A Monthly Digest of War Department Studies on the Attitudes of American Troops

WHEN THE GOING GETS TOUGH 1

TRANSFERS TO INFANTRY : A SPECIAL PROBLEM 4

ATTITUDES TOWARD MEN WHO "CRACK" IN BATTLE __-- 7

A CHECK LIST OF COMPANY LEADERSHIP PRACTICE S

WORRIES OF COMBAT TROOPS 10

MORALE ATTITUDES OF

SUPERIOR INFANTRYMEN IN TRAINING 12

SOLDIERS IN OUTLYING BASES 1 5

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE O FTHE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE ACT, 50 U. S. C., 31 AN D32, AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN AN YMANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW .

GETS ,O Gi a

. Soldiers in battle call on prayer, thoughts of home and their buddies ,and hatred For the enemy to help them get through

WAR DEPARTMENT ,

Washington 25, D . C ., 25 April 1944 .

What the Soldier Thinks, Number 5, A Monthly Digest of War Depart -ment Studies on the Attitudes of American Troops, is published for th einformation and guidance of all concerned .

[A. G. 061.05 (3 Jan 44).]

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR :

G . C . MARSHALL ,Chief of Staff .

OFFICIAL :

J.A. ULIO ,Major General ,

The Adjutant General .

DISTRIBUTION :

D (5) ; 8 (3) ; R (2) ; C (1) ; Def Comd (5) ; Sv C(10) ; Air Sv C (10) ; AF (10) ; Sp Sv Sch, AGF (2) ;Gen and Sp Sv Sch, AAF (2) ; Sp Sv Sch, ASF (5) ;Post, Camps, Sta (2) Continental only ; PE (Sp S vOff) (25) except NY and SF PE (Sp Sv Off) (50) .

Source : Study of Infantry officers in two divi -

sions--one with combat experience in the Medi-

terranean and one with combat experience in the

Pacific and Infantry enlisted men in a divisio n

with :combat experience in the Pacific .

Fear is the soldier's constant com-panion . It is at his elbow whe nhemoves into action . It shares his fox -hole when he is pinned down by enem yfire . It hovers over his gun positioneven when there is a lull in battle .When the going gets tough, fear is astubborn enemy he must conquer .

The heroes are no more immune to fea rthan are the run-of-the-mill soldiers .Combat veterans say that the soldier wh oclaims he has never been afraid is abraggart, a liar, or both . The wise andcourageous soldier makes this adjust-ment : Xe finds means of overcoming fea rbefore it overcomes him .

How can fear in combat be overcome ?There are many methods according to com -bat veterans who have met the enemy unde rthe ugliest of conditions on front sranging from the Tunisian desert to th eSouth Pacific islands . One of the meth-ods is concerned with thought ; in th elong run, the combat soldier defeat sfear by sheer strength of mind, by think -ing thoughts that will help him ge tthrough when the going gets tough .

What the soldier thinks about whe nthings look black on the battlefield de -pends on such factors as his genera lbackground, his military experiences ,his attitude toward the war, and hi sbelief in God . Officers are more likelyo think of certain things than ar etheir men, for example . And soldiers

fighting Japs are more likely to thin kof certain things than are soldier sfighting Germans .

CONCERN FOR OTHER MEN' S

WELFARE HELPS A LOT

Officers and men were asked the fol-lowing question :

Many men report that thinking abou tcertain things helps them get throug hwhen the going gets tough . Soldier swith different types of experience hav edifferent views .

What would you say o nthe basis of your experience? "

They were then given a check list o ffive kinds of thoughts and asked to rat eeach thought as to whether--and how much

--these thoughts helped them when th egoing was tough . (See chart on page 3 . )

Most frequently mentioned though tamong officers is that they `couldn' tlet the other men down ." As might b eexpected, this concern is very stron gamong them, because they are called upo nto set an example for their men to fol-low in combat . Fully 85 per cent of th eofficers studied in the Pacific and ? 7per cent of the officers studied in th eMediterranean say that such thinkin ghelped a lot when the going got tough .

Even among enlisted men, this concernwith their buddies' fate is very strong ,more than half of them saying it helpe dthem a lot during tough going . Only asmall percentage of both officers an dmen say that such thoughts didn't occu rto them .

PRAYER IS A GREAT HEL P

The judgment that "there are no athe-ists in foxholes" is close to the truth ,if one is to examine the statements o fofficers and men on the power of praye rto help banish fear .

Prayer is more likely to be a hel pto enlisted men than to officers, but

WHEN THE GOING GETS TOUGH

WHEN THE GOING GETS TOUGH

even among officers, a majority fromboth theaters say that it helped them alot when the going was tough . Almos ttwo out of three enlisted men say th esame and less than one man in five saysthe thought of prayer nev e r occurred t ohim . Among officers, one in four say she never thought of it .

HATRED FOR THE ENEM Y

;Hatred for the enemy--a concept whic hmany consider a powerful battle incen-tive--is often called into play by offi -cers and men when the going gets tough .There is a vast difference, however, inthe amount of help hatred provides amongmen fighting the Japanese and men fight -ing the Germans .

