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EN BANC

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 171271

Appellee,

Present:

Panganiban, C . J ., Puno, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago,

Sandoval-Gutierrez, - versus - Carpio,

Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Garcia, Velasco, Jr., JJ .

ELBERTO TUBONGBANUA

y PAHILANGA, Promulgated:

Appellant. August 31, 2006

x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Appellant Elberto Tubongbanua was charged with the crime of murder in anamended Information[1] that reads:

That on or about the 12th of February, 2001, in the Municipality of San Juan,Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, theabove named accused, with intent to kill and with evident premeditation, treachery,taking advantage of superior strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully andfeloniously attack, assault and stab Evelyn Kho y Sua on the different parts of her bodywith the use of a deadly weapon, thereby inflicting upon said Evelyn Kho y Sua stabwounds, which directly caused her death; that the act was committed inside thedwelling of Evelyn Kho y Sua and with insult or in disregard of the respect due to the

offended party on account of his (sic) rank, age or sex.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty and trial on the merits ensued.

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/G.R.%20No.%20171271.htm#_ftn1





The facts are as follows:

Accused was employed as a family driver by Atty. Evelyn Sua-Kho since1998. The latter worked as the managing partner of the Lawyer‟s Advocate Circle, alaw firm operated as a sole proprietorship, and located at 2302 Atlanta Center, 31

Anapolis St., Greenhills, San Juan, M.M. Accused was initially paid P6,000.00 a monthas wages, aside from boarding, food, overtime and extra pay, which he received whenhe did extra driving and other work for Atty. Sua-Kho‟s family.

On February 12, 2001, at around 6:00 o‟clock in the evening, the accused droveAtty. Sua Kho to her condominium unit at 1702 Platinum 2000, Anapolis St.,Greenhills, San Jun M.M. After handing his employer‟s bag to Marissa Hiso, thehousemaid, accused proceeded to the kitchen where he drank a glass of water. Also inthe condominium unit were Atty. Sua-Kho‟s three year old daughter Issa and her nanny, Nelie Maglasang. After talking and playing with her daughter for a few minutes, Atty.Sua-Kho emerged from the bedroom to talk with the accused. Shortly thereafter,

Marrisa heard her employer screaming, and she saw the accused stabbing her with their kitchen knife. She tried to stop the accused, shouting “Kuya Bert!”, but the latter continued to stab Atty. Sua-Kho. Meanwhile, Nelie also heard her employer‟s screams,and locked herself with Issa in the master‟s bathroom. When she peeped-out from her hiding place, she saw Marissa, whom she signaled to go downstairs for help. The latter did so, and sought help from the security guard. Nellie, meanwhile called Atty. Sua-Kho‟s f ather, Marcelino Sua, and husband, Daniel Kho, on the bedroom phone.

When Marcelino Sua arrived, he saw Marissa and a security guard in front of thecondominium unit. When they entered, they saw the bloodied and unmoving body of Atty. Sua-Kho sprawled on the floor. Marcelino then brought his daughter to theCardinal Santos Memorial Hospital, where doctors tried to revive her, but failed. Theaccused, meanwhile, fled, using the victim‟s car. He was arrested soon afterwards inCalapan, Mindoro, while on his way to his home province.

Upon examination of the victim‟s body, Dr. Edgardo Rodriguez Vida found thatshe suffered eighteen (18) stab wounds and three (3) incise wounds aside from other minor injuries. The stab wounds on her chest were considered fatal as they affected both lungs, the main blood vessel of the heart and the heart itself. There were four stabwounds on the heart, one on the right lung and four on the left lung. According to thedoctor, the wounds could have been caused by a sharp single-bladed object and that theincise wounds found on the left forearm, right wrist and left leg could have beeninflicted while Atty. Sua-Kho tried to parry the blows.

Marian Aquino, legal secretary of the Lawyer‟s Advocate Circle, where thevictim worked, related that prior to the killing of Atty. Sua-Kho, the accused hadconfided to her about his grudges against the victim, such as being given spoiled food,that his meals were being measured, that he worked long hours of the day and servedmany bosses. On February 11, 2001, accused spent the day at her boarding housewhere he told her he could no longer take the way Atty. Sua-Kho treated him. Later hesaid “nadedemonyo na ako” and that he would finish Atty. Sua-Kho. He would hit her at the back, very deep, and he would make sure that she would die. Then he would goto the province, his territory, where he could not be followed.

Atty. Joel Baguio, an associate at the Lawyer‟s Advocate Circle, also testifiedthat before the killing, the accused told him of his grudges against Atty. Sua-Kho, likehis being scolded for being late, and being called a thief, a killer, and ex-convict andother bad names. On February 12, 2001, the accused also told him not to get too close,as he might get involved in what was going to happen.

The accused, on the other hand, raised the defense of self-defense. Atty. Sua-Kho, he testified, didn‟t want her husband to know that she had been taking trips with a



company guest, a certain Phillip Robinson, to Puerto Azul and Daranak Falls inTanay. She warned the accused that something bad would happen to him if her husbandwould learn about it. In the evening of February 12, 2001, Atty. Sua-Kho urgedaccused to go to her father‟s house, because her husband Daniel Kho would bearriving. As she and the accused argued about Phillip Robinson, the former got a knifeand stabbed him with it, catching him on the wrist. Accused managed to wrest control

of the knife, and with it, stabbed Atty. Sua-Kho three or four times. After he stabbedher he was shocked and left the place using the victim‟s car. He fled to Mindoro wherehe allegedly surrendered to the police.[2]

On March 26, 2002, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 163, rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, accused, Elberto Tubongbanua y Pahilanga, is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder under Article 248 of the Revised

Penal Code and is sentenced to suffer the severe penalty of death by lethal injectionwith all the accessory penalties provided by law and to pay the costs.

On the civil liability of the accused, he is ordered to pay the legal heirs of thevictim actual, moral, nominal, exemplary and temperate damages in the respectivesums of P298,202.25, P50,000.00, P200,000.00, P200,000.00 and P50,000.00. He isalso ordered to pay the victim‟s heirs P50,000.00 for the loss of the victim‟s life, allwith interest thereon at the legal rate of 6 percent per annum from this date until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.[3]

The case was elevated to this Court because the penalty imposed wasdeath. However, pursuant to our ruling in People v. Mateo,[4] the case was transferredand referred to the Court of Appeals.[5]

On October 21, 2005, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modifications thedecision of the trial court. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City is herebyAFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS, in that, the accused-appellant, having been foundguilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder, is hereby sentenced to Death. He is orderedto indemnify the heirs of the victim the following:

(1) P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; (2) P50,000.00 as moral damages; (3) P298,202.25 as actual damages; and

(4) P50,000.00 as exemplary damages

The awards of temperate and nominal damages are hereby DELETED.

Since the imposition of the death penalty in this case was affirmed, this Decisionand the complete records of this case are hereby ordered TRANSMITTED to theSupreme Court on automatic review, immediately upon the promulgation of thisDecision.

SO ORDERED.[6]























The Court of Appeals disregarded appellant‟s claim of self defense for lack of

evidence and for being incredible considering the number and location of woundssustained by the victim and his flight from the crime scene. It also noted that treacherydid not attend the commission of the crime as there were no particulars as to how the

killing began or executed.

However, the appellate court found that evident premeditation was adequatelyestablished which qualified the killing to murder. Likewise, it appreciated abuse of superior strength as an aggravating circumstance.

As regards the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and insult to the rank, sexand age of the victim, the Court of Appeals noted that these circumstances were

included as amendments to the information after the presentation by the prosecution of its evidence. As such, the same should not be allowed because it will prejudice therights of the appellant.

In a Resolution dated March 7, 2006, we required both parties to filesupplemental briefs. The Office of the Solicitor General manifested that it will nolonger be filing a supplemental brief. On the other hand, appellant insisted on his theoryof self defense and prayed for his acquittal.

We agree with the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals thatappellant‟s claim of self -defense is self-serving hence should not be givencredence. InCabuslay v. People,[7] we ruled that:

One who invokes self defense admits responsibility for the killing. Accordingly,the burden of proof shifts to the accused who must then prove the justifyingcircumstance. He must show by clear and convincing evidence that he indeed actedin self-defense, or in defense of a relative or a stranger. With clear and convincingevidence, all the following elements of self defense must be established: (1) unlawfulaggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to

prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the personclaiming self defense.

Appellant‟s version of the stabbing incident does not inspire belief. Histestimony that it was Atty. Sua-Kho who attacked him is uncorroborated andimprobable. Appellant‟s alleged use of reasonable means to repel the aggression is alsountenable considering the nature and number of wounds inflicted on the victim whichdemonstrate a determined effort to kill the victim and not just defend oneself .[8] Wenote that the victim suffered 18 stab wounds which were all directed to her chest, heartand lungs. She also had incised wounds which were inflicted while she was parryingthe blows coming from the appellant. In fact, appellant testified that Atty. Sua-Kho wasrunning away from him but he still pursued her and inflicted the fatal wounds:

Q: According to you, Atty. launched at you and you covered and cut on your lefthand and that was the time you got the knife and what happened after that?

A: What I remember is that she went inside.











Q: So, she run (sic) away from you, is that what you are saying?A: When I was hit and I was able to stab her, she ran towards the room.

Q: So she was trying to avoid [you] after she stabbed you the first time?A: I do not know, what I know is that when I stabbed her, she went inside the

room.Q: What part of the body did you hit her the first time?A: At the abdominal area, sir.

Q: After that initial wound, Atty. Kho run (sic) towards the room, is that correct?A: What I remember, she run (sic), sir .[9]

Moreover, appellant‟s act of fleeing from the crime scene instead of reporting theincident to the police authorities is contrary to his proclaimed innocence but highlyindicative of guilt and negate his claim of self defense.[10]

We agree with the Court of Appeals that the qualifying circumstance of treacherywas not present. Treachery under paragraph 16 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal Codeis defined as the deliberate employment of means, methods, or forms in the execution of a crime against persons which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, withoutrisk to the offender arising from the defense which the intended victim might raise. For treachery to be present, two conditions must concur: (a) the employment of means of execution which would ensure the safety of the offender from defensive and retaliatoryacts of the victim, giving the victim no opportunity to defend himself; and (b) the

means, method and manner of the execution were deliberately and consciously adopted by the offender .[11] Treachery cannot be presumed; it must be proved by clear andconvincing evidence or as conclusively as the killing itself .[12]

In the instant case, there is no proof on how the attack was commenced. Whereno particulars are known as to the manner in which the aggression was made or how theact which resulted in the death of the victim began and developed, it can in no way beestablished from mere suppositions that the killing was perpetrated by treachery.[13]

We find however that evident premeditation and taking advantage of superior strength attended the killing.

Like any other circumstance that qualifies a killing as murder, evident premeditation must be established by clear and positive evidence;[14] that is, by proof beyond reasonable doubt.[15] The essence of premeditation is that the execution of theact was preceded by cool thought and reflections upon the resolution to carry out thecriminal intent during a space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. To beconsidered, the following elements must be proven: (1) the time when the accuseddecided to commit the crime; (2) an overt act manifestly indicating that he has clung tohis determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between the decision and theexecution, to allow the accused to reflect upon the consequences of his act.[16]

Prosecution witnesses Marian Aquino and Atty. Joel Baguio testified as toappellant‟s state of mind and predisposition to avenge the alleged maltreatment by thevictim. Both witnesses testified on appellant‟s ill-plans against his employer the day

prior to the crime. Absent evidence showing any reason or motive for the witnesses to


































falsely testify against the appellant, the logical conclusion is that no such improper motive exists and their testimonies should be accorded full faith and credit. Thus, thelower courts correctly concluded that evident premeditation attended the commission of the crime.

Appellant likewise took advantage of his superior strength to perpetuate thecriminal act. He killed Atty. Sua-Kho by overpowering her and driving the murder weapon into her body several times, despite her attempts to parry the blows. He couldnot have executed the dastardly act without employing physical superiority over thevictim. In People v. Espina,[17] we have ruled that an attack by a man with a deadlyweapon upon an unarmed and defenseless woman constitutes the circumstance of abuseof that superiority which his sex and the weapon used in the act afforded him, and fromwhich the woman was unable to defend herself.

We find, however, that the Court of Appeals erred in not allowing theamendments in the information regarding the aggravating circumstances of dwelling

and insult or disregard of the respect due to rank, age or sex. Section 14, Rule 110 of

the Rules of Court,[18] provides that an amendment after the plea of the accused is

permitted only as to matters of form, provided leave of court is obtained and such

amendment is not prejudicial to the rights of the accused. A substantial amendment is

not permitted after the accused had already been arraigned.[19]

In Teehankee, Jr. v. Madayag ,[20] we had the occasion to distinguish between

substantial and formal amendments:

A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offensecharged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merelyof form. Thus, the following have been held to be merely formal amendments, viz.:(1) new allegations which relate only to the range of the penalty that the court mightimpose in the event of conviction; (2) an amendment which does not charge another offense different or distinct from that charged in the original one; (3) additionalallegations which do not alter the prosecution‟s theory of the case so as to causesurprise to the accused and affect the form of defense he has or will assume; and (4) anamendment which does not adversely affect any substantial right of the accused, such ashis right to invoke prescription.

The test as to whether an amendment is only of form and an accused is not

prejudiced by such amendment is whether or not a defense under the information as it

originally stood would be equally available after the amendment is made, and whether

or not any evidence which the accused might have would be equally applicable to theinformation in one form as in the other; if the answer is in the affirmative, the

amendment is one of form and not of substance.[21]

Tested against these guidelines, the insertion of the aggravating circumstances of

dwelling and insult or disregard of the respect due to rank, age, or sex of the victim is























clearly a formal, not a substantial, amendment. These amendments do not have the

effect of charging another offense different or distinct from the charge of murder as

contained in the original information. They relate only to the range of the penalty that

the court might impose in the event of conviction. The amendment did not adversely

affect any substantial right of appellant.[22] Besides, appellant never objected to the presentation of evidence to prove the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and insult

or in disregard of the respect due to the offended party on account of rank, age or

sex.[23] Without any objection by the defense, the defect is deemed waived.[24]

There is no dispute that Atty. Sua-Kho was killed in her home. Appellant could

have killed her elsewhere but he decided to commit the crime at her home; thus we

appreciate the aggravating circumstance of dwelling. However, it was not convincinglyshown that appellant deliberately intended to offend or disregard the respect due to rank,

age, or sex of Atty. Sua-Kho. The motive for the murder was his grudge against the

victim and not because she was a lawyer and his employer. Neither did appellant took

into consideration the age of Atty. Sua-Kho and the fact that she is a woman when he

killed her.

Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code,[25] as amended by R.A. No.

7659,[26]

prescribes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death for the crime of murder. Considering the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation and theaggravating circumstances of dwelling, and taking advantage of superior strengthwithout any mitigating circumstance, the proper imposable penalty would have beendeath.[27]

However, in view of the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346 or the ActProhibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty on June 24, 2006[28], the penalty that should

be meted is reclusion perpetua, thus:

SECTION 1. The imposition of the penalty of death is hereby prohibited. Accordingly, Republic Act No. Eight Thousand One Hundred Seventy-Seven (R.A. No. 8177), otherwise known as the Act Designating Death by LethalInjection is hereby repealed. Republic Act No. Seven Thousand Six Hundred Fifty- Nine (R.A. No. 7659), otherwise known as the Death Penalty Law and all other laws,executive orders and decrees insofar as they impose the death penalty are herebyrepealed or amended accordingly.

SEC. 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed:

(a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of

the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code; or

(b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law violated does not makeuse of the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code.

Pursuant to the same law, appellant shall not be eligible for parole under Act No.4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law.






























Regarding damages, when death occurs due to a crime, the following may be

recovered: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; (5) attorney's feesand expenses of litigation, and (6) interest, in proper cases.[29]

We affirm the monetary awards granted by the Court of Appeals but modify theamount of actual damages and exemplary damages.

The award for civil indemnity is mandatory and is granted to the heirs of thevictim without need of proof other than the commission of the crime. Hence, based onrecent jurisprudence, the award of civil indemnity ex delicto of P75,000.00 for the heirsAtty. Sua-Kho is in order.

Actual or compensatory damages are those awarded in order to compensate a

party for an injury or loss he suffered. They arise out of a sense of natural justice and areaimed at repairing the wrong done.[30] To be recoverable, actual and compensatorydamages must be duly proved with reasonable degree of certainty.[31] In the presentcase, the award of actual damages of P298,210.25[32] is correct, considering that the saidamount has been duly proven.

The Court of Appeals correctly awarded moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 in view of the violent death of the victim and the resultant grief of her family.

Article 2230 of the Civil Code specifically states that exemplary damages may beimposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances, asin this case. Moreover, as an example and deterrent to future similar transgressions, theCourt finds that an award of P25,000.00 for exemplary damages is proper.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No.01366, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant Elberto Tubongbanua yPahilanga is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of MURDER as defined

in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659,qualified by evident premeditation and with the attendant aggravating circumstances of taking advantage of superior strength and dwelling, with no mitigatingcircumstances. The proper imposable penalty would have been death. However,

pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346, appellant is sentenced to suffer the penaltyof Reclusion Perpetua without possibility of parole. The appellant is ORDERED to

pay the heirs of Atty. Evelyn Sua-Kho, the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity;P298,210.25 as actual damages; 50,000.00 as moral damages; and P25,000.00 asexemplary damages; all with interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annumfrom this date until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO


















Associate Justice



WE CONCUR :

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN

Chief Justice

REYNATO S. PUNO LEONARDO A. QUISUMBINGAssociate Justice Associate Justice

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ RENATO C. CORONA


CONCHITA CARPIO-MORALES ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.Associate Justice Associate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA DANTE O. TINGA


MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO CANCIO C. GARCIA


PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice



CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified thatthe conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case wasassigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.


