trends in global income inequality and their political implications · 2014-12-15 · trends in...
TRANSCRIPT
Trends in global income inequality and their political
implications
Branko MilanovicLIS Center; Graduate School City University of New York
Talk at the Stockholm School of Economics, September 1, 2014
Branko Milanovic
A. National inequalities mostly increased
Branko Milanovic
Ginis in 1988 and twenty years later
1988 2008 Change
Average Gini 36.0 38.5 +2.5
Pop-weighted Gini
33.9 37.3 +3.4
GDP-weightedGini
32.2 36.4 +4.2
Countries with higher Ginis (38)
33.7 38.5 +4.8
Countries with lower Ginis (20)
40.5 37.7 -2.7
From final-complete3.dta and key_variables_calcul2.doBranko Milanovic
Ginis in 1988 and 2008
From key_variables_calcul3.do
Branko Milanovic
BOL
NGA
HND
UGA
COL
MRT
GTM
CIV
IND-U
BGD
IND-R
CHN-R
IDN-U
IDN-R
VEN
PAK
PHL
BRA
ECUPAN
PER
PRY
SLV
KGZ
TJK
MEX
LKA
ROU
DOM
MAR
ARM EGY
CRI
MDACHN-U
THATUR
MKD
JOR
ARG
AZE
MYS
CHL
URY
BGR SRB
ISR
POL
LVA
RUS
LTU
UKR
BIH
HUN
SVK
EST
PRTKOR
GRC
CZE
SGP
ESP
HRV
JPN ITA
CYP
USA
CAN
BELIRL
SVN
TWN
FRA
FIN
DEU
SWE
GBR
NLDAUT
DNKNOR
20
30
40
50
60
70
Gin
i in
200
8
20 30 40 50 60Gini in 1988
Ginis in 1988 and 2008 (population-weighted countries)
From key_variables_calcul3.do
Branko Milanovic
RUS
IND-U
MEX
BRA
NGA
IND-R
USA
CHN-U
CHN-R
20
30
40
50
60
Gin
i in
200
8
20 30 40 50 60Gini in 1988
Issues raised by growing national inequalities
• Social separatism of the rich
• Hollowing out of the middle classes
• Inequality as one of the causes of the global financial crisis
• Perception of inequality outstrips real increase because of globalization, role of social media and political (crony) capitalism (example of Egypt)
• Hidden assets of the rich
Branko Milanovic
Some long-term examples set in the Kuznets framework
Branko Milanovic
38,0
40,0
42,0
44,0
46,0
48,0
50,0
1929 1939 1949 1959 1969 1979 1989 1999 2009
Inequality (Gini) in the USA 1929-2009(gross income across households)
From ydisrt/us_and_uk.xls
Kuznets and Piketty “frames”
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
1600 1650 1700 1750 1800 1850 1900 1950 2000 2050
Ginis for England/UK and the United States in a very long run
England/UK
USA
From uk_and_usa.xls
9
Contemporary examples of Brazil and China: moving on the descending portion of the Kuznets
curveChina, 1967-2007
twoway (scatter Giniall lngdpppp if contcod=="CHN" & year>1960, connect(l) ylabel(40(10)60)
xtitle(2000 6000 12000) ytitle(Gini) xtitle(ln GDP per capita)) (qfit Giniall lngdpppp if
contcod=="CHN" & year>1960, lwidth(thick))
From gdppppreg4.dta
twoway (scatter Giniall lngdpppp if contcod=="BRA", connect(l) ylabel(40(10)60) xtitle(2000
6000 12000) ytitle(Gini) xtitle(ln GDP per capita)) (qfit Giniall lngdpppp if contcod=="BRA",
lwidth(thick))
From gdppppreg4.dta
10
Brazil 1960-2010
40
50
60
Gin
i
7.5 8 8.5 9 9.5ln GDP per capita
updated Giniall Fitted values
40
50
60
Gin
i
5 6 7 8 9ln GDP per capita
updated Giniall lowess Giniall lngdpppp
B. Between national inequalities remained very high even if
decreasing
Branko Milanovic
From defines.do in interyd
Distribution of people by income of the country where they live: emptiness in the middle (year 2013; 2011 PPPs)
India, Indonesia
Brazil, Mexico, RussiaW.Europe, Japan USA
China
01
02
03
0
Pe
rcen
t
0 10000 20000 30000 40000 50000GDP per capita in 2005 PPP
Different countries and income classes in global income distribution in 2008
From calcu08.dta
USA
India
Brazil
China
Russia
11
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
01
00
pe
rce
ntile
of w
orl
d in
co
me
dis
trib
utio
n
1 20 40 60 80 100country percentile
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Denmark
Mozambique
Mali
Tanzania
Uganda1
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
perc
entile
of w
orl
d in
com
e d
istr
ibutio
n
1 5 10 15 20country ventile
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0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
USA Germany France Japan Russia SouthAfrica
Brazil China Morocco Egypt India Indonesia
Percentage of country's population that belongs to the global top decile
C. Global inequality is the product of within- and between-county
inequalities How did it change in the last 25 years?