Among the Pacific division officers ,50 per cent say that the thought tha tthe job had to be finished if they wereto get home again helped a lot when thegoing was tough . Thirty-nine per centof the Mediterranean division officers and38 per cent of the Pacific division en-listed men concur with this statement .Roughly one in four says that suc hthoughts did not occur to him .

Thoughts of what they were fightin gfor are also helpful to' many officer sand men when battle pressure is severe

.Enlisted men are more likely to fin dsuch thoughts helpful than are officers

.Enlisted men are also more likely t ohave such thoughts when the going i stough .

WHEN THE GOING WAS TOUGH . . .

. . .HOW MUCH DID IT HELP YOU TO THINK THAT YOU HA D

TO FINISH THE JOB IN ORDER TO GET HOME AGAIN ?

OFFICERS . . .

ENLISTED MEN

PER CENT OF OFFICERS AND MEN WHO CHECK :

LITTLE

DIDN' TOR

THIN KA LOT

SOME NONE

OF I T

9%

23%

17%

25%

HOW SOLDIERS WHO HAY_ FOUGH TIN THE SOUTH PACIFIC COMBAT FEA R

QUESTION :

"Many men report that thinking about certain things helps them ge tthrough when going gets tough .

Soldiers with different types of experience hav edifferent views . What would you say on the basis of your experience? "

THOUGHTS OF GETTING HOME AGAI N

Concentration on the job at hand- -dirty though it is--is a method many of -ficers and men use to see them throug hthe worst situations in combat . The jobmust be done if the men are to get homeagain--regardless of other reasons--an dthis thought proves a powerful suppor tto many officers and men .2

COMPARISON OF MORE CONFIDENT AND LES SCONFIDENT SOLDIER S

Another interesting note on this mat -ter of adjustment to trying battle sit-uations is the following : Enlisted menwho gain in confidence the more time sthey go into action are more likely t obe helped by the above mentioned thought swhen things get bad than are men whos econfidence decreases as they see mor eand more action .

Thoughts of their buddies' welfare ,getting home again, Hatred for the enemy ,and belief in mission are more likely t oprove very helpful to soldiers whos econfidence increases as they see mor eand more action . Only prayer proves ashelpful to less-confident soldiers as i tdoes to their more confident buddies .

Certainly a good part of the reasonwhy some men's confidence increases a stheir battle experience increases isthat they are better able to weathe rnervous and emotional storms at th efront . This strength may well be due ,in part, to the help they get from think -ing of things above and beyon

d themselves. The soldier who thinks of getting the job done, of not letting hi s

buddies down, of the help he can ge tfrom God is less likely to crack fo rpersonal reasons when the going get stough . He is bolstered Against shocksthat might otherwise destroy him.

QUESTION : " When the going was tough, howmuch were you helped by thoughts of hatre d

for the enemy? "

PER CENT OF OFFICER S

SAYING . . .

. . .A LOT

OFFICER S

IN PACIFI C

DIVISION

OFFICERS I N

MEDITERRANEA N

DIVISION

.SOME . .

. . .LITTLE OR NONE . .

26s

15%31 %

. . .DIDN ' T THINK OF IT

15%

30%

. . .HOW MUCH DID IT HELP YOU TO THINK THAT YO U

COULDN'T LET THE OTHER MEN DOWN ?

OFFICERS .

ENLISTED MEN . .

. . .HOW MUCH DID IT HELP YOU TO THINK OF WHAT W E

ARE FIGHTING FOR?

12 %

OFFICERS . . . 16% 38%

ENLISTED MEN 15% 27%

. . .HOW MUCH WERE YOU HELPED BY THOUGHTS OF HATRE D

FOR THE ENEMY?

OFFICERS 2

15% 15%

ENLISTED MEN . 18% 18%

. . .HOW MUCH DID PRAYER HELP YOU ?

OFFICERS 26%

ENLISTED MEN 18%

3

TRANSFERS TO INFANTR Y

STO

A

A discussion of the attitudes of Infantry replacements from overseas,

ASTP and the Air CorpsSource : Study of several Infantry divisions inContinental United States .

Mass transfers of men to Infantr youtfits now in training in the U .S. haveconfronted Infantry company commander swith new problems calling for immediatesolution .

Men being reassigned to Infantry fromother outfits come largely from the fol -lowing sources :

1. Men back from overseas service .

2. Men from other branches, especially th eAir corps .

3. Men from ASTP units which have been dis-

banded .

Diverse as their backgrounds are ,these men have several things in common .Most of all, they share a dislike fo rtheir new assignments . They are reluc-tant transfers at best, many of themfeeling that the Army is not giving the ma fair deal by taking them out of thei rold assignments and throwing them int oInfantry .