Chief Justice

[1] Records, pp. 230-231.[2] CA rollo, pp. 91-92.[3] Records, p. 283. Penned by Judge Leili Suarez Acebo.[4] G.R. Nos. 147678-87, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 640.[5] CA rollo, p. 87.[6] Id . at 99-100. Penned by Associate Justice Rodrigo V. Cosico and concurred in by Associate Justices Regalado E.Maambong and Lucenito N. Tagle.[7] G.R. No. 129875, September 30, 2005, 471 SCRA 241, 256.[8] People v. Galvez , 424 Phil. 743, 755 (2002).[9] TSN, February 5, 2002, p. 41.[10] People v. Pansensoy, 437 Phil. 499, 518 (2002). See also People v. Atadero, 435 Phil. 888, 904 (2002).[11] People v. Malabago, 333 Phil. 20, 34 (1996).[12] People v. Simon, G.R. No. 56925, May 21, 1992, 209 SCRA 148, 162.[13] People v. Devaras, G.R. No. 48009, February 3, 1992, 205 SCRA 676, 693-694.[14] People v. Manes, 362 Phil. 569, 579 (1999).[15] People v. Derilo, 338 Phil. 350, 375 (1997).[16] People v. Herida, G.R. No. 127158, March 5, 2001, 353 SCRA 650, 658.[17] 383 Phil. 656, 668 (2000).[18] RULES OF COURT, Rule 110, Sec. 14: Amendment or substitution.

A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at

any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment mayonly be made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of theaccused.

However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense charged in or excludes any accused from the complaint or information, can be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of court. The court shall state its reasons inresolving the motion and copies of its order shall be furnished all parties, especially the offended party.

If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new onecharging the proper offense in accordance with Section 19, Rule 119, provided the accused would not be placed in double jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at thetrial.

[19] People v. Degamo, 450 Phil. 159, 171 (2003).[20] G.R. No. 103102, March 6, 1992, 207 SCRA 134, 142.[21] People v. Degamo, supra at 172.[22] Id .[23] Records, pp. 225-226.[24] People v. Degamo, supra at 173.[25] REVISED PENAL CODE, Art. 248. Murder. - Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shallkill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death if committed with any of thefollowing attendant circumstances:

1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.

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2. In consideration of a price, reward or promise. 3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel,

derailment or assault upon a railroad, fall of an airship, or by means of motor vehicles, or with the use of any other means involving great waste and ruin.

4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of anearthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic or other public calamity.

5. With evident premeditation. 6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or

outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse. [26] An Act to Impose the Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes, Amending for that Purpose the Revised Penal Code, asamended, other Special Penal Laws, and for other Purposes.[27] See REVISED PENAL CODE, Arts. 63 and 248.[28] Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that laws shall take effect after 15 days following the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwiseprovided. On the other hand, Section 5 of R.A. No. 9346 specifically provides that the Act will takeeffect immediately after its publication in two national newspapers of general circulation. R.A. No. 9346 was publishedin Malaya and Manila Times, two national newspapers of general circulation on June 29, 2006. Accordingly, R.A. No.9346 took effect on June 30, 2006. [29] Nueva España v. People, G.R. No. 163351, June 21, 2005, 460 SCRA 547, 555.[30] Villafuerte v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 134239, May 26, 2005, 459 SCRA 58, 69.[31] LBC Express, Inc. v. Ado, G.R. No. 161760, August 25, 2005, 468 SCRA 216, 225.[32]

The Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 163 and the Court of Appeals had a total of P298,202.25 as actualdamages. This amount is comprised of P25,438.25, representing the hospital bill; and P272,772.00, representing the priceof the casket and funeral services for Atty. Evelyn Sua-Kho. The total of these two amounts is P298,210.25, notP298,202.25.
























SECOND DIVISION

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 156606

represented by the Regional

Executive Director, Department of Present:

Environment and Natural Resources,

Regional Office IV, QUISUMBING, J.,

Petitioner, Chairperson,

CARPIO,

CARPIO MORALES,

- versus - TINGA, and

VELASCO, JR., JJ .

ILDEFONSO T. OLETA, Promulgated:Respondent. August 17, 2007

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO, J .:

The Case

This is a petition for review on certiorari[1] of the Decision[2] dated 30 July 2002and the Resolution

[3] dated 3 January 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.

66714. The 30 July 2002 Decision set aside the 24 July 2001 and 6 September 2001

Orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 80, Morong, Rizal (trial court) which

reinstated the complaint filed by petitioner Republic of the Philippines (petitioner) and

denied respondent Ildefonso Oleta’s (respondent) motion for reconsideration,

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respectively. The 3 January 2003 Resolution denied petitioner’s motion for

reconsideration.

The Facts

On 29 December 1999, petitioner filed a complaint for cancellation of free patent,

original certificate of title, and reversion against respondent and the Register of Deeds

ofRizal. On 17 April 2000, respondent filed his answer. Thereafter, the trial court

issued an Order dated 4 July 2000 directing petitioner “to take the legal steps so that

the case can be expedited.”

On 11 January 2001, the trial court issued an Order[4]

dismissing the complaint

without prejudice because of petitioner’s failure to set the case for pre -trial. Upon

petitioner’s motion and over respondent’s opposition, the trial court reinstated the

complaint on 15 March 2001.[5]

Pre-trial was set for 17 May 2001. However, on 8 May 2001, petitioner moved

that the pre-trial be reset to 14 June 2001 at 10:00 a.m. The trial court granted

petitioner’s motion and reset the pre-trial to 14 June 2001 at 8:30 a.m. The trial court

warned petitioner that failure to appear at the scheduled pre-trial would constrain the

trial court to act accordingly.

On the 14 June 2001 pre-trial, petitioner and petitioner’s counsel failed to

appear. Records also showed that petitioner failed to file a pre-trial brief. In anOrder

[6] dated the same day, the trial court dismissed the complaint for failure to

prosecute.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. Petitioner’s counsel explained that

he arrived at the pre-trial conference at 9:55 a.m. because he expected the pre-trial to

start at10:00 a.m., the time requested in the motion for postponement. Petitioneralso explained that the pre-trial brief was filed on 8 June 2001 by registered mail and

that it was unfortunate that neither the trial court nor respondent received it on

time. Petitioner asked the trial court to reconsider its 14 June 2001 Order and reset

the pre-trial to 2 August 2001.















In its 24 July 2001 Order,[7]

the trial court, in the interest of substantial justice,

granted petitioner’s motion and reinstated the complaint. Respondent filed an Urgent

Motion for Reconsideration. In its 6 September 2001 Order,[8]

the trial court denied

respondent’s motion.

On 18 September 2001, respondent filed a petition[9]

for certiorari with prayer for

preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order with the Court of

Appeals. Respondent alleged that the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it issued the 24 July 2001 and 6

September 2001Orders because the trial court disregarded the rules on pre-trial.

In its 30 July 2002 Decision, the Court of Appeals granted the petition and setaside the 24 July 2001 and 6 September 2001 Orders of the trial court. The Court of

Appeals ruled that the trial court “abused its discretion” when it reinstated the

complaint even if petitioner’s counsel had no special authority to represent plaintiff at

pre-trial. The Court of Appeals added that the trial court had no discretion on the

matter of petitioner’s failure to file its pre-trial brief on time.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which the Court of Appeals denied in

its 3 January 2003 Resolution.

Hence, this petition.

The Issue

Petitioner raises the sole issue of whether the Court of Appeals erred in setting

aside the 24 July 2001 and 6 September 2001 Orders of the trial court.

The Ruling of the Court

The petition is meritorious.

On Failure to File Pre-trial Brief














Section 6, Rule 18[10]

of the Rules of Court (Rules) mandates that parties shall file

with the court and serve on the adverse party their pre-trial briefs at least three days

before the scheduled pre-trial. The Rules also provide that failure to file the pre-trial

brief shall have the same effect as failure to appear at the pre-trial.[11]

Therefore,plaintiff’s failure to file the pre-trial brief shall be cause for dismissal of the action.

[12]

The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the trial court had “no discretion” on the

matter of a party’s failure to file a pre-trial brief. If the trial court has discretion to

dismiss the case because of plaintiff’s failure to appear at pre-trial,[13]

then the trial

court also has discretion to dismiss the case because of plaintiff’s failure to file the pre -

trial brief. Moreover, whether an order of dismissal should be maintained under the

circumstances of a particular case or whether it should be set aside depends on the

sound discretion of the trial court.[14]

In this case, petitioner sufficiently explained that the pre-trial brief was sent by

registered mail to the trial court and respondent on 8 June 2001. That the trial court

and respondent did not receive the pre-trial brief at least three days prior to the pre-

trial was already beyond petitioner’s control. Therefore, the trial court had discretion

to lift the order of dismissal after giving credence to petitioner’s explanation.

On the Absence of a Special Power of Attorney

Petitioner’s counsel admits that he was not equipped with a special power of

attorney when he appeared at the 14 June 2001 pre-trial. However, petitioner’s

counsel claims that the special authority need not be in writing and may be establishedby competent evidence or subsequently ratified by the party concerned.

[15]

Section 4, Rule 18 of the Rules provides:

SEC. 4. Appearance of parties. ― It shall be the duty of the parties and their counsels to

appear at the pre-trial. The non-appearance of a party may be excused only if a valid cause is

showntherefor or if a representative shall appear in his behalf fully authorized in writing to

enter into an amicable settlement, to submit to alternative modes of dispute resolution, and

to enter into stipulations or admissions of facts and of documents.


























Under the old rules, a representative was allowed to establish the authority

needed by showing either a written special power of attorney or competent evidence

other than the self-serving assertions of the representative.[16]

However, the new rules

require nothing less than the authority be in writing. As held in United Coconut

Planters Bank v.Magpayo,[17]

“the rules now require the special power of attorney be

in writing because the courts can neither second-guess the specific powers given to the

representative, nor can the courts assume that all the powers specified in Section 4 of

Rule 18 are granted by the party to his representative.”

The Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court “abused its discretion” when it

reinstated the complaint despite the fact that petitioner’s counsel had no special

authority to represent petitioner at pre-trial. However, abuse of discretion is not

sufficient by itself to justify the issuance of a writ of certiorari. The abuse must begrave and patent, and it must be shown that the discretion was exercised arbitrarily

and despotically.[18]

In this case, there is no showing that the trial court gravely abused

its discretion in reinstating petitioner’s complaint.

Moreover, in Calalang v. Court of Appeals,[19]

the Court ruled that “unless a

party’s conduct is so negligent, irresponsible, contumacious, or dilatory as to provide

substantial grounds for dismissal for non-appearance, the courts should consider lesser

sanctions which would still amount into achieving the desired end.” In this case, there

is also no showing that petitioner willfully and flagrantly disregarded the trial court’sauthority. There is also no indication that petitioner had manifested lack of interest to

prosecute or acted deliberately with the intention to delay the

proceedings. Therefore, the trial court acted accordingly when it set aside the order of

dismissal and ordered the reinstatement of petitioner’s complaint.

We are not saying that adherence to the Rules could be dispensed with. However,

exigencies and situations might occasionally demand flexibility in their

application.[20]

In this instance, substantial justice can be best served if both parties are

given the full opportunity to litigate their claims in a full-blown trial.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the 30 July 2002 Decision

and 3 January 2003 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.

66714. We REINSTATE the 24 July 2001 and 6 September 2001 Orders of the Regional

Trial Court, Branch 80, Morong, Rizal.

SO ORDERED.























ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR :

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING

Associate Justice

Chairperson

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES DANTE O. TINGA


PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation

before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court‟s Division.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING

Associate Justice

Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division

Chairperson‟s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been



reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the

Court‟s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO

Chief Justice

[1] Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.[2] Rollo, pp. 26-33. Penned by Associate Justice Buenaventura J. Guerrero, with AssociateJustices Rodrigo V. Cosico and Perlita J. Tria Tirona, concurring.[3] Id. at 34.[4] Id. at 54.[5] Id. at 56-57.[6] Id. at 77.[7] Id. at 79.[8] Id. at 85-86.[9] Id. at 88-98.[10] Section 6, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 6. Pre-trial brief . ― The parties shall file with the court and serve on the adverse party, in such amanner as shall ensure their receipt thereof at least three (3) days before the date of the pre-trial, their respective pre-trial briefs which shall contain, among others:

(a) A statement of their willingness to enter into amicable settlement or alternative modes of dispute resolution indicating the desired terms thereof;

(b) A summary of admitted facts and proposed stipulation of facts;(c) The issues to be tried and resolved;(d) The documents or exhibits to be presented stating the purpose thereof;(e) A manifestation of their having availed or their intention to avail themselves of discovery

procedures or referral to commissioners; and(f) The number and names of the witnesses, and the substance of their respective testimonies.Failure to file the pre-trial brief shall have the same effect as failure to appear at the pre- trial.

[11] RULES OF COURT, Section 6, Rule 18.[12] RULES OF COURT, Section 5, Rule 18.[13] American Insurance Co. v. Republic of the Phils., 128 Phil. 490 (1967).[14] Pacweld Steel Corp. v. Asia Steel Corp., 203 Phil. 606 (1982).[15] Citing Lim Pin v. Liao Tan, 200 Phil. 685 (1982).[16] See Fountainhead International Phils., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 86505, 11 February 1991, 194SCRA 12; Development Bank of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 49410, 26 January 1989, 169 SCRA409; Lim Pin v. LiaoTan, 200 Phil. 685 (1982); Home Insurance Co. v. United State Lines Co., 129 Phil. 106 (1967).[17] G.R. No. 149908, 27 May 2004, 429 SCRA 669, 675.[18] Vette Industrial Sales Co., Inc. v. Cheng , G.R. No. 170232, 5 December 2006, 509 SCRA532 citing Estate of Jimenez v. Philippine Export Processing Zone, 402 Phil. 271 (2001).[19] G.R. No. 103185, 22 January 1993, 217 SCRA 462, 470.[20] See Bahia Shipping Services Inc. v. Mosquera, 467 Phil. 766 (2004).

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2007/august2007/156606.htm#_ftnref1






























































Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. Nos. 76344-46 June 30, 1988

ANG KEK CHEN, petitioner,vs.THE HON. ABUNDIO BELLO, as Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, and the PEOPLEOF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Eriberto D. Ignacio for petitioner.

YAP, C.J.:

Petitioner questions the alleged grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction committed byrespondent Judge Abundio Bello in violating Administrative Circular No. 7, dated September 23, 1974,regarding the raffle of Criminal Cases Nos. 021429, 021430 and 021431, and prays that the Court ordersthe outright dismissal of the cases.

It appears from the records that on December 28, 1977, petitioner Ang was charged before the then ManilaCity Court (now Metropolitan Trial Court), Branch VIII, with the crimes of "MALTREATMENT," "THREATS,"and "SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES," committed according to the information as follows:

Criminal Case No. 021429 (Maltreatment)

That on or about December 26, 1977, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accuseddid then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously ill-treat by deed one, LE HE CO Y YUDE ANG by then and there, slapping her and giving her fist/blows on her head severaltimes, without, however, inflicting upon said LE HE CO Y YU DE ANG any physical injury.

Criminal Case No. 021430 (Threats)

That on or about December 25, 1977, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused inthe heat of anger, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously threaten to commita wrong and inflict bodily harm upon the person of Le He Co y Yu De Ang by then andthere threatening to kill her but, accused, however, by subsequent acts, did not persist inthe Idea conceived in his threats.

Criminal Case No. 021431 (Slight Physical Injuries)

That on or about December 26, 1977, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accuseddid then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and use personalviolence upon the person of one LUCRECIA ANG Y GO by then and there slapping her onthe face and by beating her thereby inflicting upon the said LUCRECIA ANG Y GO physicalinjuries which have required and will require medical attendance for a period of more thanone but not more than 9 days and incapacitated and will incapacitate the said Lucrecia Angy Go from performing her customary labor during the said period of time.

After the prosecution had presented its evidence, Ang filed a Demurrer to Evidence which was denied by

the respondent court. Ang elevated the incident to the Regional Trial Court of Manila on certiorari andprohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining orders. The petition waslikewise denied (Order dated November 18,1983). On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto theRegional Trial Court's Order.

Meanwhile, the then presiding judge of MTC Branch VIII (where the rases were pending) was promoted tothe Regional Trial Court of Manila. As a consequence, respondent judge, as officer-in-charge of the MTC(Manila), directed the return of the case records to the Clerk of Court for "re-raffle." Petitioner, however,alleged that he received the corresponding order only on August 23, 1984, or AFTER the cases hadalready been actually "re-raffled" and assigned to respondent judge on August 16, 1984.



On September 27, 1984, Ang filed a motion to re-raffle the cases, which was denied. The subsequentmotion for reconsideration was likewise denied. 1 Hence, the present petition, alleging that:

1. Respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction in the manner he conducted the raffle of Criminal Cases Nos. 021429,021430and 021431 Annexes 'A', 'B' and 'C' hereof in gross violation of Circular No. 7 of this Hon.Court in his capacity as Acting Executive Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila

resulting in the assignment to the branch presided by himself of the aforesaid three (3)criminal cases and in denying peremptorily the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner contesting the manner of said raffle.

2. This Hon. Court in the exercise of its rule making power and supervision over all lower courts as demonstrated in several cases decided by it since its reconstitution under thepresent administration in having displayed judicial statemanship and activism and in theexercise of its equity jurisdiction may order the outright dismissal of the said three (3)Criminal Cases Nos. 021429, 021430 and 021431 Annexes "A", "B" and "C" of thispetition."

On November 17, 1986, the Court required the public respondents to comment on the petition. On January26, 1987, the Solicitor General, in an Urgent Manifestation and Motion, prayed that the entire records of the case be ordered transmitted from Branch XIII, Metropolitan Court of Manila, to the Solicitor General'sOffice, so that a comment may be prepared.

In the Comment dated June 23, 1987, the Solicitor General stated that the issue of the alleged non-compliance with the Court's circular regarding the raffle of cases was trivial, that the Court's guidelines onthe matter did not vest any substantive right and a violation thereof did not per se infringe anyconstitutional right of the accused, and that the raffling of cases did not involve an exercise of judicialfunction, but was a mere administrative matter involving the distribution of cases among the differentbranches of the court, which could not be the subject matter of a special civil action for certiorari. TheSolicitor General, however, stated in his comment that in Criminal Case No. 021430, for Light Threats, areview of the records showed no evidence on the alleged threat to kill, hence it should be dismissed. Asregards Criminal Case 021429 (Maltreatment) and 021431 (Slight Physical Injuries) the Solicitor General

opined that it was premature to determine petitioner's guilt or innocence, for unless rebutted, evidence onrecord appeared sufficient to establish the prosecution's cause.

The principal issue of alleged grave abuse of discretion in violation of Circular No. 7 of this Court,regarding the manner of raffle of cases, not denied or explained by public respondent, is not a trivial one.The raffle of cases is of vital importance to the administration of justice because it is intended to insureimpartial adjudication of cases. By raffling the cases public suspicion regarding assignment of cases topredetermined judges is obviated.

