THE ROLE OF THE VALUE-JUDGMENT- IN THE CHRISTOLOGY OF ALBRECHT RITSCBL

A Thesis Presented to

^the Faculty of the Graduate School of Relig The University of Southern California

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree

Master of Theology

hyGeorge Myron Raun

June 1944

UMI Number: EP65137

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This thesis, wr i t ten by

........................... GEQRGE.. MYRQ3L HAUN.....................

under the direction of Ais. Faculty Committee, and approved by a l l its members, has been presented to and accepted by the Faculty of the School of Religion in partia l fu lf i l lm ent of the requirements fo r the degree of

MASTER OF THEOLOGY

9 ...Dean

Date June...l9.44.......

Faculty Committee

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER _ 'PAGEI. THE PROBLEM TO BE INVESTIGATED.............. 1

Statement of the Problem . . .............. 1 .Scope of the S t u d y ........................... . . 2Justification of the discussion of the

problem......................................... 2Organization of the material of the Thesis . . . 3

II. THE THEOLOGICAL AM) PHILOSOPHICAL BACKGROUNDOF R I T S C H L ...................................... 5Ritschls Relation to the Theologians, Baur,

Bernard, Luther, Calvin, and Schleiermacher . . 5Ritschlfs Relation to the Philosophers, Kant

and L o t z e ...................................... 8Ritschls Epistemology.......................... 10

III. RITSCHL1 S THEORY OF VALUE-JUDGMENTS............... 28The Historical Retrospect........ . ............ 28The Distinctions Between Theoretical Judgments

and Value-judgments, and Between Concomitantand Independent Value-judgments................ 31

The Ontological Status of Objects Known ThroughValue-judgments................................ 35

IV. RITSCHLS CONCEPT OF RELIGION AND OF CHRISTIANT H E O L O G Y ............. 43 .Definition of Religion .......................... 44

CHAPTER PAGEThe Place of Revelation in Theology........ . . 50Ritschl's Idea of God and the Kingdom of God . . 53

V. THE CONSEQUENCES OF RITSCHL* S PHILOSOPHICAL ANDTHEOLOGICAL PRESUPPOSITIONS FOR HIS CHRISTOLOGY . 60The Approach to the Christological Problem . . . 61The Vocation of C h r i s t ........................ 63The Meaning of the Divinity of C h r i s t ..........70The Relation of the Death of Christ to

the Forgiveness of Sin ..................... 76VI. SUMMARY AND C O N C L U S I O N ........... .*.................81

Summary..........................................81C o n c l u s i o n ..................................... 82

BIBLIOGRAPHY .....................................90

CHAPTER I

THE PR6BLEM TO BE INVESTIGATED

Albrecht Ritschl's distinctive contribution to theology was a new method of* approach which he consistently applied'.-*- In the historical Jesus, as set forth in the pages of the New Testament, Cod is revealed; and this presentation of God is to be the starting point of all theological thought. What we are to think about God as to His Person, His Character and His demands upon us, it is possible to discover only through Jesus. But the data of theology are only available to members of the community which Jesus founded; because revelation is not only to be found in the Scriptures (which are but the literary deposit of His community) but it (revelation) is living in His community still. Inasmuch as the revelation of God is in Jesus Christ, it is only as one shares it as a member of the community .which He founded, and shares in the "forgiveness of sins" which is the condition for membership in the community that one can discover the value

1 Hugh Ross Mackintosh, Types of Modern Theology. (Charles Scribners Sons, 1939), p. 148. James Orr, The Ritschlian Theology, p. 53, says this is not a new viewpoint in theology.

and significance of Jesus.2 It is only as one stands within the community of Christ that he can interpret the materials given in the New Testament. It is from this standpoint that Ritschl developes his system.

Obviously, the theologian must make an evaluation of the materials of the New Testament and of the community of Christ in order to grasp the revelation of Lrod in uhrist.The development of a theology, then rests upon the valuing activity or value-judgments of the theologian. Thus we come* by the term "value-theology

The problem of this thesis is to examine in detail the function of the value-judgment in so far as it has a bearing on Ritsehl*s Ghristology. We will hope to discover what estimate of the historical Jesus, Ritschl was able to come to through his approach, and which of his insights are valid so that they may make a permanent contribution to Ghristology.

The problem justifies itself in the light of Ritschl*s system. The core of his system is found in his view of (1), value-judgments and (2), of the historical revelation of God in Jesus Christ, the founder of "the c o m m u n i t y T h e r e is no other way, according to Ritschl, to evaluate Jesus than by

2 Albrecht Ritschl, The Christian Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation, Translated by H. R. Mackintosh and A. B. Macaulay (New York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1900), pp. 2ff.

means bf the value-judgment, but the value-judgment can give us no valid insight*unless it can contemplate the revelation of God in the historical Jesus. The two must always go together according to Ritschls thought.

The problem is further justified inthat Ritschl *doesnt seem concerned to give a systematic statement of his

method. Indeed, in the first edition of Justification and Reconciliation he doesnt even use the term value-judgment The third edition contains but a few statements, scattered throughout the entire third volume 'which give a clue to his method. He was concerned to give the practical results rather than to explain the method.4 It should, therefore, be important to discover the relationship between his underlying assumptions and to see the result for his system of Christology.

A complete exposition of every phase of Ritschls thought cannot be attempted in*this thesis. Rather, attention must be confined to only those elements of his thought which bear a direct relationship to his formulation of Christology on the basis of value-judgments. Accordingly,

3 Wilfred C.' Keirstead, "Theological Presuppositions of Ritschl, The American Journal of Theology, 10:434,July, 1906.

4 Albert T. Swing, The Theology of Albrecht Ritschl, (Hew York: LongmansGreen, and Company, 1901), p. 27.

in phapter II the stage is set by a sketch of the theological and philosophic background and foundations of his system, and especially of his epistemology. In order to understand how value-Judgments can have a bearing on Christology, it is necessary to understand what value-Judgments are. Chapter III meets this need, and it is devoted to the Ritsehlian view of value-Judgments. One other phase of Rischls thought must be understood before there can be an appreciation of his Christology, i.e., his concept of religion in general and Christianity as the Absolute religion. Therefore, in chapter TV there is a statement of his definition of religion; of his view of revelation, God, and the kingdom of God. Chapter V is the main body of this work. Here all the above mentioned strands of Ritschl*s thought are woven together to show their effect on his Christology. Here Ritschl*s concept of the person and work of Christ is dealt with specifically. The concluding. chapter, chapter VI, contains a summary and conclusions in which an attempt is made to formulate Ritschls contributions 450 the Christological problem*

CHAPTER II

THE THEOLOGICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL BACKGROUNDOF RITSCHL

Perhaps the "best entrance into Ritschls thought is through the gateway of his theological and philosophical presuppositions. These can most easily he set forth in their relation to previous thinkers.

I. RITSCHL1 S RELATION TO THE THEOLOGIANS, BAUR, BERNARD, LUTHER, CALVIN, AND SCHLEIERMACHER

Ritschl approached the realm of theological thought through the study of church history. While a pupil of Ferdinand Christian Baur, he gradually became aware of how the Hegelian dialectic-al view of history had led Baur into notions of the origin and date of the New Testament hooks which did not take into account the "manifoldness of the historical causes at work in the early history f the Christian C h u r c h . T h u s Baur failed, Ritschl felt, to evaluate truly the historic Jesus in the beginnings of Christianity.

Eugene W. Lyman, ttRitschl,s Theory of Value- Judgments," Journal of Religion. Vol. 5, 501, Sept., 1925.

6It is significant to note that of all the theologians

of the old church,-Ritschl found Bernard most helpful. A. T. Swing2 thinks this was so because Bernard laid such emphasis upon the historical Christ, and did not give too much attention to the metaphysics of his divinity.

Ritschl finds in Luther his greatest helper. He felt that Luther had recovered the true approach Jo the historical Jesus. From A. T. Swing*s3 lengthy discussion of this point can be gleaned the following ways in which'Ritschl felt he followed Luther: (1) **It is when we turn from the philosophic to the ethical conception of God and discover His love to us that we are won to him.** (2) *. . . the true faithand the assurance of salvation are inseparable.** (3) **. . .faith is to be no intellectual act but a vital confidence in the very gospel itself, which is a religious and not a theoretic proclamation." (4) God is to be known only inChrist, and to know Christ is to accept grace from Him.tf (5) Christ is called Christ, not because of his two natures (which have only to do with a sophistical knowledge of him), but because of his office and work. (6) The Scriptures are a religious means, not a formal authority.

The Theology of Albrecht Ritschl. (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co ., 1901) p . 34.

3 Ibid., pp. 37ff.

Ritschl quotes Calvin, only a little less than he doesLuther. Swing feels that Ritschl has recovered for Moderntheology some of the real contributions of Calvin. This, hesays* is evident in

. . . Calvins practical employment of the inductive method, of his* caution in going beyond the substantial content of the revelation in Jesus Christ, and his emphatic shutting out of speculative questions concerning that great realm which Cod has not made known to us.