Since they enter the Infantry wit hbad attitudes about Infantry, there i sreal danger that their entry will hav ebad effect on the esprit of their ne woutfits . Old Infantry men often lookupon them with suspicion and dislik eanyhow, and the situation is aggravate dwhen the new men fail to adjust . Thi sproblem is likely to increase rathe rthan decrease .

WHAT NEW MEN THINK OF THEIR OUTFIT S

Combat veterans recently returne dfrom overseas and assigned to Infantr yand men recently reassigned to Infantryfrom other branches tend to have les spride in their new outfit and less re -

spect for its ability than do older In-fantrymen . This lack of pride and re-spect stems in large measure from th esuper-critical attitudes these men carr yover when they are transferred .

The figures below are based on astudy of relatively recent members an d"old timers" in two Infantry division snearing completion of training in th eU .S .

PER CENT OF ME N

NOT PROUD OF THEIR COMPAN Y

AMONG :

Men recently transferredfrom overseas

Men recently transferre dfrom other branches

Men recently transferredfrom other Infantry outfits .

Men with long servicein outfit

The same situation holds true amon gmen who think their division is poore rthan average .

ATTITUDES OF TRANSFERS FROM OVERSEAS

Overseas personnel now being assigne dto Infantry outfits training in th estates are very often battle veteran swho have been rotated out of their out-fits or rehabilitated for active dut yafter suffering wounds in action .

These men are highly critical o ftheir new outfits . Having had actua lcombat experience, they often feel tha tthey know more about fighting a war tha nthose officers and noncoms who hav enever been closer to combat than fiel dproblems and maneuvers .

In addition, they are viewed wit hsuspicion by some officers and men i ntheir new outfits . Officers are some -times prone to fear these combat veteran swho might very well "show them up" i nthe eyes of the men .

This situation is made even mor eserious by the fact that the oversea stransfers are very likely to have builtup false expectations . Many of the mresent not getting lengthy furlough sbefore being reassigned . Others resentnot being assigned to stations near thei rhomes . Still others feel that they areentitled to jobs as instructors in thei rnew outfits and thus resent being re -trained for the same kind of combat job sthey've already performed overseas .

ATTITUDES OF ASTP TRANSFER S

In recent weeks, nearly 100,000ASTP students have been transferred t oGround Forces units--mainly Infantry .That these men's attitudes and previou smilitary backgrounds make them a specia lproblem for Infantry commanders can read -ily be seen from the following figures :

of them think their ASTP training will be of absolutely no use

to the Infantry .

of them still think that th eArmy has a lot of assignment s

open on which they could use their skills

and that Infantry assignments are thu sunnecessary .

of them think they will not hav e%good promotion possibilities in

the Infantry because the better jobs ar ealready filled .

of fer t o

themInfantrythink that will their trans -

fe rtheir advancement in the Army .

Despite the handicaps of the abov eattitudes, most ASTP men are potentiall yvaluable soldiers . Their fundamenta loutlook on the war is healthy . Eve nthough they look with distaste on th eInfantry, fully 87 per cent of them ad -mit the Infantry is of great or greates timportance in winning the war . Desir eto see action is also strong among them ,with 67 per cent wanting to go overseas .Perhaps their greatest asset is thei ryouth and intelligence . They were orig-inally selected for ASTP training becaus ethey stood out from the general run o fsoldiers .

ATTITUDES OF TRANSFERS FROM AIR CORP S

Large numbers of the men being trans -ferred to Infantry from other branche sin the U .S . are Air Corps "washouts, "

many of whom were washed out through n ofault of their own . These men's atti-tudes are determined in large measure b ythe fact that they are being transferre dout of the Air Corps--the Army's mos t

popular branch--into one of the leas tpopular branches--the Infantry .

Studies have shown that 75 per cen tof Air Corps men prefer their branch t oany other . This compares to less than

3 per cent of Air Corps men who prefe rInfantry .

Many men object to Infantry servic eon the grounds that it would not giv ethem a chance to do the kind of wor kthey can do best and that it would no tgive them training for better jobs afte rthe war . These same reasons are hig hon the list of reasons given for pre-ferring the Air Corps . On only one rea -son will men who prefer Air Corps and

5

PER CENT OF MEN WHO THIN K

THEIR DIVISION IS BELOW AVERAG E

AMONG :

Men recently transferredfrom overseas

Men recently transferredfrom other branches

Men recently transferredfrom other Infantry outfits .

Men with long servicein outfit

4

67% of them think other soldier sresent the good deal they had in

going to college under the ASTP set-up .

73

TRANSFERS TO INFANTR Y

Infantry agree : they think that bot hbranches are important in winning th ewar .

WHAT TO DO ABOUT THE PROBLEM ?

Each of the three groups of transfer sinto Infantry has much to offer the In-fantry in terms of qualifications, ex-perience, and intelligence . They makeup such a potentially valuable additionto our Infantry forces that they are de -serving of special attention by thei rcompany commanders .

A vast majority of these men are con-vinced that the Infantry is doing avital job . But they do need orientatio nwhich is aimed at convincing them o fthe importance of their doing that job .By and large, the problem of assimilat-ing them into the Infantry becomes on eof effective orientation .

