51

TTrriiaanngguullaarriittyy iinn IInnddiiaa--CChhiinnaa--JJaappaann RReellaattiioonnss::

AAnn IInnddiiaann PPeerrssppeeccttiivvee Dr. Prashant Kumar Singh

Associate Fellow

Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses(IDSA), New Delhi

The India-Japan perceived strategic hedging against

China has been a notable strategic development of the

21st century. The vigour of the liberal values-based

India-Japan special strategic partnership appears to have

gained salience over India-China strategic and

cooperative partnership for peace and prosperity rooted

in the Panchsheel. While the Panchsheel is struggling to

sustain stability in India-China relations, the India-Japan

arc of freedom and prosperity has achieved compatible

strategic levels with implications for Asia-Pacific.1

Interaction among the three sets of relationships

(India-China, China-Japan, Japan-India) provides an

important strategic sub-text for the period after 2000.

While India and Japan strive to maintain stability in their

relations with China in their respective contexts, the

upgraded India-Japan relations reflect the desire of the

two to hedge against China. The deepening of

India-Japan bilateral relations also reflect their general

efforts towards diversification of friends, a process that

started after the end of the Cold War. During this period,

India, formerly loosely aligned with the erstwhile USSR,

undertook to build relations with the East Asian countries,

most of whom it had neglected considering them as being

US allies, in keeping with its Look East Policy (LEP).2

Japan, a treaty ally of the US, too started its quest for

friends during this period, due to its fear of a possible

abandonment by the US after the end of the Cold War.3

At present, while Japan figures very prominently in

India’s Look East Policy, India is a pillar in Japan’s

value-based foreign policy vision. Japan’s value-based

foreign policy visualises an arc of freedom and

prosperity, encompassing the leading maritime liberal

democracies, in the Indo-Pacific region.

Concerns about China’s rise are a common

denominator in India-Japan relations. They are viewed as

a major motivation for India’s LEP. The China factor in

India’s strategic calculations comes from the deep-rooted

mutual strategic mistrust, that has its origins in the

long-festering boundary dispute over which they fought a

war in 1962, and the unrest in Tibet. The mistrust,

however, has extended to various regional arenas such as

the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean following

their economic and military rise. China’s rise has become

a concern for Japan too. Japan is concerned about the

Chinese political domination of Asia following its

economic and military rise because of its security

implication. The two countries are in the midst of

territorial dispute in the East China Sea over

Diaoyu/Senkaku islands. On the other hand, China

remains apprehensive regarding Japan’s potential rise as

a military power and constantly reminds the world and

the region of Japanese colonial past in Asia.

India-China Relations:

Panchsheel’s Struggle to

‘Manage’

A big military standoff between the Indian army and

the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) on the

52 東協瞭望 010

western border region during President Xi Jinping’s visit

to India in September 2014, took the sheen off the visit.

A similar standoff had taken place on the eve of Premier

Li Keqiang’s visit to India in 2013. The unusual timing

and unprecedented scale of the two military standoffs

indicates that the confidence building measure (CBMs)

the two countries have established since the early 1990s

are passing through a difficult phase.4 The two incidents

expose the limitation of the strategy of intensifying

economic and other functional engagement and

bypassing critical issues such as the boundary dispute.

They underscore the ad hoc status of peace and

tranquillity on border, in spite of a stable and productive

relationship remaining a high priority in the bilateral

relations. The two countries have followed the said

strategy since early 2000s. The strategy reflects the

optimism that this would enable them to keep their

frictions under check.5

In the 2000s, the two sides worked to infuse a

strategic direction into their bilateral relations.

Considerations of economic growth occasioned this

development. Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s

China visit in 2003 saw a formal enunciation of the

understanding, that cooperation can overcome friction.

Later, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and President

Hu Jintao propagated, the principle that ‘this world has

enough space for both India and China to grow’. The two

sides believed that deepening economic ties and

strengthening dialogue mechanisms, in the long run,

would contribute to good strategic political and security

relations.6 This strategy has yielded some dividends. The

bilateral trade between the two has made an impressive

growth. They have also established an elaborate dialogue

architecture at various civil and military levels.7 They

have shown a degree of cooperation on the issues of

common interest such as climate change within the

United Nations (UN) Framework Convention on Climate

Change (UNFCCC) and its Kyoto Protocol, trade issues

in Doha development round of the World Trade

Organisation (WTO) negotiations and the reform of

international financial institutions.8

However, this strategy has thus far been unable to

deliver on the optimism. Contrarily, mistrust has

intensified, new concerns have emerged, and the dormant

border has progressively become militarily active in the

corresponding period. The two countries uphold

Panchsheel that places a premium on cooperation in their

contemporary relations. However, their cooperation is

limited to some issues of global trade and financial and

environmental governance. Divergence in strategic

security and political issues weighs heavier on the

relationship. China viewed the Indo-US defence deal

(2005) and waiver by the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG)

for India with US support in 2008, as India closing ranks

with the US against China.9 India’s vocal expression of

interest in the affairs of the South China Sea and the

Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) and its

expanding reach in the Indian Ocean have caused

annoyance in both countries.10

The Chinese presence in

Pakistan Occupied Kashmir that was first noted after the

Kashmir earthquake in 2005, has added a new element in

India’s concerns vis-à-vis Sino-Pakistan relations.11

Ironically, renewed attempts to resolve the boundary

dispute is having opposite results on the border. China

has raked up its claim on Arunachal Pradesh, particularly

the border town of Tawang, in the border issue. The

border has witnessed an alarming rise in intrusions and

other military activities. These are the two major

negative developments with respect to the boundary

dispute that surfaced in the period after 2000.

Triangularity in India-China-Japan Relations: An Indian Perspective 53

Competitive infrastructure building and augmentation of

military capabilities in the disputed border areas has been

a primary reason for the rise in intrusion incidents.12

Militaries acquiring a bigger role in the border issue,

which has hitherto been the exclusive domain of the

foreign ministries, is an unwelcome development of the

period.

President Xi has underlined the need for taking

India and China relations to a new level of partnership.13

However, this will not be possible without addressing the

fundamental causes of mistrust. The resolution of the

boundary dispute and peace in Tibet are the necessary

conditions for removal of mistrust. Although India is not

a party to the unrest in Tibet and it recognises Tibet as

part of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the turmoil

in Tibet willy-nilly spills over to India-China relations as

it makes China suspicious regarding a possible Indian

hand. While the two countries need to accelerate and find

ways for the settlement of the boundary dispute, China

needs to engage with the Tibetan-Government-in Exile

(TGIE). The present strategy of bypassing contentious

issues is incapable of taking the relationship to a new

level of partnership.

