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ARISTOTLE'S
TREATISE
ON
RHETORIC,
LITERALLY TRANSLATED FROM
THE GREEK.
AU
ANALYSIS
BY
THOMAS HOBBES, AND A
SERIES OF
QUESTIONS
NEW
EDITION, TO WHICH IS ADDED, A STJPPLEMENTAllY
-' fSLR'AIYSIS
CONTAINING
THE
GREEK
DEFINITIONS.
THE POETIC OF
ARISTOTLE,
LITERALLY
TRANSLATED,
WITH A
SELECTION
OP
NOTES,
AN
ANALYSIS, AND OUESTIONS.
BY
THEODORE
BUCKLEY,
B.A.
OP
CHRIST CHURCH.
)
^^^
LONDON
HEKRY
G.
BOHN, YORK
STREET,
COVENT
GARDEN.
MDCCCLIII.
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JOHN
OHILDS
AND
SON,
EUNGATI.
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TO
THE EEADEE.
In this
third edition,
the
Ja^anslation
of Aristotle's
Rhe-
toric has
been again carefully
compared with
the
Greek,
and
revised
and
corrected
throughout.
Numerous
ex-
planatory
and illustrative
notes have also been added
as
well as a
marginal
analysis, which it is
presumed
will
be
found of
much
service to
the reader.
The
famous
Thomas
Hobbes'
Brief
of
the
Art
of
Rhetorick,
containing
in
substance
all
that
Aristotle
hath
written
in
his three
books
on
that subject,
and
forming
the best
summary
of this noble science,
has
been again reprinted
from the scarce
edition published
at London in 1681.
A
body of Analytical
Questions,
for
self-examination,
has
also been appended.
With
these
improvements, the
Editor confidently
hopes that the
present
volume
wiU.
be found to
contain,
not
only
the
most faithful
version
of
the Ehetoric
of
Aristotle,
but
the
best
helps for
the
due understanding
and
retaining
the
sense thereof.
Oxford,
November,
1846.
In the present iiew
edition
of
the
Oxford
version of
the
Ilhetoric, it has been
thought advisable not to
interfere
either
with
the
text, notes,
or
Questions,
all being of
acknowledged
excellence.
But,
as
Hobbes,
by
the
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IV
TO
THE
KEADER.
quaintness
of his Analysis,
at
times
lost sight
of
the
precise
character
of
the
original
definitions,
an
Appen-
dix has
been
added,
containing
the
very
words
of
Aristotle, connected by
such
remarks as were
necessary
to
preserve
clearness,
and
furnishing such
passages
as
should
be almost
learnt by
heart.
The
new
translation
of the Poetic is an
attempt
to
unite the
closeness
of
Taylor
with
the perspicuity
of
Twining,
upon whose versions it
has
principally
been
based.
A copious
selection from the
notes
of the last
named scholar
has
been
added,
together with
a
few ne-
cessary
ones
from recent
sources
by
the
present
Editor,
Theodore
Alois
Bucklet,
Christ
Chukch.
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ARISTOTLE'S
TREATISE
ON
RHETORIC.
BOOK I.-CHAP.
I.
That
Rhetoric,
like
Logic, is conversant
with no
definite
class
of
subjects
;
that it is
useful
;
and that its bitsiness
is not
absolutely
to
persuade, but to
recognise topics
fitted
to
persuade.
Rhetoric'
is
the counterpart of
logic
'^;
since both
1. Eheto-
are
conversant
with
subjects
of
such
a
nature as it
is
^^
'^T'^f'
the
business
of
all
to
have
a
certain
knowledge of, and
Logic,
which
belong to
no distinct
science.
Wherefore
all
2.
men
in
some
way
participate
of
both'; since all,
to
a
^
Aristotle
appears to
have contemplated
a mucli
greater
va-
riety
of
occasious
for
tke
exercise
of
his
'PjiTOjoiKj;,
than
we
consider
proper to that
ill-defined art, or habit, or faculty,
vaguely
called
rhetoric.
In
fact, according
to him,
any man
Tfho
attempts
to
persuade
another,
under
whatever
circum-
stances,
and
with whatever
object, may
be said to exercise
prjTOpiKr}.
.'
'
Muretus
explains
the
passage as
conveying
a censure
ou
Plato, who
extolled
logic, but
compared
rhetoric
to
cookery
i\(roTroitrriic7J.
He therefore would
have
it convey this
mean-
ing,
Rhetoric
is the
counterpart, not
of cookery, as
Plato
asserts, but
of
his own
favourite
science,
dialectics.
See also
note ,
p.
23.
'
Sir P.
Sidney,
arguing
that all
arts are
but
attempts
to
methodise
natural
subjects, says,
that
the
rhetorician
and
lo-
gician,
considering
what
in
nature will
soonest prove
and
per-
suade,
thereon
give
artificial
rules,
which are still
compressed
within the
ch-cle of
a
question,
according
to the
proposed
mat-
ter. Defense
of Poetry.
B
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2
ARISTOTLE'S
I
book
i
certain extent, attempt, as
well to sift, as to
maintain
an
argument
;
as
well
to
defend
themselves, as
to
im-
Thatwe
peach*-
Now,
of
the
multitude^,
some
do
this
at
ran-
du
ft
^'^
'
0*^6' ^'
^J
reason
of
practice,
from habit
;
but as
to
a sys-
it is
possible either way,
it
is
plain
that
the case
will
tem.
admit of our
reducing
these
things
to
a
system.
For
we
are
at
liberty
to
speculate
on the
causes
of
the
success,
as
well
of those
who
from
practice, as
of
those
who on
the spur
of
the
moment,
[attempt
either to
convince
or to
persuade].
And
every
one
will
be
antecedently
prepared
to
acknowledge
that
an
undertaking
of this
description is the
business of
art^.
3.
Stric-
Hitherto, however, such as have
compiled systems
previous
f oratory
have
executed a
very
trifling
part
of
it
systems,
for the means of
making
credible'
alone
come pro-
**
'E^ET-a^Eiy
Kal vTrix^tv,
qua
Logicians
;
^TroXoyslirOat
Kal
jca-rriyopiiv,
qu&
Rhetoricians : so that
the
faculties
which
form
the basis of
each
of
these
arts
appear
to
be
natural
to
every
man.
Zeno
elegantly
illustrated
the
distinction between the
two
by
a simile
taken
from the
hand.
The
close power
of
Logic
he
compared to
ihejisf,
or hand
compressed
s
the
disuse
power of
Rhetoric to
the
palm^ or hand open.
Cicero, Orator.
*
The
vulgar
can give reasons
to
a
certain
degree,
and
can
esamine, after a
manner, the reasons given them
by
others.
And
what is
this
but
Natural Logic
?
If
therefore
these
fefforts
of
theirs
have an
effect, and
nothing
happen
without
a
cause,'
this eifect
must
of
necessity
be
derived
from
certain
principles.
The
question then
is,
What
these
principles are
for
if these can
once
be
investigated,
and then knowingly
ap-
plied,
we shall
be
enabled
to do by
rule
what
others do
by
hazard;
and in
what
we
do,
as
much to excel tlie uninstructed
reasoner, as a
disciplined
boxer surpasses
an
untaught rustic.
Harris's Philosophical Arrang. ch.