Swing also points out three elements in Calvin which Ritschl made fundamental in his system. They are:

First, the turning from the cosmological and metaphysical to the etjiical and religious. Second, the use of the ethical as the measure of values. Third, the recognition of the fact that only in this way can we come to the possession of a religious life.5

The great influence of Schleiermacher on all-modernGerman theological thought makes him important for Ritschlbecause he preceded Ritschl by fifty years. D. C. Macintoshthinks Ritschl has followed Schleiermacher in basing histheology on the religious consciousness rather than onmetaphysical speculations. He says,* therefore:

. . the claim, or assumption, of the autonomy of the religious consciousness; the dependence upon Christian religious feeling as a basis for dogmatics; the protest against the mingling of philosophical and religious knowledge; the metaphysical agnosticism, making the content of theology mainly Christology and soteriology, rather than theology proper; the consequent anthropo- centric rather than theocentric character of the system,

4 Ibid., p. 45f.5 Ibid., p . 47.

8at least in so far as it claims to be scientific; and finally, the normative value attached to the consciousness of the religious community.6

D. C# Macintosh goes on to point out that the chief differences between the two are:

. . . first, that Ritschl made will as well as feeling basic in theology, or in other words undertook a* synthesis of Kant and Schleiermacher; and second, that he proceeded . . . from the gospel [by this he means the revelation in Christ] instead of from the religious consciousness.7

II. RITSCHLS RELATION TO THE PHILOSOPHERS,KANT AND LOTZE

In tracing the obligations to the philosophers of Ritschl1s system, we naturally turn first to Kant in the light of whose teachings all nineteenth century German thought must be approached. This is not the place to attempt an exposition of Kant*s system; and, therefore, it will only be necessary here to suggest the uses to which Ritschl places Kantian philosophy.6

6 The Problem of Religious Knowledge, (New York:Harper and Brothers, c1940), p .245.

7'Ibid., p. 244. These suggestions have been taken from James Orr,

The Ritschlian Theology. (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1897), pp. 35ff. Orr has made still other suggestions, but no notice is taken of them because they are questionable.

Ritschl agrees thoroughly with Kant that our knowledge of God rests on the practical, not the theoretic judgment.9 He accepts the Kantian deduction of the Kingdom of God.l^He felt alsothat Kant had'laid a sound "basis for Christian theology in his doctrine of human freedom, with its important hearings on the ideas of guilt and punishment. He says:

The high importance of Kants contribution to the right understanding of the Christian idea of reconciliation lies less in any positive contribution to the structure of doctrine than in the fact that he establishes critically that is, with scientific strictness those general presuppositions of the idea of reconciliation which lie in the consciousness of moral freedom and moral guilt . H

The relationship of Ritschl to Lotze is so close that one cannot hope to understand certain phases of Ritschls system unless he knows something of Lotzes system. It will suffice here to indicate in a general way the obligations of Ritschl to Lotze. In the consideration of specific doctrines there is a more complete exposition of the bearing of Lotge on Ritschl.

^Albrecht Ritschl, The Christian Doctrine of Justification and* Reconciliation, translated by H. R. Mackintosh and A. B. Macaulay. (New York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1900), p. 280. Unless otherwise indicated, references will always be in Vol. III.

1 0 > P H ^ Christian Doctrine of Justification and

Reconciliation, Vol. I, p. 408, quoted by James Orr, The Ritschlian Theology, p. 35.

He acknowledges his indebtedness to Lotze for the1 pfollowing: First, a theory of knowledge. ^ He does not

agree with Kant that the thing in itself is -unknowable because it is hidden behind phenomena. Rather, he professes to believe with Lotze that the "thing is known in the phenomena.-" Ritschl agrees with Kant and. Lotze that the idea of the Good must be placed above theoretic knowledge, and . . .in seeking the ultimate principle of the explanation of the world in a Highest-Good Personal,* which he identifies with Living Love*. Furthermore, Ritschl acceptsLotzes idea of a faculty by which we "judge according to worth, which gives our world of values, and which- is higher than the theoretic faculty by which we arrive at the world of forms.

Ill. RITSCHLS EPISTEMOLOGY

The situation regarding the necessity of an epistem- ology appears, at first sight, to Joe uncertain for in his Theologie und Metaphysik Ritschl contends that the theologian must work in accordance with some theory of knowledge; but six pag*es later he says that Christianity is neutral as

Albrecht Ritschl, o. cit., pp. 19f.I3 James Orr, o. cit.. p. 40.

11regards all theories of knowledge .14 Liberals-*-^ and conservatives^-6 alike have used these two statements as evidence that Ritschl was confused in his thinking and thus produced a system full of contradictions, . W. C. Keirstead^? and A. T. Swingl think there is no basic contradiction at this point, especially if Ritschl is read in the light of Lotze whom he, indeed, professed to follow. Since this is the constructive approach, it will be followed here.

It was Ritschl1s opinion that correct theological propositions depend upon epistemology. He says,

The formally correct expression of theological propositions depends on the method we follow in defining the objects of cognition, that is the theory of knowledge which we consciously or unconsciously obey.**-9

In Theologle und Metaphysik he says, every theologian is asa scientific man

. . under the duty or necessity to proceed according to a determined theory of knowledge of which he must be

14 pp. 40 and 46, quoted in John K. Mozley, Ritsch- lianism, (London: James Hisbet and Co# Limited, 1909), p. 14#

15 por example: Pfleiderer, The Development ofTheology, translated by J. Frederick Smith (New York: TheMacmillan Co., 1909), pp. 185ff.

"#16 For example: 'James Orr, jop. cit., chap. III.^ W# C. Keirstead, Metaphysical Presuppositions of

Ritschl, (A Doctoral Dissertation: University of Chicago,1905), p. 677.

18 A. T. Swing, op. cit.. chap. III.Justification and Reconciliation, p. 15.

12conscious and which he must he prepared to justify.20

While Ritschl regarded Christianity as a religion as indifferent to any epistemology, yet he felt epistemology to be so important for theology that the misunderstanding between himself and his opponents was really over a correct.theory of knowledge.Therefore, it is important to understand his conception of epistemology and its function in theology.

In order to grasp Ritschl1s epistemology, it is necessary to understand his conception of metaphysics. He says:

The theory of knowledge in the sense here intended, is identical withthe doctrine of the thing or things which forms the first part of metaphysics . . . Metaphysics deals with the universal ground of all being. It abstracts from the peculiar nature of natural and spiritual magnitudes in order to get the conception of a thing which is common to both.22

It would seem, then, that metaphysical knowledge is a priori.Metaphysics for Ritschl, Keirstead believes,2* is

divided into two parts, ontology, or the doctrine of things, and cosmology. In the Theologie und Metaphysik, Ritschl says of ontology (or the doctrine of things) that it presents

. cit., p. 66 auoted by W. C. Keirstead, p. 6 77. There is no available Rnglish translation of this, the latest of Ritschls writings. Consequently, secondary authorities have had to be depended on entirely for Ritschls viewpoint in this work.

2 - W. C. Keirstead, op. cit., p. 67722 Justification and Reconciliation, pp. 15f.^ kc. cit. The situation is confusing because Ritschl

only devotes scattered remarks to his epistemology.

13the forms arising in the intelligible spirit of man in which it proceeds in general to fix the objects of representation above the currents of sensation and perception. . Thus metaphysical conceptions include and regulate all other acts of knowledge which involve the specific peculiarity of nature and spirit.. They explain how it is that the human mind, having had experimentally perceptions of different kinds, differentiates them in consequence into natural things and spiritual beings. But it does not follow from the position of metaphysics as superordinate to experimental knowledge that metaphysical conceptions give us a more profound and valuable knowledge of spiritual existence than can be gained from psychology and ethics. Compared with psychology and ethics, metaphysics yields only elementary and merely formal knowledge.24

In Justification and Beconciliation he saysA theory of things is employed formally in theology as settling the objects ofknowledge, and defining the relations between the multiplicity of their qualities

and the unity of their existence. The rules, which it is possible to set up here, form the conditions of experience by means of which the specific nature of things is to be recognized.25

Metaphysics includes also cosmology. In the Theologie und Metaphysik he says tf. . . the manifold of the perceived and presented things is ordered to the unity of a world, whether the world be conceived as limitless or as a w h o l e . ^ 6 Keirstead interprets Bitschl to mean that this knowledge is also a priori dealing with the pure forms of intuition

14than with the experimentally g i v e n . I n a s m u c h as cosmology does not take into consideration the distinction between nature and spirit, its knowledge is elementary and superficial; and since it "applies the results of ontology to the realm of nature* . . . ontology is the most important part of metaphysics .**28

Keirstead*s conclusion is that since for Ritschl epistemology means ontology, and since he equates this with metaphysics (inasmuch as it is the important part of metaphysics), Ritschl is not guilty (as'he has been charged) with ruling metaphysics out of theology.20 Metaphysics gives us real, although elementary knowledge, confining itself to the universal ground of being. In the Theologie und Metaphysik he says,

Metaphysical concepts are elementary knowledge in which one fixes the objects of knowledge as such, that is, as things in general, in their general relation to each other. For this reason spiritual magnitudes are only superficially and Imperfectly known in metaphysics, and not in their characteristic reality.*50

He says also a few pages earlier concerning the doctrine of

God which is an expample of where a metaphysical idea is presented directly as theological,

27 Rc cit. ^ cit.20 Loc. cit.

Ibid., p. 56, quoted in I. C. Keirstead, op. cit.,p. 680.

