Tower Ins. Co. of N.Y. v Mercos L'Inyonei Chinuch,Inc.

2010 NY Slip Op 32114(U)July 29, 2010

Sup Ct, NY CountyDocket Number: 100275/10

Judge: Carol R. EdmeadRepublished from New York State Unified Court

System's E-Courts Service.Search E-Courts (http://www.nycourts.gov/ecourts) for

any additional information on this case.This opinion is uncorrected and not selected for official

publication.

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK - NEW YORK COUNTY

CAROL EDMEAO PRESENT: 8 Justice

PART 3 5

- v . MOTION DATE

MOTION S E Q . NO.

cA/‘nkc/! MOTION CAI.. NO.

\\

The following papers, numbered 1 to were read on this motion toifor ‘,

PAPERS NUMBERED

Notice of Motion/ Order to Show Cause - Affidavlts - Exhlbits ... Answering Affidavits - Exhibits

Replying Affidavlta ---.

48 Cross-Motion: i? Yes d N o

Upon the foregoing papers, it is ordered that this motion

In accordancc with the :iccompanying Memorandum Decision, it is hereby

OIWERED that thc branch of the motion by dekndant Merkos L’Inyonei Chinuch, Inc., pursuant to CPT,l< $5302, 1001, 321 I (a)@) and 321 1 (a)(lo), dismissing the complaint by plaintiff Tower lnsurancc Cor-np:uly of Ncw York for lack of personal jurisdiction over necessary parties is granted; and it is further

ORDERED that the branch of thc motion by defendant Merkos L’hyonei Chinuch, Tnc., pursuant to CI’LR $337 (a) dismissing thc complaint by plaintiff Tower Insurance Company of New York Lor.forum non convenien.~, is granted; and it is further

ORDERED that the branch of the niotion by defendant Merkos L’Inyonei Chinuch, Inc., pursuant to CPLR 532 I 1 (3)(4), dismissing the complaint by plaintif’f Tower Insurance Company : ) fNew York on the ground that another action is pending in Florida, is granted; and it is furthcr

.~rcier. with iioticc o r entry upon all parties within 20 days of cntry. ORDERED that dde~iclan t Mcrkos L’Inyonei Chinuch, Inc. shall serve a copy of this

‘l’his coristitutcs tlic ciecision and orclcr of the Court.

Check one: ?d FINAL DISPOSITdN NON-FINAL DISPOSITION

Check if appropriate: I? DO NOT POST 0 REFERENCE

[* 1]

1) 1 ai n t i fi’.

-agai ns 1-

HUN. CAROL ROBINSON EIIMI<AI). J.S.C.

Indcx No. 1 OO275/10 1)

MEM 0 li ANDUM T)lXTS ION

PlaintiL‘i‘ Tower lnsui-ancc C h i i i p i i y of New York (“Tower”) coininenccil this action

sceking a declaratory judgment that i l has iiu du ty to dcfend or indemnify defendiiiit Merkos

1,’Inyonei C‘hinuch, Inc. (“Mcrkos”) i l l nil uidcrlying negligence action in Florida (thc

“underlying action”). Merkos iiow iiioves to dismiss Tower’s complaint pursuant to CPLR

9 $302. 100 1 , 32 1 1 (a)( 8) and 32 1 1 (a)( 10 1, i i ~ lack of personal jurisdiction over iicccssary parties

arid pursuant to CPLR $327 ( a ) f o r f i w i o ~ I Z O Y I C W I V C I Z ~ C ~ , Y .

b’l1.~t14Ul Lluckpwim/

Dekiidant Merkos is n Ncw Yoi-k-buscd not-for-profit corporation doing biisincss in

Florida. Chabad HOLW of’ North Dildc, liic. (“Chnbad”) is a Florida not-fur-profit corporation

with its principal placc of Imsiiicss in Miami-Uadc c‘ounly, Florida. Chabad is not registcred to

clo husiness in New Yorli. Jane Due a n d .loc Doe iue the parents and natural guardians

(collectively, the “1)oes”) oftheir 1 1 -yc;ii--old soil .T.D., who livcs with his parents in Miami-

[* 2]

13ade County, Florida

The underlying action wiis coiiimenccd by the Does on May 30, 2008, alleging that

between Noveiiibcr 2006 and August 2007 (the “relevant time”), two teenage vnlunteer workers

of Merkos and its affiliate Chabad physically, mentally aiid sexually abuscd thc Does’ son, a

child with special needs. Thc coiiiplniiit allegcs negligent hiring and supcrvision against Chabad

and direct and vicarious negligcncc against Mcrkus.

During thc rclcvant time, Merkos was insurcd by three consecutive, non-overlapping

policies issued bq tlirec insurancc carriers’, including Tower. Merkos contacted Tower and

reclueskd cuverngc under the policy, hii t ‘fowcr clcnied coveragc by letters, dated .Iunc 19, 2008

and July 2 1, 2008, clainiing, r n l ~ i . ( i l ir/ , that thc policy coiitaiiis a “Ilcsignated Pi-cmiscs

I~nciorscmctit” (thc “~i i i torsei i ie i~~”)~ ivhich purports to limit tlic application of said policy to

liabilities arising out of certain localions in Brooklyn, New York, whilc the complaint alleges

that the tortious acts cornmittcd by Merlius o~ciut.ed in Florida.

On or about October 7, 2000, tlic Iloes amended the original complaint, aclding the claim

that Merkos negligently uiisi-cprcscii[cd to the Does that tlic volunteers were "specially trained”

and “profcssionally trained,” and Mcrlins again cuiitacted Tower for coverage. ‘[‘his timc Tower

did not respond to Mcrkos’s reques(s, latcr claiming that %o respoiise [ , , , J was necessary sincc

I owcr [previously] disclaimcd cc~vcixge l o Merkos for this claim” in its Julie 19, 2008 and July

2 1, 2008 letters. Merkos’s couiiscl dciiinndctl h a t , iiiiless Tower provide its position as to

coverage by the end of1)ecembci- 3 I , 2009, Mcrkos intends to start an action against it in the

I According 10 t l ie iiiotiun papci-s, tlic two olhei- cai-riers, Colony Insurance Company (“Colony”) and I ravelers have been dcfciidiiig Merkos in h e iindei-lying oclion uitder a reservation of rights, hut C’olony has filed a clcclaratory judgment :iction agairist Meiku’; in Florida i‘cdci-al court on June 4, 2009 (thc “Coloiiy action”).