1.
'
An effect is
produced
;
sometimes
indeed
accidentally,
and
sometimes
from
the person's
having
been
habituated
to
that
which
he
attempts.
Now
if
we
can
ascertain
and
methodise
the causes
of
this his
success, so as
to
insure
the
success
of
subsequent attempts,
we shall
have
constructed
something
similar
to
an
art : for,
in some
points,
chance
and
art
ai'e
not
nulike
;
whence tlie
verse of
Agatho
;
Tix^^
TVX^^
crTp^e, Kal Tuyvv
T)(yt]i/.
See
Eth.
Nich.
vi. 4.
'
Hio-Tis.
If
the
translation
of
this
word
shall
appear
fre-
quently to
be vague and
indeterminate, the
reader
is
requested
to
observe
that
we
have
no
equivalent
expression
in
English
for it is
conceived
that
proof
(the
usual
translation)
always
implies
something qualified to convince
the
understanding
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;
TILCX-
CHAP.
1.]
RHETOllIC.
a
perly
within
tlie
sphere
of
the
art, but
other
points are
merely
adscititious.
On
the
subject-of ,enthjaeinSr
Neglect
of
however,
which
in
point of
fact
is
the
very
body
of
*^^
'
proof,
these men
say
not
a
word
;
while
on
points
foreign
to
the
subject they busy
themselves most
mightily.
Now the feeling
of
ill-will
*,
pity, and
anger,
4. Hence
and
the
like
emotions
of the mind,
appertain not
to
the
^s'^to^'
case,
but refer
to the
judge
;
so that
if,
in regard to
all
the
pas-
judicial
processes, matters
were regulated as they now
s>s,
are
in
some
states,
(and
more
particularly
in
such
as
are well
constituted,) these
spokesmen
would not have
a
word to say.
And
every
one
[approves the
regula-
5.
tion], whether
they
think
that the law should hold
this
language,
or whether
they
avail
themselves of the rule,
and
positively
forbid to speak
irrelevantly
to
the
case
;
just as
they do in the
Areopagus,
observing
this usage properly enough. For
it
is not right that.\
an
orator
should bias the
judge
by
winning him
on
to
1
anger,
or
pity, or
jealousy
;
since it
is equally
absurd
as
though
one were
to
make
a
ruler
crooked
which
^he is about to use*. It
is
further
evident
that
the*
6.
pleader's
business is nothing more than to prove the
matter
of
fact, either that
it is, or is
not
the
case
;
that it has, or
has
not
happened.
But
as to the-
question
whether
it
be
important
or
trifling,
just
or
whereas
Aristotle
designates
by
the
word
iritrTis,
every thing
which
has
a
tendency to persjtade
the
will.
It is
not, however,
meant
to
be
denied
that proof
{properly
such)
frequently
has,
and always ought to have,
a tendency to persuade
;
bat, at
the
same time,
it
would be
too much
to
say that
it
is
the
only thing
which
is qualified
to do so.
Vide Mitchell's
Aristoph. vol.
i.
Pal.
Diss.
p.
72
; ibid.
p.
75.
*
For
a
similar
use
of
the
word
Sia^oXii,
of.
Thucyd.
lib.
i.
c,
127.
oil
fiivTot
TotrovToi/
v^iri'^ov
iradiXi/ dv
aitTov
tovto,
Strov
5taj3oX?;y
oitrstv
avTtS
Trpos
t}]v
ttoX-LV.
^
KpLTTjs Tov
voiiov
KCLvmv.
Aiistotle
employs
the same
me-
taphor
in
his
Ethics
;
tov
yrip aopioTOyj,
aopt(TT0s Kal
o
kolkoiv
itTTLv,
ibffirep
Kal
t^s Aso-jStas
oJ/coSo/xt/s, 6
ft-oXOfSSLvo^
navoiv
irpo's
yap
rd
ffXVfjLa
TOV
Xidov
fiBTaKLVELTULy
Kal
ou p.ivu
6
Ka-
vuu.
Lib.
V. c.
10.
See
Lucretius,
iv.
516.
Denique
ut in
fabrica, si
prava
est
regula
prima,
Normaque
si
fallax
rectis
regionibus
exit,
Omnia
mendose
fieri
atque
obstipa necesse est, etc.
B
2
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4 ARISTOTLE'S
[bock
i.
unjust,
whatever
questions
of
this
nature
the
legis-
lator
has
not
determined
;
on
these
the
judge
must
somehow
or other
make
up
his mind
of
himself,
and
not take
instructions
on
them
from the
parties
at
is-
7.
Kea-
sue. It
would
then
be
most
admirably
adapted
to
*?J[liy
the
purposes
of
justice,
if
laws
properly
enacted
^ssiblt^
were, as
far as
circumstances
admitted,
of themselves
should be
to mark out
all
cases,
and to
abandon
as
few
as pos-
l^^f
^J'
*K
sible
to
the
discretion of
the
judge.
And
this
be-
' '
^'^
1st.
cause,
in
the
first
place, it is
easier
to
get
one
or
a
,
few
of
good
sense, and
of
ability to
legislate
and
ad-
2ncl. judge,
than
to
get many'
: and next
to this,
legisla-
'tive enactments
proceed
from
men
carrying
their
views
a
long time
back
;
[or,
from
men
who have
reflected on
the
subject
for
a
long time
;]
while judi-
cial
decisions
are made off hand
;
so
that
it
is diffi-
cult
for persons
deciding
under
these circumstances
3rd.
to
assign
what
is
just
and
expedient
:
and,
what
is
most
of all
to the
point,
is
this,
that
the award of
the
legislator is
not
particular
nor
about
present cir-
cumstances,
but
about what is future and
general
whereas
the member
of a
popular
assembly
and
the
j
udge decide
on
points actually
present
and definite
j
and
under
their
circumstances,
feelings
of
partiality,
and
dislike,
and
personal
expediency,
wiU,
in
many
instances,
antecedently
have
been
interwoven
with
the
case
;
and to such
a
degree,
that one is
no
longer
able,
adequately, to contemplate
the
truth,
and
that
personal
pleasure
or
pain throws
a
shade over the
'
As the
young
man
can
learn consequences
{on.)
ere
he
discovers
principles,
(SioVj,
Eth.
Ub.i.,) so
can
most men
bet-
ter
judge
of
individual cases
by
SiKaa-TLKri
(f>p6vrj(7is,
than
frame
laws
by
vofioSiriKf]
c/)poj/riTts.
(Eth. lib.
Vi.)
And
this
is
proved
by
the
universal
bias of
orators to
individual
cases
founded
on
law.
To borrow
an
illustration from
the
arts,
we
may
say,
that
as
a person
placed
in the centre of a landscape
has
a
fuller'
view
of
any individual object in it than the
painter
himself,
but
loses
proportionately the general effect
; so the
judge
can
discern all the
particulars of
a
given ease,
but
cannot,
as
the
legislator
who
contemplates at a distance,
view
so
well
the
general
bearings
and
effects
of
any law
when
united
or
con-
trasted with others.
Cf.
also
the
Ethics, lib.
v.
c.
1
6p6uit
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CHAP.
I.]
>
RHETORIC.
5
judgment.