Tensions in Sino-Japanese

Relations

China-Japan relations are another example of good

trade and investment relations, not necessarily spilling

into the political arena. China and Japan relations have

been on tenterhooks for last two years, with the

heightened fears of an accidental war ever since the

nationalisation of the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku islands in

the East China Sea by the Shinzo Abe government in

2012.14

In the post Cold War period, China’s rise as an

economic power has come at the expense of Japan’s

standing as the economic leader in Asia. Its massive

military modernisation has also become a concern for

Japan. On the other hand, China perceives the

continuation of the US-Japan security alliance in the

post-Soviet era as directed against itself. This security

perception has been aggravated by the rising nationalist

fervour in the corresponding period.15

The current

unprecedented heightened tension between them has a

history of around two decades of the clash of two

nationalisms. The complaint against Japan’s wartime

atrocities in China has emerged as perhaps the single

most powerful reference point in the

government-sponsored nationalist project in China after

the Tiananmen episode in 1989. The project introduced

victim nationalism as a new source of legitimacy, for the

ruling communist party in the 1990s. While paying court

to the official socialist ideology, the party’s emphasis

that it brought China out of 100 years of humiliation of

foreign subjugation, has become a new source of its

legitimacy to rule.16

Similarly, nationalist dissatisfaction

against Japan’s international position has grown louder in

Japan during the same period. Japanese nationalism does

not agree with the standard reading of Japanese colonial

history. It questions the legality of the post Second World

War International Military Tribunal for the Far East. It

considers allegations against the Japanese forces for

perpetrating the Nanjing massacre as exaggerations.

China’s military modernisation gives Japanese

nationalists a basis for questioning the constitutional

constraints on Japanese military forces. Incidentally, the

post World War II, constitutional constraints on Japan’s

military forces allow them to operate only for the

purpose of self-defence, in terms of capabilities and

operational scope.17

54 東協瞭望 010

The two nationalisms collide over Japan’s history

textbooks, Japanese leaders’ visits to Yasukuni shrine (a

traditional war-memorial that houses ashes of the

Japanese war criminals of the World War II), and more

importantly the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku islands. The

island issue adds a territorial dimension to historical

bitter memories. The islands have been under Japanese

authority since the end of the 19th

century. After the end

of the World War II, they remained under the US

authority till 1972. The issue started heating up in the

mid-1990s due to some private individuals’ nationalist

activities. Later, Japanese Prime Minister Koijumi’s

annual visits to the shrine from 2001 to 2006 heightened

tensions between Japan and China.18

During this period,

the two countries did not have any high-level bilateral

exchanges. After Koizumi, the Japanese prime ministers

refrained from visiting the shrine, which brought about a

thaw in Japan-China relations. However, China’s

aggressive stance in the East China Sea from around

2010, Japan’s nationalisation of islands and Abe’s visit to

the shrine in 2013 marked a new round of Japan and

China nationalist hostilities that has occasioned

significant departures in Japan’s security policy.

Abe, a radical nationalist, won the election in 2012

on the agenda to ‘take Japan back’ to its rightful place in

international community. Since then, he has undertaken a

vigorous international outreach. The nationalisation of

the disputed islands and the transformation of Japan’s

pacifism into proactive pacifism, are in line with his

nationalist convictions. His government has attempted to

create a new security architecture for Japan. It has

enacted a tough State Secrecy Bill to curb espionage;

created National Security Council; lifted the ban on

Japanese export of arms and arms technology; and more

importantly it has reinterpreted Article 9 of the Japanese

constitution and enabled the Japanese Self Defence

Forces to play a larger and more active role under the

U.S-Japan alliance.19

China has roundly criticised these

moves.

John W. Garver and Fei-Ling Wang point out that in

the 2000s China was cautious not to allow its relations

with India and Japan to deteriorate at the same time.

When there were tensions between China and Japan from

2001-2006, China was busy with mending fences with

India. Later, following the Indo-US nuclear deal (2005)

when a hardening of stands in India and China relations

was perceived on various issues20

, China responded

positive to Abe’s reconciliatory gestures during his first

tenure in 2006, even though his attitude was not radically

different from that of his predecessor. Abe, at that time

did not visit the shrine, but never committed that he

would not do so in the future either. In the meantime,

India and Japan on their part continued building a

strategic framework for their relations, regardless of the

upswings and downswings in their relations with

China.21

At present, perhaps for the first time, China has

to worry about managing its relations with the two

countries at the same time.

Japan-India Relations: On

the Way to Becoming

Partner Allies

Leaving the long mutual ideological disinterest of

the Cold-War period behind, the India and Japan

partnership has emerged as a remarkably fast developing

strategic partnership. The two countries have signed an

India-Japan global partnership. However, it was the

joint strategic orientation of India-Japan global

partnership signed in 2005, that provided a well-defined

strategic framework for the relationship.22

Since then,

Triangularity in India-China-Japan Relations: An Indian Perspective 55

the relationship, inspired by cooperation among

democracies, has carved out a niche for itself. Unlike

China, Japan’s seclusion from South Asian geopolitics

has contributed to the fast-paced growth of India and

Japan relations. Except for Japan’s ideological resistance

to India’s military nuclear programme, the two countries

do not face any strategic obstacles in their relationship.

The resistance largely comes from Japan’s pacifist

elements. Thus, unlike the India-China strategic

pronouncements of cooperation, the India-Japan strategic

vision does not have to pass the litmus test of thornier

bilateral issues. The India-Japan strategic vision thus has

the advantage of being assessed on the basis of larger

strategic parameters only.23

The India-Japan partnership combines huge material

benefits with an undeclared motivation to hedge against

China. Reducing the relationship to either of the two

facets and ignoring the other would render the picture of

the relationship incomplete. In a short span, India and

Japan have begun recognising each other as ‘natural

partners’ with ‘strategic convergences’ and committed to

democracy, an open society, rule of law, human rights

and free market economy. Although India has generally

maintained a caution in its articulations, Japan’s Liberal

Democratic Party (LDP) governments unambiguously

describe India as an important likeminded country in

their foreign policy vision of ‘arc of freedom and

prosperity’. In keeping with this vision, Japan advocates

a quadrilateral cooperation among India, Japan, US and

Australia. The quadrilateral cooperation idea envisages

political as well as military cooperation.

India and Japan have achieved a clear delineation of

security and defence contours in their strategic

partnership and an impressive institutional infrastructure

to steer the partnership. Various joint communiqués since

2005 reveal that security and defence cooperation are

acquiring a greater role in India-Japan strategic

partnership. The two countries’ engagement for policy

coordination and information exchange in the

Asia-Pacific has become regular, stable and

self-sustaining in last one decade. The annual prime

minister and foreign minister level summits and regular

defence minister level meetings, constitute the prime

strategic level dialogue forums. Their dialogue

mechanisms go from summit levels down to working

levels in civil and military administrations.