Branko Milanovic
Essentially, global inequality is determined by three forces
• What happens to within-country income distributions?
• Is there a catching up of poor countries?
• Are mean incomes of populous & large countries (China, India) growing faster or slower that the rich world?
Branko Milanovic
Global inequality 1950-2012: three concepts
Branko Milanovic
Concept 2
Concept 1
Concept 3
.45
.55
.65
.75
Gin
i co
eff
icie
nt
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010year
Divergence begins
Divergence ends
China moves in
52
The effect of the new PPPs on countries’ GDP per capita (compared to the US level)
Branko Milanovic
EGYPAK
ETH
LAO
BGD
IND
VNM
UGAKHM
TZA
MDG
NPL
GMB
BDI
LKA
YEM
SLEBTN
TJK
GINBLR
KGZKEN
NIC
THA
IDN
MRT
PHL
JOR
DZA
TUNMKD
MNG
BOLUKR
RWA
MLI
ALBBFA
BEN
MAR
TGO
AZE
SDNSDN
GHA
GTM
GNB
NER
BGR
MDA
HTI MYSNGA
CMR
CIV
MWI
ZMBSAU
OMN
SEN ARMSLV SRB
DOMGEO MNE
TWN
BIH
LBR
HND ECU
DJI
TCD
PRYSWZLSO
CAF
CHN
KAZ
PAN
BWA
MOZ
PER MUS
SUR
BRN
MAC
BLZ
FJI
MDV
COM
TUR
RUS
CPV
COG
TTOHUN
POLMEX
KWT
GNQ
COLJAM
LTU
VEN
NAM
ZAF
QAT
GABCRI
LVA
ARE
HKGSVK
SGP
HRV
CHLAGO
EST
CZEKOR
MLTURY
SVNPRT
BRA
CYP
BHS
GRCESP USAITA
DEUISR
GBR
IRLISL
AUTNLDBEL
NZLFRA
CAN
LUX
FIN
JPNSWE
DNKAUS
NORCHE
-50
05
01
00
150
gain
com
pare
d t
o 2
005
ipc--
norm
aliz
ed b
y th
e u
s leve
l
50000 100000150000gdppc in 2011ppp
C:\Branko\worldyd\ppp\2011_icp\define
The effect of new PPPsCountry GDP per capita
increase (in %)GDP per capita
increase population-weighted (in %)
Indonesia 90 ---
Pakistan 66 ---
Russia 35 ---
India 26 ---
China 17 ---
Africa 23 32
Asia 48 33
Latin America 13 17
Eastern Europe 16 24
WENAO 3 2
Concept 1 and 2 international inequality with 2011 PPP values
Branko Milanovic
Without India and China
Without China
all countries
.45
.5.5
5.6
.65
Gin
i coe
ffic
ien
t in
pe
rcen
t
1940 1960 1980 2000 2020year
47
defiine.do in interyd
Population coverage
1988 1993 1998 2002 2005 2008 2011
Africa 48 76 67 77 78 78 60
Asia 93 95 94 96 94 98 86
E.Europe 99 95 100 97 93 92 76
LAC 87 92 93 96 96 97 97
WENAO 92 95 97 99 99 97 90
World 87 92 92 94 93 94 83
Non-triviality of the omitted countries (Maddison vs. WDI)Branko Milanovic
Large countries and the world, from 1950-60s to today
Branko Milanovic
China
United States
Brazil
Russia
World
20
30
40
50
60
70
Gin
i coe
ffic
ien
t
1000 5000 10000 40000GDP per capita in PPP dollars
c:\branko\glob_talks_and_opeds\opeds_interviews\finance_development\figures\figure2Using gdppppreg5.dta
D. How has the world changed between the fall of the Berlin Wall and
the Great Recession
Branko Milanovic
Real income growth at various percentiles of global income distribution, 1988-2008 (in 2005 PPPs)
From twenty_years\final\summary_data
X“US lower middle class”
X “China’s middle class”
Branko Milanovic
$PPP2
$PPP4.5 $PPP12
$PPP 110
Estimated at mean-over-mean
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
0 20 40 60 80 100
Re
al P
PP
inco
me
ch
ange
(in
pe
rce
nt)
Percentile of global income distribution
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Re
al P
PP
inco
me
ch
ange
(in
pe
rce
nt)
Percentile of global income distribution
Real income gains (in $PPP) at different percentile of global income distribution 1988-2008
