warfighting Capabilities , op. cit., p. 114; Office of NavalIntelligence, Iran’s Naval Forces , op. cit., p. 18; “Submarine Proliferation. IranImport Behavior”, Nuclear Threat Initiative , available at: http://www.nti.org/db/submarines/Iran/import.html. 65

Cf. Unclassified Report on the Military Power of Iran , op. cit., p. 6.66

Cordesman and Kleiber, Iran’s Military Forces and Warfighting Capabilities , op.cit., p. 97.

http://www.nti.org/db/submarines/Iran/import.html









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but they do not currently appear to pose a real threat to modern aircraftsupported by electronic warfare and Suppression of Enemy Air Defense(SEAD) assets.

Iran is conscious of its weaknesses. As a result, it has, over the pastyears, favored a decentralized approach of its surface-to-air defense.Hence, Iran relies on a greater autonomy of command, on mobile assets(SA-15s and SA-22s), and takes advantage of the mountainous terrain. 67 This current situation could evolve depending on Iran’s future equipment.Numerous sources have underlined the existence of a Russo-Iranianagreement for the supply of S-300 SAMs (V/PMU2) whose capacities arefar superior to the defenses Western armies have been facing until today.For now, the sale has been suspended, apparently due to pressures fromthe US and Israel, but the possibility that Iran will end up acquiring suchcapabilities in the long run – either as a retaliatory measure from Russia, orthrough other channels such as Belarus – cannot be ruled out. 68 Syria

bought Russia around fifty SA-22 / Pantsir S-1, of which a dozen willprobably be transferred to Iran. The latter already owns around thirty SA-15 / Tor -M1. Their short ranges (20 and 15 kilometers, respectively) do notmake SA-22s and SA-15s highly threatening to modern air forces that canfire their missiles from a safe distance, beyond these ranges. However,their mobility and the modernity of their components may protect them frommany anti-radiation capabilities, except for the most recent ones.69

Lastly, Iran possesses a large spectrum of assets to strike APODs,SPODs and theater bases. Such attacks could be carried out as part of aninterdiction strategy, were previous actions to fail to prevent enemy fleets

from entering the Persian Gulf. Iran could use threats to blackmail aneighboring country and discourage it from allowing Western forces on itsterritory, or even try to alter its behavoir by a limited use of force. The soleexistence of these anti-access and strike capabilities may suffice tofavorably alter neighboring countries’ behaviors.

70 The Iranian ballisticarsenal comprises of means of varied ranges, from rockets firing at severaldozen kilometers to Shahab -3 and Sejjil -2 medium-range ballistic missiles.The extension of the missiles’ reach and the transition to solid-fuelpropellants (Sejjil -2), more stable and faster to prepare for launch than theliquid-propelled Shahab , typify the fact that Iranian ballistic mediumsglobally tend to improve. For now, according to available estimates of theirprecision, Iranian ballistic missiles do not appear as a credible threat for

targets such as runways, which would be vital for the success of anyoperation against Iranian forces.71

67

“Iranian air defences”, Jane's Intelligence Digest , March 2007.

On the contrary, the greater surface ofseaport facilities and, especially, assembly and storage areas, make themmore exposed to such strikes. It should be noted that, to be politically

68 Ibid.

69 About the transfer of the Pantsir system, see Military Balance 2009 , London,IISS, 2009, p. 275; Abdullah Toukan and Anthony H. Cordesman, GCC - Iran: Operational Analysis of Air, SAM and TBM Forces , Center for Strategic andInternational Studies, 20 August 2009, p. 57.70

Ward, Immortal , op. cit., p. 316.71Toukan and Cordesman, GCC - Iran , op. cit., pp. 123-124.




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effective, an attempt to convince the Gulf regimes not to allow a Westernmilitary presence on their territory would not necessarily need to besupported by a highly credible military threat.

Theoretically, Iran could also try to disorganize the process of forceprojection on the ground by using proxies to disperse appropriate chemicaland biological agents. As of today, however, we do not know with certaintywhat Iran’s capabilities in this field are. There is little doubt that Iranpossesses the know-how and facilities necessary to run offensive chemicaland biological programs, but there seems to be no tangible evidence thatIran did initiate such programs.72

*****

Moreover, even if successful limitedstrikes against facilities hosting Western forces could momentarily, or evencontinuously, hamper their action, the political consequences of such anattack could be devastating for Iran.

The study of Iran’s capabilities that could potentially be used as partof an anti-access strategy illustrates the multidimensional character of thethreats that Western projection forces could be confronted with.Nonetheless, analyzing the Iranian anti-access threat in the Persian Gulfshould not be limited to the study of the assets developed and deployed byTehran – and which it may be putting forward as a deterrent.

Beyond the diffusion of advanced technologies, which the Islamicrepublic of Iran typifies in a concrete way, one can assess the scope of thechallenge posed to Western projection forces only by setting these

capabilities in a strategic perspective. This requires first to take into accountthe capabilities that interventionist powers could mobilize in order to defeatanti-access strategies. Secondly, it appears necessary to understand thepolitical and strategic context of these operations, as it would befundamental in determining the belligerents’ respective capabilities.73

72

Cordesman and Kleiber, Iran’s Military Forces and Warfighting Capabilities , op.cit., pp. 157-168.

Thiswill be the focus of a future issue of the Focus stratégique series that will bepublished in Fall 2011, taking forward the analyses developed in thepresent article.

73

The bibliography gathering the references mentioned in this article appears inthe issue No. 21 bis of the Focus stratégique series.



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http://www.ifri.org/


http://www.ifri.org/downloads/fs32aeromobilite.pdf


http://www.ifri.org/downloads/fs31pertusotnatopartnerships.pdf


http://www.ifri.org/downloads/fs30chareyron.pdf


http://www.ifri.org/downloads/fs29dedurand.pdf


http://www.ifri.org/downloads/fs28monsonis.pdf


http://www.ifri.org/downloads/fs27pdm.pdf


http://www.ifri.org/downloads/fs24bisdefeligonde.pdf










toward the end of force projection? i. the anti-access threat

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