An idea of what can be done abou thelping these replacements adjust to th eInfantry , can be gathered from the pro -gram now in operation in one division i nthe U.S . In this division new replace-ments are given special consideration .The division policy is to recognize tha ttheir adjustment depends as much on theattitudes of the men who have served along time with the division toward the mas it does on their own attitudes towardthe division .

Upon arrival, the men are sep arate dinto small groups and interviewed a t . digvision headquarters . Results of thes einterviews are then forwarded to uni tcommanders to give them a better under -standing of the attitudes and problem sof the men .

On the basis of these problems an dattitudes, a division-wide program o forientation is in operation to convinc ethe men that they still have a chanc efor advancement and that every effort i sbeing made to assign them properly . Inaddition, the following points ar estressed :

1. That their assignment to Infantry was amilitary necessity ;

2. That Infantry jobs have an importanc eabove and beyond the skills they call for ;

3. That Infantry benefits from their skill sand that there are jobs in Infantry tha tmake use of even the highest intelligenc eand finest skills .

While the above is only suggestive ,it does indicate the magnitude of th eproblem and steps that can be taken t osolve it . Any officer facing the sameproblem who takes similar steps shoul dfind that the esprit and effectivenes sof his command will improve correspond-ingly .

Source : Study of company-grade officers and menin an Infantry division which saw action in the

Pacific and officers in an Infantry division

which saw action in the Mediterranean theater .

Enemy weapons do not account for al lour casualties in this global war . Men-tal crack-ups brought on by the strai nof pounding under fire and the fact thatline soldiers are subjected to theroughest kind of experience--both phys -ical and emotional--are responsible fo rlarge numbers of losses .

What should be done with men wh ocrack up mentally, who "blow their tops? "

Are these victims of the "screamin g

meemies" genuinely incapacitated b ytheir "breaking down" just as surely a sif they were actual battle casualties orare they cowards and fakers who ac t"haywire" just to get out of combat ?

Officers with combat experienc eagainst both the Japs and Germans and

WL_F0

L

enlisted men who have fought the Jap swere asked their opinion on how menta lcrack-up cases should be treated . Thes eofficers and men had seen the "screamingmeemies" hit their buddies under fire .

It is significant that an overwhelm-ing proportion of them say that soldier swho crack up mentally should be treatedas sick men . Only a relative handfu lsay such soldiers are cowards and shouldtherefore be punished .

Because mental crack-up cases ceas eto be effective combat soldiers and be -cause they must be pulled out of th eline and replaced by other troops, the yare battle casualties in a very rea lsense . Experience has shown that wit hproper treatment as many as 60 to 80 pe rcent of them can be returned to actio nunder ideal conditions . Under ordinarycircumstances, an average of 30 to 5 0per cent of them are so rehabilitated a tthe present time .

.

uMost officers and nen say the soldier who goesLI

haywire

is sick and should be treated accordingl y

The WD film, "The Negro Soldier, "which was produced to depict the Negr osoldier's contribution tothewar effort ,is now available for general distribu-tion throughout the Army .

To find men's reaction to the film ,it was previewed before two groups o fsoldiers-one Negro, one white . Th egroups were chosen so as to represent ,insofar as possible, groups comparabl eto the Negro and white Army populations .Their reactions are thus representativeof Negro and white-soldiers generally .6

Both Negro and white soldiers wer eenthusiastic about the film, nine-tenth sof the Negroes and two-thirds of th ewhites saying they "liked it very much . "There was less than 10 per cent differ-ence between Southern and Northernwhites in the percentage liking th efilm .

In addition to liking the film, mos tsoldiers think it gives a true picture .of the activities of the Negro soldier.Less than 3 per cent of the Negroes an d5 per cent of the whites think the filmis mostly untrue or one-sided .

7

HOW OFFICERS AND MEN THINK MENTAL CRACK-UP CASES SHOULD BE TREATE D

QUESTION :

"In your opinion what should be don ein action, that is, men who ge ttops, go haywire? (Check the on e

to what you think should be done

with men who crack u pshell-shocked, blow thei ranswer that comes neares t

with them .) "

MEDITERRANEA NDIVISIO NOFFICERS

PACIFI CDIVISIO NOFFICERS

PACIFI CDIVISIO N

ENLISTED ME NPER CENT SAYING . .

. . .Most of them should b e

treated as sick men . . .

. . .Most of them should be treate d

as cowards and punished . .

., .Most of them should b e

treated some otheteway . .

915%

29%

25%

chat below shows tae relationship between

company practices and moral e

Source : Study of company practices among 34ASF companies in 'Continental United States .

How close is the relationship betwee ncompany leadership practices and companymorale?

The answer is that the relationshi pis close, indeed . This answer is backe dby the results of a study just completed

of company practices and morale among agroup of 34 companies stationed in Co ntinental U .S.

