towards the war of position: gramsci in continuity and...

Volume 4, 2013 Uprising 19

Towards the War of Position: Gramsci in Continuity and Rupture with Marxism-Leninism

Introduction: It’s Time to Jailbreak Gramsci’s Ideas

Amongtheleadingfiguresoftheinterna-tionalcommunistmovement(ICM)inthetwentiethcentury–Lenin,Stalin,HoChiMinh…–AntonioGramsci,leaderofthePartitoComunistad’Italia/ItalianCom-munistParty(PCI),featureslesspromi-nentlythanmanyothers–thisinspiteofhiscanonicalstatusintheliberalacad-emy.Granted,hedidn’tleadasuccessfulrevolution.Butnocommunistpartyintheimperialistcountriesdid.Also,thatthebulkofGramsci’stheorizing–andcertainlymostofhisoriginalandmostpenetratingtexts–werewritteninposi-tionofcaptivityinItaly’sfascistprisonscontainedGramsci’sreflectionsoncom-muniststrategy.Gramsci’sthoughtwouldremainquiteinaccessibletoICMandeventhePCIuntilwellafterhisdeath.Butevenwhenhisprisonnotebooksreturn

toItalyfromtheirsafehavenintheSovietUnionaftertheSecondInter-imperialistWar(WWII),therevolutionarycontentofhisideaswouldbecontainedbytherevi-sionismofthe‘Eurocommunists’,ofwhichthePCI’sTogliattiwasattheforefront.LiberalacademicswouldlaterfurtherstripGramsci’sthoughtofitsclearlycom-munistobjectives.

Forthesereasons,itcanbesaidthatGramscihashad,atbest,verylittleim-pactoncommuniststrategyinthetwen-tiethcentury.ButGramscihadmuchtosayonthechallengesofaccumulat-ingrevolutionaryforcesinimperialistcountriesthatshouldnotbeoverlooked,andIwouldargue,havemuchimportforthetaskofreconceptualizingcommuniststrategytoday.It’stimetojailbreaksomeoftheseideasoutoftheconfinesoftheliberalacademy.

ByComradeAmil

Therevolutionarycrisisthatspannedthecourseoftheimmediatepostwaryearsrevealedseriouslimitationsinhowthe‘OctoberRoad’torevolutionthattheBolsheviksinspiredcametobeunderstoodandappliedthroughouttheCommunistInternational.TheinsurrectionsthatwereinspiredbytheRussianrevolutionintheimmediatepostwaryearsallfailed–fromEuropetoNorthAmericatothefailed1927insurrectionsinChina.TheRevolutionaryCommunistPartyofCanada(RCPCanada)andthenewCommunistPartyofItaly(nPCI)todayupholdtheidea(withsomeconceptualdifferencesbetweenthem)thatthiswastheresultofinappropriatestrategy:theinsurrectionarystrategyunderesti-matestheresilienceofthestateandthatsomethingakintoaprotractedpeople’swarstrategyisrequired.Iwouldliketoap-proachthisproblem(inawaythatbuildsuponthecritiqueofinsurrectionismcarriedoutbyRCPCanadaandnPCI)bydigginga

InMarch1927,theGeneralLaborUnioninShanghai,underdirectionoftheChineseCommunistParty,launchedageneralstrikeandanarmedinsurrectionofsome600,000workers(imagetoleft)againstthewarlordsandinsupportoftheapproachingRevolutionaryNationalistArmyledbytheKuomintang,whichthecommunistsweremembersof.Whilepraisingtheunionspublicly,ChiangKai-shekproceededtosecretlyraiseaparamilitaryforcewithsupportfromthebourgeoisieandthecriminalunderworldtodrownthecommunistforcesintheirownblood.

OnApril12,thesereactionaryparamilitaryelementslaunchedaseriesofattacksagainstthecity’slargeunionsagainstthenowdisarmedwork-ers(imagetoright).Unionmemberswereslaughtered,arrested,anddisarmed.Whentownspeople,workers,andstudentsstagedaprotestrallythenextday,theywerefiredonbyKuomintangtroops,withexecutionscontinuingforweeks.TheGeneralLaborUnionorganizationsweredeclaredillegal,andallstrikeactivityinthecityceased.Atthistime,theCCPoperatedwithastrategyofurban-basedinsurrectionbasedontheproletariat.Thiseventencouragedtheshifttotheprotractedpeople’swarinthecountrysidewiththepeasantrybecomingthemainforceoftherevolution.

20 Uprising Volume 4, 2013

littledeeperintohowtheStateandbour-geoispowerwereconceivedatthistimewithinrevolutionaryMarxism,particularlybycomparingLenin’sStateandRevolu-tionwithGramsci’sprisonnotebooks.

TheconceptionofthestatecontainedwithinLenin’s1917publicationStateandRevolutioncametobewidelyacceptedintheinternationalcommunistmovementandinturninformedtheinsurrection-aryapproachtorevolutionandaveryspecificexpressionofthevanguardParty.WhetherweattributethesuccessoftheRussianrevolutiontothecontingenciesofaparticularhistoricalconjunctureorwhetherreactionaryregimesweremorepreparedforproletarianrevolutioninthewakeoftheOctober1917revolution–likelybothfactorsapply–the‘OctoberRoad’ledonlytobloodydefeatswhereverelseitwasattempted.Andoutofthedepthsofthesedefeats,AntonioGramsciwasattheforefrontofarticulatingamorecomprehensivestrategyfortheadvanc-ingtheproletarianrevolutionincountrieswherecapitalistsocialrelationsandthehegemonyofthebourgeoisiewasmoreadvanced.

Gramsci’scontributionstocommunisttheoryaremany,butamongthemostimportantishissubstantialelaborationtotheconceptualizationofthebourgeoisState,onethatfallswithinMarxist-Le-ninistorthodoxyasarticulatedinLenin’s

StateandRevolution,butalsobuildsuponelementsofandfarsurpassesit.Inthisway,Gramsci’sideasareincontinuityandrupturewithelementsofLeninism.Gramsci’sinclusionofbourgeoiscivilsocietywithinhistheorizationofthebourgeoisstateelaboratesatheoryofclasspoweranddominationthatismorecomprehensivethanLenin’s.Andthisconceptionofclasspowerpointsusinthedirectionofacommuniststrategythatsomewhatmoreprotracted(nottobeconfusedwithreformist)initsconcep-tualizationofaccumulatingproletarianrevolutionaryforces.

Gramsci’smoment,thoughseparatedfromusbyeightyyearsandinaverydifferentcontextfromourown,incertainwaysislikeourown.Gramsci’sprisonnotebookscommenceaprojectofcom-munistreconceptualizationafterthewaveoffailedinsurrectionaryattemptsintheinternationalcommunistmove-mentthathasyettobeadequatelytakenupbytheICM.

Uponacriticalre-examinationofLenin’sconceptionofthestateandrevolution,wecanestablishthepointsofcontinuityandruptureofGramscivis-a-visLenin.Itistheargumentofthisessaythatap-prehendingthesepointsofcontinuityandrupturewithLeninismarenotonlyfundamentaltorescuingGramsci’sideasfromtheclutchesofliberalacademic

appropriations,butforreconceptualizingtheplaceoftheseideaswithinourprojectofreconceptualizingcommuniststrategytoday.

The Strengths and Limitations of Lenin’s State and Revolution

AsthetitleofLenin’sStateandRevolution(S&R)suggests,thequestionoftheStateandthequestionofrevolutionareinter-twined;andthefirstshouldbeansweredbeforethesecond.Howoneconceptual-izestheStatecomestobearuponhowoneconceptualizestherevolutionthatisrequiredtooverthrowit.

S&Riswritteninthethroesofthefirstinter-imperialistwarandpublishedontheeveoftheRussianrevolutioninAugust1917.S&Rwasintendedtobeadecisivepolemicalinterventionagainstalltherevi-sionistforcesoftheSecondInternationalandtheir“superstitionsconcerningthe‘State’”(Lenin,StateandRevolution,p.5),morethananyotherstheMensheviksandSocialistRevolutionarieswhoweresup-portingthebourgeoisKerenskygovern-mentaftertheFebruaryrevolution.

