TREATISE ON BASIC PHILOSOPHY

Volume I

SEMANTICS I: SENSE AND REFERENCE

TREATISE ON BASIC PHILOSOPHY

1

SEMANTICS I Sense and Reference

2

SEMANTICS II Interpretation and Trlllth

3

ONTOLOGY I The Furniture of the World

4

ONTOLOGY II A World of Systems

5

EPISTEMOLOGY I The Strategy of Knowing

6

EPISTEMOLOGY II Philosophy of Science

7

ETHICS The Good and the Right

MARIO BUNGE

Treatise on Basic Philosophy

VOLUME 1

Semantics I:

SENSE AND REFERENCE

D. REIDEL PUBLISHING COMPANY

DORDRECHT-HOLLAND / BOSTON-U.S.A.

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 74--83872

ISBN-13: 978-90-277-0572-3 DOl: 10.1007/978-94-010-9920-2

e-ISBN-13: 978-94-010-9920-2

Published by D. Reidel Publishing Company, P.O. Box 17, Dordrecht, Holland

Sold and distributed in the U.S.A., Canada, and Mexico by D. Reidel Publishing Company, Inc.

306 Dartmouth Street, Boston, Mass. 02116, U.S.A.

All Rights Reserved Copyright © 1974 by D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland

No part of this book may be reproduced in any form, by print, photoprint, microfilm, or any other means, without written permission from the publisher

GENERAL PREFACE TO THE TREATISE

This volume is part of a comprehensive Treatise on Basic Philosophy. The treatise encompasses what the author takes to be the nucleus of con­temporary philosophy, namely semantics (theories of meaning and truth), epistemology (theories of knowledge), metaphysics (general theories of the world), and ethics (theories of value and of right action).

Social philosophy, political philosophy, legal philosophy, the philoso­phy of education, aesthetics, the philosophy of religion and other branches of philosophy have been excluded from the above quadrivium either because they have been absorbed by the sciences of man or because they may be regarded as applications of both fundamental philosophy and logic. Nor has logic been included in the Treatise although it is as much a part of philosophy as it is of mathematics. The reason for this exclusion is that logic has become a subject so technical that only mathematicians can hope to make original contributions to it. We have just borrowed whatever logic we use.

The philosophy expounded in the Treatise is systematic and, to some extent, also exact and scientific. That is, the philosophical theories formulated in these volumes are (a) formulated in certain exact (mathema­tical) languages and (b) hoped to be consistent with contemporary science.

Now a word of apology for attempting to build a system of basic philosophy. As we are supposed to live in the age of analysis, it may well be wondered whether there is any room left, except in the cemeteries of ideas, for philosophical syntheses. The author's opinion is that analysis, though necessary, is insufficient - except of course for destruction. The ultimate goal of theoretical research, be it in philosophy, science, or mathematics, is the construction of systems, i.e. theories. Moreover these theories should be articulated into systems rather than being dis­joint, let alone mutually at odds.

Once we have got a system we may proceed to taking it apart. First the tree, then the sawdust. And having attained the sawdust stage we should

VI GENERAL PREFACE TO THE 'TREATISE'

move on to the next, namely the building of further systems. And this for three reasons: because the world itself is systemic, because no idea can become fully clear unless it is embedded in some system or other, and because sawdust philosophy is rather boring.

The author dedicates this work to his philosophy teacher

Kanenas T. Pota

in gratitude for his advice: "Do your own thing. Your reward will be doing it, your punishment having done it".