A violation or disregard of the Court's circular on how the raffle of cases should be conducted is not to becountenanced. A party has the right to be heard by an impartial and unbiased tribunal.

When the respondent judge conducted the raffle of the three criminal cases in question, apparently inviolation of the Court's Circular No. 7, he did not only arouse the suspicion that he had some ulterior motive for doing so, but he violated the cardinal rule that all judicial processes must be done above board.We consider the procedure of raffling cases to be an important element of judicial proceedings, designedprecisely to give assurance to the parties that the court hearing their case would be impartial. On this point,we found the petition meritorious.

Regarding the other prayer of petitioner for the outright dismissal of the cases invoking the equity jurisdiction of this Court, we are inclined to adopt the view of the Solicitor General that Criminal Case No.021430 (for Light Threats) should be dismissed for lack of evidence. Even Hon. Manuel T. Reyes (later tobecome Justice of the Court of Appeals), before whom as a Regional Trial Judge the case was brought oncertiorari, was of the opinion that there was "utter paucity" of evidence with respect to the charge of threatsin Criminal Case No. 021430 to put to "serious doubt the legal cogency of the disputed orders of April 21

and July 20, 1983;" however, on procedural grounds he refrained from granting the petition. Consideringthe comment of the Solicitor General we find merit in petitioner's contention that Criminal Case No. 021430should be dismissed.

Accordingly, the order of the respondent court denying petitioner's motion to re-raffle the criminal cases inquestion, except Criminal Case No. 021430 for threat which is hereby DISMISSED, is set aside and thesaid cases Criminal Cases No. 021429 and 021431 are remanded to the Executive Judge for re-raffle inaccordance with this Court's Circular No. 7.



SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Respondent Judge was not re-appointed when the judiciary was reorganized pursuant tothe Freedom Constitution of 1986.




Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-31084 May 29, 1981

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,vs.WESTRIMUNDO TABAYOYONG alias "WESTRING", ELIGIO CACAYAN, JULIAN AGUILAR andFRANCISCO GARLEJO, defendants, ANTONIO BAUTISTA alias "BUCOT", ANTOLIN CASTRO andMIGUEL BEGENIO alias "ANING", defendants-appellants.

GUERRERO, J.: 1äwp h ï1.ñët

In an Information dated May 15, 1967 filed with the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, WestrimundoTabayoyong, alias "Westring", Antonio Bautista, alias "Bucot", Antolin Castro, Eligio Cacayan, Alias"Cadio" Julian Aguilar, Miguel Begenio, alias "Aning", and Francisco Garlejo, were charged with the crime

of murder alleged to have been committed as follows:1äwphï1.ñët

That on or about 21st day of January, 1966, at about 11:30 o'clock in the evening, in themunicipality of Manaoag, Pangasinan Philippines and within the jurisdiction of thisHonorable Court, the above named accused, armed with bolo, knives and hard piece of bamboo, conspiring and mutually helping one another, with evident premeditation. abuse of superior strength, treachery, in consideration of a prize or reward and in utter disregard of the respect due the offended party, MARCELO GUICO Y JACOB, a Barrio Captain of Barrio Cabilaoan, Manaoag, Pangasinan, and with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully,unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and strike with said bolo. knives and hard piece of bamboo MARCELO GUICO Y JACOB thereby inflicting upon him wounds and injurieswhich caused his death.

That in attacking, assaulting and striking and MARCELO GUICO y JACOB, the above-named accused took advantage of nighttime besides superior strength to insure thesuccess of their acts and plans.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 1

Upon arraignment, all of the above-named accused pleaded "not guilty". Before trial commenced, thecourt, upon petition of the Special Counsel handling the prosecution of the case, discharged the accusedFrancisco Garlejo from the Information in order that he may be utilized as a government witness. 2 Duringthe progress of the trial, accused Eligio Cacayan who was then released on bail, disappeared and wasbelieved to be dead, while. accused Julian Aguilar escaped from jail and was never found again. Thus. thetrial continued only as to the other four accused, Westrimundo Tabayoyong, Antolin Castro, Miguel

Begenio and Antonio "Bucot" Bautista. 3

The evidence for the prosecution consisted of the testimonies of: (1) the discharged accused FranciscoGarlejo, (2) Dr. Florencio Mangaliman the Municipal Health Officer of Manaoag, Pangasinan whoconducted the necropsy examination on the body of the deceased Marcelo Guico, (3) Mrs. EncarnacionGuico, widow of the deceased, (4) Municipal Judge Marcelino Andrada who conducted the preliminaryinvestigation, and the autopsy report (Exhibit "A"), photographs of the victim after his death (Exhibits "B" toB-1-b"), the extrajudicial statements of Francisco Garlejo (Exhibit "C"), Julian Aguilar (Exhibit "D") andEligio Cacayan (Exhibit "E"), and the transcript of the second stage of the hearing during the preliminaryinvestigation (Exhibit "F").

The substance of the testimony of the principal witness for the prosecution, former accused Francisco

Garlejo, is summarized by the lower court, thus:1äwphï1.ñët

... In the night of January 21, 1966, he, Eligio Cacayan, Julian Aguilar, Antolin Castro,Miguel Begenio and Antonio 'Bucot' Bautista killed Marcelo Guico in Bo. CabilaoanManaoag, Pangasinan. He declared that they killed Marcelo Guico at the instance of theaccused Westrimundo Tabayoyong who promised them a reward of P1,000.00 after killingMarcelo Guico. According to this witness it all began one late afternoon in January, 1966,when he and the accused Julian Aguilar and Eligio Cacayan were. together, walking in abarrio road of Inamotan, Manaoag, Pangasinan, which adjoins barrio Camantiles of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, the four other accused, Westrimundo Tabayoyong, Antolin Castro,



Miguel Begenio and Antonio 'Bucot' Bautista arrived and approached the witness and hiscompanions. The accused Westrimundo Tabayoyong greeted them by saying 'So you arehere.' In that occasion, Westrimundo Tabayoyong proposed to them to kill Marcelo Guico,Bo. Captain of Cabilaoan, Manaoag, Pangasinan, offering to pay them P1,000.00 if theysucceeded. The said witness declared that in the conversations that day, the accusedWestrimundo Tabayoyong and Antonio 'Bucot' Bautista did most of the talking. Knowingthat the proposal was a bad one, the witness said that he and his companions did not

agree. Before they separated, however, Westrimundo Tabayoyong allegedly told thewitness and his two companions to think it over and to be at the same place on another dayto give their decision.

The witness and his two companions went to the same place on the designated day andthere they met again their four co-accused. Altho the proposal was renewed, the witnessand his companions did not agree. So the latter were told to be at the same place onanother day designated for them to talk over the proposal some more. On this third meetingwhen the witness and his companions hesitated to agree to the proposal of WestrimundoTabayoyong, the accused Antonio 'Bucot' Bautista forced them to accept the said proposalby threatening them with bodily harm if they did not agree. Before they parted the witnessand his companions were told to meet with their co-accused once more so that they wouldknow the other details of their plan to kill Marcelo Guico. And so, about three days before

the execution of their agreement, all the accused met on the same place and the witnessand his companions were told to gather in the house of the accused Eligio Cacayan in theafternoon of January 21, 1969 (sic), where the other accused would meet them.

In the afternoon of that day, the accused, Julian Aguilar passed for the witness and,together, they went to the house of the accused Eligio Cacayan in Bo. Barrientos,Manaoag, Pangasinan, When they arrived there Eligio Cacayan told them that their co-conspirators were not yet in. After sometime, however, the accused Antolin Castro, MiguelBegenio and Antonio 'Bucot' Bautista arrived. Around seven o'clock that evening all six of them proceeded to the house of the accused Antonio 'Bucot' Bautista in Bo. Cabilaoan,also in Manaoag, Pangasinan. On the way they stopped by a small store owned by acertain Sito Escritor where Antonio Bucot Bautista bought four bottles of wine. There they

drank three of the four bottles and moved on. On their way they met the accusedWestrimundo Tabayoyong who reminded them that if they succeeded in killing MarceloGuico he would pay them P1,000.00. When they reached the house of Antonio 'Bucot'Bautista the latter served them dinner and let them drink the fourth bottle of wine which wasleft of the four bottles they got from the store of Sito Escritor. Then, Antonio 'Bucot' Bautistatold them that it was time to go. They proceeded to Bo. Cabilaoan. At a certain point in thebarrio road of Cabilaoan Antonio 'Bucot' Bautista stopped them and told them that theywould wait for their intended victim, Marcelo Guico. The time me was between eight andnine o'clock that night.

They sat by the road side and waited. About two and a half hours later, they saw a man ridingon a bicycle with lights coming down the road. Antonio "Bucot" Bautista stopped him. The manwas Marcelo Guico their intended victim Antonio "Bucot" Bautista held him by pointing a gun at

him. Then he thrust a bamboo club to Eligio Cacayan and ordered: "Club him." Marcelo Guicopleaded for his life saying: "Please do not kill me for the sake of my children." Eligio Cacayanhesitated but because he feared Antonio "Bucot" Bautista, he got the bamboo club and struckMarcelo Guico at the back of the latter's head. The victim was thrown towards Antonio "Bucot"Bautista and grappled with the latter. Antonio 'Bucot' Bautista ordered his companions to holdhim. Miguel Begenio went behind the victim and held him by the legs. Antolin Castro held onehand of the victim and the witness helped also by holding the other hand of Marcelo Guico. Antonio "Bucot" Bautista then got the bamboo club from Eligio Cacayan and struck the victim'shead at the back. Marcelo Guico put his right hand on his head just as Antonio "Bucot" Bautistahit him anew right where the victim placed his hand. The victim became limp and he wasdropped on the ground. Antonio "Bucot" Bautista drew a bolo which he carried by his side, heldthe victim by the head and bolowed him several times slashing his neck and hacking him on thehead and face. Then he gave the bolo to Eligio Cacayan and ordered him to do likewise. Eligio

Cacayan out of fear, hacked and slashed the victim on the face. Antonio "Bucot" Bautista,Miguel Begenio and Antolin Castro pulled the deceased and deposited him by the roadsidewhile Julian Aguilar took the victim's bicycle farther down the road. Then Antonio "Bucot"Bautista ordered them to go home, with assurance to pay them later their share of the Pl,000.00promised to them by Westrimundo Tabayoyong. The foul deed was all over before 11:30 o'clockthat night. 4

The post-mortem findings of Dr. Florencio Mangaliman showed that the deceased sustained the followinginjuries:1äwphï1.ñët



1. A mortal slash wound about 10-½ inches long across the neck just above the Adam'sapple, from the left side of the neck to the right side, about 2 inches wide and about 5inches deep, severing the cervical bone, by means of a sharp instrument, thus injuring thespinal cord.

2. A slash wound about 10 inches long from the lower eyelid of the left eye, cutting thebridge of the nose and the zygomatic or cheek bone of the right side of the face, about 1

inch wide and about 3 inches deep, by means of a sharp instrument.

3. Another cut wound about 8 inches long from the vicinity of the right nostril to the center of the nape, right side.

4. A cut v and at the level of the mouth located near its outer canthus, right side, cutting theright lower jaw and connected to the first wound above mentioned.

5. A shattered lacerated wound, star shaped, over the occipital region of the head about 3inches long and about 2 inches wide, produced by a blunt instrument.

6. Another lacerated wound about 1 inch long just behind the right ear or mastoid area.

7. Another lacerated wound of about- 1-½ inches long located about 2 inches above theright ear.

8. A compound fracture with laceration of the terminal phalanx bone of the right little finger,by a blunt instrument.

9. A chop wound somewhat circular in shape, about 1 inch in diameter, over the first knuckle of the middle finger of the right hand, produced by a sharp instrument. 5

The necropsy report further stated that the cause of death was "an irreversible shock due to the injury of the spinal cord and vertebrae of the neck, cerebral concussion and profuse bleeding." 6 At the witness

stand, Dr. Florencio Mangaliman testified that wounds nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4 located at the face and neck couldhave been caused by a bolo; wound no. 5 in the occipital region or at the back of the head could havebeen caused by wood or bamboo; wounds nos. 6 and 7 and fracture no. 8 could have been caused by ablunt instrument; and wound no. 9 was caused by chopping. 7

The widow of the deceased; Mrs. Encarnacion Guico, testified inter alia: that the accused Antolin Castrowas the defeated opponent of her late husband Marcelo Guico for the office of Barrio Captain of Bo.Cabilaoan, Manaoag, Pangasinan; that she did not know the party affiliation of her husband, but since hisopponent Castro was a Nacionalista, then the deceased could have belonged to the Liberal Party; that asBarrio Captain elected in 1963, the deceased was very strict in the enforcement of regulations againststealing, gambling and cattle rustling, thus he made many enemies; that several times during his lifetime,the deceased told her (Mrs. Guico) that he had apprehended and issued warnings to the accused AntolinCastro, Antonio Bautista and Miguel Begenio several times for their gambling activities; that on one

occasion, she was present when the accused Antolin Castro and Antonio Bautista were investigated for gambling (playing cards) but the case was settled amicably after they were warned by the deceased not toplay gambling again; and, that the wife of accused Miguel Begenio was her first cousin. Mrs. Guico alsostated that her deceased husband mentioned to her that he had an altercation with the accusedWestrimundo Tabayoyong during which the latter almost shot the deceased on account of his strictness inenforcing regulations. 8

The then Municipal Judge of Manaoag, Pangasinan, Marcelino Andrada, who conducted the preliminaryinvestigation of the three original accused, namely, Francisco Garlejo, Julian Aguilar and Eligio Cacayan,testified that he personally typed the statements given by said accused which the witness identified asExhibits "C", "D" and "E", respectively. Judge Andrada also identified the records of his preliminaryinvestigation presented in the lower court as Exhibit "F". He further stated that during the preliminary

investigation, he purposely planted one Bernabe Manlepes

9

the janitor of the Mayor of the town, whomformer accused Francisco Garlejo pointed to as one of his companions in the execution of the gruesomemurder. He, however, also admitted that said Bernabe Manlepes looked very much like the real accusedMiguel Begenio. 10

To the accusation filed against them, the accused Westrimundo Tabayoyong Antonio "Bucot" Bautista, Antolin Castro and Miguel Begenio, with respect to whom the trial proceeded, all interposed the defense of alibi, independently of each other as follows:



Accused Westrimundo Tabayoyong alleged that on the night the heinous crime was committed, he was inthe company of Assistant Fiscal Leon Zabala, former Vice-Mayor Legaspi, Atty. Ireneo Salinas, one Atty.

Aquino and then Governor Conrado Estrella, at the Carbungco Restaurant in Quezon City where the latter invited and took them to dinner. The said accused claimed that he left Pangasinan for Manila on January19, 1966 with Zabala, Legaspi and Salinas, and returned to Pangasinan only on January 22, 1966, or theday after Marcelo Guico was killed. 11 Corroborating the allegations of Tabayoyong was the testimony of his witness, Assistant Fiscal Leon Zabala. 12

Accused Antonio "Bucot" Bautista accounted for his whereabouts on the fateful night of the murder asfollows: On January 19, 1966, he went to Barrio Toledo, Ramos, Tarlac to collect the debt of P50.00 owedto him by his uncle, Eusebio Melegrito and stayed in that place up to January 22, 1966. 13 Melegrito whowas presented as a defense witness, confirmed the testimony of Bucot Bautista. This witness also averredthat the accused Bautista had to stay for three days in Toledo because he (Melegrito) was able to sell hispalay only on January 21, 1966 and paid Bautista only on that night, so that the latter left for Pangasinanonly at dawn of the following day, January 22, 1966. This witness further declared that during the threedays that the accused Bautista waited to be paid, he helped the witness in the piling of his palay, andnever left the witness' house in Bo. Toledo. 14

Accused Antolin Castro testified that from January 13 to January 20, 1966, he was in Manila following uphis application papers in connection with his intended trip to Vietnam. 15 He presented his uncle-in-law,

Simon Bilog, who claimed to have visited the accused Castro and conversed with him in the evening of January 20, 1966 up to midnight. 16 The same accused, however, failed to account for his whereaboutsand activities on the night of the murder, and when interrogated on his alleged participation in theconspiracy to kill Marcelo Guico, he merely denied having any knowledge of it and averred that theaccusation against him was untrue. 17

Lastly, accused Miguel Begenio testified that in the evening of January 21, 1966, he was in his own houseat Barrio Cabilaoan, Manaoag, Pangasinan sleeping with his wife and children, and that he learned of thedeath of Marcelo Guico only on the next day, January 22, 1966. He further testified that he was evenpresent during the embalming of the deceased, and together with his wife, he attended for several nightsthe vigil over the remains of the murdered man and the nightly prayers after the burial with the family of deceased, the latter's widow being a first cousin of his (Begenio's) wife. 18

After trial, judgment was rendered on July 24, 1969, the dispositive portion of which reads:1äwphï1.ñët

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds the accused WESTRIMUNDO TABAYOYONG notguilty of the crime charged, his guilt not having been proven beyond reasonable doubt. Thebond he has filed for his provisional liberty is hereby cancelled.

The accused Antolin Castro, Miguel Begenio and Antonio 'Bucot' Bautista are hereby foundto have conspired and caused the death of Marcelo Guico and are, therefore, guilty of thecrime of murder as charged in the information. In the commission of the said offense, theaggravating circumstances of:1äwphï1.ñët

1) that the crime was committed in consideration of a price or reward, or atleast a promise thereof;

2) abuse of superior strength;

3) nighttime, purposely sought to facilitate its commission; and

4) that the wrong done was deliberately augmented by causing other wrongs not necessary for its commission when, after the victim was killed,the accused deliberately slashed his throat and sliced his face several timeson several places,

were found to be present. No mitigating circumstance has been offered by the accusedPursuant to the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, the said accused, each and all of them, are hereby sentenced to death. They are likewise ordered to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Marcelo Guico in the amount of P12,000.00. May God have mercy on their souls.

SO ORDERED. 19



On August 29, 1969, the accused Miguel Begenio moved for reconsideration and/or new trial on thegrounds of: (1) insufficiency of evidence to sustain a finding of his guilt beyond reasonable doubt; and (2)newly discovered evidence. The motion, however, was denied on September 9, 1969.

On October 13, 1969, the records of the ease were elevated to Us for an automatic review of the deathpenalty imposed on the accused Antolin Castro, Miguel Begenio and Antonio "Bucot" Bautista, hereinappellants, who have filed their respective briefs.

Appellant Miguel Begenio raises the following Assignment of errors:1äwphï1.ñët

I. The lower court erred in accepting the testimony of the discharged accused FranciscoGarlejo without any convincing corroborative evidence.