TheapproachofLenin’sS&RistoreclaimtheideasofMarxandEngels,or“thoseaspectsoftheirteachingswhichhavebeenforgottenoropportunisticallydistorted”(p.6)by“resuscitat[ing]therealteachingsofMarxonthestate”(p.7).Ines-sence,Leninismakingaseriesofaffirma-

A monument to Gramsci under construction in 2013 at a housing complex in the Bronx. So people still find Gramsci relevant.


tionsofrevolutionaryMarxisminlightoftheSecondInternational’susurpation,degeneration,andrevisionismofsomeofthebasictenetsputforwardbyMarxandEngels.Amongtheseaffirmationsincludethepointsthat:

• “Thestateistheproductandthemanifestationoftheirreconcilabilityofclassantagonisms,”and,therefore,“theexistenceofthestateprovesthatthestateclassantagonismsareirreconcilable”(p.8);

• Thestateisaninstrumentfortheexploitationoftheoppressedclasses;andfinally,

• Thestateismadeupof“specialbodiesofarmedmenwhohaveattheirdisposalprisons,etc.”(p.10),whichiscontrastedwiththe“self-actingarmedorganizationofthepopulation”thatprecededtheriseofthestate.

TheseideologicalinterventionswereessentialontheeveoftheRussianrevo-lutionforestablishingadefiniteclarityabouttheinabilityofthebourgeoisstate(managedbytheKerenskygovernment,aftertheFebruaryrevolution)toserveasamediatingforceforresolvingtheantagonismofclassesinRussia.Thethirdaffirmation,concerning“specialbod-iesofarmedmen”intheserviceofclassdictatorship,underscorestheneedforanarmedforceoftheproletariattoreplacebourgeoisdictatorshipwithatransitionalproletariandictatorship.AsubstantialpartoftherestofS&Risdedicatedtodefendingthehistoricalnecessityofadictatorshipoftheproletariatasanin-strumentforrepressingthebourgeoisie.AsLeninputsit,

Opportunismdoesnotleadtherecognitionofclassstruggleuptothemainpoint,uptotheperiodof

transitionfromcapitalismtoCommu-nism,uptotheperiodofoverthrow-ingandcompletelyabolishingthebourgeoisie…thestateduringthisperiodinevitablymustbeastatethatisdemocraticinanewway(fortheproletariatandthepooringeneral)anddictatorialinanewway(againstthebourgeoisie)(30-1).

InaffirmingtheseessentialthesesofMarxismonthequestionofthestate,LeninisaffirmingananalysisofthestatethatwhileevidentlyapplicabletoRussia–consideringthesuccessoftheRussian

revolution–isarguablylessapplicabletootherwesternStatesatthetimeofLenin’swriting.Lenin’sexclusiveempha-sisonthecoerciveaspectsofthestate–asadictatorshipoftherulingclass(es),withits“specialbodiesofarmedmen”–whileessential,overlooksthoseaspectsofbourgeoispowerthatarebeyondtherepressiveapparatus,suchasinideol-ogyandcivilsocietywhereconsensualdominationisexercised,therealmofhegemony.Itisdifficultandwouldbeer-roneoustofaultLeninwithnotdevelop-ingatheoryofthestatemoreapplicabletotheconditionsofsocietiesotherthanRussia.S&R,whilearguablycontainingcertainuniversalpositionsonthebour-geoisstate,isnotacompletelyuniversalviewoftheStateinitsmodernform,oreveninLenin’sday.

Thoseaspectsofbourgeoispowerconstitutedintherealmofcivilsocietywerealreadywell-developedandquiteformidableinthecapitalist-imperialistcountriestotheWestinLenin’stime,andcertainlyunderwentfurtherdevelopmentbetweentheinter-imperialistwarswiththevastexpansionoftheproductivebaseofcapitalism.GramsciacknowledgedthedifferencesbetweentheRussianstateandthewesternEuropeanstatesatthemomentoftheRussianrevolutionwhenhereflectedmorethanadecadelaterinhisprisonnotebooksthat

IntheEasttheStatewaseverything,civilsocietywasprimordialandgelatinous;intheWest,therewasaproperre-lationbetweenStateandcivilsociety,andwhenthestatetottered,asturdystructureofcivilsocietywasimmediate-lyrevealed.TheStatewasjustaforwardtrench;behinditstoodasuccessionofsturdyfortressesandemplacements.

(Gramsci[1930-32],SelectionsfromthePrisonNotebooks,238).

Therefore,theurbaninsurrectionthatsucceededinRussiawouldprovelessthansufficienttotopplethemore“sturdyfortresses”ofthemoreadvancedcapital-istregimes,asthepostwarperiodwouldrevealattheexpenseofgreatlossestotheproletarianmovement.

ButwiththetriumphoftheRussianrevo-lution,theenormousprestigeofLenin-isminitswake,andtheurgentnecessityofbuildinganinternationalcommunistmovementinthecontextofthepostwarrevolutionarysituationmeantthattheCommunistPartyoftheSovietUnionservedasamajorpoleofattractionfornewcommunistpartiesaroundtheworld.Inthecontextoftherevolutionarysitu-


ationintheimmediatepostwarperiodwherearapidregroupementofcommu-nistforceswasrequired,unfortunatelyemulationtrumpedinnovation.TheconsequenceofinadequatetheorizationofthestateintheICMledtotheapplica-tionofstrategiesandtacticsill-conceivedforcontextsotherthanwheretheywereoriginallyformulated.

ThisisnottosuggestthattherewerenocontributionsbyLeninthatwereuni-versal,andthatshouldnothavebeenappropriatedofbythenewCommunistParties.Lenin’sconceptionofthevan-guardpartyandtheBolshevikexamplesetitapartfromthefailed‘massparties’ofsocialdemocracythatplacedtheproletariatundertheleadershipofthepetty-bourgeoisie,labouraristocracy,andopportunistsalmostuniversally.Lenin’stheoryofimperialismwasalsoasignifi-canttheoreticalcontribution,notonlyinadvancinginternationalismanddevelop-inganti-colonialismwithinthecommu-nistmovement,butalsoinexplainingtherelationshipbetweenimperialismandthecorruptionofthe‘bourgeoisi-fied’sectionoftheworking-class.TheseelementsofLeninismallcontributedtoitswidespreadappealforcommunistregroupementintheimmediatepostwarperiod.ButthestrengthofLeninism,anditscanonizationintheCommunistInter-national,alsorelievedcommunistpartiesoftheirdutyofcreativelyadaptinganddevelopingMarxism-Leninisminrelationtotheirdomesticcontexts.

AnothermajorlimitationofS&Rthatshouldbementionedhere,andisrel-evanttotheconceptualinnovationsbyGramsci,concernsthesupposed“wither-ingawayofthestate”aftertherevolutionthatLenindefendsinhisbook.LenindefendsEngels’positionontheques-tionofthe“witheringaway”ofthestate,whichwasthatitcanonlycomeaftertheproletarianrevolution,andthatitisanactofsocialistsociety.LeninaffirmsEngels’positionagainsttheopportunistswhousethisphraseagainsttheessenceofwhatEngelsmeantinordertoproposeaprocessof“slow,even,gradualchange,freefromtheleapsandstorms,freefromrevolution.Thecurrentpopularconcep-tion…ofthe‘witheringaway’ofthestateundoubtedlymeansaslurringover,ifnotanegation,ofrevolution”(StateandRevolution,16).Thepointisreiterated

byLeninthatthebourgeoisstatedoesnot“witheraway…butis‘putanendto’bytheproletariatinthecourseoftherevolution.Whatwithersawayaftertherevolutionistheproletarianstateorsemi-state”(17).Engels’ownpolemicwasaimedatboththereformistsandtheanarchists:theformerfortheirrejectionofrevolution,thelatterforrefusingtounderstandthestate(inallitsforms)isnotsimply“smashed”inonegrandnight.Leninfurtherclarifieshispositiononthispointlaterinthetextwhenhestates:“theproletarianstatewillbegintowitherawayimmediatelyafteritsvic-tory,becauseinasocietywithoutclassantagonisms,thestateisunnecessaryandimpossible”(25).