2

[* 3]

I.’ I or i da co urt .

On January 8, 201 0. ‘I’owcl- lilcd this declarator-y judgment action against Mcrkos in New

York, also naming thc Docs :tnd ChL-ihad ;IS nominal d c l n d a ~ i r s . ~ In or about Mxch 201 0,

Merkos filed a third-party complaint against lower in the underlying tort action in Florida (the

b‘iiiiplcadcr actioii”). Later, Merltos agreed to stay that action and Tower agrecd to withdraw

without prejudice its motion to stay tlic iiiiplcader action pending the decision on this motion (see

Stipulation and Oi.dei*, datcd J L I I ~ 7, 201 o).’

In this motion, Merkos moves [or disiiiissal on scvcral grounds. First, the court lacks

personal jurisdiction over Chabad and tlic Ilocs, :mi because they are necessary parties to the

;idL; Lidication of this action, the court cannot proceed without them. The oulcomc of this litigation

will affect Does’ m d C:habad’s rights i inc l iiitcrcsls i ftliey are omitted: Chabad may have rights

iiiidcr the policy and tlic DOCS may 10:;c their slalutoi-y right pursuant to the Insurance Law

43420(b)( 1 ) to bring an action agaiiisl ‘I’ower, iissLu-ning they obtain a judgment against Chabad

;tnd/or Merkos in the underlying action.

Merkos niaiiitains that Florid:) coLri-ts Iinvc jurisdiction over all the parties in the

underlying action and any prc-judice to C:habad arid thc Oocs if they are ornittcd from the instant

action can be easily avoided by tht: court dismissing this action and Towcr refiling its action in

I‘lorida.

The COLII? notus t l i a t neitllai- C:hnb:itl iioi‘ tlic I h c s x u named as insureds on the policy, and neither of them 2 .

hnvc clairiied covcragc undci- Murlios’s I p i l i c> , or otticnvisc appciircd i i i this action.

Thc parties i l l the iindcrlying (or( acliori exchanged discovci-y I-ccluests, produced documtiits and deposed somc witnesses. Mcrkos espccts to dcposc :i t ldil iuiinl witnesses. including Mr. and Mrs. Doe and J.D.’s doctors. It also anticipaks tha t Tower will be secliing ~ l i c dcpositioil tehtiniony of the Chabad’s employees, sntiie of whom have ,111iciidy bccri dcposed 111 tlic Linderlying actioii i i i i ~ l / o I suhpoatiaed in conncction with the Colony aclion in Florida

3

[* 4]

Ncxt, Merkos argues that thc court should dismiss this action 011 the ground offorurn

inconvenic.ns sincz all the alleged evciits look place in Florida, where all the mntcrial witnesses

are, where the underlying action is pciidiiig arid whcrc discovery has already bcgun.

Further, Merkos argucs that niiothci- action (the underlying [tort] action) is pending

bctween thc samc partics, except ‘ l ‘o~vcr , “lor h e same cause of action” in a Flor-ida court and

that discovcry i l l tliat action will hc iicc.cssai-y foi- ‘Tower’s present action, and “will need to be

I-cpeated” if-this court l-ctains this action i i i New York. Mcrkos points out that, but lor Tower’s

“ h r u n i shopping,” Merlios wolild I - I ~ L \ T filcd its Floridn implcadcr action first and that Tower

“raced to the New York courts” alicr Icarning of Mcrkos’s intention to implead Towcr in the

underlying litigation in I:lorida.

In opposition, while iiot cliallurlging thc abscncc of this court’s jurisdiction over the Does

and Chnbad, Tower argues Ihnt the h c s and Cliabad arc not iiccessary parties ;IS their rights to

rccover from Mcrkos will not bc afli.c.kd by [lie outcome o r this action and, “iiiiless they obtain a

judgment against tortfeiisors,” thcy pi-csciitly liavc iio standing to litigate coverage issucs against

‘l‘owcr. ‘l’ower argues that neither C ~ h ~ t b a J nor the Does have claiincd coverage under the policy

and ‘l’ower included them in its complaint “in anticipation of the possible future claims against

‘I’ower’’ and “oiily as a pi-ccautionary ~iieasure in case Cliabad were to claim [ . . . ] under the

policy.”

Second, Towcr argucs that New York is the proper lorum for this insuraiice coverage

dispute. Notwithstunding Merkos’s 1;lorida tliird-party action, Towcr was “first to file” this

i i L , t i o i i , a i d Mci-Lo:, cminut slio\rv ;illy hpecial ciicumstances justirying ;-I departui-e from the

first-to-file rule. ‘l’ower points out th;i[ i t was able to %le lirst’’ only because Mcrkos has not

[* 5]

challenged the disclaimer until Towcr coiiimcnccd this action and dclaycd its third party action

by missing deirdlines for filing the rccluested extensions

Furthcr, ‘I’ower contends that Merkos has not shown relevant factors militating against the

New York ibrum which has ;1 m;iterid IICXUS to tlic subject matter ofthe suit. ‘I’ower argues that

both Tower and Merkos arc New Yolk-based entitics, tlie dispute, governed by New York law, is

contractual in nature and thc pi-ciiiises insured under tlic policy are located in New York.

Ftir-thci-, Tower contends, witricss testimony as to the specific [acts of thc underlying

i.laim is not i1cccss:ii-y since I1io.t;~ h c t s are riot inaterial to the determination O~TOWCT’S

obligations under the policy and the court iiced only to compare the uiiderlying complaint with

the policy which limits liability covci-iigc to losses arising out of the premises listed in the

policy.‘ Towcr mniiitains that this disputc “docs not iiivolve complex site-specific

insurancc-coveragc issues iicccssitatiiig depositions of local witnesses in 1:lorida” and the Florida

court would be burdencd by being fni-ced to interpret both New York and Florida law.

Finally, Tnwcr argues that it is contrary to New York law and highly prejudicial to Tower

I I ’ t h i s iiisuraicc coverage disputc WCIY joined with the underlying tort action and thus, the court

should deny the motion

111 its reply, Merlios :ii-gucs thal C:habad i s a necessary party because it “iiiay feel bound

I . . ] to accept an advcrsc holding wi tlioiit liming been heard”; CPLR €J 1001 (a) rcfers only to a

‘ Thc: eiicioi-sc.ment states in ivlcv;inl p x ( : “This i i isi irmx applies oiily to “bodily injuiy”, “propcrty

I , ‘l’lie ownci-ship, maintenance OI- trsc of-the premises shown in the Schedule and operations necessary or incidental LO [hose premises; or‘ 2 . The pri).ject showii in tlic Scliedulc. (Form (Xi 2 1 44 07 98).

damage“, “personal and advci-tising iii,jury” arid medicnl cxpetises arising out of:

The Schedule litniis tlic dcsiginted premiscs to six locations iii Brooklyn, New York, listed in tlic Extension of ihxlarations.