15The remaining propositions of theologie are of such a specifically spiritual (Geistiger) character that metaphysics comes into consideration only as the formal rule for the knowledge of religious magnitudes and relations.

Metaphysical knowledge, then, deals only with what is commonto spirit and nature, but theology is concerned with what ispeculiar to spirit alone. Thus metaphysical knowledge isreally worthless for theology. Epistemology is valuable forthe theologian because it has a formal, regulative, andcritical function in theology. This is important for Ritschlbecause he thinks the proofs for God, the speculations as tothe pre-existence of Christ and original sin, all arise from afalse theory of knoi^ledge

Ritschls opponents do not correctly appreciate himbecause they understand he thinks by metaphysics

. . . not that elementary knowledge of things in general which ignores their division into nature and spirit, but such a universal theory as shall be at once elementary and the final and exhaustive science of all particular orders of existence.33

They do this because they mix metaphysical knowledge with revelation. The result is that they get an imperfect knowledge of reality. All this would be corrected by a proper

. P* 40, quoted by Keirstead, loc. cit. W. C. Keirstead, op. cit., p. 683. Justification and Reconciliation, p . 16.

* %

16theory of knowledge, by which we learn that objects are onlyknown in their relation to us. He says,

If God belongs as an object of knowledge to scientific theology, then there is no satisfying ground for any claim that one could know something of God in himself, which would be unknown to us apart from the revelation which is somehow created by him, but felt and perceivedby us.

Ritschl*s oppoents make the mistake of speculating about suchthings as the eternal pre-existent union of Christ with God,or the metaphysical attributes of God because, he says,

They want the objective bearing of doctrine and not the interpretation of them as reflected In the subject. But we observe and explain even the objects of sense-percep- tion, not as they are in themselves, but as we perceivethem. 35

Three prevelant theories of knowledge are in common use, in the European thought, of his d a y . 36 They are the Scholas- tic-Platonic, the Kantian and the Lotzean. According to the first view

. . . the thing works upon us, indeed, by means of its mutable qualities, arousing our sensations and ideas, but that it really _is at rest behind the qualities as a permanently s^lf-equlvaTeht unity of attributes.37

He thinks that,The simplest example of this view to be found in Scholastic

Theologle und Metaphysik, p. 59, quoted from W. C. Keirstead, op.. cit., p. 684.

35 Justification and Reconciliation, p. 34.36 Ibid., pp. 18f . *37 ibid*, pp. 18f.

17dogmatics is the explication given on the one hand of the essence and attributes of God, and on the other hand of the operations of God upon the world and for the salvation of mankind.3

The contradictions of this view are:39 (1) The thing is at rest, but yet it must be active tobe the cause of its qualities. (2) There is a temporal and spatial separation between the thing at rest and its qualities which appear, so they cannot be viewed as cause and effect. (5) Such a passive thing would be entirely unknowable.

The second theory of knowledge, Kant's,*. . . limits the knowledge of the understanding to the world of phenomena, but declares unknowable the thing or things in themselves, though their interdependent changes are the ground of the changes in the world of*phenomena. The latter part of the statement contains a true criticism of the Scholastic interpretation of a 'thing*. The first part, however, is too near the Scholastic theory to avoid its errors. For a world of phenomena can be posited as the object of knowledge only if we suppose that in them something real to wit, the thing appears to us or is the cause of our sensation and perception. Otherwise the phenomena can only be treated as an illusion. Thus by his use of the conception of phenomenon Kant contradicts his own principle that real things are unknowable.49

Ritschl here seems to point out that Kant has discovered thefallacy of the Scholastic position which has separated the"thing-in-itself*1 from its effects, but did not give up the

38 Ibid.. p. 1939 W. C. Keirstead, _o. cit., p. 68549 A. Ritschl, Justification and Reconciliation, p. 19.

18knowability of the thing. This Kant did, hut he retained the Scholastic error of separating the thing* from its effects,

Ritschl claims his own position is that of Lotze, He says of Lotze,

He holds that in the phenomena which in a definite space exhibit changes to a limited extent and in a determinate order, we cognise the thing as the cause of its qualities operating upon us, as the end which these serve as means, as the law of their constant change.41

In the Theologie und Metaphysik there is this furtherexplanation:

In the elementary stage of the formation of the conception of a thing there is no need to put in two planes, side by side, the thing, and its attributes which are felt and perceived by us at the same time, and to put the one behind the other, and to assert the possibility of the knowledge of the thing behind its attributes or before the recognition of them. Nor is there need of this when the conception of a thing is enriched, when the marks are understood as manifest effects of a cause and as means to an end, when one recognizes the marks as changing in definite limits, and the whole as effective in the regular change of its attributes; when, finally, one supposes a law in the perceived history of a thing. Rather the thing is caused in its effects and purpose in the ordered series in its appearing changes.42

These two statements are very revealing for they show that a thing, for Ritschl, is causality, dynamic, and operative; but it is all this within certain limits and according

#to its own law. In other words, w . . . *a thing has the

41 i M a . , pp. i9f. 42 Pp. 63f., quoted from W. C. Keirstead, o_. cit.,

p. 689.

19purposive causality of a self/43

Ritschls statements on his epistemology are so "brief that they can hardly he understood except in the light of a full exposition of Lotze whose epistemology he admits he borrows. . C. Keirstead44 has worked this out point by point with full quotations from both Lotze and Ritschl to show just how Ritschl felt he followed Lotze. Interpretations of Lotze. differ as widely as they do of Ritschl. Consequently no * account shall be taken here of other viewpoints, because by this interpretation the viev/point of Ritschl is made understandable; but by other interpretations of Lotze, Ritschl becomes as confusing as some of his critics make him out to be.4^

Ritschl accepts Lotze1s idea of cause that causality is efficient--, and of change. Lotze says, "The phenomena of a thing exhibit changes in a definite sphere and to a limited extent.h4 Change indicates transformation of the thing, for he says, "The essence or substance of a thing is

43 Keirstead, o. cit, p. 690.44- cit. , pp. 690-698.4-8 For example, Leonhard Stahlin, Kant, Lo'tze and

Ritschl (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1889}, PP. 1^1-176.^ Metaphysics, Vol. I, chap. 2, quoted from W. C. Keirstead, op. cit.. p . 690.

20*that which admits of change,Tt hut in change . . . the thing

never passes over from one sphere to another.**47In Ritschl* s definition of the thing as the f,law of

the constant change of the qualities , he is hut followingLotze, for Lotze declares,

. . that the essence of a thing cannot he expressed in a quality, hut only in the logical form of a conception, which expresses the permanently uniform observance of law in the succession of various states or the combination of various predicates.^3

Keirstead^9 thinks Ritschl*s ascription of purposivecausality to things when he defines thing as . the endwhich the qualities serve as means . . .** indicates he isaccepting Lotze*s view . . . that things possess a certainselfhood. In support for this he quotes Lotze*s statementthat

If there he things with the properties we demand of things, they must he more than things. Only by sharing this characteristic of spiritual nature can they fulfill the general requirements which must be fulfilled in order to constitute a thing.50

In the self is the best example of the Lotzean thing, and it

47 koc. cit.48 0j>. cit.. chap. 3, quoted by Keirstead, loc. cit.49 W. C. Keirstead, op. cit.. p. 691.50 Metaphysics. Yol. I, ehap. 7, , paragraph 7,^quoted

in Keirstead, loc. cit.

is by our whole experience we are best able to understand what we mean by the thing.

*Our' ideas, feelings, and efforts appear to be in their nature the states of a being, of the necessary unity of which, as contrasted with them, we are immediately conscious . * for these inner events appear to us as states only through the marvelous nature of mind, which can compare every idea, every feeling, every passion, with others; and, Just; because of this relating activity with reference to them all, knows itself as a permanent subject from which under various conditions they resul.t.51

There is no substance lying behind the self or thing to whichqualities inhere and which gives them reality, but Lotze says,

. . . reality is that ideal content which, by means of what it is, is capable of producing the appearance of a substance lying within it, to which it belongs as predicate .52

Ritschl further accepts Lotze1s viewpoint that things are in constant interaction, and that the nature of the interaction is determined by the natures of the interacting things and by the relations existing between them. A certain state is not carried over from one body into another; for when subject and object interact, states are produced in the former. Iso, ideas are not copies of things, but are determined ac-

cording to the general law of interaction by the nature of the subject, object, and the relation existing between them. Furthermore, since the soul is active, sensation is never a

53- Ibid.. foj. II, p. 633, quoted from Keirstead, loc.cit.