II. The lower Court erred in finding that the evidence established a positive Identification of the accused Miguel Begenio.

III. The lower Court erred in denying the motion for new trial on the ground of newlydiscovered evidence.

IV. The lower Court erred in not accepting the defense of alibi interposed by the accusedMiguel Begenio.

Appellant Antonio Bautista alias "Bucot" makes the following Assignment of Errors:1äwphï1.ñët

I. The trial Court erred in attaching full complete and absolute credence to the testimoniesof Francisco Garlejo the liberated accused turned witness for the prosecution, against theherein defendant-appellant Antonio Bautista, notwithstanding that, aside from corning froma polluted source, his testimonies were so apparently forced, unreliable, uncorroboratedand contrary to the common sense and the ordinary course of things.

II. The trial Court erred in attaching any more significance, weight or value to the rest of the

testimony of Francisco Garlejo against the herein appellant, after having rightly andcorrectly found, held and dismissed as mere "second thought" and "someone else's Ideanot Garlejo's" those portions thereof against the accused Westrimundo Tabayoyong.

III. The trial Court erred in finding and holding that there was sufficient motive for theappellant to COMMIT the cold-blooded murder as charged in the information.

IV. The trial Court erred in completely disregarding and in not giving any credit, weight or value to the testimony of the appellant to the effect that, at the time of the incident, he wasin Toledo, Ramos, Tarlac in the house of his uncle Eusebio Melegrito who corroborated histestimony simply on the ground that, in the words of the trial court itself, "It is too good andtoo perfect to be true," a conclusion which is not only, biased, unjust, unreasonable andapparently malicious, but also absolutely without any real basis in fact, in evidence and inlaw.

V. The trial Court erred in not declaring the appellant absolutely innocent of the charge and,accordingly, in not ordering his complete and absolute acquittal for the failure of theprosecution to prove his guilt beyond all reasonable doubt.

Appellant Antolin Castro interposes the following Assignment of Errors:1äwphï1.ñët

I. The trial Court erred in giving any weight to the testimony of Francisco Garlejo.

II. The trial Court erred in not aquitting Antolin Castro in the face of a reasonable doubt inthe guilt, if any, of herein appellant.

A perusal of the foregoing assignments of errors shows that a common error is assigned, that is, that thetrial Court erred in according credence to the testimony of the accused turned State witness FranciscoGarlejo. Herein appellants Miguel Begenio, Antonio "Bucot" Bautista and Antolin Castro join together inseeking to discredit and cast doubt on the testimony of the aforenamed discharged accused and inassailing the latter's credibility. At this point, it is important to mention the significant fact that in convictingherein appellants and sentencing them to death, the trial Court relied heavily and principally, if not solely,on the testimony of Garlejo. For purpose of this automatic review, therefore, it is imperative that Garlejo'stestimony be carefully studied and meticulously scrutinized.



The main thrust of the arguments of herein appellants in support of their common assigned error is thatGarlejo's testimony comes from a polluted source and the same was not validly and convincinglycorroborated in any of its material points by any other witness or witnesses, nor by any other evidence for the prosecution, hence it cannot and should not be legally accepted and made the basis for the impositionof the supreme penalty of death.

We find the contention meritorious. However, before delving into the merits of appellants' arguments, a

brief discussion on the pertinent rules and applicable jurisprudence governing the discharge of an accusedto become a state witness is in order.

In allowing the discharge of a defendant who is a participes criminis to become a witness for theprosecution and against his co-defendants, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: 1äwphï1.ñët

Sec. 9. Discharge of one of several defendants to be witness for the prosecution. – Whentwo or more persons are charged with the commission of a certain offense, the competentcourt, at any time before they have entered upon their defense, man, direct one or more of them to be discharged with the latter's consent that he or they may be witnesses for thegovernment when in the judgment of the court:

(a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the defendant whose discharge isrequested;

(b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offensecommitted, except the testimony of said defendant;

(c) The testimony of said defendant can be substantially corroborated in its material points;

(d) Said defendant does not appear to be the most guilty;

(e) Said defendant has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moralturpitude.

A competent court within the above section means the court before which the trial is held. 20 The dischargeof an accused who may turn a state witness is expressly left to the sound discretion of the trial court whichhas the exclusive responsibility to see that the conditions prescribed by the rule exist. 21 A dischargeamounts to an acquittal and is a bar to future prosecution for the same offense, unless the releaseddefendant fails or refuses to testify against the other remaining accused, 22 and such failure is attributableto the former's will or fault. 23

Nevertheless, it should be remembered that the testimony of a discharged defendant, though admissible,is still subject to the tests on credibility as any other testimonial evidence. Thus, although an order of discharge of an accused issued by the trial Court may raise a presumption that all the requisites for itsissuance in fact exist, and therefore that the discharge is in order, the same Court is not duty bound tobelieve the testimony of the discharged defendant and pronounce a judgment of conviction against the

remaining accused merely on the strength of such testimony. The Court must be satisfied that the Stateevidence consisting of the testimony of a liberated participes criminis is credible.

Furthermore, it is also a well-settled rule that the testimony of a self-confessed accomplice or co-conspirator imputing the blame for the killing and implicating his co-accused cannot by itself and withoutcorroboration, be considered as proof to a moral certainty that the latter had committed or participated inthe commission of the crime. Thus it is required that the testimony be substantially corroborated by other evidence in all its material points.1äwphï1.ñët

The true doctrine which should govern the testimony of accomplices, or what may be,variously termed principals, confederates, or conspirators, is not in doubt. The evidence of accomplices is admissible and competent. Yet such testimony comes from a 'polluted

source.' Consequently, it is scrutinized with care. It is properly subject to grave suspicion. If not corroborated credibility is affected . Even then, however, the defendant may beconvicted upon the unsupported evidence of an accomplice. If corroborated absolutely or even to such an extent as is indicative of trustworthiness, the testimony of the accompliceis sufficient to warrant of conviction. ...

To quote from one of many decisions of this court, which concerns both the credibility of witnesses as determined by the trial court and the competency of testimony by an



accomplice, we turn to the case of The United States vs. Ambrosio and Falsario (1910, 17Phil., 295), wherein it is said:

It is unquestionably true that the testimony of an accomplice must be taken faith great care and caution It must be assayed and weighed with scrupulous care. The corroborating testimony must be strong and convincing . It is also true, however, that when the testimony of anaccomplice is corroborated by unimpeachable testimony and by strong circumstances, it may

be given its due weight and force against the person in regard to whom it is presented. ...

24

Counsel for the appellants assigns as error the action of the trial court in dismissing theinformation as to some of those who were included in the same charge upon which they wereconvicted and permitting the Government to make use of the persons thus discharged aswitnesses; having admitted their guilt of the crime of which appellants were convicted, their evidence should not have been taken into consideration. While it is true that the evidence of witnesses of this character is subject to the gravest suspicion and, taken by itself, might not besufficient to justify a conviction, nevertheless, the proceeding subjected to is specificallyauthorized ...; and in this case the evidence offered by these witnesses were substantiated by that of many others, both as to the existence of the band of brigands and the connection of theaccused with the same, and there was no error in the proceedings prejudicial to the interests of the accused. 25

...The witness who testified were those released from prosecution for that purpose. Suchtestimony, while under proper circumstances entirely acceptable, is at the outset always subject to suspicion and it requires only very little credible evidence to ripen that suspicion into acertainty. 26

It is elementary law that a defendant in a criminal action cannot be convicted on the evidence of art accomplice only, and that to sustain such a conviction there must be other evidencecorroborating that of the accomplice, which tends to show the guilt of the defendant. 27

... But this witness was evidently a party in the conspiracy and his testimony should not beaccepted without corroboration, of which there is none; for it is a well recognized rule that thetestimony of one of several conspirators should not be accepted, as against his fellows; without

some corroboration. This is especially applicable in a situation where the facts testified to would if fully accepted, necessarily result in the imposition of the death penalty. 28

Defendant and appellant Rufo Dizon in this case complains that he was convicted by the lower court, mainly on the strength of the testimony of his cousin and co-accused Tomas Dizon. Inthis jurisdiction, a co-accused or a co-defendant who has been found guilty or innocent in thesame case, is always a competent witness for, or against, any of his co-accused (United Statesvs. Grant and Kennedy, 18 Phil., 122, 170). And it has even been held that the uncorroboratedtestimony of a co-accused, when satisfactory and convincing, may be the basis for a judgmentof conviction (United States vs. Wayne Shoup 35 Phil. 56; United States vs. Remigio, 37 Phil.610); although the better rule is that to serve as a legal basis for conviction the testimony of anaccomplice must always be corroborated by some other witness or evidence (People vs. Asinas, 53 Phil. 59; People vs. Bantagan, 54 Phil. 834). And the testimony of defendant Tomas

Dizon, a cousin of herein defendant and appellant, as a witness for the prosecution, as to thetaking of the carabaos in question from the municipality of Labrador to the municipality of Mabini, where defendants disposed of them, has been fully corroborated by said witnessDomingo Victorio and by the chief of police and the justice of the peace , who testified as to theadmissions made by herein defendant and appellant as to their taking and disposition of thecarabaos in question, and his plea of guilty. 29

And although it is true that the declarations of an accomplice should be taken withcaution, coming as they do from a polluted source, we are satisfied from a reading of the wholerecord that his version, corroborated on important points by the circumstances disclosed, maybe made the basis or one of the bases of a judgment of conviction. The contention is not truethat the Faltados are convicted 'solely and exclusively, on the strength of the testimony' of Aquilino Agno. They were Identified among others by the offended parties, Angel Biscocho,

Raymunda Perez and Silveria Biscocho.

30

... Such testimony may warrant conviction if corroborated to such an extent that itstrustworthiness becomes manifest (People vs. Riparip 86 Phil. 526; 47 Off. Gaz. (12th Supp15P.). In the present case, Tomas Carandang's testimony finds ample corroboration in thewritten confessions of Eugenio Mendoza and Eliseo Carandang, as well as in that of ModestoLeviste, who confirmed the truth of their contents in open court. 31

The requirements of credibility and corroboration in material points apply with greater reason to thetestimony of a defendant discharged under Rule 119, section 9 above-quoted considering that the



condition of a discharge is that the liberated defendant should testify against his former co-defendants. Assuccinctly elucidated in the case of Bernardo vs. Del Rosario 32 :1äwphï1.ñët

When a defendant is discharged from the information, a contract is entered between himand the State. The discharge will be secured if the defendant will honestly and fairly makea full disclosure of the crime. It is incumbent upon him to keep his part of the contract if hehopes to receive the promised immunity; and if his testimony is corrupt or his disclosure is

only partial, he gains nothing but forfeits his rights under the contract (15 Am. Jur. sec. 32,p. 17; U.S. v. Grant & Kennedy, 18 Phil. 122; V. Francisco's Rules of Court, par. II, p. 330,Rev. Ed.). Courts should not give a premium to a culprit who worked himself into gaininghis acquittal, upon a deception and a contumacious disregard of an agreement validlyentered into.

Thus, "(i)f the testimony of the accomplice is corrupt or his disclosure is only partial, he gains nothing butforfeits his right to exemption." 33 Stated otherwise, the benefits of acquittal and freedom from further prosecution may be enjoyed fully and completely by a discharged defendant only if he testifies for theprosecution and against the rest of the accused. "(I)t is a notorious fact in human nature that a culprit,confessing a crime, is likely to put the blame on others rather than himself. Even though a court may wellcredit the statement of such a witness that other particular persons were engaged in the crime, it is unsafeto accept without corroborating evidence, his statements concerning the relative blame to be attached to

different members of his gang." 34 It is for this reason that the Rules of Court require that several conditionsbe met before an accused may be discharged to act as a government witness.

The very nature of a discharge makes it more imperative that the testimony of a discharged defendant bereceived with utmost care, caution and circumspection.

Guided by the principles laid down by the law and jurisprudence set forth above, We shall now proceed toconsider the facts and circumstances at bar.

There is no question as to the correctness of the premise of appellants' contention that the testimony of Garlejo comes from a polluted source. We fully agree. As earlier stated, Garlejo was one of the originaldefendants in this murder case, hence one of those whom the Municipal Judge who conducted the

preliminary investigation found reasonable ground to believe was guilty of the crime charged. Not only that.This State witness also unconditionally, unmistakably and voluntarily admitted his participation in theconspiracy ' to commit the murder and the actual killing of the deceased Marcelo Guico, both in thepreliminary investigation, as evidenced by his Extrajudicial Statement (Exhibit "C") and the record of theproceedings of said investigation (Exhibit "F"), and during the trial itself, when he was presented as theprosecution's star witness. His testimony is, therefore, regarded as the testimony given by an accompliceor co-conspirator.

Alerted by this fact, the next inquiry is whether Garlejo's testimony withstands the test of credibility. Wehold in the negative. Even the lower Court was not absolute in giving credence to the whole testimony of Garlejo. The decision under review states:1äwphï1.ñët

... The principal evidence laid against Westrimundo Tabayoyong is found in the testimony of Francisco Garlejo. This witness testified that altho he to see the accused WestrimundoTabayoyong on several campaign meetings, he and the accused were never acquainted andhave never spoken together until one day in early January, 1966, while the witness and EligioCacayan and Julian Aguilar were walking on the roadside in Bo. Inamotan, ManaoagPangasinan , Westrimundo Tabayoyong, in company with Antolin Castro, Miguel Begenio and Antonio "Bicot" Bautista, allegedly accosted them, Westrimundo Tabayoyong saying to them:So you are here.' Right on that occasion this witness testified that Westrimundo Tabayoyongproposed to then-. the killing of Marcelo Guico for the consideration of Pl,000.00. This story ishard to believe. It could not be imagined how Westrimundo Tabayoyong, a municipal councilor and budding politician could propose to people he has never known before and whom he wasmeeting for the first time, right then and there by the roadside, the liquidation of a barrio captain.Francisco Garlejo testified that he and his companions have met with Westrimundo Tabayoyongand also his companions three times more afterwards, and in all these meetings WestrimundoTabayoyong has proposed to them the liquidation of Marcelo Guico for reward. If we have tostretch our imagination to believe Francisco Garlejo's testimony on this point, no mater howstupid Westrimundo Tabayoyong would be, the Court cannot just believe that he would himself personally propose to people he was meeting for the first time the killing of Marcelo Guico-Matters of this kind are not done except in secrecy- and only after the proponent has theconfidence of the persons to whom he makes the proposal. 35

We agree with the trial court's holding that Francisco Garlejo's testimony to the effect that WestrimundoTabayoyong proposed and was the mastermind in the killing of the victim Marcelo Guico by offering a



reward of P1,000 to all the accused is inherently improbable, and accordingly, We find as justified theacquittal at the accused Tabayoyong based on the ground that, in the words of the Court, independent of Westrimundo Tabayoyong weak defense of alibi, the latter can not be convicted because the evidencegiven against him was weak, unreliable and even unbelievable. No motive was given by the prosecution for Westrimundo Tabayoyong to wish the killing of Marcelo Guico. No evidence was given why he should payP1,000.00 to have Marcelo Guico killed. It is not on the weakness of an accused's alibi that he should beconvicted but it should be on the showing beyond reasonable doubt that he is guilty (upon which) a

conviction must be made. (CFI Decision, p. 47, Records).

The reasoning for Tabayoyong's acquittal however was ignored or brushed aside by the Court in convictingthe three remaining accused Antonio Bautista, Antolin Castro and Miguel Begenio. For while the trial courtacquitted the accused Tabayoyong because it refused to give credence to the evidence given by thedischarge defendent Francisco Garlejo as Tabayoyong's alleged participation in the conspiracy to committhe murder, the said Court nevertheless convicted the remaining three accused on the very sametestimony of the defendant Garlejo. Rationalizing its decision of conviction, the Court said: 1äwphï1.ñët

But although the testimony of Francisco Garlejo in the conspiracy allegedly broached tothem by Westrimundo Tabayoyong were to be detached from the facts in this case, thisdoes not impair the testimony of Garlejo against the other accused. For, as this Court hasalready observed, implicating Westrimundo Tabayoyong appears more to be some one

else's Idea than Garlejo's. And, as also observed earlier in this decision, the more probabletime a conspiracy to kill Marcelo Guico was made was in the afternoon of January 21,1966, either in the house of Eligio Cacayan or in the house of Antonio "Bucot" Bautista.The Court recalls that on that day, Julian Aguilar picked up Francisco Garlejo from hishouse and together they went to the house of Eligio Cacayan. Julian Aguilar was with aquitar and thought they might do some serenading on that night (Exhibit "D"). It is thereforeclear that murder was not in their minds. But Francisco Garlejo in his preliminaryinvestigation stated that in the house of Antonio "Bucot" Bautista that evening, after theywere wined and fed the agreement to kill Marcelo Guico was 'cooked'. In that occasion allthe accused, Westrimundo Tabayoyong excepted, were present. While this finding mayperhaps affect the credibility of Francisco Garlejo, it still remains believable considering thatthis Court finds this charge reconcilable with probability and the truth. (CFI Decision, pp.

48-49, Records).

In convicting the accused Antolin Castro, the trial court said:1äwphï1.ñët

Evidence exists Chat this accused was the rival of the deceased in the election of a barriocaptain. He lost to the deceased for this position. The next election of a barrio captain wascoming up. This is a plausible cause to make the accused want the deceased eliminatedevidence also exists that this accused and Miguel Begenio and Antonio "Bucot" Bautistawere seen several tunes by the witness Francisco Garlejo in gambling dens and were alsoconnected with thefts in the neighborhood. The wife of the deceased testified that her deceased husband as barrio captain has been quite strict against gambling and cattlerustling. She has testified that Antolin Castro, Miguel Begenio and Antonio "Bucot" Bautistahad in fact been apprehended by the deceased and were released only after warning them

against a repeated violation of law. To cap it all the accused was positively Identified asone of those who were present arid who cooperated when Marcelo Guico was mercilesslymurdered. His alibi that on January 20, 1966, he arrived from Manila where he worked outhis travel papers for Vietnam and that his relatives and his father-in-law visited him andstayed with him until midnight of that day, did not make an accounting of his whereaboutson the day and in the night of the murder of Marcelo Guico.