The chart below shows how the men i n12 selected ASF companies answered 18questions about company leadership prac -tices in their own outfits . Six of thecompanies were all rated high in moraleby all three of the following : Their

post or battalion commander, their com-pany officers and their enlisted men .The other six companies were all rate dlaw in morale by corresponding judges .The companies rated highest in morale b ythese judges are favorably rated b ytheir own men on nearly all compan ypractices . Those rated lowest fare verypoorly in this respect .

Space is provided below in which youcan rate your own outfit on the 18 com-pany practices rated by the men . Foreach practice, try to estimate whethe rtwo-thirds of the men in your outfi twould rate it favorably . Compare thepattern of checks you get for your com-pany with those of the high morale com-panies on the left .

indicates companies

in

which

2/3

or more of

the men

The

six

companies

rated

highest

in

morale

Rate

your own

The 6 companies

rated

lowest

in

moral eexpress

favorable opinions

of each

practice .

company

her e

COMPANY PRACTICE : 0 P R T 1.1

[_V W X Z

I .

Officers

interested

in

me n

2 .

Officers

understand men t s needs \if

3 .

Officers

are

helpful

to me n

4 .

Officers

recognize men's

abilities

5 .

Officers

are willing

to

back

men

up \di

6 .

Fair share of off-duty time given me n

7 .

Men

given

authority to do their job s

8 .

Best

use made of training

time

9 .

Fair furlough

and

pass

policy

10 .

Fair

promotion

policy

II .

Good

selection

of

noncoms

12 .

Satisfactory

sports

and

athletic

facilitie s

13 .

Satisfactory

recreational

facilities ll 1/ 1 /

14 .

Satis-5actory

orientation on

progress and

background

of the wa r

15 .

Officers

give talks

on

importance of

outfit's jo b

16 .

Personal

talks

by

officers

on mee t s

progres s

17 .

Men given opportunity to

know the

"why" of thing s

.

Punishment

meted

out

fairly

IdORRIES OF COMBAT TROOPS

Concerns about health, . home problemsr and the post-war world .. ...

.

.trouble many of(cers and men

COMBAT 7-F1 C

WORRIES OF COMBAT OFFICERS AND ENLISTED ME N

DUESTION :

"During the past month which two of the following have worried o r

bothered you most?" (Check only two)

PER CENT OF OFFICER S

AND MEN CHECKING EACH ITEM : §

ITEM : '

OFFICERS

ENLISTED MEN

Financial matters

The progress of the war . . 0 .

. 0 0 0

.

What is going to happen to me after the war . .

Being a long way from home

Matters concerning my family or friends back home . .

The way I am getting along in the Army . .

News about national events in the U.S . . . .

Not knowing what is going to happen next . .

What will happen in the U.S . after the war . .

Whether we will get what we are fighting for . .

.

Purely personal matters not included above

§ Percentages do not add to 200 as some officers and men failed to check two items .

= Items are listed in the order in which they appeared on the original questionnaire .

S

2 ,

127,

My health . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The physical danger I might be faced with before

the war is over

3

16 5

It should also be remembered that theworries listed in the chart below ar etypical only of officers and men wit hcombat experience . Men's concern wit hhealth and danger, for example, is no tnearly so strong among non-combat troops

stationed in an inactive theater over -seas . It is only natural that comba tduty intensifies these factors, jus tas being overseas intensifies men's con -cern about the progress of events bac khome .

Source : Study of combat veteran officers andmen in a division from the Pacific .

War breeds worry. Officers and menwho are thousands of miles from home ,living and fighting under heart-breakin gand nerve-wracking conditions, worr yboth about immediate battle problems an d

'home problems back in the states .

Concern about relatives and friend sat home plagues the combat soldier a sdoes the ever-present concern for hi sown life . He worries about the peace t ocome and about his future after tha tpeace .

To the officer, knowledge of th ethings his men worry about is essentialto effective leadership . Worry saps aman's working and fighting efficiency .Anything an officer can do to alleviat eworry in his command will pay off in abetter fighting outfit .

The Army has done much to help solv ethe soldier's home problems while he i sin the service . The effect of govern-ment dependency allotments is readil yseen from the fact that only a smal lpercentage of enlisted men say they areworried about financial matters . Un-doubtedly, the Red Cross and Army Emer-gency Relief have also ceen effectiv ein this respect .

Various other worries common to manysoldiers can probably be solved partiall ythrough stepped-up and properly pre-sented orientation . Through orientation ,many of the soldiers' concerns about hi splace in the post-war scheme of thing sand whether the U .S . will achieve th eobjectives for which it is fighting canbe eliminated . (As the chart on th eopposite page shows, such concerns ran khigh among the worries of both officer sand enlisted men. )10

HOW THE WORRIES OF OFFICER SAND MEN COMPAR E

That officers and enlisted men diffe rin the things they are likely to worr ymost about is evident from even a hast yglance at the chart .

Officers are more likely than men t oworry most about the following matters :

1. What is going to happen to them after the

war .