CONTENTS OF SEMANTICS I

PREFACE

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

SPECIAL SYMBOLS

INTRODUCTION

1. Goal 2. Method

1. DESIGNATION

1. Symbol and Idea 1.1. Language 8 1.2. Construct 13 1.3. Predicate 15 1.4. Theory and Language 18

2. Designation 2.1. Name 21 2.2. The Designation Function 23

3. Metaphysical Concomitants 3.1. Basic Ontology 26 3.2. Beyond Platonism and Nominalism 27

2. REFERENCE

1. Motivation 2. The Reference Relation

21. An Unruly Relation 34 2.2. Immediate and Mediate Reference 36 2.3. Reference Class 37 2.4. Factual Reference and Object Variable 39 2.5. Denotation 42 2.6. Reference and Evidence 43 2.7. Misleading Cues in the Search for Referents 46

3. The Reference Functions 3.1. Desiderata 48 3.2. Principles and Definitions 50

XI

XIII

XV

1

1 4

8

8

21

26

32

32 34

48

VIII CONTENTS OF 'SEMANTICS I'

3.3. Some Consequences 53 3.4. Context and Coreference 56

4. Factual Reference 59 4.1. The Factual Reference Class 59 4.2. The Factual Reference Class of Scientific Theories 62 4.3. Spotting the Factual Referents: Genuine and Spurious 68 4.4. The Strife over Realism in the Philosophy of Contemporary Physics 70

5. Relevance 75 5.1. Kinds of Relevance 75 5.2. The Paradox of Confirmation as a Fallacy of Relevance 79

6. Conclusion 81

3. REPRESENT A TION 83

1. Conceptual Representation 83 2. The Representation Relation 87

2.1. A Characterization 87 2.2. The Multiplicity of Representations 93 2.3. Transformation Formulas and Equivalent Theories 97

3. Modeling 99 3.1. From Schema to Theory 99 3.2. Problems of Modeling 101

4. Semantic Components of a Scientific Theory 104 4.1. Denotation Rules and Semantic Assumptions 104 4.2. Philosophical Commitment of the SA's 108 4.3. Application to Quantum Mechanics III

5. Conclusion ll3

4. INTENSION 115

l. Form is not Everything 1.1. Concepts of Sense 115 1.2. Extension Insufficient 118 1.3. 'Intensional': Neither Pragmatic nor Modal 120

2. A Calculus of Intensions 2.1. Desiderata 123 2.2. Principles and Definitions 124 2.3. Main Theorems 126 2.4. Intensional Difference and Family Resemblance 130

115

123

3. Some Relatives - Kindred and in Law 134 3.1. Logical Strength 134 3.2. Information 135 3.3. Testability 138

4. Concluding Remarks 140

CONTENTS OF 'SEMANTICS I'

5. GIST AND CONTENT

1. Closed Contexts 1.1. Closed Contexts and Their Structure 143 1.2. The Logical Ancestry of a Construct 145

2. Sense as Purport or Logical Ancestry 2.1. Purport and Gist 146 2.2. The Gist of a Basic Construct 148 2.3. The Gist of a Theory 150 2.4. Changes in Gist 153

3. Sense as Import or Logical Progeny 3.1. The Logical Progeny of a Construct 154 3.2. Import 156 3.3. Theory Content 158 3.4. Empirical and Factual Content 160 3.5. Changes in Import and Content 165

4. Full Sense 5. Conclusion

BIBLIOGRAPHY

INDEX OF NAMES

INDEX OF SUBJECTS

IX

142

143

146

154

166 171

173

181

183

PREFACE TO SEMANTICS I

This is a study of the concepts of reference, representation, sense, truth, and their kin. These semantic concepts are prominent in the following sample statements: r"fhe field tensor refers to the field', r A field theory represents the field it refers to', r"fhe sense of the field tensor is sketched by the field equations', and rExperiment indicates that the field theory is approximately true'.

Ours is, then, a work in philosophical semantics and moreover one centered on the semantics of factual (natural or social) science rather than on the semantics of either pure mathematics or of the natural languages. The semantics of science is, in a nutshell, the study of the symbol-con­struct-fact triangle whenever the construct of interest belongs to science. Thus conceived our discipline is closer to epistemology than to mathe­matics, linguistics, or the philosophy of language.