[* 6]

pci-son “who might he inequitably allicted” and not “ ~ v o t r l r i be inequitably affccted” (id., at p. 5

[ ci-riphnsis in the original]) and thus, thal llic DOCS niny presently lack standing does not prevent

11ici-n from bciiig a necessary party.

Further, Mcrkos argues that h e covci-agc dispute caimot be resolvcd without depositions

u f uitnesses i n Florida, ;is it is difficult to detcrniinc “from where thu alleged

I iiii.c;reprcsentatic,ns] stuteiiicnts originated,” siiicc the ainendcd complaint alleges that “Mcrkos

committcd toils outside the statc cai~sing iiij ui-y within the state.”Merkos also points out that,

while Tower in its JuneNuly 2008 lctters deiiied coverage as to the original claims, it has not

addi-esscd Lhc new claiins in the amer1dccl complaint fjlcd in October 2009. Finally, Merkos

argues t lm , whethei- tlic cover;ig:e disliute may be joined with the underlying action in Florida is

not contrary to either Flor ida or Ncw Yorli law, aiicl it is lor the Florida courts to decide.

Disc ussiori

Persontrl Jwisiiiction: C-’I’LX 32 1 1 ( c I ) ( ~ )

Indi.rpensd>lt> Purties: C’PLli‘ ,$ I O U 1 (u) trnd (h j

As an initial matter, because disiiiissal bascd upon lack of personal jurisdiction is

niandatory, while tlisinissal hased iipo11 claims 01 inconvenient forum or another action pending

arc discretionary, issuc oi‘ personal jui-isdiction must bc resolved before the court cvcii reaches

;in y ) t t hc i ssu e s rai sc d I-cgnrd i 11 g d i sc I-ct i D iiary d i s m i s s d (LYm;fii/y v Ruin how Ilclicoptcrs, Inc.,

22 1 h D 2 d 6 I8 r2d D c p ~ 19951; New ll~rri/,~~.shii-c. 1rz.s. C’o. v ,$/?ere Drake h. I A d , 2002 WL

158hq62 [SDNY 3,002]; ,5’ancic,/fLr 17 (.;/lU’( ‘ O I I S I Pz~r~~cyor.s h c . , 2008 WL 620747 (Trial Order)

[Sup Ct, Ncw York County 200Xl).

Has;ed 011 c P L R $321 1 (a)(#) , ;I party can move to dismiss a cause of action against a

[* 7]

defendant on the gi.oi1nd that “the court has no jurisdiction of the person of the defendant.”

Merkos, without specilying fhc subscction, appears to basc its arguments on the due process

requiremerits of CPLR $302, i. o., sufiicierit miniinurn contacts with the forum and purposeful

availment of. the privilege of cutidticling activities within the forum State (Hanson v Deckla, 357

IJS 235 , 253 1 1 9.58 I ; i W c C k c ? 1’ ltiterii~itionui Liji: I n s . C:’o., 355 US 220, 222-223 [1957];

I i ~ ~ e ~ x u ~ i o t z ~ i l Shot C’n. LJ W~7L7//i~7~t0/7, 326 IJS 3 10, 3 1 6 [ 19451).

There is 110 dispute that this coiirt laclcs personal jui-isdiction over Chabad and the Does.

Chabaci is a Florida ciitity, with a principal place of business in Florida and not registered to do

biisilicss i n New York . While thc ainciidecl cornplaint a1 lcgcs that Chabad docs business in New

Yor!?, there is nothing i n the rccord to support this allcgation. Similarly, the Does are residents

of Florida :ind there is 110 evidcncc that the Does wcljvcd their rig111 to a pcrsonal jurisdiction

deliiisc in lliis action. ‘l‘hus, the Docs’ and Cliahad’s presence in this action is jurisdictionally

iinpropcr.

Ncverllieless, Mcrkos iirgos this court that thc 13ocs and Chabad are necessary parties to

this action. CPLR $321 1 (a)( 10) provides that “the court should not proceed in the abscnce of a

pcrson who should bc n party.” I’ursuitnt t o C:PI,R 9 100 1 (a), a party is necessary if‘ its presence is

required for “coniplete relief” to bc accorded between the pcrsons who are partics to the action or

if an absent party “might bc ineqiiitably atlfcctcd by ajudginent in the action.’” An action is

’ This would appxit- to invoke j u r i sd ic t io i i under CPLR $30 I which provides that “a foreign corporation is ainenable to suit in New YOI-IC courts if it t i n s cngascd i i i such a coiitiiiuous arid systematic coitrse of ‘doing business’ l i L > i - c tha t ii tirlding ni i t5 ’j)rc‘st‘iicu’ in [his j u i - i ,diction is waimntcd” (Lrridoil Resources C o y . v Altlxl-rrido & ,-Iic.\u/rdc.r- SC,~I~S . , I n ( , . , 77 NY2d 2X, 563 NL’S2tl 739 [ 1390] [internal citations orriittedj). Howcvci-, there is no evidence bclore thc ctiii1.t r h n t Chnbad engagcil iii sucll activities.

(’ CPLR 5 100 I ( a ) provides thxt ncccxii-). parties are “[p]cr.soiis who ought to be partics if complete relief is tu be accordcd bctwccn h e persons who ai-c pi-tics io ihc action or who might be inequitably affcclcd by ajudgment

7

[* 8]

sub-iect to dismissal without prejudicc ir there has beeii 21 hilure to join a necessary party (CPLR

3 1003; City o f . N e ~ ~ York I) Long I.slr7ttLJilir~)orl.s Limoiisinc Service Corp., 48 NY2d 469, 423

NYS2d 651 [I 9791; ELtluir Advisor L , / d 11 Ji ido Amccricu, Inc., 39 AD3d 240, 244-245 [Ist Dept

20071; (:‘13S Corp. v ~lzim.~u’Cry, 268 AD2d 350, 353 [ ls t Dept 20001).