2. The way they are getting along in the Army .

3. What will happen in the U .S. after the war .

4. News about national events in the U .S .

5. Purely personal matters .

Enlisted men are more likely to worr ymost about the following matters :

1. Their health .

2. The physical danger they might be face d

with before the war ends .

3. Not knowing what is going to happen next .

4. Whether the U .S . will get what it is

fighting for .

Both enlisted men and officers ar eequally likely to worry most about th efollowing matters :

1. Being a long way from home .

2. Matters concerning their families or

friends back home .

3. The progress of the war .

4. Financial matters (practically no worry

to either) .

The above list is based only on thos e l,items officers and men worry most about .It is in no way representative of th etotal number of items which cause the mgreat or little concern .

SUPERIOR INFANTRYME N

THE SUPERIOR INFANTRYMAN TENDE D

TO HAVE MORE SELF-CONFIDENCE

QUESTION : "If you were sent into actua l

fighting after one year of training, ho w

do you think you would do? "

PER CENT SAYING "ALL RIGHT" OR "I'D HAV E

TROUBLE AT FIRST BUT WOULD DO O .K . LATER" . . .

. . .Among Privates who

were destined t o

become line NCO' S

. . .Among othe r

Privates

THE SUPERIOR INFANTRYMAN WAS MOR E

LIKELY TO FEEL THAT WHAT HE WA S

DOING IN THE ARMY WAS WORTHWHIL E

QUESTION : "Do you usually feel that wha t

you are doing in the Army is worthwhil e

or not? "

PER CENT SAYING IT IS WORTHWHILE . . .

. . .Among Privates who

were destined t o

become line NGO ' s

. . .Among othe r

Privates 52 "

SOME OTHER DIFFERENCE S

As another part of the study, lin enoncoms in the two regiments (assumed t obe the best enlisted Infantrymen) wer ecompared with privates and pfc's o nsuch factors as education, AGCT scores ,physical characteristics and mechanica laptitude .

The noncoms were generally found t ohave more education, intelligence an dmechanical aptitude and to be slightl y

41,

Ask -taller and heavier than the privates an d111Pl c's .

In all the above cases, however, th edifferences between noncoms and private sand pfc's were small. It was evident

D

Source : Study of privates in two regiments o fan Infantry division in Continental U.S.

Here is a situation which often con -fronts the Infantry line officer . Theofficer surveys the columns of recruitswho have been assigned to his outfit fo rtraining . These recruits have bee nrounded up from many sections of th ecountry ; they stem from a variety o fbackgrounds .

The officer looks them over an dthinks : "A few short months from now ,some of these basic privates will b esquad, section and platoon noncoms .These men will stand out . "

The months go by and some of the basi cprivates have blossomed out with ne wstripes . In what ways did they standout? The fact that they were promote dto positions of leadership and responsi -bility is, in the main, proof of th efact that they were considered to b esuperior soldiers . What, then, was th esecret of their success ?

Some of their success was due, o fcourse, to their superior mastery of th ebasic skills of the Infantryman . Inaddition, however, it is likely tha ttheir morale attitudes also contributed .This idea is borne out by a study amon gInfantry privates in two regiments of adivision in the U .S . which reveal sstriking differences between the moraleattitudes of privates who were destine dto be promoted to line NCO's and thos ewho were not .

For the purposes of the study, th emen were questioned during their firs tfew weeks in the Army and the result sof the study were then filed away unti lsome months later . They were then re -viewed to see how the morale attitudes

T JDLS

of men who rated promotions compare dwith those of other men . Though it thusbecame necessary to identify the men in -dividually, their anonymity was pro-tected from all but the members of th eresearch staff working on the study .

The study shows that the private sdestined to become NCO's were likely t odiffer from their buddies in the follow -ing attitudes :

I .

They tended to be better-disciplined .

2. They tended to have more self-confidence .

3. They were more likely to feel that wha t

they were doing in the Army is worthwhile .

4. They tended to have a more favorable atti-

tude toward their officers .

5. They tended to have a more favorable atti-

tude toward their noncoms .

that the most striking differences be-tween the two groups were in their mo-rale attitudes . On the five attitude scharted in this report, for example, th e

differences range from 34 to i8 Per cent .

Since, by the very nature of things ,officers must rely on men's performancerecords in making promotions, the abov efindings indicate that superior moral eis related to superior performance . Theofficers had no sure way of knowing thespecific morale attitudes of the me nthey selected to be line NCO's . It i ssignificant that the men they chose wer egenerally higher on these attitudes tha nthe men they passed over .

THE SUPERIOR INFANTRYMAN

TENDED TO BE BETTER DISCIPLINE D

QUESTION : "Do you feel that the Army is try -

ing to control you and other soldiers mor e

strictly than it needs to? "

PER CENT SAYING "NO" . . .

