trade marks ordinance (cap. 559) opposition to trade … · 2014-05-23 · appraisals of diamonds,...
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TRADE MARKS ORDINANCE (Cap. 559)
OPPOSITION TO TRADE MARK APPLICATION NO. 301346841
MARK:
CLASSES:
16, 36, 42
APPLICANT: GEMOLOGY HEADQUARTERS INTERNATIONAL, LLC
OPPONENT: GEMOLOGICAL INSTITUTE OF AMERICA, INC.
STATEMENT OF REASONS FOR DECISION
Background
1. On 20 May 2009, Gemology Headquarters International, LLC (the
“applicant”) filed an application (the “subject application”) under the Trade Marks
Ordinance, Cap. 559 (the “Ordinance”) for registration of the following mark:-
(“The subject mark”).
2. Registration is sought in respect of the following goods and services
(“subject goods and services”) in Classes 16, 36 and 42:-
Class 16
Certificates of authenticity and certificates of grading for diamonds, gemstones, pearls
and jewelry; certificates; printed certificates; printed award certificates.
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Class 36
Appraisals of diamonds, gemstones, pearls and jewelry.
Class 42
Gemological services, namely, providing identification, authentication, and grading of
diamonds, gemstones, pearls and jewelry, and issuing certificates related to such
grading; inscriptions on diamonds and gemstones (gemological services); precious
metal assaying.
3. Particulars of the subject application were published on 21 August 2009.
On 20 January 2010, Gemological Institute of America, Inc. (the “opponent”) filed a
Notice of opposition attached with a Statement of Grounds of Opposition. That
Statement of Grounds of Opposition was later deemed to have been replaced with an
Amended Statement of Grounds of Opposition filed on 1 March 2010 (“Grounds of
Opposition”).
4. The opposition hearing took place before me on 20 November 2013. Ms.
Mok Yee Ting of ONC Lawyers represented the applicant. Mr. Sebastian Hughes of
Counsel, instructed by DLA Piper, represented the opponent.
Grounds of Opposition
5. In the Grounds of Opposition, the opponent opposes registration of the
subject mark under sections 11(1)(b) and (c), 11(5)(b), 12(3), 12(4) and 12(5)(a) of
the Ordinance. A Schedule attached to the Grounds of Opposition lists out the trade
marks relied upon by the opponent in launching the opposition against the subject
application. That Schedule is reproduced in this decision as Annex 1 hereto.
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Counter Statement
6. The applicant filed a Counter Statement on 20 April 2010, denying all the
grounds of opposition.
Preliminary issues
7. An issue arose just days before the hearing on 20 November 2013. The
issue was raised by the applicant in ONC Lawyers’ letter to the Registrar dated 8
November 2013, alleging that the Statutory Declaration of Seung-Hae Moon dated 2
March 2012, which forms part of the opponent’s evidence, made reference to a
settlement agreement and contained related materials which were made on a without
prejudice basis, as such the statutory declaration should be amended by re-execution
in order that all reference and materials in that regard would be removed. In the said
letter, ONC Lawyers further suggested that the hearing officer assigned for the
hearing should be changed to another one who had not previously perused the
evidence.
8. DLA Piper’s letter in reply came to the Registrar on 15 November 2013.
They disagreed that the alleged materials in the Statutory Declaration of Seung-Hae
Moon were privileged, and submitted that the same were admissible as evidence in
the proceedings. They also disagreed that there should be a change of the hearing
officer.
9. The Registrar issued a letter on 18 November 2013 indicating that the above
two issues cannot be determined without giving full opportunity to the parties to
address the hearing officer, hence they would be dealt with as preliminary issues at the
scheduled hearing before substantive hearing of the proceedings is to take place.
10. As it turned out, at the hearing on 20 November 2013 Ms. Mok of ONC
Lawyers representing the applicant agreed not to further pursue the two issues upon
my preliminary indication that the subject matters of the alleged materials, as
mentioned in the Statutory Declaration of Seung-Hae Moon, appeared not relevant to
the core issues of these proceedings. The hearing of the case then proceeded
accordingly.
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The opponent’s evidence in support
11. The opponent’s evidence in support comprises a statutory declaration of
Seung-Hae Moon dated 20 January 2011 (“Moon’s statutory declaration”) and a
statutory declaration of Robert Frank dated 14 January 2011 (“Frank’s statutory
declaration”).
12. Ms. Seung-Hae Moon has been employed by the opponent for over 30 years,
acting as its Managing Director (for Asia Pacific) since 2007. The facts she deposed
to in her statutory declaration are from her personal knowledge or from the opponent’s
records, and she has been duly authorized by the opponent to make the statutory
declaration in these proceedings.
13. According to Ms. Moon, Mr. Robert M. Shipley founded the Gemological
Institute of America in 1931 in Los Angeles, the United States of America, which was
incorporated in October 1943 under the laws of the State of Ohio. The opponent,
which got the current name in January 1999, is a result of a series of mergers of a
number of corporations which focused on different streams of the gem industry.
From Moon’s statutory declaration, it seems the merger had involved the following
entities and their subsequent merged entities:- the said Gemological Institute of
America founded in 1931, GEM Instruments incorporated in 1976 which later
changed name to GIA Gem Instruments, Gem Trade Laboratory incorporated in 1978
which later changed name to GIA Gem Trade Laboratory.
14. The Gemological Institute of America had adopted “GIA” and “Gemological
Institute of America” as the corporation’s house marks since its foundation. It
follows that the opponent is alleged to have first used the trade marks “GIA” and
“Gemological Institute of America” in 1931 and has used the marks continuously
since then in the United States of America for goods in Class 16 goods. It is also
alleged that these opponent’s marks have been and continue to be used in relation to
grading services for precious gems in Class 36 and services in respect of services of
grading precious gems and gemological services, identifying, grading, registering and
inscribing precious gems and pearls identification in Class 42 since as early as 1996 in
Hong Kong. For the purposes of all the latter discussions, the opponent’s marks
including the marks “GIA” and “Gemological Institute of America” are hereinafter
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loosely and collectively referred to as the “GIA Trade Marks”.
15. Moon’s statutory declaration is painstaking in showing that Hong Kong is
among one of the places in the world where the GIA Trade Marks have a long and
extensive history of use. For example, Exhibit-D and Exhibit-E to Moon’s statutory
declaration contain copies taken from the quarterly magazine “Gems & Gemology”
allegedly showing use of the GIA Trade Marks. It is alleged that the magazine has
been in distribution to key members of the Hong Kong jewelry community from 1977
through to today. Exhibit-F contains what is said to be a list of the Hong Kong
subscribers to the magazine, with their personal data redacted.
16. Ms. Moon alleged that the GIA Trade Marks had been used in the United
States since 1931 for services in respect of correspondence courses in the field of
gemology. Exhibit-H contains copies of the 1958 course materials and 1986 Lab
Manual. It is said that in 1980, the opponent provided the first one-week gemology
classes in Hong Kong and Singapore. Exhibit-I to Exhibit K contain copy computer
printout showing classes taught in Hong Kong from 1980 to 1988, a list of 1995-2000
Hong Kong courses and monthly enrolment, a summary of enrolment, copy of a
diploma awarded by the opponent to a Hong Kong student, and enrollment figures for
the residence classes and courses in Hong Kong over the years. It is alleged that the
GIA Trade marks were used on course materials and other handouts given to student,
as well as on brochures and catalogs advertising gemology classes and soliciting
students to enroll in these courses since 1980.
17. Ms. Moon further said that in July 1994, the opponent licensed certain right
to Gemological Institute of America – Hong Kong as licensee for promotion,
marketing and solicitation of enrolments in distance education courses, extension
classes and seminars of instruction in jewelry sales, gemology and jewelry
manufacturing arts offered and taught by the opponent under the GIA Trade Marks.
Exhibit-L is copy of the licence agreement, and copies of the letterhead, business
cards, envelopes, writing pad, etc. used by the licensee since 1994 were exhibited in
Exhibit-M. Exhibit-N contains copies of brochures and catalogs using the GIA
Trade Marks and distributed by the licensee since 2003; Exhibit-O shows the Hong
Kong enrolment figures and worldwide enrolment figures of the extension classes
since 1980.