52 Outlines of Metaphysics, paragraph 28, quoted by Keirstead, op. cit. p. 692.

22passive content, but the reaction of the soul upon the object*53That this is the view*Ritschl has accepted, Keirstead thinks,is evidenced by the following quotations:

In the theory of things, it is taken for granted that the self is not of itself the cause of sensation, perceptions, etc., but that these peculiar activitiesof the soul are stimulated by its coexistence with things of which the human body is one.^For all causes which affect the soul work upon it as stimuli of the special activity with which it is endowed.The relation of the soul to all the causes which work upon it is not one of simple passivity; all actions upon it, rather, it takes up in its sensations, as a reaction in which it manifests itself as an independent cause.33

Sensations and perceptions are states of a thing orself as a result of interaction with other things. Therefore,knowledge is subjective although it may have a transubjectivereference. Here Ritschl explains the psychological origin ofa concept of a thing:

The presentation (Vorstellung) .of a .thing arises out of the different sensations which, in a definite order., fasten themselves to something that perception fixes in a limited space. We posit the apple as a round, red, sweet thing, since the sensations of touch, sight, and taste bunch themselves in the place in which the corresponding relations of form, color, and taste are perceived. These same relations which by repeated perceptions meet in a common spot* we unite in the idea of a thing** which exists in its relations, which we know only in these relations

53 W. C. Keirstead, op. pit., p. 692.A. Ritschl, Theologle und Metaphysik. p. 44, quoted

in Keirstead, l.oc. cit.33 Justification and Reconciliation, p. 21.

and designate by means of them. The relation of the marks in question, thus fixed by our sensations, to the thing which we express in the judgment1, This thing is round, red, and sweet, signifies that we knotv the subject of this proposition solelyi. the predicate. Could we leave them out of view, or forget them, the thing which we had come to know in and by these marks would cease to be a matter of knowledge.5*The impression that the perceived thing in the change of its marks is one, arises from the continuity of the feeling of self in the succession of sensations excited by the thing, further, the apprehension of the thing as cause and as its own end arises from the.certainty that I am cause and that I am end in the activities due to me.. . . The appearances which are perceived in a limited space in the same position or series, and their changes in a definite limit and order, are combined by our faculty of representation to the unity of a thing, after the analogy of the cognizing soul which, in the change of its corresponding sensations, feels and remembers itself as a permanent u n i t y *7

This viewpoint is different from Kants because forKant, Ritschl thinks, we know phenomena, and phenomena are notrealities, they, being in the consciousness since the worldof hature is the product of consciousness and is constructed

mare noth- by themselves of repre- indicate,

by Keirstead,

cit.58 Kant,cri11que of Pure Reason, translated by Max

Muller, quoted by Keirstead, no reference, loc. cit.

by the understanding. Kant tells us: "Phenomena ing but sensuous representations, which therefore must not be taken for objects outside the faculty sentation."58 jpor Ritschl, as the passages above

56 Theologie und Metaphysik, p. 63, quoted op. cit., p. 693.

57 ibid., p. 44, quoted by Keirstead, loc.

2 4

as well as for Lotze, the excitation of sensation is caused by the thing. This is very much like Kant. But Keirstead finds the difference between Kant and Lotze in their conception of phenomena.59 por Kant, we know phenomena. But phenomena are mental constructs. Therefore, for Lotze, what Kant calls phenomena, are knowledge. Keirstead says,

Kants phenomena are not realities, because they are a knowledge of reality, and knowledge is subjective. Knowledge is knovrledge for someone just as truly as it is knowledge of something. Sensations, perceptions, and conceptions are elements of knowledge, and are the possession of an individual consciousness.60

Keirstead quotes for confirmation a passage in Lotze to whichRitschl appeals:

We admit, therefore, the complete subjectivity of our knowledge with the less ambiguity because we see clearly, moreover, that it is unavoidable, and that although we may forego the claim to all knowledge whatever, we can put no other knowledge in the place of that on which doubt is thrown that would not "be open to the same reproach . . .But this universal character of subjectivity as belonging to all knowledge can settle nothing as to its truth or u'ntruth. And it is a fallacy, on account of the subjectivity of all the elements out of which it has been formed, to deny its truth, and to pronounce the outer world to be merely a creation of our imagination. For the state of things could be no other, were the things without us or not. Our knowledge in the one case, our impressions in the other, could -alike consist only in states or activities of our own being in what we call impressions made on our

W. C. Keirstead, op. cit. , p. 694.60 Loc. cit.

5nature, supposing these to he things, hut on no supposi- _ tion on anything other than a subjective property of ours.The demonstration of a thoroughgoing subjectivity of all the elements of our cognition, sensations, pure intuitions, and pure notions of the understanding is in no respect decisive against the assumption of the existence of a world of things outside of ourselves. For it is clear that this subjectivity of cognition-must in any case be true, whether things do or do not exist. For, even if things exist, still our cognition of them cannot consist in their actually finding an entrance into-us, but only in their exercising an action upon us. hut the products of this action, as affections of our being, can receive' their form from our nature alone. And it is easy to persuade ourselves that, even in case things do actually exist, all parts of our cognition will have the very same subjectivity as that from which it might.be hastily concluded that things do not exist.

For Lotze, the most that we can have is a connected and consistent system of ideas about the thing. Knowledge that should exhaust the thing-itself is unintelligible.6^

The Kantian phenomena are for Lotze, knowledge. Sensations, percepts, concepts^, being processes in the individual consciousness, unite to form knowledge, but not things.

For Lotze, certain a priori elements in knowledge, being logical acts have formal and not real significance. He says,

We cannot assent to the distinction between the matter and form of knowledge as drawn by Kant. The idea is, indeed, perfectly just, but he formulates it inaccurately

^ Metaphysics, p. 94, quoted from Keirstead, loc. cit.Outlines of Metaphysics, paragraph 79, quoted from

Keirstead, loc. cit.63 Keirstead here refers to LotzeLs Logic, paragraph 308.

26when he ascribes the entire content to experience, and the form alone to the innate activity of the mind. Kant was well aware of the fact that even the simplest sensations which in the strictest sense furnish the original content of all our perceptions do not come to us ready made from without, but, on the contrary (if we are to hold to the concept of an external world), can only be considered as reactions of our own nature to combinations

of sense and intellect in response to the stimuli coming from that world.64

For Kant, according to Keirstead1s Exposition, thecontent of sensation is furnished by an unknowable, and thesoul subsumes this under its own forms. For Lotze, the soulis stimulated by interaction of things and reacts in the formof sensation, feeling, and ideas. We form the concept of athing from its continued activity. How do you pass from thegenesis of the concept to its validity? The answer for Lotze,Keirstead thinks, is in intuition.65 Keirstead outlines histhought as follows:

Things exist in interaction. Sensation, ideas and feelings are the states in a conscious being which arise through this interaction. They give us knowledge of reality. Appearance has both a subject to which it appears and an object which appears. Ideas are not things, th,ey are not copies of things, but they are valid of things. Every sensation, feeling, or idea * is in itself a bit of information about reality*; it is the very nature of knowledge that it gives us information of things beyond immediate experience. The concept of a thing may arise in the child-mind after repeated experiences. And the concept conveys to the child information concerning its own cause. It is in this light that Ritschl is to be interpreted when he makes real things the cause

64 Ibid.. paragraph 32665 Keirstead, op. cit. , pp. 695ff.

27of experience, and yet regards the concept of the thing as the product of experience

According to Lotze, then, our finiteness limits us to partial knowledge, or to the formal nature of things. Trulyvaluable knowledge is found in the laws of science, morals and religion, and these give content to our formal ontology.

In conclusion, therefore, it can be said, Ritschl rejects the scholastic conception of substance as the essence of things, because this is but to transform a logical concept into a metaphysical entity. He rejects Kantianism, because the Kantian principle that we know only phenomena,- reduces'knowledge to illusion. He adheres to LotzTs position, and takes him to mean,

. . . that we have a partial knowledge of reality. Weknow the formal nature of things by metaphysics. Their real nature is learned by exp'erience, and induction is the method of procedure. We can never know things as a

perfect intelligence knows them, but only as they are for us. Knowledge is subjective. It is the possession of an individual consciousness, but it has an objective reference .67

66 SB* cit., p. 697^ W. C. Keirstead, op. cit. , p. 698.

CHAPTER.Ill

RITSCHL*S THEORY OE VALUE-JUDGMENTS

The theory of value-judgments plays such an Important part in Ritschl*s system that special consideration must be given to it. Curiously enough, as we have already point out in chapter I, Ritschl did not even use the term, value- judgment, in the first edition of Justificationand Reconciliation. Furthermore, when he does use the term in the third edition, he seems to presuppose the term is fully understood, for he only devotes scattered remarks to the subject. His son, Otto Ritschl, however, has made up for this in his pamphlet, Ueber Wethurtheile (Concerning Value-judgments,1895) , which Edghill thinks t1deals with the question with commendable thoroughness .r,3-

I. THE HISTORICAL RETROSPECT

Otto Ritschl traces back value-judging on its religiousside to Luther, and on its philosophic side, to Kant. Hequotes this statement from Luther:

It is not enough that a man believes, that God is, that Christ has suffered, and such-like; but he must steadfastly believe, that God is his God for his blessedness,

3-Ernest A. Edghill, Faith and Fact: a study of Ritschlianism (London: Macmillan and Co., 1910j, P 108.