In
regard, then,
to
other particulars,
as
I
8>>B\it
observed, it is right
to
leave the
judge
a
discretion
in
^J'f^pJ '^*
as few as possible : but
questions
of
fact,
whether
etc.
must
it
has
or
has not taken
place,
will or
wiU
not
happen,
^'^^'
'
does or does not
exist
;
all such
it
i.s
necessary
'^
to
abandon to
the
discretion of
the
judges
;
since it
is not
possible that the
legislator
ever should
foresee
them.
If
these things
be
so,
it is
plain that
they
embrace*
9.
in their
systems matters
foreign
to
the
subject,
who
give us
explanations
of the other
points, as
for in-
stance
what
the
proem,
and
the
narration,
and
the
other
divisions,
ought severally to
embrace-
for
in
these treatises they busy
themselves about
nothing
else, except
how to render the judge
of
a
certain dis-
position
;
while
on
the subject of those means of
persuasion, recognised by art,
they discover
nothing
;
and
yet
this is the
source
whence an orator may
be-
come
a
good
reasoner.
And
it is for this reason
lo.
Reji-
that,
notwithstanding the
same
system
is
conversant
sons
why
about
deliberative
and judicial
cases,
and although
^^1^'
the
business
of
the
senate is more
honourable,
and
cial
to de-
embraces higher social
interests, than that
whose
liberative
subject is merely the
transactions of individuals
;
yet
about the
former
they say
not
one word, while
all
undertake
to
frame
systems
of
judicial pleading.
And'^ they are not
without
a
reason for this, since
Cf.
Hooker,
v.
9,
p.
36.
^^
It
is
not in tlie
nature of things that
any human
legislator
should determine
on
the
infinite
number of
possible
cases
; or
that
he should
not,
with
regard to
some, be
an unsafe guide
to
our
decisions
:
for
the
last of
these
inconveniences we
have
a
remedy
in
kTrizlKzia
;
since
equity
is,
as
he subsequently
de-
scribes
it,
TO
TOv
iSiov
vofjLOv
KUL
yiypu^^ivou
kXXsLiifia,
and
TO
irapa
tov
yEypafifiEVOv
vofj-ov
6'iicaiou.
lib. i.
c.
xiii.
13.
And
again in
the
JEthics,
e-n-avopQajfia
voixov,
jj
eWeittei dia.
t-6
KaQoKov^
V.
10.
^*
This
error
is
a
consequence
on
the
one
mentioned
before,
3 :
from
the
disregard
there
noticed
of the enthymem
and
irio-Tis,
orators
are naturally
led
to
attach themselves
to'
that
branch of
public speaking
which requires
enthymem
least; and
such is
judicial
pleading,
inasmuch
as
the
cause
there
rests
mainly
on
evidence^
properly
so called,
on the
aTLyyai
ttIo-tsi^.
Aristotle
himself
gives as
another reason
for this
preference,
the greater ease
of
judicial oratory.
(Vide
lib. iii.
c.
xvii.
10.)
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6
ARISTOTLE'S
Leook
i.
in
deliberative
speeches
it is
less
worth
while
to
state
matters
foreign to
the
subject,
and
a
deliberative
speech
admits less of malicious
sophistry
than
judi-
cial
pleading,
but
is
more
widely
interesting
;
for
here
the judge [i.
e.
the senator]
decides
on
questions
which
nearly interest himself, so
that
no
more
is ne-
cessary
than
to
prove that
the
question
stands
just
as
he,
the
adviser, asserts.
In
judicial
questions,
how-
ever, this is
not
sufficient,
but
it
is
worth
while
to
engage
the
hearer
;
for the decision
is
about a case
which
does
not
affect
himself:
so
that
the
judges,
looking to their own
gratification,
and
listening
with
a view to amusement, surrender
themselves up to
the pleaders
;
and, strictly
speaking, do
not,
fulfil
the
character of judges'*.
On
which very
account the
law, in
many places,
as
I
before
remarked,
forbids
And
this
he proves, first, because that
which
has
teen
is plain
to
afl, even
to
diviners
;
secondly, the orator
having
law
for a
premiss,
the
demonstration
is
easier.
To these
reasons
may
be
added one which the
master
of
Alexander
would not
willingly
have allowed, namely, the
loss
of
liberty to Greece,
and
file
consequent loss of all interest in deliberative
questions,
to
men
whose
future
fates were totally
out of
their
own
power.
'*
A
writer
in
the Quarterly Review,
No.
26,
after contrasting
.
the
perplexity
of
English
law
with the simplicity of Athenian
jurisprudence, says,
This
simplicity
in
the
law
made
it
the
orator's
business
less
to
hunt
for cases
and
precedents than to
discriminate character ;
less to
search
for eiTors
in a bill than
for
flaws or errors in a witness's life
or
testimony. And
the
prevalence of this practice may
be
inferred
from
a
subsequent
passage
in this
book,
(c. ix.
^
38,)
where Isocrates
is
mentioned
as an
adept
in
the
comparison
of
c/iaracters,
which,
says
Aristotle,
he used
to
do
to further
his familiarity
with
Judicial
pleading.
To
this
we may subjoin the following
remarks
of
Mitford
on
a
speech by
Alcibiades :
The
multitude ordinarily
composing
an Athenian
court
of
justice
was
so
great,
that
the
pleaders
always
addressed it as under the
impulse
of
the
same
interests, and subject
to the same feelings
as
the
general
as-
sembly,
and equally
without
responsibility.
Impartiality
was
never
supposed ;
the
passions
were always
applied
to
; and
it
never
failed
to
be
contended
between
the parties,
which
could
most persuade
the
jurors
that
their
interest was
implicated
with
his, and
that
by
deciding
in
his
favour
they
would
be
gainers.
Hist,
of Greece,
vol.
v.
p.
94.
So
also Xenophon,
in
his
Athe-
nian
Republic,
c.
i.
1
3.
iv
te
toIs
iiKonr-nj^iois
oO
tou
diKalov
aii'To7?
/it'\Ei
fiaWov
ri
TOU
aiiTol^
^vjupipovTO^.
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CHAP.
1.]
RHETORIC.
7
the saying
any
thing
irrelevant
;
but there
[in
deli-
berative
assemblies]
the
judges
are,
of
themselves,
careful
enough
of
this.
But as it is
plain
that
an artificial system is con-
11. Rea-
\
versant
about
the means
of
making credible,
and
as
l^iJ^J
this is a sort
of
proof
(because we are then
most
per-
cian
wiU
suaded when
we
conceive
that
the point has
been
probably
proved,)
but the proof of
rhetoric
is enthymem,
(and
j,^j^
^^ie-
this, to
speak
generally, has
the most
sovereign
eflfect
torician.
of
all the means
of
persuasion
;)
and
the
enthymem
is a
sort
of
syllogism
;
since
too it is the
province
of
logic to
consider
equally
every
sort of syllogism,
.
whether
of
that art
as
a whole,
or
of
some
particular
branch of
it
;
then,
these
points being
admitted, it
is*
evident
that
the
man best able
to consider
the
ques-
tion,
out of
what sources and how the syllogism arises,
will
moreover
be
in
the
highest
degree capable
of
employing
enthymems
;
provided
he
make
himself
acquainted,
besides his logic, with the kind
of
sub-
jects
about
which
enthymems are conversant, and
what
differences
they exhibit
as
compared
with the
syllogism of
logic.