Howevcr, wlicrc, as hci-e, thc court lacks personal jurisdiction over a necessary party, a

~ ~ , u i - t niay allow tIic action tn pi-occcc~, i n h c iritcrest ofjustice, without such a party,’ upon

consideration of tlic fivc factors set 1i)rlli in CPLR $1001 (b) (Saratnga Counfy C‘hnmber of

( ‘orrirnLJrc*c, Jnc. 11 Pl i l l i k i , 100 NY2ti XO I . 8 19, 766 NYS2d 654, 665 [2003]; Bhmcnthul v Allen,

40 Misc 2d 688, 260 NYSZd 363 [NY Sup Ct , New Yoi-k County 19651). Thus, in determining

whether to procecd without parties wliosc rights woulci be affected but who are not sub.jcct to the

court’s jurisdiction. the court must consider the following factors: 1) whether the plaintiff has

another eNective rei-ricdy i n case the action is disiiiisscd for nonjoinder; 2) thc prejudice that may

accrue from the non.joinder to the parly not joined; 3) whether the prejudice might have been

avoided (or could be in the liiturc), and by whom; 4) lhc ability of the court to protect thc parties

I-ron~ the prej uclice; and 5 ) whclhci- ci.l‘eclive j iicigmenl niay be rendered in the parties’ absence

(CP1,R (j 100 I (b); LYi~iwzo~~ 1’ Mcrrill I ,JWL‘/I, Pierce, h’erimr & Smith, Inc., 2009 WL 4009121,

2009 NY Slip Op 32650(U), ‘l’rial Orcler, No 104734/09, N Y Sup Ct, November 5 , 20091, citing

Windy Ridge F[7rni 1 1 A.s.ses,roi* (?f‘Toi~v~7 of‘Shariciaken, 1 1 NY3d 725, 726 [2008]; Red

I lo oh?Go PI. 1111 t1.s C l h 111 I h ci . C ‘o 111 rl ~ L , I ’ L Y 11 New 1 brk (,’i[y Bourd q J‘Standards and A ppeuls, 5

i i i the action . . .”

’ Moreovci-, ‘‘~iii]isjoir~clt.r of panics is not ii ground for dismissal of an action” (CPl.,I<$ 1003). Instead, an itrii~roperly,ioiticd pat-ly m a y he “dropped" ( C ‘ I ’ L J $ 1003: [plattics may bc dropped by the COUI-L oti motion of any parry o r 011 i t s own initiiitivc), a t any st;iyc o l ‘ t l ie a c t i o n arid iipnti srich terms as miiy be just]; see Ko.r/iiha v Civ of , Y ~ ~ r w ~ i w , 2x7 NY 2x3, 30 NE2d 240 1: I % I ? ] ) ,

x

[* 9]

NY3d 452, 457-59 1.2005 I ) .

This rule a i m to prevent inconsistent ,~udgmciits relating to the same coiitrovcrsy and to

protect the otherwi\e uhsent pa~- l~cs who would be “embarrassed by judgments purporting to bind

thcir rights or interests whwc tlicy Iintrc h:id 110 opportunity to be hcard” (S‘clmtogcr C’mcnfy, at

820). Nevertheless, CT’I,R $ I 0 0 1 (b) treats dismissal for failure to join a necessaiy party as a last

rcsort (L-3 Commu~~icn/io~t,r Gorp. \. ,S’ufi)iVef, /nc., 45 AD3d I , 10-1 1 [lst Dept 20071; see Siegel,

N Y Prac 8 133, at 227 [4th ed,.]).

Applying tht: abovc priiiciplcs, the court finds that Cliabad and the Does are necessary

parties becausc, assuming ‘1 LLcotiiplc~tc reliel” can bc accorded between Tower and Merkos, the

Does arid Chabad miglit bc incqiiitahly affccted by a judgment in this actioii if the court proceeds

to adjudicate this dispute withoul tlicni (CI’1,R $ 1 001 [ a ] ) .

As to the Does. altliougli thcy neither have direct claims under the Towcr policy, nor are

111 jprivity with ‘I’owcr o r third-p;ii-ty I~ne f i c i a r i e~ of tlic insurance contract (Clcn.cridon Place

C’orp. v Liindrrrclrk Ins. C’o., ( 1 82 A112d 6, 587 N Y S M 31 l [ l s t Dept 1992]), uppen1 dismissed, lv

denied, 80 NY2d 918, 589 N Y S 2 d 303 [1092]), and have not obtained judgiiicnt against Merkos

in the undcrlying tort action pursuant to Iiismiiicc LAW $3420 (a)(2)$, they will iieverthcless be

“bound to the court’s c‘ovei agc clctcriiiinati~iii irrespectivc of their presence i i i the case caption”

( I / S 0nhrwri~cr.s I)!.\ ( ‘ 0 1’ Luti(hi i i , 079 I:Supp2d 330, 338 [EDNY, January 19, 20103). It has

becii lield ha t Insiir*aiicc~ Law s-3420 dors not bcar 011 the situation where, as here, thc insurer

[* 10]

pursues a declaration of noncoveragc against its insured and the injured tort claimants (id.). Even

if Towcr only named Merlcos as def2ndnnt, and thus the action was purely between the two

/jartics to the insurxice coiiti-xt, "thc rcsult of any declaratory judgment denying coverage would

practically affect the iii,jui-ed parties in rxactly the S~I I IL ' way as if they had been named

defendants" (id.). 'l'lius, if Towcr is successlul, it will nullify the Does' chances to later bring a

direct action against Tower pursuaiit to Insmince I .aw $3420, if they obtain a judgment against

Mcrkos.

Furthermore, contrary to 'Tower's iissertioIi, even though the Docs would not ordinarily

have standing at this point to bring xi action as to the 'l'ower's coverage obligation (Lung v

Hannvcr Ins. Co., 3 NY3d 350 [ZOO-I], , s z q ) i x , footnote 9), because Tower joined them as

defendants in seeking ;I declaration oI'its rights in this action, they would be permitted to contcst

tlic issue ol'coverage in the inslant case (3405 l'utiwn Kcul/y Corp. v Ins. Corp. q f N , Y., 36

AD3d ShS, 828 NYS2cl 394 [ 1st 13q)t 20071, ciiing hlrrroncy v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins.

Co., 5 NY3d 467, 471 [2005]) .