29that Christ suffered for him, died, was crucified, rose again, that he tore his sins for him.^

Here Luther is obviously insisting on the incomparable interest of the objects of faith for the religious subject.

Otto Ritschl thinks that Kant paved the way for thetheory of value-judgments in his distinction bet?/een thepure and the practical reason.3 But, more than that,Kant distinguished relative value or price, from "innervalue or worthiness. To illustrate this distinction, OttoRitschl says:

. . . talent has a commercial price, temperment an emotional price, character an inner worth, and is raised above all price* . . . [for) . . . Any man calls agreeable what delights him; beautiful what simply pleases him; good, what is esteemed, approved, that is, in which he places an objective value.^

In Herbert there is the distinction, Otto Ritschl says, between theoretical representation, where the subject is indifferent, and aesthetic judgments in which is expressed a spontaneous preference or rejection. Otto Ritschl also says Herbert declares that

. . . religion makes an aesthetic impression in addition to the moral, and that is so essential to it, that if it did not act at all aesthetically it could not act at all

2 quoted fom Alfred E. Garvie. The Hitschiian Theology (Edinburgh,' T. and T. Clark 1899), p. '179.

3 Eric S. Waterhouse, Modern Theories of Religion (New York: Eaton and Mains, n.d. [ preface," 1910J), p. 117.

4 quoted by A. E. Garvie, op. cit., pp. 179f.

30morally. For "behind the moral conceptions there necces- sarily lie hidden, as the first fundamental presuppositions aesthetic conceptions.5

yDe Wette is the first to recognize in the process of

valuation a motive to action.$ Otto Ritschl describes histhought this way:

We recognize, not only the existence of things, we also assign them a value, and it is this assigning of value that drives us on to action, inasmuch as the value "becomes our purpose. This judging of things according to value and purpose is of different kinds and rises in stages or different feelings of pleasure and impulses from the sensuous to the spiritual. Only in combination with the highest and purest feeling of value is faith complete and perfect, and can be separated from it only by an abstraction.7

Otto Ritschl next acknowledges Rothe who held that . . . we also know with our feeling, that the function of

*feeling is also a knowledge, . . that is, in regard to . . . these things without the knowledge of which an existence worthy of man is not at all possible. Rothe also remarks, according to Otto Ritschl, . . . that transcendental objects and things of the utmost importance are for the great majority of men part of their knowledge through feeling rather than through thinking . . .9 Mozley thinks this remark

5 Xbid., P* 6 E. A. Edghill, op. cit., p. 109.7 Ibid., pp. 180f. Ibid., p . 181.9 John K. Mozley, Ritschlianism (London: lames Nisbet and Co., Limited, 1909), p. 98.

should be related to Pascals saying that "the heart has its reasons.

In Lotze, Otto Ritschl recognizes the real source of the Ritschlian theory. Values do not inhere in things in themselves but only in the pleasure or pain which the things occasion in the subject, but in which the things cannot participate themselves. For according to Lotze, Otto Ritschl says,

In the feeling for the value of things reason possesses a revelation as seriously intended as it has In the fundamental propositions of logical Inquiry an indis- pensible instrument of experience. Accordingly, Lotze finally distinguishes the world of figures or of forms from the world of values, which he once also identifies with the world of ends.lu

II. THE DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN THEORETICAL JUDGMENTS AND VALUE-JUDGMENTS, AND BETWEEN CONCOMITANT AND

INDEPENDENT VALUE-JUDGMENTS

The basic problem for man is how he shall Interpret the world in which he finds himself. He is challenged both by nature and history to say whether their difficulties can be solved by an analysis of their content and on investigation of the causal process manifest in their progress and decay; or whether the true solution is to be sought, not within, but without and above. Ritschl1s theory of value-judgments is

^ Quoted from A. E. Garvie, op. cit., p. 181.

his method for discovery of truth and for dealing with the given phenomena.!!

He begins his theory with a statement of the two-foldY mj in which the mind appropriates its sensations. He says,

They are determined, according to their value for the Ego, by the feeling of pleasure or pain. Feeling is the basal function of the mind, inasmuch as in it the Ego is originally present to itself. In the feeling of pleasure or pain, the Ego decides whether a sensation, which touches the feeling of sjslf, serves to highten or depress it. On the other hand, through an idea the sensation is judged in respect of its cause, the nature of the latter, and its connection with other causes: and by means of observation, etc., the knowledge of things thus gained is extended until it becomes scientific.I2

We see, therefore, for Bitschl, that sensations may produce pleasure or pain by which their value for the Ego is determined . Or they may be embodied in ideas and judged in thelight of their causal relationships. Of these two functionsthat of making value-judgments and causal judgments, the latter of which is often called trtheoretical judgments11, the former is the more basic for in feeling the Ego is ft. . . originally present to itself.tf

It must not be thought that these two operations areso distinct that they never overlap. The fact of the matter

John K. Mozley, o. cit.. p. 93.^ Justification and Reconciliation, pp. 203f*

33is that they frequently occur together; and, in some cases, the one cannot occur unless the other does. Thus-Ritschl says,

The two functions of spirit mentioned are always in operation simultaneously, and always also in some degree mutually related, even though it he in the inverse ratio of prominence. In particular, it must not he forgotten that all continuous cognition of the things which excite

. sensation is not only accompanied, hut likewise guided, hy feeling. For in so far as attention is necessary to attain the end of knowledge, will, as representing the desire for accurate cognition, comes in between; the proximate cause of will, however, is feeling as expressing the consciousness that a thing or an activity is worth desiring, or that something ought to he put away. ?alue- judgments therefore are determinative in the case of all connected knowledge of the world, even when carried out even in the most objective fashion. Attention during scientific observation, and the impartial examination of the matter observed, always denote that such knowledge has a value for him who employs it. This fact makes its presence all the more distinctly felt when knowledge is guided through a richly diversified field by attention of a technical or practical kind. 15

In other words, the theoretic and the value-judging functions%

of the mind always operate simultaneously, bpt the value- judging is more basic because attention is necessary for accurate scientific knowledge. This means that the will is : present in theoretic knowing, and will expresses the feeling that accurate knowing is valuable.

The fact that value-judging is always present in the theoretic judgment prompts Ritschl to distinguish between concomitant or accompanying value-judgments and independent

15 Ifria*, P* 204.-

34value-judgments** Of them he says,

The former are operative and necessary in all theoretical cognition, as in all technical observation and combination* But independent value judgments are all perceptions of moral ends or moral hindrances, in so far as they excite moral pleasure or pain, or, it may be, set in motion the will to appropriate what is good or repel the opposite* If the other kinds of^knowledge are called "disinterested " this only means they are without these moral effects.14

It is apparent, therefore, for Ritschl, that concomitant value-judgments are operative in all theoretical cognition, but It would seem that independent value-judgments are untouched by the theoretic. It Is also apparent, as Lyman has pointed out,3-5 tha.t in this statement Ritschl has not directly defined independent value judgments: he has only illustratedthem*

Another group of independent value-judgments have todo with religious knowledge. .Of them, he says,

Religious knowledge forms another class of independent value-judgments. That is, it cannot be traced back to the conditions which mark the knowledge belonging to moral, will, for there exists religion which goes on without any relation whatever to the moral conduct of life. Besides in many religions, religious pleasure is of a purely natural kind, and is independent of those conditions which lift religions above natural pleasure. For only at the higher stages do we find religion combined with the ethical conduct of life. Religious knowledge moves in independent value-judgments, which relate to man*s attitude toward the world, and call forth feelings

3-4 Ibid. pp . 04f.3-5 Eugene W. Lyman, "Ritschls Theory of Value-judg

ments" , The Journal of Religion, 5:504, Sept. 19B5.

of pleasure or pain, in which man either enjoys the dominion over the world vouchsafed him by God, or feels greviously the lack of Gods help to that e n d . 16

The point is that the religious and ethical value-judgmentsmay he separated, hut in Christianity they are extremelyclosely interwoven.17 ,

The above quotations contain all that Ritschl says inhis great work, Justification and Reconciliation, concerningthe fundamental principles of his theory of values. Bailliethinks it is important (so far as the historical perspectiveis concerned) to realize that in this brief account Ritschlhas gone beyond both Lotze and Kant who

. .. . had spoken as if a clear-cut and absolute distinction could be made between the fact and value, the actual and ideal, the is* and the ought to be*. Hitachi., however, has the signal merit of having been among the first to see clearly that this is hot the case.-18

III. THE OlflOLOGICAL STATUS OF OBJECTS KNOWN THROUGHVALUE-JUDGMENTS

L i b e r a l s 1 ^ and conservatives2^ alike have contended

Justification and Reconciliation, p. 205.1 7^ In Chapter IV there is a more complete discussion

of the reiationship between scientific knowledge and the value-judgments of Christian religious knowledge.