. . .Among Privates who

were destined t o

become line NCO' s

. . .AmOng other Privates

THE SUPERIOR INFANTRYMAN TENDE D

TO HAVE A MORE FAVORABL E

ATTITUDE TOWARD HIS OFFICER S

QUESTION :

"How many of your officers ar e

the kind that always look out for the wel-

fare of their enlisted men? "

PER CENT SAYING " ALL " OR " MOST OF THEM " . . .

. . .Among Privates who

were destined t o

become line NCO' S

. . .Among other Privates

THE SUPERIOR INFANTRYMAN TENDE D

TO HAVE A MORE FAVORABLE ATTITUD E

TOWARD HIS NONCOM S

QUESTION :

"How many of the noncoms you no w

serve under are the kind you would want to

serve under in combat? "

PER CENT SAYING "ALL " OR " MOST OF THEM " . . .

. . .Among Privates wh o

were destined t o

become line NCO ' s

. . .Among other Privates

4

S k"I'D-i5)y E \ AK A G

Infantry privates who are later promoted to line NCO' s

tend to have been superior in morale attitudes

1. 3

A majority of officers and men say their outfit ' s leading guard

turns out well in Front line combatThe G.I. seems quite adept at adjusting to

in an inactive theater Far from home

ouse tenant e

Source : Study of a cross section of enlisted

men in an inactive tropical area overseas .

That happens to morale when men ar estationed for long periods in an inac-tive tropical theater far away fro mhome?

One idea held by many people is tha tmorale deteriorates rapidly under suc hconditions and that it tends to get low -er the longer men are so stationed .

A study of a cross section of en -listed men stationed in just such a narea throws a good deal of light on thesubject .

The study supports the following con -clusions :

1. Though there is a tendency for morale to de-

teriorate when men are in an inactive the-

ater, the fears expressed about rapid de-

terioration are somewhat exaggerated .

2. Though length of service in such a theater

tends to have only slight effect on men' s

general morale, it does have stronger effec t

on some of their leisure-time habits .

As the chart opposite shows, th elonger men are stationed in an inactiv etheater, the more likely they are t ospend their off-duty time going to tow n)and drinking beer, and the less likel ythey are to write letters home . Thesame trend holds true for still anotherleisure-time activity--having dates wit hwomen .

It may well be argued that becaus eleisure-time activities may reflect th egeneral quality of men's morale that in -

* creased drinking and decreased lette rwriting are indications of lowered mo -rale . Certainly, the decline in lette rwriting gives some cause f or alarm inso -far as it indicates a kind of growing

Source : Study of enlisted men and company-grade

officers in an Infantry division which saw ac -

in the Pacific .

There are two schools of thought onthe question of how well disciplinar yoffenders turn out in combat . One schoolholds that most of them cannot be truste dto do a good Sob under fire . The othe rholds that when the chips are down, mos tguardhouse tenants are satisfactor yfighting men .

The latter point of view is supporte dby a recent study in which about three -quarters of the officers and men ques-tioned say that the soldier in thei routfit who had the longest guardhous erecord was at least as good as the aver -age soldier in combat action .

The following table indicates howthese officers and men rated the battleperformance of their outfit's worst dis -ciplinary offender :

QUESTION : " . . .Think of the one man in you r

unit who served time the most in the guard -

house. How did he do in battle compared t o

other men in the platoon? fl

Per cent of officers and

enlisted men saying . . .

ENLISTE D

OFFICERS

ME N

Much better than average .

7

1 1

Better than average . . .

22

1 5

Same as average . .

42

5 3

Worse than average 12

5

Much worse than average . . . 3

3

Any other answer 10

3

No answer 4

1 0

The fact that this opinion of thebattle performance of guardhouse tenant sis not limited to officers and men wit hcombat experience in one area is borne

out by testimony of officers who saw ac -tion in another area. These officer sconcur almost absolutely with the judg-ment expressed in the table .

This opinion cannot be taken as recom-mendation by the officers and men tha tcombat units be made dumping grounds fo rmen with bad records .

In the first place, the worst disci-plinary offenders were, in the main, no tunder consideration . The officers an dmen were simply rating the battle per-formance of the worst offenders amon gthose who reached the battle front . It

may well be argued that the guardhous einmates who saw combat were a selectio nof the very best men who had ever go tinto trouble with Army law .

In the second place, it is probabl ethat officers and men expected little o fthese offenders . A guardhouse veteranwho actually was poorer than average incombat might have been rated average orbetter simply because he behaved bette rthan he was expected to .

But even when we consider all thes elimitations, the fact remains that mos tof the men with guardhouse records wh osurvived pre-battle screening seem t ohave earned the respect of their fellows .

While it must be granted that thedisciplinary offender may have characte ror personality drawbacks that tend t omake him a bad man to have around, com-bat performance is such an importan tpart of a soldier's service that th efollowing conclusion from the figure sopposite seems justified :

If a soldier has a bad record, ye tyou or your senior officers feel he has 41,enough value to his unit to be carrie dinto action, givehim a chance to prov ehimself. The odds are good that he willprove a useful fighting soldier .

apathy among the men . It is this kindof apathy which often leads to a genera llet-down in men's efficiency .