The central aim of this work is to constitute a semantics of science - not any theory but one capable of bringing some clarity to certain burning issues in contemporary science, that can be settled neither by computa­tion nor by measurement. To illustrate: What are the genuine referents of quantum mechanics or of the theory of evolution?, and Which is the best way to endow a mathematical formalism with a precise factual sense and a definite factual reference - quite apart from questions of truth?

A consequence of the restriction of our field of inquiry is that entire topics, such as the theory of quotation marks, the semantics of proper names, the paradoxes of self-reference, the norms of linguistic felicity, and even modal logic have been discarded as irrelevant to our concern. Likewise most model theoretic concepts, notably those of satisfaction, formal truth, and consequence, have been treated cursorily for not being directly relevant to factual science and for being in good hands anyway. We have focused our attention upon the semantic notions that are usually neglected or ill treated, mainly those of factual meaning and factual truth, and have tried to keep close to live science.

The treatment of the various subjects is systematic or nearly so: every

XII PREFACE TO 'SEMANTICS I'

basic concept has been the object of a theory, and the various theories have been articulated into a single framework. Some use has been made of certain elementary mathematical ideas, such as those of set, function, lattice, Boolean algebra, ideal, filter, topological space, and metric space. However, these tools are handled in a rather informal way and have been made to serve philosophical research instead of replacing it. (Beware of hollow exactness, for it is the same as exact emptiness.) Moreover the technical slices of the book have been sandwiched between examples and spiced with comments. This layout should make for leisurely reading.

The reader will undoubtedly apply his readermanship to skim and skip as he sees fit. However, unless he wishes to skid he will be well advised to keep in mind the general plan of the book as exhibited by the Table of Contents. In particular he should not become impatient if truth and extension show up late and if analyticity and definite description are found in the periphery. Reasons will be given for such departures from tradition.

This work has been conceived both for independent study and as a textbook for courses and seminars in semantics. It should also be helpful as collateral reading in courses on the foundations, methodology and philosophy of science.

This study is an outcome of seminars taught at the Universidad de Buenos Aires (1958), University of Pennsylvania (1960-61), Universidad Nacional de Mexico (1968), McGill University (1968-69 and 1970-71), and ETH Zurich (1973). The program of the investigation and a preview of some of its results were given at the first conference of the Society for Exact Philosophy (see Bunge, 1972a) and at the XVth World Congress of Philosophy (see Bunge, 1973d).

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

It is a pleasure to thank all those who made useful comments and criti­cisms, whether constructive or destructive, in the classroom or in writing. I thank, in particular, my former students Professors Roger Angel and Charles Castonguay, as well as Messrs Glenn Kessler and Sonmez Soran, and my former research associates Professors Peter Kirschenmann, Hiroshi Kurosaki, Carlos Alberto Lungarzo, Franz Oppacher, and Raimo Tuomela, and my former research assistants Drs David Probst and David Salt. I have also benefited from remarks by Professors Harry Beatty, John Corcoran, Walter Felscher, Joachim Lambek, Scott A. Kleiner, Stelios Negrepontis, Juan A. Nuiio, Roberto Torretti, Ilmar Tammelo, and Paul Weingartner. But, since my critics saw only frag­ments of early drafts, they should not be accused of complicity.

I am also happy to record my deep gratitude to the Canada Council for the Killam grant it awarded this research project and to the John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation for a fellowship during the tenure of which this work was given its final shape. Finally I am grateful to the Aarhus Universitet and the ETH Ziirich for their generous hospitality during my sabbatical year 1972-73.

Foundations and Philosophy of Science Unit, McGill University

MARIO BUNGE

~

.f hnp L fL' .It Q

IP f!}ut

[Jl

S [/'

[/' i fI T f

SPECIAL SYMBOLS

Set of constructs (concepts, propositions, or theories) Context Content (extralogical import) Consequence Designation Denotation Representation Extension Intension Import (downward sense) Logic Language Meaning Universe of objects (of any kind) Family of predicates Purport (upward sense) Reference Set of Statements (propositions) Sense Signification Theory (hypothetico-deductive system) Truth value function