Because it belongs to
the same,
faculty
of
the
mind
to
recognise
both
truth
and
the
semblance
of
truth
;
and more than this, mankind
have
a'
tolerable
natural tendency
toward
that
which
is
true
;
and,
in general,
hit
the
truth
;
wherefore an
aptness
in
conjecturing
probabilities
belongs
to
him
who has a
similar
aptness in
regard
to
truth.
It
is
plain,
then,
that
other
rhetoricians embrace
in their
systems,
points
foreign
to
the subject,
and what rea-
sons they
have
for
inclining to
the
subject
of
judi-
cial
pleading
in
preference
to the
other branches
of
rhetoric.
1
But
rhetoric
is
useful,
because
truth
and
justice
i2.
Uffli-
are
in
the
ir_nature_sta-onger
than
their
opposites
;
so
W^i
.
that
if
decisions
be
made,
not
in
conformity
to
the
tnrove
rule
of
propriety,
it
must
have
been
that they
have
Ist.
been
got
the
better
of,
through
fault
of
the
advocates
'
themselves
:
and
this is
deserving
reprehension.
Fur-
2nd.
15
Ti(j,vKa(riii
iKavais,
have
naturally
a
considerable aptitude
toward
what
is
true.
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8
ARISTOTLE'S
[book
i.
thermore,
in
the case
of some people, not
even
if
we
had the
most
accurate scientific knowledge,
would
it
.
be
easy to
persuade
them
were
we to
address
them
through
the
medium
of
that
knowledge
;
for
a
scien-
tific discourse,
it is the
privilege of education
[to ap-
preciate], and
it
is
impossible
that
this
[should
es-
tend
to
the
multitude ] ;
but
we must
construct.our
means
of
persuasion, and our
addresses,
through
th_
'medium
otordinary
language ; as in fact
I
stated in
myTopTcs,
''on~the~mamier
of
communicating
with
Srd.
the
multitude.
Again, too,
we ought
to
be
able to
persuad
e
on opposite sides^of
a
question
; as
also
we
ought inTEe case of
arguing
by
syllogism: not
that
we should practise
both, for
it is
not
right to
persuade
to what is
bad
; but
in order that
the
bearing
of
the
case may
not
escape us, and
that
when
another
makes an
unfair
use
of these
reasonings,
we may be
able to
solve
them.'^
Now, of
all
the
other
arts, there
is
not
one
which
embraces
contraries
in
its
conclu-
sions
;
but logic
and
rhetoric
alone
do this
;
for they
are both in
an equal degree
^^
conversant
about con-
.traries
;
not,
however,
that
these
contrary
subjects
present
equal facilities
:
but the
true
and
better side
of
the
question is always
naturally
of
a
more
easy
. inference, and has,
generally
speaking,
a greater tend-
4th.
ency
to
persuade.
To
illustrate
further the
utility
of rhetoric,
it were
absurd, if,
while
it
is
disgraceful
'^
The communication of ideas requires
a similitude
of
thought and
language
:
the
discourse
of
a philosopher
would
vibrate without
effect on
the ear
of
a peasant.
Gibbon's
De-
cline
and
Fall, c. 1. note 90.
In
the
words of
Falconbridge,
let the orator
resolve
to
*'
smack of observation;
Which,
though
I will
not
practise
to
deceive,
Yet, to
avoid deceit,
I
mean
to
leara.
>
Riccobon remarks,
that
a
person
may
at
first
be
inclined
to
doubt the truth of
the assertion
that
Rhetoric
and
Logic
alcne recognise contraries
;
seeing tliat
music,
for
instance,
re-
cognises
harmony and discord
;
grammar,
the
improprieties
and
the proprieties
of
language,
etc.
This
doubt
is
however
removed, he
says,
by the
word
onotms,
for these
alone
recog-
nise
with
egiml
propHety
each
of
the
two
contraries
;
whereas
other
arts
apply
more
strictly
to
one
than
to another.
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CHAP.
I.]
RHETORIC.
9
for
a
man
not
to
be
able to assist himself
by
liis
per-
son,
it_werenot
disgraceful
to be
unable
to do this,
by
his
sggefih^wEich'TsTHftre
a
peculiarity
of
man
than
Jke^jeserciso
of the .body
'^-
If, however, [any
one
13. Ob-
should
object^ ]
that
a
person, unfairly
availing him-
^ ^ ^j
self
of
such
powers
of speaking, may
be,
in
a
very
the
abuse
high
degree, injurious
;
this is an objection
which
of
itan-
will
lie
in some
degree
against every
good
indis-
criminately,
except
virtue
;
and
with especial force
against
those
which
are
most advantageous,
as
strength,
health, wealth, and generalship. Because,
.employing these
fairly,
a
person may
be beneficial
in
points
of the
highest importance
;
and,
by
employing
them
unfairly, may be equally
injurious.
That
rhetoric, then,
is conversant
not
with
any
one
14.
End
distinct
class of subjects,
but like logic [is of
universal
f'^'^ *^.
applicability], and
that
it is useful, is
evident
;
as
also
ric.
that
its
business
is
not
absolute
persuasion
^',
but
to
^consMer
on every subj^ect what means oLpeiisijasiQIl
are
inherenFlh it; just as
is also'the
case
in every
^
Tbis is an
^ minori argument, to
understand tbe
full
force
of
wbicb we
ought
to
bear in mind the great iipportauce
at-
tached
to
the
Suva^L9
dytovLGTLK^)
by
the Greeks.
^
Non tamen
idcirco
crimen
liber omnis habehit
:
Nil
protest
quod
non laedere
possit idem.
Igne
quid
utilius ? Si quis tamen urere
tecta
Comparat,
audaces instruit
igne
manus.
Eripit
interdum,
modo
dat
medicina
salutem,
Quseque
juvans
monstrat, quseque sit
herba
nocens,
Et latro,
et
cautus prascingitur ense
viator
lUe
sed
insidias, hie
sibi portat opem.
Discitur
innocuas
ut
agat
faeundia
causas
:
Protegit
haec
sontes,
immeritosque
premit.
Ovid.
Trist.
lib.
ii.
1.
265.
Having
told
us
what we may
expect
from
Rhetoric;
he
now
tells
us
what
we
are
not
to
expect
from
it.
Persuasion,
though the
end,
is
not
the
duty of
.rhetoric
:
Offlcium
ejus
facultatts
videtiir
esse,
dicere
apposite
ad
persuadendum
:
Finis,
persuadere
dictione.
(Cicero
de
Inv.)
_
In
the
arts whose
foundation
is
conjectural
[in-oxairTi/cai
tsx' '']'
among
which
we
must
class
rhetoric,
if
the
artist had
done all that
the case
admitted
his
duty
was
conceived
to
have been
fulfilled,
and
he
was
entitled
to
commendation
though
he
had
entirely
failed
of
success.
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10
ARISTOTLE'S
[book
i.
Other
art
:
for neither
is it
the
duty
of
medicine
to
render
its
patient healthy,
but to bring
him
on
as
far
as
the
case
admits
;
for
it is nevertheless
very
possi-
ble
to
treat
properly
even
such
as
may
be
incapable
of
again
partaking
of
health : and besides
this
[it is
evident]
that
it
belongs
to
the self-same
art
to
ob-
serve
both
the real
and seeming means
of
persuasion;
just
as it is
incumbent
on logic to
consider
syllogisms
Differ-
and
apparent
syllogisms.