Similarly. C'habaci, whilc standing OII distinctly din'crent footing than the Does, may also

LK incquitubly affecled Iiy ilic oiitconie ol'tliis action. Ijveii though Chabad is not alleged to be a

iiamed insured undcr thc policy and, at this juncture, thc nature of thc relationship between

Merkos and Cliabad is not coinplctcly cleat (the complaint merely identifies it as an "affiliate" of

Merkus) (complaint. 771 4 - 1 S ) , tlic issuc oi'wlietlier C1iab:d may qualify as an insured under the

polic>, is not hcl'ore [lie court 011 tliis inotioii. Howcvcr, it may be fairly assuined that, in case

Chabad is i'ouiid to 1iwc any rights tinder tlic policy (which is not implausiblc i n light of Tower's

seeking a declaratory judgnicnt against Chiahad), it would be prejudiced if the lcgal issue of

[* 11]

Tower’s rights and obligations uiidcr thc policy is litigated in Chabad’s absence (see 1,-3

I.’omrnuniccriions C-’orp. v S‘ufi!Nei, l i i ~ , 45 AD3d 1 , at1 0-1 1 ).

This is not tlic casc wlicrc ~i inanufxtiirer arid distributor of a product which caused

injury, who were no1 iiariied insui-eds and clearly did not qualify in any way under the policy,

were not necessary pai-tics to B coverage dispute between tlle insurer and the insured, because the

covci-agc issue as to the in:;ured hi0 110 /wLii*iri~y o~z uiiy claim by /he injured claiman/ against the

minujr/c‘iurev OY di.s/rihulor, :tnd thus, they were not iiicquitably affected by the declaratory

judgment action ( M ~ y ~ ’ ~ s C‘i&r A f i / / , fm’. v I’rr;fim-ccl 1 2 h l . Ius. Co., G 3 AD3d 1522, 879 NYS2d

858 [4th Dept 20091 [eiiiphasis ;tddecl I ) .

Iliilike the nianuhcturcr or distributor in Cider h4i/l, who wcre clearly strangers to the

policy at issue, Clhabad, ns an alleged agent or an “affiliate” of Merkos, may be in privity with

Merkos and may be I ~ n d tu c p d i r y ;IS ;I claiiiiant under h e policy (as stated above, thc court

docs not make this determination un this Iliotion). ‘l’he case Brother Jimmy’s Bf lQ Znc. v

4n i i J i . i c .m Intcri7r1/ior1~11 Gr-oi./p IHC.. , Iiidcx No . I05077/09 [Sup Ct, New York County 20101,

1-cliccl on by Tower nnd suhniitteci to this court on July 12, 2010, is factually similar to Cider Miff

and thus, likewise distiiiguishable liom tlic casc at bar on the same grounds.

Thus, h e court finds tliat, bcuause both Chabad and the Does might be inequitably

affected by the iiclvcrse judgriien t in lliis action, they are iieccssary parties. However, because

[hey ai-e not sub-jcct 10 this court’s pcrsonal jurisdiction, in order to determinc whether, in the

intcrest ofjustice, thc court may allow tlic action to proceed without tlic Does and Chabad bcing

;is parties, thc court turns to coiisiclcratioii oi‘the five 1:;lctoi-s set forth in CPLR $1 001 (b)

( S‘ruu/ ofq i /lo 1.111 cy; 111 i m I ni ~ L I I I 1 :I 11 c I I , .s zi j i ix) .

I 1

[* 12]

As t o tlic first Lictur - whether pliiintiff‘has anotlicr- effective remedy in case tlie action is

dismissed - at this point, tlie court ;issuiiies that Towcr ~riay have an cffective rcincdy in tlic

Floi-ida court since Tower does nol allegc h a t Florida courts lack jurisdiction over Towcr, and

there is nothing in this court’s rccorcl showing that it raised a personal jurisdiction defense in its

motion lo stay the Florida inipleader action. As to the second factor, the potential pre-judice to

Chabad and thc Docs mists, as discussed ~ i b o v ~ , iftliis action proceeds in their absence. As to the

t1iii.d factor, whilc thc prejudice oi’oiiiittiiig C‘habad and tlic Does from this action could be

avoided if they waived jurisdiction in N w York; hut , to date, they have not. With respect to the

Ibur th Factor. if‘this action is clisniisscd, i t would not be iiccessary for the court lo offer any

protective orders since the pi-c.viously stayed impleacier action in Florida will be revived. Thc

fifth factor - whether an efkclivc juclg,riicnt may be rendered in the Does’ and Chabad’s absence -

also weighs in hvor 01’ clisini 11, since, i i s discusscd above, even assuming “complete rclicf” can

be accorded between Towcr and Mcl-kos, in the absence 01 the Does and Chabad, the .judgment

will riot bc “cffective” to the extent t h a t i l wo~.ilcj “bind [the Does’ and Chabad’s] rights or

interests whei-e thcy I M V C had no oplx)rtuiiiiy to be heard” (,S’~irutogu County Chamher c,f

C,‘orrimorcc, ,supru, at 820).

Thc factors iliscusscd Libove \\-fig11 heavily in h v o r of disinissal of thc entire action and

acijiiciicatiiig it in Florida where all Jiiclispciisablc partics could be heard (I-lonvilz 1’ SCIX, 16 AD3d

161, 792 NYS2d 383 1 1 st 13cpt 2005 1 [disniissal was warranted because New York courts lacked

j urisdictioii Over a necessary party, a ircsidcrlt ol‘ France, and there was an alternative forum

:Ivailahle i n Gibraltar, where all indispensable parlies coirld be joined]).

Notwithstanding the above, thc court turns to dit: iiiovant’s two altcriiative grounds cor

12

[* 13]

dismissal: pursuant to CPLR $ 321 I (a)(4)‘’ (“anothcr action pending” in Florida court) and

pursuant to ClPLR $327 (a) foi*.fiwz~//; n o i i m 7 ~ ~ ~ n i ( ~ n s .

.4nolhrr Aclion P~‘n(a’iug: L’ljl, It $ 3.21 I(i1)()4)

I n deciding a motion lo disiiii:;s based or1 the peiidency of another action, the analysis is

similar to that employed iii deciding ;I nio~ion prcdicated oii,fbrum non conveniens (White Light

ProJzic.fion.r, lnc. v On the Swnc ProhcfionLs, h*. , 23 1 An2d 90 [ 1 st Dept 19971). The court

iiiiist consider in which jurisdicti(.)n litigation was first conimenced, how I‘ar cad1 litigation has

progressed and which I‘oruni has ;i iiiorc significant and suhstantive nexus to the controversy, and

thus, is thc most appropriate foruiii Tor its resolution (Ccrtirin Underwriters at Lloyd’.s, London v

Iiurljbrd AmirJent iind Im/crrini[jI Co., I6 AD3d 167, 1 G8 [ 1 st Dcpt 20051; Sun Ysidro Cory. v

l i c ~ h r ~ u w , 1 An3d 1 XS, 186 [ 1st 13cp: ‘70O;l; ,S’enecir Ins. Co. v Lincotnshire Mgmt., lnnc., 269

ADM 274 [ist n e p t 20001).