Onceagain,inmakingtheseaffirmations,Leninwascounteringthedistortionsoftheopportunists.ButwhatS&Rhastosayonthisquestionishistoricallylimitedbyvirtueofasocialistsocietyhavingnotyetexisted.ButthehistoricalexperienceofsocialistsocietythatfollowstheRus-sianrevolutionrevealsinpracticethat,quitetheoppositeofwitheringaway,classstruggleragesonwithinsocialistsociety,andnotjustagainsttheolden-emies,thebourgeoisie,butnewonesaswell.Thebourgeoisieanditsforeignim-perialistsponsorsinRussiaaremilitarilydefeatedbytheendoftheCivilWar;andanyremnantsoftheruralbourgeoisieareliquidatedbytheforcedcollectiviza-tionpoliciesofthelate1920s.However,thisdoesnotpreventtheriseofanewbourgeoisiewithintheSovietUnion,whichintimecomestoexerciseinflu-ence,leadership,andultimatelycontrolovertheCPSUinsubsequentdecades.SufficeittosaythatforthepurposesofthisessaythattheprotractedandviolentstruggleswithintheSovietUnionitself,fromthecivilwartotheforcedcollec-tivizations,certainlybearsitsmarkuponGramsci’snotionofthesortofproletar-ianpowerthatwouldberequiredtomakerevolutionincountrieswithevenmorepowerfulanddeeplyentrenchedbourgeoissocialrelations.Gramsciwasaffordedwiththehindsighttoseethatthegreatestchallengefacingthedicta-torshipoftheproletariatwasnotsimplyinseizingstatepower,butholdingontoit,maintainingthedictatorshipoftheproletariatinthefaceofallexternalandinternalenemiesinawaythatmoved

socialistsocietycloserandclosertocom-munism.Whentheproblemisposedlikeso,thequestionthenarisesofwhatformsofproletarianpowerarenecessaryintheleaduptoarevolutioninordertobestsecurethedictatorshipoftheproletariataftertherevolution?TheanswertothisquestionentailsarethinkingofbothformsofStates–thedictatorshipsofthebourgeoisieandoftheproletariat.AndtothesequestionsGramscirespondswithaprotractedrevolutionarystrategythatelaboratestheLeninistpartyformandcommuniststrategyinawaythatarticu-latestherelationshipbetweenthePartyandtheorganizationsofthemassesthathadnotyetbeenclearlyarticulatedintheinternationalcommunistmovement,andwasonlyjustbeginningtotakeformintheChineseCommunistParty.

The Historical Context and Gramsci’s Political Work Prior to the Prison Notebooks

ItmustbesaidthatGramsci’sconceptualapparatusisnotentirelyoriginal.ThisisnotadiminutionofGramsci’sthought,butratherarecognitionthatGramsciquiteclearlybuildsuponMarxist-Leninistfoundations.Buttobesure,Gramscidoesnotsimplyapplywhathecalled“philoso-phyofpraxis”(Marxism)totheItaliansitu-ation–youknow,breakouttheoldMarx-isttoolbagandbeginputtingthemtoworkinItaly.Rather,Gramsciarticulatesaconceptualapparatusthatattemptstogetbeyondsomeofthelimitationsandunder-developedaspectsofLeninism,ideasthatmaybeinstructiveforourownchallengestoday.

Thecommunistmovementprovedinsuf-ficientlycapableofemergingvictoriouslyfromtherevolutionarycrisisafterWorldWarI.Itsgainswereimportant;butitsdefeatswerenotinsignificantandowedalottothelackofpreparationofCom-munistPartiesforthetaskstheyfaced.WiththeexceptionoftheBolsheviks,virtuallyallcommunistpartiesemergedasbreakawaysorleft-polesofpre-existingsocialdemocratic,socialistand/orsyndi-calistorganizationswhicheitherhadnoclearstrategyforrevolution,orwerenotworkingtowardsaforcefulrevolutionarytransformation.InItaly,thebasefortheformationofthePCIwastheleftten-dencyintheSocialistPartythatdefined


themselvesas‘electoralabsentionists’(thesameSocialistPartyoutofwhichMussolinioriginates!).Noneoftheseformationswerepreparedtomeetthechallengesofproletarianrevolutionandallthequestionsthatwentalongwithit.Nonewerepreparedtoanswertheques-tionofbywhatmeanscantheproletariattakeandholdontopowerandcrushtheresistanceoftheexploitersandoppres-sors.

BythetimeoftheformationofthePar-titoComunistad’Italia(PCI),thepostwarrevolutionarycrisisalreadypeakedandpassedwiththeTurinmetalworkersstrikeinApril1920,whereaneffectivedualpowerexistedbetweenrevolu-tionaryworkersandthebosses(HoareandNowellSmith:xl-xli“Introduction”toGramsci’sSelectionsfromPrisonNotebooks).TheclosestItalycametoitsinsurrectionarymomentwaslaterin1920withthefactorycouncilmovementwhichextendedfromMilantoTurinandallacrossmuchofthecountry.HoareandNowell,theeditorsofthefirstEnglisheditionoftheSelectionsfromthePrisonNotebooks,summarizethefailuresoftheearlyItaliancommunistmovement:

[Gramsci’s]OrdineNuovomighthaveimplantedanideathathadcaughtimaginationofthemasses;theintransigentsandBordiga’sabstentionistfractionmighthavedefinedanattitudewhichrejectedallcompromises;butnoteventheseforces–andhowmuchlessthemassorganizations,theParty,andthetradeunions–hadmadeanyseriousattempttoorganizetheproletariat,onanationalscale,forarevolutionaryassaultonthecapitaliststate.Instead,whattranspiredwasthestatetakinginitiativetodisarmthemovementthroughconcessions,whilebegin-ningtoarmandfinancethefascistsquads.Inshort,theylackedeventhesortofdisciplinedvanguardorganiza-tionthatLeninhadbeenadvocatingsince1903asanalternativetotheopportunistorganizationalstructuresofsocialdemocracy,andthatGramsciwouldcometofurtherelaborateupon.Bordiga’seffectiveleadershipwithinthePartycametoanendwiththesmashingofthePartyapparatus,whichreduceditsmembershipby80%to5000members(lv).

InSeptember1923,Gramsciproposedcreatinganewworking-classdaily,Unitá,alongthelinesoftheOrdineNuevoof1919-1920,andproposedthecreationof“afederalrepublicofworkersandpeas-ants”asideologicalpreparationforaSo-vietregimeinItaly.AsHoareandNowellrecount,“GramscisidedwithBordigainresistingtheComintern’sadviceofadhe-siontothePSI,butbrokewithhimonaseriesofotherquestions,particularlyhislackofapositivestrategyforItalyandhisdesiretostartaninternationalistopposi-tiontotheComintern”(lxi).GramscialsodifferentiatedhimselffromBordigaonthequestionoftherelationshipbetweenPartyandmasses.Takinghistoricalinspirationfromhowthecommissioniinterneofthefactorycouncils1919-1920servedasacountertotheleadershipofthereformisttradeunionmovement,theConfederazioneGeneraledelLavora(CGL),Gramsciarguedthatthemassorganizationsofproletarianrevolutionweretheinstitutionalbasisofthedicta-torshipoftheproletariat.

InresponsetothesetbackstothePCI,andwithBordigaincaptivity,GramsciproposedanewstrategicorientationforthecommunistmovementinItaly.Gramscistrategicpointsincluded:

1. Intensivepropagandaforaworker-peasantgovernment;

2. Astruggleagainstthelabouraris-tocracyandreformismtocementan

alliancebetweennorthernworkersandsouthernpeasants;

3. Anewprogrammeofpoliticaleducationinthepartytoovercomepastdivisionsthatwerenolongerdecisive;and

4. SteppingupcommunistactivityintheémigrépopulationinFrance.

ThefoundationofGramsci’sstrategicpointswashisnewconceptionoftheParty:

Theerrorofthepartyhasbeentohaveaccordedpriorityinanabstractfashiontotheproblemoforganisa-tion,whichinpracticehassimplymeantcreatinganapparatusoffunctionarieswhocouldbedependedonfortheirorthodoxytowardstheofficialview…Thecommunistpartyhasevenbeenagainsttheformationoffactorycells.Anyparticipationofthemassesintheactivityandinternallifeoftheparty,otherthanonbigoc-casionsandfollowingaformaldecreefromthecentre,hasbeenseenastheresultofadialecticalprocessinwhichthespontaneousmovementoftherevolutionarymassesandtheorganis-inganddirectingwillofthecentreconverge;ithasbeenseenmerelyassomethingsuspendedintheair,somethingwithitsownautonomousandself-generateddevelopment,somethingwhichthemasseswilljoin

Italian “Red Guards” – dated 20 September 1920


whenthesituationisrightandthecrestoftherevolutionarywaveisatitshighestpoint,orwhenthepartycentredecidestoinitiateanoffensiveandstoopstothelevelofthemassesinordertoarousethemandleadthemintoaction(lxii-iii).

ThisisessentiallyacritiqueofthepartyformunderBordiga,abureaucraticcen-tralistorganizationalstructure.Bordiga’sconceptionofthePartymayhaveop-posedthereformiststructuresoftheSecondInternationalparties.ButneithercouldtheconceptionofthePartythathemaintainedbringaboutapositivestrat-egyforthemakingofrevolutioninItaly,noranorganizationalformtoidentifyandcarrythroughsuchastrategy.Bythespring1924electioninwhichthePCIpar-ticipated,undertheguidanceofGrams-ci’sstrategicchanges,thePartyhadonceagaingrownto12,000members.