And
this is
the
case, be-
ence in
cause
the
character
of
sophist
does
not
consist in
the
Rhetoric
faculty
^^
[for
the
logician
possesses
this
as
well
as
he],
as
regards
but
in
his fixed
design
[of abusing
it^^].
Here
[in
^
That he
is consistent in thus
classifying
characters
accord-
ing
to their
moral
principles, -will
appear from
his
application
of
the appellation
'AXaJciii/
by
the
same
rule in
the
Ethics
OuK
kv
Ty
Suirdfjif.t E(7Tiy o
dXa^iiiv,
dW.'
ev
tij TrpoaLpiait.
Ethics, iv.'
c. 7.
^
In
order more
fully to illustrate
the
nature of rhetoric,
Aristotle
has
considered
it throughout
this
chapter
as analogous
to logic.
Each,
he 9ays, is founded on a
faculty
naturally
pos-
sessed
by
all
men ;
each is
useful,
and applicable -with
equal
propriety
to
any
class
of subjects
whatever.
Besides
this,
lo-
gic
and
rhetoric
alone,
of all arts,
are
equally
conversant with
opposite
inferences
;
and of course
witli sound
and specious
arguments
(whether in
the
form
of
syllogism
or
enthymem).
Now as
Iqgip
and
rhetoric are in
their
own
nature
indifferent
J
to
truth
or
falsehood,
it
must
require
an
act
of choice
in either
case to
select
the
former
or the
latter,
and
the
constant
repeti-
tion of that
choice
will
ultimately
form
a
corresponding habit.
Hence the
5taA./cTiKoff
may be
considered
as
SvudfiEi
trocpiaTii^,
and
the o-oj^io-tt/b
as
dvvdfj.Ei
fitaXe/cTifcds.
But when
logic
is
prostituted
to
the
support
of
false
propositions,
by
the
bad
principles
(the
irpoaipEcris)
of its professors,
it is branded
witli
the name of
sophistry, and
the
persons who
so misapply
it
are
called sophists
:
whereas, in
the case
of
rhetoric,
no such
dis-
tinction in
reference
to
the principles of its professors
ever
ob-
tained
;
but
the
name
of orator
is
enjoyed
equally
by
all
who
are masters
of the
art, whether they exercise
it
fairly
or
not,
IvTavOa
jittv, EtTTaL
6
/liv KUTa
Triv
EirLaTii^iiv,
6 Sk
KaTO,
n-iju
jrpoalpEniv,
'PiJTiup.
A
reason
for
this
distinction
may
per
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ciUP.
n.]
RHETORIC.
11
rhetoric],
however,
the
one who
is
considered
in
re-
the
name
ference
simply
to
his
knowledge
of the.ai-t,.as well
as
f
*
he
who
is
considered
in reference
to
his
moral
prin-
ojg_
ciples, is
indiscriminately designated
aa
orator
. But in
logic,
a_sohist
is
callfid
so
in
reference
to
his
moral
princigles
;
a logician, however,
without reference
to
nispnnbiples, simply
as
regards
the
faculty
he is
master of.
However, commencing from
this
point, let
us
at-
15.
tempt
to
treat
of
the system
both
from
what
sources
and in what
manner
we
shall
be able to
attain
the
proposed
objects
;
having
then once more,
as
at the
outset,
defined
what
this
art
is,
let
us treat
of what
remains.
CHAP. II.
Definition
of
jRJietoric.
EiVoe
:
SriiiEiov
:
Ttic/jj/piov
:
their
differences.
Example.
Lex us define
rhetoric
to
be,
A
faculty
of
consider-
1.
Defini-
ing
all
the
possible means of
persuasion on
every
sub-
^'JJ^^^c.
ject
;
for
this
is
the
business
of
no
one
of
the other
arts, each
of
which is fit
enough
to
inform
or persuade
respecting
its
own
subject
;
medicine,
for instance,
on what
conduces to
health
or
sickness
;
and
geome-
try,
on
the
subject
of
relations
incidental
to
magni-
tudes
;
and
arithmetic,
on
the
subject of
numbers
;
and
in the
same
way
the
remaining
arts and
sciences.
But
rhetoric, as
I
may
say,
seems
able to
consider the
means of
persuasion
on
any
given
subject
whatso-
ever. And
hence I
declare
it to
have
for its province,
as an
art, no
particular
limited
class
of
subjects. Now
2.
Two
of the
means
of
effecting
persuasion,
some originate
^^^^if
in
the
art,
others
independently
of it.
By
inartificial
ivrix-
VOl,
OtTX
up
to
moral
certainty.
Here
then a
fallacy is
not
so
easily
discoverable,
even
by
the
orator
himself;
and candour
re-
quires
us
not
to
brand as
moral
what after
all
may
be
merely
mental
imperfection
in the
speaker.
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12
ARISTOTLE'S
[boos
i.
^^^
I mean
whatever are not furnished
forth
by
our
own
X
means,
but which are
in
existence
already,
as
wit-
nesses,
torture,
deeds,
and all
of
this kind
;
by artifi-
cial,
such
as
may
be
got
up
by
means
of
the
system,
and
by ourown talents.
So
that as
regards
these,
we have
to
employ
the one class,
to
discover
the
other.
3.
Of
means
of
persuading
by
speaking
there are
three^pecies^ :
some
consist in
the
character
of_tli.e
speaker
;
others
in
the disposing the
hearer
a
certain
way
;
others
in
the
thing
itself
which
is'
said,
by
rea-
son
of
its
proving,
or appearing to
prove the
point.
4. i. Cha-
[Persuasion
is
effected]
by means
of
the
moraZcAarac-
th'^'^
k
'*' '
'^^^^
^^
speech
shall
have been spoken
in sucE~
er.
a way as to render the speaker
worthy
confidence :
for
we
place
confidence
in
the
good
to
a
wider
extent,
and
with less
hesitation, on all subjects
generally
;
but
on points where no real
accuracy exists,
but
there
is
room for
doubt,
we
even entirely
confide in them.
This
feeling,
however, should arise
by means of
the
speech,
and not by reason
of
its
having
been
precon-
ceived
that
the
speaker is
a
certain kind
of
man.
For
it
is
not true, as some treatise-mongers
lay down
in
their
systems,
of
the
probity
of
the
speaker, that
it
contributes
nothing to persuasion
;
but moral
charac-
ter
nearly,
I
may
say, carries with
it the
most
sove-
6.
ii.
Feel-
reign
efficacy in making
credible^.
[Persuasion
is
' St^
effected] through
the medium
of
the
hearers,
when
they
shall
have been
brought
to
a state
of
excitement
under
the
influence
of the
speech
;
for
we
do not,
when
influenced
by
pain
or
joy,
or
partiality
or
dis-
like,
award our decisions
in the
same
way
;
about
which
means
of
persuasion
alone,
I
declare
that the
'
UicrxEis
Sia
Toil
Xoyov,
or
artificial,
of three
kinds,
h
tiS
^6t.1 Tou
Xtyoi/Tos iv Tw
Toy
(LKpoaTri^ Stadsluai TTiOs
ev
avTia
T(2 \oycu.