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18. Moon’s statutory declaration gives the gross revenue figures for educational
services provided under the GIA Trade Marks in Hong Kong for 2003-2010. Except
for the year 2003, the rest all have an annual gross revenue between US$1,000,000
and 2,000,000.
19. Exhibit-Q shows the numbers of grading reports issued to customers in
Hong Kong each year since 1996 to 2007. Exhibit-R contains sample diamond
grading reports and explanations about grading reports from the opponent’s website.
The annual figures of the gross revenue for diamond or precious gem grading
laboratory services rendered by the opponent under the GIA Trade Marks to clients in
Hong Kong for 2004-2010 are shown to be in the region between US$2,496,133 in
2004 to US$8,072,300 in 2010, with a peak in 2008 at US$9,664,767. Exhibit-S
contains copies of various invoices issued by the opponent in that connection.
20. The opponent established its new laboratory and diamond grading facility in
Hong Kong in 2010. Although this took place a bit after the subject application was
filed in 2009, there were other preceding promotional activities of the opponent’s
goods and services in Hong Kong, as evidenced by Exhibit-U to Exhibit-Y. I do not
propose to go into detail here but would refer to the relevant ones as and when
appropriate.
21. Mr. Robert Frank has been the owner, President and Founder of Illuminor
LLC (“Illuminor”) which was retained by the solicitors for the opponent to provide
data to support the oppositions in these proceedings. Frank’s statutory declaration,
as well as the various exhibits attached to it, was made with large chunks of it being
devoted to detailing Mr. Frank’s qualifications and professional profile, awards and
honours received by him, his research methodology and training practice, features of
the database he would use – all that having no direct relevance to the issues of these
proceedings. I am conscious that this tribunal should not get caught up in the thick
of these and lost sight of the main issues, and I do not propose to summarize them
here.
22. Having said that, it is noted that search results conducted on the internet as
well as on the database known as Dialog in respect of words such as “Gemological
Institute”, “GIA”, “Gemological Headquarters International”, “GHI”, or combinations
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of these words with “Hong Kong”, are set out in Exhibits “C” to “F” to Frank’s
statutory declaration. Claiming to be basing on these results, Mr. Frank formed the
following opinions:-
(1) The acronym GIA is strongly associated with the corporate name Gemological
Institute of America;
(2) The acronym GIA is more often used than is the full company name of the
Gemological Institute of America;
(3) The acronym GIA has a long association in Hong Kong with the company
Gemological Institute of America;
(4) GIA/Gemological Institute of America is the leader and most frequently
referenced business in the world that is involved in the diamond grading industry;
(5) There appears no brand association of the acronym GHI with the company
Gemological Headquarters International anyway in the world with respect to
magazine and newspaper stories or articles in magazines, professional
publications, journals, etc.;
(6) The acronym GHI does not appear to be associated with the jewelry business in
Hong Kong.
The applicant’s evidence
23. The applicant’s evidence comprises a statutory declaration of Nachum
Krasnianski dated 24 June 2011 (“Krasnianski’s statutory declaration”). Mr.
Krasnianski is the President of the applicant since the founding of the company in
January 2006. Mr. Krasnianski has thirty years of experience in lab work related to
the field of gemology and has operated and owned gem laboratories in the United
States of America since 1986, Canada since 2002 and India since 2007. The facts he
deposed to in his statutory declaration are from his personal knowledge or from the
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applicant’s books and records, and he has been duly authorized by the applicant to
make the statutory declaration in these proceedings.
24. In gist, according to Krasnianski’s statutory declaration, the applicant is a
corporation organized and existing under the laws of Delaware with offices in the
United States of America and India. The applicant operates advanced laboratories
specializing in identification, grading and certification of diamonds and research
services. It is claimed that the applicant is a leader in gemological and research
services and offers gemological services comprising identification, authentication and
grading of diamonds and jewellery under the applicant’s mark, which he identifies to
be the subject mark.
25. It is also alleged that the applicant has offered a variety of basic and
advanced education programs in the field of gemology under the subject mark in India.
A list of education programs offered by the applicant in India are given in
Krasnianski’s statutory declaration.
26. The applicant also offered certificates of authenticity as well as certificates
of grading of diamonds, gemstones, pearls and jewellery under the subject mark. It
is alleged that certificates offered under the subject mark have been available in the
US and India since 2007, exhibit “NK-3” to Krasnianski’s statutory declaration is said
to contain copies of representative gem identification reports produced by the
applicant in the ordinary course of business in association with its goods and services.
27. Exhibit “NK-4” is said to contain copies of representative gem identification
cards produced by the applicant and transferred to its customers in the ordinary course
of its business since 2007 in the US and in India. Exhibits “NK-5” and “NK-6” are
said to contain copies of representative brochures and pamphlets distributed by the
applicant.
28. A book entitled “Laboratory-grown Diamonds” by Branko Deljanin and
Dusan Simic, which explains the different methods used to grow diamonds and
educates about the characteristics to be observed in examining laboratory grown
diamonds with standard gemological equipment, is alleged to have been published by
the applicant under the subject mark. Copy of the book is exhibited as “NK-7” to
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Krasnianski’s statutory declaration. Exhibit “NK-8” is said to contain printout of
EGL Canada’s website which advertised the book in Canada, and exhibit “NK-9”
contains printout from the applicant’s website which is said to have been available
since 2007. Exhibit “NK-10” contains copies of pictures of a representative business
card stationery and redacted invoice of the applicant.
29. The rest of Krasnianski’s statutory declaration deal with the alleged
co-existence of the subject mark with the opponent’s marks in the United States of
America and the applicant’s other marks in other jurisdiction. I do not propose to
summarize them here.
30. There is attached an expert report of Carole E. Ghaski as exhibit “NK-19” to
Krasnianski’s statutory declaration. Carole E. Ghaski, a PHD, prepared the report on
behalf of the applicant in respect of the lack of linguistic similarities of the GHI mark
and other representative trade marks of the opponent.
The opponent’s evidence in reply
31. The opponent’s evidence in reply comprises another statutory declaration of
Seung-Hae Moon dated 2 March 2012 (“Moon’s second statutory declaration”), a
statutory declaration of Dr. Arthur McNeill dated 2 March 2012 (“McNeill’s statutory
declaration”), a statutory declaration of Albert Chan dated 1 March 2012 (“Chan’s
statutory declaration”), a statutory declaration of Ephraim Zion dated 6 March 2012
(“Zion’s statutory declaration”) and a supplemental statutory declaration of Robert
Frank dated 27 February 2012 (“Frank’s supplemental statutory declaration”).
32. Moon’s second statutory declaration was filed as evidence in reply to the
applicant’s evidence, namely, Krasnianski’s statutory declaration, casting doubt on
many of the claims made by Mr. Krasnianski as discussed above. I do not propose to
summarize the points here but would refer to the relevant parts only as and when
appropriate.
33. Dr. Arthur McNeill is the Director of the Language Centre, Hong Kong
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University of Science and Technology. He has over 40 years of experience in
English language teaching, second language vocabulary, language awareness and
policy, of which more than 20 of those years were in Hong Kong. McNeill’s
statutory declaration is expressed to be offered in reply to the expert report of Carole
E. Ghaski (which is exhibit as “NK-19” to Krasnianski’s statutory declaration). I do
not propose to summarize the contentious points between the two expert views here
but would refer to the relevant parts as and when appropriate in the latter discussions.
34. Mr. Chan Hiu-Sang, Albert, who made Chan’s statutory declaration, is an
Executive Director of Chow Tai Fook Jewellery Group Limited and a director of
Chow Tai Fook Jewellery Co., Ltd. (the two companies are referred to collectively as
“Chow Tai Fook”). Mr. Chan has his career in the diamond and jewellery business
started in 1977 when he joined Chow Tai Fook as a diamond procurement staff.
Drawing on his considerable experience in grading and procuring diamonds, he
testified to the use and reputation of the GIA Trade Marks. I do not propose to
summarize his testimony here but would refer to the relevant parts as and when
appropriate.