ThefoundationofGramsci’sstrategywasaclassanalysisthatembracedLenin’sthe-oryofthelabouraristocracyandappliedittoItaly,recognizingtheobstaclesthatthisstratumoflabourposedtoproletar-ianrevolution.However,atthisperiodoftime,thisstratumoflabouronlyreallydominatedthelabourmovementintheadvancedcapitalist-imperialistcountries,wherethebourgeoisifiedstratumofla-bourplaysitspartindiscipliningthepro-letariatandchannelingitsstrugglesintoarenasofstrugglewherethebourgeoisiealwayswins.Whereasthebackwardnessandunder-developednatureofcapital-isminRussiahadmeantthatthemasseswerenotunderthedominationofalabouraristocracy,Gramscipointedoutthatin:

…CentralandwesternEuropethedevelopmentofcapitalismhasdeterminednotonlytheformationofbroadproletarianstrata,butalsoandasaconsequencehascreatedthehigherstratum,thelabouraristocracywithitsappendagesoftrade-unionbureaucracyandthesocial-demo-craticgroups.Thedetermination,whichinRussiawasdirectanddrovethemassesintothestreetsforarevolutionaryuprising,incentralandwesternEuropeiscomplicatedbyallthesesuperstructures,createdbythegreaterdevelopmentofcapitalism;thismakestheactionofthemasses

slowerandmoreprudent,andthere-forerequiresoftherevolutionarypartyastrategyandtacticsalto-gethermorecomplexandlong-termthanthosewhichwerenecessaryfortheBolsheviksintheperiodbetweenMarchandNovember1917(lxvi-ii).

TheperiodinwhichGramsciledthePCIwasthepracticalbasisfortheworkingoutofhisthinkinginprison.GramscidismissedZinoviev’sscapegoatingoftheGermanCommunistParty’sBrandlerforthefailureofthe1923attemptataninsurrection,andofferedadeepercritiqueofitsattemptasbeingputschist.UnderthenewstrategyandGramsci’sleadership,thePCImadeconsiderableadvancesdespitethegrowingstrengthoffascism.Asrepressionintensifiedthroughout1925,Gramsciviewedinsurrectionasonlypossiblethroughaunificationofworkersandpeasantscom-mitteeswellpreparedinadvance.Theformerwouldtaketheformofautono-mousfactorycommittees,whiledefend-ingtheindependenceoftheCGLfromfascistliquidation.Attemptswerealsobeingmadetocreateanundergroundapparatus.Despiteintensifyingrepres-sion,PCImembershiproseto27,000members,withanincreasingproportioncomingfromtheranksofthepeasantry.Gramscicametorecognizethatthesitu-ationwasqualitativelychanging,andthisledtohis1926paperontheSouthernQuestion,inwhichhearticulatedhisthesesonthedualroleofthenorthernproletariatandthesouthernpeasantry.

IntheearlymonthsofGramsci’sincarcer-ation,beforefacingsolitaryconfinement,Gramsci’spoliticalagitationinprisoncanbeseenastheseminalformoftheprofoundtheoreticalpointsthathelaterworkedoutinprisonnotebooksoverthecomingdecade.Thesetheoreticalpointsconsistedofthefollowing:

1. Theconceptionofthepartyasbeingledbytheorganicintellectualsoftheproletariat;

2. Theneedformilitaryorganizationunderstoodnotinnarrowtechnicaltermsbutbroadpoliticalterms;

3. Theimportanceoftheintermediatesloganof“constituentassembly,”asfirstameansofwinningalliesforthe

proletariatinitsstruggleagainsttherulingclass,andsubsequentlyontheshiftingterraintostruggleagainstallcompromiseandcapitulation;

4. Amorepreciseformulationoftheworker-peasantallianceunderthesloganof“arepublicofworkerandpeasantsovietsinItaly”;

5. FascismasaparticularexpressionofthebourgeoisrevolutiononthebasisofItaly’sspecificities,whichincludedthelackofunityamongstItaly’sbourgeoisie;

6. CounteringtheweightoftheCatho-licChurch;and

7. Thenecessityofproletarianhege-monyoverthepeasantry(xci).

FromsomeofGramsci’sstrategicpoints,Ibelievewecanextrapolatequestionsofsignificancefortheentireinternationalcommunistmovement(manyofwhichhavebeenrespondedtobyMaoism.Butlet’sholdoffonelaboratingthoseforPartIIofthisessay.).Ifindthatthesegeneralcontributionsconsistatleastofthefol-lowing:

• Thequestionofactualproletarianleadershipintheproletarianrevo-lutionaryparty,towhichGramscirespondswiththe“organicintellectu-al”andtowhichMaorespondswiththeconceptofthemassline[Point1above];

• Anunderstandingofthemilitaryquestionasapoliticalquestion,ofwaraspoliticsandpoliticalstruggleasaformofmilitarystruggle[Point2above];

• Aclassanalysisthatdifferentiatesamongthepopularclasseswhichwillplaytheleadingroleintherevolu-tion,whichconstituteanumericallymainforce,andwhichmustfollowthehegemonyofotherclasses[Points4and7].

ItwasonlyincidentallythatGramsci’ssister-in-lawTatianaSchuchtwasabletosmuggleouthis33prisonnotebooksafterhisdeath,allowingustostudyhowGramscidevelopsthesepointsoverthecourseofnearlyadecadeinfascistprisons.


The Prison Notebooks: Towards a ‘War of Position’

Themainconcernoftheprisonnote-booksisthedevelopmentof“thephiloso-phyofpraxis”withtheaimofrejuvenat-ingcommuniststrategyinlightofthefailuresandsetbacksinGramsci’speriod.Howeverfragmentarythepassagesofthenotebooksare,theycomposeatotal-izingsystemofthoughtinwhichamajorfocalpointisthequestionofstrategy.WhilethereissomuchmoretotheprisonnotebooksintermsofGramsci’sintellec-tualcontributionsthanquestionsofclasswarandstrategy–hence,theGramscibeingatreasuretroveforliberalacadem-ics–manyofthenotespointbacktowhatGramscicallsthewarofposition.Butthisconceptcanonlybeappreciatedbyunpackingsomeoftheconceptualapparatusbuiltuparounditthroughouttheprisonnotebooks,whichincludesconceptssuchasthehistoricalbloc;the‘analysisofsituations’;hegemony;Gramsci’sconceptofphilosophyandtheorganicintellectual;hisdistinctnotionoftheParty;andfinally,hisexplanationofcivilsociety.

UnderstandingtheHistoricalBloc

OneofthecoreconceptsofGramsci’sprisonnotebooksisthe‘historicalbloc’.Whilethetermisonlyscarcelymen-tionedintheprisonnotebooks,giventheconcept’sroleinframingmuchofGramsci’sconceptualapparatusitcanbearguedthatGramsci’sprisonnotebooksarealong-runningelaborationoftheconcept.Thereisnosectiondedicatedtothehistoricalbloc,onlyacoupleshortpassages:

Conceptof‘historicalbloc’,i.e.unitybetweennatureandspirit(structureandsuperstructure)unityofoppo-sitesandofdistincts(137).

Structuresandsuperstructuresforman‘historicalbloc’.Thatistosaythecomplex,contradictoryanddiscor-dantensembleofthesuperstructuresisthereflectionoftheensembleofthesocialrelationsofproduction(366).

IfImaytakethelibertytofleshthisoutsomewhat,inlightofmyreadingoftheprisonnotebooks,thehistoricalbloc

istheorganicbutcontradictoryunitybetweenthedominantandsubalternsocialgroupsinagivenhistoricalperiod,therelationsofwhicharehistoricallyemergentandneedtobeunderstoodassuchinordertounderstandthenatureoftherelationsamongthesesocialgroupsinthepresent.Whereas‘nature’hereisconsideredrelativelyfixedandgenerallychangesonlyovermuchlongerperiods,the‘Spirit’isthecontradictoryunitybetweenstructuralandsuper-structuralelementsinablocoftime.Ontheonehand,theconceptofthehistoricalblocisaratherorthodoxreformulationofMarx’shistoricalmaterialism,aprinciplethesisofwhichGramsciparaphrasesatcertainpointsthroughouttheprisonnotebooks:“1.Thatnosocialformationdisappearsaslongastheproductiveforceswhichhavedevelopedwithinitstillfindroomforfurtherforwardmovement;thatasocietydoesnotsetitselftasksforwhosesolutionthenecessaryconditionshavenotalreadybeenincubated”(106).