However, Francisco Garlejo positively tagged him as one of those who arrived in the houseof Eligio Cacayan in the afternoon of January 21, 1966, went with them to the house of

Antonio "Bucot" Bautista, drank wine with them along the way and was with them whenthey left the house of Antonio "Bucot" Bautista to that part of the barrio road in Cabilaoanwhere they waited for almost two hours for the deceased. Francisco Garlejo also positively

testified that when Marcelo Guico was being murdered the accused Antolin Castro gave aidby holding the deceased Marcelo Guico. (CFI Decision, pp. 49-51, Records).

In the case of the accused Miguel Begenio his conviction by the trial court is reasoned out in the decisionunder review as follows: 1äwphï1.ñët

In the case of Miguel Begenio after making a lame denial of his implication by FranciscoGarlejo, he alleged that on the night Marcelo Guico was killed he and his family went tosleep at 8:00 o'clock. He came to know of the death of Marcelo Guico only the following



morning when he followed people who went to see the body of the deceased which waslying by the roadside. He also said that his wife and the wife of the deceased are secondcousins that he watched the embalming of the body of Marcelo Guico and attended the vigilof the deceased. Beyond saying that he did not know the witness Francisco Garlejo andthe accused Eligio Cacayan and Julian Aguilar before they were accused together in thiscase, he did not have explanation to offer why he was implicated in so serious an offensewhich carries the penalty of death. Close as he claimed to be to the widow of Marcelo

Guico, he never denied to her his alleged participation in the killing of her husband or asked her why he was ever accused of the same. This circumstance is quite unnaturalbecause if he was innocent the usual thing for him to have done was to remonstrate withthe deceased, denying his alleged participation therein and asked why he was ever implicated in the murder of Marcelo Guico. Unfortunately, he was likewise Identified to bewith the group that ambushed and murdered Marcelo Guico. Even when he was not in thecourtroom when the Municipal Judge of Urdaneta was conducting the preliminaryinvestigation of this case, the witness Francisco Garlejo readily pointed to the one in thecourt, admittedly planted therein by the judge to test the witness, who was strikingly similar in appearance with the accused Miguel Begenio, as one of the murderers of MarceloGuico. This spontaneous Identification of someone who looked very much like MiguelBegenio convinced this Court that the accused was one of the plotters and was there onthe road when Marcelo Guico was killed. Miguel Begenio like his co-accused does not only

belong to but is an assistant auditor of the party against which the deceased campaignedand won as a barrio captain. Altho he claimed he was in good terms with the widow of thedeceased and attended the vigil for the latter, he has never talked with the said widowabout the death of her husband or told her of his vaunted innocence. He has not rebuttedthe testimony given against aim by the widow of the deceased that he, in company with hisco-accused Antolin Castro and Antonio "Bucot" Bautista, was on several occasionsapprehended by the deceased for gambling and warned against repeated violations of thelaw. Finally, the Court cannot find any explanation, unless it was true why FranciscoGarlejo in his preliminary investigation and in the court charged the accused MiguelBegenio as a co-conspirator and co-principal in murdering Marcelo Guico, a very seriousoffense which carries with it the penalty of death. When Miguel Begenio denied that henever knew Francisco Garlejo, he practically affirmed the truth of the testimony of Francisco Garlejo because it is inconceivable that the latter should Testify against theformer if they did not know each other at all. (CFI Decision, pp. 51-53, Records).

As to the accused Antonio Bautista, the Court after discrediting his alibi, relied on "the fact that FranciscoGarlejo unmistakably placed him in the scene of the killing," so his defense of alibi becomes weaker still.Thus, said the Court: 1äwphï1.ñët

Finally, Antonio 'Buco' Bautista, like his co-accused, also sought the defense of alibi. Hesaid that the clay before Marcelo Guico was killed he went to Toledo, Ramos, Tarlac, toCollect P50.00 which his uncle has borrowed from him and he stayed until 4:00 o'clock inthe morning of January 22, 1966, alleging that when lie was finally paid it was only in thenight of January 21, 1966. His uncle, testimony was corroborated by his alleged debtor Isaw Eusebio Meligrito who testified that Antonio 'Bucot' Bautista went to his house on

January 19, 1966 to collect what he owed from him. He became indebted to the accused ata tune when tile accused was his visitor. As a reason for the prolonged stay of the accusedin his house, the witness said that the accused arrived only when he was piling up hisharvest and had to wait until he was able to sell his palay on the 21st of January and,having arrived late in his house, he was able to pay the said accused only that night.

This defense appears too good to be true. First the obligation was unusually created. – Thewitness borrowing money from the accused when the latter was his visitor. The Courtknows that borrowing does not. usually happen that way. The accused had to go andcollect just before the crime was committed. He had to wait here for barely three dayswithout going anywhere apparently to preclude the possibility of being placed in the vicinitywhere the incident occurred. Even tile payment has been time to be in night of the crime sothat, considering the distance Toledo Ramos Tarlac and Manaoag, Pangasinan, it couldnot be said of the accused that he was in Manaoag when Marcelo Guico was killed. Thisnewfangled defense is too perfect to be true but it cannot fool anyone lt was corroboratedonly by his uncle who cannot even tell at once the name of the alleged buyer of his palaywho gave him the money which to pay the accused. So the Court says s that this defenseof alibi is weak and unreliable because it easily fabricated and concocted without muchopportunity of checking or rebutting it and when we consider the fact that Francisco Garlejounmistakably placed him in the scene of the killing this defense of alibi becomes weaker still. accused appalled perhaps by, the evidence against him even neglected to file his ownmemorandum.



Francisco Garlejo testified on the way to the house of Antonio 'Bucot' Bautista early in theevening of January 21, 1966, all the accused, excluding Westrimundo Tabayoyong stoppedin the store of Sito Escritor in Paitan where Bautista bought four bottles of wine and wherethey drank the first three bottles. Why did not the accused even as much as cite – let alonepresent – Sito Escritor as their witness if only to show that they were not together thatnight? No reason was given for such fatal commission (CFI Decision, pp- 53- 56, Records).

Summarizing the reasons of the trial court in convicting the three accused, it can easily be discerned thatthe conviction was based on (1) the Identification of each of the accused by the discharged or liberateddefendant Garlejo, (2) the possible motives of each of the accused and (3) the weakness of their respective alibis.

After a careful analysis of the evidence on record, We find the conclusions of the trial court to be withoutfactual and legal basis.

The Identification of the accused Bautista made by the defendant Garlejo whose testimony "unmistakably"placed him (Bautista) at the scene of the killing," and the Identification of the accused Begenio who was"unfortunately Identified to be with the group that ambushed and murdered Marcelo Guico," and that of theaccused Castro who, according to Garlejo "when Marcelo Guico was being murdered the accused AntolinCastro gave aid by holding the deceased Marcelo Guico" is not worthy of credence and belief, not onlybecause the evidence relied upon comes from a polluted source but also because it is not supported byany other material evidence on record. The legal principles heretofore cited earlier in this decision as to theprobative value of evidence given by an accomplice, unsupported by corroborating evidence on thematerial points are clearly applicable to the case at bar. We reject Garlejo's testimony incriminating thethree (3) remaining accused not merely because it is polluted, corrupt and contaminated. It is highlyimprobable, unnatural and far out of the common experience of man whether in doing what is good andlawful or what is evil and wrong.

The defendant Garlejo has been accused of stealing a cow and farming equipment worth Fifty Pesos(P150.00) in Urdaneta, Pangasinan, which case is still pending in court (t.s.n., p. 4, 8, July 27, 1967) andhe has also admitted having escaped from jail. (t.s.n., p. 7, July 27, 1967, cited in Brief for accused Castro,p. 7). From this evidence, Garlejo's character is open to grave suspicion and doubt.

The only evidence on record tending to prove herein appellants' complicity in the crime charged, asidefrom Garlejo's unbelievable and incompetent testimony, are the extrajudicial confessions of the missingoriginal co-accused, Julian Aguilar and Eligio Cacayan, marked Exhibits "D" and "E", respectively. As amatter of fact, before the actual trial could commence in the lower court, and while the prosecuting fiscalwas arguing his petition for the discharge of then accused Francisco Garlejo which was met with energeticprotests and objections from the respective counsel of the other accused, said fiscal admitted: 1äwphï1.ñët

I should be frank with the defense that the evidence of the prosecution in this case are onlythe three confessions of the three accused (referring to Francisco Garlejo, Julian Aguilar and Eligio Cacayan), and we have no more. There is a need for us to get the testimony of one of these accused ... (t.s.n., Ceralde, July 5, 1967, p. 4).

Pursuant to Rule 130, Section 29 of the Rules of Court. the declaration of an accused expresslyacknowledging his guilt of the offense charged may be given in evidence against him. The corollary rule isthat the confession of one of several co-accused is not competent evidence against his co-accused, thereason being that the confession of one of the defendants is hearsay evidence with respect to the rest, asthe latter had no opportunity to cross- examine the former 36 and since appellants' respective counselsinterposed timely and vigorous objections during the trial to the admission of the aforementioned Exhibits"D" and "E" (t.s.n., Ceralde, August 2, 1967, pp. 103-105), the same being hearsay are inadmissible asevidence against the appellants.

There is, therefore, no other evidence to corroborate the unreliable, unconvincing and unsatisfactorytestimony of Garlejo as far as herein appellants are concerned.

We agree with the argument of the accused Antolin Castro that it would he illogical and unfair for the trialcourt to convict appellants on the basis of the testimony of Francisco Garlejo which was discredited by thecourt and so acquitted the alleged mastermind of the killing, the accused Westrimundo Tabayoyong, citingthe case of People vs. Chaw Law Shun et al ., 23 SCRA 127 and reiterating the holding in People vs.

Aquino, et al ., L-3789, June 30, 1960, 108 Phil. 814, thus —1äwphï1.ñët

Since the widow appears to be the star witness of the prosecution whose testimony wasgiven much weight in pinning liability on the accused, the Supreme Court would not beconsistent and true to logic and fairness if it would now reach a verdict of conviction against



them on the strength of the same testimony which was discredited by the trial court insofar as one of their co-accused in the same case is concerned. (Syllabus)

As to the possible motives pointed out in the judgment under review, We rule that the evidence in supportthereto are, to our considered view, very flimsy and weak. For assuming that the accused Antolin Castrowas the rival of the deceased in the election of barrio captain and said accused lost to the deceased for theposition; that the next election for barrio captain was coming up and this was a plausible cause for the

accused Castro to eliminate the deceased, it has not been shown that said accused was a candidate or interested in running for said position. Assuming also that the accused Begenio does not only belong to butis an assistant auditor of the party against whom the deceased campaigned and won as a barrio captainand that he was apprehended by the deceased on several occasions for gambling with his co-accusedBautista and warned against repeated violations of the law, there is also no showing that Begenio andBautista were charged in court or convicted for said offenses.

But basically, the testimony of the widow as to these motives however plausible is essentially hearsay, theprobative value of which is open to grave doubts and suspicion, especially in a capital accusation such asthe case at bar.

Moreover, while proof of motive is not necessary where there is a positive Identification of the accused, inthe instant case where the identification of the accused-appellants as the authors of the crime chargedproceeds from unreliable and unsatisfactory evidence, evidence of motive becomes necessary. (People vs.Salas, 66 SCRA 126; People vs. Madera, 57 SCRA 349; People vs. Dorico, 54 SCRA 172). Indeed, thelack of motive to kill the offended party which has become apparent from the rejection of Garlejo'stestimony that the killing was motivated in consideration of a price or reward allegedly offered by theaccused Tabayoyong, may be taken or considered as a further basis for acquitting the remaining accused.(People vs. Padirayon, 67 SCRA 135).

The remaining errors assigned by herein appellants which all revolve around their respective defenses of alibi need not be lengthily discussed for there can be no dispute of the well-known and oft-repeated rulingsof the Supreme Court on the inherent weakness of this particular defense interposed by said appellants.However it must also be admitted that in quite a number of cases where the evidence for the prosecutionagainst the accused as author of a crime charged is weak, doubtful, unconvincing, unreliable or

unsatisfactory, the defense of alibi assumes importance and acquires commensurate strength, andtherefore, may be given credence. 37 Indeed, We must "emphasize the fact that courts should not at oncelook with disfavor at the defense of alibi. When an accused puts up the defense of alibi, the court shouldnot at once have a mental prejudice against him. For, taken in the light of all the evidence on record, it maybe sufficient to acquit him ... ." 38 In People vs. Bartolay , 39 We held: "The alibis of the three appellants,while weak in themselves, yet when coupled with the improbabilities and uncertainties of the prosecutionevidence and the absence of adequate proof of conspiracy, suffice to raise reasonable doubts as to their responsibility."

Appellant Bautista's allegations that on the night of the murder he was in Barrio Toledo, Ramos, Tarlac inthe house of his uncle, Eusebio Melegrito was sufficiently corroborated by the latter who testified in openCourt.

For his part, appellant Begenio simply testified that on the fateful night of January 21, 1966, he was in hisown house in the same barrio where the murder was perpetrated, and that he was then sleeping with hiswife and children. The simplicity of this accused's defense of alibi ought to be commended rather thandisbelieved. As a defendant in a murder case, he could have offered to establish a concocted alibi whichwould bring him to a place far from the scene of the killing so as to make it impossible for him to haveparticipated in the commission of the crime, rather than declare as the truth his presence in the very samebarrio where the victim met his death in the hands of assasins. We are, therefore, persuaded to takeBegenio's declarations regarding his whereabouts as aforestated to be true.

With respect to appellant Castro, it is true that he has failed to account for his whereabouts at the time of the murder for his evidence consisted of proof tending to show where he was, what he was doing andwhom he was with on the day before the murder. Nevertheless despite this failure as well as the weakness

of appellants' evidence, their acquittal or conviction should be based on all the evidence on recordbecause "the accused cannot be convicted by reason of the weakness of their alibi. The prosecution mustprove their guilt upon the strength of its evidence and not by the weakness of that of the accused." 40 AsWe said in People vs. Fraga, et al ., speaking through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes; 1äwphï1.ñët

(A)n accused cannot be convicted on the basis of evidence which, independent of his alibi, isweak, uncorroborated, and inconclusive. The rule that alibi. must be satisfactorily proven wasnever intended to change the burden of proof in criminal cases; otherwise, we will see theabsurdity of an accused being put in a more difficult position where the prosecution's evidence



is vague and weak than where it is strong." 41(See also People vs. Cunanan, etal., supra People vs. Bulawin, supra; People vs. Basuel, supra; People vs. Dayag,supra; andPeople vs. Lim and Lim, supra)

In fine and essence, the prosecution has failed to prove the guilt of the accused-appellants beyondperadventure of doubt, not because of the weakness of their alibi but due to the reliance of the governmenton evidence that is polluted and corrupt. The innocence of the three accused which is presumed by

constitution trial mandate has not been successfully rebutted or overthrown, hence their acquittal mustnecessarily result from and be ordered by virtue of this review.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the judgment of conviction is hereby reversed and the accused Antonio Bautista alias "Bucot", Antolin Castro and Miguel Begenio alias "Aning" are hereby acquitted andordered released from confinement, unless otherwise detained for another offense.

Cost de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Aquino, Abad Santos, De Castro and Melencio-Herrera,

JJ., concur.1äwphï1.ñët

Fernandez, and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., are on leave.

Footnotes1äwphï1.ñët

1 CFI Record, p. 189.

2 CFI Decision, p. 3; CFI Records p. 484.

3 Ibid ., pp. 11-12; CFI Record, pp. 492-493.

4 Ibid ., pp. 3-8; CFI Record, pp. 484-489.

5 Exhibit "A"; Folder of Exhibits, p. 1.

6 Ibid .

7 T.SN., Navarro, July 21, 1967, pp. 85-94.

8 T.SN., Ceralde Aug. 2, 1967; pp. 77-100.

9 T.SN., Austria, July 28, 1967, pp. 116, 118; but "Bernabe Manlapas" in lower Court'sdecision, p. 14, CFI Record, p. 495, while "Bernabe Marquez" in Exhibit "F" t.s.n. secondstage of preliminary investigation, Jan. 27, 1967), p. 84.

10 T.SN., Austria, July 28, 1967, pp. 96-118.

11 T.SN., Navarro, March 1, 1968, pp. 123-127.

12 Ibid . pp. 112-119.

13 T.SN., Mabutas Aug. 22, 1968, pp. 42-43 and pp. 48-52.

14 T.SN., Navarro, April 25, 1968, pp. 149-15-D.

15 T.SN., Navarro, Oct. 24, 1968, pp- 170-174 and pp. 179- 184.

16 lbid , pp. 15 -164.

17 lbid., pp. 169-170.



18 T.SN.,Mabutas, March 1, 1968, pp. 25, 32.

19 CFI Decision, pp- 39-40; CFI Records pp- 520-521.

20 U.S. vs. Inductive, 40 Phil. 84, 88-89.

21 U.S. vs. Barredo, et al. 32 Phil. 444, 451: U.S. vs- Abanzado, et al. 37 Phil. 658. 664-

668; People vs. Ibañez, et al., 92 Phil. 933, 936; Guiao vs. Figueroa, 94 Phil. 1018, 1023;People vs. Mendiola, et al., 46 O.G. 3629, 3633: People vs- Bautista, et al. 106 Phil. 39,44; People vs. Manigbas et al., 109 Phil. 469, 478.

22 Section 11, Rule 119, Revised Rules of Court.

23 People vs. Mendiola et al., supra p. 3634.

24 U.S. vs. Remigio, et al., 37 Phil. 599, 610-611 (Emphasis supplied); also quoted inPeople vs. Lanas, et al., 93 Phil. 147, 154155, and in People vs. Canete 43 SCRA 14, 26.See also People vs. Aquino. 57 SCRA 43,48.

25 U.S. vs. Aguasa et al., 4 Phil. 274, 275-276 (Emphasis supplied).

26 U.S. vs. San Juan, 25 Phil. 513, 521 (Emphasis supplied).

27 People vs. Asinas, et al., 53 Phil. 59, 67 (Emphasis supplied) also quoted in People vs,Lanas, et al., supra, p. 155.

28 People v. Bumanglag, et al. 56 Phil. 10, 14-15 Emphasis supplied); also quoted inPeople vs. Lanas, et al., supra, p. 155.

29 People vs. Dizon, et al., 76 Phil. 265, 271 (Emphasis supplied).

30 People vs. Faltado, et al., 84 Phil. 89, 94 (Emphasis supplied ).

31 People v. Manigbas, et al. supra, 478-479 (Emphasis supplied).

32 L-18237, Jan. 31, 1964, 10 SCRA 140,147.

33 14 Am. Jur., p. 845.