'
In
SO high
estimation
did
Menander hold
the
manner
of
an
address,
that he attributed
the -whole effect
to
it
;
T-poVos
t
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CHAP.
II.]
RHETORIC.
13
system-mongers
of
the
present
day
busy
themselves.
On
the
subject
of these,
however,
some light
will
be
afforded,
when
I
speak on
the
subject
of the
passions.
Men
give
credit
from
the
force of
what is
said,
6. iii.
The
when
out
of
the means
of persuasion
which
attach
to
^V^'^'^i^
it-
each subject,
we
evince
the truth,
or
that which
ap-
^^
'
pears so. Now
as persuasion
is
effected
by these
7.
Rheto-
means,
it is plain that it
wiU
be
the
privilege
of him
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14
AEISTOTLE'S
[book
I.
8.
Subdi-
vision
of
TTtC-TElS,
TtZ
\6ytS :
i.
'Enthy-
mem, ii.
Example.
9.
Ex-
ample.
Defini-
tion
of
SyUo-
gism.
10.
Vari-
ous
styles
of
speak-
ing.
subject,
as to what may
be
its nature
;
but
both
being
certain
faculties for
furnishing
ourselves
with
argu-
ments.
Now
on
the
subject
of the
powers
of
the
two,
and
their
mutual
relation,
nearly
enough
has
been said.
With
regard
to
means
of
persuading
by
proving,
or
appearing
to
prove
your point,
just
as
in
logic
one
is
induction,
another
syllogism,
another
apparent
syl-
logism, so
also is
the
case
here
in
rhetoric
;
for
its
example
is
an
induction,
its enthymem
a
syllogism
and
enthymem I
call
rhetorical syllogism
;
example,
rhetorical induction. Now
all
orators effect
their de-
monstrative
proofs
by
allegation either of
enthymems
or
examples,
and, besides
these,
in
no other
way
whatever. So
that
if it
be
incumbent on you to prove
with
regard
to
any
thing or
person
mform
of syllo-
gism
or
induction,
it
cannot bat
be
(as is evident
from
Analytics)
that
each
of
these
will
be
essentially
the
same as
each
ofthe former
(enthymem and induction).
And
what the
difference
is between
example
and
en-
thymem
is
plain from the Topics, where,
on
the sub-
ject
of
syllogism
and
induction,
it
has been
stated
before, that
the
proving
that such
or
such
is the fact
in
many
and
similar
cases,
is
called in
the
other
art,
induction
;
in
this,
exaniple.
But
when,
certain
points
having been
granted,
there
results,
by virtue
of
these,
something
else over
and above
these, by
virtue
of
their
existence,
either
as
generals
or
parti-
culars
;
this
process is,
in that art,
called
syllogism
in this, enthymem^. Rhetoric,
it is
plain,
enjoys
each
advantage
;
for [with
respect
to
it]
the
case, in
this
treatise,
is
the
same
as
in
the
Methodica
has
been
stated of
logic
;
the
speeches
of orators
^
abounding,
some
in
examples,
others
in
enthymems
;
and
orators
themselves
being
in
the
same
way,
some
fond
of ex-
ample,
others
of
enthymem.
Eeasonings,
however,
'
Or,
each style
of
rhetoric
has its
peculiar
advantage.
'
'Pr/Topsta,
the
words
of
an orator,
modelled
according
to
rhetoric,
whose
object
it
is
to
persuade
;
versus,
Xoyos
the
words of a
logician, modelled according
to
logic,
whose
object
It
is to
convince.
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CHAP.
ii.J
RHETORIC.
15
conducted
througli
the
medium
of
example,
are not
less
calculated
to
persuade ; but
those
of which
en-
thymem
is
the
chai-acferistic
are rather
applauded^.
But
I will
hereafter explain
what is
the cause
of this,
and
how
we
are
to use each
species of
proof: let
us,
at
present,
distinguish
more
clearly
respecting
these
proofs
themselves. Now
forasmuch
as
that which*
11.
Rhe-
carries
persuasion
with
it,
does
so in reference
to ^V-
'^?'
some
one
;
and either is,
immediately
on being
enun-
ttSuvov
dated,
actually
of a
nature
to
persuade,
and
enforce
for
a
class,
belief
;
or
[has
its
effect] from
its
appearing
to
prove
^,^|J^''
through
the
medium
of
such
[as compose the former
class]
;
and as
no art considers
particular
cases
;
me-
dicine for
example, what is
wholesome
for
the
indi-
viduals,
Socrates
or
CaUias, but
what
is
so for any
person
of
such
a constitution
;
for this question comes
within
the
province
of
art,
hvA
particulars
are infinite,,
and cannot be
known :
so
neither will rhetoric
con-
sider
probability
in reference
to
particular individuals
?
what,
for
instance,
is
probable
to
Socrates
or Callias,
but
that which
is
so to
persons such
as they are
;
just
in
the
same way as
logic, for that
art
does not draw
conclusions
indiscriminately
from any subjects
;
for.
some
things
there
are which
appear
probable even to
a
madman
;
[yet
you never
would
dream
of
arguing
about
them;] but
it supplies itself
from
subjects'P'1'ifaws
which
require
reasoning, as does
rhetoric from
sub-
pu
from
jects
which are
usual
matters
of
deliberation.
Its subjects
of
business
then is
respecting points about
which
we de-
delibera-
liberate,
and
have
no
art
specially
conversant, and
12.
Audi-
before auditors
of such
abilities as
are
not able
to
take
ence
held
a
connected
view
of
reasonings,
conducted
through
^^^^^.
'
QopvfiouiiTai.
Twining,
in
his
notes
on
the Poetic,
quot-
ing
a
subsequent
passage
of
this
Treatise,
in
-which
this word
again occurs,
(ii.
23,)
translates
it,
are
applauded,
and
ob-
serves, that
the
commentators
strangely
mistake
the
sense
of
this
word
here,
and
in lib.
i. c.
2.
They
render
it absurdly,
ve/wmentms
percelluntperturbant
maxime.
Whether
an au-
dience
be
pleased
or
displeased,
to
any
great degree,
noise
is
equally
the
consequence;
and
the
word
Sfofxu^Cw
is
used,
sometimes
for
the
uproar
of
approbation, and
sometimes
for
that
of
dislike.
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16
ARISTOTLE'S
[book
I.
many
stages, nor to
deduce
an
argument
from
remote
principles.
Now
we
deliberate on
subjects
which
appear
to
admit
of
having
themselves
in
either
of
two
ways : for
on
questions
which
cannot,
under
any
cir-
cumstances, past,
present, or
future,
be
otherwise
on
these, I
say, no
one
deliberates,
at
least
not
while
iie apprehends them to
be
such^;
for by
such a
deli-
13.
Hence
beration
nothing
is
gained.