Ontheotherhand,Gramsci’selabora-tionofthearchitectureofthehistoricbloc(withoutactuallyreferencingtheterm)throughouttheprisonnotebooksrevealsanawarenessoftheincrediblydynamicandever-shiftingcharacteroftherelationshipsamongthe“discor-dant…ensembleofthesocialrelationsofproduction”(366).TheacuteawarenessofthedynamismatplayamongstvariouslevelsofrelationsofforceisafeatureofGramsci’sthinkingthatmakeshisanalysesofhistorysopenetratingandhisoverallmethodofhistoricalandpoliticalanalysissuchaforceofrejuvenationfor“thephilosophyofpraxis”andthecom-munistmovement.Ofparticularimpor-tanceforGramsci,andforanycommu-nistmovement,isacomprehensivestudyoftheoppressedandexploitedclasseswithintheirownhistoricalbloc.

Inhisnote“HistoryoftheSubalternClasses:MethodologicalCriteria”,Gramsciprovidesaschemaforwhatsuchahistoricalreconnaissanceactuallycon-sistsofwhenitcomestothe“subalternclasses.”WhereasthehistoricalunityoftherulingclassesisrealizedintheState(andthereforeitshistoricaldevelopmentcanbetracedthroughthedevelopmentoftheStateaswell),

Thesubalternclasses,bydefinition,

arenotunifiedandcannotuniteuntiltheyareabletobecomea“State”:theirhistory,therefore,isintertwinedwiththatofcivilsociety,andtherebywiththehistoryofStatesandgroupsofStates.Henceitisnecessarytostudy:1.Theobjectiveformationofsubalternsocialgroups,bydevelop-mentsandtransformationsoccurringinthesphereofeconomicproduction;theirquantitativediffusionandtheiroriginsinpre-existingsocialgroups,whosementality,ideology,andaimstheyconserveforatime;2.theirac-tiveorpassiveaffiliationtothedomi-nantsocialformation,theirattemptstoinfluencetheprogrammesoftheseformationsinordertopressclaimsoftheirown…3.thebirthofnewpartiesofthedominantgroups,intendedtoconservetheassentofthesubal-terngroupsandtomaintaincontroloverthem;4.theformationswhichthesubalterngroupsthemselvesproduce,inordertopressclaimsofalimitedandpartialcharacter;5.thosenewformationswhichasserttheautonomyofthesubalterngroups,butwithintheoldframework;6.thoseformationswhichasserttheintegralautonomy(52).

Thisschematicoutlineforstudyingthesubalternisamajorcomponentforunderstandingthehistoricalbloc.Thismethodofhistoricalanalysisisthemeansbywhichacommunistforma-tionultimatelydetermineswhetherornotafavourablesituationexistsforthesubalternsocialgroupstoaccumulaterevolutionaryforcesandwhetherthesituationisfavourabletothembecomingtherulingclassatagivenconjunctureofhistory;inotherwords,theessenceofthishistoriographicalmethodreducestothequestionofwhetherthesituationisfavourableforrevolutioninthepresenthistoricalbloc.

ThefactordrivingthedynamismwithinGramsci’shistoricalschemaultimatelyre-ducesintoaquestionofthedevelopmentofthemodeofproduction.AsGramscireiteratesinhisoutliningoftheconceptofthepassiverevolution,

Noformationdisappearsaslongastheproductiveforceswhichhavedevelopedwithinitstillfindroomforfurtherforwardmovement;2.


thatasocietydoesnotsetitselftasksforwhosesolutionthenecessaryconditionshavenotalreadybeenincubated,etc.Itgoeswithoutsay-ingthattheseprinciplesmustfirstbedevelopedcriticallyinalltheirimplications,andpurgedofeveryresidueofmechanismandfatalism.Theymustthereforebereferredbacktothedescriptionofthethreefundamentalmomentsintowhicha‘situation’oranequilibriumofforcescanbedistinguished,withthegreat-estpossiblestressonthesecondmo-ment(equilibriumofpoliticalforces),andespeciallyonthethirdmoment(politico-militaryequilibrium)(106-7).

Here,Gramscidirectlylinkshismethodofhistoricalanalysistoanelaborationofthephilosophyofpraxisthatheprovidesinhisnote“Analysisofsituations.”Theim-plicitstatementhereisthattheobjectofthestudyofhistoryandanaccountofthehistoricalblocistograspthesituation,andthevariouslevelsofforcethatmakeupagivensituation.

Grasping‘thesituation’andRelationsofForceatThreeLevels

Inhisexplicationofthenotionof‘asitu-ation’thecontoursofatheoryofrevolu-tionbegintoemergewhichdistinguishesGramscifromcommuniststrategies

overlyfocuseduponwhathecallstherapidwarofsiege/warofmaneuver.GramscidirectlycritiquesTrotsky’sconceptof‘permanentrevolution’,Lux-emburg’sadvocacyofthemassstrike,andsyndicalism’smethodsingeneralforeachforoverestimatingthecapacityofthewarofmaneuver(238)toover-whelmbourgeoispowerandallofthembeingladenwithnotionsofspontane-itybecause–asweshallseeinfurtherelucidationsofGramsci’notionsonstateandcivilsocietybelow–theymisidentifythelocusofpowerofthebourgeoisie,atleastinthecaseofthemoreadvancedcapitalistcountrieswherecivilsocietyismoreadvanced.Aproperanalysisofasituationisapreconditionforrevealingtheobjectiveconditionsfororagainsttherevolution.

“Thestudyofhow‘situations’shouldbeanalyzed,”Gramscitellsus,isto“estab-lishthevariouslevelsoftherelationsofforces,”andthis,ultimately,iswhatconstitutesthe“elementaryexpositionofthescienceandartofpolitics”(175).Suchananalysisofthesituation,Gramscitellsus,isthebasisforformulationofthestra-tegicplanwithastrategyandtactics,forpropagandaandagitation,fordevelop-ingthecommandstructure,organizationofthearmedforces,andresolvingotherquestionspertainingtoorganizationalstructure(175).

Onceonehasresolved“theproblemoftherelationsbetweenstructureandsu-perstructure”–inotherwords,thenatureofthecontradictionsinthestructureofsocietyandthetrajectoryoftheirdevel-opment–onecanproceedtocorrectlyanalyzetheroleoftheforcesthatareactiveinthehistoryofaparticularperiod.However,onemustalsobeabletodistin-guishbetweentheorganic(orstructural)andtheconjuncturalcrises,whichdifferfromoneanotherbyvirtueofbeinglong-termcrisesconsistingofbasiccontradic-tioninthestructureofsocietyversustheconjuncturalphenomenonarisingfrom“occasional,immediate,andalmostaccidental”movementsinthesuperstruc-ture(177).“Acommonerrorinhistorico-politicalanalysisconsistsinaninabilitytofindthecorrectrelationbetweenwhatisorganicandwhatisconjunctural,”andGramsciwarnsthatsuchlinesofresearchare“mostseriousintheartofpolitics,whenitisnotreconstructingpasthis-torybuttheconstructionofpresentandfuturehistorywhichisatstake”(178-9).Whatthisreconstructionconsistsofisadeterminationoftheimmediaterelationsofforcethatdefinethesituation.

Gramscidefinesthreelevelsofrelationsofforce,beginningfromthemoststructuralandproceedingintothesuperstructural.Thefirstistherelationofsocialforces,whichis

closelylinkedtothestructure,objec-tive,independentofhumanwillandwhichcanbemeasuredwiththesys-temsoftheexactorphysicalscienc-es…Bystudyingthesefundamentaldataitispossibletodiscoverwhetherinaparticularsocietythereexistthenecessaryandsufficientconditionsforitstransformation(181).

Thedevelopmentofanyclashofpoliti-calormilitaryforceswilloriginatefromcontradictionsatthislevel.

Thesubsequentmomentistherelationofpoliticalforces,“inotherwords,anevaluationofthedegreeofhomogeneity,self-awareness,andorganisationattainedbythevarioussocialclasses”(181).Bywayofexamplepulledfromelsewhereintheprisonnotebooks,Gramsci’smethodologicalcriteriaforconductinghistoricalresearchintothesubalternclasses–pointsfourthroughtosix,which

Despite the overthrow of immensely popular liberation theology priest Jean-Bertrand Aristide twice in a decade by U.S.-led imperialism, for years after the 2004 occupation the Haitian masses remained militant and mobilized. But Aris-tide never supported arming the people during his term, nor after he was overthrown. Neither was his political party, Lavalas, willing to build an armed struggle after the occupation, despite armed resistance from the urban masses in


dealwiththepoliticalformationscreatedbythesubalternclasses,rangingfromthoselimitedtopressingtheirclaimsinalimitedmannerandindependenceuponthebourgeoisieallthewayuptoaninte-gralandrevolutionaryway–aremethodsbywhichonecandeterminethelevelofpoliticalforcesofthesubalternclasses(52).