The India-Japan secretary level two-plus-two

dialogue; the India-Japan-US joint secretary level

trilateral dialogue; and the issue of Japan’s participation

in the India-US Malabar series of military exercises

deserve special mention. The two-plus-two mechanism is

a Japanese way of integrating security and defence

dialogue, involving foreign ministries and defence

ministries on the same platform. This format conveys a

greater degree of mutual strategic convergence and trust

between the dialogue partners. As of now, Japan has this

dialogue format with very few countries. Japan’s

two-plus-two with the US, Russia and France operates at

the minister level, whereas the India-Japan two-plus-two

works at the secretary level. The trilateral dialogue is in

keeping with the idea of a quadrilateral dialogue. Japan

has pushed for upgrading the two dialogue mechanisms.

Two mechanisms may have been kept at official levels

because of India’s concerns for Chinese sentiments, as

well as its desire to let the relationship develop in a

gradual manner. Japan has been keen on participating in

the Malabar exercises which started in 2007. However,

India has been circumspect on account of Chinese

opposition. China formally protested against the holding

56 東協瞭望 010

of the India, Japan, US and Australia quadrilateral

exercise in 2007.24

The two countries, in principle, have agreed to the

minister level trilateral cooperation.25

An

India-Japan-US strategic trilateral would wield far

greater strategic weight than the existing

India-China-Russia trilateral dialogue. The

India-China-Russia trilateral has limited strategic utility

owing to the divergence in the security interests of India

and China. Similarly, the India-Japan defence

cooperation, as per the defence and security cooperation

guidelines they signed in 2008 and 2009, envisage a

superior action-oriented and wide-ranging

functional-technical and capacity building cooperation,

than the routine India-China defence exchanges and joint

anti-terrorism drills, that are susceptible to the overall

situation in their political relations.

Much of institutional infrastructure promised by the

India-Japan declarations is already in place, and the rest

should be activated in due course of time. India has

welcomed the creation of the National Security Council

(NSC) in Japan and looks forward to a dialogue

mechanism between their National Security Advisors

(NSA) who head their NSCs for a full spectrum security

dialogue. India and Japan’s willingness to cooperate in

high military technology is all set to take the functional

dimensions of their strategic relationship to an even

higher level. India has welcomed changes in Japan’s

defence production and commerce policies. The two

countries have formed a joint working group for

cooperation in the building of the US-2 amphibian

aircraft and its technology and to promote defence

equipment and technology cooperation in general.26

Cooperation in the submarine business is also not

unlikely considering Japanese prowess in submarine

building, and India’s requirement for them. The

India-Japan advance defence cooperation combined with

their strategic political and security hedging against

China would command even greater importance and

make their special strategic partnership an undeclared

political alliance.

Latest Trends: Advantage

India-Japan Partnership

The Manmohan government faced ideological

opposition from its Leftist allies between 2004 and 2009

with regard to the quadrilateral political cooperation.

Their opposition stemmed from India’s legacy of

non-alignment and anti-imperialism. As already

discussed, China too opposed the quadrilateral

cooperation. All this impacted Japan’s participation in

the Malabar exercises.27

Towards the end of its second

term (2004-2009), the Manmohan government, however,

overcame this ideological opposition, and appeared less

amenable to China’s pressure. It initiated talks for the

purchase of US-2 amphibian planes. It held a bilateral

joint naval military exercise with Japan in 2012 and

invited Japan to participate in the Malabar exercise in

January 2014. 28

The present Modi government displays even greater

confidence. Modi’s Japan visit was his first foreign visit

beyond India’s neighbourhood. During the visit, the two

countries agreed to ‘intensify’ the two-plus-two to the

minister level, upgrade the India-Japan-US joint

secretary trilateral dialogue to the foreign minister level,

and regularise Japan’s participation in the Malabar

exercise. The author is of the view that the idea of

cooperation among democracies might eventually lead to

a trilateral two-plus-two, or the merger of the two

dialogue mechanisms producing a trilateral two-plus-two,

Triangularity in India-China-Japan Relations: An Indian Perspective 57

leading to a clear strategic alignment among the three

countries.

Modi’s statement condemning the 18th

century

expansionist mindset in the present timeduring the visit,

was interpreted as pointing towards China’s various

territorial claims. Although official sources termed the

statement as a general remark, the timing and the venue

of the statement cannot be ignored.29

Later, during his

US visit, India and the US, for the first time, mentioned

the South China maritime disputes, to which China is a

party, in their joint communiqué. The reference to

‘freedom of navigation and overflight…unimpeded

lawful commerce and peaceful settlement of disputes in

accordance with international law’ are clear references to

the Chinese ADIZ in East China Sea and its other

aggressive activities in the South China Sea.30

Vietnam’s

Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung during his India visit

in October 2014 urged India to play a greater role in the

resolution of the disputes in South China Sea. The media

reported that India expressed its, in principle willingness

to sell advanced military hardware to Vietnam. India is

amenable for an India-Japan-Vietnam trilateral to discuss

security concerns.31

Thus, a reading of the three sets of bilateral relations

and trends in the regional strategic scenario indicate an

advantage for the India-Japan special strategic

partnership over the India-China strategic and

cooperative partnership for peace and prosperity.

A Comparison of the Heft

in the Two Relationships

India-China relations have a clear advantage in

terms of bilateral trade. With the exception of financial

year (FY) 2012-13, the India-China bilateral trade has

been four times that of India-Japan since FY 2009-10.

Considering that India is the third and Japan is the fourth

largest economy of the world in purchasing power parity

(PPP) terms, the volume of India and Japan bilateral

trade is indeed unsatisfactory (see Table 1). However, the

advantage for India-China trade relations includes India’s

concerns over the huge trade deficit it incurs in its trade

with China. In FY 2012-13, India had a record $38

billion plus trade deficit with China. The latest figure for

FY 2013-14 is around $37 billion (see Table 1). In this

relationship, India is the raw material supplier. The

reasons for this trade deficit lie mainly in India’s

comparatively underdeveloped manufacturing sector, and

partly in the trade restrictions the Indian companies face

in some sectors, such as pharmaceuticals. How much this

trade deficit impacts the Indian economy in actual

economic terms is a different subject. But the Indian

security planners’ anxiety about the trade deficit and its

occasional reflection in decision-making is well noted.

Trade dependence on China is has strategic implications

for India in long run. China’s stopping rare earth export

to Japan due to political reasons is taken as an example

of strategic implication of trade overdependence.