35. Mr. Ephraim Zion is the Managing Director of Dehres Limited which is a
Hong Kong based company in the jewellery and diamond industry. Mr. Zion’s
career in the diamond and jewellery business started in 1960 when serving an
apprenticeship as a diamond cutter in a diamond factory in Isreal. Having
accumulated significant experience in procuring and dealing in diamonds and
precious gems, and recognizing the demand for large certified diamonds in Asia, Mr.
Zion came to Hong Kong in 1971 and set up his own diamond and gem business.
Dehres is a company he founded in 1985. He testified to the use and reputation of
the GIA Trade Marks. I do not propose to summarize his testimony here but would
refer to the relevant parts as and when appropriate.
36. The supplemental statutory declaration of Robert Frank was made only to
rectify certain minor technical deficiencies of Frank’s statutory declaration. There is
nothing significant of that.
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Findings on goodwill and reputation of the GIA Trade Marks
37. The opponent oppose registration of the subject mark under sections 11(1) (b)
and (c), 11(5)(b), 12(3), 12(4) and 12(5)(a) of the Ordinance. At the hearing, Mr.
Sebastian Hughes, counsel for the opponent, made it clear that the opponent would
only be proceeding on sections 11(5)(b), 12(3), 12(4) and 12(5)(a). I would
therefore treat the opposition based on the other pleaded grounds as no longer being
pursued by the opponent.
38. Mr. Hughes said in the opponent’s skeleton argument that the opponent
relies on its registered trade marks in Hong Kong as listed in the Schedule to the
Grounds of Opposition (see Annex 1) and the goodwill and reputation in these marks.
That has connotations of the opposition being premised in large part on sections 12(3),
12(4) and 12(5)(a) of the Ordinance where the opponent’s marks must be assessed
with reference to any enhanced distinctive character, or reputation and goodwill, that
it has acquired or generated. It is convenient for me to first investigate the evidence
and make the relevant findings in this connection.
39. I have outlined the opponent’s evidence in support of the opposition in
paragraphs 11 to 22 above. In gist, evidence is produced to show that the opponent
has been using the GIA Trade Marks, namely, “GIA” and “Gemological Institute of
America”, since 1931 in the United States of America for goods in Class 16, and in
relation to grading services for precious gems in Class 36 and services in respect of
services of grading precious gems and gemological services, identifying, grading,
registering and inscribing precious gems and pearls identification in Class 42 since as
early as 1996 in Hong Kong.
40. From the various exhibits to Moon’s statutory declaration, there is no doubt
about the use of the GIA Trade Marks or related marks by the opponent in the US as
well as in Hong Kong as claimed. The following is extracted from the 2001 issue of
the quarterly magazine “Gems & Gemology” (Exhibit-E to Moon’s statutory
declaration) where the GIA Trade Marks featured:-
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41. That magazine is said to have been in distribution to key members of the
Hong Kong jewelry community from 1977 through to the present. Exhibit-F to
Moon’s statutory declaration is produced to support this.
42. The mark or marks were used in Hong Kong more directly in residence
classes and courses being run here. The marks reproduced below are extracted from
the letterhead, business cards, envelopes, writing pad, etc. exhibited in Exhibit-M:-
43. The one appearing on the left above also appears in the brochures and
catalogs (exhibited in Exhibit-N) distributed by the opponent’s Hong Kong licensee.
On the last page of the brochure, which lists the opponent’s campuses over the world
including Hong Kong, the mark or marks below appear at the top corner of the page:-
44. It seems the marks being used in Hong Kong are more or less the same as
the marks used by the opponent in the US and over the world. More importantly, the
marks in use always come together – in the manner as shown by the various pictures
above. But first it must be identified that the following three marks are always in
use together: (1) the logo which has a crown-like outer layer with the words
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“GEMOLOGICAL INSTITUTE OF AMERICA” and the word “KNOWLEDGE”
displaced concentrically in it (the “Opponent’s Logo”), (2) the mere word mark
“GEMOLOGICAL INSTITUTE OF AMERICA”, and (3) the letter mark “GIA”.
The three marks are always put together such that the Opponent’s Logo is on the left,
and the “GIA” together with the “GEMOLOGICAL INSTITUTE OF AMERICA” on
the right, with the “GIA” usually on top of or go before the “GEMOLOGICAL
INSTITUTE OF AMERICA”. I am aware of the picture on the right under
paragraph 40, where “GEM TRADE LABORATORY” was used in place of
“GEMOLOGICAL INSTITUTE OF AMERICA”. Given the corporate history of
the opponent as given in paragraph 5 of Moon’s statutory declaration (which I
summarized in paragraphs 13 and 14 above), in particular the fact that the opponent
was the result of various mergers that took place over a long span of time, it’s not
surprising to find in some cases or occasions that this is so. Nevertheless, taking all
the materials exhibited by Moon’s statutory declaration into consideration, I find a
pattern of use of the marks, as discussed above, has been clearly established.
Moreover, beneath “GIA” and “GEMOLOGICAL INSTITUTE OF AMERICA” on
the right of such a combination of marks, there are usually descriptive words which
give information about the locality or the occasion or event in which the marks are
being used. I shall hereinafter refer to this way of use of the three said marks
alongside certain descriptive words to be the “GIA Trade Marks Combination”.
45. The GIA Trade Marks Combination also appear in all the grading reports
issued to customers in Hong Kong and the promotional activities of the opponent in
Hong Kong and elsewhere. In view of the gross revenue figures for educational
services provided under the GIA Trade Marks in Hong Kong for 2003-2010, the
numbers of grading reports issued to customers in Hong Kong each year since 1996 to
2007, the annual figures of the gross revenue for diamond or precious gem grading
laboratory services rendered by the opponent under the GIA Trade Marks
Combination to clients in Hong Kong for 2004-2010, and the various advertising and
promotional activities of the opponent’s goods and services in Hong Kong, as
evidenced by Exhibit-U to Exhibit-Y to Moon’s statutory declaration, I have no doubt
that the GIA Trade Marks Combination has become the distinguishing feature of the
opponent, and has undeniably acquired through it a substantial reputation and
goodwill in its goods and services offered and promoted in Hong Kong since 1980s.
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46. As to the three individual trade marks that comprise the GIA Trade Marks
Combination, from the evidence filed I find they are under different treatments. I am
not aware of any independent use or appearance of the Opponent’s Logo. The mere
word mark “GEMOLOGICAL INSTITUTE OF AMERICA” is virtually the corporate
name of the opponent and has been used as such, its rare use outside the context of the
GIA Trade Marks Combination is nothing more than that. I do not find any goodwill
or reputation have been established on the Opponent’s Logo or the mere word mark
“GEMOLOGICAL INSTITUTE OF AMERICA” outside the context of the GIA
Trade Marks Combination.
47. The use of the letter mark “GIA” is another story. There is evidence
showing that “GIA” had independently appeared or been used, say for example in the
opponent’s booths at various jewellery trade fairs in Hong Kong (Exhibit-X2 to
Moon’s statutory declaration), in advertising for the “GIA courses” offered in Hong
Kong as advertised in the jewellery magazine “Hong Kong Jewellery” (Exhibit-W3).
More importantly, the three letters mark GIA featured in numerous textual context,
say for example in advertisements and articles in magazines (Exhibits-W2 to W7),
and its appearance constituted not only as an acronym for referring to the opponent
but as a branding in itself.
48. The opponent has produced in its evidence certain testimony of people in the
trade or industry of gemstone and other jewellery. Mr. Chan Hiu-Sang, Albert is a
director of Chow Tai Fook, a famous local jewellery retail brand. Mr. Chan’s
experience is that many consumers on buying a diamond ring or any other piece of
diamond jewellery would look to buy certified diamonds, in respect of which he cited
the “GIA” certified diamonds as a symbol of credibility, to get the assurance that they
are purchasing high quality diamonds.
49. Another people in the trade, Mr. Ephraim Zion, who has dealt with diamond
and jewellery manufacturers, dealers, retailers and certification laboratories on a daily
basis for half a century globally including Hong Kong, said that diamond certification
by a reputable gemological laboratory to authenticate a diamond’s attributes is
integral to its valuation, and he cited GIA to be generally regarded by the industry and
consumers as the most prestigious and authoritative gemological laboratories and the
widely recognized authority in diamond certification. Mr. Zion also mentioned that
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GIA has made considerable effort in educating the gem and jewellery industry and the
general public through its publication, for example the quarterly publication of the
magazine “Gems & Gemology” and the monthly electronic newsletter “GIA Insider”.