Thethirdmomentistherelationofmili-taryforces,whichGramscibreaksdownfurtherintomilitaryforcesandpolitico-militaryforces,whichbecomedecisiveforthesubordinatesocialclassesifandonlywhenallthreelevelsofrelationsofforcesexistinthefavourofthesubalternsocialclassesandareseizeduponbythesocial,political,andmilitaryactorstheyhaveconstituted.Ofcourse,oppressedpeoplecantakearmedactionwithoutthesocialandpoliticalrelationsofforcesbeingfavourable.Butthesearealwaysdefeatedandareeasilydismissedasactsofterrorism(nomattertheactualcontentofthearmedact)ifthepoliticalforcesarenotsufficientlycapableofdefendingthearmedactions.Butifthesocial,political,andmilitaryrelationsofforceareindeedfavourableandsufficientlymature,thenwhatitmeansforasituationtobeseizeduponisasfollows:

Thedecisiveelementineverysitu-ationisthepermanentlyorganisedandlong-preparedforcewhichcanbeputintothefieldwhenitisjudgedthatasituationisfavourable(anditcanbefavourableonlyinsofarassuchaforceexists,andisfulloffight-ingspirit).Thereforetheessentialtaskisthatofsystematicallyandpatientlyensuringthatthisforceisformed,developed,andrenderedevermorehomogeneous,compact,andself-aware(185).

Whatwehavehere,inanabstractandsimpleoutline,isanhistorical-materialistanalysisofhowtodetermineifandhowtomakearevolutionandunderwhatconditionscantheconsciousinterventionofthevanguardforcesofthehistoricallyprogressiveclassesbesuccessfulinprovidingleadershiptoarevolution.Revolutiondoesnotconsistofthemomentarynumericalsuperiorityofthemassesinamassstrikeoraninsur-rection–thatis,momentarilyfavourablemilitaryrelationsofforce–butrelations

offorcethatcorrespondtoeverylevelofrelationsofforce.AndforthepoliticalrelationsofforcetobeinthefavouroftheproletariatanditsalliesincountriesundercircumstanceswherebourgeoispowerextendsbeyondtheformalinstitutionsofgovernmentandState,itsleadingforcesmustdomorethanmusteranarmyforapitchedbattleandaday’svictory.

ThisformulationisasharpcritiqueofthewayinsurrectioncametobeconceivedwithintheCommunistInternational,theworstexpressionofwhichwasTrotsky’s‘permanentrevolution’.ButitisalsoamuchsharperformulationofhowtoperformageneralanalysisofasituationthanthatofferedbyLenin.Lenindefinedarevolutionarysituationasoneinwhichtherulingclasscouldnolongergoonrulingthesameway,whenthesufferingofthemasseshadreachedanintoler-ablelevel,andwhen,consequently,themassesburstintopoliticalactivity(Lenin1915).Butthisdefinitionneitherdiffer-entiatesbetweenstructuralorconjunc-turalcrises,nordoesitofferprecisionintheanalysisofrelationsofforcesthatGramsci’sphilosophyofpraxisrevealedtobenecessary.

TofullyappreciatehowGramsci’stheoryofrevolutiongoesbeyondLenin’sfoun-dationalbuthistorically-andcontextual-ly-limitedarticulation,onemustfurtherunderstandGramsci’stheoryofthe

stateandcivilsociety.Forthehistoricallyprogressiveforcestoactuallyprevailinanobjectivelyfavourablesituation,thequestionofleadershipmustbecorrectlyposedandcorrectlyanswered;whichbringsustoGramsci’sconceptsofhege-mony,theroleofintellectuals,andhisconceptualizationoftheParty.Withtheseconceptsathand,wecangainafullerap-preciationofGramsci’sideaofrevolution-arystrategy–thewarofposition.

Hegemony:Coercion&Consent

Beginningfirstwiththequestionofhegemony:Dominantsocialgroupsmaintaintheirpowerintwodistinctways:throughdomination/coercion,andthroughintellectual-moralleadership/consent.Dominantsocialgroupsdomi-natetheclasseswithwhichtheyhaveanantagonisticrelationshipbyliquidatingorsubjugatingthemthrougharmedforce(57);buttheylead“kindredandalliedgroups”byprovidingmoralandintellec-tualdirection.Solongastheproductiveforcesstillhaveroomforgreaterdevelop-mentunderagivenmodeofproduction,thedominantsocialgroupscanmaintaintheirhegemonybymakingleadershipprimaryanddominationsecondary.Butanorganiccrisis–whichconsistsoftheshiftingofthesocialcompositionofsoci-ety,theclassesandtherelationsamongthem–willengendercrisesinleadershipasthedominantsocialgroupsrelymoreheavilyuponcoerciontosubduetheiran-

We support the people armed… but armed by who? At their own initiative and with their own resources, or backed and armed by the imperialists? What social classes and which political forces are animating the civil war from within Syria? Is this Syria’s revolutionary situation? Or is the temporary

military balance of power being propped up by imperialism?


tagonistsandevenformerlyalliedclasses.

WhatisPhilosophyandwhoisthe‘Or-ganicIntellectual’

Theplaceofintellectualsinrulingclasshegemonyisthroughdiffusionofitsmoralandintellectualculture.Gramsciunderstandsthatthereisnotadirectcor-respondencebetweentherulingsocialgroupsanditsintellectualfunctionaries,butthatthelatteraredependentontheformerfortheirexistenceandservethemaccordingly:“Theintellectualsarethedominantgroup’s‘deputies’exercisingthesubalternfunctionsofsocialhegemo-nyandpoliticalgovernment,”forwhichtheyarecompensated.Gramsciincludestheworkofsuchintellectualswithintheoveralloperationandpoweroftherulingclass,notoutsideofit.

ItshouldbesaidatthispointthatGrams-ciseeseachandeverypersonasaphi-losopher,albeitwhosecapacitytothinkindependentlyrelatestothedynamicsoftheoverallsituation,themostimportantquestionofwhichis:Hasagivenclassproducedthepoliticalforcestothinkandactindependently,andtowhatextentaretheseforcesdeveloped?

Gramsciseeseachhumanbeingasaphilosopher,sinceeverypersonhasaconceptionoftheworld.ForGramsci,thereisnopurephilosophy,but“variousphilosophiesorconceptionsoftheworldexist”(326).Asforthosephilosophiesthataredisconnectedfromthepeople,eliteintellectualculturesofandinsupportofthedominantsocialclasses,Gramsciasks:

Isaphilosophicalmovementprop-erlysocalledwhenitisdevotedtocreatingaspecialisedcultureamongrestrictedintellectualgroups,orratherwhen,andonlywhen,intheprocessofelaboratingaformofthoughtsuperiorto‘commonsense’andcoherentonascientificplane,itneverforgetstoremainincontactwiththe‘simple’andindeedfindsinthiscontactthesourceoftheproblemsitsetsouttostudyandtoresolve?Onlybythiscontactdoesaphilosophybecome‘historical’,purifyitselfofintellectualisticelementsofanindividualcharacterandbecome‘life’(330).

Incontrasttothesephilosophies,“thephilosophyofpraxisdoesnottendtoleavethe‘simple’intheirprimitivephilosophyofcommonsense,butrathertoleadthemtoahigherconceptionoflife…toconstructanintellectual-moralblocwhichcanmakepoliticallypossibletheintellectualprogressofthemassandnotonlyofsmallintellectualgroups”(333).Gramsciisclearinhispositionthatforthecommunistmovementsuchanintellectualélite–whileitseffectmustbediffuseandhegemonic–isnotanunorganizedandundisciplinedcurrent.RatheritisthePartythatisthe“elabora-torofnewintegralandtotalitarian[i.e.unifiedandall-absorbing]intelligentsiasandthecrucibleswheretheunificationoftheoryandpractice,understoodasarealhistoricalprocess,takesplace”(335).TheneedforsuchaunifiedifdynamicintellectualcurrentleadsGramscitoclearrejectpartiesonthe“patternoftheBritishLabourParty”infavouroftheLeninist/Bolshevikvanguardmodel.However,asweshouldseefurtherbelow,thedeeplydemocraticandpedagogicaltasksofthecommunistpartyshouldnotbeoverlookedinGramsci’sthinking.

Theintellectualworkofsuchanintellec-tual-moralblocincludes:(1)therepeti-tionofitsbasicarguments;and(2)toraisetheintellectuallevelofthemassesandtoraisenewintellectualsdirectlyoutofthemasses.Theseintellectualsraisedfromtheranksoftheexploitedandop-pressedmassesarewhatGramscicalledorganicintellectuals,andsmall,‘indepen-dent’intellectualcurrentscannottakeupthetaskofseriouslycultivatingthissortofleadership.ThiscanonlybetakenupbytheParty,oraPartyofsorts.