Recently, Indian NSA Ajit Doval has flagged the issue of

overdependence on China for certain pharmaceutical

ingredients.32

Besides, the investment part of the

bilateral economic relations is highly unimpressive (see

Table 2). The nominal Chinese investment in India

cannot be a security guarantee against China. The trade

deficit and strategic concerns are the reasons for India’s

reluctance to sign a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with

China. On the other hand, India and Japan signed their

FTA, known as Comprehensive Economic Partnership

Agreement (CEPA), in 2011. Also, the deficiency in

India-Japan bilateral trade relations is to an extent offset

by Japanese investment and the ODA loan to India. Japan

is the fourth largest Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)

58 東協瞭望 010

equity provider to India with a 7.46 per cent share in the

cumulative FDI equity in India from April 2000 to

February 2014 (Table 2). The Japanese ODA loans

financed projects, standout in India and Japan economic

relations. These projects contribute to India’s economic

and civic infrastructure and create goodwill for Japan

(see Tables 4 & 5). Trade in the defence and high

technology sectors has the potential to significantly

impact India-Japan economic relations in terms of both

quality and quantity.

Incidentally, India’s infrastructure, particularly the

railways sector is attracting both Japan and China’s

attention. In recent high-level visits –– Xi’s to India and

Modi’s to Japan –– investment assurances for the

modernisation of Indian railways attracted media

headlines. Whether India can expect a Japan-China

competition to win over India and get economic benefits

out of it, is yet to be seen. So far, indications are that

trade and investment will follow their own logic. On the

eve of President Xi’s India visit, the Chinese officials

were quoted as predicting that the President may

announce $100 billion of investment in India over the

next five years. However, actual investment announced

was around $30 billion.33

How much the scores of memorandum of

understanding (MoUs) and agreements between India

and China in various fields such as, education and

science technology are actually contributing in the

laboratories and what is their practical implementation

requires a separate research. However, on the face of it,

they appear to be more routine consultative exchange

programmes. On the basis of the limited available

information in open domain, such as the Indian foreign

ministry and embassy websites, one can tentatively argue

that India-Japan cooperation in science and technology is

more substantial that India-China cooperation.34

Strategic impediments would not allow India and China

to conduct joint research in laboratories on a larger scale.

Recurring instances of security concerns in India about

Chinese telecommunication companies such as Huawei

and Xiaomi are instructive in this regard. Reservations

over the opening of China’s Confucius Institutes in India,

also highlight the limits to functional cooperation, due to

security concerns.35

India and Japan science and

technology and other forms of cooperation do not face

such strategic hurdles.

Implications for Regional

Order

India and China have displayed a certain amount of

cooperation in international multilateral forums. They, as

developing economies, demand reforms in economic

global governance. The creation of the BRICS bank

headquartered in China with its first president from India;

and the new China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment

Bank (AIIB) which India supports are the examples in

this regard. Reforms in economic global governance are

an area where the India-China partnership shows more

convergence than India-Japan partnership. Japan as a

developed G-8 economy is part of the existing

international financial architecture. The presidency of the

Asian Development Bank (ADB) has traditionally been

with Japan. Japan, along with the US, has opposed the

new Asian Bank.36

However, India and China are not on the same page

when it comes to multilateral forums that are of a

strategic political and security nature. China expressed its

reservations against the extension membership to India in

the ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum), the East Asia

Summit (EAS) and the NSG waiver for India. China is

Triangularity in India-China-Japan Relations: An Indian Perspective 59

not keen on allowing full member status for India in the

Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). The latest

instance was China’s attitude towards India’s entry into

Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP)

talks. Although the proposed RCEP agreement is for a

regional trade framework, it is widely considered as

being a Chinese response to the US-led Trans-Pacific

Partnership (TPP). Therefore, it has got geopolitical

dimensions too.37

The same is true of India’s reluctance

for granting full member status to China in the South

Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).

India and China both have observer status in the SCO

and SAARC.38

On the other hand, India and Japan share

an understanding about each other’s role in the

multilateral organisations, which have a strategic

political and security orientation. The two countries

envisage a regional order that is based on liberal

democratic values. Japan played a role in India’s entry

into the EAS and the RCEP talks.39

Both countries

strongly advocate reform in United National Security

Council (UNSC) structure. China, on its part, is by and

large non-committal about India’s bid for greater role in

the UN. It is opposed to a permanent seat for Japan in the

UNSC. 40

The widely perceived emergence of Sino-centricity

in East Asian economic life and its reflection in the

regional order, is a market-driven phenomenon. Japan

still continues to be an economic and technological

power in the region to reckon with.41

If China is

ASEAN’s largest trading partner, Japan is not far behind.

It is the third largest trading partner. India too figures in

the top 10 (see Table 6). With the emergence of new

technological and economic forces, a new economic

alignment is always a possibility. Deepening India-Japan

political and economic relations have the potential to

become a joint countervailing force vis-à-vis Chinese

pre-eminence in East Asia.

The China and India-Japan bi-polarity in the

Asia-Pacific would create a new situation in East Asia.

While regional countries have concerns about China in

varied degrees, the emergence of the Japan-India pole

would also raise concerns. The regional countries have

bitter World War II memories of Japanese imperialism.

Japan’s re-militarisation has been a fear that China has

all along stoked in the region. Recent changes in Japan’s

security policy may not be a welcome development for

the regional countries. The regional countries’ response

to an India-Japan axis in East Asia would depend on

factors like their domestic perceptions about China, their

security perception, their economic dependence on China

and their geographical location.42

Conclusion

Abe’s oft-quoted statement his book Toward a

Beautiful Country: My Vision for Japan–– that it would

not surprise him if ‘in another decade, Japan-India

relations overtake Japan-U.S. and Japan-China ties’ ––

has come to be seen as prophetic. Abe’s statement should

be seen in its spirit rather literally. Recent trends suggest

that India and Japan are attaching considerably high

political priority to each other, and their relationship is

showing implications for the regional order independent

of the US. Drawing an analogy from the famed

appellation of an all weather friendship for

China-Pakistan relations; one can say that the India Japan

relationship is the new all weather friendship flourishing

in Asia. India-Japan relations are a comprehensive

package and free from strategic concerns vis-à-vis each

other. Although it picked up late, the relationship is

advancing with clarity of purpose and determination and

60 東協瞭望 010

has a clear advantage over India-China relations. It is not

to suggest that India and Japan would make a classical

politico-military alliance. However, a strategic level

camaraderie is, indeed, developing between them.