50. Again taking all the evidence as a whole, I have no doubt that the letter mark
“GIA” has become the distinguishing feature of the opponent and has acquired
through it a substantial reputation and goodwill in its goods and services offered and
promoted in Hong Kong.
Assessment of use of the applicant’s subject mark in Hong Kong
51. Though not strictly required at this stage to do so, I find it useful to also give
an assessment on the applicant’s evidence in relation to the use of the subject mark in
Hong Kong.
52. I have summarized the applicant’s evidence in paragraphs 23 to 30 above.
Given that the applicant is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of
Delaware with offices in the United States of America and India, it is assumed that the
applicant operates its laboratories specializing in identification, grading and
certification of diamonds and research services also in these areas unless it is shown
otherwise. It is the opponent’s case that the applicant has not commenced business
in Hong Kong and has not used the subject mark in Hong Kong, and I would say the
applicant has not produced any credible evidence to counter this allegation.
53. As mentioned above, a list of education programs offered by the applicant in
India are given in Krasnianski’s statutory declaration. There is no evidence that the
applicant has run similar programs in Hong Kong.
54. The applicant also offered certificates of authenticity as well as certificates
of grading of diamonds, gemstones, pearls and jewellery under the subject mark. It
is alleged that certificates offered under the subject mark have been available in the
US and India since 2007, exhibit “NK-3” to Krasnianski’s statutory declaration is said
to contain copies of representative gem identification reports produced by the
applicant in the ordinary course of business in association with its goods and services.
Exhibit “NK-4” is said to contain copies of representative gem identification cards
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produced by the applicant and transferred to its customers in the ordinary course of its
business since 2007 in the US and in India. Exhibits “NK-5” and “NK-6” are said to
contain copies of representative brochures and pamphlets distributed by the applicant.
55. All the above, however, have no Hong Kong connection.
56. In the applicant’s evidence, a book entitled “Laboratory-grown Diamonds”
by Branko Deljanin and Dusan Simic is alleged to have been published by the
applicant under the subject mark. Exhibit “NK-8” contains printout of EGL
Canada’s website which advertised the book in Canada, and exhibit “NK-9” contains
printout from the applicant’s website which is said to have been available since 2007.
Exhibit “NK-10” contains copies of pictures of a representative business card
stationery and redacted invoice of the applicant. In these there is no suggestion that
the book has any sale in Hong Kong.
57. As there is no evidence to show the use of the subject mark in Hong Kong, I
conclude that the subject mark is not known in the Hong Kong market as far as the
goods and services in question are involved.
58. Mr. Hughes further pointed out that aside from the miniscule total annual
sales figure of US$150,000 from the year 2005 for the applicant’s predecessor in title,
namely, Gem House International of USA, Inc., the applicant has filed no evidence of
turnover under the subject mark, nor is there any evidence of advertising expenditure.
Indeed Moon’s second statutory declaration, filed as evidence in reply to the
applicant’s evidence, cast doubt on many of the claims made by Mr. Krasnianski in
relation to the various use of the subject mark. For the present purposes of
examining the use of the subject mark, I find that it has not been used in Hong Kong.
Decision
59. I just record that for any of the grounds of opposition discussed in this
decision, it’s not in dispute that the relevant date is the date the subject application
was filed, viz., 20 May 2009 (“the relevant date”).
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Section 12(3) of the Ordinance
60. Section 12(3) of the Ordinance provides as follows:
“(3) A trade mark shall not be registered if-
(a) the trade mark is similar to an earlier trade mark;
(b) the goods or services for which the application for registration is made are
identical or similar to those for which the earlier trade mark is protected; and
(c) the use of the trade mark in relation to those goods or services is likely to
cause confusion on the part of the public.”
61. Under section 7(1) of the Ordinance, in determining whether the use of a
trade mark is likely to cause confusion on the part of the public, the Registrar may
take into account all factors relevant in the circumstances, including whether the use
is likely to be associated with an earlier trade mark.
62. Section 12(3) of the Ordinance is similar in effect to section 5(2) of the U.K.
Trade Marks Act 1994, which implements Article 4(1)(b) of the First Council
Directive 89/104 of 21 December 1998 of the Council of the European Communities
(“the Council Directive”). In interpreting Article 4(1)(b) of the Council Directive,
the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) has formulated the “global appreciation” test,
the principles of which can be found in the ECJ decisions in Sabel BV v Puma AG
[1998] R.P.C. 199, Canon Kabushiki Kaisha v Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc. [1999]
R.P.C. 117, Lloyd Schuhfabrik Meyer & Co GmbH v Klijsen Handel B.V. [2000] F.S.R.
77 and Marca Mode CV v Adidas AG [2000] E.T.M.R. 723.
63. In essence, the test under section 12(3) is whether there are similarities in
marks and goods which would combine to create a likelihood of confusion. The
likelihood of confusion must be appreciated globally and I need to address the degree
of visual, aural and conceptual similarity between the marks, evaluating the
importance to be attached to those differing elements, and taking into account the
degree of similarity in the goods and how they are marketed. I must compare the
marks at issue, having regard to the distinctive character of each and assuming normal
and fair use of the marks across the full range of the goods within their respective
specifications. I must do all of this from the standpoint of the average consumer for
18
the goods in question.
Earlier trade marks
64. The term “earlier trade mark” is defined in section 5 of the Ordinance.
References to an earlier trade mark shall be construed as including a trade mark in
respect of which an application for registration has been made under the Ordinance
and which, if registered, would constitute an earlier trade mark under or by virtue of
section 5(1)(a), subject to its being so registered.
65. As I have pointed out, the Schedule attached to the Grounds of Opposition,
reproduced in this decision as Annex 1 hereto, lists out the trade marks relied upon by
the opponent in launching the opposition against the subject application. There are
many of them and it is just impracticable and unnecessary for me to consider each of
them here, suffice to say that I find the only mark that really matters for the present
purposes is the following mark which has been registered in Classes 9, 16 and 41:-
Registration No. Trade Mark Class
Specification &
Disclaimer
2005B00434
GEMOLOGICAL
INSTITUTE OF
AMERICA
161 printed matter,
periodical
publications, books,
instructional and
teaching materials
(other than
apparatus); all relating
to gemology or to
gems.
300399033
GEMOLOGICAL
INSTITUTE OF
AMERICA
412 in-residence, on-site
and correspondence
courses in
gemological including
jewelry design, sale
1 It is stated in the Trade Marks Registry record that this Trade Mark has been accepted for registration
by reason of use pursuant to Section 10(2) of the Trade Marks Ordinance 2 It is stated in the Trade Marks Registry record that this trade mark has been accepted because of
distinctiveness acquired through use.
19
and promotion of
gems, pearls and
jewelry, investigation
of genuineness of
gems and valuation of
gems and pearls; all
included in Class 41.
300584488
GEMOLOGICAL
INSTITUTE OF
AMERICA
93 video tapes, compact
disc read only
memories, audio
tapes; all being
educational materials
relating to gemology;
all included in Class
9.
66. The word mark chosen above, which I shall call “the opponent’s word mark”,
is the mark that I can reasonably say is the mark, among the various marks listed out
at the Schedule to the Grounds of Opposition or Annex 1 here, closest to the subject
mark in terms of appearance and the goods and services concerned. As to the other
marks including those identified by the opponent to constitute the GIA Trade Marks,
though they may be used alongside the opponent’s word mark or form part of the GIA
Trade Marks Combination as discussed above, they are just marks that are rather
different from that mark and from the subject mark, hence I would ignore them as
they practically could not stand a better chance of success against the subject mark
than the “GIA” mark for the present purposes of section 12(3). The opponent’s word
mark has obtained registrations in Hong Kong in respect of goods and services in
Classes 9, 16 and 41 and meets the criteria of “earlier trade mark” as defined under
section 5(1)(a) of the Ordinance.