34 People vs. Mandangan, et al., 52 Phil. 62, 64.

35 CFI Decision, pp- 25-27 (Emphasis supplied).

36 U.S. vs. Candelaria, et al., 4 Phil. 543, 544; U.S. vs. Macalalad, et al., 9 Phil. 1, 5;People vs. Durante, et al., 47 Phil. 654, 658; People vs. Amajul, et al., 1 SCRA 682 687.

37 People vs. Cunanan, et al., 19 SCRA 769, 783; People vs. Bulawin, 29 SCRA 710, 721-722; People vs. Cruz, 32 SCRA 181, 187, quoting from People vs. Baquiran, 20 SCRA451, 460- 461, People vs. Basuel, 47 SCRA 207, 222-223; People vs. Beltran, 61 SCRA246, 255-256; People vs. Salas, et al., 66 SCRA 126, 132-133; People vs. Lim and Lim, 80SCRA 496.

38 People vs. Villacorte, et al.. 55 SCRA 640, 655.

39 42 SCRA 1, 6.

40 People vs. Davag 56 SCRA 439, 450.

41 109 Phil. 241, 250.




Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-33492 March 30, 1988

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appelleevs.EFREN MERCADO, defendant-appellant.

PADILLA, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision * rendered by the defunct Circuit Criminal Court, Seventh JudicialDistrict, Pasig, Rizal, dated 11 March 1971, in Criminal Case No. CCC-564-Rizal, entitled: "People of thePhilippines, plaintiff, versus Efren Mercado, accused," the dispositive part of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, finding the accused, Efren Mercado, GUILTY, beyond reasonable doubt, of the crime of Murder as defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as charged inthe information, the Court hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of RECLUSIONPERPETUA; to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Dominador Salvador, Jr., the amountof P12,000.00; to pay the amount of P5,000.00 as moral damages and another P5,000.00as exemplary damages; and to pay the costs.

The facts of the case, as summarized in the People's Brief, are as follows:

At about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of December 23, 1970, the deceased Dominador Salvador, Jr. and his friends were in their house preparing to caroling. Among those with

the deceased were Ding Cristobal, Rod Cristobal, Teody Pangilinan, Emilio Fuerte andLeonardo Calvento. (t.s.n., pp. 2-3, January 14, 1971) From the house of Dominador Salvador they proceeded to the house of Mr. Aguilar a place which is more or less 16 to 25meters from the place of the deceased Dominador Salvador, Jr. (t.s.n., p. 3, January 15,1971), In going to the place of Mr. Aguilar they were to pass through an "eskinita" a smallroad (t.s.n., p. 3, January 15, 1971). Mr. Aguilar lives in Real street, a national road.

When they went to the place of Mr. Aguilar, Dominador Salvador, Jr. and LeonardoCalvento went ahead of the group. The group walked in a regular manner, not too slow butnot too fast. On their way to Mr. Aguilar's place they heard slanderous words directed atthem and when they looked around to ascertain who uttered the slanderous words, stoneswere suddenly hurled against them. Those who hurled the stones belonged to the group of the accused Efren Mercado (t.s.n., p. 4, January 15, 1971). Emilio Fuerte who was one of

those who went caroling was hit by a stone about one (1) inch in a diameter (t.s.n., p. 5,January 15, 1971) and because he was not hurt very much and, finding that the guitar which they brought along with them had a broken string, the group returned to the place of Dominador Salvador, Jr. to repair the guitar (t.s.n., p. 6, January 15, 1971). It took thedeceased and his group ten (10) minutes to repair the guitar after which they proceeded togo caroling again.

Upon reaching a comer, they saw the group of the accused Efren Mercado waiting for them(t.s.n., p. 6, January 15, 1971). The group of the accused again stoned the group of thedeceased and because of this, deceased (and Leonardo Calvento) approached the groupof the accused to inquire from them why they were stoned (t.s.n., p. 6-7, January 15, 1971).

Deceased and Leonardo Calvento were followed by Emilio Fuerte. While Emilio Fuerte wasin front of the store he saw Efren Mercado grab the deceased and gave him a thrust withhis right hand. At first Leonardo Calvento who was with the deceased thought that thedeceased was not stabbed but when they were leaving the place of the incident the victimstated the following words, "May tama ako," and later he saw blood on the right chest of thevictim. The victim was brought to the San Juan De Dios Hospital where he died on arrival.

A necropsy report was made on the victim by Dr. Roberto Garcia and the following woundswere found:



POST-MORTEM FINDINGS

Pallor, integument conjunctivae and nailbeds, stab wound, chest, right,anterior aspect, infraclavicular region, at the level of the 1st intercostalspace, right, 6.5 cms. from the anterior mediam line, 1.7 cm. in size,oriented downward and laterally, edges, clean-cut, upper extremity sharp,lower extremity, contused, directed downwards, backwards, and medially,

involving among other things, the soft tissues, thru the lst intercostal space,right grazing the lower order of the 1st rib, into the right thoracic cavity,perforating the upper lobe right lung, into the middle mediastinumpenetrating the superior vena cava with approximate depth, 12.0 cms.

Hemothorax, right -1,920 cc.

Brain and other visceral organs, pale.

Stomach - 1/2 filled with partly digested rice and food materials

CAUSE OF DEATH — Stab wound of the chest, right. 1

The accused-appellant admits having stabbed the deceased, but claims self- defense. His account of theincident is as follows:

... It appears that in the evening of December 23, 1970, accused Efren Mercado had to go tothe house of his employer, Larry Salvador, at Real Street, Las Pinas Rizal. He had twocompanions at the time, who were left outside when he went into the house of his employer.When he came out, his two companions complained to him that they were "napagiinitan" by agroup of persons, who were later Identified to be Dominador Salvador and his "barkada." Thisgroup of Dominador Salvador threw firecrackers at the two companions of the accused. Toavoid any incident, the accused told his companions to go home, and he himself went home. Onthe way home, he saw some persons, numbering twelve in all, chasing two other persons. HeIdentified the pursued persons as his two companions so he intervened and tried to stop the

pursuers. The pursuers turned on the accused, attacking him with piece of chain and a piece of bamboo. To defend himself, the accused whipped out a knife and brandished it before hisattackers, to frighten them. He had no intention to injure anyone, only to stop his attackers andto defend himself. After the attackers ran away, the accused proceeded home. Later, in theevening, he was brought to the police department and subsequently charged for the death of one Dominador Salvador. 2

The trial court, after analyzing the evidence, rejected the defense of the accused, because of the positiveand unqualified Identification by prosecution witnesses Leonardo Calvento and Emilio Fuerte that theaccused-appellant was the unlawful aggressor and slayer of the victim; and, besides, according to the trialcourt, the act of the appellant of running away from the scene of the crime, after the commission thereof, is"repugnant" to the appellant's claim of innocence "for if it is really true that he was forced to slay the victimto save his life, then he could have surrendered to the police authorities right after the commission of the

crime or given himself to any member of the barrio council, where he is residing as is ordinarily done inurban areas." 3

We agree with the trial court that the accused-appellant has not convincingly proven his claim of self-defense. His defense is based solely upon his testimony, whereas, the version of the prosecution issupported by the testimonies of Leonardo Calvento and Emilio Fuerte both of whom were with thedeceased on the night in question and witnessed the commission of the offense. It is well-settled that self-defense is an affirmative allegation that must be proven with certainty by sufficient, satisfactory andconvincing evidence that precludes any vestige of criminal aggression on the part of the person invokingit, 4 and the Court has ruled that the plea of self-defense cannot be justifiably entertained where it is notonly uncorroborated by any separate competent evidence but, in itself, is extremely doubtful, 5 and cannotovercome the version of the prosecution supported by the testimony of two eye-witnesses who saw the

incident.

6

The accused-appellant, in this appeal, assails the trial court for giving more weight to the testimony of theprosecution witnesses despite certain errors, inconsistencies and contradictions in their declarations.

We have examined the record of the case with great care and find no reason to set aside the findings of fact of the trial court, which are supported by documentary evidence and the testimony of witnesses whohave no reason whatsoever to testify falsely against the accused-appellant. Moreover, the rule is well-settled that, where the issue is one of credibility of witnesses, appellate courts will not generally disturb the



findings of the trial court, unless it has plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value which, if considered, might affect the result of the case. Herein appellant failed to demonstrate that his case fallsunder such exception which would justify this Court to overturn the findings of fact of the trial court.

The accused-appellant further assails the trial court for denying his motion to dismiss dated 28 January1971. The appellant contends that the prosecution failed to prove a prima facie case against him so thatthe trial court should have granted his e motion to dismiss.

The contention is not well-taken. Judicial action on a motion to dismiss or demurrer to the evidence is leftto the exercise of sound judicial discretion. Unless there is a grave abuse thereof, amounting to lack of

jurisdiction, the trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss may not be disturbed. In the instant case, the trialcourt, after hearing the evidence presented by the prosecution, was convinced that said evidence wassufficient to warrant a finding of guilty vis-a-vis the accused. As a matter of fact, the Court is convinced thatthe accused-appellant is criminally liable for the death of Dominador Salvador, Jr. even without theadmission of the accused-appellant.

The crime committed, however, as pointed out by counsel for the accused- appellant and confirmed by theSolicitor General, is Homicide and not Murder. We cite with approval the following disquisition of theSolicitor General:

We agree that the defendant should have been convicted of Homicide instead of Murder.The circumstance alleged in the information to qualify the crime of murder is treachery.There is treachery or "alevosia" if the "offender commits any of the crimes against person,employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly andspecially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which theoffended party might make."

A perusal of the evidence adduced by the prosecution reveals that the stabbing incidentwas preceded by the "uttering of slanderous remarks and followed by stoning." (t.s.n., pp.4-5, January 14, 1971 and t.s.n., pp. 4, 5, 6, January 15, 1971). Because of the stoning, thedeceased approached the group of the accused and (t.s.n., p. 6, January 14, 1971) it wasat that time when the deceased was inquiring from the group of the accused the reason

why they were stoned that he (deceased) was stabbed.

The utterance of slanderous remarks followed by the stoning incident is a warning to thedeceased and Ms group of the hostile attitude of the group of the appellant and theseshould have placed the deceased and his companions on their guard. (People vs.Gonzales, 76 Phil. 2173; People vs. Luna, 76 Phil. 107; People vs. Sagayno, 95 SCRA366).

Further, the prosecution evidence also discloses that the place of the wound indicated thatthe accused was facing the deceased. (p. 8, t.s.n., January 12, 1971)

All these circumstances negative "alevosia".

We also find merit in the submission of the accused-appellant that the trial court erred in finding that he(accused) had fled from the scene of the crime. Pat. Artemio Talampas of the Las Pinas police declaredthat he arrested the accused in the latter's house, which is located about 40 meters away from the sceneof the stabbing incident; that the accused was at the time talking with his friends; and that when heconfronted the accused with the knife, the accused readily admitted ownership, thereof, as well as hishaving stabbed Dominador. 7 These circumstances negate flight.

As recommended by the Solicitor General, the penalty to be imposed upon the accused-appellant shall beeight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor , as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months andone (1) day of reclusion temporal , as maximum. However, the indemnity to be paid to the heirs of thevictim shall be increased to P30,000.00, in line with recent decisions.

WHEREFORE, with the modifications above indicated, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.With costs against the defendant-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Yap (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Paras and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.



Footnotes

* Penned by Judge Onofre A. Villaluz.

1 Appellee's Brief, pp. 2-5.

2 Appellant's Brief, pp. 2-3.

3 Trial Court decision, p. 16, Rollo, p. 24.

4 People vs. Lebumfacil, G.R. No. L-32910, March 28, 1980, 96 SCRA 573.

5 People vs. Maranan, G.R. Nos. L-47228-32, L-46587, Dec. 15, 1986, 146 SCRA 243.

6 People vs. Empeno, G.R. No. L-27610, May 28, 1970, 33 SCRA 40.

7 T.S.N. of Jan. 12, 1971, pp. 17-18,



FIRST DIVISION

SPS. HENRY and ROSARIO G.R. No. 159098

UY,

Petitioners, Present:

- versus - PANGANIBAN, C.J., Chairperson,

YNARES-SANTIAGO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

HON. JUDGE ARSENIO P. CALLEJO, SR., and

ADRIANO, in his capacity CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ . as Pairing Judge of RTC, Br. 64, Tarlac City, CITY

PROSECUTOR ALIPIO C. YUMUL and Promulgated: PIÑAKAMASARAP CORP.,

Respondents. October 27, 2006

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

D E C I S I O N

CALLEJO, SR., J .:

Challenged in this instant Petition for Review on Certiorari is the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 62103 which affirmed the Orders of theRegional Trial Court (RTC) of Tarlac City[2] denying the motion to quash theInformation in Criminal Case Nos. 6512-94.

Based on a confidential information that petitioner Henry Uy had been engaged inmanufacturing, delivering, and selling “fake” Marca Piña soy sauce,[3] Orlando S.Bundoc, Intelligence Officer II of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau(EIIB), applied for a search warrant[4] for unfair competition which was grantedon February 14, 1994. When the search warrant was implemented on even date, Atty.Francisco R. Estavillo, agent of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in Tarlac,seized fifty-five (55) bottles of label Marca Piña soy sauce.[5]

Consequently, a criminal complaint was filed in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC)of Tarlac City on March 23, 1994, charging petitioner Henry Uy with violation of Article 189 (Unfair Competition) of the Revised Penal Code.[6]

On November 8, 1994, private respondent Piñakamasarap Corporation moved toamend the criminal charge by including Henry‟s spouse, petitioner Rosario Uy.[7] The

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/october2006/159098.htm#_ftn1




























court granted the motion in its Order dated November 15, 1994 and admitted theamended criminal complaint which reads:

The undersigned, LUIS E. GONZALES, Comptroller of PIÑAKAMASARAPCORPORATION of 583 Sta. Veronica St., Novaliches, Quezon City, and by authorityof the said corporation, under oath accuses HENRY UY, ROSARIO GUTIERREZ UYand a certain JOHN DOE of Violation of Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code,committed as follows:

That on or about February 14, 1994, and for sometimes ( sic) prior thereto, inMunicipality of Tarlac, Tarlac, Philippines, the said Rosario G. Uy accused, being thenthe owner of a business establishment with principal address at Phase I, Northern HillsSubdivision, San Vicente, Tarlac, Tarlac, and her co-accused, husband, HENRY UY,and a certain John Doe, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully andfeloniously conspire and confederate together and help one another engaged in unfair competition with the intention of deceiving and defrauding the public in general and theconsuming public in general and PIÑAKAMASARAP Corporation, the manufacturer and bottler of soy sauce under the name “MARCA PIÑA,” a [trademark] dulyregistered with the Philippine Patent Office and sell or offer for sale soysauce manufactured by them with the brand name “Marca Piña” which is a bastardversion of the trademark, and using the bottles of Piñakamasarap Corporation andsubstituted the contents thereof with those manufactured by the accused and passing tothe public that said products to be the products of Piñakamasarap Corporation which isnot true, thereby inducing the public to believe that the above-mentioned soy sauce soldor offered for sale by said accused are genuine “MARCA PIÑA” soy saucemanufactured by PIÑAKAMASARAP CORPORATION, and of inferior quality to thedamage and prejudice of the Piñakamasarap Corporation.

Contrary to law.

Tarlac, Tarlac, November 8, 1994.[8]

After preliminary examination of the prosecution witnesses, the court found probable cause to indict petitioners.[9] On January 30, 1995, the court issued a warrantof arrest against petitioners.[10] They were released after posting a cash bondon February 1, 1995.[11] On July 10, 1995, petitioners were arraigned, assisted bycounsel, and pleaded not guilty to the charge.[12] Petitioners, through counsel, waived

the pre-trial conference on October 25, 1995. The initial trial was set on November 27,1995.[13]

However, it was only on February 26, 1996 that the first witness of the prosecution, Atty. Estavillo of the NBI, testified. In the meantime, in October 1996, thisCourt issued Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 104-96 providing, inter alia, that theRTC shall have exclusive jurisdiction over violations of Articles 188 and 189 of theRevised Penal Code and Republic Act (R.A.) No. 166, as amended, thus:

VIOLATIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS SUCH AS, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, VIOLATIONS OF ART. 188 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE(SUBSTITUTING AND ALTERING TRADEMARKS, TRADE NAMES, OR SERVICE MARKS), ART. 189 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE (UNFAIR COMPETITION, FRAUDULENT REGISTRATION OF TRADEMARKS, TRADE NAMES, OR SERVICE MARKS, FRAUDULENT DESIGNATION OF ORIGIN,AND FALSE DESCRIPTION), P.D. NO. 49 (PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUALPROPERTY RIGHTS), P.D. NO. 87 (AN ACT CREATING THE VIDEOGRAM



























REGULATORY BOARD), R.A. NO. 165, AS AMENDED (THE PATENT LAW),AND R.A. NO. 166, AS AMENDED (THE TRADEMARK LAW) SHALL BE TRIEDEXCLUSIVELY BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS IN ACCORDANCE WITHTHE ESTABLISHED RAFFLE SCHEME EXCEPT THOSE COVERED BYADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 113-95 DATED 2 OCTOBER 1995, IN WHICHCASE, THE DESIGNATED REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS SHALL CONTINUE TO

OBSERVE THE PROVISIONS THEREIN.CONSIDERING THAT JURISDICTION FOR VIOLATIONS OF

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS HEREINBEFORE MENTIONED IS NOWCONFINED EXCLUSIVELY TO THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS, THEDESIGNATION OF METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS AND MUNICIPAL TRIALCOURTS IN CITIES UNDER ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 113-95 ISDELETED AND WITHDRAWN.

Despite the administrative order of the Court, the MTC continued with thetrial. Gloria P. Tomboc, Analyst of the Bureau of Food and Drugs Administration(BFAD), testified on August 25, 1997. In the meantime, Articles 188 and 189 of theRevised Penal Code were amended by R.A. No. 8293, otherwise known as theIntellectual Property Code. Two years thereafter, Alfredo Lomboy, supervisor of Piñakamasarap Corporation, testified on August 30, 1999.

On December 12, 1999, the prosecution filed its formal offer of evidence.[14] Inthe meantime, on October 22, 1999, Atty. Joselito L. Lim had moved to withdraw hisappearance as counsel for petitioners;[15] the court had granted the motion on October

25, 1999;[16] and the new counsel of petitioners, Balbastro and Associates, had enteredits appearance on November 24, 1999.[17]

On February 15, 2000, the court resolved to admit the documentary evidence of the prosecution except Exhibit “E” which was rejected by the court, and Exhibits “I”and “J” which were withdrawn.[18] The prosecution rested its case.