New York courls gciierally follow h e first-in-timc rule, which instructs that “thc court

which has first taken jurisdiction is tlic oiic iii which the matter should be deteiniined and it is a

violation of thc rulcs of comity t o intcrfe1.e” (L-3 C,’om/7~~inic,alion,s, 45 AD3d I , szqwcr, citing Cify

7 k d e & hidus., I,[(,/. 11 N w C’t>nt. <Jzi / i , Mills C ’o., 25 NY2d 49, 5 8 , 302 NYS2d 557 [ 19691

1 intcrnal quotations inarks arid citation onlittedj).

However, this rulo should not he :tpplicd in a “iiieclianical” way, and, spccial

circuiiistaiiccs may warranl cleviatioii IiOm this rule whci-c “the action sought to be restrained is [

. , . 3 instituted lo obtain suint: ui1.ju.c;t o r itirquitable advantage” (While Light Prods., at 96-97;

” Ilndcr CPLli 321 13 ( a ) (4), it parr>’ iiiay iiiove tor dismissal of an action if “thcre is another action pending hrtweeri iho .sa,ne p r r l i u s jbr rlic , S W H C LW// .SC o j i i d / o i i in n court of any state or the IJnilcd States; thc court need not disrriiss upon this grouiid h u t may mukc siicli oldel- 3s jiisticc 1-cquii-cs.” [Etnphasis added].

13

[* 14]

C’urtliin IJnderwrr1er.v r i t Llo,vrJ’s, 1 , o i i ~ h t i 11 Hrirtjord ALI‘. ct: lndcm. C’o., 16 AD3d 167, 168, 791

NYS2d 90 [2005]) . And, while CI’l,l< $321 l(a)(4) vests ;I court with broad discretion in

considering whether tu dismiss an L ~ C tion on thc ground that another action is pending between

tlic snmc partics on tlic m ~ i e cal ix ol‘action (Hurvr.s/ C’ozirt, LLC v Nunupierce Technologies,

/ ) I ( . N o t Iiepor(eti in NYS2tl, 2001 W I , 1 359501 [Sup C‘t, New York County 2001]), the race to

the courthouse sliudd n u t bc cletermiiiativc, ;uid the C ~ S C should be heard by the forum with tlie

Hcrc, Merkos coiiiinenced an impleader action against ‘Tower in Florida for the sarnc

relief - to determine l’ow er’s covcr:iyc rights nnd obligations under thc policy.’o While that

action is hcld in abeyaiicc pending 1-csolution of this motion, it will proceed if this action is

dismissed. Although ’Tolver tilcd this iiction three months prior to Merkos’s filing its impleader

action in Florida, the rccord shows tha t ‘i‘ower actcd preeniptively by filing only shortly alter

learning of Merkos’s intuntion to comiiieiicc litigation (White Light Prods., mprci; ,%in Ysidro

( .’orp 11 Xohinow,l AD3d I85 [ l s t I k p t 2003 1 [ tcchnical priority not dispositive]; Herlz Gorp v

I d e n , 126 AD2d 446, 450, 5 10 NYS7d 500 [1987] [fact that Florida complaint filcd a few days

earlier than New York complaint was “not particularly significant”]). Merkos’s counsel’s letter

dated Deccmber 29, 3009 tu Towci- stating th3t if ‘I’ower “did not provide a coverage position ‘by

the close of business oil Ileccmbcr 3 1 st’, Mci-kos would bring Tower before the Florida courts”

shows thai l’owcr was clearly awarc iliat Mcrltos was considering a legal action to enforcc its

rights at tlie time th is Ncw York aclion w x c(.)imtiiciiced Significantly, that this suit was brought

--

I ” The cotii-L notcs th;it, to [hc cs i c i i i l l i i l t Mci-kos refers t n thc underlying toit action in Florida as ‘‘aiiothcr Lictioii prnrliiig”, i ts ai-giiriierit is tiri;[vailiiig i i i ~ e tli;i[ autiun arid tliu prcscnt itisurancc coverage dispute are 1101 “between thc same parties on h c siiiiie C;ILIS< of iicticrn.”

14

[* 15]

as ;I declaratory judgment aclioii, st1 ongly suggests that it was responsive to Merkos's thrcat of

rhcsc ficls weigh heavily against ap*?licarioii of thc first-in-time rulc, "which otherwise would

reward a party fbr winning the r x c IO tlic coii~-tl i~ii~e' ' (Rlhex Video, Lld. v Tecton, Lfd. , 2000

Wl, I708 189, *8 ~SDNYZOOO]; J'CC (//,\o C.'onlinenfd Ins, C?o, v Gurlock Sealiizg Technologies,

LLC, 2005 WL 62 14778 [Sup Ct, N L W k'ork County 2005lLthe basis for dismissal of one or the

other aciion miist turn on soiiic othcr consiclcration aiid not just wlio was more successl'ul in

racing to thc courthuuse I ) .

Further, both Florida aiid Nc>,v Yui-k litigatioiis rclaling to Tower's coverage obligations

are in the carly stages. As stated ab~ivc, the Flcorida impleader action has been stayed, and 110

Jiscovery has bcen conductcd ;is to lilis coverage dispute. As discussed below (supra at 16-19),

t~'loi-ida has ;I niorc sigrii licaiit nexus to tlic entire controversy.

Tlierelui-c, i n view of thc : ~ I x I \ T aiicl, since 'Fowcr's comincncement of this action first in

timc is no1 deteriniiiative, c1isiiiiss;il ;?iir'suant to CPI ,I< $321 l(aj(4) in favor of the Florida

I itigation is warranled.