Finally, the interactions in the three sets of

relationships require careful handling. Xi, Modi and Abe

are powerful leaders. Modi and Abe’s parties have a

majority of their own in their respective parliaments. Xi

is credited as being the strongest leader after Mao

Zedong from start of his tenure. China, India and Japan

are the second, third and fourth largest economies in PPP

terms in the world, in that order. Besides, China and

India are advanced military powers. Japan has the

economic and technological potential to transform itself

into a military power. Wrong moves can have

destabilising effects on the region. The three countries

need to work and offer new approaches for peaceful

coexistence.

Table1: India-China-Japan Bilateral Trade

Dated: 17/10/2014, Values in US $ Billion

Ind-Chi Ind-Jp Ind-Chi Ind-Jp Ind-Chi Ind-Jp Ind-Chi Ind-Jp Ind-Chi Ind-Jp

Year ‘09-‘10 ‘09-‘10 ‘10-‘11 ‘10-‘11 ‘11-‘12 ‘11-‘12 ‘12-‘13 ‘12-‘13 ‘13-‘14 ‘13-‘14

Export 11.61 3.62 15.48 5.09 18.07 6.32 13.53 6.10 14.82 6.81

%Share 6.50 2.03 6.17 2.03 5.91 2.07 4.51 2.03 4.72 2.17

Import 30.82 6.73 43.47 8.63 55.31 11.99 52.24 12.41 51.03 9.48

%Share 10.69 2.34 11.76 2.33 11.30 2.45 10.65 2.53 11.34 2.11

Total

Trade

42.44 10.36 58.96 13.72 73.39 18.32 65.78 18.51 65.85 16.29

%

Share

2.22

2.21

2.30

2.34

2.13

Table2: Comparative Data of Japanese and Chinese FDI in India

Financial Year Japanese FDI

equity inflows

(US$ in millions)

Chinese FDI

Equity inflows

(US$ in millions)

2000-01 223.66 0.00

2001-02 177.68 0.00

2002-03 411.87 0.05

2003-04 78.36 0.06

2004-05 126.24 1.35

2005-06 208.29 0.91

2006-07 84.74 0.68

2007-08 815.20 1.09

2008-09 4,469.95 6.71

2009-10 1,183.40 41.36

2010-11 1,562.00 1.56

Triangularity in India-China-Japan Relations: An Indian Perspective 61

Financial Year Japanese FDI

equity inflows

(US$ in millions)

Chinese FDI

Equity inflows

(US$ in millions)

2011-12 2,971.70 72.69

2012-13 2,237.22 151.86

2013-Feb.14 1,418.31 117.81

Cumulative Total

(Apr.l 2000-February

2014)

15,968.61 396.13

% share in total

FDI equity into India

7.46 0.19

Rank 4 28

Source: FDI Synopsis on Country China www.dipp.nic.in/English/Investor/China.../FDI_Synopsis_China.pdf

FDI Synopsis on Country Japan dipp.nic.in/English/Investor/Japan_Desk/FDI_Synopsis_Japan.pdf

Table3: Top sectors that attracted FDI equity inflows(from April 2000 to February 2014), from China

and Japan

Japan China

Drugs & Pharmaceuticals

28% Metallurgical Industries 34%

Automobile Industry

16% Automobile Industry 25%

Services Sector

15% Industrial Machinery 7%

Metallurgical Industries

9% Services Sector 6%

Electrical Equipment 4% Power 4%

Source: FDI Synopsis on Country China www.dipp.nic.in/English/Investor/China.../FDI_Synopsis_China.pdf

FDI Synopsis on Country Japan dipp.nic.in/English/Investor/Japan_Desk/FDI_Synopsis_Japan.pdf

Table4: The ODA Loan from Japan to India

Year Commitment Disbursement

Yen Billion INR Crores Yen Billion INR Crores

2008-09 236.047 11713.32 122.56 5861.48

2009-10 218.2 10694.93 128.95 6553.43

2010-11 203.566 11197.81 123.84 6581.67

2011-12 134.288 8303.01 139.22 8497.43

2012-13 353.106 23179.77 113.964 7259.95

2013-14 101.703

(upto 31.05.2013)

6812 22.320

(upto 30.06.2013)

1249.85

(upto 30.06.2013)

Source: http://finmin.nic.in/the_ministry/dept_eco_affairs/japan/japan_index.asp?pageid=2#List1

62 東協瞭望 010

Table5: Sector Wise Allocation of the Japanese ODA

S. No. Ministry Total Projects Amount (Million Yen)

1 Urban Development

26 824,540

2 Railways

4 230,603

3 Power 8 187, 759

4 Environment and Forest 15 172,657

5 Department of Drinking Water Supply 4 91,305

6 Water Resources 3 38,601

7 Department of Financial Services 1 30,000

8 New and Renewable Energy 1 30,000

9 Road and Transport Highways 1 22,903

10 Tourism 2 16,826

11 Agriculture 1 5,001

12 Shipping 1 4,129

Total 67 1,654, 324

(Rs.86555 Crore)

approx.

Source: Adapted from List of JICA Assisted Projects under Implementation

http://finmin.nic.in/the_ministry/dept_eco_affairs/japan/japan_index.asp?pageid=2#List1

During the period between 2003 and 2013, the two

countries signed agreements for 67 various projects. The

projects include both those concluded as well as well as

those that are ongoing on. These projects are spread

across India in around 21 states. Twenty of the 67

projects are national in nature and under the direct

supervision of the central government of India. The ODA

is spread across 12 sectors under various ministries and

departments. The four major sectors where the Japanese

ODA is active are: urban development, railways, power

and environment and forest conservation. Incidentally,

the railway has fast emerged as an important sector for

the Japanese ODA in recent years.

Table 6: China, Japan and India Trade with ASEAN trade partner countries/regions, 2013 as of 24 July

2014

(Value in US$ million; share in percent)

Value Share to total ASEAN trade Rank

Exports Imports Total trade Exports Imports Total trade

China 152,521.1 197,962.5 350,483.6 12.0 16.0 14.0 1

Japan 123,040.8 117,903.9 240,944.7 9.7 9.5 9.6 3

India 41,936.7 25,937.3 67,874.1 3.3 2.1 2.7 9

Source: http://www.asean.org/resources/2012-02-10-08-47-55/asean-statistics/item/external-trade-statistics-3 (Table 20)

Triangularity in India-China-Japan Relations: An Indian Perspective 63

1 The Panchsheel (Five virtues) stands for the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence: mutual respect for each

other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in each other’s

internal affairs, equality and cooperation for mutual benefit, and peaceful co -existence. The five principles

were part of the Panchsheel agreement between India, China and Myanmar in 1954. The principles had great

ideological appeal in a world which was still in the process of decolonisation. The India -China war in 1962

gave a jolt to the principle. Deng Xiaoping revived the principles in the1980s. China fo llows the principles

as basis in its international relations.