Without China
World
Quasi non-anonymous GIC: Average growth rate 1988-2008 for different percentiles of the 1988 global income distribution
Branko Milanovic
Growth incidence curve (1988-2008) estimated at percentiles of the income distribution
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mean growth
02
04
06
08
0
cu
mula
tive
re
al g
row
th r
ate
betw
een
198
8 a
nd 2
008
2 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 95 100percentile of global income distribution
Using my_graphs.do Mean-on-mean
0 0 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 45 4
13
5
10
2527
0
5
10
15
20
25
305
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
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60
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85
90
95
99
10
0
Dis
trib
uti
on
(in
pe
rce
nt)
of
gain
ventile/percentile of global income distribution
Distribution of the global absolute gains in income, 1988-2008: more than ½ of the gains went to the top 5%
From summary_data.xls
Branko Milanovic
Branko Milanovic
From my_graphs.do
MYS
PAK
IDN-RIDN-R
IDN-UIDN-U
THA
CHN-R
CHN-RCHN-U
CHN-U
-.6
01
2
real gro
wth
1988-2
008
450 500 550 600real pc income in 1988
growth>50% Asia highlighted
BGR BGR BGR BGRJPN BGR BGRLVA LVAROU LVAROU LVAJPNLVA LVA
JPNLVAROU JPNAUT
AUTSVKSVK AUTSVK SVKDEUDEU SVKDEUGRC DEUESTCZE GRCCZE GRCCZE GRCCZE DNKEST DNKGRCCZEPOL DNK CZEESTPOLUSA USAFIN USACYP
VEN
JORPRY
URY ARGARG URYARGURY
ARGTUR
-.6
01
2
real gro
wth
1988-2
008
5000 6000 7000 8000 9000 10000real pc income in 1988
growth<25% mature econ highlighted
Best and worst performing parts of the 1988 distribution
500
5000
1988 1993 1998 2003 2008 2011
An
nu
al p
er
cap
ita
afte
r-ta
x in
com
e in
in
tern
atio
nal
do
llars
US 2nd decile
Chinese 8th urban decile
From summary_data.xls
Global income distributions in 1988 and 2008
twoway (kdensity logRRinc [w=pop] if logRRinc>2 & bin_year==2008 & keep==1 & mysample==1) (kdensity logRRinc [w=pop] if logRRinc>2 & bin_year==1988 & keep==1 & mysample==1, legend(off) xtitle(log of annual PPP real income) ytitle(density) text(0.95 2.5 "1988") text(0.85 3 "2008"))Or using adding_xlabel.do; always using final_complete7.dta
1988
20080
.2.4
.6.8
1
den
sity
300
100
0
300
0
600
0
100
00
300
00
500
00
100
00
0
log of annual PPP real income
Emerging global “middle class” between $3 and $16
Branko Milanovic
Increasing gains for the rich with a widening urban-rural gap
Urban and rural China Urban and rural Indonesia
170
180
190
200
210
220
co
mbin
ed r
ea
l_g
row
th 1
and
2
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10decile
200
250
300
350
400
450
co
mbin
ed r
ea
l_g
row
th 1
and
2
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10decile
From key_variables_calcul2.do
Branko Milanovic
urban
rural
urban
rural
E. Issues of justice and politics
1. Citizenship rent2. Migration
3. Hollowing out of the middle classes
Branko Milanovic
Global inequality of opportunity
• Regressing (log) average incomes of 118 countries’ percentiles (11,800 data points) against country dummies “explains” 77% of variability of income percentiles
• Where you live is the most important determinant of your income; for 97% of people in the world: birth=citizenship.