18 John Baillie, The Interpretation of Religion (New .York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1928), p. 285.

.19 otto Pfleiderer, The Development of Theology. translated by J . Frederick Smith (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1909), p. 186.

2(3 James Orr, The Ritschlian Theology (London: Hadder and Stoughton: 1897), p. 67.

that the above stated principles of Kitschl s theory of values if followed seriously, would deny objective reality to objects of religious knowledge such as God* They contend that Ritschl really in his value-judgments denies objective existence. Stfhlin thinks this has led Ritschl into subjective idealism in which the world of faith is relegated to nothing more than illusion.21 Mozley,22 Waterhouse,23 and Robert Mackintosh2^ think such charges are entirely without foundation when Ritschl is understood. That Ritschl held value- judging has to do with real existences and not mere subjective illusions is affirmed by Otto Ritschl. He ssljs,

To set in opposition to one another value-judgments and so called existence judgments as though the value-judgments expressed a non-existence, is a quite senseless misunderstanding of the thought-operations which take place in reality. For in value-judgments it is the persons intention to express, just as in theoretical judgments, only a matter of fact that is considered true.23

This opinion seems to be borne out by Ritschls own statement that

The two functions of spirit mentioned are always in

^1 'Leonhard Sthhlin, Kant, Lotze and Ritschl (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1889), p. 176

22 Lohn K. Mozley, o jd . cit., p. 99.23 Eric S. Waterhouse, op. cit., p . 120.2-1 Robert Mackintosh; Albrecht Ritschl (London:

Chapman and Hall, 1915), p. 277.^ ffeber Werthurtheile, p. 22, quoted from.John K.

Mozley, ov. cit., pp. 105f.

3?operation simultaneously, and always alsp in some degree mutually related, even though it be in the inverse ratio of prominence.^

Furthermore, Waterhouse thinks,27 Ritschl has made it plain that

. . . value judgments do not merely accompany theoretical judgments, they give rise to them: for it is inconceivable that any theoretical judgment should be made without interest or motive, in other words apart from value.

Waterhouse further contends that for Ritschl the two are soclosely connected in thought that they cannot be separatedpsychologically. The only way to separate them is throughabstraction. He interprets Ritschl as holding that thetheoretical judgments were originally value judgments, but inthe course of time they seem to have become more objectivebecause of their wide acceptance. However, we* should notlose sight of the fact that the theoretical judgment is basic-all3^ a value-judgment. Thus, Waterhouse thinks that forRitschl the theoretical judgment

. . . arises from the habit of predicting the truth or falsity, goodness or badness, pleasantness or unpleasant-

* ness, of things. Such judgments are value-judgments, but * in course of time, and by reason of social intercourse

and comparison with other valuations, they assume the character of definite and objective predictions; . . .Upon such facts are established systems of explanation, and hence theoretical judgments, judgments of facts as such apart from their values. Evidently, therefore, the theoretical judgment is concerned with the material

Justification and Reconciliation, p. 204.27 OH* cit* P* 123.

38m

provided by valuation, with the consolidated and accepted value-judgments which are known as facts. Upon such theoretical judgments, in their turn, fresh value-judgments may depend; but if their account of the matter be correct it follows that the original* source of all judgments is in value-judgments, and fresh proof of the unity of fact and value is afforded.28

+Mozley agrees with this interpretation of Ritschl, and

he reminds us. . . that everything is not given in the same way. The conception of the existence of God, for instance, cannot be reasoned about as a given fact in the same way in which we can reason about some phenomenon which confronts -our senses in the world. Therefore for Ritschl the value- judgments, besides being judgments which can be applied to existent things, are also judgments by means of which, starting from some given fact, we infer the real existence of some other fact.^9. All this leads us to the conclusion that, for Ritschl,

value-judging is a method of arriving at truth, just as metaphysical speculation is. But for Ritschl the value-judging method can lead us to. Vhlid conclusions, whereas the speculative method cannot.

Ritschl comes to these conclusions because the object of a value-judgment is related to our feeling and willing rather than to the intellectual side of our personalities.This aspect of Ritschl*s theory of values cannot be understood, both S w i n g ^ O an^ Keirstead^l think, except in the light

28 .2R* P* 12 5

29 John K. Mozley, op. cit.. p. 93.^ Albert T. Swing, The Theology of Albrecht Ritschl

(London: Longman^ G-reen, and Co., 1901) , p. 71.^ W. C. Keirstead, "The Theological Presuppositions of

Ritschl , The American Journal of Theology. 10:443, July, 1906.

of Lotze whose ontology Ritschl borrowed.339

According to Lotze the true beginning of metaphysics.lies in ethics. "We are to seek in that which should be,the ground of that which is."^3 Thus only can we arrive atthe meaning and order of the world. He says

There can be no body of facts, no arrangment of things, no course of destiny apart from .the end and meaning of the whole from which every part has received not only existence but also the active nature in which it glories.. . . After all, what satisfaction could the theory (of the unbroken causal chain of mechanism) afford if it were unable t.o unite the two great contrasting parts that together make up the world-nature and the sphere of ethics? . . . If we will not . . . either externally ground the moral world oif a nature originally given or assume that the two separate roots (of nature and ethics) coexist without any bond in a supreme Being that we call One, no other choice rema.ins than to include the good in the cycle of natural phenomena, or Nature in the accomplishment of theGood. I cannot for a moment doubt that- the latter alternative is-alone permissible. That is, to conceive of Nature in the accomplishment of erood. All beings, all that call mode and form, thing and content, the whole sum of Nature, can be nothing else than the condition for the realization of good, can be as it is only because thus in it the infinite worth of the Good manifested i t s e l f .34

For Lotze, therefore, nature only becomes truly understandable in the light of its worth-meanings. Things exist to produce values.

32 Supra. Chapter II, Part III.33 Quoted from Keirstead, oj>. cit.. p. 444.

Mic.; I. p. 396, quoted from Albert T. Swing, op. cit., pp. 72f. Swing points out that in this same work, pp. 244-250, Lotze holds that even in the theoretical Judgments it is the "worth elements which give the sense of reality."

40It is because there are moral beings with feeling,

capable of pleasure or pain, that there can be an obligatorymoral law. Drop~out the element of feeling in uod and man,and consider them as pure intellect and volition, and it isdifficult to find a place for moral obligation. Lotze says,

In our own feelings for the value of things and their relations, our reason possesses as genuine a revelation as, in the principle of logical investigation, it has an indispensible instrument of experience . . . Every real cause of pleasure is indeed only recognition and enjoyment of a specific worth which has its own occasioning cause different from the cause of every other pleasure. There is an ideal according to which we may measure v/orths. Supreme pleasure is in the satisfaction of conscience itself. Pleasure in the agreement of any individual pleasure and this supreme legislation is a standard exempt from fluctuations . . . That which corresponds to a momentory and accidental condition of some indivi- dualpeculiarity of the mind which it affects is of less worth, and that is of more worth which harmonizes ?vTith the general and normal features 'for organization, by which the mind is fitted for the fulfilment of its destiny.That would be of supreme worth which caused satisfaction to an ideal mind in its normal condition, a mind which had been purified from all tendency to divert from its proper path of development.35

The following quotations from Lotze throw further light onthe relation between values, personal spirits, and objectivereality:

Actions are not good simply as events that occur,.nor their results simply as facts that have been accomplished --it is only the will from which the actions proceed that is good . . . u-ood and good things do not exist as such independent of the feeling, willing and knowing nind: they have reality only as the living movements of

rzc Quoted by Keirstead, erg. cit., pp. 444f., from the various works of Lotze.

41such a mind . What is good in itself is some felt bliss: what we call good things are means to this good . . .The only thing that is really good is that Living Love which wills the blessedness of others. And it is just this that is the good-in-itself for which we are seeking . . . Ho kind of unsubstantial, unrealized and yet eternally valid necessity, neither a realm of truth nor a realm of worth, is prior as the initial reality: but that reality which is Living Love unfolds itself in one movement, which for finite cognition appears in the three aspects of the good which is its end, the consecutive impulse by which*this is realized, and the conformity to law with which this impulse keeps in the path that leads toward its end. . .

If this eternal sacredness and supreme worth of love were 'not at the foundation of the world, and if in such a case there could be a world of which we could think and speak, this world, it seems to me, would, whatever it were, be left without truth and order . . . True reality is not matter and is still less idea, but is the living Personal Spirit of God and the world of personal spirits which He has c r e a t e d . 36

Here then we have in his own words Lotzefs theory ofvalues, which is the key*to his whole philosophic system.Here is the way Keirstead sums up Lotze1s position:

The whole world of forms, the whole mechanism of nature, exists for*the creation of values. Values then, are not purely subjective or arbitrary, for Lotze. The desires of men as well as thought may contain a universal element and-possess objectivity in the sense of universality. Since.man is a part of reality, he neither thinks nor values in a purely subjective way. Our valuation conforms to a perfect valuation as our knowledge conforms to a perfect knowledge. In both we have an interpretationof reality.37

^ Mic.; II. pp. 720-728, quoted by Albert T. Swing, op. cit., pp. 74f.