The average consumer
67. As the case law indicates, in the global assessment of the likelihood of
confusion, account should be taken of the average consumer of the category of goods
and services concerned, who is reasonably well informed and reasonably observant
and circumspect. It should also be borne in mind that the average consumer’s level
3 It is stated in the Trade Marks Registry record that this trade mark has been accepted because of
distinctiveness acquired through use.
20
of attention is likely to vary according to the category of goods or services in question
(Mundipharma AG v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks
and Designs) (OHIM) – Altana Pharma (RESPICUR) (T-256/04) [2007] E.C.R.
II-449 at [42] and the case law cited), and I have to determine the manner in which
these goods and services are likely to be selected by the average consumer in the
course of trade.
68. The goods at issue in this case, take for example the applicant’s applied for
goods, are “certificates of authenticity and certificates of grading for diamonds,
gemstones, pearls and jewelry; certificates; printed certificates; printed award
certificates”. Although they are mere printed matters, they are all related to the
appraisals service in Class 36 and in providing identification, authentication and
grading services in Class 42 of diamonds, gemstones, pearls and jewelry such that
relevant certificates would be issued in respect of the services rendered. More
generally, the applicant’s applied for goods and services can be said to be rendered in
relation to the field of gemology, which has a market for both professional
gemologists and non-professional gemstone or jewellery buyers.
69. I would say that the relevant public is comprised of members of the general
public in Hong Kong interested in those goods and services, which means it is made
up of the general public in Hong Kong. As goods and services rendered in relation
to the field of gemology is not one that would be required by an average consumer on
a daily basis, and the costs and expenses involved is usually high, the public
concerned is therefore one which is reasonably well informed and reasonably
observant and circumspect.
Comparison of goods and services
70. According to settled case-law, in order to assess the similarity between
goods or services, all the relevant features of the relationship between them should be
taken into account. Those features include, inter alia, their nature, their intended
purpose, their method of use and whether they are in competition with each other or
are complementary. Other factors may also be taken into account such as the
distribution channels of the goods or services concerned (see for example British
Sugar Plc v James Robertson and Sons Ltd [1996] R.P.C. 281; Canon Kabushiki
21
Kaisha v Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc. See also Case T-443/05 El Corte Inglés v
OHIM – Bolaños Sabri (PiraÑ AM diseño original Juan Bolaños) [2007] ECR II-2579,
paragraph 37 and the case-law cited).
71. As I have discussed above, the applicant’s applied for goods and services
can be said to be rendered in the field of gemology. This also suits the description of
the goods and services covered by the opponent’s word mark in Classes 9, 16 and 41
as set out above.
72. In Gérard Meric v Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market (Trade
Marks and Designs) (OHIM) Case T-133/05, at paragraph 29 the General Court said:
“In addition, the goods can be considered as identical when the goods designated by the
earlier mark are included in a more general category, designated by the trade mark
application (Case T-388/00 Institut für Lernsysteme v OHIM – Educational Services (ELS)
[2002] ECR II-4301, paragraph 53) or when the goods designated by the trade mark
application are included in a more general category designated by the earlier mark (Case
T-104/01 Oberhauser v OHIM – Petit Liberto (Fifties) [2002] ECR II-4359, paragraphs 32
and 33; Case T-110/01 Vedial v OHIM – France Distribution (HUBERT) [2002] ECR
II-5275,paragraphs 43 and 44; and Case T-10/03 Koubi v OHIM – Flabesa (CONFORFLEX)
[2004] ECR II-719, paragraphs 41 and 42.”
73. The comparison of the goods and services must concern the description of
the goods and services covered by the marks at issue and not the goods and services
for which the trade marks are actually used. In this connection, although the
applicant’s goods and services are more in relation to the provision of identification,
authentication and grading services in respect of diamonds, gemstones, pearls, jewelry
etc., whilst the goods and services covered by the registrations of the opponent’s word
mark seem to be more inclined to providing educational service in respect of
gemology, it can still be said that they are all goods and services that are rendered in
relation to the field of gemology. I am of the view that the goods and services
covered by the marks at issue were similar.
Comparison of marks
74. According to consistent case law, in order to assess the degree of similarity
22
between the marks concerned, it is necessary to determine the degree of visual, aural
and conceptual similarity between them and, where appropriate, to determine the
importance to be attached to those different elements, taking account of the category
of goods or services in question and the circumstances in which they are marketed
(see Lloyd Schuhfabrik Meyer v Klijsen Handel, paragraph 27).
75. In addition, the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion must, as
regards the visual, aural and conceptual similarity of the marks in question, be based
on the overall impression created by them, bearing in mind, in particular, their
distinctive and dominant components. The perception of the marks in the mind of
the average consumer of the goods or services in question plays a decisive role in the
global assessment of the likelihood of confusion (see Sabel BV v Puma AG, para 23;
Lloyd Schuhfabrik Meyer, para 25; and the order in P Matratzen Concord v OHIM
(Case C-3/03), para 29). In that regard, the average consumer normally perceives a
mark as a whole and does not proceed to analyze its various details (see Office for
Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) v Shaker di L.
Laudato & C. Sas, Limiñana y Botella, SL (C-334/05 P) [2007] E.C.R. I-4529 at [35]
and the case law cited).
76. I should point out here that both the applicant and the opponent had tried to
introduce expert evidence into the comparison of marks here. The applicant’s is an
expert report of Carole E. Ghaski which is exhibit as “NK-19” to Krasnianski’s
statutory declaration. But they deal largely of the “GIA” and “GHI” marks rather
than the subject mark or the opponent’s word mark here. The reference value of
these reports for the present proceedings is therefore very minimal.
77. Whilst the comparison must be made by examining each of the marks in
question as a whole, that does not mean that the overall impression conveyed to the
relevant public by a composite trade mark may not, in certain circumstances, be
dominated by one or more of its components (see OHIM v Shaker [2007] E.C.R.
I-4529 at [41] and the case law cited). It is only if all the other components of the
mark are negligible that the assessment of the similarity can be carried out solely on
the basis of the dominant element (OHIM v Shaker [2007] E.C.R. I-4529 at [42]).
23
Distinctive and dominant components of the opponent’s word mark and the subject
mark
78. As discussed at paragraphs 65 and 66 above, among the earlier trade marks
that are relied upon by the opponent in the present proceedings, I have chosen the
opponent’s word mark to be the mark for consideration. This is a word mark
consisting of the following words: GEMOLOGICAL INSTITUTE OF AMERICA.
79. The words “INSTITUTE”, “OF” and “AMERICA” are obviously ordinary
words and indistinctive. As to the word “GEMOLOGICAL”, it is an adjective,
meaning that it is of or relating to gems or gemology. It is therefore directly
descriptive of any goods or services rendered in relation to the field of gemology.
The fact that the opponent’s word mark could obtain registration in Classes 9, 16 and
41 but all with the disclaimer that the trade mark has been accepted for registration by
reason of use speaks for itself that this mark lacks inherent distinctiveness, it’s only
because of its combination of words that works through use could it be regarded as a
mark that somewhat is capable of distinguishing the goods or services offered by the
opponent.
80. Similarly, the subject mark, namely, “GEMOLOGY HEADQUARTERS
INTERNATIONAL”, is also a combination of indistinctive and descriptive words.
The words “HEADQUARTERS” and “INTERNATIONAL” are obviously common
and indistinctive words, and the word “GEMOLOGY” is clearly descriptive of any
goods or services rendered in relation to the field of gemology. Nonetheless, the
combination of these words may bestow certain distinctive character on the mark as a
whole.
81. Putting aside the question of whether the marks have acquired an enhanced
degree of distinctive character through use, I consider that both trade marks to be at
the very same low level of inherent distinctiveness, and that minimal distinctiveness
must find its place in the very combination of words constituting the mark, rather than
any individual indistinctive or descriptive word. Taking into consideration that all
word elements are descriptive and non-distinctive, they cannot be the dominant
elements of the marks. I conclude that for either of the marks, there is no word
which is able to dominate the entire mark, and all elements have the same value.
24
Visual similarity
82. Visually speaking, taking each of the marks as a whole, the only similarity
between them is that they contain either the word “GEMOLOGICAL” or
“GEMOLOGY” as the head word of the combination of words.