On March 10, 2000, petitioners, through their new counsel, filed a Motion for Leave to File Demurrer to Evidence.[19] The court granted the motion. In their demurrer ,[20] petitioners argued that a judgment of acquittal is proper since no sufficientevidence was presented to prove beyond reasonable doubt that they are guilty of theoffense charged. The prosecution was not able to establish that they gave their goods thegeneral appearance of another manufacturer or dealer and that they had the intent todefraud the public or Piñakamasarap Corporation. Moreover, under both R.A. No. 166,as amended, and its repealing law, R.A. No. 8293, the RTC had jurisdiction over thecrime charged; hence, the amended complaint should be quashed.

The prosecution opposed the demurrer to evidence, contending that it had presented proof beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of petitioners for the crimecharged. The prosecution maintained that, under Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129, theMTC had jurisdiction over the crime charged in the light of the imposable penalty for unfair competition under Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code.[21]


































In its Resolution dated May 16, 2000,[22] the court held that there was prima

facie evidence which, if unrebutted or not contradicted, would be sufficient to warrantthe conviction of petitioners. However, the court ruled that the RTC was vested by lawwith the exclusive and original jurisdiction to try and decide charges for violation of R.A. No. 166 as amended by R.A. No. 8293. Accordingly, the court denied the

demurrer to evidence and ordered the records of the case forwarded to the Office of theProvincial Prosecutor for appropriate action.

The City Prosecutor forwarded the case records to the Clerk of Court of RTC, Br.63, Tarlac City.[23] On June 19, 2000, the RTC ordered the City Prosecutor to conductthe requisite preliminary investigation and to file the necessary Information if he found

probable cause against petitioners.

The City Prosecutor found probable cause based on the findings of the MTC in itsMay 16, 2000 Resolution that there was a prima facie case against petitioners.[24] Hefiled an Information in the RTC on July 18, 2000 for violation of Article 189 of theRevised Penal Code.[25] The Information reads:

That on or about February 14, 1994 and sometime prior thereto, at Tarlac City,and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, being the owner of a business establishment with principal address at Phase I, Northern Hills Subd., SanVicente, Tarlac City, the accused, conspiring, confederating and helping one another did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, in unfair competition with the

intention of deceiving and defrauding the public in general and thePIÑAKAMASARAP CORPORATION, the name “MARCA PIÑA,” and sell or offer for sale soy sauce manufactured by them with the brand name “Marca Piña,” which is aversion of the trademark, and using the bottles of Piñakamasarap Corporation andsubstituted the contents thereof with those manufactured by the accused and passing tothe public the products, thereby inducing the public to believe that the soy sauce sold or offer ed for sale by the accused are genuine “MARCA PIÑA” soy sauce, to the damageand prejudice of PIÑAKAMASARAP CORPORATION.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[26]

Petitioners filed a Motion to Quash the Information,[27] alleging that their rights todue process and speedy trial had been violated. Other than the notice of hearing sent bythe court, they never received a subpoena which required them to submit their evidenceduring a preliminary investigation. Petitioners further averred that certain delays in thetrial are permissible, especially when such delays are due to uncontrollablecircumstances or by accident. In this case, the inordinate delay was obviously brought

by the lackadaisical attitude taken by the prosecutor in prosecuting the case. Petitioners pointed out that there was already a delay of six (6) long years from the time the initial

complaint was filed, and that they had already been prejudiced. Their life, liberty and property, not to mention their reputation, have been at risk as there has been nodetermination of the issue of whether or not to indict them. Thus, the case should bedismissed in order to free them from further capricious and oppressive dilatory tactics of the prosecution. Indeed, their right to a speedy trial is part of due process, both of which are guaranteed by no less than the fundamental law itself. They insisted that theyshould not be made to unjustly await the prosecution of the charges against them.



























In opposition, the City Prosecutor clarified that subpoenas were sent to the parties

during the preliminary investigation. In fact, petitioner Henry Uy appeared andsubmitted the case for resolution without submitting additional evidence. Also, the

proceedings in the MTC were not part of preliminary investigation but the trial on the

merits.[28]

On September 8, 2000, the court issued an Order denying the motion toquash.[29] The court ruled that:

While there must have been a protracted trial since the case was originally filed before the Municipal Trial Court, a period of about six (6) years, as the accusedcontends, nevertheless the delay if any, is partly attributable to the accused. [They]allowed the prosecution to rest the evidence in chief before raising the issue of lack of

jurisdiction. Had the accused immediately raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction, thiscase could have been filed anew before the RTC. The accused allowed themselves to bearraigned without raising the issue of jurisdiction. In fact, the prosecution [had] restedits evidence in chief.

The parties may[,] however[,] stipulate in the pre-trial that all the proceedingstaken before the Municipal Trial Court are automatically reproduced and are considered part of the prosecution's evidence, so that the trial will now be with respect to thereception of defense evidence.[30]

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order [31] which the trial court

denied.[32] At the same time, the court granted the oral motion of the prosecution toamend the Information to reflect in its caption that the law violated by the accused isR.A. No. 8293 and not Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code. On October 12, 2000,the City Prosecutor filed an amended Information. The inculpatory portion reads:

That on or about February 14, 1994 and sometimes prior thereto, at Tarlac City,and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, being the owner of a business establishment with principal address at Phase I, Northern Hills Subd., SanVicente, Tarlac City, the accused, conspiring, confederating and helping one another

did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, in Violation of Sec. 168 of R.A. No. 8293 with the intention of deceiving and defrauding the public in general andthe PIÑAKAMASARAP CORPORATION, the name “MARCA PIÑA,” and sell or offer for sale soy sauce manufactured by them with the brand name “Marca Piña,”which is a version of the trademark, and using the bottles of Piñakamasarap Corporationand substituted the contents thereof with those manufactured by the accused and passingto the public the products, thereby inducing the public to believe that the soy sauce soldor offered for sale by the accused are genuine “MARCA PIÑA” soy sauce, to thedamage and prejudice of PIÑAKAMASARAP CORPORATION.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[33]

Petitioners then filed before the CA a petition for certiorari with prayer for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction,[34] on the sole ground thatrespondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in denying their motion to quash

based on violation of their right to a speedy trial. They claimed that there was no activeeffort on their part to delay the case as they merely attended the scheduled hearings and

participated in the preliminary investigation. On the contrary, it is the prosecution that































has the unmitigated obligation to immediately file the Information with the proper court. The public prosecutor is supposedly knowledgeable of the existing laws and

jurisprudence since his office has the delicate task of prosecuting cases in behalf of theState. Under the Rules on Criminal Procedure, he is the officer responsible for thedirection and control of criminal prosecutions. In the case at bar, the public prosecutor

failed in his bounden duty by neglecting to file the case in the court of competent jurisdiction. The prosecution could not advance a single reason to justify the proceduralerror and instead pointed its accusing finger to petitioners who are just ordinarycitizens. Their failure to call the attention of the prosecution is neither acquiescence nor consent on their part. While their former lawyer was obviously lackluster in their defense, the act of the counsel should not deprive them of their constitutional right to aspeedy trial. For petitioners, the prosecution‟s blunder in procedure and ignorance of existing laws and jurisprudence far outweigh whatever minimal participation, if any,

they had in the protracted proceedings.

On March 21, 2003, the CA dismissed the petition.[35] The fallo of the decisionreads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition ishereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Orders dated September 8,2000 and October 9, 2000 of the public respondent are herebyDISMISSED.[36]

In dismissing the petition, the appellate court ratiocinated that:

[T]he right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, isdeemed violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious andoppressive delays” (Castillo v. Sandiganbayan, 328 SCRA 69, 76); “or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having hiscase tried.” ( Binay v. Sandiganbayan, 316 SCRA 65, 93)

In the instant case, aside from the fact that it took almost six years for the prosecution to complete the presentation of its evidence, petitioners failed to show thatthe delay, if ever there is any, was caused solely by the prosecution. Neither did the petitioners show that the proceedings before the Municipal Trial Court was attended byvexatious, capricious and oppressive delays attributable to the prosecution or thatunjustified postponements of the trial were asked for and secured by the prosecution tothe prejudice of the petitioners. The fact alone that the prosecution had consumed six(6) years to complete its presentation of evidence, without any allegation or proof thatthe prosecution has caused unreasonable delays or that the proceeding was attended byvexatious, capricious and oppressive delays, to Our minds is not sufficient for theapplication upon the petitioners of their Constitutional right to speedy trial. “A meremathematical reckoning of the time involved, therefore, would not be sufficient. In theapplication of the Constitutional guarantee of the right to speedy disposition of cases, particular regard must also be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to eachcase.” ( Binay v. Sandiganbayan, supra, p. 93). In the case at bar, petitioners failed to present, for Our perusal, the circumstances attending the trial of their case before theMunicipal Trial Court.

The only controversy of the instant case lies in the fact that the Municipal TrialCourt which heard the case has no jurisdiction over the said case. While it may beconceded that the prosecution erred in not filing the information against the petitioners











to a proper court, still, petitioners are not blameless in this regard. Petitioners, throughtheir counsel, had actively participated in the proceedings before the Municipal TrialCourt. Petitioners had to wait for almost six (6) years to elapse before they brought tothe attention of the Municipal Trial Court that it had no jurisdiction to hear the caseagainst the petitioners. Petitioners have, by reason of their participation in the proceedings before the Municipal Trial Court and also by reason of their silence and

inaction, allowed the Municipal Trial Court to proceed with a case for six (6) yearsdespite absence of jurisdiction of such court to hear the case. We cannot allow the petitioners to reap from their acts or omissions. “A litigation is not a game of technicalities in which one, more deeply schooled and skilled in the subtle art of movement and position, entraps and destroys the other.” ( Fortune Corporation v. Court

of Appeals, 229 SCRA 355, 364)

“The constitutional privilege was never intended as furnishing a technical meansfor escaping trial.” ( Esguerra v. Court of First Instance of Manila, et al., 95 Phil. 609,611-612) “The right of an accused to a speedy trial is guaranteed to him by theConstitution, but the same shall not be utilized to deprive the State of a reasonableopportunity of fairly indicting criminals. It secures rights to an accused, but it does not preclude the rights of public justice. ( Domingo v. Sandiganbayan, 322 SCRA 655,667)[37]

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which the appellate court denied.[38]

Petitioners sought relief from this Court on a petition for review, alleging that:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OFDISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN

IT AFFIRMED THE COURT A QUO‟S DENIAL OF PETITIONERS‟ MOTION TOQUASH, BASED ON VIOLATION OF THEIR RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL (SEC.16, ART. 3, 1987 CONSTITUTION).[39]

Petitioners reiterate their arguments in the CA to support the present petition. They aver that:

In this case, the prosecution took six (6) long and grueling years before it filedan Information with a competent court, despite the fact that jurisdiction of the RegionalTrial Courts over trademark cases remained unchanged since the birth of the Trademark

Law. Surely, this inordinate delay can be considered a “vexatious, capricious andoppressive delay” which is constitutionally impermissible in this jurisdiction pursuant tothe right of the accused to speedy trial.

Indeed, petitioners have been prejudiced. Their lives, liberty and property, notto mention their reputation have all been put at risk for so long.

The public prosecutor failed to explain the reason for the delay. Truth to tell,even at this last stage, the public prosecutor chooses to remain silent why it hadunjustifiably taken him too long to file this case before a competent court.Unfortunately, the Court of Appeals deliberately ignored this glaring flaw committed by

the public prosecutor and instead focused on petitioners‟ alleged negligence in notraising the issue of jurisdiction earlier. It further ruled that due to this fact, petitionersare thus not entirely blameless for the delay of the trial.

Truth to tell, these findings of the Court of Appeals are palpably erroneous.

Firstly, it is elementary that jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised atany stage of the proceedings. This is because no amount of waiver can confer















jurisdiction on a court over an offense for which such jurisdiction has not beenconferred by law in the first place.

Secondly, even assuming that petitioners failed to raise the issue of jurisdictionearlier, still, they could not be estopped from invoking their right to speedy trial. The

delay to be considered “partly attributable” to the accused (which could work againsthim in invoking the right to speedy trial) presupposes an active effort of the defendantto delay the case ( Manabat v. Timbang , 74 Phil. 295). There is no violation of the rightto speedy trial where the delay is imputable to the accused ( Solis v. Agloro, 63 SCRA370). Here, it was the prosecution that had the unmitigated obligation to file theInformation with the correct court, within a reasonable time. It did not. Such blunder was fatal to its cause.

To emphasize, petitioners need not even call the attention of the prosecution thatit had failed to file the case with the proper court, contrary to the opinion of the Court of Appeals. x x x[40]

x x x xAlthough petitioners agree with the Court of Appeals that mere mathematical reckoningof time would not be sufficient for the application of the right to speedy trial, still, the public prosecutor‟s blunder should already be considered “vexatious, capricious andoppressive” warranting the dismissal of the case.

Indeed, to condone the public prosecutor‟s manner of having directed this case, just like what the Court of Appeals did, might give rise to a disturbing precedent wherethe constitutional right of the accused could very well be set aside to justify themishandling of the prosecution by officers of the State.[41]

Section 1(h), Rule 115 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides thatthe accused is entitled to a speedy, impartial and public trial. Section 2, Rule 119 of thesaid Rules provides that trial, once commenced, shall be continuous until terminated:

Sec. 2. Continuous trial until terminated; postponements. – Trial, oncecommenced, shall continue from day to day as far as practicable until terminated. Itmay be postponed for a reasonable period of time for good cause.

The court shall, after consultation with the prosecutor and defense counsel, set

the case for continuous trial on a weekly or other short-term trial calendar at the earliest possible time so as to ensure speedy trial. In no case shall the entire trial period exceedone hundred eighty (180) days from the first day of trial, except as otherwise authorized by the Supreme Court.

The time limitations provided under this section and the preceding section shallnot apply where special laws or circulars of the Supreme Court provide for a shorter period of trial.

However, any period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by thecourt motu proprio, or on motion of either the accused or his counsel, or the

prosecution, if the court granted the continuance on the basis of its findings set forth inthe order that the ends of justice is served by taking such action outweigh the bestinterest of the public and the accused on a speedy trial, shall be deducted.

The trial court may grant continuance, taking into account the following factors:










(a) Whether or not the failure to grant a continuance in the proceeding wouldlikely make a continuation of such proceeding impossible or result in a miscarriage of justice; and

(b) Whether or not the case taken as a whole is so novel, unusual and complex,due to the number of accused or the nature of the prosecution, or that it is unreasonable

to expect adequate preparation within the periods of time established therein.In addition, no continuance under section 3(f) of this Rule shall be granted

because of congestion of the court‟s calendar or lack of diligent preparation or failure toobtain available witnesses on the part of the prosecutor .[42]

Under the Constitution and Section 1(7) of Rule 115 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the accused shall be entitled to have a speedy and impartial trial.“Speedy trial” is a relative term and necessarily a flexible concept.[43] In determiningwhether the right of the accused to a speedy trial was violated, the delay should be

considered, in view of the entirety of the proceedings.[44] Indeed, mere mathematicalreckoning of the time involved would not suffice[45] as the realities of everyday life must

be regarded in judicial proceedings which, after all, do not exist in a vacuum.[46]

Apart from the constitutional provision and Section 115, Section 1(i) of the Rulesof Criminal Procedure, A.O. No. 113-95 of the Court provides that:

The trial of cases for violation of Intellectual Property Rights covered by thisAdministrative Order shall be immediately commenced and shall continue from day to

day to be terminated as far as practicable within sixty (60) days from initialtrial. Judgment thereon shall be rendered within thirty (30) days from date of submission for decision.

More than a decade after the 1972 leading U.S. case of Barker v. Wingo[47] was promulgated, this Court, in Martin v. Ver ,[48] began adopting the “balancing test” todetermine whether a defendant‟s right to a speedy trial has been violated. As thistest necessarily compels the courts to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis, theconduct of both the prosecution and defendant are weighed apropos the four-fold

factors, to wit: (1) length of the delay; (2) reason for the delay; (3) defendant‟s assertionor non-assertion of his right; and (4) prejudice to defendant resulting from thedelay.[49] None of these elements, however, is either a necessary or sufficient condition;they are related and must be considered together with other relevantcircumstances. These factors have no talismanic qualities as courts must still engage ina difficult and sensitive balancing process.[50]

A. Length of the Delay

The length of delay is to some extent a “triggering mechanism.” Until there issome delay, which is presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity to inquire into theother three factors. Nevertheless, due to the imprecision of the right to a speedy trial,the length of delay that will provoke such an inquiry is necessarily dependent upon the

peculiar circumstances of the case.[51]









































B. Reason for the Delay

Under Section 9, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, theaccused have the burden to prove the factual basis of the motion to quash theInformation on the ground of denial of their right to a speedy trial.[52] They must

demonstrate that the delay in the proceedings is vexatious, capricious, and oppressive;or is caused by unjustified postponements that were asked for and secured; or thatwithout cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse withoutthe case being tried.[53] On the other hand, the prosecution is required to presentevidence establishing that the delay was reasonably attributed to the ordinary processesof justice, and that petitioners suffered no serious prejudice beyond that which ensuedafter an inevitable and ordinary delay.[54]

The records bear out the contention of petitioners that there had been aconsiderable delay in the trial in the MTC. Upon motion/agreement of petitioners andthe prosecution, or because of the joint absences, the trial of the case was delayed for more than 11 months.[55] In its own instance, the MTC also reset some of the trial datesin order to correct mistakes in scheduling or because the witnesses were not dulynotified,[56] thus, delaying the trial of the case for an additional seven months. Even

petitioners contributed to the delay of more than five months – they or their former counsel were either absent or moved for postponements to attend another pending caseor due to health concerns.[57] The delay of about 21 months, covering 15 re-settings, can

be attributed to the prosecution. However, except in five instances, when the trial wasreset because the private prosecutor had to attend to some professional[58] and personalmatters,[59] the



































delays were brought about because of the recent engagement of legal service,[60] absenceof the public prosecutor ,[61] and unavailability of documents[62] and witnesses.[63]

Not only the petitioners but the State as well were prejudiced by the inordinatedelay in the trial of the case. It took the prosecution more than four years to rest its case

after presenting only three witnesses. Had the prosecution, petitioner and the trial court been assiduous in avoiding any inordinate delay in the trial, the prosecution could haverested its case much earlier. The court even failed to order the absentcounsel/prosecutor/witnesses to explain/justify their absences or cite them for contempt. The speedy trial mandated by the Constitution and the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is as much the responsibility of the prosecution, the trial court and

petitioners to the extent that the trial is inordinately delayed, and to that extent theinterest of justice is prejudiced.