37 W. C. Keirstead, op. cit. p. 445.

The relationship "between Lotze and Ritschl should now "be rather obvious. As we have seen, Ritschl professes to base his theology upon the Lotzean epistemology one part of which is his theory of worth. &o far as the theory*of values is concerned, Ritsch appears to have borrowed a great deal from Lotze. Here are some essential elements in value-theory upon which they agree:(1) Ideation is accompanied by feeling and willing.(2) The worth of an object is in its capacity to arouse

pleasure and pain.(5) The highest good is blessedness.(4) Our valuation gives us a true valuation of reality.(5) Values are not arbitrary, but feeling as well as thought

may possess a universal element.*The conclusion, then, that these facts bring us to is

that Ritschl cannot be guilty of denying.(by his principles) ontological reality to objects a knowledge of which we can only reach through value-judgments.

CHAPTER IV

RITSCHL*S CONCEPT OF RELIGION AND OF CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY

In Ritschl*s account of religion, he does not feel he is dealing with the subject in a formal or scientific manner* He does not claim to have adequately considered religion philosophically or comparatively* Rather he tries to discover the common denominator of all religion. The general conception of religion, thus, is to be used, not constitutively but regulatively.1 He admits that his purpose in glancing at other religions is to tf . . . point out the modifications for the worse which they exhibit when compared with Christianity *f,2

With these restrictions in mind we can now turn our attention to Ritschl*s concept of religion and of Christianity. This will involve a discussion of: first, his definition of religion and religious knowledge; second, his view of revelation; third, the result for.his conception of God and the Kingdom of God.**

1 Justification and Reconciliation. p. 196.2 Ibid *, p . 198.

44 I. DEFINITION OF RELIGION

Ritschl is famous for his analysis of religion whichhe regarded as springing from a two-fold root.3 Religion isdue on the one hand to mans position as a helpless part ofnature, and on the other hand to his irrepressible moralclaim. He says,

In every religion what is sought, with the help of the super human spiritual power reverenced by man, is a solution of the contradiction in which man finds himself, as both a part of the world of nature and a spiritual personality claiming to dominate nature. For in the former role he is a part of nature, dependent upon her, subject to and confined by other things; but as a spirit he is moved by the impulse to maintain his independence against them. In this juncture, religion springs up as faith in superhuman spiritual powers, by whose help the power which man possesses of himself is in some way supplemented, and elevated into a unity of its own kind which is a match for the pressure of the natural world.4

He also says,But the religious view of the world, in all its species, rests on the fact that man in some degree distinguishes himself in worth from the phenomena which surround him and from the influences of nature which press upon him.All religion is equivalent to an explanation of the course of the world to whatever extent it may be known in the sense that the sublime spiritual powers (or the spiritual power) which rule in or over it, conserve and confirm to the personal spirit its claims and independence over- against the restrictions of nature and the natural effects of human, society.3

3 Robert Mackintosh, Albrecht Ritschl (London: Chapman and Hall, 1915), p. 158.

4 cit., p. 1995 I b i d .* P. 1?

It will be seen that this definition of religion makes Bitschls conception of it, practical, rather than, specula- * tive. He tells us that it arises out of an acute practical distress of man; and it offers us, not speculative knowledge of Creator and creation but the assurance man needs to consolidate, enrich, and secure his life. This conclusion is confirmed by the following statements of Ritschl:

Now we have no difficulty in ascertaining by an examination of all other religions, that the secular knowledge they involve is not disinterestedly theoretical, but guided by practical ends.6 ..............................The various historical religions are always of a social character, belonging to a multitude of persons7 . . . . .

* . *. . the historical religions claim service from all the functions of spirit knowledge, for the doctrinal tradition, i.e. for a particular view of the world; will, for the common worship; feeling, for the alternation of satisfaction and dissatisfaction, moods by which religious life is removed from the ordinary level of existence. No religion is correctly or completely conceived when one element o.f this succession is regarded as more important or more fundamental than the others.8

It is because Christianity solves this practical problem of the conflict of "nature"- and "spirit" in man, that Ritschl regards it to be the absolute religion.9 He defines

6 Ibid., p. 195.7 Ibid., p. 198. Ibid., p . 199.9 Eugene W. Lyman, Ritschls Theory of Value-Judg

ments The ihnerican j ournal of Theology, 5:508, Sept. 1925.

46the Christian Religion as

. . . the monotheistic, completely spiritual, and ethical religion, which based on the life of its Author as Redeemer and as Founder of the Kingdom of God, consists in the freedom of the children of God, involves the impulse to conduct from the motive of love, aims at the moral organization of mankind, and grounds blessedness on the relation of sonship to God, as well as on the Kingdom of God.iO

The distinction here referred to as the world of natureand the realm of personality, should remind us of Lotzesdistinction between the world of forms and the world ofvalues,11 This will also have to.be understood in the lightof Ritschl's distinction between theoretical judgments andvalue-judgments,12 for he tells us that

*In Christianity, religious knowledge consists in independent value-judgments, inasmuch as it deals with the relation between the blessedness which is assurred by God and sought by man, and the whole of the world which God has created and rules in harmony with His final end.^

One other element must be taken into considerationalso before an adequate concept of Ritschls view of religioncan be obtained, i.e., his epistemology.14 Metaphysicalspeculation is to be left out of theology, for theology relies

10 J2E* c^ * P*Supra, Chapter III, Part III.

12 Supra. Chapter III, Part III.

-*3 Ojd cit.. p. 207.14 Supra, Chapter II, Part III.

47for its content upon a different source of truth. By metaphysics, in'this sense he means the attempt to extend the method of natural science so that it yields reliable knowledge, about the world as a. whole. He says,

Theology has performed its task when, guided by the Christian idea of God and the conception of mens blessedness in the Kingdom of God, it exhibits completely and clearly, both as a whole and in particular, the Christian view 6f the world and of human life, together with the necessity which belongs to the interdependent relations between its component elements. It is incompetent for it to enter upon either a direct or an indirect proof of the truth of the Christian Revelation by seeking to show that it agrees with some philosophical or juridical view of the world; for to such -Christianity simply standsopposed. And as often as systems, even of monistic Idealism have asserted their agreement with Christianity, and its leading ideas have been worked up into a general philosophic view, the result has only been to demonstrate over again the opposition between even such systems and Christianity

He goes on to say that he who would have proof forChristianity must be, as Spener pointed out, by he whoM . . . willeth to do the will of God . . . he shall know thedoctrine of Christ is true. Thus for Ritschl, Christianity finds its proof where the knowledge of it is put on a different level from nature and her lav/s. He says.

To subordinate the ethical to the idea of the cosmical is always characteristic of a heathen view of the world, and to its jurisdiction Christianity is not amenable; before it Christianity will 3^ever succeed in justifying itself. Even when such an explanation of the world starts

15 QP cit., p . 24.

48from an idea of God, it offers no guarantee that it can prove the truth of Christianity. Christianity includes as one of its elements the distinction of the ethical, from the world of nature in respect of worth, inasmuch as it attaches blessedness for man, as the highest and all-dominating notion of worth, to participation in theft ingdom of God and lordship over the world. The theological exposition of Christianity, therefore, is complete when it has been demonstrated that the Christian ideal of life, and no other, satisfies the claims of the human spirit to knowledge of things u n i v e r s a l l y .1C

*

While he will admit that metaphysical conceptions do aid us in the classification of knowledge, yet he contends that we cannot by metaphysical inquiry secure knowledge which is more valuable than we can through ethical judgments. The metaphysical determinations of a spiritual force cannot distinguish it from a natural force, 'therefore such knowledge is not significant for theology.

Metaphysics cannot help us in the study of God because it can never give us knowledge of God as a conscious personality. Ritschl says,

The proofs for the existence of God conducted by the purely metaphysical method do not lead to the forces whose representation is given in Christianity, but merely to conceptions of world-unity, which conceptions are neutral as regards all religion. This application of metaphysics must therefore be excluded from theology if its positive and peculiar nature is to be maintained.1,7

16 Ibid., p. 25.17 Ibid.. p. 17.

49Religious knowledge, being thus cut loose from science

and philosophy, is yet just as valid as these because itbuilds on religious value-judgments. Scientific knowledge

0 can never be knowledge of the whole because it advancesthrough experiences only to laws. But in religious value,knowledge finds the key to ultimate reality. ^Whenever thephilosophers have arrived at a "supreme universal law" bywhich everything can be explained, they have become religion-.ists, for science can never give a view of the whole.Thus, it is through value-judgments that religious knowledgefinds a peculiar and appropriate sphere independent oftheoretical knowledge. Ritschl says,

In Christianity, religious knowledge consists in independent value-judgments, inasmuch as it deals with the relation between the blessedness which is assured by God and sought by man, and the whole of the world which God has created and rules in harmony with His final end.19

Ritschl rejects, likewise, natural theology because natural theology takes the approach of the natural scientist, i.e., the objective approach. But this would leave out of the Christian religion all that is significantbecause the data of religion are personal and subjective and require personal

rbid., p. 207.19 Xoc cit.

conviction so that they cannqt be handled by the method of natural science.