The principles form the normative basis of India and China’s vision for their relations as seen in their

various joint declarations. A perusal of India -China joint declarations reveals that while the documents

contain a roadmap for the functional aspects of their relations, concerns about peace and stability and

respect for each other’s sensitivities in critical security strategic arenas persist. The two countries added the

word ‘strategic’ and ‘partnership’ to their relationship when they defined it as the Strategic and Cooperative

Partnership for peace and prosperity in 2008 . On the other hand, India and Japan have pitched their

relations on a higher and ambitious note since they signed India-Japan Global Partnership in 2000. A

reading of the titles and the content of India and Japan’s nine summit -level joint declarations from 2000 to

2014 demonstrates a determined gradualism towards unambiguous strategic relationship with security and

defence cooperation progressively assuming more significant role. The declarations underline liberal

democratic values as the basis for the relationship. All the India -China summit-level joint declarations since

2003, and the India-Japan summit-level joint declarations since 2005 are available on the Indian Ministry of

Affairs website’s documentation section.

For Japanese concept of ‘arc of freedom and prosperity’, please see Taro Aso, ‘Arc of Freedom and

Prosperity: Japan’s Expanding Diplomatic Horizons’, Speech, November 30, 2006,

http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/fm/aso/speech0611.html; Shinzo Abe, ‘Confluence of the Two Seas’,

Speech at the Indian Parliament, August 22, 2007,

http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/pmv0708/speech-2.html 2 Christophe Jaffrelot, ‘India’s Look East Policy: An Asianist Policy in Perspective’, India Review, Vol. 2, No.

2, 2003: pp. 35-68; Rajiv Sikri, ‘India’s Look East Policy’, Asia-Pacific Review, Vol. 16, No. 2, May 2009:

pp. 131-45. 3 Shamshad Ahmad Khan, ‘Indo- Japan Strategic Cooperation: Issues, Expectations and Challenges’, in

Akihiro Iwashita (Ed,), India-Japan Dialogue: Challenge and Potential , paper No.6, Comparative Studies on

Regional Powers, Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University, Japan, July 2011 : p. 19 4 India and China signed an agreement for the maintenance of peace and tranquillity along the line of actual

control (LAC) in the India-China Border Areas in 1993 and Confidence-Building Measures Along the Line of

Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas in 1996. They signed the Border Defence Cooperation

Agreement (BDCA) in 2013 after the military standoff between them in Ladakh region on the eve of Premier

Li Keqiang’s India visit. 5 The end of the Cold War did not bring closure to the two issues responsible for their mutual mistrust -

China’s continued political and military, particularly nuclear, support to Pakistan and the Dalai Lama’s

presence and Tibetan activities in India. The Freudian slip made by the Indian defence minister, George

Fernandes after India’s nuclear tests in 1998, that China is India’s enemy no.1 highlighted the lack of trust

in the relationship. The relationship in the 1990s remained stable but low key, and without a proper strategic

perspective. For India-China relations in 1990s, please see Mohan J. Malik, ‘China-India Relations in the

Post-Soviet Era: The Continuing Rivalry’, The China Quarterly, Vol. 42, 1995: pp. 317-355. Surjit Singh

Mansingh, ‘India-China Relations in the Context of Vajpayee’s 2003 Visit’, The Sigur Center Asia Papers,

The Elliot School of International Affairs, The George Washington University, 2005, pp. 1 -15. 6 ‘Declaration on Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation Between the Republic of India and

the People’s Republic of China’ on June 23, 2003,

http://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/7679/Declaration+on+Principles+for+Relations+and+C

omprehensive+Cooperation+Between+the+Republic+of+India+and+the+Peoples+Republic+of+China;

‘Joint Declaration by the Republic of India and the People’s Republic of China’ on November 21, 2006,

http://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/6363/Joint+Declaration+by+the+Republic+of+India+an

64 東協瞭望 010

d+the+Peoples+Republic+of+China

7 India and China have around 40 bilateral dialogue mechanisms. The majority of them have been created after

2004 in Manmohan-Hu Jintao era in India and China. The two countries had 58 agreement of various sorts

for trade and commerce till 2011; and 23 for science and technology cooperation till 2009, as per the India

embassy website. Thus, it can be safely concluded that the present tally must be over 100. 8 Amitendu Palit, ‘China-India Collaboration on Global Economic Issues: Strengthening South -South

Bonding?’, Jindal Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 1, October 2011: pp. 243 -258.

‘China and India Agree to Cooperate on Climate Change Policy’, The Guardian, October 22, 2009,

http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2009/oct/22/china -india-climate-change-cooperation; ‘Climate

cooperation Changing India-China Ties, Says Jairam Ramesh’ , The Hindu, April 9, 2010,

http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/climate -cooperation-changing-indiachina-ties-says-jairam-ram

esh/article392921.ece 9 Sujit Dutta, ‘Managing and Engaging Rising China: India’s Evolving Posture’, The Washington Quarterly ,

Vol. 34, No. 2: pp. 127-144 10

Lok Sabha Question on South China Sea,

http://164.100.47.132/LssNew/psearch/QResult15.aspx?qref=148762

‘Sri Lanka Snubs India, Opens Port to Chinese Submarine Again’, Times of India , November 4, 2014,

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Sri-Lanka-snubs-India-opens-port-to-Chinese-submarine-again/arti

cleshow/45008757.cms; ‘Indian Navy Closely Watching PLA Submarine Movements in Indian Ocean’,

Deccan Chronicle, November 15, 2014,

http://www.deccanchronicle.com/141114/nation-current-affairs/article/indian-navy-closely-watching-pla-su

bmarine-movements-indian 11

Priyanka Singh, ‘Chinese Activities in PoK: High Time for India to Put its Act Together’, IDSA Comment,

September 9, 2010,

http://idsa.in/idsacomments/ChineseActivities inPoKHighTimeforIndiatoPutitsActTogether_psingh_090910 12

Monica Chansoria, ‘China’s Infrastructure Development in Tibet Evaluating Trend lines’, Manekshaw Paper,

No. 32, Centre for Land Warfare Studies (New Delhi), 2011. Recently, military infrastructur e building on

the Indian side of border has received new thrust under the Modi government, which has invited a response

from China. ‘With Eye on China, Modi Government to Fast -Track Border Roads’, NDTV, June 12, 2014,

http://www.ndtv.com/article/india/with-eye-on-china-modi-government-to-fast-track-border-roads-540178;

‘Govt Announces 54 New BoPs, Rs 175 Crore Infrastructure Package on China Border’, The Economic

Times, October 24, 2014,

http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2014-10-24/news/55397998_1_border-dispute-china-border-b

order-areas; ‘China Alarmed, Tells India Not to Complicate Border Situation with New Road’, The Times of

India, October 15, 2014,

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/China -alarmed-tells-India-not-to-complicate-border-situation-with-

new-road/articleshow/44826891.cms 13

‘Xi’s India Visit to Take Relationship to Next Level’, CCTV, September 16, 2014,

http://english.cntv.cn/2014/09/16/VIDE1410818282636996.shtml 14

‘Japan on High Alert Year after Senkaku Nationalization’, The Japan Times,

http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/09/11/national/politics -diplomacy/japan-on-high-alert-year-after-se

nkaku-nationalization/#.VGtMUZVxmP8 15

Emma Chanlett-Avery, Kerry Dumbaugh and William H. Cooper, ‘Sino -Japanese Relations: Issues for U.S.