As to wlicther New York is ; i n inconvcnienl l?)r im, a court may stay or dismiss an action

i l ' i t finds %at in 11ic interest ofsubsrxiLiu1 justice the action should bc heard in another forum"

(UPI ,R 5327(a);" Atlan!io M I I I . lm 1 '0. v C'irdillcic F~iit-viciv US, Inc., 125 AD2d 181, 508

NYS2d 445 [ 1 st Dcpt 1 %C;][a coui.1 %:xi stay o r dismiss nu action when it determines that such

" CI'LII $37,7(a) pi-ovidcs: "Whcii .Iic COIII-I tiiids tha t in rhc iriterest of substantial justicc tlie action should h e heard in anothcr i'onim, tlic coiii-I, on tlic i i i o t i o i i o f niiy p i t y 7 may slay or dismiss the action in whole or in part or1

iiny curiditioiis thar iiiay be jiist. 'l'hc cIci i i i ic i !c 01. rcsiileiice iii this smic o f any party to the action shall not preclude i l i e coiirt froni staying o r dismissing {lie aclioii."

15

[* 16]

actinn, alrliough j Lirisdictionally so~ind, \voulcl he better ad.judicatcd clsewhere than in New York

state I j .

Although no one f‘actor is coiitrolling, I;ictors which the court must weigh in deciding a

motion to dismiss on such grounds :ire tlie rcsiclcncy ol‘ the partics, the potential hardship to

pi.oposed witnesses, thc :ivailabilitJ, ol’m altelnativc 1-oruiii, the situs of tlie undcrlying action and

h e burdcn which will Iiu imposed ~ t p m tlic New York courts (Phut 7’nn Ngziyen v Banque

Inrl‘clsticz, 19 AD3d 292, 294, 797 N YS2d 89, 92 [ 1 st Dept 20051; Inlertec Contracting v Turner.

S‘teiner Inlern. S.A., 6 A113d 1 [ 1st Ijcpt 2004); NL>vilk v AqZo American Munagement Carp.,

19 1 A W d 240, 594 N Y S2d 747 [ 1 sl I:>cpt I9031; Dirly 11 Adctropofitan L$? Ins. Co., 4 Misc3d

887. 894 [Sup C‘t. Ncw Yo& C‘outity 2004I). “‘l’he burdcn rests ~ipori the defendant challengiilg

[he l‘oruiii to demoiistrotc relevant private or public interest factors which militate against

accepting Ihe litigation” (IsIiin7ic. I{q)i/hlic. c?f’lrim v Prihlavi, 62 NY2d 474, 479 [ 19841, cert

denied 469 IJS 1 108 [ 19851). ‘1’0 o\~ci-riclc plaiiiliff’s chosen forum, “defendant[ . - 3 bear[s] the

burden to identily the non-party wilncsses and the testimony they would offer and to show it

would be unobtainable in this h u i i I ( /s/miic R r p d ~ l i c , a1 479-480; Anugnostou v StifiZ, 204

AD2d 61, 62 I 1 st l k p t 1094 I ) .

The court holds that this x t i % . ) i i \voiild bc better ad-judicated in Florida than in New York.

Fii-st, while both ‘l’ower and tV/lci-kos lire Ncw York residents, Merkos is alleged to do

busincss in I’loritlu and ‘I owc‘r, at lcx,t nt this l~oint, has no( allegcd that it raised or will raise

jurisdictioiial objections in its iiiotiou to slity (or disiiiiss) the Florida impleadcr action (Islamic

Repiihlic, ,vupm, at 479 [‘rhc dornicilc or residelice in this state of any party to the action shall iiot

preclude the court from staying 01- clismissing the action]).

[* 17]

Second. thc situs ol'thc u1idc.i-lying action is Florida, the majority of the events giving rise

to tlic liability for ~ v t i i d i coverage is ;(.)uglit NOSC in Florida and Merkos showed that there is a

significantly grealel- iiuiiibcr of wihiL>sses s i tuakd in Florida than in New York (see Certcrin

I Indmwriters [ i t L , ~ o ) J ~ ' . Y . I,oim'oti I ' :1 hl l ru i i i i im Holcliui~qs, I , K , 44 AD3d 536, 844 NYS2d 226

[ 1 sl Dcpt 20071; C.'crtairi W / i d ~ ~ i w i ~ i / ~ ~ r , s ( I / Lloyd's, 1,otido~ v Mobil Corp., 303 AD2d 259, 756

NYS2d 204 [ 1 st I k p t 2003 I ) .

Merkos has identified scvcral witiicsses relaliiig to material issues in this litigation,

including those beyond the subpociin power of this court (<:'habad employees, Mr. and Mrs.

Iloes), soiiic oi' wliorn liiivc drezuiy I)ccii deposed in the underlying tort action (L$ Grizzle v Hertz

C'orp., 305 AI32d 3 1 I , 761 NYS2d 167 [ 1 st Dept 20031 [dismissal of the New York action for

jiww17 nor, convoniencc denied whc1c: thc witncsses of tlw xcident in Jamaica were willing to

triivel to Ncw York and the non-witiicss policc officer could not oi'fer any matcrial evidencc]).

Notwitlisti~ndi~ig thc lac^ ~ I . I ; I L thc rccord docs noi cc.)iitain aLlidavits or any other evidencc

showing potentid Iiardship 01- un\\Ji I I i nyicss of those witncsses to travel to New York or testify

iibsciit a subpoena, "i'ailure i o submi( allidavits establisliing hardship is not neccssarily fatal to a

niotion to dismiss for fi)rurn / w i z c o i 7 ~ ~ / ~ k r ~ s " ( Jukarn 11, Ndure ' s Bozrnty, Inc., 70 AD3d 1000,

895 NYS2d 508 [2d Dept 201Ol).

Most iniportantlq,, a substaii~i:iI iicxiis hctween tlic state of Florida and thc issues in this

coverage dispute is ;I coiiipelling hctoi- in liivor of litigating this action in Florida. An altcrnative

I'oruni is available sincc, :is statcd ~ihovc , tlierc is a siiniliir action involving coveragc dispute is

pending in the Florida court: the sitiis 01' h e ~i~idci-lying action is Florida, where substantial

iliscuvei-y lias already bccn conductctl hy Merkos, aiid a significantly greater number of material

17

[* 18]

witnesses are located than in New Yorli.