II. THE PLACE OF. REVELATION IN THEOLOGY

Religious value-judgments indicate only the knowers* side of religious knowledge, and have to do with his method of appropriating religious truth* True, the basic value- judgment of the worth of the human personality compared to physical nature gives us the basis for an insight into the nature of the universe. But the objective content of religious knowledge is grounded in Revelation. The important fact of Revelation is that it is not outside of history but within it, so that the facts of revelation actually exist independent of the wishes of the individual believer* What the believer does, as Garvie says, . . . is to claim for his own need and trial the help and the comfort that are offered to him in the revelation presented in these facts.20 Thus it is that faith (value-judgment) and Revelation are correlative for Ritschl.

Theology is an inductive science because its starting

20 Alfred Garvie, The Ritschlian Theology (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1899/, p. 194.

51point is in historical Revelation whose content is deterialned by the experiences of the Christian community. Mystical theology of the Catholic type Ritschl will not allow because it tends to become independent of historical revelation. Mysticism is so closely connected with Neo-platonic metaphysical speculations that both must be rejected if theology is to be saved from subjective illusions.

The source-point in the historical Revelation from which theology must proceed is the New Testament. .He says,

m-The theology which is to set forth the authentic content of the Christian religion in a positive form has to obtain the same from the books of the New Testament and from no other source.21

He furthermore says that authentic knowledge for theology. . . can only be obtained from original documents which stand near the foundation epoch of the Christian Church.22

The foundation epoch consists of . . . not only the personal work of Christ, but also the fir^t generation of His community. 11 The books of the New Testament are the original documents of the revelation,

, . . for the reason that the oral tradition of Christ and His Apostles is either laid down in the Gospels and stands in accord with the Epistles, or we should have to

) *

PI Justification Q-nd Reconciliation, Vol. II, p. 18, quoted by Albert T. Swing, The Theology of Albrecht Ritschl (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 19011, pp. 86f.

^ Loc. cit.

52^regard it as having died away and been lost . . . The exclusive validity of these hooks as authentic documents of the Christian religion might have been established by the very fact that the first authors of the following generation actually and fundamentally recognized the standard authority of the books of the New Testament by the reproduction- of ideas of Apostolic origin, and that succeeding .theology cannot do otherwise.

The Old Testament is important for Ritschl because it is necessary to an understanding of the New Testament. The Pharisaic legalism of the New Testament period which Jesus combats in favor of a return to prophetical religion, certainly cannot be understood without a knowledge of the Old Testament.

Ritschl1s use of the Scripture is a little more critical than one would be inclined to expect. He does not think Revelation includes all the convictions of the early church or their social arrangments as set forth in the New Testament. He says,

All the necessary doctrines of salvation must be grounded in the Holy Scriptures as regards their material, but that not all the original Christian hopes and social forms are to be considered as necessary parts of Christian theology

Therefore, Ritschl evades the difficulties of a literalistic *

Loc. cit.

^ Justification and Reconciliation, Vol. 'II, p . 19f., quoted from A. T. Swing, op. cit., p. 90.

53theory of the scriptures. Concerning an infallible principle of interpretation, Ritschl says,

Neither for such a principle nor its application can we be assured of infallibility, inasmuch as these are sought, or supposed to be found, by weak human beings. Since the exposition of Holy Scripture according to the positive standard of church tradition is not accepted within the church since the reformation, there is no appeal left which can claim even an illusion of an infallible understanding of the Scripture . . . Therefore,' I pay no attention to those who are not clear-sighted enough to perceive where alone the thirst for an infallible exposition of Scripture, or an errorless decision of doctrine, can be satisfied . . . For the evangelical theologian it is merely a question of the exposition of Scripture from its own context and the approximate consummation of thetask.25

Ritschl*s view of the Scriptures is, therefore / that they are the divinely appointed human means through which God has given the Revelation and consequently they are to be interpreted historically

III. RITSCHL*S IDEA OF GOD AND OF THE* KINGDOM OF GOD

Having maintained that the contents of the Christian religion are found in Revelation, Ritschl further insists upon the necessity of a systematic expositions of the value- Judgments of religion so as to demonstrate their organic unity. For this study, only two need consideration, i.e.,* the idea of God and the idea of the Kingdom of God,. There

Justification and Reconciliation, Yol. Ill, pp. 20f. quoted from A. T. Swing, op. cit., pp. 91f.

^ Albert T. Swing, op. cit*., p. 95.

54will be no attempt here to develop a complete statement of Ritschls position on either of these doctrines. Only those aspects which have a specific bearing upon Rits-chl* s Christ- ology need consideration.

Of course, the theoretical proofs of God are rejectedinasmuch as they merely prove the necessity of his existencefor theoretic reason, but they are incapable of proving Hisobjective existence. He seems to believe that our knowledgeof God arises from a revelation of Him which is conditionedby our active trust in him. He says, for example,

For religious cognition the existence of God is beyond question,mfor the activity of uod becomes to us a matter of conviction through the attitude we take up to the worM as religious men.2*7

This is of course to be understood in the light of hisLotzean epistemology, for he says in the first edition thatthe Christian experience n . . . validates the actuality ofGod inasmuch as it convinces of the activity of God.2 Andelsewhere he says, TfWhen one thinks effects rightly, onethinks the cause in the effects.tt2S

Furthermore, while Ritschl accepted the moral argument of Kant, yet he criticised Kant for limiting the argument to

^ Justification and Reconciliation, p. 218.^ rbifl., p . 185.

*PQ Theologie und Metaphysik, Part II, p. 49, quoted by Eugene W. Lyman, o. cit., p. 513.

55 . *practical validity but not including theoretic validity. But on the basis of his own epistemology " . . . it is the duty of theology to conserve the special characteristics of the conception of Bod, namely, that it can be represented in value-judgments .30

Theology as a science by this method and by . . . urging, the Christian view of God and the world . . . makes it possible for us to . . unify our knowledge of nature and the spiritual life of man in a way which otherwise is impossible.31 But, as we have seen,32 since the chief problem in securing a unified view of the world is created by the antithesis 'between nature and spirit, and since thisproblem is empirically solved through the Christian faith in

God, Ritschl holds that the Christian idea of God unifies ourview of the world as nothing else does.33 Even the scientists and the philosophers when they, attempt a unified view of the world, do so through an impulse of a religious nature in which the intuitive imagination or synthetic imagination plays a

30 Justification and Reconciliation, p. 225.31 Ibld. p. 225f.32 Supra. Chapter XV, Part I.33 Justification and Reconciliation, p. 222.

56chief part. He says,

In all philosophic systems the affirmation of a supreme law of existence . . is a departure from the strict application of the philosophic method, and betrays itself as being quite as much an object of the intuitive imagi- , nation, as God and the world are for religious thought.34

The two characteristics of God which have importancefor this study are His spiritual personality and His goodwill

or love. Ritschl insists on the personality of God in op-position to the pantheism of Strauss and to the Absolute ofiFrank. Personality in-God can be compared and contrastedw i t h p e r s o n a l i t y i n m a n . T h e c o m p a r i s o n i s t h a t e x p e r i e n c e

proves that personalitjr consists In power to control theportions of the environment appropriated in order to make it

*a n s w e r o u r n e e d s a n d s u i t o u r p u r p o s e s . T h e c o n t r a s t i s t h a t

human personality is always in a state of becoming, but InGod there is the absence of all those restraints that limitpersonality. Consequently human personalities are alwaysdeveloping toward that full personality for which they aredesigned. He* says,

The truth of the idea of personality of God rather is verified just by our finding in it the standard which determines whether and how far the same predicate is to be ascribed to us.^5

34 Ibid- > P* 223 55 Ibid.. p. 23&.

57From this position Ritschl draws an important con-

* .elusion: "It follows as a settled result that God is realonly in the form of w ill."36 This ascribes a relation towardm a n k i n d . I n C h r i s t i a n i t y t h i s r e l a t i o n i s r e v e a l e d a s 1 l o v e .Here, in the attribute of love, is the real significance ofthe Christian conception of God. He says,

Theology, in deliniating the moral order of the world, must take as its starting-point that conception of God in which the relation of God to His Son, our Lord, is expressed, a relation which by Christs mediation is extended to His community.37

Love, or good will, as the order of the universe he defines as , . the steadfast will to further another rational

. being, of like nature with oneself, in the attainment of his purpose in such manner that he one who loves follows in so doing his own self-end. Love adopts the ends of others as its own, and in so doing realizes its own ideal. We must see then first &odr*s purpose toward His Son: and then, through our union with the &on, learn tosee in that purpose the Love of G-od towards ourselves.

In a very famous passage Ritschl speaks of Christianityas tT. . . a n ellipse which is determined by two foci. "39These two foci seem to have to do with the moral and thereligious ideals in Christianity, and between these two a fairbalance must be held. The moral has to do with the kingdom of

56 Ibid., p. 224.57 Ihid., pp. 287f.^ Unterricht, p. 9, quoted by E. A*. Edghill, op. cit.,

p. 137