Policy’, Congressional Research Service (CRS), December 19, 2008 16

Zheng Wang, Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign

Relations, New York, Columbia University Press 2012, pp: 1 -312. 17

Norihiro Kato, ‘Tea Party Politics in Japan: Japan’s Rising Nationalism’, The New York Times, September

12, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/13/opinion/tea -party-politics-in-japan.html?_r=0;

Dennis McCornac, ‘ ‘New Nationalism’ in Japan’, The Diplomat, August 21, 2014,

http://thediplomat.com/2014/08/new-nationalism-in-japan/

Triangularity in India-China-Japan Relations: An Indian Perspective 65

18

Emma Chanlett-Avery, Kerry Dumbaugh and William H. Cooper, ‘Sino -Japanese Relations: Issues for U.S.

Policy’, Congressional Research Service (CRS), December 19, 2008 19

Sebastian Maslow, ‘Japan’s Evolving Security Architecture’, The Diplomat, December 3, 2013,

http://thediplomat.com/2013/12/japans-evolving-security-architecture/; Clint Richards, ‘Timing is

Everything: Abe’s Playbook for Military Normalization’, The Diplomat, July 1, 2014,

http://thediplomat.com/2014/07/timing-is-everything-abes-playbook-for-military-normalization/; ‘Japan’s

New Defense Posture, The Diplomat, July 10, 2014,

http://thediplomat.com/2014/07/japans-new-defense-posture/; ‘Japan Cabinet Approves Landmark Military

Change, BBC, July 1, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world -asia-28086002 20

During this period, India-China relations witnessed contention on various issues. China attempted to block

Asian Development Bank’s (ADB) loan to a dam building project in Arunachal Pradesh. It start ed issuing

stapled visa to the residents of Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir claiming that sovereignty over this state

was disputed. It, in fact, did not issue visa Indian Lt. General B. S Jamwal to go to China to attend defence

exchange. India, in retaliation, cancelled defence exchanges with China. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh

and Dalai Lama’s visist to Tawang were opposed by China, though India did not budge. ‘China suggests

it blocked India's loan efforts at ADB due to border dispute’, The Times of India, April 14, 2009,

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/china/China-suggests-it-blocked-Indias-loan-efforts-at-ADB-due-t

o-border-dispute/articleshow/4401348.cms; ‘India has to live with China’s stapled visas’, The Hindu,

October 26, 2013,

http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-has-to-live-with-chinas-stapled-visas/article5273292.ece;

Prashant Kumar Singh, ‘China’s Denial of Visa to the Indian General: Not So Incomprehensible’, IDSA

Comment, August 30, 2010,

http://idsa.in/idsacomments/ChinasDenialofVisatotheIndianGeneralNotSoIncomprehensible_pksingh_30081

0.html; ‘China ‘Deeply Upset’ over Arunachal Pradesh Visit’, The Hindu, October 13, 2009,

http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/china -deeply-upset-over-arunachal-pradesh-visit/article33242.

ece; ‘China Opposes Dalai Lama’s Arunachal Visit’, India Today, October 21, 2009,

http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/China+opposes+Dalai+Lama's+Arunachal+visit/1/67157.html 21

John W. Garver and Fei-Ling Wang, ‘China’s Anti-Encirclement Struggle’, Asian Survey, Vol. 6. No.3,

2010: pp. 238-261 22

‘Joint Statement, India-Japan Partnership in a New Asian Era: Strategic Orientation of India -Japan Global

Partnership’ on April 29, 2005,

http://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/6627/Joint+Statement+IndiaJapan+Partnership+in+a+N

ew+Asian+Era+Strategic+Orientation+of+IndiaJapan+Global+Partnership 23

For India-Japan relations, please see Arpita Mathur, India-Japan Relations: Drivers, Trends and Prospects ,

RSIS Monograph No. 23, 2012: pp. 1-130; Rajaram Panda, ‘India-Japan Defence Partnership’, Indian

Foreign Affairs Journal Vol. 7, No. 3, July–September 2012, 311-320; Rajaram Panda, ‘India and Japan:

Exploring Strategic Potentials’, Journal of Defence Studies, Vol 4, No 4, October 2010: pp. 89-107;

Shamshad Ahmad Khan, ‘Indo- Japan Strategic Cooperation: Issues, Expectations and Challenges’, in

Akihiro Iwashita (Ed,), India-Japan Dialogue: Challenge and Potential , paper No.6, Comparative Studies on

Regional Powers, Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University, J apan, July 2011 24

‘New ‘Strategic Partnership’ against China’, BBC, September 3, 2007,

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6968412.stm; ‘India Snubs Australia, US Move to Check China’, The

Times of India, December 2, 2011, 25

‘Tokyo Declaration for India - Japan Special Strategic and Global Partnership’, MEA Website, September 1,

2014,

http://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/23965/Tokyo_Declaration_for_India__Japan_Special_S

trategic_and_Global_Partnership 26

‘Joint Statement on the occasion of Official Visit of the Prime Minister of Japan to India’ On January 25,

2014,

http://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/22772/Joint+Statement+on+the+occasion+of+Official+

Visit+of+the+Prime+Minister+of+Japan+to+India+January+2527+2014; ‘India Invites J apan to be Part of

66 東協瞭望 010

Malabar Naval Exercises with the US’, The Indian Express, January 25, 2014,

http://indianexpress.com/article/india/politics/india -invites-japan-to-be-part-of-malabar-naval-exercises-wit

h-the-us/ 27

Prakash Karat, ‘Why the CPI(M) and the Left Oppose the Nuclear Deal’, Pragoti, August 21, 2007,

http://www.pragoti.in/node/119

Karat is the General Secretary of Communist Party of India (Marxist), CPI (M). The party was a major

alliance partner in the Manmohan Singh-led first United Progressive Alliance (UPA) during 2004-09. In this

article, he deals with the issue of the quadrilateral cooperation too. 28

‘Joint Statement on Prime Minister’s Visit to Japan: Strengthening the Strategic and Global Partnership

between India and Japan beyond the 60th Anniversary of Diplomatic Relations’ on May 29, 2013,

http://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/21755/Joint+Statement+on+Prime+Ministers+visit+to+