“GEMOLOGICAL” and “GEMOLOGY” are said to be the same word in its variant
forms, but both are descriptive of goods or services rendered in relation to the field of
gemology. As I have analyzed above, no word in either mark is able to dominate the
entire mark and that each and every word within them cannot be overlooked, the
overall effect is that there is low degree of visual similarity between the opponent’s
word mark and the subject mark.
Aural similarity
83. Aurally the same reasoning applies, and I would add that
“HEADQUARTERS INTERNATIONAL” would sound very different from
“INSTITUTE OF AMERICA”, this would reduce any similarity between the
sounding of the first word.
84. I find there is low degree of aural similarity between the marks.
Conceptual similarity
85. Conceptually speaking, both marks adopt the very descriptive word of the
field of gemology, and then relate it to certain organizational structure, say, an
international headquarters or an institute of America. I consider they share certain
degree of conceptual similarity.
Distinctiveness of the opponent’s word mark
86. A mark may be particularly distinctive either per se or because of the
reputation it enjoys with the public. The more distinctive an earlier mark, the greater
will be the likelihood of confusion (Sabel BV v Puma AG).
87. In determining the distinctive character of an earlier trade mark, I must make
25
an overall assessment of the greater or lesser capacity of the mark to identify the
goods or services for which it has been registered as coming from a particular
undertaking, and thus to distinguish those goods or services from those of other
undertakings. In making that assessment, account should be taken, in particular, of
the inherent characteristics of the mark, including the fact that it does or does not
contain an element descriptive of the goods or services for which it has been
registered; the market share held by the mark; how intensive, geographically
widespread and long standing use of the mark has been; the amount invested by the
undertaking in promoting the mark; the proportion of the relevant section of the
public which, because of the mark, identifies the goods or services as originating from
a particular undertaking; and statements from chambers of commerce and industry or
other trade and professional associations (Windsurfing Chiemsee v Huber and
Attenberger [1999] E.C.R. I-2779; Lloyd Schuhfabrik Meyer v Klijsen Handel [1999]
E.T.M.R. 690).
88. As I have analyzed above, the letter mark “GIA” as well as the GIA Trade
Marks Combination (of which the “GIA” mark forms part) have become the
distinguishing feature of the opponent, but the mere word mark “GEMOLOGICAL
INSTITUTE OF AMERICA” is rarely used outside the context of the GIA Trade
Marks Combination or as the corporate name of the opponent. Nonetheless, through
the aforesaid context of use, it’s fair to say it has acquired an enhanced degree of
distinctive character, though overall this mark is still weak in distinctive character.
Likelihood of confusion
89. The global assessment that I am required to undertake implies some
interdependence between the relevant factors. Thus, a lesser degree of similarity
between those goods or services may be offset by a greater degree of similarity
between the marks, and vice versa.
90. It has been said that the more distinctive the earlier mark, the greater the risk
of confusion (SABEL, paragraph 24). Marks with a highly distinctive character,
either per se or because of the reputation they possess on the market, enjoy broader
protection than marks with a less distinctive character (see Canon, paragraph 18, and
Lloyd Schuhfabrik Meyer, paragraph 20). In the present case, although I have found
26
that the opponent’s word mark has acquired certain enhanced degree of distinctive
character through use in the field of gemology, and hence it has certain distinctiveness
to distinguish the goods and services of the opponent’s, the opponent has largely
relied upon the GIA Trade Marks Combination and the “GIA” mark to promote and
operate its business. I consider that both the opponent’s word mark and the subject
mark are of weak distinctive character anyway.
91. In the evidence there had been discussions about how consumers would
make a purchase of gemstone or jewellery products. According to Chan Hiu-Sang,
Albert, who is a director of Chow Tai Fook, a famous local jewellery retail brand, for
most people, buying a diamond ring or any other piece of diamond jewellery would
qualify as one of the largest purchases they will ever make; many purchasers of
diamond and jewellery would therefore undertake research before making such a
purchase, and because of the internet, finding and evaluating standards and
laboratories is freely and easily available and allows consumers to make smarter
purchasing decisions.
92. Mr. McNeill said that diamonds are of very high value, their significance as
precious gemstones are generally purchased for special occasions such as engagement,
weddings, or other significant occasions in life.
93. All this suggest that the goods and services involved will be expensive, and
of a kind to which potential purchasers would give careful and due consideration
before purchase. But would the fact that consumers would pay a high level of
attention to the selection of the goods and services means that they would also pay
high attention to the marks involved?
94. Mr. Ephraim Zion, a person experienced in the field of gemology, said that
diamond certification by a reputable gemological laboratory to authenticate a
diamond’s attributes is integral to its valuation. Mr. Chan said many consumers
would look to buy certified diamonds to get the assurance that they are purchasing
high quality diamonds. Mr. McNeill is of the view that the public’s ability to discern
two similar marks will be greatly influenced by their emotional state, and this is
particularly relevant in the case of diamonds given the special value and the occasions
as mentioned above.
27
95. With regard to the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion, how
such a high level of attention paid to the goods and services as well as the marks
would fare in the case of low degrees of similarity between two descriptive marks is a
question that the present case must answer.
96. How a tribunal like ours should approach the global assessment under such
circumstances had been explored in the case Digipos Store Solutions Group Ltd v.
Digi International Inc [2008] R.P.C. 24, though in a somewhat different context.
The English Chancery Court in that decision has the following observation:-
“….A weak mark is, in practice, likely to have a reduced scope because there is a lesser
likelihood that other marks will be confused with it, if all that the respective marks have in
common is the descriptive element. That, in turn, is because, as a matter of fact, the
common element would not be thought by the average consumer to signal that the goods in
relation to which the respective marks are used come from the same trade source, not
because of any special approach under section 5(2)(b) to marks composed of descriptive
elements: Reed Executive [2004] RPC 767 and L'Oréal SA v OHIM (Case C-235/05P) 27
April 2006.” (paragraph [42])
97. Going back to the present case, having found that the parties’ goods and
services are similar, I find that visually and aurally the opponent’s word mark and the
subject mark are of a low degree of similarity. As to the conceptual similarity, I
found they share certain degree of similarity because they both adopt the very
descriptive word of the field of gemology and then relate it to an international
headquarters or an institute of America – they have a common convenient point of
referencing to a structure or organization that proffer to have high standing in
gemology. But that common point of reference is something considered to be of
weak distinctive character. I believe the argument about descriptiveness could apply
equally to something which is considered non-distinctive. As said in Reed Executive,
“Where you have something largely descriptive the average consumer will recognize
that to be so, expect others to use similar descriptive marks and thus be alert for detail
which would differentiate one provider from another.”
98. On the other hand, I also bear in mind what is said in Air Products and
Chemicals, Inc. v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and
Designs) (OHIM) (In Jointed Cases T-305/06 to T-307/06):-
28
“With regard to the weak distinctiveness of the common components and of the earlier
marks as a whole, it should be recalled that the finding of a weak distinctive character for
the earlier trade mark does not preclude a finding that there is a likelihood of confusion.
While the distinctive character of the earlier mark must be taken into account when
assessing the likelihood of confusion (see, by analogy, Canon, paragraph 24), it is only one
of a number of elements entering into that assessment. Even in a case involving an earlier
mark of weak distinctive character, there may be a likelihood of confusion on account, in
particular, of a similarity between the signs and between the goods or services covered
(Case T 134/06 Xentral v OHIM – Pages jaunes (PAGESJAUNES.COM) [2007] ECR
II-5213, paragraph 70; see, to that effect, Case T-112/03 L’Oréal v OHIM – Revlon (FLEXI
AIR) [2005] ECR II 949, paragraph 61).” (paragraph [59])
99. Whilst it is not inconceivable that the marks’ conceptual similarity alone
could create a likelihood of confusion, it must be recalled that the conflicting marks
are still similar to a low degree, and that their similarity is limited to the common
descriptive and non-distinctive element “gemology” or “gemological”.