TheParty:theconsciousnessofaclass

AtthispointitisworthwhiletobrieflyconsiderwhatexactlyisaParty.Gener-ally,thewordPartyinvokestheideaofanelectoralformation,unitedbyaprogramsufficienttouniteitsfunctionaries,candidates,electedmembers,rank-and-filemembershipandsufficientlyunitedtopresentitselftoawiderelectorate.ButthisisonlyaveryspecificformofaParty–theelectoralParty–andnotthegeneralsortthatGramscibringsourat-tentionto.

Gramsci’sModernPrinceoffersageneral

historicaltheorizationofpartiesinordertobettersituatetheparticulartasksofthepartyoftheproletariat.Thehistoryofthepoliticalpartyisnotthehistoryofelectoralismorthepartyconstruedinsuchnarrowterms,butratherthehistoryofthesocialclassesthemselves.Withpoli-ticstheorizedatasuperstructurallevelasbeingareflectionofcontradictionsinthefundamentalstructureofsociety,par-tiesappearallthroughouthistorywherewefindbasicclasscontradictionsinthestructureofsociety.Thehistoryofpoliti-calpartiesisnotthehistoryofitsfound-ersorleadingintellectualthinkers,butrathertheintricatenetworkofrelationswithwhichthepartyisattachedtoandorganizesitssocialclass.

Gramsciarguesthatallpartieshave(1)amasselement“whoseparticipationtakestheformofdisciplineandloyalty,ratherthananycreativespiritororganizationalability(2)acadreelement,“theprincipalcohesiveelement,”withoutwhichthefor-merwould“scatterintoanimpotentdias-poraandvanishintonothing”;and(3)“anintermediateelement,whicharticulatesthefirstelementwiththesecondandmaintainscontactbetweenthem(152-3).ThisschematicoutlineofthePartyformisofferedasamatterofobjectivehistoricalfact,onethatthecommunistpartymustobserveifitistosucceedinitstask.ThedistinctionwiththeCommunistPartyisthatitrepresentsaclasswhosehistori-calmissionistoabolishclassdistinctionsaltogether.

ThatGramscihadadistinctlyLeninistviewontheparty,butaLeninistviewnonetheless,isevidentfromthishierar-chicalstructuringofthePartyandthetasksthatitmustbepreparedtocon-front.OfparticularinteresttoGramsciconcerningthevariousstrataofthepartyishowthesestratamustbeorganizedtoguardagainstdestruction.Gramsciarguesthatfirstly,anironconvictionmustprevailamongstthevariousstratathatasolutionhasbeenfoundtothehistori-calproblemsfacedbyitsclass.Gramsci’sviewsonphilosophyclarifythatsuchanironconvictionisnotbasedondogma,butonthedevelopmentofaphiloso-phyofpraxisthatactuallyaddressestheproblemsofthemassesandadequatelyreflectsthecontoursofthehistoricalbloc.Withoutthis‘irondiscipline,’theinterme-diatestratacannotbeformed.Butthis


philosophyofpraxis,aswehaveseenintheforegoinganalysisonphilosophy,isnotasimplifiedMarxism.Gramsciwasaharshcriticofcrudematerialismandeconomism,andunderstoodthedan-gersofsuchanarticulationofMarxismincludedlosingitsconnectionwithatoplayerofintellectualsthatitneededtobringunderitshegemony(164).

Gramsciusesthemetaphorofthe“modernprince,”buildingonMachiavelli’sconceptofthePrince,tostandinfortherolerequiredofthecommunistpartytodevelopanational-popularwill,notawilldevelopedaroundanindividual,butacollectivewillofthepopularmasses:“TheprotagonistofthenewPrincecouldnotinthemodernepochbeanindividualhero,butonlythepoliticalparty”(147).

TheStateandCivilSociety

Returningtothequestionofthestateandcivilsociety,Gramsci’sdefinitionoftheStateisnotlimitedto“formalpoliti-calsociety,”whichincludestheofficialorgansoftheState,butinstead“theState

istheentirecomplexofpracticalandtheoreticalactivitieswithwhichtherul-ingclassnotonlyjustifiesandmaintainsitsdominance,butmanagestowintheactiveconsentofthoseoverwhomitrules”(244).Inotherwords,atheorizationoftheStatemustincludethoseorgansofbourgeoispowerthatareoutsideofficialbourgeois-democraticstateorgans–themere“outerditch”ofbourgeoispower–toincludetheexerciseofbourgeoisdominationofcivilsociety,wherebour-geoispowerisconstituted“inapowerfulsystemoffortressesandearthworks”(238).

Therefore,basedontheforegoingexpli-cationofGramsci’sconceptualizationsofthehistoricalbloc,relationsofforceandtheanalysisofsituations,philosophy,theorganicintellectual,theParty,andtheStateandcivilsociety,wecandevelopafullerappreciationofGramsci’sunder-standingofrevolutionarystrategy.

WarofPositionvs.WarofManeuver

Gramsciwarnedthat“inpoliticalstruggle

oneshouldnotapethemethodsoftherulingclass,oronewillfallintoeasyam-bushes”(232).ReflectingonthepostwarsituationinItaly,Gramsciwarnsintheprisonnotebooksoftryingtocountertheillegalprivatearmedorganizationsoftherulingclasseswithsimilarcommando-liketactics:

Itisstupidtobelievethatwhenoneisconfrontedbyillegalprivateactiononecancounterposetoitanothersimilaraction–inotherwords,com-batcommandotacticsbymeansofcommandotactics…Theclassfactorleadstoafundamentaldifference:aclasswhichhastoworkfixedhourseverydaycannothavepermanentandspecialisedassaultorganiza-tions–ascanaclasswhichhasamplefinancialresourcesandallofwhosemembersarenottieddownbyfixedwork(232).

Gramscialsodismissestherapidwarofmovement/warofmanoeuvreasastrategyfortheproletariatbyfocusingonLuxemburg’sconceptualizationofthe

The Black Panthers succeeded like no other revolutionary organization in its era – arguably in the whole of the twentieth century America – in the recruitment of this “mass element.” However, the breakneck speed of the organization’s growth overwhelmed its capacity to preserve the unity of its cadre – that “principle cohesive element” – when faced with repression and counter-intelligence.


massstrike,wherein

theimmediateeconomicelement(crises,etc.)isseenasthefieldartil-lerywhichinwaropensabreachintheenemy’sdefenses–abreachsufficientforone’sowntroopstorushinandobtainadefinitive(strategic)victory…Thisviewwasaformofironeconomicdeterminism,withtheag-gravatingfactorthatitwasconceivedofasoperatingwithlightningspeedintimeandspace.Itwasthusoutandouthistoricalmysticism(233).

Forthemodernproletariat,however,itisthewarofpositionthatisthestrategyforproletarianrevolution–aprotractedrevolutionarystrategy(moreontheparallelswithMao’sprotractedpeople’swarinPartIIofthispaper).Withthefailedattemptsatproletarianrevolutionsintheearly1920sweighingheavilyuponGramsci’sconscience,herecognizedthat“inthecaseofthemostadvancedStates,where‘civilsociety’hasbecomeaverycomplexstructureandonewhichisresistanttothecatastrophic‘incursions’oftheimmediateeconomicelement(crises,depressions,etc.)”thentheproletarianrevolutionmustfocusitsstrategyoncarvingoutpowerwithin“thesuperstruc-turesofcivilsociety”whichare“likethetrench-systemsofmodernwarfare”(235).InlightoftheICM’sfailures,Gramscihadthehindsighttorecognizeandboldnesstostate“acrisiscannotgivetheattackingforcestheabilitytoorganizewithlight-ningspeedintimeandinspace;stilllesscanitendowthemwithfightingspirit”

(235).Thisisanargumentagainstspon-taneity.Itsometimesseemslike“afierceartilleryattackseemedtohavedestroyedtheenemy’sentiredefensivesystem,whereasinfactithadonlydestroyedtheouterperimeter…Thesamehappensinpolitics,duringgreateconomiccrises”(235).Therefore,Gramsciwarns,thoseelementsofbourgeoiscivilsocietythatconstitutedstrongdefensiverampartsmustbecloselystudied.Gramsci’sentireconceptionofphilosophyandtheroleofthepartyisarguablyworkedoutinrelationtotheideologicalandculturaldefensiverampartsofthebourgeoisiethatmustberuptured.