• Citizenship rent.
Branko Milanovic
Is citizenship a rent?
• If most of our income is determined by citizenship, then there is little equality of opportunity globally and citizenship is a rent (unrelated to individual desert, effort)
• Key issue: Is global equality of opportunity something that we ought to be concerned or not?
• Does national self-determination dispenses with the need to worry about GEO?
Branko Milanovic
The logic of the argument
• Citizenship is a morally-arbitrary circumstance, independent of individual effort
• It can be regarded as a rent (shared by all members of a community)
• Are citizenship rents globally acceptable or not?
• Political philosophy arguments pro (social contract; statist theory; self-determination) and contra (cosmopolitan approach)
Branko Milanovic
The Rawlsian world
• For Rawls, global optimum distribution of income is simply a sum of national optimal income distributions
• Why Rawlsian world will remain unequal?
Branko Milanovic
All equal Different (as
now)
All equal
Different (as
now)
Mean country incomes
Individual incomes within country
Global Ginis in Real World, Rawlsian World, Convergence World…and Shangri-La World (Theil 0; year 2008)
98
68 (all country Ginis=0)
30 (all mean incomes same; all country Ginis as now)
0
Branko Milanovic
Conclusion
• Working on equalization of within-national inequalities will not be sufficient to significantly reduce global inequality
• Faster growth of poorer countries is key and also…
Branko Milanovic
Migration: a different way to reduce global inequality and citizenship rent
• A new view of development: Development is increased income for poor people regardless of where they are, in their countries of birth or elsewhere
• Migration and LDC growth thus become the two equivalent instruments for development
Branko Milanovic
Political issue: Global vs. national level
• Our income and employment is increasingly determined by global forces
• But political decision-making still takes place at the level of the nation-state
• If stagnation of income of rich countries’ middle classes continues, will they continue to support globalization?
• Two dangers: populism and plutocracy
• To avert both, need for within-national redistributions: those who lose have to be helped
Branko Milanovic
Final conclusion
• To reduce global inequality: fast growth of poor countries + migration
• To preserve good aspects of globalization: redistribution within rich countries
Branko Milanovic
Additional slides
Branko Milanovic
H. Global inequality over the long-run of history
Branko Milanovic
Global income inequality, 1820-2008(Source: Bourguignon-Morrisson and Milanovic; 1990 PPPs )
Theil
Gini
02
04
06
08
01
00
1820 1860 1900 1940 1980 2020year
twoway (scatter Gini year, c(l) xlabel(1820(40)2020) ylabel(0(20)100) msize(vlarge) clwidth(thick)) (scatter Theil year, c(l) msize(large) legend(off) text(90 2010 "Theil") text(70 2010 "Gini"))
Branko Milanovic
A non-Marxist world
• Over the long run, decreasing importance of within-country inequalities despite some reversal in the last quarter century
• Increasing importance of between-country inequalities (but with some hopeful signs in the last five years, before the current crisis),
• Global division between countries more than between classes
Branko Milanovic
Composition of global inequality changed: from being mostly due to “class” (within-national), today it is
mostly due to “location” (where people live; between-national)
Based on Bourguignon-Morrisson (2002), Maddison data, and Milanovic (2005) From thepast.xls
0
20
40
60
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1870 2000
Th
eil
0 in
de
x (
me
an
lo
g d
evia
tio
n)
Class
Location
Location
ClassBranko Milanovic