And
you
may
draw
your
conclud-
conclusions and
inferences,
sometimes
from
premises
cruXXsXo-
which
you
have
arrived
at
by
former
syllogisms
;
and
yi(yfi.ivoiv
sometimes
from
propositions, not
syllogistically
de-
r|,'''ye;
'duced,
but requiring
such
a
process by
reason
of their
lengthy, not being probable at
first
sight
;
but
of
these
pro-
^^'^\\ cesses, it
is
impossible
that
the
former
should not
be,
'yil-rmJ
^^''^^
to follow
up,
by
reason
of
its
prolixity (for
your
fiiflcofii-
hearer^ is supposed
to
be
a
man
of
merely ordinary
xx
understanding), and the
latter
defective in
persuasive
yKTfiou,
efficacy,
by
reason
of
its
not
being
deduced
out
of
being
im-
principles
either acknowledged,
or
probable
;
so that
Se'tobe ^'
^
necessary
that
both the enthymem and
example
avoided,
should
be
conversant
about
points
which,
generally
speaking, admit of
being
otherwise,
(the example
an-
swering
to
induction, and the enthymem to
syllo-
A
man
under
a
mistaken
idea of
the
nature
of
the
subject
may possibly
deliberate
on
a
question, the nature
of
which
is
fixed and
necessary.
Still, however,
as long as
he
remains
under
this
impression,
the subject relatively
to
him
is of
a
con-
tingent
nature.
^
Cicero gives a similar caution
;
Hasc
nostra
oratio
multitudinis
est
auribus
accoinmodanda,
ad
oblectandos animos,
ad
impellendos, ad
ea
probanda quae
non
aurificis statera,
sed
quadam populari trutina
examinantur.
De Orat.
lib. ii.
We
may
further
prove
that
this
precept
has
its
foundation
in
na-
ture,
by
quoting
the
words of
a
celebrated
modern
writer, who,
at
least
in
penetration and
knowledge
of
mankind,
had
few
superiors
:
The receipt to
make
a
speaker,
and
an
applauded
one
too,
is short
and
easy.
Take
common
sense
quantum
suf-
ficit;
add
a little
application
to
the
rules
and
orders
of
the
House
; throw obvious
thoughts in a
new
light,
and
make
up
the
whole with
a
large
quantity
of
purity,
correctness,
and
elegance
of style. Take it for
granted
that
by
far
the
greatest
part
of
mankind
neither
analyse
nor
search
to
the
bottom
they are
incapable
of
penetrating
deeper
than
the
surface.
Lord Chesterfield's
Letters.
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CHAP.
II.]
RHETORIC.
17
gism,)
and
be
deduced
out of
few, and
frequently
out
of
fewer
intermediate
propositions than
the
syllogism,
in
its
original
form,
consisted
of.
For
if
any
of
these-
be
known,
it is
not necessary
to
mention
it
;
for
the
hearer of
himself
makes
this
addition.
For
example,
in order to
convey
the
information
that
Dorieus
was
conqueror in
a
contest
where
a chaplet
is
the
prize
it suffices to say,
that
he
conquered
in
the Olympic
games
:
but as
to the circumstance
that, having
con-
quered
at
Olympia, he
got
a
chaplet,
there
is
no
ne-
cessity for
adding
it,
because
every
one
knows it.
But
as
the necessary
premises
out
of
which
theiiW.
En-
syUogisms of
rhetoric
ai-e
formed
are very
few,
(for
thymcms
the majority of
questions
about which
decisions
and
cluoed
ei-
consideration
are
exercised admit
of
being otherwise
;
ther from
because men
deliberate and consider
on
the
subjects
'' ^
of human
conduct, and
all
conduct is
of
this
con-
tingent nature,
nor
is
a single
branch,
I
may
say,
of
these subjects necessary,)
and it cannot
but
be
that
you
should
deduce contingent
conclusions
from pre-
mises
whose nature is such
;
and
necessary
ones,
from
necessary
;
(this is
evident
to us
from the
Analytics
:)
I say, since this is
the
case,
it
is plain
that
the .premises out of
which
enthymems are de-
duced,
will
be
some
of
them
necessary,
but
the
v
greatest
part
contingent
:
for
enthymems
are
ad-
duced from probabilities
'
(ti/cora) and signs (o-jjjuEla).
And
thus
it
follows
of
necessity,
that,
of
these,
each
In
despair of
binding
adequate
English expressions
for
the
words
EiKos
and
a-rintloi/,
I
have
acquiesced in the
usual,
but
erroneous
translation.
At the
risk of
incurring
the charge
of
prolixity,
the
following
are
given
as
the
most
popular
ways
of
explaining this
difficult
subject.
Dr.
Whately
considers this
a
division of
arguments according
to
the
relation
of
the
sub-
ject-matter
of
the
premises to that
of the
conclusion.
The
eiKos
(or
iioTi
of
Aristotle)
he
takes
to
be
an a priori
argu-
ment,
which
may
be
employed
to accoimt
for
the
fact
supposed
granted. The
aniiiiov
(or
Sti
of
Aristotle) and example,
arguments which
could
not be
so
employed
:
vid.
Rhetoric,
p.
116.
Others,
again,
maintain
that
the
irii/istov
is
an
argument
to
prove
past
matters,
the
siicos
to
prove
fature.
The
majority
of commentators,
however,
consider
the
sikiJs
and
artiitiov
as
propositions
in
different
matter :
thus,
C
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18
ARISTOTLE'S
[book
I.
respectively
is
identified
with
each
of
the
former.
15.
Deft-
For
probability
is
what
usually
happens,
not
abso-
lution
of A, r
eiKos.
eUas,
m
contingent
matter,
.tioii
in
necessary
matter.
in
the
ratio
of
an
univer-
I
sal to
a
particular.
,
'
1
As
a
particular
As
an
universal
to
an
universal.
to
a
particular.
(Illicit
process
J
of
the
minor
j
term,)
hence
inconclusive.
'
^vaynaiov
or tk-
\
fir)
ivaytcaiov
dyw-
ixripiou. (Conclu-
I
vu/uoi/.
(Inconclu-
sive,
and
only (
sive,
the
middle
assailable
in
the
term
not
beiag
premises.)
|_distributed.)
Another
explanation,
founded
on three
passages,
the
first in
the
Analytics ; the
second by
Cicero (de
Inv. i.
30)
;
the
third
in
Quintilian,
(v. c.
ix.
10,)
adopted by
Majoragius,
is
as
fol-
lows : The
o-ij/jeTo /
is
some
sensible
fact,
either
attested
by
sense
or
reducible
thereto,
not
a
general truth
;
hence
it will
be
the
miraor
premiss
in the
enthymem,
not
the
major,
the
t^mjitiSixcvov,
or thing
signified by it,
being
the conclusion,
and
as the latter
is
known
solely
through
and
by
the
former,
there
is
always
a
real or
supposed
connexion
between them.
1st.
The
thing
signified
may
be
contained in
the sign
which
implies
not
only that, but
something
more. The
latter then,
as
regards
the
former,
will
stand
in the ratio of a
whole to
its
part ; as
individual or
particular
nature to common
or
generic
:
what
is
definite
always
containing
or implying more
than
what
is
indefinite
(on wloich
principle we
are told in
logic
that
the
species is
more
of
a
whole than
a genus) .
Hence it
is defined,
ti>9
Toiu
KadzKaiTTov
Ti
TTpo^
TO
Ka66\ou,
aud
Is
callcd
avayKjcuov
or
TEK/inpLov.