100. The opponent’s word mark and the subject mark coincide only in a
non-dominant, descriptive and non-distinctive element and are dissimilar with respect
to all the other aspects. It would be against established case law to give too much
importance in the assessment of likelihood of confusion to non-distinctive elements,
otherwise this would result in an unduly broad protection of descriptive and
non-distinctive elements.
101. In the present case, even though the goods are similar, the other factors, such
as the non-distinctive character of the earlier trade mark and the low visual and aural
similarities, are sufficient to exclude any likelihood of confusion, including the risk of
association; a risk of association cannot be based on a non-distinctive element.
102. It follows that the ground of opposition under section 12(3) fails.
Section 12(4) of the Ordinance
103. Section 12(4) of the Ordinance, like section 12(3), requires the existence of
an earlier trade mark which is identical or similar to the mark in question. Moreover,
29
section 12(4) requires that the earlier trade mark is entitled to protection under the
Paris Convention as a well-known trade mark.
104. As in the case of section 12(3), I identify the opponent’s word mark
registered in Classes 9, 16 and 41 to be the possible earlier trade mark. But that
mark has also to be a well known trade mark.
105. Section 4 of the Ordinance provides that a trade mark which is entitled to
protection under the Paris Convention as a well-known trade mark shall be construed
as references to a trade mark which is well known in Hong Kong, and further provides
that in determining whether a trade mark is well known in Hong Kong, the Registrar
or the court shall have regard to Schedule 2 to the Ordinance.
106. I have examined and evaluated all the evidence of use of the opponent’s
word mark filed in these proceedings, as summarized in paragraphs 37 to 50 above.
I simply cannot find sufficient evidence to hold that the opponent’s word mark is well
known in Hong Kong.
107. I must therefore also hold that the ground of opposition under section 12(4)
fails.
Section 12(5)(a)
108. Section 12(5)(a) concerns the protection of “an unregistered trade mark or
other sign used in the course of trade or business” by virtue of the law of passing off
vis-à-vis the mark in question.
109. A helpful summary of the elements of an action for passing off can be found
in Halsbury’s Laws of Hong Kong Vol 15(2) at paragraph 225.001. The guidance
takes account of speeches in the House of Lords in Reckitt & Colman Products Ltd v
Borden Inc [1990] R.P.C. 3414 and Erven Warnink BV v J Townend & Sons (Hull)
4 This has also applied in local cases, e.g. Ping An Securities Ltd v 中國平安保險 (集團) 股份有限公司, FACV 26/2008 (12 May 2009).
30
Ltd [1979] A.C. 731, and is as follows :
“The House of Lords has restated the necessary elements which a plaintiff has to establish
in an action for passing off:
(1) the plaintiff’s goods or services have acquired a goodwill or reputation in the market
and are known by some distinguishing feature;
(2) there is a misrepresentation by the defendant (whether or not intentional) leading or
likely to lead the public to believe that goods or services offered by the defendant are goods
or services of the plaintiff; and
(3) the plaintiff has suffered or is likely to suffer damage by reason of the erroneous
belief engendered by the defendant’s misrepresentation.
The restatement of the elements of passing off in the form of this classical trinity has been
preferred as providing greater assistance in analysis and decision than the formulation of
the elements of the action previously expressed by the House of Lords. However, like the
previous statement of the House of Lords, this latest statement should not be treated as akin
to a statutory definition or as if the words used by the House of Lords constitute an
exhaustive, literal definition of ‘passing off’, and in particular should not be used to
exclude from the ambit of the tort recognized forms of the action for passing off which
were not under consideration on the facts before the House of Lords.”
110. The element of misrepresentation necessarily means that the relevant
members of the public will mistakenly infer from the use of the mark in question
which is the same or sufficiently similar to the name or marks of the plaintiff that the
goods on which the mark in question is used or proposed to be used are from the same
source or are connected. From my analysis so far, the only mark of the applicant that
is of relevance here is the opponent’s word mark. Again, without repeating myself,
after examining all the evidence of use of the opponent’s word mark filed in these
proceedings, I am not satisfied that the opponent has established that by the Filing
Date (i.e., the date when registration of the subject mark was applied for), it enjoys a
goodwill or reputation attached to its goods and services in the mind of the purchasing
public by association with the opponent’s word mark. It follows that there is no
relevant goodwill or reputation of the opponent’s word mark which could be damaged
by any misrepresentation (if any) on the part of the applicant. The ground of
opposition under section 12(5)(a) fails.
31
Section 11(5)(b)
111. Section 11(5)(b) of the Ordinance provides that a trade mark shall not be
registered if the application for registration of the trade mark is made in bad faith.
The term “bad faith” is not defined in the Ordinance.
112. In Gromax Plasticulture Ltd v Don & Low Nonwovens Ltd [1999] R.P.C. 367
at 379, Lindsay J. said in relation to section 3(6) of the U.K. Trade Marks Act 1994
(equivalent to section 11(5)(b) of the Ordinance):
“I shall not attempt to define bad faith in this context. Plainly it includes dishonesty and,
as I would hold, includes also some dealings which fall short of the standards of acceptable
commercial behaviour observed by reasonable and experienced men in the particular area
being examined. Parliament has wisely not attempted to explain in detail what is or is not
bad faith in this context: how far a dealing must so fall-short in order to amount to bad faith
is a matter best left to be adjudged not by some paraphrase by the courts (which leads to the
danger of the courts then construing not the Act but the paraphrase) but by reference to the
words of the Act and upon a regard to all material surrounding circumstances.”
113. In Harrison v Teton Valley Trading Co (CHINAWHITE) [2005] F.S.R. 10, the
Court of Appeal in the United Kingdom said (at paragraph 26):
“The words “bad faith” suggest a mental state. Clearly when considering the question of
whether an application to register is made in bad faith all the circumstances will be relevant.
However the court must decide whether the knowledge of the applicant was such that his
decision to apply for registration would be regarded as in bad faith by persons adopting
proper standards.” (Emphasis added)
114. Further, in Ajit Weekly Trade Mark [2006] RPC 25, the Appointed Person
said,
“The subjective element of the test means that the tribunal must ascertain what the
defendant knew about the transaction or other matters in question. It must then be
decided whether in the light of that knowledge, the defendant’s conduct is dishonest judged
by ordinary standards of honest people, the defendant’s own standards of honesty being
irrelevant to the determination of the objective element.”
32
115. The position is further summarized in the following passage in Melly’s Trade
Mark Application (Oppositions of Fianna Fail and Fine Gael) [2008] E.T.M.R. 41,
where it is said:
“53 The mental element required for a finding of bad faith has been much discussed. The
discussion has centred on the test for determining dishonesty in English law, that is to say
the “combined test” as explained by the House of Lords in Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley and
clarified by the Privy Council in Barlow Clowes International Ltd (In Liquidation) v
Eurotrust International Ltd. In her decision in Ajit Newspaper Advertising Marketing &
Communications Inc’s Trade Mark (No.2283796) Professor Annand considered whether
the “combined test” makes it necessary to give effect to the applicant’s belief in the
propriety of his own behaviour when deciding whether he applied for registration in bad
faith. She said not, on the basis that his own perception of propriety could not provide a
conclusive answer to the question whether he actually had applied for registration in bad
faith. I agree with her analysis. It supports the view that the relevant determination must
ultimately be made “on the basis of objective evidence” rather than upon the basis of
evidence as to the beliefs and opinions of the applicant with regard to the propriety of his
disputed application for registration. I note in this connection that in the Harrison v Teton
Valley Trading Co Ltd--CHINA WHITE the Court of Appeal upheld the Hearing Officer’s
finding of bad faith: (1) notwithstanding that the applicant for registration had deposed to
the fact that he “recognised no bad faith in my decision to develop and market the drink
CHINA WHITE” and was not cross-examined on the evidence he had given; and (2)
notwithstanding that the Registrar’s Hearing Officer had accepted the applicant’s evidence
and concluded that at the date of the disputed application for registration the applicant “saw
nothing wrong in his own behaviour”.” (footnotes omitted)
116. In essence, bad faith is a serious allegation that must be proved. An
allegation of bad faith should not be lightly made unless it can be fully and properly
pleaded and should not be upheld unless it is distinctively proved and this will rarely
be possible by a process of inference (ROYAL ENFIELD Trade Marks [2002] R.P.C.