The case before the RTC should not be dismissed simply because the public prosecution did not move for the dismissal of the case in the MTC based on A.O. No.104-96 declaring that the RTC has exclusive jurisdiction over cases under Articles 188and 189 of the Revised Penal Code; or for failure of the MTC to motu proprio dismissthe case on that ground. The City Prosecutor then believed in good faith, albeiterroneously, that under R.A. No. 7691 which amended B.P. Blg. 129, the MTC had

jurisdiction over the crime charged.

The mistake of the City Prosecutor and the failure of the MTC to dismiss thecase motu proprio should not prejudice the interest of the State to prosecute criminaloffenses and, more importantly, defeat the right of the offended party to redress for itsgrievance. Significantly, petitioners do not attribute to the prosecution or to the MTCany malice aforethought or conscious disregard of their right to a speedy trial; nor havesubstantially proven the same by clear and convincing evidence. Hence, absentshowing of bad faith or gross negligence, delay caused by the lapse of the prosecution isnot in itself violative of the right to a speedy trial.

Different weights should be assigned to various reasons by which the prosecution justifies the delay. A deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defenseshould be weighed heavily against the prosecution. A more neutral reason such asnegligence or overcrowded courts should be weighed less heavily but neverthelessshould be considered since the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances must restwith the government rather than with defendant.[64]

In Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan,[65] the Court had carefully balanced the societal

interest in the case, which involved the so-called “tax credit certificates scam,” and theneed to give substance to the defendants‟ constitutional rights. In said suit, we upheldthe decision of the Sandiganbayan (Special Fourth Division) that the dismissal of thecases was too drastic, precipitate and unwarranted. While the Court recognized thatdefendants were prejudiced by the delay in the reinvestigation of the cases and thesubmission of a complete report by the Ombudsman/Special Prosecutor to theSandiganbayan, we underscored that the State should not be prejudiced and deprived of



























its right to prosecute cases simply because of the ineptitude or nonchalance of theOmbudsman/Special Prosecutor. “An overzealous or precipitate dismissal of a casemay enable defendant, who may be guilty, to go free without having been tried, therebyinfringing the societal interest in trying people accused of crimes by granting themimmunization because of legal error.”[66]

The same observation was made in Valencia v. Sandiganbayan.[67]

Here, theCourt noted the haphazard manner by which the prosecutor handled the litigation for theState when he rested the case without adducing evidence for the prosecution and simplyrelying on the Joint Stipulation of Facts, which the accused did not even sign before itssubmission to the Sandiganbayan. In allowing the prosecution to present additionalevidence and in dismissing the claim of the accused that his constitutional right to aspeedy trial had been violated, we ruled:

As significant as the right of an accused to a speedy trial is the right of the State

to prosecute people who violate its penal laws. The right to a speedy trial is deemedviolated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressivedelays x x x [T]o erroneously put premium on the right to speedy trial in the instantcase and deny the prosecution‟s prayer to adduce additional evidence would logic allyresult in the dismissal of the case for the State. There is no difference between an order outrightly dismissing the case and an order allowing the eventual dismissal thereof.Both would set a dangerous precedent which enables the accused, who may be guilty, togo free without having been validly tried, thereby infringing the interest of thesociety.[68]

Certainly, the right to speedy trial cannot be invoked where to sustain the same

would result in a clear denial of due process to the prosecution. It should not operate indepriving the State of its inherent prerogative to prosecute criminal cases or generally inseeing to it that all those who approach the bar of justice is afforded fair opportunity to

present their side.[69] For it is not only the State; more so, the offended party who isentitled to due process in criminal cases.[70] In essence, the right to a speedy trial doesnot preclude the people‟s equally important right to public justice.[71] Thus, assuccinctly decreed in State v. McTague:[72]






























The constitutional and statutory provisions for a speedy trial are for the protection of the defendant, but that does not mean that the state is the only one thatmay initiate action. There is really no reason for the courts to free an accused simply because a dilatory prosecutor has „gone to sleep at the switch‟ while the defendant andhis counsel rest in silence. These solicitous provisions are not to be used as offensiveweapons, but are for the benefit of defendants who claim their protection. They are a

shield, and they „must not be left hanging on the wall of the armory.‟ It is for the protection of personal rights, not to embarrass the administration of the criminal law nor to defeat public justice.

Be that as it may, the conduct of the City Prosecutor and the MTC must not passwithout admonition. This Court must emphasize that the State, through the court andthe public prosecutor, has the absolute duty to insure that the criminal justice system isconsistent with due process and the constitutional rights of the accused. Society has a

particular interest in bringing swift prosecutions, and the society‟s representatives are

the ones who should protect that interest. The trial court and the prosecution are notwithout responsibility for the expeditious trial of criminal cases. The burden for trial promptness is not solely upon the defense. The right to a speedy trial is constitutionallyguaranteed and, as such, is not to be honored only for the vigilant and theknowledgeable.[73]

C. Petitioners’ Assertion of the Right

The assertion of the right to a speedy trial is entitled to strong evidentiary weight

in determining whether defendant is being deprived thereof. Failure to claim the rightwill make it difficult to prove that there was a denial of a speedy trial.[74]

Except in only one instance in this case,[75] the records are bereft of any evidencethat petitioners, through counsel, have bothered to raise their objection to the several re-setting of the trial dates. This is not unexpected since, as already shown, the reasons for the delay are not in themselves















totally inexcusable or unreasonable. Moreover, petitioners actively participated in thetrial when the prosecution presented its evidence, as they scrutinized the documentaryevidence and cross-examined the witnesses. Until the filing of the motion to quash inthe RTC, they never contested the prosecutorial proceedings nor timely challenged the

pendency of the case in the MTC.

While it is true that lack of jurisdiction may be assailed at any stage of the proceedings, such defense must be seasonably raised at the earliest possibleopportunity. Otherwise, active participation in the trial would estop a party from later challenging such want of jurisdiction.[76]

In the same vein, one‟s failure to timely question the delay in the trial of a casewould be an implied acceptance of such delay and a waiver of the right to question the

same. Except when otherwise expressly so provided, the speedy trial right, like anyother right conferred by the Constitution or statute, may be waived when not positivelyasserted.[77] A party‟s silence may amount to laches.[78] The right to a speedy trial is a

privilege of the accused. If he does not claim it, he should not complain. R.A. No.8493 (Speedy Trial Act of 1998) is a means of enforcing Section 14(2), Article III of theConstitution.[79] The spirit of the law is that the accused must go on record in theattitude of demanding a trial or resisting delay. If he does not do this, he must be held,in law, to have waived the privilege.

This Court cannot subscribe to petitioners‟ untiring argument that, being“ordinary citizens,” they should not be made to suffer from the “lackluster” performanceof their former counsel who failed to recognize the MTC‟s want of jurisdiction. Toooften we have held that a client is bound by the acts, mistakes or negligence of hiscounsel.[80] This is, as it should be, since a counsel has the implied authority to do allacts which are necessary or, at least, incidental to the prosecution and management of the suit in behalf of his client. Any act performed within the scope of his general andimplied authority is, in the eyes of the law, regarded as the act of the client.[81] If the

rule were otherwise, there would be no end to litigation so long as a new counsel could be employed who would allege and show that the prior counsel had not been sufficientlydiligent, experienced, or learned.[82] It would enable every party to render inutile anadverse order or decision through the simple expedient of alleging gross negligence onthe part of the counsel.[83] Every shortcoming of a counsel could be the subject of challenge by his client through another counsel who, if he is also found wanting, wouldlikewise be disowned by the same client through another counsel, and so on ad

infinitum.[84] Proceedings would then be indefinite, tentative and at times, subject toreopening by the simple subterfuge of replacing counsel.[85]

While the rule admits of certain exceptions,[86] we find none present in this case.Other than his obvious failure to assert lack of jurisdiction, Atty. Lim undeniablyrepresented the cause of his clients in the MTC proceedings. Interestingly, their newcounsel, wittingly or unwittingly, raised the issue of jurisdiction only four months after it entered its appearance,[87] thus, adding to the delay.



















































D. Prejudice to the Petitioners

In the Barker case,[88] the different interests of a defendant which may be affected by the violation of the right to a speedy trial were identified. It was held that prejudice

should be assessed in the light of the interests of a defendant which the speedy trial rightwas designed to protect, namely: (1) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (2) tominimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (3) to limit the possibility that thedefense will be impaired. Of these, the most serious is the last, because the inability of a defendant to adequately prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system. If witnesses die or disappear during a delay, the prejudice is obvious. There is also

prejudice if defense witnesses are unable to recall accurately events of the distant past. Loss of memory, however, is not always reflected in the record because what has

been forgotten can rarely be shown. Even if an accused is not incarcerated prior to trial,he is still disadvantaged by restraints on his liberty and by living under a cloud of anxiety, suspicion, and often hostility.[89] After all, arrest is a public act that mayseriously interfere with the defendant‟s liberty, whether he is free on bail or not, and thatmay disrupt his employment, drain his financial resources, curtail his associations,subject him to public obloquy, and create anxiety in him, his family and friends.[90]

Again, a perusal of the records failed to reveal that the delay in bringing petitioners to trial in a court of competent jurisdiction caused them any prejudice

tantamount to deprivation of their right to a speedy trial. Petitioners in this case werenot subjected to pretrial incarceration, oppressive or otherwise, thus eliminating thefirst Barker consideration bearing on prejudice.

As to the minimization of anxiety and concern of the accused , there is no showingthat petitioners suffered undue pressures in this respect. Mere reference to a generalasseveration that their “life, liberty and property, not to mention reputation” have been

prejudiced is not enough. There must be conclusive factual basis, as this Court cannot

rely on pure speculation or guesswork. Surely, a pending criminal case may causetrepidation but, as stressed in Barker , the standard here is minimization, not necessarilyelimination of the natural consequences of an indictment. While this is not to be

brushed off lightly, it is not by itself sufficient to support a claim of denial of the right toa speedy trial.

There is no factual basis for the claim of petitioners that we are not supplied withany specific allegation in the record, nor witnesses or evidence may become unavailable

because of the delays in this case. To repeat, the claim of impairment of defense

because of delay must be specific and not by mere conjecture. Vague assertions of faded memory will not suffice. Failure to claim that particular evidence had been lost or had disappeared defeats speedy trial claim.

As neither the specific types of prejudice mentioned in Barker nor any othershave been brought to the Court‟s attention, we are constrained to dismiss petitioners‟claim. The passage of time alone, without a significant deprivation of liberty or















impairment of the ability to properly defend oneself, is not absolute evidence of prejudice. The right to a speedy trial is not primarily intended to prevent prejudice tothe defense caused by the passage of time; that interest is protected primarily by the due

process clause and the statutes of limitations.[91]

In several cases where it is manifest that due process of law or other rightsguaranteed by the Constitution or statutes has been denied, this Court has not faltered toaccord the so-called “radical relief” to keep accused from enduring the rigors andexpense of a full-blown trial.[92] In this case, however, there appears no persuasive,much less compelling, ground to allow the same relief for absence of clear andconvincing showing that the delay was unreasonable or arbitrary and was seasonablyobjected to by petitioners.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The March 21, 2003 Decision and July 17, 2003 Resolution of the Courtof Appeals are AFFIRMED. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 64, Tarlac City, isdirected to proceed with the trial on the merits of the criminal case with all reasonableand judicious dispatch consistent with the right of petitioners to a speedy trial. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN Chief Justice Chairperson

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate Justice Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice











C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that

the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case wasassigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court‟s Division.


Chief Justice

[1]

Penned by Associate Justice B.A. Adefuin-De la Cruz (retired), with Associate Justices Mercedes Gozo-Dadole (retired)and Mariano C. Del Castillo, concurring; rollo, pp. 20-24.[2] Penned by Judge Arsenio P. Adriano.[3] Records, p. 57.[4] Id. at 57-58.[5] Id. at 3.[6] Id. at 1-30.[7] Id. at 45-47.[8] Id. at 46.[9] Id. at 165.[10] Id. at 169.[11] Id. at 171, 173.[12] Id. at 178, 184, 186.[13] Id. at 192.[14] Id. at 440-442.[15] Id. at 420-421.[16] Id. at 422.[17] Id. at 430-431.[18] Id. at 495-496.[19] Id. at 499-501.[20] Id. at 502-512.[21] Id. at 515-531.[22] Id. at 553-555.[23] Id. at 556.[24] Id. at 565.[25] Id. at 559-560.[26] Id. at 559.

[27] Id. at 567-573.[28] Id. at 574-575.[29] Id. at 579-580.[30] Id. at 580.[31] Id. at 581-586.[32] Id. at 601-603.[33] Id. at 605-606.[34] CA rollo, pp. 2-22.[35] Rollo, pp. 20-24.[36] Id. at 23.[37] Id. at 22-23.[38] Id. at 25.[39] Id. at 10.[40]

Id. at 12-13.[41] Id. at 14-15.[42] Section 4, Rule 119, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.[43] Lumanlaw v. Hon. Peralta, Jr., G.R. No. 164953, February 13, 2006, 482 SCRA 396, 409; Caballes v. Court of

Appeals, G.R. No. 163108, February 23, 2005, 452 SCRA 312, 332; People v. Tee, 443 Phil. 521, 544 (2003); Zuzuarregui,

Jr. v. Judge Rosete,431 Phil. 585, 596 (2002); Lopez, Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman, 417 Phil. 39, 50 (2001); Abardo v.

Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 139571-72, March 28, 2001, 355 SCRA 641, 654; and Dansal v. Hon. Fernandez, Sr ., 383 Phil.897, 906 (2000). [44] People v. Rama, 403 Phil. 155, 168 (2001).

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/october2006/159098.htm#_ftnref1






































































































































the Philippines, G.R. No. 165767, November 29, 2005, 476 SCRA 453, 457; GCP-Manny Transport Services, Inc. v. Hon.

Principe, G.R. No. 141484, November 11, 2005, 474 SCRA 555, 562; R Transport Corporation v. Philippine Hawk

Transport Corporation, G.R. No. 155737, October 19, 2005, 473 SCRA 342, 347; Spouses Que v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150739, August 18, 2005, 467 SCRA 358, 369; Spouses Ragudo v. Fabella Estate Tenants Association, Inc. , G.R. No.146823, August 9, 2005, 466 SCRA 136, 145;Spouses Zarate v. Maybank Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 160976, June 8, 2005,459 SCRA 785, 797; Palanca v. Guides, G.R. No. 146365, February 28, 2005, 452 SCRA 461, 473; and Southech

Development Corp. v. NLRC , G.R. No. 149590, January 12, 2005, 448 SCRA 64, 70.[81] Basuel v. Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB), supra; Spouses Ragudo v. Fabella Estate Tenants Association,

Inc., supra, 146; Victory Liner, Inc. v. Gammad , G.R. No. 159636, November 25, 2004, 444 SCRA 355, 361; and Air Philippines Corp. v. International Business Aviation Services Phils., Inc., G.R. No. 151963, September 9, 2004, 438 SCRA51, 61.[82] Basuel v. Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB), supra; Tan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 157194, June 20,2006; Friend v. Union Bank of the Philippines, supra, at 457; GCP-Manny Transport Services, Inc. v. Hon. Principe, supra,at 562;Spouses Ragudo v. Fabella Estate Tenants Association, Inc., supra, at 145; Balgami v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.131287, December 9, 2004, 445 SCRA 591, 600; and Gacutana-Fraile v. Domingo, 401 Phil. 604, 615.[83] Friend v. Union Bank of the Philippines, supra, at 457-458.[84] Spouses Ragudo v. Fabella Estate Tenants Association, Inc., supra, at 146.[85] Spouses Ragudo v. Fabella Estate Tenants Association, Inc., supra, at 146-147; Spouses Que v. Court of Appeals, supra.[86] Among the recognized exceptions are: (1) where the gross, palpable, reckless and inexcusable negligence of counseldeprives the client of due process of law; (2) when its application will result in outright deprivation of the client's liberty or property through mere technicality; or (3) where the interests of justice so require (See Callangan v. People, G.R. No.

153414, June 27, 2006; Friend v. Union Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 165767, November 29, 2005, 476 SCRA 453,457; GCP-Manny Transport Services, Inc. v. Hon. Principe , G.R. No. 141484, November 11, 2005, 474 SCRA 555, 562-563; R Transport Corporation v. Philippine Hawk Transport Corporation, G.R. No. 155737, October 19, 2005, 473 SCRA342, 347; Spouses Que v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150739, August 18, 2005, 467 SCRA 358, 369; Southech

Development Corp. v. NLRC , G.R. No. 149590, January 12, 2005, 448 SCRA 64, 70; Victory Liner, Inc. v. Gammad , G.R. No. 159636, November 25, 2004, 444 SCRA 355, 361; Azucena v. Foreign Manpower Services, Inc., G.R. No. 147955,October 25, 2004, 441 SCRA 346, 356; Air Philippines Corp. v. International Business Aviation Services Phils., Inc., G.R. No. 151963, September 9, 2004, 438 SCRA 51, 62; Sarraga v. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank , 442 Phil. 55,64; Del Mar v. Court of Appeals, 429 Phil. 19, 28-29; and Gacutana-Fraile v. Domingo, 401 Phil. 604, 615.[87] Balbastro and Associates entered its appearance on November 24, 1999. The Motion for Leave to File Demurrer toEvidence was filed on March 10, 2000.[88] Supra note 49.[89] Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 51, at 313, citing Barker v. Wingo, supra note 49.[90]

US v. Marion, 404 US 307, 92 S.Ct. 455 (1971).[91] U.S. v. Colombo, 852 F.2d 19 (1988), citing US v. MacDonald , 456 US 1, 102 S.Ct. 1497 (1982). [92] See Mendoza-Ong v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 146368-69, October 18, 2004, 440 SCRA 423; Dimayacyac v. Court of

Appeals, G.R. No. 136264, May 28, 2004, 430 SCRA 121; Dela Peña v. Sandiganbayan, 412 Phil. 921 (2001); Dansal v.

Hon. Fernandez, Sr., supra, at 908; Duterte v. Sandiganbayan, 352 Phil. 557 (1998); and Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. L-72335-39, March 21, 1998, 159 SCRA 70.





































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