Hence Quintilian,
obsei'ving
the
conclusiveness
of
this
argument,
denies
it
the
name
of
argument at
all
:
Non
sunt
argumenta,
quia ubi
ilia
sunt, quasstio
non est;
an
error resembling that made
by
certain
modem
philosophers,
who
deny
the utility
of
logic
because
the premises of a
syllo-
gism
virtually imply
the conclusion.
2nd.
The
thing
signified
may not
be contained or implied
in
the
sign.
The
latter
being
more
vague
and
indefinite
than
the
former
;
bearing
to
the
thing
signified
the
ratio
of
a
part
to
the
whole,
as
common
or generic nature
to individual
or
particular,
(ijs Twy
Kaf)6\o\j
Tt Trpos
to Kaxd
fiEpoi.
This
enthymem
ap-
pears
in
the
same
mood
as the
first,
scilicet,
Barbara,
but
in
the
second
fig-ure,
hence
an
illicit
process
of the
minor term.
Note,
that
as
the
ati/j-ilov
is
always
the
minor
and the thing
signified
the
conclusion,
the
relation
here
spoken
of as
ica66\o\j,
and
KUTCL
ixipo^,
must
be
understood
not
of the
logical
relation
in
the
syllogism
between the major
premiss
and
the
conclusion,
but
of the
relation
between
two
things,
one
specific,
the
other
general.
Now in
the
eikos
enlhypiem,
on the
contrary,
the
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CHAP.
II.]
RHETORIC.
19
lutely
so,
however,
as
some define it,
but, at
any
rate,
that
which,
in
contingent
matter, has itself
so to-
wards
that
with
respect
to
which
it is
probable,
as
an
universal
to
a
particular
.
But
of the
signs,
one
16.
Three
relation
of
i/cos
and
tlie
conclusion
(eksii/o
Trpos
o
tiicos)
is the
strict
logical
relation of
universal to
particular, or of a
generic
law
to its application in
an
individual instance. The
tU-os
Jherefore
is tie major
premiss,
not
the minor.
We
see that the
universal
major
in the
a-rifiiiov
enthymem
cannot
he
the
mi/xiiov
itself,
because it is
detached
from
any
particular
relation,
and
involves
no
particular deduction
:
nor
yet
is
this
major,
though
universal,
an
e^kos,
heing
dTrXws
and
totally true,
which
is
inconsistent with tie
very
meaning of
the
word
prohable.
Again,
though
the
minor
premiss
of
the
iIkSs
enthymem
contains
a
simple matter
of fact,
it
is
not a a-ti/AtJipi', for to con-
stitute
a sign
it must point
to something
else
equally necessary
with
itself;
a
condition
not
fulfilled by the
eikos
enthymem
conclusion.
Still
there
is
so
much affinity
between
the
minor
premiss
of
the
eikos enthymem, and the
dvuivvixov
o-ij/iEiov,
that
by
converting
the
major
premiss,
with
the
addition
of
the
word
probably
to
the
copula, we shall change the
o-ij^eIoj/
into
an
E'Kos
of low
degree
:
e.
g.
All
who
have
a
fever
breathe
Those
who
breathe hard
pro-
hard,
bably
have a fever.
This
man
breathes
hard.
This
man breathes
hard.
This man
has a
fever.
This
manproiofi??/
has a fever.
And
this
affinity
perhaps
led
Quintilian to
confound
Aristotle's
ivuivvfiou
(T-rjfjLalov
with-his
eIkos.
(lib.
v,
c.
ix.
8.)
It
is
this
kind
of
sign
and
tie
argument deducible from
it,
which
constitutes what,
in
criminal
cases,
is called
circumstantial
evidence.
Aristotle
mentions
another sort of
o-i)jueTok
(
18)
which
comes out
a
syllogism
in
the third
figure,
with
an
universal
conclusion,
and
hence
its
eiTor
is
an
illicit
process
of
the mi-
nor
term.
The
principle
on
which
this
syllogism proceeds is
an imperfect,
precarious
induction,
and
endeavours to
deduce
a
general
truth
from
a
particular
instance.
The
ratio, there-
fore,
of the
sign
to
the
thing
signified,
is
as
one
to
all.
This,
it will
be
observed,
is a
new
signification
of the
terms
xaOoXov
and
Kad'
'iKacrrou,
but one
which
they
will
obviously admit,
and
borne
out
by
the
example
he
adduces.
The
above
explanation has
been
given
rather
at length,
be-
cause
it
is not
generally so
well
known
as
tlie
others,
nor
so
easy
to follow.
The usual
definition
of
eIkos
is
considered
by Aristotle as
too
vague
; he
limits
it,
therefore,
to
contingent matter,
and
would
have
it
stand
in
such a
relation
to
the
conclusion to be
drawn, as
an
universal
to
a
particular.
For instance, the
C
2
-
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20
ARISTOTLE'S
[book
1.
different
has
the
same
ratio
as
a
particular to
an
universal
soi-tsof
^]jg
other,
as
an
universal
to
a particular
:
and of
-
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CHAP.
11.]
EHETORIC.
21
one
were
to
say
it
was
a
sign
that
a
man
has
a fever,
because
he
breathes thickly. But
this, even
granting
the
premiss
be
true,
may
be
done
away
:
for
it
is
very
possible
that
one
who
has
not
a fever
should
breathe
thickly.
Now
what
is
probability,
what sign,
and
what
TEKfiripioi',
and
in what
they differ,
has
been
explained
:
but
in the
Analytics
[these
several
gradations of
proofj
as
well
as the
reasons why
some
are
not correctly
inferred, and
others
are,
have
been.*
distinctly stated
with
greater
clearness
''.
As
to
ex-
19.
Ex-
ample, it has
been
stated that
it is
an
induction,
and
ample,
or
induction on
what
kind
of
subjects
;
and
its
ratio
is
indue''
neither
that
of
a
part
to a whole,
nor of
a
whole
to a,
tion.
part,
nor of
a
whole
to a
whole
:
..^t example
js_in*a>s
^Llpo^
the
ratjo of
a j)a,rt
to
a
part''',
of
a similar
case to
a
'^' '^
'
simirar, when,
both
coming
under
the
same
genus,
the
one
case
happens
to be better known than the
other. For instance,
you assert
that Dionysius, in
asking
a
guard, has
views
of setting
up
a
tyranny,
because
Pisistratus
before him,
when
designing this,
began
to
ask
for
a
body guard,
and
when
he got it,
established
himself
as
tyrant
;
so
too
did Theogenes,
at
Megara. And
all
other
persons
who
have
acted
in this
way,
and with whom
your audience
are
ac-
quainted,
become
examples
against
Dionysius,
with
respect
to whom
they do not
yet
know
whether he
be asking a
guard
with
this
intention
: and
all these
^3
In
the
Analytics,
lie says,
the
eI/cos
is
Trpoxaerts
'IvSo^o^^
but
the
orrifjiiiov
professes
to he
irpoTatri^ diroSeiKi-Lidj^
whether
necessary
or
probable.
Now
an
enthymem (he continues)
is
an
imperfect
syllogism,
consisting
of
sUo-ra
and
o-i)|UETa,
and
the
latter
are
assumed
in
three
ways,
according
to
the
number
of
the iigures of
syllogism
(for
Aristotle made
only
three),
the
first, second,
and
fiird of
logic.
In
all
these the
a-rnisiou
is