24 at para. 31).
117. In the Grounds of Opposition, the opponent pleads the bad faith ground
based upon the following allegation: - that the applicant previously filed an identical
application under application no. 300578764, covering the same mark and the same
goods and services, on 10 February 2006, and such application was subsequently
withdrawn by the applicant on 9 May 2008 upon the opponent’s opposition thereto.
33
118. In the opponent’s evidence in support, the above alleged fact was just
repeated in paragraph 30 of Moon’s statutory declaration, with Ms. Moon just adding
that the applicant was well aware of the opponent’s prior use of, and prior rights in
and to, the GIA Trade Marks such that the subject application was made in bad faith.
119. In Krasnianski’s statutory declaration, which constitutes the applicant’s only
evidence, I am not aware that Mr. Krasnianski has made any reply to that.
120. In Moon’s second statutory declaration, which was filed as evidence in reply
after the applicant’s evidence, a settlement agreement was mentioned to have existed
and that seemed to shed light on the abovementioned scenario of the applicant having
once made an application for the same mark and later withdrawn it.
121. The settlement agreement and related materials were allegedly made on a
without prejudice basis, and hence this led to the preliminary issues I mentioned in
paragraphs 7 to 10 above that arose before the substantive hearing.
122. I do not think I need to go into any detail of the settlement agreement and
the related materials. If they are relevant to these proceedings at all, they should
have been filed in the opponent’s evidence in support, rather than as evidence in reply
when the applicant’s evidence did not contain any allegation or denial about the prior
evidence of the applicant in that connection.
123. Based on the fact that the applicant had previously filed an identical
application covering the same mark and the same goods and services and later
withdrawn such application, and assuming the applicant was well aware of the
opponent’s use of the GIA Trade Marks, could I take the bad faith claim any further?
124. I am afraid I cannot. There is too much that could explain or justify the
applicant in making the previous application and later withdrawing it, that fact alone
is not sufficient to make out a case of bad faith.
125. The ground of opposition under section 11(5) (b) fails.
34
Conclusion
126. As the opponent has not succeeded in any of the grounds of opposition, I
award the applicant costs. Subject to any representations, as to the amount of costs
or calling for special treatment, which either the opponent or the applicant makes
within one month from the date of this decision, costs will be calculated with
reference to the usual scale in Part I of the First Schedule to Order 62 of the Rules of
the High Court (Cap. 4A) as applied to trade mark matters, unless otherwise agreed.
(Frederick Wong)
for Registrar of Trade Marks
19 May 2014
35
Annex 1
Trade Mark
No.
Trade Mark Class
No.
Specification of Goods or Services
1. 19810813 GEMOLOGICAL
INSTITUTE OF AMERICA
16 paper and paper articles, cardboard and
cardboard articles, printed matter, periodical
publications, books, photographs, stationery,
instructional and teaching material (other than
apparatus); all relating to gemology or to
gems.
2. 1982B0478 GIA
16 printed matter, periodical publications, books,
instructional material (other than apparatus)
all relating to gemology or to gems.
3. 199900489AA GIA 9, 35 video tapes, compact disc
read-only-memories, audio tapes; all being
educational materials relating to gemology;
data carriers, transmitters and reproducers of
sound, images or data; all included in Class 9.
mail order services by product catalog;
computerized ordering via computer
terminals; all included in Class 35.
4. 200104503 GIA 42 gemological services; registration services
relating to precious gems; grading precious
gems; all included in Class 42.
5. 2002B08340 GTL 42 identifying, grading, registering, and
inscribing precious gems; pearl identification;
all being gemological services and included in
Class 42.
6. 2002B13902 GIA GEM TRADE
LABORATORY
INTEGRITY
42 gemological services; identifying, grading,
registering, and inscribing precious gems;
pearl identification; all included in Class 42.
7. 200306517 GIA GEM TRADE
LABORATORY
INTEGRITY
42 gemological services, registration services
relating to precious gems; grading of precious
gems; all included in Class 42.
36
Trade Mark
No.
Trade Mark Class
No.
Specification of Goods or Services
8. 200315802 GIA 14 jewelry, jewelry boxes, jewelry cases, pearls,
gems, gem replicas, gem cases, beads, pins,
label pins, rings, ring stands; all included in
Class 14.
9. 200401163 GIA 41 conducting a school training people in the arts
of gem identification and jewelry making; all
included in Class 41.
10 200401909 GIA 9 scientific instruments and apparatus,
microscopes, measuring instruments, scales,
refractometers, lamps for the microscopes,
color testing equipment, ultraviolet and
fluorescent testing equipment and
photo-optical instruments and spectroscopes,
tubes, filters, color testing equipment, color
comparaturos, ultraviolet and fluorescent
testing equipment, photo-optical instruments,
spectroscopes, microscopes for grading gems,
and portable laboratory equipment; scientific
instruments and apparatus for examining,
testing, evaluating, and appraising pearls and
jewelry; all included in Class 9.
11. 200403770 GIA 9 microscopes, measuring instruments, scales,
refractometers, lamps for the microscopes,
color testing equipment, ultraviolet and
fluorescent testing equipment and
photo-optical instruments and spectroscopes,
tubes, filters, color testing equipment,
ultraviolet and
fluorescent testing equipment, photo-optical
instruments, spectroscopes, microscopes for
grading gems, and portable laboratory
equipment; scientific instruments and
apparatus for examining, testing, evaluating,
and appraising gems, pearls and jewelry; data
carriers, computer software, video tapes,
CD-ROMs, audio tapes; all featuring
educational materials; transmitters and
reproducers of sound images, data, telephonic
and digital transmitters of information; all in
the field of gemology, pearls and jewelry; all
included in Class 9.
37
Trade Mark
No.
Trade Mark Class
No.
Specification of Goods or Services
12. 2004B08504 GEMOLOGICAL
INSTITUTE OF AMERICA
KNOWLEDGE
41 conducting a school training people in the arts
of gem identification and jewelry making; all
included in Class 41.
13. 2005B00434 GEMOLOGICAL
INSTITUTE OF AMERICA
16 printed matter, periodical publications, books,
instructional and teaching materials (other
than apparatus); all relating to gemology or to
gems.
14. 300176814 GEMOLOGICAL
INSTITUTE OF AMERICA
KNOWLEDGE
9 video tapes, compact disc read only
memories, audiotapes; all being educational
materials relating to gemology; data carriers,
transmitters and reproducers of sound, images
or data; all included in Class 9.
15 300176823 GIA GEMOLOGICAL
INSTITUTE OF AMERICA
9 data carriers, videotapes, CD-ROMs,
audiotapes and transmitters and reproducers
of sound, images or data; all featuring
educational materials in the field of
gemology; all included in Class 9.
16. 300176832 GIA GEMOLOGICAL
INSTITUTE OF AMERICA
16 paper, paper articles, cardboard and cardboard
articles, printed matter, periodical
publications, books, photographs, stationery,
and instructional and teaching materials.
17. 300176841 GIA GEMOLOGICAL
INSTITUTE OF AMERICA
41 in-residence, on-site and correspondence
courses in gemology including jewelry
design, sale and promotion of gems, pearls
and jewelry, investigation of genuineness of
gems and valuation of gems and pearls.
18. 300207611 GEMOLOGICAL
INSTITUTE OF AMERICA
KNOWLEDGE
35 mail order services by product catalog;
computerized ordering via computer
terminals.
38
Trade Mark
No.
Trade Mark Class
No.
Specification of Goods or Services
19. 300399033 GEMOLOGICAL
INSTITUTE OF
AMERICA
41 in-residence, on-site and correspondence
courses in gemological including jewelry
design, sale and promotion of gems, pearls
and jewelry, investigation of genuineness of
gems and valuation of gems and pearls; all
included in Class 41.
20. 300584488 GEMOLOGICAL
INSTITUTE OF AMERICA
9 video tapes, compact disc read only
memories, audio tapes; all being educational
materials relating to gemology; all included in
Class 9.
21. 300584497 GEMOLOGICAL
INSTITUTE OF AMERICA
35 mail order services by product catalog;
computerized ordering via computer
terminals.
~ End ~