HOW LENGTH OF SERVICE IN A THEATE R

AFFECTS CERTAIN LEISURE-TIME ACTIVITIES *

25 MONTH SOR MOR E

NO EFFECT ON OTHER OFF-DUTY ACTIVITIE S

Length of service in an inactive are aseems to have no effect whatsoever o nthe following leisure-time activities :

1. Book and magazine reading habits .

2. Movie attendance .

3 . Card playing and other indoor activities .

4. Indoor and outdoor sports activities .

'In Plotting these indexes, activitie s

of men with 12 months service or les s

have been used as a base line .

19-24MONTH S

13-1 aMONTH S

12 MONTH SOR LESS

15

In addition, as the chart below shows ,there is no significant difference be-tween men with long service and men wit hshort service on such morale-relate dfactors as the following :

1. Extent of interest in Army job .

2. Satisfaction with Army life .

3. Feeling that their job assignments are worth -while .

In plotting these indexes, attitudes o fmen with 12 months of service or les shave been used as a base line .

12 MONTHS 13-18

19-24

25 MONTH SOR LESS

MONTHS

MONTHS

OR MOR E

ATTITUDE TOWARD OFFICERS

FEELING THAT ARMY ASSIGNMENT

IS WORTHWHILE

Q

HOW LENGTH OF SERVICE IN A THEATE RAFFECTS CERTAIN MORALE-RELATED ATTITUDES *

SOLDIERS IN OUTLYING BASES

4. Attitude toward officers .

MA D

The articles in this bulletin are based on attitude surveys conducted by th eResearch Branch, Morale Services Division and the research units reporting t othe commanding generals of the several theaters .

The staff of the Research Branch is composed of Army officers who are experi -enced in the field of surveys, together with a number of civilian specialists .Techniques have been developed, tested and adjusted to fit the Army's problems .

The basic steps in conducting a study are as follows :

1. The questionnaire is prepared in consultation with the War Departmen tbranches, or t :e theater command immediately concerned . Questions arecarefully chosen to provide the exact type of information desired .

2. The questionnaire is pre-tested . That is, the questions are tried out onsmall groups of men to determine whether they are meaningful and under-standable to the type of men or officers to be studied .

3. The project is cleared for action with the commands in which the study i sto be made .

The number of men to be surveyed is set sufficiently large to insure sta -tistically reliable findings .

The men to be surveyed are selected to insure as true a cross section o fthe group to be studied as possible . A cross section of enlisted men i nthe United States, for example, is so drawn as to give proper proportionat erepresentation to each branch of the Army, to men in each stage of train -ing, and to men stationed in the various sections of the country . It is ,of course, possible to get cross sections of a single branch, of a divi-sion, of Negro troops, or any other portion of the Army desired .

6. The men complete questionnaires under conditions of absolute anonymity .They are assembled in small groups, and hear a short introduction given b ya specially trained class leader . This introduction makes it clear to th emen that only their frank opinianemis wanted, and that they are not bein gtested or spied on . If the group is composed of enlisted men, the clas sleader is an enl ;sted man, and no officers are present during the session .No names or serial numbers are placed on the questionnaires . Ordinarily ,illiterates or men of very low intelligence are interviewed by speciall ytrained enlisted men .

7. The data are analyzed by specialists in attitude research analysis . Re-ports of these analysts are released to agencies concerned, and also for mthe basis for the material presented in this bulletin .

The procedure outlined above is that followed in the typical cross sectio nsurvey . Other techniques, of course, are employed from time to time in spe-cial situations .

4 .

5 .

These findings by no mea c:cZ;A0 410the picture . On several morale-relate ditems, men with the longest service i nthe area seem to have attitudes superio r

to those with shorter service .

For example, they are more likely t oexpress preference for their soldie rroles as against being civilian worker sin war industries . On this latter facto ralone, 23 per cent more of the men wit htwo years of service in the area or mor eprefer the soldier role than prefer i tamong those men with one year of servic eor less .

COMPANY PUNISHMEN T

Perhaps the one instance in whic hthere is positive evidence of a kind o fmorale deterioration among men with lon gservice in the area is in the recenc ythat men have received company punish-ment . Fifteen per cent of the men wit htwo years or more service in the are asay they received company punishmen twithin the past six months ; only nineper cent of those with one and a hal fyears of service or less say they re-ceived such punishment .

SOME GENERAL CONCLUSION S

It cannot be denied that--as far a sover-all policy is concerned--men shoul dnot be kept too long in an inactiv etropical theater . Discipline tends t osuffer under such conditions, and me nget sloppy in their habits . In thi stheater, the men themselves are con-scious of this fact . Almost half themen with two years of service or mor esay that they would like to see more em -phasis on neatness of dress and that or -ders should be given in a more militarymanner .

On the other hand, there seems littl ereason to fear that men kept for lon gperiods in such a theater fall apart athe seams . The evidence seems to b ethat most soldiers try to make whateve radjustments they can to the life the yare forced to live .

16