Gramsci’sseestheRussianrevolutiontohavecorrespondedtoawarofmaneuver–asuccessfuloneatthat.Butheiscon-cernedthattotheextentthat“1917hasbeenstudied–[ithasbeenonly]fromsuperficialandbanalviewpoints”(235).GramsciaccusesTrotsky’sformulationofthepermanentrevolutionasconstitutinga“reflectionofthetheoryofthewarofmaneuver”(236),whichGramsciviewsinhindsightashavingbeeninappropri-ateforthepostwarsituation.WhereasTrotskyupheldtheuniversalityofthe“frontalattackinaperiodinwhichitonlyproduceddefeats,”Gramsciviewsthepostwarsituationashavingbeenonewhereintheshifttothewarofpositionwasnecessary,astrategicshiftwhichLeninunderstood:“IllichunderstoodthatachangewasnecessaryfromthewarofmanoeuvreappliedvictoriouslyintheEastin1917,toawarofpositionwhichwastheonlyformpossibleintheWest”

(237).

Therefore,thewarofposition,undertak-enandledbyaproletarianrevolutionaryvanguardPartyonthebasisofthecriteriaoutlinedabove,istheonlystrategicap-proachGramsciviewedasfeasibleforrev-olutionintheimperialistcountriesofhisday.Thetaskoffuturecommunistpartieswouldhavetobetoidentifytheopen-ingsandnecessarypointsofinterventionwithin‘civilsociety’whereinthecommu-nistpartycouldmakeitsinterventionsandentrenchitselfforthelongbattlefor‘terrain’withinthematricesofbourgeoissociety.Thisisn’tanargumentforoperat-ingexclusivelyorevenmainlywithinthehegemonyofbourgeoissociety,suchasthroughitsinstitutions;butrathertorupturethoseinstitutionsbybuildingupadualpowerofthepopularclasses.

InthefaceofthefailuresofEuropeancommunistpartiesintheearly1920s,Gramscirecognizedthatamoreformi-dableproletariancounter-hegemonywasrequiredinadvanceofaninsurrectionarymoment,andthatonlytheseadvancedpreparationscouldconsolidatethedicta-torshipoftheproletariatpost-revolution.Posedassuch,revolutionarystrategycanbeunderstoodasacontinuousprocessofaccumulatingrevolutionaryforcesthatispunctuatedwiththeruptureofrevolution,orrevolutions.Inotherwords,aprotractedwarofpositionwouldhavetoprecedetherapidwarofmaneuver.Inrevolutionarycommunisttheorytoday,Ibelievethatthisconceptionbearssomesimilaritywiththeprotractedpeopleswar

During the Winnipeg General Strike in the summer of 1919, workers inspired by the Russian revolution completely took control of the city (image to left). While the local ruling elites and the Canadian government completely lost political power for a span of weeks within the city, the Citizens’ Committee of One Thou-sand (image to right) – a secretive organization of Winnipeg’s bourgeoisie created – was created to maintain the unity of its class and counter the revolution-ary advances, and finally, facilitate the Canadian state’s quasi-military repression of the strike in late June 1919.


strategiesoftheRevolutionaryCom-munistPartyofCanada–thoughmuchremainsuncleartomeabouttheirstra-tegicformulation–andespeciallythatofthenewCommunistPartyofItaly(nPCI).ForthenPCIinparticular,insurrectionisconceptualizedasnecessarybutonlyasamomentarytacticalmaneuverwithinawiderprotractedpopularwar.WithoutintendingtosplithairsintheICMtoday,weshouldseriouslyconsiderwhetherGramsci’swarofpositionisamoreclearandcorrectarticulationofwhatourtasksareintheimperialistcountriestoday.Gramsci’sstrategicframeworkwasspe-cificallydevelopedwiththehegemonyoftheimperialistbourgeoisiesinmind,andthetermwarofpositionhastheaddedbenefitofclearingupconfusionsandstrawmanargumentsthatareeasytomakeabouttheideaofPPWinanimpe-rialistcountry.However,theworkingoutoftheseideas–GramsciincomparisontoMaoTse-Tung’sthoughtinparticularandthemodernconceptionsofPPWingeneral–isthemainobjectofPartIIofthisessay.

Concluding Thoughts: Is Gramsci a launching point for reconceptualizing communist strategy today?

Thewarofpositionisneveractuallyap-pliedtothecontextofItaly,oranywhereelseintheimperialistcountries,forthatmatter.Although,thePCIdevelopsasubstantialarmedapparatusintheearly1940sbeforethefallofMussolini,itisdis-armed,andunderAmericanoccupationandinthepostwarperiod,thePCIplayedaleadingroleinEuropeinblazingatrailofparliamentarismandreformismthatcomestobeknownas‘Eurocommunism’.Withthecenterofgravityoftheinter-nationalcommunistmovement(ICM)havingcompleteditsshifttothethirdworldbytheendofworldwartwo,thepartiesoftheICMintheimperialistcoun-triesneverseriouslytakeupGramsci’sideas.MaoTse-Tungis(rightfully)lookedtoastheleadingstrategicthinkerintheInternationalCommunistMovementafter1960,thisatatimewhenthenameofGramsciremainedobscureformostcommunists

InPartIIofthisessay,IwillexplorewhatIbelievetobethestrikingsimilaritiesbetweenGramsci’sreconceptualizingcommuniststrategyandthatofMaoand

theChineserevolution.TheanswersthateachgivestothequestionofMarxism-Leninism’slimitationsinthe1920sarestrikinglysimilar,howeverdifferentandparticularizedtotheirverydifferentcontexts.

Toreiterate,Gramsci’sprisonnotebooksconstituteamajorrejuvenationofrevo-lutionaryMarxism,orthe‘philosophyofpraxis’.Whileupholdingmanyoftheap-plicableandvalidelementsofMarxism-Leninism,GramscisubstantiallyrevisesandbreakswithelementsoforthodoxythatproveddisastrousandtragicintheirapplicationwithintheComintern.Gramsci’stheoreticalcontributionsrangefromquestionsofhistoricalmaterialism,thepartyform,stateandcivilsociety,philosophy,andrevolutionarystrategy,albeitinafragmentaryunity.AlthoughGramsci’sprisonsentencewouldclaimhishealthandultimatelyhislife,it’sdoubtfulthatthisleveloftheoreticaldevelopmentwouldhavebeenpossiblewithoutanextendedperiodofsolitudethathefaced.AlltheothercommunistleadersofGramsci’scaliberwouldgener-allyhavebeenkilledortoopre-occupiedwiththeday-to-daytasksofdevelopingthecommunistpartytoembarkuponthehugeandnecessaryintellectualprojectthatGramscicommenced.Weoweittothecommunistmovement,toourselves,andtotheliberationofallop-pressedandexploitedpeoplestoreturntoGramsci,andtakewhatwemustfromhiscontributions.Butfirst,letusconsiderGramscialongsideMao…

Astheacuteandmomentaryfinancialcrisisof2008pulledtheimperialisteconomiesdeeperintostagnationandtheresidentsandcitizensofthosecoun-triesjustalittlebitclosertothelong-runningcrisesfacedbythethirdworldfordecades,thehideouslieofneoliberal-ismhasbeenexposedforwhatitis.NolongerdotheFukayamaandThatcher’smythsthatcapitalismis“theendofhisto-ry”andthat“thereisnoalternative”holdwater.Instead,wearemovingintoanerawheretherulingclassesarepropagatingformsofapocalypseasinevitableandas“theendofhistory.”

Rebellionsareunfoldingacrosstheworld;themassesarelookingfor,re-discovering,asolutiontothecapitalistproblemofhumancivilization.Yet,while

theideologiesoftheimperialistrulingclassespredominate,thecommunistalternativehasyettobereasserted,recreated,reinvented.

Ironically,however,incontrasttofortyyearsago,whentheobjectiveconditionswerenotripeforrevolutionintheimperialistcoun-tries,evenifthesubjectiveconditionswereadvanced,wearelivinginaperioddefinedbytheobverse:matureobjectiveconditions,andtheunderdevelopedsubjectivefactor.Tounderstandthissituation-tounderstandhowbourgeoishegemonyisexercisedinourpresentday-wewoulddowelltorevisittheconceptualtoolsforgedbyGramsci,assesswhatremainsvalid,andapplythemwhole-heartedlytotheseincreasinglybarbaricdaysofthelateperiodofthecapitalistepochofhumancivilization.

Bibliography

Hoare,QuintinandGeoffreyNowellSmith(eds.).SelectionsfromthePrisonNotebooksofAntonioGramsci.InternationalPublishersCo.Inc.:NewYork,1971.

Lenin,V.I.[1915].“TheCollapseoftheSecondInternational”inLenin’sCollectedWorks.Prog-ressPublishers:Moscow,1974.

Lenin,V.I.[1917]StateandRevolution.Interna-tionalPublishersCo.Inc.:NewYork,1932.

towards the war of position: gramsci in continuity and...

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