Japan+Strengthening+the+Strategic+and+Global+Partnership+between+India+and+Japan+beyond+the+60th

+Anniversary+of+Diplomatic+Relations 29

‘Modi Takes ‘Swipe’ at China, Deplores ‘Expansionist’ Tendency of Some Nations’, The Times of India ,

September 1 2014,

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Modi -takes-swipe-at-China-deplores-expansionist-tendency-of-so

me-nations/articleshow/41422173.cms; ‘Modi -Abe Intimacy Brings Scant Comfort’, Global Times,

September 2, 2014, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/879478.shtml 30

‘Joint Statement During the Visit of Prime Minister to USA’, MEA Website, September 30, 2 014 31

‘As China Flexes Its Muscles, Vietnam Seeks India’s ‘Active Support’ on South China Sea Row’, The Times

of India, October 27, 2014,

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/As-China-flexes-its-muscles-Vietnam-seeks-Indias-active-support-

on-South-China-Sea-row/articleshow/44950403.cms; ‘India Ignores China’s Frown, Offers Defence Boost to

Vietnam’, The Times of India, October 29, 2014,

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/India -ignores-Chinas-frown-offers-defence-boost-to-Vietnam/articl

eshow/44965272.cms 32

‘China Still Bans Rare Earth to Japan’, The New York Times, November 10, 2010,

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/11/business/global/11rare.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0; ‘Overdependence

on China for Drug Ingredients Worries NSA’, The Times of India , November 26, 2014,

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Overdependence -on-China-for-drug-ingredients-worries-NSA/artic

leshow/45278715.cms; ‘India Calls for Chinese Investments to Offset Huge Trade Deficit’, The Economic

Times, March 18, 2014,

http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2014-03-18/news/48331062_1_trade-deficit-india-china-strate

gic-economic-dialogue-indian-exports; ‘India Worried Over Rising Trade Gap with China; NSC Secretariat

Sends Out Note Detailing Concerns’, The Economic Times, December 9, 2011,

http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2011-12-09/news/30498007_1_india-china-freetrade-trade-def

icit 33

‘China to Invest $100 Billion in India over 5 Years’, The Times of India , September 13, 2014,

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/China-to-invest-100-billion-in-India-over-5-year

s/articleshow/42386772.cms;

During President Xi’ visit, the commerce ministries of China ‘committed to investing $20 billion in India

over the next five years…China committed to an investment of $6.8 billion in two industrial parks in Gujarat

and Maharashtra, and some 24 Chinese companies entered into agreements with Indian companies that, if

and when delivered, would add up to investments of another $3.6 billion.’ Thus, the total expected

investment is $30.4 billion. Shashi Tharoor, ‘President Xi or President XXX? India Let Down By Visit’,

NDTV, September 21, 2014,

http://www.ndtv.com/article/opinion/president -xi-or-president-xxx-india-let-down-by-visit-595557 34

‘Science & Technology Cooperation’, Embassy of India in China,

http://www.indianembassy.org.cn/DynamicContent.aspx?MenuId=90&SubMenuId=0; ‘Bilateral

Cooperation in the field of Science & Technology between India and Japan’, Embassy of India in Japan,

http://www.indembassy-tokyo.gov.in/st_cooperation.html

Triangularity in India-China-Japan Relations: An Indian Perspective 67

35

‘NSC Points to Huawei, ZTE’s Links with Chinese Military Project PLA -863’, The Economic Times, May 15,

2013,

http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-05-15/news/39282046_1_huawei-and-zte-telecom-equip

ment-nsc; ‘Indian Air Force Reportedly Issues Security Warning Against Xiaomi Products’, NDTV, October

24, 2014,

http://gadgets.ndtv.com/mobiles/news/indian-air-force-reportedly-issues-security-warning-against-xiaomi-p

roducts-611292; ‘Xiaomi to Approach Indian Authorities to Sort Out Security Concerns’, The Times of India,

October 26, 2014,

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/tech/tech-news/Xiaomi-to-approach-Indian-authorities-to-sort-out-securi

ty-concerns/articleshow/44938959.cms 36

BRICS Development Bank Launched, First President to Be from India’, Times of India, July 16, 2014,

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/international -business/BRICS-Development-Bank-launched-firs

t-president-to-be-from-India/articleshow/38440605.cms; ‘India To Head BRICS' $100 Billion New

Development Bank’, NDTV, July 16, 2014,

http://www.ndtv.com/article/india/india-to-head-brics-100-billion-new-development-bank-559330; ‘India,

20 Others Set Up Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank’, The Indian Express, October 24, 2014,

http://indianexpress.com/article/business/economy/india-20-others-set-up-asian-infrastructure-investment-b

ank/#sthash.qk9LujhU.dpuf; ‘New Opportunities for ADB’, The Japan Times,

http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2013/05/06/commentary/world -commentary/new-opportunities-for-adb

/#.VGhwfpVxmP8 37

‘India Becomes Part of Regional Trading Bloc Despite Chinese Opposition’, The Times of India , July 8,

2013,

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/India -becomes-part-of-regional-trading-bloc-despite-Chinese-oppo

sition/articleshow/20963479.cms 38

‘Eyeing Relations with SAARC, China Supports India in SCO’, Business Standard, September 18, 2014,

http://www.business-standard.com/article/news-ians/eyeing-relations-with-saarc-china-supports-india-in-sc

o-114091801222_1.html 39

M Malik, ‘China and the East Asia Summit: More Discord Than Accord’, 2006, Asia Pacific Centre for

Secuirty Studies, www.apcss.org/Publications/APSSS/ChinaandEastAsiaSummit.pdf; Murray Hiebert and

Liam Hanlon, ‘ASEAN and Partners Launch Regional Comprehensive Economic Par tnership’, December 7,

2012, Center for Strategic Studies and International Studies (CSSIS),

http://csis.org/publication/asean-and-partners-launch-regional-comprehensive-economic-partnership 40

‘Joint Press Statement - India, Brazil, Japan and Germany Meeting on UN Reforms’ on September 21, 2004,

MEA Website,

http://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/7464/Joint+Press+Statement++India+Brazil+Japan+and

+Germany+Meeting+on+UN+Reforms; ‘G -4 London Declaration’ on July 8, 2005,

http://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/6756/G4+London+Declaration; ‘Joint Press Statement

of Ministerial Meeting of the G4 countries (Brazil, Germany, India and Japan) on February 2011, MEA

Website,

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