Tower’s argumcnt tliat tlic spccifyc facts of the underlying claim are not material to the

ilctui-ininiition ol‘c~overage obligalioiii; aiid chi1 bc made solely by comparing the policy to the

coniplaint, is riot persuasive. For one, the crux of the Towcr’s disclaimer is the location of the

events giving rise 10 the claims oi‘Mcrkos’s and Cliabacl’s liabilities. Sccond, it is not so readily

discernable fri-oiii the allcgations in the aiiiendcd complaiiit that the alleged negligent

iilisi-cprescntr~tions WCIY 1101 niadc 011 the “coverccl prciiiises.” Thus, it is unlikely that the

covcrage issues call be rcsolved witliout (lie necessity of calling witnesses, the majority of whom

arc in Florida, and solcl!~ on the hasis of documentary cviclerice (Shin-Etsu Chernicd Co. v 3033

1CJCI Bayik Limitcd, 9 AD3d 171 , 170 11 st Dept 20041; Cotztinentc.1 Ins. Co. v Polaris Industries

Parincrs, l,.P., 199 AD2d 222, 600 NYS2d 164 [ 1st Dept 19931; sec Giovanielli 17 Certain

Ilnderwrilcrs l i t Llo~yds, Lonr.lon, 2.3 Misc 3d 1128, 889 NYS2d 882 [Sup Ct, Queens County

7 0 0 0 ] ) .

Neithcr do Tower’s rcasoiis l*or its choice ofNcw York as the situs of this action weigh

against the dismissal in Irivoi- of h e l.,’lorid;t ftoruni. Firs(, t l u t thc insurance policy was issued in

New York is “but onc factor to hc coiisidei-cd and does not :iutornatically rnakc Ncw York the

inost conveniciit forum” (Avriel, I i i ~ a . v AetnLi C’nsziul/j~ c!? Szrrety Co., 160 AD2d 463, 464,

554 NYS3cl 134, 135-36 1 I sl Ilcpt 1900], ~*il ing A/ lmtiL: Mut. Ins. Co v Cadillac Fuirview

0<5’, 135 AD2d lX11~1s t Ilept 19861, ~ / 0 1 7 i c d 6 ~ ) N Y 2 d 013 [1987]).

Second, this couri is iiiindf‘iil ( l i i i t “ 1 i It is gcticrally rccognized that even where common

liicts exist, i t is prejudiciiil to insurcrs to have thc issuc o f insurance coverage tried before thc

[sariit.] jury tha t consiclei->; the Lindcrlyiiig 1i:lbility claims” (C.’ruz v Taino Const. Cw-p., 38 AD3d

[* 19]

301. 830 NYS2d 902 [ 1 st I k p t 3C)07 1; iZk8dic.k it Adi1lcr.s Liveslock Mkt., 248 AD2d 864, 865, 669

NYS2d 776 (19981, cili/i,q h‘cliv 11 I’(it1m)tii. 4 NY2d 603, 607, 176 N Y S 2 d 637 [1958J).

Huwcver, such prejudicc can bc avoiclctl 1)y sewring tlic iiisurance disputc action from the

negligence action (C:lhzmn v N u v York C‘il,)) Ikoi/.sing A ~ l h . 5 5 AD3d 437, 866 NYS2d 145 [lst

20081; C h z t’ Tuino Coizst. (.?or/).; Kelly 1: Ymr7ot/i , at 007 [The second third-party action should

be severed to avoid the prejudice to dic sccotid third-party defendants that would rcsult from thc

jury’s aw~rerit‘ss of the rxistence 01‘ liability insurance)).

Nor docs this court f i n d n11y potential applicatioil by the Florida court of the laws of New

k’ork to bc an uimecessai-y burden u l i o n Florida judiciary siiicc ‘‘coiirts arc frequently called upon

10 apply laws ol‘ foreign jurisdictioiis” (PhuI 7bvr Ngi.iyycn v Ucrnyzrc! Indnsuez, 19 AD3d 292,

Yiq>ru; lnlL>rrc)c C‘onfrcrcting T i ~ r ~ i i ~ i ~ ,Vtciiticr- Itilcrri. ,C;.A., (i AD3d 1, supra).

€Iaving considei-cd all the irclcvant Lictol-s, tlic court finds that, even assuming Merkos has

riot sustained its burden ol‘ dui~ions~r;iting ilisproportionatc hardship or unwillingness of its

,i tncsses to come to New York, j b / . / / / i z 1 1 0 1 7 cwriverzicncc is an altcrnative ground for dismissal of

this action, which shoulcl in any cvciit hc disniissed based i i i i thc other grounds, discusscd above.

L’ct, since “no m e f‘actor i s c~on~rolliiiy’’ (A’OIJ;//P 11 A ~ g r / o A/ricriccrn Muncgernent Corp., 191

h D 2 d 240, ,vzyirn) and all the remaiiiiiig relevant interests militate against this litigation

proceeding in Ncw York, tlic court holds that, clisniissal Ibr filrurn r70n convenience is warrantcd.

Thus, because C:habad and 1 1 7 ~ ‘ T)oe.c; are necessai-y parties to this action, not subject to this

court’s personal Ajurisdictioii. anti Florida liiis ;I ~ i i w e significant I I ~ X ’ U S to the controversy, the

motion is gl-antccl arid h i s actioii is tiisiiiisxd in its entirety.

[* 20]

Conc ius io n

Accordingly, it is hci-cby

OIIDERED that the branch or tlic motion by del'endiint Mcrkos L'lnyonei Chinuch, Inc.,

pursuant to C'PLR $6303, 1001, 32 1 1 (LL)(Q) a i d 321 1 (a)( 1 O), disiiiissing the complaint by

plaintifr'l ower 1n.surnncc C'ompiuiy o1'Nt.w York for lack of persoiial jurisdiction over necessary

partics is granted; mid it is further

OKDERED that the branch (.)I ' the motion by deL'endmit Merkos T.'Inyonei Chinuch, Inc.,

piirsirant to CPLR $327 (a) dismissiiig thc complaint by pliiiiitiff Tower Insurance Company of

New York for.forurn non ~ Y ) H I ~ C I ~ ~ C / I ~ Y . is grantecl; and it is l'iirther

OICDIXED thal h e l~i-nnch 01' Iho inotion by dei-mclnnt Merkos L'Inyoi~ei Chinuch, Tnc.,

pursuant to CYLR $321 1 (a)(4), disii~issing the coinplaint by plaintiff Tower Insurance Company

of Ncw Yurk on tlic ground that anolher action is pending i n Florida, is granted; and it is further

OKDElIEI) that dcfendant Mcrkos L'liiyonci Chiniich, Inc. shall serve a copy of this

order with notice o f c i ~ t r y upon all 1xii-ties within 20 clays ol'cntry.

l h i s constitutes t l ~ c decisioii and order of tlic Cour~ .

r m d : J U I ~ 29. xi1 o / I Ian. Carol R. I%lyiead, J.S.C.

[* 21]